IR 05000373/2020002
| ML20224A174 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 08/11/2020 |
| From: | Kenneth Riemer NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B1 |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2020002 | |
| Download: ML20224A174 (18) | |
Text
August 11, 2020
SUBJECT:
LASALLE COUNTY STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000373/2020002 AND 05000374/2020002
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On June 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at LaSalle County Station. On July 15, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. J. Washko, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One Severity Level IV violation without an associated finding is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at LaSalle County Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Kenneth R. Riemer, Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000373 and 05000374 License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000373 and 05000374
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000373/2020002 and 05000374/2020002
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-002-0031
Licensee:
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility:
LaSalle County Station
Location:
Marseilles, IL
Inspection Dates:
April 01, 2020 to June 30, 2020
Inspectors:
J. Havertape, Resident Inspector
W. Schaup, Senior Resident Inspector
Rick Zuffa, Illinois Emergency Management Agency
Approved By:
Kenneth R. Riemer, Chief
Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at LaSalle County Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Turbine Stop Valve Limit Switch Failure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable NCV 05000373/2020002-01 Open/Closed Not Applicable 71153 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Severity Level IV (SLIV), non-cited violation (NCV) of LaSalle Generating Station Technical Specifications (TS) for failing to meet/follow Limited Conditions for Operations (LCO) 3.3.1.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation, and LCO 3.3.4.1, End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation.
Specifically, operators performed surveillance testing per station procedure LOS-RP-Q2 on March 24, 2019, when turbine stop valve #3 limit switch, 1C71-N006C, failed to operate, rendering the associated RPS and EOC-RPT channels inoperable. The licensee determined on May 3, 2019, that the cause for the failure of the limit switch could have existed after the completion of the last successful performance of the surveillance on December 15, 2018, rendering the associated RPS and EOC-RPT channels inoperable at that time.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000373/2019-002-00 LER 2019-002-00 for LaSalle County Station, Unit 1, Turbine Stop Valve Limit Switch Failure Due to Insufficient Lubrication 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On May 16, 2020, the unit was down powered to approximately 72 percent to perform feedwater valve testing, control rod channel distortion testing, and a rod sequence exchange. The unit was returned to full power the following day. The unit remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On May 12, 2020, the 2B turbine driven reactor feed pump soft tripped due to a failed hydraulic power unit that resulted in closing the control valve to the pump. The feed pump trip resulted in a reactor recirculation pump run-back and the start of the motor driven feed pump. Plant operators took actions and stabilized power at 86 percent. The hydraulic power unit was replaced, and the turbine driven reactor feed pump was placed in service. The unit was returned to service the next day. On June 13, 2020, the unit was down powered to approximately 72 percent to perform feedwater valve testing, turbine driven feed pump testing, turbine control and stop valve testing, scram time testing, control rod channel distortion testing, and a rod sequence exchange. The unit was returned to full power the following day. The unit remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of extreme high temperatures for the following systems: lake screen house, switchyard, and station transformers.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 2 standby gas treatment system during maintenance on Unit 1 standby gas treatment system on April 21, 2020
- (2) Unit common Division 1 diesel generator during maintenance on the Unit 1 Division 2 diesel generator on May 5, 2020
- (3) Unit 1 reactor core isolation cooling system during condensate storage tank maintenance on May 29, 2020
- (4) Unit 2 Division 3 diesel generator after maintenance on June 25, 2020
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire Zone 4E1, Unit 1 auxiliary building, auxiliary electrical equipment room, elevation 731', on May 29, 2020
- (2) Fire Zone 4E3, Unit 1 auxiliary building, Division 2 essential switchgear room, elevation 731', on May 29, 2020
- (3) Fire Zone 4D1, Unit 1 auxiliary building cable spreading area, elevation 749', on May 29, 2020
