IR 05000322/1987016

Insp Rept 50-322/87-16 on 870711-0830.No Unacceptable Conditions Observed.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Radiation Protection,Security,Surveillance,Outage Activities Repts to NRC

ML20235T955
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	09/28/1987
From:	Cowgill C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235T944	List: IR 05000322/1987016 ML20235T940
References
50-322-87-16, IEB-86-001, IEB-86-1, IEIN-83-69, NUDOCS 8710130300
Download: ML20235T955 (13)

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U.S. NUCLEAR-REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I'

Report N /87-16 i Docket N License N Long Island Lighting Company i

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P. O. Box 618 Shoreham Nuclear Power. Station )

l l Wading River, New York 11792 __

l Inspection At: Wading River, Naw York' l

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Inspection Conducted: July 11, 1987 - August 30, 1987 '

q Inspectors: C. C. Warren, Senior Resident Inspectar l

F. J. Crescenzo,' Resident Inspector Approved By: Nh C. J.'Cowgi 1, Chief, Reactor Projects N 7~

Section 1D, . ision of Reactor Projects 3 Inspection Summary: During the period covered by Inspection Report 87-16.the i facility was r,aintained in a cold shutdown condition. The licensee commenced- l a major plant modification project.to tie in an additional emergency AC power i source supply to 4.16 KV safety bus 10 Routine maintenance and surveillance '

activities were also conducted during the inspection perio Seventy-five hours of direct inspection effort were expended for this i inspectio '

Areas Inspected: Routine Resident Inspection of plant operations, radiation protection, security, plant events, maintenance, surveillance, outage activities, and reports to the NRC. Additional inspections were also conducted in areas of Diesel trip logics, Warehouse systems, and Residual Heat Removal-(RHR) flow logic Results: No unacceptable conditions were. observe i l

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DETAILS 1. Review of Facility Operations 1.1 Plant Status Summary During the period covered by Inspection Report 87-16, the facility remained in a cold shutdown condition. The licensee conducted routine. surveillance and maintenance items as required by License NPF-3 In addition to routine items, the licensee cor.tinued work on a plant modification to tie a Colt Diesel Generator to bus 10 I 1.2 Operational Safety Verification The inspectors routinely toured the control room to verify proper shift manning, use of and adherence to approved procedures, and compliance with Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation. Control panel instrumentation and recorder traces were observed and the status of annunciators was reviewed. Nuclear instrumentation and reactor protection system status were examine Radiation monitoring instrumentation, including in plant Area Radiation monitors and effluent monitors were verified to be within allowable limits, and observed for indications of trends. Electrical distribution panels were examined for verification of proper lineups of backup and emergency electrical power sources as required by the Technical Specification. Eight (8) hours of this inspection effort were expended during backshift or weekend periods, l i

The inspector reviewed Watch Engineer and Nuclear Station Operator )

logs for adequacy of review by oncoming watchstanders, and for proper d entries. A periodic review of Night Orders, Maintenance Work i Requests, Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Log, and other control room logs and records were made. Shift turnovers were observed on a periodic basi The inspector also observed and reviewed the adequacy of access j controls to the Main Control Room, and verified that no loitering by ;

unauthorized personnel in the Control Room Area was permitted. The l inspector observed the conduct of Shift personnel to ensure adherence i to Shoreham Procedures 21.001.01, " Shift Operations" and 21.004.01,

" Main Control Room - Conduct for Personnel". i No unacceptable conditions were identifie ;

1.3 Plant and Site Tours The inspectcr conducted periodic tours of accessible areas of the plant and site throughout the inspection period. These included: the Turbine and Reactor Buildings, the Rad Waste Building, the Control Building, the Screenwell Structure, the Fire Pump House, the Security Building, and the Colt Diesel Generator Buildin _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . - _ _ _ _ _ -.

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l During these tours, the following specific-items were evaluated:

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Fire Equipment - Operability and evidence of periodic inspection of fire suppression equipment;

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Housekeeping - Maintenance of required cleanliness levels; )

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Equipment Preservation - Maintenance of special precautionary measures for installed equipment, as applicable;

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QA/QC Surveillance - Pertinent activities were being surveilled on a sampling basis by qualified QA/QC personnel;

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Component Tagging - Implementation of appropriate equipment tagging for safety, equipment protection and jurisdiction;

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Personnel adherence to Radiological Controlled Area rules, including proper Personnel frisking upon exit from the Radiation Control Are Access control to the Protected Area, including search activities,' escorting and badging, and vehicle access control; I

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Integrity of the Protected Area boundar No unacceptable conditions were identifie . Licensee Reports i

2.1 In Office Review of Licensee Event Reports The inspector reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) submitted to .

