IR 05000382/2018002
| ML18199A643 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 07/18/2018 |
| From: | Geoffrey Miller NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-D |
| To: | Dinelli J Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR 2018002 | |
| Download: ML18199A643 (26) | |
Text
July 18, 2018
SUBJECT:
WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2018002
Dear Mr. Dinelli:
On June 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. On July 12, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. Further the inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Geoffrey B. Miller, Chief Project Branch D Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-382 License No. NPF-38
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000382/2018002 w/ Attachment: Documents Reviewed
Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report
Docket Number(s):
05000382
License Number(s):
Report Number(s):
Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-002-0002
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
Location:
Killona, Louisiana
Inspection Dates:
April 1, 2018 to June 30, 2018
Inspectors:
F. Ramírez, Senior Resident Inspector
C. Speer, Resident Inspector
C. Henderson, Senior Resident Inspector, Arkansas Nuclear One
W. Sifre, Senior Reactor Inspector
C. Smith, Reactor Inspector
E. Uribe, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
G. Miller
Chief, Project Branch D
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A self-revealed violation and additional items are summarized in the tables below. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report Section 7115
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Ensure Appropriate Chemistry Controls on the Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000382/2018002-01 Closed
[H.12] - Human Performance,
Avoid Complacency 71111.07 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, which occurred because the licensee did not prescribe procedures for preventing fouling of the component cooling water heat exchangers that were appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, the licensee did not require in its instructions for adding biocide to the auxiliary component cooling water system that additions be coupled with running the associated auxiliary component cooling water pump or other means of ensuring that the biocide would be sufficiently circulated through the system. As a result, on February 8, 2018, component cooling water heat exchanger B failed a performance test and therefore would not maintain required design basis temperatures under all accident conditions due to biological fouling.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue number Title Report Section Status URI 05000382/2018002-02 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation Associated with Emergency Feedwater Logic Modification 71111.17T Open LER 05000382/2018-001-00 Failure to Enter Limiting Condition of Operation Action Statement due to Lack of Procedure Guidance Results in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
The plant operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Summer Readiness (1 Sample)
On April 30, 2018, the inspectors evaluated summer readiness of offsite and alternate alternating current (AC) power systems and walked down:
- (1) Transformer yard
- (2) Switchyard
Seasonal Extreme Weather (1 Sample)
On May 7, 2018, the inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of hurricane season and walked down:
- (1) Main steam isolation valve areas
- (2) Dry cooling tower areas
- (3) Wet cooling tower areas
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Auxiliary component cooling water train B with train A out of service for maintenance on April 2, 2018
- (2) Emergency feedwater system train B with train A out of service for maintenance on May 2, 2018
- (3) Component cooling water train A with train B out of service for maintenance on May 23, 2018
Complete Walkdown (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the containment spray system on May 16, 2018.
71111.05Fire Protection Quarterly Inspection
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:
(1) +21 vestibule, Fire Area RAB 3A-003, on April 27, 2018
- (2) Component cooling water pump A, Fire Area RAB 19, on April 27, 2018
- (3) Condensate polisher building upper levels, Fire Area NS-CP-002, on May 9, 2018
- (4) Fire water pump house, Fire Area FWPH-001, on May 16, 2018
- (5) Battery Room 3A, Fire Area RAB 12, on June 12, 2018
- (6) Cable vault, Fire Area RAB 1E, on June 12, 2018
71111.06Flood Protection Measures Internal Flooding
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the component cooling water pump rooms on April 4, 2018.
71111.07Heat Sink Performance Heat Sink
The inspectors evaluated component cooling water heat exchanger performance on June 11, 2018.
71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Operator Requalification
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the simulator during an emergency exercise on June 20, 2018.
Operator Performance (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed and evaluated the control room during engineered safety features actuation system subgroup relay test on train B on June 25, 2018.