- (4) Fire Zone 8B1, Unit 2 diesel generator building, high pressure core spray diesel generator room, elevation 710', on June 8, 2020
- (5) Fire Zone 8B2, Unit 2 diesel generator building, Division 2 standby diesel generator room, elevation 710', on June 8, 2020
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a down power of Unit 1 to support testing activities and rod pattern adjustments on May 16, 2020.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated an out-of-the-box examination on the simulator on June 16, 2020.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Unit 2 reactor recirculation flow control valve hydraulic power units
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed;
- (1) Unit 1 Yellow online risk due to Division 3 diesel generator room cooler replacement on April 28, 2020
- (2) Unit 2 Yellow online risk due to severe thunderstorm warning on April 29, 2020
- (3) Unit 2 Yellow online risk due to emergent Division 2 diesel generator maintenance on May 4, 2020
- (4) Unit 1 Yellow online risk due to planned Division 2 diesel generator maintenance on May 5, 2020 (5)flawed maintenance risk evaluation for reactor core isolation cooling pressure control availability during condensate storage tank maintenance on June 18, 2020
- (6) Unit 2 Yellow online risk due to planned Division 3 diesel generator maintenance on June 23, 2020
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 2 Division 3 diesel generator following cooling water leak from the cooling water strainer
- (2) Engineering Change 631576, "Evaluation of the Unit 1 Division 2 Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Eddy Current Testing, After Additional Tubes Were Plugged in the Unit 1 Division 2 Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger"
- (3) Engineering Change 631579, "2E22-D300 Strainer Coupling Structural Integrity Evaluation Using Code Case N-513, After Retracting Event Notification EN#"
- (4) Division 1 diesel generator following voltage regulator adjustment
- (5) Unit 2 reactor recirculation flow control valve operability due to hydraulic power unit subloop A1 trip during runback on May 12, 2020
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 standby gas treatment system after maintenance on April 21, 2020
- (2) Unit 2 Division 3 diesel generator room cooler after replacement on May 1, 2020
- (3) Unit 1 Division 2 diesel generator after maintenance on May 4, 2020
- (4) Unit 2A residual heat removal pump seal cooler after piping replacement on May 12, 2020
- (5) Unit 2 residual heat removal northwest cubicle cooler on May 13, 2020
- (6) Unit 1 reactor core isolation cooling water leg pump after pump replacement May 22, 2020
- (7) Unit 2 Division 3 diesel generator after maintenance on June 24, 2020
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) LOS-DG-103, "Division 3 Diesel Generator Start and Load Acceptance Surveillance,"
- (2) LOS-VG-SR2, "Standby Gas Treatment HEPA/Charcoal Filter Test," Work Order
4841562 Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) LOS-HP-Q1, "Unit 1 High Pressure Core Spray and In-Service Test," Work Order
===5025011
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02)===
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) The inspectors observed an out-of-the-box examination on the simulator that included drill and exercise performance and emergency response organization drill and performance indicator opportunities on June 23,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11)===
- (1) Unit 1 (04/01/2019-03/31/2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (04/01/2019-03/31/2020)
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends and did not identify any trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) Licensee Event Report 2019-002-00, Turbine Stop Valve Limit Switch Failure Due to Insufficient Lubricant (ADAMS Accession No. ML19178A209). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER; therefore, no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors did, however, identify a violation of NRC requirements.
The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under the Inspection Results Section.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Observation: Semi-Annual Trend Review of Corrective Action Proram 71152 The inspectors reviewed action requests entered into the corrective action program for the following:
Complete, accurate, and timely documentation of the issue identified in the corrective action program.
Evaluation and timely disposition of operability and reportability issues.
Consideration of extent of condition and cause, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences.
Classification and prioritization of the problems resolution commensurate with the safety significance.
Identification of corrective actions that are appropriately focused to correct the problem.
Completion of corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with the safety significance of the issue.
Identification of negative trends associated with human or equipment performance that can potentially impact nuclear safety.