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' the NRC to verify that details were clearly reported, including f accuracy of the cause description and adequacy of corrective actions. The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were involved, and whether the event warranted onsite follow-up. The following LERs were reviewe LER 87-020: Bomb Threat i

LER 87-021: Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning penetration !

design deficiencies identified after detailed review !

of Information Notice 83-69 resulting in violation of a license condition identified in this LE Corrective action is in progress. Followup of.this action is an unresolved item (322/87-16-02-02).

LER 87-022: Voluntary report of Motor Operated Valve dynamic testing failure of High Pressure Coolant Injection recirculation valve ,

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LER 87-023: Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water shed non-safety-related loads due to Low "A" head tank water leve LER 87-024: Fire watch patrol required by Fire Protection Program was not met due to personnel injury. The fire watch misued three locations on a routine required hourly tou LER 87-025: Instrument and Controls surveillance calibration and response time procedures found to not adequately satisfy Technical Specification _

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The inspector has no further questions regarding the above LER {

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Monthly Surveillance and tiaintenance Observation i i

3.1 Surveillance Activities I The inspector observed the performance of various surveillance tests to verify that the surveillance procedure conformed to technical specification requirements. Administrative approvals and tagging requirements were reviewed and approved prior to test initiation, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel, current approved procedures were used, test instrumentation was currently calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, test data was accurately and completely recorded, removal and restoration of affected components was properly accomplished, and tests were completed within the required Technical Specification frequenc No unacceptable conditions were identifie .2 Maintenance Activities l The inspector observed the conduct of various maintenance activities throughout the inspection period. During this observation, the inspector verified that maintenance activities were conducted within the requirements of the plant's administrative procedures and technical specifications, proper radiological controls were implemented and observed, proper safety precautions were observed, and that activities which have the potential to impact plant operations are properly coordinated with the control roo No unacceptable conditions were note . Warehouse Inspection An inspection of the warehouse facilities and administrative processes for receiving and storage of materials was conducted by the resident inspector. The purpose of this inspection was to determine whether:

. Safety related materials were being properly stored in the C-3 and main warehouses,

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. and to assess housekeeping conditions in the warehouse The inspector reviewed station procedures SP 12.019.02, Receiving Spare Parts, Materials and Components, and SP 12.019.03, Storage of Spare Parts, Materials and Components,. along with a previous inspection report detail-ing findings of a warehouse inspection conducted in February 1987, (50-322/87-04). It was noted during this review that storage of safety related materials is permitted in both the main warehouse and the C3 warehouse provided storage requirements delineated in SP 12.019.03 revision 12, are met. These requirements include assignment of a storage level "A" through "D" depending on the c'egree of environmental control required for storage of the particular component or materia Level A is the most controlled environment (inside, temperature and humidity control-led, with clean filtered air) and level D is the least controlled environ-ment (outside on cribbing). Storage level requirements are independent of safety or non-safety related classificatio Following the review, the inspector met with the main warehouse manager

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and toured the warehouse facilities. During the tour of the main ware-l house the inspector noted that although the warehouse seemed to be at near full capacity, housekeeping was adequate within storage areas. House-

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keeping within receipt inspection areas was poor but this was due to a large number of materials awaiting inspection which gave an appearance of disorganization. The inspector did not have a safety concern related to housekeeping in the main warehouse however, housekeeping could be improved. Several safety related items were selected at random from storage areas and documentation of receipt inspection QA paperwork reviewed for completeness. All were found to be stored at an appropriate level and in compliance with the station procedures referenced abov The inspector also toured the C-3 warehous This warehouse is located approximately 3/4 mile from the protected area, but within the licensee's controlled access area. This warehouse is suitable for Level "C" storage requirements only (inside, unheated). It was noted during inspection of the C-3 warehouse that a large amount of materials appeared to be in the process of being moved or inspected. The C-3 warehouse manager was questioned on this subject and it was found that the majority of this