71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness Routine Maintenance Effectiveness
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:
- (1) Containment spray system on May 8, 2018
- (2) Reactor cutback system on June 26, 2018
- (3) Startup transformers on June 28, 2018
71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:
- (1) Risk assessment for planned Yellow risk due to emergency feedwater system train A work window on May 2, 2018
- (2) Risk assessment for planned work on switchgear ventilation on May 14, 2018
- (3) Emergent work on emergency diesel generator A1 fuel oil storage tank on June 1, 2018
- (4) Emergent Yellow risk due to severe weather on June 11, 2018
- (5) Emergent work on essential chiller B on June 13, 2018
- (6) Emergent work on static uninterruptible power supply A on June 19, 2018
71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Letdown inside containment isolation valve packing leak on April 18, 2018
- (2) Control room envelope during pressure boundary repairs on April 26, 2018
- (3) Containment spray riser level indication on May 8, 2018
- (4) Switchgear auxiliary air handling unit outlet damper on May 15, 2018
- (5) Letdown heat exchanger temperature control valve on June 27, 2018
71111.17TEvaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments
The inspectors evaluated the following from April 1, 2018, to April 6, 2018:
10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations (1)15-02 - Fukushima Emergency Preparedness Communications - Engineering Change (EC) 47846 and licensing basis document change request (LBDCR)15-019 (2)15-03 - EC 58901, Evaluate RC 1T0125-1 for Use as CPC Input (3)15-05 - EC 61746, Temporary Modification for Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System Position Switches (4)16-02 - EC 65610, Technical Requirements Manual 3.3.4 Turbine Valve Testing One Time Extension (5)17-03 - EC 62939 - Update Specifications 1564.467 and 1564.468 to accept Drillco Maxi-Bolt undercut anchors, add Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.199 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Chapter 1.8, add a description of how to use code ACI 349-01, Appendix B, to UFSAR Chapter 3.8, and issue Calculation ECC17-001 (6)17-04 - EC 64801 Emergency Feedwater Logic Modification (7)17-07 - EC 62976 Enable Trip for Open Phase Detection Systems (8)17-08 - CR-WF3-2017-5763 Compensatory Measure: Addition to OP-500-003 for Manual Action to Restart Essential Chiller for Design Basis Events without LOOP 10 CFR 50.59 Screening/Applicability Determinations
- (1) PAD-EC-0000061092 - Revise Combustible Loading Calculation ECF91-024 for RAB 22 and ECF91-030 for RAB 30
- (2) PAD-MM-006-207 - WMVAAA184A and B (M),(M1), (N) and (N1) valve replacement
- (3) PAD-UNT-006-033 - Surveillance Frequency Extensions for Selected Population of Molded Case Circuit Breakers (Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.4.1.B)
(4)
===0000044904 - Main Steam Isolation Valve Low Low Nitrogen Pressure Alarm Setpoint Change (5)0000054158 - Dry Cooling Tower Missile Shield Panel Closure Plate - Train A Ultimate Heat Sink Margin Restoration Project Phase 1 (6)0000054159 - Dry Cooling Tower Missile Shield Covering - Train B Ultimate Heat Sink Margin Restoration Project (7)0000059101 - Dry Cooling Tower Tube Sleeving (8)0000062125 - RCP 2A Speed Input to CPC B Degraded Voltage Enhancement (9)0000064156 - Engineering Evaluation of Pressurizer Heater Welds CR-WF3-2015-8163
- (10) 0000064246 - Evaluation of Crack Between Fire Areas RAB-33 AND RAB-30
- (11) 0000067163 - Evaluate 6W12CM10 Using the Ultimate Strength Design Method
- (12) 0000068045 - Update PAD SUPS A / B Move from Phase III to Phase II
- (13) 0000069189 - Temporary Power for the Supplementary Chiller B Chilled Water Common Circuits in PDP-386A
- (14) 0000073256 - Installation of Suppression Diode for 152X Relay in the Fast Bus Transfer Circuit 71111.18Plant Modifications===
The inspectors evaluated the following permanent modification:
- (1) Permanent modification to raise component cooling water flow to containment spray pump bearing and seals on May 9, 2018
71111.19Post Maintenance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:
- (1) Auxiliary component cooling water header A component cooling water heat exchanger outlet temperature control valve following maintenance on April 3, 2018
- (2) Chemical volume control pump B following maintenance on April 17, 2018
- (3) Emergency feedwater header B to steam generator 2 primary flow control valve following maintenance on April 25, 2018
- (4) Containment spray train B following maintenance on May 23, 2018
- (5) Control room envelope following repairs on May 31, 2018
===71111.22Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
In-service===
- (1) Auxiliary component cooling water pump B on May 18, 2018
- (2) Component cooling water pump B on May 24, 2018
- (3) Containment spray pump B on June 12, 2018
Reactor Coolant System Leak Detection (1 Sample)
- (1) Reactor coolant system unidentified leakage calculation on April 19, 2018
71114.06Drill Evaluation Emergency Planning Drill
The inspectors evaluated an emergency planning training drill on June 20,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicator submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs)===
- (1) Unit 3 (April 1, 2017, through March 31, 2018)
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 3 (April 1, 2017, through March 31, 2018)
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 3 (April 1, 2017, through March 31, 2018)
71152Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review
The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors identified an observation related to the evaluation of non-adverse conditions in the Maintenance Rule Program that is documented in the Inspections Results section below.
