IR 05000373/2020003
| ML20346A464 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 12/11/2020 |
| From: | Kenneth Riemer NRC/RGN-III |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co |
| References | |
| IR 2020003 | |
| Download: ML20346A464 (18) | |
Text
December 11, 2020
SUBJECT:
LASALLE COUNTY STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000373/2020003 AND 05000374/2020003
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On September 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at LaSalle County Station and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. J. Washko, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at LaSalle County Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at LaSalle County Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Kenneth R. Riemer, Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000373 and 05000374 License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000373 and 05000374
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000373/2020003 and 05000374/2020003
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-003-0029
Licensee:
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility:
LaSalle County Station
Location:
Marseilles, IL
Inspection Dates:
July 01, 2020 to September 30, 2020
Inspectors:
G. Edwards, Health Physicist
J. Havertape, Resident Inspector
W. Schaup, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Zuffa, Illinois Emergency Management Agency
Approved By:
Kenneth R. Riemer, Chief
Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at LaSalle County Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Perform a Maintenance Risk Assessment for Mobile Crane Operations Near Power Transmission Lines Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000373,05000374/2020003-01 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71111.13 The inspectors identified a Green finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," for the licensee's failure to assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activities. Specifically, maintenance activities utilizing a mobile crane in the vicinity of the Unit 1 auxiliary transformer and transmission lines was not assessed for the increase in risk associated with the crane potentially impacting the transformer or power lines resulting in a turbine trip.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On September 19, 2020, the unit was down powered to 72 percent to perform surveillance testing and a rod sequence exchange. The unit was returned to rated thermal power on September 20, 2020 and remained at or near full-rated thermal power for the rest of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On September 6, 2020, the unit was down powered to 63 percent to support replacement of 2PA06J heater drain pump primary control power supply and surveillance testing and a rod sequence exchange. After successful power supply replacement and surveillance testing, the unit was returned to rated thermal power on September 7, 2020 and remained at or near full-rated thermal power for the rest of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather (derecho) on August 10, 2020.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 2 Division 3 diesel generator after repairs to the water-cooling system on July 29, 2020
- (2) Unit 2 high pressure core spray after maintenance on September 22, 2020
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 1 reactor core isolation cooling system on July 23, 2020
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire Zone 4F1, Unit 1 auxiliary building, Division 1 switchgear room, elevation 710',
on July 17, 2020
- (2) Fire Zone 4F2, Unit 2 auxiliary building, Division 1 switchgear room, elevation 710',
on July 17, 2020
- (3) Fire Zone 5D2, Unit 2 auxiliary building, Division 3 switchgear room, elevation 687',
on July 17, 2020
- (4) Fire Zone 5C11, Unit 1 turbine building, ground floor general area, elevation 710', on July 13, 2020
- (5) Fire Zone 5C11, Unit 2 turbine building, ground floor general area, elevation 710', on July 13, 2020
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:
- (1) Unit 1 turbine building, flood hazard area 5E1, lower basement area, circulating and service water systems, elevation 663'
- (2) Unit 2 turbine building, flood hazard area 5E2, lower basement area, circulating and service water systems, elevation 663'
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a down power of Unit 1 to support testing activities and rod pattern adjustments on September 19, 2020.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator re-qualification training exam (ESG 55, Revision 6) on September 9, 2020.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Unit 1 reactor core isolation cooling flex hose maintenance strategy
- (2) Unit 1 safety-related ventilation maintenance effectiveness for Division 3 diesel generator ventilation temperature controller failure on November 12, 2020
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
- (1) Unit 1 turbine stop valve limit switches
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 2 Yellow risk due to Division 3 diesel generator unavailable for cooling system repairs on July 28, 2020 (2)operational risk screening for crane operations in the vicinity of high voltage lines on August 2, 2020 (3)reactivity and operational risk screening and mitigation plan for Unit 2 reactor manual scram functional work on September 3, 2020
