IR 05000322/1985037

Insp Rept 50-322/85-37 on 850916-1008.No Violation Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Startup Test Program During Test Condition Heatup,Main Turbine Initial Operation & Valve Operator Failures

ML20205G888
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	11/05/1985
From:	Eselgroth P, Florek D, Petrone C, Wen D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205G876	List: IR 05000322/1985037 ML20205G871
References
50-322-85-37, NUDOCS 8511130375
Download: ML20205G888 (10)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /85-37 Docket N ~ License No. NPF-36 Priority --

Category C Licensee: Long Island Lighting Company 175 East Old Country Road Hicksville, New York 11801 Facility Name: Shoreham Nuclear Power Station

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Inspection.At: Shoreham, New York Inspection Condu t -

Septemper 16-October 8. 1985 Inspectors: .

D. Flor-J f7

, Lead Reactor Engineer kIh

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/ M-C.'Petrone, Lead Reactor Engineer

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P. Wen, Re c or E

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Approved by: ## [

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P. Eselcph, Chief, Test Programs Section, 'date 08, DRS Inspection Summary: Inspection on September 16-October 8, 1985 (Inspection

' Report No. 50-322/85-37).

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of the startup test program during test condition heat up including startup test witnessing, startup test results evaluation; review and evaluation of main turbine initial operation, RHR bypass ~ valve malfunction, and valve operator failures; independent measure-ments/ calculations / verifications; QA/QC interfaces and tours of the facilit The inspection involved 110 hours0.00127 days <br />0.0306 hours <br />1.818783e-4 weeks <br />4.1855e-5 months <br /> onsite by three region based inspector Results: No violations were identifie Note: For acronyms not defined refer to NUREG-0544 " Handbook of Acronyms and

.Initialisms" 8511130375 851107 DR ADOCK 0 % p

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

• J. Alexander, Reactor Engineer

• B. Beytin, Systems Engineer

• D. Bouchie, Lead STO&A Engineer

• A. Chmela, Startup. Engineer

• G. Cocuzzo, QC Inspector

• J.'Dutka, GE Field Engineer

• F. Hearty, GE Operations Superintendent .

• D. Himle, Power Ascension Test Program (PATP) Test Coordinator

• Olsen, Systems Engineer

• R. Perra, QC Section Head S. Petty, QA Supervisor J. Scalice, Operations Manage *W. Steiger, Plant Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission J. Berry, Senior Resident Inspector The inspector also contacted other members of the licensee staff including reactor operators, watch supervisors, watch engineers, and test engineer * denotes those present at the exit meeting on October 8, 1985

2. Startup Test Program 2.1 References:

Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS) Final Safety Analysis Report

• SNPS Safety Evaluation Report

• Regulatory Guide 1.68 " Initial Test Program For Water Cooled Reactor Powar Plants"

• SNPS Power Ascension Test Program Schedule

SP-12.075.01 " Administration of-Startup Testing"

• ANSI N18.7-1976 " Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for

'the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants."

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2.2 Startup Test Witnessing Scope The inspector witnessed portions of the tests described in the dis-cussion section below. The tests were reviewed against the attri-butes identified in inspection report 50-322/85-29 section Discussion '

On September 24, 1985 the licensee began performance of startup test procedure STP-15, High Pressure Coolant Injection, (HPCI) section 8.2.2.4, a cold quickstart test, and 8.4.2, an endurance run. The inspector observed control room activities and verified that the re-

. quired prerequisites had been completed. The HPCI system was aligned to pump from the' condensate storage water tank (CST) and discharge back to the CST at a rated pressure of 1025 PSIG. To simulate pumping against reactor pressure, pump discharge valve MOV-37 was preposition-ed in a partially closed position. The test commenced at 10:35 am ar.d the HPCI came up to rated speed and flow in the specified time, however the discharge pressure only came up to 750 psig. The licensee continued to run the' system to obtain needed pipe expansion and tem-

_perature data, however the test would have to be repeated at a later

'date (after the HPCI system had cooled down for the minimum 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> specified in the procedure prerequisites). The licensee determined that the MOV-37 valve would have to be repositioned to bring the dis-charge pressure up to the required 1025 psig. Some data was also obtained for the procedure section 8.4.2 Endurance Run, but that test would also be run at a later dat On October 4, 1985 with the reactor at approximately 3% power, one turbine bypass valve 25% open and at rated pressure the licensee per-formed the hot reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) vessel injection portion of STP-14 "RCIC". The inspector observed QC performing a surveillance of the' operator and test personnel activities. The in-