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activity was associated with the licensee's material transfer progra This program prescribes the methods by which the licensee reclaims materials / components leftover from the construction phase, previously=

controlled by the Architect Engineer's material control program. The process entails identification of items previously controlled by the Architect Engineer and retrieval of the historical records back to the original vendor. Following this, the material is' receipt inspected and entered into the LILCO material storage program. There is a large amount of this material which must still be transferred as evfdenced by approximately seventeen full time warehouse employees dedicated to completion of this tas Housekeeping in some areas of the C-3 warehouse was poor. There were large amounts of materials stored in the aisles between storage rack However, these areas were used mostly for storage of items awaiting th transfer' process described above. Housekeeping.in areas of the C-3 warehouse where safety related materials were stored was adequat Several safety related items were randomly selected for inspectio All were found to be stored at their appropriate storage level .and in accordance with other requirements of the station procedures referenced abov In summary, the inspector found that storage of safety related material in the warehouses inspected was prope However, he noted that housekeeping conditions in both facilities required attention by licensee managemen The inspector discussed his concerns regarding housekeeping with station managemen The inspector has no further questions related to this matte . Bomb Threat On August 5, 1987, an unidentified caller to the west security gate stated that there were two bombs " strategically" located on' site set to l go off at 4:00am.

An Unusual Event was declared at 2:15am based on a security threat and all required emergency notifications were made. Suffolk County Police responded to the plant and a search was conducted of the site. No bombs were found. The Unusual Event was terminated at 5:00a The inspector has no further questions concerning this inciden j 6. Drug Related Event Involving a Licensee Employee On August 6, 1987, a Clerk-Typist employed by the licensee at the plant, and her husband, were arrested by State and Federal law enforcement persannel for operating a CRACK and synthetic cocaine production L

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laboratory in their Rocky Point, New York home. The husband'was-reportedly employed as a Chemist at the nearby Brookhaven National ;

Laboratory in Upton, New Yor The licensee has suspended the employee's authorization for unescorted access to the plant protected area pending the outcome of the cas Interviews of co-workers conducted by the licensee provided no indication 1 that she used illicit drugs on sit The licensee's Fitness for Duty-Program had not been fully implemented; consequently, the employee had not been tested for drug us I l

The inspector has no further concerns related to this inciden . Personnel Found Sleeping During the inspection period, four separate incidents occurred involving site accessed individuals sleeping while on duty. Three of the persons ;

involved were security guards employed by the licensee's security force contractor, Protection Technology Incorporated (PTI) of Philadelphia, P The fourth person was a non-licensed operator on shift for training watches required by the licensed operator training program he was i Of the three incidents involving security guards, one resulted in a moderate loss of security effectiveness which was properly compensated for as defined by 10 CFR 73.71. The other two incidents involved guards who were not at positions required by the station physical security pla Although no reports were required to be made to the NRC regarding these ,

events by 10 CFR 73.71, the resident inspectors were promptly notified !

after each inciden The inspector interviewed the site security manager regarding the above problems. The site security manager provided the following informatio The manager attributed the problems directly to a lack of supervisory 3 experience on the part of certain security force foremen (sergeants).

This contributed to lax discipline among the security' force. Typically in

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the past, when such a position became vacant, selection was made from the security guard force. A sergeants salary, relative to a guards salary, resulted in small monetary raise along with a greatly increased responsibility and supervisory role. Because of this, many of the more experienced guards would not apply for the sergeant vacancies due to a perception that the increased compensation was inade quate for the increased responsibility. Additionally, although it is be-lieved that the competency and morale of the security force is adequate, attrition is very high, (37% to 40%), resulting in a relatively low experience level within i the guard force. The licensee attributes the large attrition rate 'to two I factors:

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Uncertainty regarding Shoreham's licensing status as it relates to job security.

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Aggressive hiring by local law enforcement agencies. This factor is exacerbated by the highly desirable employment status of a fully trained security guard. Much of the preliminary training and background investigation required by local law enforcement has been completed by the license As a result cf the above two factors, when a sergeant vacancy became available, many security force personnel chose not to apply and those who did typically were not experienced at personnel supervisio j Based on discussion with licensee representatives it appears that the l licensee is aggressively pursing corrective actions in response to these !

sleeping incidents. A new policy has been established whereby security i l force personnel posted at required positions are not allowed to sit down while on duty. Infraction of this rule results in a five day suspension l q

from the site without pay. Additionally, any security force personnel found sleeping on duty are immediately and permanently denied site access.