Operating experience is adequately evaluated for applicability, and applicable lessons learned are communicated to appropriate organizations and implemented.
The inspectors completed the review and noted no issues above the minor threshold or any adverse trends.
Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Turbine Stop Valve Limit Switch Failure Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000373/2020002-01 Open/Closed
Not Applicable 71153 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Severity Level IV (SLIV), non-cited violation (NCV) of LaSalle Generating Station Technical Specifications (TS) for failing to meet/follow Limited Conditions for Operations (LCO) 3.3.1.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation, and LCO 3.3.4.1, End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation.
Specifically, operators performed surveillance testing per station procedure LOS-RP-Q2 on March 24, 2019, when turbine stop valve #3 limit switch, 1C71-N006C, failed to operate, rendering the associated RPS and EOC-RPT channels inoperable. The licensee determined on May 3, 2019, that the cause for the failure of the limit switch could have existed after the completion of the last successful performance of the surveillance on December 15, 2018, rendering the associated RPS and EOC-RPT channels inoperable at that time.
Description:
On March 23, 2019, while performing surveillance testing on Unit 1 turbine stop valve (TSV)
- 3 per station procedure LOS-RP-Q2, the 1C71A-K10C relay failed to de-energize, but the 1C71A-K10F relay de-energized as expected. The TSV otherwise functioned normally, by closing and fast closing as expected. Further investigation determined that the closure RPS channel A2 scram limit switch (1C71-N006C) that actuates relay 1C71A-K10C was stuck closed. The relay was declared inoperable and the appropriate TS LCOs were entered. This was documented in Action Request 4232438.
Troubleshooting was performed under Work Order 4827792 which found the limit switch stuck in the up position, preventing the relay from de-energizing. The limit switch was removed and a new limit switch with high temperature grease was installed. The surveillance test was completed with the limit switch and relay performing satisfactorily. The relay was declared operable and the TS LCOs were exited.
The limit switch was sent off for failure analysis that was completed on May 3, 2019. The analysis determined that the cause of the failure was insufficient lubrication in the shaft bushing section of the limit switch. The report stated that this fact established firm evidence that the failure mechanism resulting in the relay being inoperable may have existed since the last successful completion of the surveillance on December 15, 2018, until the corrective actions to replace the switch were completed on March 24, 2019. The licensee performed a review of the occurrence and determined that the relay had been inoperable for a period greater than the allowed outage time for TS LCOs 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.4.1. and required reporting in accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by the plant's TS.
Licensee Event Report 2019-002-00, "Turbine Stop Valve Limit Switch Failure Due to Lubricant Degradation," was reported to the NRC on June 27, 2019, and stated that the relay inoperability period existed as far back as the last successful surveillance performed on December 15, 2018, until corrective action was taken in response to the surveillance test failure on March 24, 2019. The inoperability period was greater than allowed by TS LCO 3.3.3.1 and TS LCO 3.3.4.1 as follows:
Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.1.1 required that the RPS instrumentation for each function is OPERABLE, and Condition A applies to one or more required channels being inoperable and required that the channel or its associated trip system is placed in trip within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. In this case, the station had exceeded the completion time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> when the malfunctioning channel was found inoperable during the December 2019 surveillance test. In addition, LCO 3.3.1.1 Condition D was not entered for the completion time of Condition A not met.
Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.4.1 required that the EOC-RPT instrumentation is OPERABLE, which included two channels of the TSV closure and turbine control valve fast closure or minimum critical power ratio limits are applied. This condition was not met.
The resident inspectors requested and reviewed applicable documentation and licensee records and determined the following.
The licensee failure analysis stated that lab functional testing of the limit switch verified the switch was sluggish and failed to return to the self state. When the switch was opened for further examination, there was significant binding occurring between the shaft and the cam bushing. Looking at the bushing further, significant scoring and galling wear gouges were observed along with wear material. Additionally, no lubricant was detectable on the shaft or the cam bushing. The lack of lubricant would be a cause for the bushing wear and the binding with the shaft. The limit switch had to be completely disassembled to perform the failure analysis and determine why the failure occurred.