-spector observed the test director briefing the operating personnel prior to the conduct of the test. At approximately 4:30 A.M. the operator manually initiated RCIC. The. inspector independently timed the duration required for RCIC to inject 400 gpm into the vessel as 18 seconds, which satisfied the test criteria. The inspector observed a 0.5% increase in reactor power due to the slightly cooler water injection by RCIC. After the test data was obtained, RCIC was secured at approximately 5:30 Findings No violations or unacceptable conditions were note I I

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2.3 Startup Test-Results Evaluation Scope The inspector reviewed the test results listed in the discussion section for the attributes identified in inspection report 50-322/

85-29.section 3.2. The appropriate attributes were applied depending on the status of the licensee review process. Twenty three (23) test exception reports were also reviewed for technical adequacy and pro-cessing in accordance with the administrative procedur Discussion The inspector verified that the following startup test result sections have completed the management review cycle of independent review and the technical review committee (TRC) review. Detailed

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inspector review was completed in previous inspections. The test sections reviewed were STP-6 Section 8.3, STP-10 Section 8.2, STP-12 Section 8.1, STP-26 Section 8.1 and STP-33 Section The test result sections listed below were reviewed. Except as noted, the appropriate attributes from above were satisfied. A-summary of each follows:

STP-1 Section 8.2 " Chemical and Radiochemical," Revision 2, test implemented August 28, 1985 Acceptance criteria were satisfie Independent review was completed. TRC review is not complete STP-2 Section 8.2 " Radiation Measurements," Revision 2, test implemented August 19, 198 Acceptance criteria were satisfied. Independent review was completed. TRC review is not complete STP-9 Section 8.1 " Water Level Measurements," Revision 3, test implemented September 22, 198 Test was reperformed after the first attempt on August 9, 1985. A test exception was prepared for the 1 out of 10 narrow range level instrument and the 2 out of 14 wid range instruments that were outside the acceptance criteria band and would be recalibrated. Independent review was completed; however, TRC review is not complete STP-11 Section 8.1 "LPRM Calibration," Revision 4, test implemented August 10- September 25, 198 p

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Independent review was completed, however TRC review is not completed. Test exceptions identified were processed for those LPRM'.s not tested due to low neutron levels during the test. These will be tested when neutron levels are sufficiently high to see LPRM respons STP-25 Section 8.1 " Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV),"

Revision 4, test implemented August 22, 198 Independent review was completed, however TRC review is not yet completed. The inspector independently calculated the MSIV closure times using the data recorded in the startup test. The NRC inspector values for MSIV closure time including delay were longer and did not agree with the licensee values in the test analysis section. The NRC inspector calculated values for MSIV full stroke time agreed with the licensee values. After discussion, the licensee recalculated the MSIV closure time including

.. delay and obtained the same value as the inspector. The licensee subsequently revised thL test analysis section values. Both sets of values satisfied-the acceptance criteria. MSIV closure times ranged from 3.3-4.7 seconds and thus satisfied the acceptance criteria af 3-5 second The' twenty three (23) test exception reports reviewed included two test exceptions of level 1 acceptance criteria; The inspector reviewed the licensee actions that occurred following these test exceptions (TER 14-5 and 14-7) and the stop/ restart forms and con-cluded that the licensee actions were consistent with the adminis-trative procedures. -The inspector also held discussions with the

'PATP Test Coordinator regarding the level of closeout information detail contained within the test. exception report. The licensee is planning to issue instructions to assure that-additional detail is added to the test exception report to clearly indicate that all actions were performed as stated in the resolutio This will be further reviewed in subsequent inspection Findings No violations were identifie .3 Licensee Plans for Testing Beyond Test Condition Heatup The. inspector discussed the plans for testing in the next test con-dition. The licensee is currently in a 60 day scheduled outage following the completion of the turbine roll activity. The licensee indicated that the required startup testing in test condition heatup has been performed. The licensee is planning to complete the required test result reviews, resolve the test exceptions identified and conduct the required plateau revie ~