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Potential preconditioning of safety-related valves on May 15, 2018
- (2) Corrective Actions to NCV 05000382/2017002-04 and CR-WF3-2017-06754
71153Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Licensee Event Reports
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports which can be accessed at https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx:
- (1) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000382/2018-001-00, Failure to Enter Limiting Condition of Operation Action Statement due to Lack of Procedure Guidance Results in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications (ADAMS Accession No. ML18051B502), on February 20, 2018. A licensee-identified violation associated with this LER is documented in the Inspections Results section below.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Ensure Appropriate Chemistry Controls on the Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000382/2018002-01 Closed
[H.12] - Human Performance, Avoid Complacency 71111.07 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed, Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, which occurred because the licensee did not prescribe procedures for preventing fouling of the component cooling water heat exchangers that were appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, the licensee did not require in its instructions for adding biocide to the auxiliary component cooling water system that additions be coupled with running the associated auxiliary component cooling water pump or other means of ensuring that the biocide would be sufficiently circulated through the system. As a result, on February 8, 2018, component cooling water heat exchanger B failed a performance test and therefore would not maintain required design basis temperatures under all accident conditions due to biological fouling.
Description:
On February 8, 2018, while analyzing the results of Procedure PE-004-021, Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Performance Test, Revision 5, the licensee discovered that component cooling water heat exchanger B could not maintain its required outlet temperature. The outlet temperature of the heat exchanger is required to be maintained at less than 115 degrees Fahrenheit (F) under design basis accident conditions and the acceptance criterion for Procedure PE-004-021 is an outlet temperature of less than 114 degrees F. Testing showed that under design basis accident conditions, component cooling water heat exchanger B outlet temperatures could exceed 120 degrees F.
In reviewing the event, the licensee determined that biological fouling was the most likely cause of the degraded condition. The component cooling water heat exchanger carries component cooling water in its tube side. Biological buildup on the shell side of the heat exchanger degraded its ability to transfer heat to the auxiliary component cooling water such that it could not meet its design basis requirements. This condition has potentially existed since the summer of 2015.
The licensee uses Procedure CE-002-003, Maintaining Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Chemistry, Revision 304, to address potential biological fouling in the auxiliary component cooling water system, including the shell side of the component cooling water heat exchanger. Procedure CE-002-003 only required biocide to be added on an as needed basis based on periodic chemistry sampling. However, because the biological fouling adhered tightly to the component cooling water heat exchanger surfaces, the chemistry sampling of auxiliary component cooling water did not show increased biological levels despite biological fouling being present. Additionally, although it included instructions for adding biocide to reduce biological fouling, revisions of Procedure CE-002-003 in use prior to the February 8, 2018, failed test did not include specific instructions to ensure that the biocide additions were dispersed through the auxiliary component cooling water system. Notably, Procedure CE-002-003 did not include a requirement to couple additions with operation of the auxiliary component cooling water pumps or for alternating biocide types to address biological resistance.
The licensee completed an engineering evaluation and determined that the heat exchanger could have performed its safety function despite the degraded condition. Although potentially unable to maintain its required outlet temperature given design basis ambient air temperatures, the licensee found that given the actual ambient air temperatures over the previous 3 years, the heat exchanger would have maintained the required outlet temperatures.
Corrective Actions: The licensee performed cleaning and biocide additions to reduce fouling in the component cooling water heat exchangers A and B. Additionally, the licensee revised Procedure CE-002-003 to include detailed guidance on adding biocide to address biological fouling, including requiring additions to coincide with auxiliary component cooling water pump operation, requiring routine monthly additions rather than basing additions solely on chemistry sampling, and directions for changing biocide types to address biological resistance.