Based on the information reviewed by the inspectors, they determined that for the events that occurred in the subject LER, the licensee would not be required to disassemble limit switches to verify the manufacturer had appropriately applied grease to all parts of the switch prior to installing the switches for use; therefore, this failure mechanism was not within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct and that no performance deficiency existed. However, a violation of TS had occurred.
Corrective Actions: The licensee replaced the failed limit switch with a new limit switch with high temperature application grease.
Corrective Action References: Action Requests 4232438 and 4247819
Performance Assessment:
The NRC determined this violation was not reasonably foreseeable and preventable by the licensee and therefore is not a performance deficiency. Specifically, for the events that occurred in the subject LER in March 2018, the licensee could not have known that the limit switch did not have lubricant applied to the cam which ultimately led to the limit switch not functioning; therefore, no performance deficiency existed.
Enforcement:
Severity: Traditional Enforcement is being used to disposition this violation with no associated Reactor Oversight Process performance deficiency, per NRC Memorandum Interim Guidance for Dispositioning Severity Level IV Violations with No Associated Performance Deficiency, dated June 15, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18158A220). The inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with IMC 0612 and the Enforcement Manual.
Reactor violations without a performance deficiency are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process. The inspectors reviewed Section 6.1.d.1 of the Enforcement Policy and determined this violation was Severity Level IV because it was a failure to comply with a TS action requirement for an LCO in Section 3.0.
Violation: LaSalle TS LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation,"
requires that the RPS instrumentation for each function in Table 3.3.1.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
Condition A, "One or More Required Channels Inoperable," required action A.1, "Place Channel in Trip," completion time, "12 Hours." OR required action A.2, "Place Associated Trip System in Trip," completion time, "12 Hours."
Condition D, "Required Action and Associated Completion Time of Condition A, B or C Not Met," required action D.1, "Enter the Condition Referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1 for the Channel," completion time, "Immediately."
Table 3.3.1.1-1 Function 8, Turbine Stop Valve - Closure, Conditions Referenced From Required Action D.1, "E."
Condition E, "As Required by Required Action D.1 and Referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1,"
required action, "Reduce THERMAL POWER to Less Than 25% Rated Thermal Power,"
completion time, "4 Hours."
LaSalle TS LCO 3.3.4.1, "End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation,"
requires that two channels per trip system for each EOC-RPT instrumentation Function listed below shall be OPERABLE:
1. Turbine Stop Valve - Closure; and
2. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low
LaSalle TS LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," limits for inoperable EOC-RPT as specified in the COLR are made applicable.
Condition A, "One or More Required Channels Inoperable," required action A.1, "Restore Channel to Operable Status," completion time, "72 Hours." OR required action A.2, "Place Channel in Trip," completion time, "72 Hours."
Condition C, "Required Action and Associated Completion Time Not Met," required action C.1, "Remove the Associated Recirculation Pump Fast Speed Breaker From Service,"
completion time, "4 Hours." OR required action C.2, "Reduce THERMAL POWER to Less than 25% Rated Thermal Power," completion time, "4 Hours."
Contrary to the above, on December 15, 2018, when LaSalle TS LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," requiring that the RPS instrumentation for each function in Table 3.3.1.1-1 shall be OPERABLE and LCO 3.3.4.1, End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation," requiring two channels per trip system for each EOC-RPT instrumentation Function listed below shall be OPERABLE:
1. Turbine Stop Valve - Closure; and
2. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure-Low
LaSalle TS LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," limits for inoperable EOC-RPT as specified in the COLR are made applicable were not met, the licensee failed to reduce reactor power or follow any remedial action permitted by the TS until the condition could be met.