- (4) Yellow risk on both units while performing periodic breaker operations in the switchyard to support maintenance on the Braidwood line the week of September 14, 2020
- (5) Unit 1B reactor protection system half scram during replacement of relay on September 11, 2020
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 2 high pressure core spray pump loss of offsite power (LOOP) - loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) safety function during Division 3 diesel generator maintenance window on July 28, 2020
- (2) Unit 2 low pressure core spray alarm discharge pressure low alarm would not clear after surveillance pump run on September 9, 2020
- (3) Unit common diesel generator lube oil temperature below 85 degrees Fahrenheit on February 15, 2020
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
(1)post-maintenance testing of the Unit 2 Division 3 diesel generator following jacket water cooling system repairs on July 28, 2020 (2)post-maintenance testing of the Unit 2 low pressure core spray pump after maintenance on September 9, 2020
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) Unit 1 Division 3 diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump and air start check valve quarterly testing on July 30, 2020
- (2) LOS-DG-M2, 1A diesel generator idle start Work Order 5067090
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) LOS-DG-Q2, 1A diesel generator cooling water pump in-service test, Work Order 5047429
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) The inspectors observed licensed operator evaluated scenario guide S-20-4-5 that included drill and exercise performance and emergency response organization drill and performance indicator opportunities on August 7,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.06 - Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
Sampling and Analysis (IP Section 03.02) (3 Samples)
(1)inspectors evaluated compensatory sampling (2)inspectors evaluated effluent sample processing (3)inspectors evaluated sampling and analysis from the station vent stack
Dose Calculations (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following dose calculations:
- (1) October 2019 liquid and gaseous effluent offsite dose calculations
- (2) January 2020 liquid and gaseous effluent offsite dose calculations
Abnormal Discharges (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following abnormal discharges:
- (1) There were no abnormal discharges during this inspection period.
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, &
Transportation
Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (1 Partial)
The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted radioactive material shipments through a record review:
(1)
(Partial)
Shipment LM 20-072, UN 3328 Radioactive Material, Type B(U) Package, Fissile 7, Lead Test Assembly
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05)===
- (1) Unit 1 (07/01/2019 - 06/30/2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (07/01/2019 - 06/30/2020)
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (07/01/2019 - 06/30/2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (07/01/2019 - 06/30/2020)
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (07/01/2019 - 06/30/2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (07/01/2019 - 06/30/2020)
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Lessons learned during performance of LEP-AP-141Y
- (2) Reportability of 2B diesel generator event
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Perform a Maintenance Risk Assessment for Mobile Crane Operations Near Power Transmission Lines Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events
Green NCV 05000373,05000374/2020003-01 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71111.13 The inspectors identified a Green finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," for the licensee's failure to assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activities. Specifically, maintenance activities utilizing a mobile crane in the vicinity of the Unit 1 auxiliary transformer and transmission lines was not assessed for the increase in risk associated with the crane potentially impacting the transformer or power lines resulting in a turbine trip.
Description:
The inspectors noted that on August 1 and 2, 2020, a large crane was parked approximately 50 feet from the Unit 1 345 kV offsite power lines. The inspectors noted that the crane was equipped with a 200 boom and that it was possible for the crane to interrupt offsite power. They determined that this activity had not been screened for operational risk in accordance with the licensee's maintenance rule implementing procedure, OP-AA-107, Integrated Risk Management, Revision 2, which is typically done as part of the work week screening process.
The inspectors discussed the issue with the licensee who agreed that the issue had not been screened as part of the work week management process, but believed that it was not a program requirement. It was the position of the licensee that the lift, part of a service building heating, ventilation, and air conditioning replacement project, was not required for screening because it was characterized as facilities maintenance. Facilities maintenance was typically exempt from the work week management risk screening process per section 4.1.2 of OP-AA-07. Section 4.1.2 stated that facilities maintenance tasks whose work scope is not in the power plant boundary or does not impact safety, regulatory, Technical Specification (TS),code, environmental qualification, or design basis requirements.