Corrective Action References: CR-WF3-2018-00785, CR-WF3-2018-00951, CR-WF3-2018-01001
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to provide procedures to address biological fouling of the component cooling water heat exchangers that were appropriate to the circumstances was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee did not address biological fouling to ensure the component cooling water heat exchangers could maintain the required temperatures under all design basis accident conditions.
Significance: Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it involved the design or qualification of a mitigating structure system or component but maintained its operability.
Cross-cutting Aspect: The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with avoiding complacency because individuals did not recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk even while expecting successful outcomes. Specifically, the licensee did not recognize and plan for the possibility of latent issues associated with their approach to controlling biological fouling in the auxiliary component cooling water system.
Enforcement:
Violation: As required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances.
Contrary to the above, prior to February 8, 2018, the licensees procedure for maintaining auxiliary component cooling water chemistry, an activity affecting quality, was not appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, Procedure CE-002-003, Maintaining Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Chemistry, did not include appropriate instructions for adding biocide to the auxiliary component cooling water system to ensure adequate dispersal. As a result, the train B component cooling water heat exchanger was unable to meet its design basis requirements due to biological fouling.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Unresolved Item (Open)10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation Associated with Emergency Feedwater Logic Modification URI 05000382/2018002-02 71111.17T
Description:
The licensee changed the emergency feedwater logic, as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Section 7.3.1.1.6, from flow control mode to level control mode during a safety injection actuation signal. To accomplish this change, the licensee had to modify the following logic system signals and setpoints: steam generator critical level, steam generator lo level, steam generator lo-lo level, safety injection actuation, control board manual control, and the steam generator lo-lo level annunciator. The NRC team questioned whether the emergency feedwater modification required additional information to determine if the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was adequate, or if NRC approval was needed for the change. Specifically, the NRC team questioned if the emergency feedwater logic change:
- used a method of evaluation other than what was described in the UFSAR (e.g. the use of the TRANFLOW program) or
- would result in a more than minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a system important to safety. Specifically, because the emergency feedwater logic change introduced the potential to overcool the reactor, and substituted a previous automatic action for manual operator action, the NRC team questioned if the change and associated 50.59 evaluation addressed these concerns.
Planned Closure Actions: The NRC and the licensee are working to gather more information related to the Final Safety Analysis Report-described methods for steam generator analyses and if the change resulted in a more-than-minimal increase in risk. Specifically, the licensee plans to provide an analysis that demonstrates the emergency feedwater logic change would not result in a more than minimal increase in the likelihood of an overcooling accident.
Licensee Actions: The licensee has implemented a compensatory measure to take manual control of the emergency feedwater system during a safety injection signal such that an overcooling event will be prevented.
Corrective Action References: CR-WF3-2017-06067, CR-WF3-2017-05882, CR-WF3-2017-05173
Observation 71152 The inspectors identified a trend involving deficient Maintenance Rule functional failure screenings. Specifically, the inspectors identified that for condition reports that were classified as non-adverse in accordance with Licensee Procedure EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Program, the Maintenance Rule evaluation stated: This condition report has been classified as non-adverse by CRG [condition review group]. Based on this non-adverse classification this CR [condition report] has been auto classified not to impact any system maintenance rule function. The condition review group was the management group responsible for condition report review, categorization, and assignment of responsibilities. The same function is now performed by the performance improvement review group. The inspectors identified numerous condition reports with this Maintenance Rule screening, which impacted safety-related systems such as emergency feedwater system, containment spray system, plant protection system, component cooling water system, and 125 Vdc system. The inspectors concluded that the practice of screening condition reports in the Maintenance Rule process based on the condition report classification represented a vulnerability since once the performance improvement review group classified the condition report as non-adverse, the Maintenance Rule database did not provide it to systems engineering or the Maintenance Rule coordinator to fully assess if it constituted a maintenance rule functional failure.
The inspectors discussed this trend with licensee personnel, who captured the issue in Condition Reports CR-WF3-2018-00472 and CR-WF3-2018-02255. The licensees corrective actions included performing a review of the past 2 years in all the safety systems to ensure that condition reports categorized as non-adverse did not include a functional failure. In addition, systems engineering supervisors and the maintenance rule coordinator are now expected to review all condition reports on a daily basis to determine if non-adverse condition reports should be reclassified to adverse to ensure they are evaluated for maintenance rule functional failure.