Specifically, when the limit switch failed, the licensee did not perform remedial actions for LaSalle TS LCO 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.4.1 or 3.2.2 until the LCO could be met.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On July 15, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. J. Washko, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
20 LOS-ZZ-A2 Attachment B Exceptions List
06/15/2020
Work Orders
LOS-ZZ-A2, Attachment B, Preparation for Summer
Operations
06/15/2020
Procedures
LOP-DG-01
Preparation for Standby Operation of Diesel Generator
Systems
LOP-RI-05
Preparation for Standby Operation of the Reactor Core
Isolation Cooling System
LOP-VG-01
Preparation for Standby Operation of the Standby Gas
Treatment System
Procedures
PFP FZ 4D1
Pre-Fire Plan, Auxiliary Building 749' Elevation, Cable
Spreading Area, Fire Zone 4D1
PFP FZ 4E1
Pre-Fire Plan, Auxiliary Building 731' Elevation, Auxiliary
Electrical Equipment Room, Fire Zone 4E1
PFP FZ 4E3
Pre-Fire Plan, Auxiliary Building 731' Elevation, Division 2
Essential Switchgear Room, Fire Zone 4E3
PFP FZ 8B1
Pre-Fire Plan, Diesel Generator Building 710' Elevation, High
Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator Room, Fire Zone 8B1
PFP FZ 8B2
Pre-Fire Plan, Diesel Generator Building 710' Elevation,
Division 2 Standby Diesel Generator Room, Fire Zone 8B2
Work Orders
U1 Cable Spreading Room Sprinkler System Channel
Functional Test
01/02/2020
U1 Fire Zone Ionization Fire Detector Channel Functional
Test, Attachment 1G for Fire Zone 1-29
08/29/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
RM - 1A RR RCV Drifiting While Locked Up
2/13/2019
RM - 2B RR FCV Lock Up During and Down Power
04/30/2020
A and B RR FCV Locked Up During Runback
05/12/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC Identified - Paragon Not Properly Updated
06/18/2020
Drawings
Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
'R' (E51) Part 5
Schematic Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
'RI' (E51) Part 17
X
Corrective Action
Documents
Large KVAR Swings On 0 DG During Performance of DG
Start and Load Acceptance Test
2/20/2020
2B DG Cooling Water Strainer Leak
05/01/2020
Drawings
M-134, Sheet 1
CSCS Equipment Cooling Water System
BH
Engineering
Changes
Evaluation of the 1A DG Heat Exchanger Eddy Current
Testing
2E22-D300 Strainer Coupling Structural Integrity Evaluation
Using Code Case N-513
Work Orders
Common DG Voltage Regulator Replacement
2/20/2020
Common DG Load and Acceptance Test
2/20/2020
Common DG 24 Hour Endurance Run Surveillance
05/16/2020
MM Replace Coupling on 2B DG Cooling Water Strainer
05/05/2020
Common DG Voltage Regulator Adjustment
05/16/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Relay Found Outside Acceptance Criteria During LES-DG-
2
06/25/2020
Procedures
LEP-AP-06
GE Magne-Blast 4KV Breaker Inspection Following
Operation in Test Position
06/24/2020
LEP-DG-103
Diesel Generator Governor Oil Change and Compensation
Adjustment
06/25/2020
LEP-DG-107
General Inspection and Cleaning of Generator and
Associated Equipment for HPCS DG-1B or DG-2B
06/25/2020
LES-DG-202
2E22-S001 Emergency Diesel Surveillance
06/22/2020
LOS-DG-SR5,
B
DG Cooling Water System Flow Balance