Following further review, the inspectors noted that Attachment 1 of OP-AA-107 stated that a single human failure leading to unexpected loss of planned generation was a consideration for operational risk and, as such, would not be appropriate for exemption per section 4.1.2. Therefore, an operations department risk screening was required by section 4.3 of OP-AA-103. The inspectors determined this issue to be a performance deficiency for the failure to assess the risk associated with crane activities in accordance 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). The licensee documented the inspectors' concerns in Action Request 4361002.
Corrective Actions: Training will be provided during operations continual training and a presentation will be provided to first line supervisors on the requirements associated with risk in station procedures WC-AA-101, WC-AA-101-1006, OP-AA-107, MA-AA-716-002 and WC-AA-2000 on use to fulfill the requirements of 10CFR50.65(a)(4).
Corrective Action References: Action Requests 4361002 and 4371257
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to assess maintenance risk for crane operation near offsite power lines as required by Title 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants, was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management SDP. The inspectors requested a RIII senior reactor analyst perform a risk evaluation of the finding because the licensee's maintenance risk assessment process does not quantitatively assess the increase in initiating event likelihood due to maintenance. Instead the licensee's approach is to qualitatively assess the potential likelihood, increase the risk status of the plant to "Yellow," and take mitigating actions based on the assessment. The senior reactor analyst performed an assessment of the risk, considering an increased frequency of a turbine trip/reactor trip for a period of 3 days. The senior reactor analyst used the NRC Standardized Plan Analysis Risk model for LaSalle, version 8.58, to perform the evaluation and increased the frequency of a reactor trip by one order of magnitude. The dominant core damage sequences involved a transient followed by a loss of main feedwater and various other system failures resulting in the loss of all decay heat removal. The incremental core damage probability was less than 1E-7/yr. and the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.14 - Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision making-practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. Specifically, licensee management involved in the south service building heating, ventilation, and air conditioning project opted to not place the maintenance activity into the work week screening process based on an exception to work week screening used for facilities maintenance work that does not have the potential to impact SSCs related to nuclear safety. This decision also relied on human performance tools in place to minimize station risk during crane activities, indicating that the station recognized a potential hazard, but put into place risk mitigating actions outside of its official risk screening process.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) states, in part, "Before performing maintenance activities (including but not limited to surveillance, post-maintenance testing, and corrective and preventive maintenance), the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activities."
Contrary to the above on August 1, 2020, before performing maintenance activities, the licensee failed to assess and manage the increase in risk that resulted from maintenance activities. Specifically, maintenance activities utilizing a mobile crane in the vicinity of the Unit 1 auxiliary transformer and transmission lines was not assessed for the increase in risk associated with the crane potentially impacting the transformer or power lines.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Assessment 71152 The inspectors reviewed Action Request 4318337, "Lessons Learned During LEP-AP-141Y,"
for the following performance attributes:
- complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance and ease of discovery;
- consideration of the extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences;
- evaluation and disposition of operability/functionality/reportability issues;
- classification and prioritization of the resolution of the problem commensurate with safety significance;
- identification of corrective actions, which were appropriately focused to correct the problem; and
- completion of corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with the safety significance of the issue.
The inspectors determined that the licensee had appropriately followed station procedures and the station's corrective action program to ensure all elements inspected were adequately addressed with the exception that it was not identified that station procedure LOP-DG-02, "Diesel Generator Startup and Operation," step B.5 was not followed when lube oil temperature fell below 85 degrees Fahrenheit.
The inspectors determined that there was a minor violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, "Instructions, Procedures and Drawings," for the licensee's failure to follow station procedure LOP-DG-02 and start the diesel. The issue was determined to be minor because a previous operability evaluation performed by the licensee demonstrated that although not desirable, the diesel would start at temperatures below 85 degrees Fahrenheit and be able to perform its safety function. The licensee has entered the issue into the corrective action program as Action Request 4370977.