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71153 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Technical Specification 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, requires, in part, that when an isolation valve for containment penetrations associated with an open system are inoperable, the licensee must restore the inoperable valve(s) to operable status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, isolate the affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or be in hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
Contrary to the above, between December 8, 2017, and December 11, 2017, with containment isolation valves inoperable, the licensee did not restore the inoperable valves to operable status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, isolate the affected penetrations within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or place the unit in hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The licensee restored the valves to operable status on December 20, 2017, exceeding the Technical Specification 3.6.3 allowed outage time by approximately 70 hours8.101852e-4 days <br />0.0194 hours <br />1.157407e-4 weeks <br />2.6635e-5 months <br />.
Significance/Severity Level: The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the containment isolation valves were maintained closed during the period and did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment.
Corrective Action Reference: CR-WF3-2018-00983
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public disclosure.
On May 17, 2018, the inspector presented the Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments inspection results to Mr. R. Gilmore, Director, Regulatory Performance Improvement, and other members of the licensee staff.
On July 12, 2018, the inspector presented the quarterly resident inspector inspection results to Mr. J. Dinelli, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
THIRD PARTY REVIEWS Inspectors reviewed Institute of Nuclear Power Operations reports that were issued during the inspection period.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision/Date
Summer 2018 Seasonal Reliability Plan
May 1, 2018
ECM13-001
MSIV Area Flooding Analysis
ECM99-10
DCT Basin Ponding Analysis
MNQ3-5
Flooding Analysis Outside Containment
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
Entergy Nuclear South Unit Seasonal Capability Updating
Process
Fatigue Management For Hurricane Response Activities
EN-FAP-EP-010
Severe Weather Response
EN-FAP-EP-012
Severe Weather Recovery
EN-FAP-WM-016 Seasonal Reliability
ENS-DC-199
Off Site Power Supply Design Requirements Nuclear Plant
Interface Requirements
ENS-DC-201
ENS Transmission Grid Monitoring
OP-901-314
Degraded Grid Conditions
OP-901-521
Severe Weather and Flooding
25
Condition Reports (CRs)
CR-WF3-2017-08052
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision
G-153
Flow Diagram Feedwater, Condensate & Air Evacuation
Systems - Sheet 4
G-163
Flow Diagram Containment Spray & Refueling Water
Storage Pool
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
OP-002-001
Auxiliary Component Cooling Water
311
OP-002-003
Component Cooling Water
317
OP-009-001
306
OP-009-003
309
Condition Reports (CRs)
CR-WF3-2018-01550
71111.05Fire Protection Quarterly
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision
FWPH-001
Waterford-3 S.E.S
Prefire Strategy
Fire Water Pump House
NS-CP-002
Waterford-3 S.E.S
Prefire Strategy
Condensate Polisher Building - Upper Levels
RAB1E-001
Waterford-3 S.E.S
Prefire Strategy
Elev. +35.00 RAB
Cable Vault
RAB3A-003
Waterford-3 S.E.S
Prefire Strategy
Elev. +21.00
Vestibule
RAB13-001
Waterford-3 S.E.S
Prefire Strategy
Elev. +21.00 RAB
Battery Room 3A
RAB19-001
Waterford-3 S.E.S
Prefire Strategy
Component Cooling Water Pump A
Condition Reports (CRs)
CR-WF3-2018-02168
71111.06Flood Protection Measures
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision
Incorporate Seismic Leakage Criteria Into Design Basis For
ECM05-004
Required Isolation Time to Prevent Depletion of CCW Surge
Tank Due to SSE
ECM97-006
Design Basis for CCW Makeup
ECM97-042
Design Basis Review for CCW Pumps Header Isolation
Valves CC-114A, CC-114B, CC-115A, CC-115B, CC-126A,