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The licensee has plans to review the startup test procedures for future testing and revise as necessary to assure that the procedures are technically adequate and are consistent with license' requirements and commitments. Following the procedure reviews, the licensee plans to conduct extensive training in the procedures and in the adminis-trative-program. The inspector will closely follow the licensee activities for test condition heatup evaluation and future testing plans and trainin . Main Turbine Initial Operation Scope The inspector reviewed the licensee plans and procedures and witnessed a major portion of the licensee activities related to the initial operation of the main turbine to ascertain that the-licensee's actions were consistent with the license. The following documents were reviewed:

• TP-23.127.02 " Turbine Generator Initial Roll and Synchronization,"

Revision 0 Issued October 3, 1985

• " Safety Evaluation for SNPS Turbine Generator Initial Roll and Synchronization at or Below 5% Licensed Power" dated September 16, 1985

• SNPS Planning Schedules Discussion Inspection report 50-322/85-32 described independent assessment by the inspector regarding the physical ability to achieve rated turbine speed and indicated that a subsequent inspection would assess the administrative controls. ' The inspector review of.the safety evaluation, operator train-ing and procedures was done in this inspection. The safety evaluation concluded that this operation can-be accomplished safely and should not result in exceeding 5% thermal power. The safety evaluation indicated that because the test is to be conducted with the mode switch in " start-up," administrative' controls will-be instituted for the operator to scram'

the reactor and close the MSIVs if low pressure.is sensed at the inlet to the'high pressure turbin Inspector review of the governing procedure for this activity, TP-23-127.02, indicated that monitoring of the steam pressure and actions to be taken.were include The licensee assigned one of the day Watch Engineers to coordinate operations preparation and training of this activity. Training was conducted' principally through review and discussion of the procedur .

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The licensee began warming the main turbine shell on October 4, 198 During the shell warming activities water conductivity was increasing apparently due to the protective coating residue of the main turbin Conductivity was being monitored and controlled by the licensee. The inspector monitoring of.the RWCU conductivity indicated conductivity was being maintained between .5 and .7 micro mho/cm and was acceptabl The licensee completed testing and adjustment of the moisture separator cross around relief valves on October 6, 198 On October 6, 1985 at approximately 1750 hours0.0203 days <br />0.486 hours <br />0.00289 weeks <br />6.65875e-4 months <br /> the licensee performed the initial sounding roll on the main turbine. The licensee rolled the turbine to approximately 100 rpm and then permitted the turbine to coast down to the turning gear speed. The reactor was at approximately 4.1%

power with one turbine bypass valve at about 47% open. The inspector monitored- APRM power levels during the initial sounding roll and did not observe any unacceptable power increases during the evolution. Review of the transient recorder output also indicated that reactor power was less than license power during the evolutio After successfully completing the sounding roll the licensee then initiated the main turbine roll at approximately 1906 hours0.0221 days <br />0.529 hours <br />0.00315 weeks <br />7.25233e-4 months <br />. The reactor conditions were as before. The main turbine achieved 1800 rpm at approxi-mately 1945 hours0.0225 days <br />0.54 hours <br />0.00322 weeks <br />7.400725e-4 months <br /> with one turbine bypass valve approximately 30% ope Inspector review of the transient recorder indicated license power was not exceeded. No further turbine roll activities were witnessed during this' inspection.

After completion of a scheduled 60 day outage which began on October 18, 1985.the licensee plans to conduct additional testing of the turbine

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and generato Findings No violations were note .0. RHR Bypass Value Malfunction At 0915 on September 25 the licensee declared an unusual event (category 15,) when it was discovered that the valve operator on the Residual Heat Removal System (RHR)'"B" loop bypass valve (IE11 MOV-45) had malfunc-tioned. At the time, the reactor was operating at approximately 1.5%

power when it was discovered that the bypass valve could not be closed following a shutdown of RHR cooling. This valve cycles open as the RHR system is shut down, to provide adequate circulation and cooling for the pump. Following-the shutdown, the valve is normally cycled closed again and left in that position until the next shutdow Following the indi-cation in the control room that the valve had not closed, the licensee investigated and discovered that the four studs (bolts) which secure the valve operator had sheared of i x