Assessment 71152 The inspectors reviewed Action Request 4364409, "Reportability of 2B Diesel Generator Event," for the following performance attributes:
- complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance and ease of discovery;
- consideration of the extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences;
- classification and prioritization of the resolution of the problem commensurate with safety significance;
- identification of corrective actions, which were appropriately focused to correct the problem; and
- completion of corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with the safety significance of the issue.
The inspectors determined that the licensee had appropriately followed station procedures and the station's corrective action program to ensure all elements inspected were adequately addressed with the exception that the action to track the submittal of the required LER was not completed. The details of the event are described in the results section of this report.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On September 30, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. J. Washko, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On August 24, 2020, the inspectors presented the radiation protection baseline inspection results to Mr. J. Washko, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
LOA-TORN-001 Entered Due to Severe Thunderstorm
Warning
08/10/2020
Trip of Line 0108 and Loss of Power to River Screen House
08/10/2020
200 Foot Wind Speed Indication Lost during Severe Weather
08/10/2020
ISFSI Hi-Storms Missing White Bolt Caps after High Winds
08/10/2020
Damage Found Post Storm per LOA-TORN-001
08/10/2020
Procedures
LOA-AP-001
Loss of 12 kV Power
LOA-EM-001
Environmental Monitoring Abnormal Procedure
LOA-TORN-001
High Winds/Tornado
Drawings
M-101, Sheet 1
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Unit 1 Reactor Core
Isolation Cooling System
BH
M-101, Sheet 2
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Unit 1 Reactor Core
Isolation Cooling System
AT
Procedures
LOP-DG-01
Preparation for Standby Operation of Diesel Generators
LOP-DG-05E
Unit 2 Diesel Generator Electrical Checklist
LOP-DG-05M
Unit 2 Diesel Generator Mechanical Checklist
LOP-HP-02E
Unit 2 High Pressure Core Spray Electrical Checklist
LOP-HP-02M
Unit 2 High Pressure Core Spray Mechanical Checklist
LOP-HP-03
Preparation for Operation of High Pressure Core Spray
System
LOP-RI-01E
Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Electrical
Checklist
LOP-RI-01M
Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Mechanical
Checklist
Procedures
PFP FZ 4F1
Pre-Fire Plan, Unit 1 Auxiliary Building 710' Elevation,
Division 1 Switchgear Room, Fire Zone 4F1
PFP FZ 4F2
Pre-Fire Plan, Unit 2 Auxiliary Building 710' Elevation,
Division 1 Switchgear Room, Fire Zone 4F2
PFP FZ 5C11
Pre-Fire Plan, Unit 1 and Unit 2 Turbine Building 710'
Elevation, Ground Floor General Area, Fire Zone 5C11
PFP FZ 5D5
Pre-Fire Plan, Unit 2 Auxiliary Building 687' Elevation,
Division 3 Switchgear Room, Fire Zone 5D5
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Work Orders
U2 Fire Zone Ionization Fire Detector Functional Test,
Groups 2F and 2I
07/31/2018
U1 Fire Zone Ionization Fire Detector Functional Test,
Groups 1F and 1I
10/29/2019
Drawings
M-11
General Arrangement Basement Floor Plan
N
M-12
General Arrangement Miscellaneous Floor Plan
O
M-125, Sheet 2
Service Water System
M-15
General Arrangement Section 'C-C'
G
M-18
General Arrangement Sections 'G-G' and 'H-H'
F
M-63, Sheet 1
AX
M-68
Service Water System
AJ
M-69, Sheet 2
Service Water System
BB
M-765, Sheet 1
Circulating Water Piping
F
M-770
Sub-Structure Piping
L
Engineering
Evaluations
LS-PSA-012