CC-126B, CC-127A, and CC-127B
ECM98-009
CCW Makeup Design Basis
ER-W3-2005-
0430-000
Stroke Times for CCW Isolation Valves
MNQ3-5
Flooding Analysis Outside Containment
MNQ9-2
Component Cooling Water System
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
OP-903-118
Primary Auxiliaries Quarterly IST Valves Test
STI-0063
CCW Non-Seismic Loop Isolation Valve Leakage Test
Condition Reports (CRs)
CR-WF3-2015-00828
CR-WF3-2016-00260
71111.07Heat Sink Performance
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision
457000087
Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers
Chemistry
Standing
Instruction 57
General Guidelines on Cooling Water Chemical Additions
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
CE-002-003
Maintaining Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Chemistry
CE-002-003
Maintaining Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Chemistry
305
CE-002-003
Maintaining Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Chemistry
304
Condition Reports (CRs)
CR-WF3-2018-00951
CR-WF3-2018-01302
71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
OP-100-010
Equipment Out of Service
315
OP-100-010
Equipment Out of Service
316
OP-100-014
Technical Specification and Technical Requirements
Compliance
344
OP-100-017
Emergency Operating Procedure Implementation Guide
OP-901-524
Fire In Areas Affecting Safe Shutdown
OP-902-000
Standard Post Trip Actions
OP-902-007
Steam Generator Tube Rupture Recovery Procedure
OP-902-008
Functional Recovery
OP-903-094
ESFAS Subgroup Relay Test
Condition Reports (CRs)
71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis
Maintenance Rule Monitoring
Maintenance Rule (A)(1) Process
Condition Reports (CRs)
CR-WF3-2016-07340
CW-WF3-2017-03529
CR-WF3-2017-04983
CR-WF3-2017-06078
CR-WF3-2017-06622
CR-WF3-2017-07644
CR-WF3-2018-00196
Work Orders
00480584
00480585
71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision
B-424
Letdown Containment Isolation Control and Wiring Diagram 13
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
EN-FAP-WM-107 Emergent Issues Process
Troubleshooting and Control of Maintenance Activities
On Line Risk Assessment
OI-037-000
Operations Risk Assessment Guideline
313
Condition Reports (CRs)
CR-WF3-2018-03492
Work Orders
00379330
00379590
00395470
2689943
2689944
2747600
71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision
G153
Feedwater, Condensate & Air Evacuation Systems, Sheet 4 49
G160
Component Closed Cooling Water System, Sheet 1
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision
G160
Component Closed Cooling Water System, Sheet 4
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
Operability Determination Process
Condition Reports (CRs)
CR-WF3-2018-00785
CR-WF3-2018-01829
CR-WF3-2018-02242
CR-WF3-2018-02298
CR-WF3-2018-03587
71111.17T - Evaluations of Changes, Tests and Experiments
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision
1501532
ASME Code,Section III Qualification of Pressurizer Heater
Sheath to Heater Sleeve Fillet Weld
CN-NCE-08-44
Waterford 3 Replacement Steam Generator TRANFLOW
Analysis: Emergency and Faulted Transients to Support
Emergency Feedwater System Modifications
Evaluation of Train B Dry Cooling Tower Air Recirculation
with Temporary Work Platform
Temporary Modification for CEA 66 RSPT 2 Temporary
Signal from RSPT Substitution Box
Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Circuitry Modification
(Parent)
Technical Requirements Manual 3.3.4 Turbine Valve Testing
One Time Extension
Common Mat Stress Analysis - Cooling Tower Area
TRM Update to Address Equipment Dependency on HVAC
Tube Clamp Installation for DCT Tube Bundle 1B at Tube
Location 5F
Incorporate LPI CALC LA170375-LR-001 into Design Basis
CALC A13073-C-001
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision
Document PAD for Design Change EC 69180 for DCT
Bundle NO. 1/5 F Tube Support Clamp per EN-OP-104
Mark Up Drawings G802C & G802F to Reflect Approval to
Have Less Than 1" Gap Between Grating and Containment
Wall
Determine Leakage Criteria for Essential Chiller Select
Valves
ECM10-006
Dry Cooling Tower B Airflow Reduction Limits to support
Steam Generator Replacement