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Because the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was also out of service at that time, the licensee was required by T.S. 3.0.3 to begin a plant shutdown within one hour if both ECCS systems could not be brought back into service. By 1028 hours0.0119 days <br />0.286 hours <br />0.0017 weeks <br />3.91154e-4 months <br />, the licensee had brought the HPCI system back into service and terminated the unusual event. The reactor pressure had been reduced to approximately 750 psig. The licensee is evaluating the valve operator failur The inspector reviewed the licensee's action in response to this unusual event. This review included discussions with the plant operations staff, plant management, review of control room logs, the emergency director's log, and the Emergency Director's Implementing Actions Checklist. The inspector verified that the appropriate actions specified in the licensees Emergency Preparedness Plan, and Emergency Preparedness Implementing Pro-cedure (EPIP) 1-1, " Unusual Event", had been completed satisfactoril The event had been appropriately classified as a UE-15 (Category 15 un-usual event) as defined in Section 4 of the Shoreham Emergency Prepared-ness Pla . Valve Operator Failures Following the discovery of the broken bolts on the valve operator on IE11-MOV-45B, (see section 4.0) the licensee's management committed to evaluate the cause of the failure and to inspect other safety related valves for similar problems. The licensee's inspection identified that IE11-MOV-45A also had a broken valve operator mounting bol On September 26, 1985 the inspector toured the reactor building elevation 40' and discovered that one of the four bolts on IE11-MOV-41B (RHR system suppression pool spray inlet valve) had backed out (loosened) approxi-mately one inch. This bolt is one of the four (approx.) 1/2 inch diameter socket head capscrews which secure the motor valve operator assembly to the valve yok Following this discovery, the inspector questioned the licensee's manage-ment about the scope of the ongoing valve inspection to determine if this valve discrepancy would have been discovered by the licensee's inspectio The licensee's representative stated that only valves in reactor building elevation 8' had been inspected due, in part, to the limited manpower available. At the time, many plant employees were making preparations for the approaching Hurricane Gloria which was projected to hit the area by noon the following day (September 27). The inspector expressed his con-cern about the limited scope and apparent low priority of the valve inspection in view of the licensee's intention to continue startup testing until about midnight on September 26, 1985, when a shutdown was planned because of the approaching hurricane. When the licensee's management became aware of the additional valve operator failure, they decided to increase the scope of the inspection, to increase the number of personnel assigned, and begin a shutdown of the reactor earlier than planned.

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o Following these discussions, the inspector made another tour of the reactor building (all elevations), inspected a sample of thirty motor operated valves, and discovered a broken valve . operator mounting bolt on IE11-MOV-41 This valve is the RHR Systems Suppression Pool Spray inlet valve and per-forms the same function as the IE11-MOV-41B valve on the other loop. The head of the (approx.) 1/2_ inch diameter socket head capscrew was missing and appeared to have sheared off flush with the surface of the yoke. The inspector verified that the licensee's augmented inspection had already identified this discrepanc By September 27 the licensee had completed their inspection and identified a total of seven RHR valves with loose mounting bolts, one with a sheared mounting bolt, one with a loose handwheel, and one with a missing handwhee _The licensee's engineering evaluation was ongoing and will be further pur-sued by the resident inspecto . Independent Measurements / Calculations / Verifications The inspector did independent evaluation of test results and performed calculations of MSIV stroke times as described on Section The inspector monitored reactor power response and RWCU conductivity during the initial turbine roll activitie The inspector monitored performance of RCIC during RCIC reactor vessel injection test The inspector independently assessed the status of bolting on safety re-lated valves as described in Section . QA/QC Interfaces The inspector held discussions with the QA and QC Supervisors and the lead QC startup inspector regarding the status of QA/QC involvement. QC is con-ducting surveillance of startup activities and have been observed perform-ing these surveillances. QC review of completed test sections has commence The inspector inquired regarding the status of the completed reviews and those yet to be performed. QC personnel indicated that they rely on the Startup test program personnel to provide the test section package when they are_ completed and did not track the number of test section packages required. The QC personnel decided to implement a tracking system to de-fine'the test sections packages required and the status of the QC revie The inspector also reviewed the surveillance activity checklist for test section packages review and was found to be acceptabl . Tours of the Facility The inspector made several tours of the facility during the course of the inspection including the turbine building, reactor building, control struc-ture and control roo No unacceptable conditions were noted.

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' Ex'it Interview At the conclusion of the site inspection on October 8, 1985, an exit meeting was conducted with the licensee's senior site representatives

~(denoted in paragraph 1). The findings were identified and discusse At no time during the inspection did the inspector provide written inspection-findings to the. licensee. The licensee indicated.that no proprietary information was contained in the scope of the inspectio .