LaSalle Internal Flooding Report
11/20/2015
LS-PSA-013
LaSalle PRA Summary Notebook
Procedures
LOA-FLD-001
Flooding
Corrective Action
Documents
2C71A-K010G Relay did not Open during LOS-RP-Q2
06/13/2020
Relay 1C71A-K010F Cycling
08/11/2020
AR 43669707
Turbine Stop Valve #3 not Full Open Alarm with Relay
Chattering
09/02/2020
Engineering
Evaluations
Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Determination
Associated with Failed Room Cooling Temperature
Controller for the Unit 1 Division III Diesel Generator
11/19/2019
Maintenance Rule (A)(1) Determination Associated with
Failed Room Cooling Temperature Controller for the Unit 1
Division III Diesel Generator
11/19/2019
SIEE EXL
223084
Switch, Limit, 600VAC, CW/CCW, DPDT, 2NO, 2NC, High
Temp, +10 to +180 DE
- G. C Ambient, Long Mount
Miscellaneous
Expansion Joint
and Flexible
Hoses
Performance Centered Maintenance (PCM) Template
Work Orders
Contingency Unit 2 Turbine Stop Valve Reactor Protection
System Limit Switch Repair
06/13/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
1C71-N006C Reactor Protection System Limit Switch
Repair/Replace MR90
03/24/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 368877368877Unit 1 B RPS Half Scram
09/11/2020
Procedures
Integrated Risk Management
OP-AA-107-F-01
Risk Screening - Mitigation Plan
Online Risk Management and Assessment
Corrective Action
Documents
Jacket Water Leak Identified on 2B DG
07/28/2020
NRC Identified - Reportability of 2B DG Event
08/20/2020
low Pressure Core Spray Discharge Pressure Low Alarm
would not Clear Following Pump Run
09/09/2020
AR 828551828551Reportability of Unit 1 HPCS Safety Function
10/09/2008
Procedures
LOS-DG-M3,
2B-
IDLE
2B Diesel Generator Idle Start
104
LOS-LP-Q1,
2A
Unit 2 Low Pressure Core Spray Operability and In-Service
Test
Work Orders
Operations Post Maintenance Test - Verify no Leaks at
System Pressure
07/28/2020
Procedures
LOS-DG-M2,
1A-
IDLE
1A Diesel Generator Idle Start
105
LOS-DG-Q2,
A5
1A Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump In-Service Test
Work Orders
Unit 1 Division III Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump
Test
07/30/2020
Unit 1 Division III Diesel Generator 'A' Air Start Check Valve
Test
07/30/2020
Unit 1 Division III Diesel Generator 'B' Air Start Check Valve
Test
07/30/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
SBGT WRGM Mid-Range Indication Erratic
09/02/2018
Old Service Building HVAC Equipment Room in RCA
Exhausts to Outside
09/26/2018
SBGT WRGM Flow/Control Valve Issue
10/10/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
LL: L1R18 Chemistry Learning
03/04/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC Identified: Increasing Trend in Co-58, Co-60, and H-3
08/24/2020
Miscellaneous
LaSalle County Nuclear Power Station Annual Radioactive
Effluent Release Report (ARERR) for 2019
04/23/2020
Procedures
Radioactive Effluent and Environmental Monitoring Programs 6
CY-LA-170-3002
Total Dose Determination at LaSalle Generating Station
CY-LA-170-3003
Open EMS Effluent Management System Implementation
Self-Assessments AR 04265423
NRC Inspection: Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent
Treatment (RETS) (IP 71124.06)
06/03/2020
Shipping Records Shipment LM 20-
2
UN 3328 Radioactive Material, Type B(U) Package, Fissile 7,
Lead Test Assembly
05/29/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Lessons Learned during LEP-AP-141Y
2/16/2020
NRC Identified Procedure Change Request Action for LOP-
DG-02
09/21/2020
Engineering
Changes
Loss of Diesel Generator Standby Lubrication and Minimum
Standby Oil Temperature
Procedures
LEP-AP-141Y,
15
Temporary Power Temporary Configuration Change for 0
Diesel Generator Auxiliaries
LOS-DG-02
Diesel Generator Startup and Operation
73