The licensee has also rret with senior management from PTI (the guard force contractor) on two separate occasions since the first incident. As a result of these meetings the following program / personnel changes have l

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Three of eight security force foremen (sergeants) were relieved from supervisory positions at the licensee's request. All three individuals have subsequently resigned their positions at Shoreha Three new sergeants were hired from outside the security force personnel. All three individuals retired from long careers with local law enforcement agencie LILCO security management has committed to a more active role in the selection of future security force supervisory personne Particular emphasis will be placed on selection of individuals with an extensive history of successful supervision of security force personne LILCO is negotiating with the contractor to increase salaries awarded to supervisory personne This should assist the licensee in attracting and maintaining highly qualified individual The sleeping incident involving the LILCO employee occurred late in the inspection period. This incident appears to be an isolated case and does not, at this time, have generic implications. The individual was found sleeping in the control room by the Watch Engineer, the senior licensed individual on shif The individual had dozed while studying at a desk behind the main panels in the control room area.

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The licensee subsequently disciplined the individual'. I The inspector will closely monitor the licensee future actions in regard to these matter . Completion of Temporary Instruction 2515/82 The purpose of this Temporary Instruction was to provide guidance for performing the inspection followup of the licensee's actions taken in response to NRC Bulletin 86-0 J Bulletin 86-01 discussed the potential for a single failure under certain accident sequences which could result in all RHR minimum flow bypass valves be:nq signaled to close while pump discharge valves are also closed. This condition could_ result in no flow through the RHR pumps and could lead to pump damage in a few minutes. .This would disable RHR functions including LPCI and containment' cooling sprays ultimately disabling the core spray system due to loss.of NPS A review of the licensee's actions in response to this bulletin resulted in the following observations:

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The licensee responded within three days of receipt of the notic l This is well within the required 7 days specified by the bulleti '

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A detailed review of the design documents for the RHR flow logic configuration at Shoreham determined that this single failure vulnerability ldoes not exist at Shoreha The flow sensing ,

instrument in each of the RHR loops control only its associated '

bypass valv Therefore, a postulated failure of a single flow ,

sensing instrument has the potential to effect only one loop of the }

RHR system at Shoreham, j

The inspector has no further questions regarding this issue, i Region I Temporary Instruction 87-04

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This inspection instruction was in response to an event which occurred at Limerick Unit I involving a non-essential trip of'the Emergency Diesel Generato The inspection requirements delineated a review of the Diesel Generator trip logics to determine if non-essential EDG trips are bypassed during either a LOCA or a LOOP transient and to determine if the bypass feature is routinely tested to verify operabilit i I

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The inspector conducted a detailed review of the diesel trip logics and surveillance procedures. The following documents the results of that review:

Shoreham TDI Diesel Generators have ten trip Three of these are considered " essential" and are included in the trip circuit at all times. These are:

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Overcurrent

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Generator Phase Differential

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Overspeed The remaining seven signals are bypassed following a LOCA signal only. This bypass feature is accomplished by a relay within the core spray system logic, which opens a contact in the Diesel trip logics isolating the non-essential trips from the trip circuit The relays and contacts are tested by Shoreham surveillance procedure SP 24 203.04, Core Spray Initiation Logic System Functional and Actuation Test. This is accomplished by simulation of LOOP and LOCA. With the diesel running, each non-essential trip is simulated and the diesel verified not to tri The inspector has no further questions regarding this matte . Potential Spent Fuel Rack Deficiencies It was brought to the attention of the inspector that a potential problem existed with the vendor responsible for fabrication of Shoreham's Spent Fuel Rack NRC Vendor Inspection Branch report 999-010-82 87-01 documents a number of I program deficiencies found at U. S. Tool and Die'Inc., a major manufact-urer of spent fuel racks. These deficiencies included material defects, welding defects, QA program deficiencies and non-compliance with 10 CFR 21 reporting requirements. The report further documents that a number of fuel racks were shipped by U. S. Tool and Die, Inc. to Shoreham in 198 The inspector obtained a copy of the inspection report and informed the licensee of the potential problems. The licensee QCD manager responded by presenting the inspector with extensive documentation regarding the procurement, design, construction, OA and inspection of the spent fuel racks at Shoreham. The inspector asked why so much documentation existed and received the following explanation: '