EN-ME-SOO1-W Tube Sleeve Installations for Dry Cooling Towers
G707
Tornado Missile Protection Dry Cooling Towers, Sh.1
W3-DBD-37
Essential Chilled Water System
301
W3-DBD-38
Safety Related HVAC-Control Room
301
WF3-ME-15-
00004
Tube Sleeve Qualification for Dry Cooling Towers
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
Process Applicability Determination
CFR 50.59 Evaluations
OP-002-004
Chilled Water System
314
OP-500-003
Control Room Cabinet C
OP-901-502
Evacuation of Control Room and Subsequent Plant
Shutdown
Condition Reports (CRs)
CR-WF3-2017-05761
CR-WF3-2017-05882
CR-WF3-2017-09164
CR-WF3-2018-01841
71111.18Plant Modifications
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision
Increase Containment Spray Pump Bearing Seal Cooling by
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision
Chile EC for CC IFIS7651B Alarm Setpoint Change
EC-M97-028
Bearing Frame Cooling Water Flow Requirements
Condition Reports (CRs)
CR-WF3-2016-06499
71111.19Post Maintenance Testing
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
Control Room Habitability Program
OP-903-035
Containment Spray Pump Operability Check
OP-903-118
Primary Auxiliaries Quarterly IST Valves Test
OP-903-121
Safety Systems Quarterly IST Valve Tests
Condition Reports (CRs)
CR-WF3-2018-02281
Work Orders
454900
485093
500167-07
2764205
2785365
71111.22Surveillance Testing
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
OI-040-000
Reactor Coolant System Leakage Monitoring
OP-903-006
Reactor Trip Circuit Breaker Test
OP-903-035
Containment Spray Pump Operability Check
OP-903-050
Component Cooling Water and Auxiliary Component
Cooling Water Pump and Valve Operability Test
Condition Reports (CRs)
CR-WF3-2018-01845
CR-WF3-2018-02473
Work Orders
2807736
71114.06Drill Evaluation
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Date
Emergency Preparedness Drill Scenario
June 20,
2018
71151Performance Indicator Verification
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Date
0058
NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - 2nd Quarter 2017
ROP Data
Jul 13, 2017
0076
NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - 3rd Quarter 2017
ROP Data
Oct 6, 2017
0004
NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - 4th Quarter 2017
ROP Data
Jan 9, 2018
24
NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - 1st Quarter 2018
ROP Data
Apr 12, 2018
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
Regulatory Performance Indicator Process
71152Problem Identification and Resolution
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision/Date
Engineering Analysis Required by CEP-IST-4 for
CR-WF3-2018-03279 Containment Spray Start Time
ECI99-001
ESF Response Time Acceptance Criteria Basis
ECS10-001
Waterford 3 Cycle 22 Reload Analysis Groundrules
ER-W3-97-0174-
00-00
CCW & ACCW Flow Balance Test Acceptance Criteria
May 26, 1997
UNT-006-033
Technical Specification Surveillance Frequency List
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
CEP-IST-4
Standard on In-service Testing
308
Planner Training Program
Planner Training Program
OP-100-014
Technical Specification and Technical Requirements
Compliance
344
PE-004-024
CCW/ACCW System Flow Balance
306
SEP-WF3-IST-1
WF3 Inservice Testing Bases Document
SEP-WF3-IST-2
WF3 Inservice Testing Plan
Condition Reports (CRs)
CR-WF3-2017-04390
CR-WF3-2017-06754
CR-WF3-2018-00472
CR-WF3-2018-02496
CR-WF3-2018-03308
71153Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Date
LER 2018-001-
Failure to Enter Limiting Condition of Operation Action
Statement due to Lack of Procedure Guidance Results in a
Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications
February 20,
2018
Condition Reports (CRs)
SUNSI Review
ADAMS:
Non-Publicly Available
Non-Sensitive
Keyword:
By: GMiller
Yes No
Publicly Available
Sensitive
OFFICE
SRI:DRP/D
RI:DRP/D
BC:DRS/EB1
BC:DRS/EB2
BC:DRS/PSB2
BC:DRS/OB
NAME
FRamirez
CSpeer
TFarnholtz
JDrake
HGepford
VGaddy
SIGNATURE
/RA/ GBM for
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/ JCK for
DATE
7/17/18
7/17/18
07/17/2018
7/17/18
7/17/18
7/17/18
OFFICE
TL:DRS/IPAT
SPE:DRP/D
BC:DRP/D
NAME
GGeorge
JDixon
GMiller
SIGNATURE
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
DATE
7/18/18
7/17/18
7/18/18