LOS-DG-SR5,
F
Northwest and Northeast Cubicle Cooler 1(2)VY01A and
1(2)VY04A Differential Pressure Test
LOS-DG-SR7,
E
2B DG Cooling Water System Flow Balance
LOS-DG-SR7,
G
2VY02A Differential Pressure Test
LOS-RH-SR1,
RHR Pump Seal Cooler Service Water Side Flowrate Test
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
B
LOS-VG-M1,
1A
Unit 1 Standby Gas Treatment System Operability and In-
Service Test
LOS-VG-SR2
Standby Gas Treatment HEPA/Charcoal Filter Test
LOS-VY-SR1,
B
Test HPCS Pump Room Area Cooler Fan 1B(2B) VY02C
Work Orders
Operations Post Maintenance Test Breaker for 1A DG Jacket
Water Immersion Heater
05/06/2020
Operations Post Maintenance Test 1DG01K/1AP80E-D2
05/06/2020
Operations Post Maintenance Test 1DG01A DG Cooling
Water Heat Exchanger Verify No Leaks
05/06/2020
Operations Post Maintenance Test Replaced Elastomer
Hose on 1A EDG Expansion Tank
05/06/2020
Operations Post Maintenance Test Verify No Leaks
05/06/2020
VY Cooler Leak and Flow Check
05/12/2020
Operations Post Maintenance Test 1VG01A Standby Gas
Treatment Equipment Train Heating Coil
04/21/2020
Operations Post Maintenance Test 2B DG Runs With No
Lockout Trips
06/25/2020
Operations Post Maintenance Test Trip Test CB-15, 2B DG
Generator Field Flash
06/25/2020
Operations Post Maintenance Test 2B DG Runs With No
Lockout Trips
06/25/2020
Operations Post Maintenance Test 2E22-S001 HPCS DG
Heat Exchanger Leak Check
06/25/2020
Operations Post Maintenance Test Division 3 Cooling Water
Test Per LOS-DG-SR7
05/01/2020
Operations Post Maintenance Test Verify Acceptable Air
Flow Thru New Coolers
05/01/2020
Slow Oil Leak on the RCIC Pump
05/20/2020
Perform LES-DG-202 and Applicable Attachments
06/25/2020
Operations Perform LOS-VG-SR2 Charcoal Filter Leak Test
1VG01S
04/21/2020
Operations Perform Leak Check and Flow Test per LOS-RH-
05/12/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
SR1
Operations Post Maintenance Test RHR PP 'A' Seal Cooler
Check for Leaks
05/12/2020
Post Cleaning LOS-RH-SR1 2A RHR Pump Seal Flowrate
Test
05/12/2020
Operations Post Maintenance Test Verify no Leaks on 2B
06/25/2020
Operations No Leaks 2E12-F068A After Re-Torque Packing
05/12/2020
05/20/2020
Operations Post Maintenance Test Verify Voltage 2B DG
LOP-DG-02
06/25/2020
Procedures
LOS-DG-103
1B Diesel Generator 1E22-S001 Start and Load Acceptance
Surveillance
LOS-VG-SR2
Standby Gas Treatment HEPA/Charcoal Filter Test
Work Orders
Operations Diesel Generator Start and Load Acceptance -
Unit 1
04/27/2020
Standby Gas Treatment HEPA Filter Test
04/21/2020
LOS-HP-Q1, HPCS Pump Run, Attachment 1A
06/26/2020
71151
Work Orders
LOS-AA-S201 TS Shiftly Surveillance, Attachment A
04/22/2020
LOS-AA-S101 TS Shiftly Surveillance, Attachment A
08/12/2020
LOS-AA-S201 TS Shiftly Surveillance, Attachment A
2/23/2020
LOS-AA-S101 TS Shiftly Surveillance, Attachment A
03/23/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
1C71A-K10C Failed to De-Energize During LOS-RP-Q2
03/24/2019
AR 4232438-02
Special Plant Condition Tracking Assignment - Failure
Analysis of a NAMCO Limit Switch from LaSalle Station
05/03/2019
RPS TSV Limit Switch Powerlabs Failure Analysis
05/09/2019
Work Orders
1C71-N006C RPS Limit Switch Repair/Replace MR90
03/29/2019