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Shoreham placed an order for fuel racks in 1977 with the Wachter Engineering Corporation. Wachter subcontracted fabrication of the racks to V. S. Tool and Die, Inc. .In 1978-79 both companies began to develop financial and labor relation difficultie LILC0 management became concerned.that the fabrication would be delayed and/or defective. In response to this, LILC0 arranged to provide 100 percent QA inspection of the fabrication process. This was performed by LILC0 or Stone and Webster Quality Control inspectors who were assigned at the manufacturing facility. Additionally, LILCO reevaluated engineering calculations performed by Wachter to verify accuracy and arranged to segregate completed fuel racks designated for Shoreham from other orders handled by U.S. Tool and Die, In q Because of this, the licensee has extensive detailed documentation regarding the Quality Control and fabrication of the fuel racks, which would not normally be available. The inspector reviewed this documentation. A number of minor deficiencies were identified by inspectors at U. S. Tool and Die, however, all were corrected or reevaluated as satisfactory. A-number of material receipt inspections were also conducted at U. S. Tool and Die on raw materials received at U. S. Tool and Die to be used in the manufacture of Shoreham's Fuel rack T.'ase were also found to be sati sf actor In summary, the licensee was conservative in meeting its obligation to monitor vendor activities with regard to U. S. Tool and Di The inspector has no further questions regarding this matte . Observation of Shift Advisor Examination The inspector observed an oral examination administered by facility personnel to a prospective shift advisor. The shift advisor position provides a non licensed function to assist / advise the licensed staff on shift in making operational decisions. Typically, a shift adviror has been NRC licensed at an operational plant and can presumably offer operational experience / knowledge otherwise unavailable to a cold licensed staf The examination was administered by three senior licensed examiners, one of whom was the assistant plant manager. The questions were prepared and each examiner took turns asking them in each of five separate categorie At the end of this portion of the exam, each examiner subjectively determined a raw score (0-100) based on the candidates' answers. An average score of the three examiners is used to determine pass / fai The inspector noted that, while there was a prepared question package, some questions were shallow in depth. Specifically, a number of questions

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appeared to overemphasize ' nominal ~ system values, set points and response The:importance of such knowledge'to a' shift advisor's. function did not appear to warrant this emphasis. It~was noted that in-depth. follow up questions dealing with basic Tech Spec interpretation, judgemental deci-sions, etc. .. were al so' asked. The inspector discussed his concerns wit licensee managemen The inspector has no further questions-regarding this matte . Licensee Part 21 Report Update On August 11, 1987- Long Island Lighting Company submitted a Part 21 Report -

to the NRC regarding defective fittings received from' Guyon Industries, now Radnor Industries, of Harrison-N.'J., The~ fittings in question were forged, two inch, six thousand psi, category I elbows. Although the fittings were purchased to ASME section 3 specifications, which allows.no linear indications greater than one sixteenth inch in length, approximatel fifteen percent had rejectable indications. ~ Subsequent grinding of the defect indications revealed that approximately five percent were.in actual violation of minimum. wall thickness criteria. .The fittings in question were manufactured by Standard Fittings of Opelousas, LA. with the NDE-certification being performed by XRAY Inspection Incorporated of Lafayette, L Subsequent licensee investigation has revealed that approximately 7000 fittings of various design and dimension (all are category .I) have been-received at Shoreham which were purchased from Guyon Industries, manufactured by Standard Fittings, and NDE certified by.XRAY Inspection Incorporated. The licensee believes that the majority of.these' fittings are still in warehouse storage however, tw estigation regarding tne final disposition of all fittings in question is' continuing. Additionally, the licensee has placed a hold on warehouse issuance of any fittings with purchase order numbers indicating association:with the above mentioned vendor It is expected that all fittings still in. storage will be

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summarily rejected by the licensee and returned to the vendor without further. inspectio On August 27, 1987 the licensee met with the Quality Assurance Manager of Radnor, Inc. to discuss the problem. It was discovered that Guyon is currently near completion of 'a financial liquidation process and that 1 Radnor Inc. is unrelated to Guyon with exception of certain staff members 1 and facilities employed or purchased by Radnor from Guyon. As a result, j according to the Radnor representative, Radnor has no legal E responsibility to honor past obligations of Guyon. 'The Radnor representative has volunteered to assist theilicensee by inspecting Guyon records still housed at Radnor facilities, and by contacting Standard Fittings 'and XRAY Inc. to obtain additional records and quality assuranc procedure Because of the potentia'l safety impact of this item, the inspector.will follow this as unresolved item 87-16-0 i _ - _ _ - _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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~ held with the licensee management to discuss the scope and findings of this inspectio Based on NRC Region I review of this report, and discussions with licensee representatives, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restriction The inspectors also attended entrance and exit interviews for inspections conducted by region-based inspectors during the perio .

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