IR 05000322/1987005
| ML20214J954 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1987 |
| From: | Wiggins J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214J898 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-322-87-05, 50-322-87-5, NUDOCS 8705280264 | |
| Download: ML20214J954 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region I REPORT NO.
50-322/87-05 Docket No.:
50-322 License No.:
NPF-36 Licensee:
Long Island Lighting Company-P. O. Box 618 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Wading River,.New York 11792 Inspection At: Wading River, New York Inspection Conducted:
February 16 - March 31, 1987.
Inspector:
Clay C. Warren, Senior Resident Inspector Approved:
kllA 44 f[f 7 J/. T.Yiggi@{, Chief, Reactors Projects Date USection IB, Jivision of Reactor Projects Inspection Summary:
Areas Inspected:
Inspection on February 16, 1987 - March 31, 1987 (Inspection Report 50-322/87-05)
Routine resident inspection of plant operations, security,- radiological con-trols, surveillance testing, maintenance and ' modifications.
Additionally, a loss of offsite power event was reviewed.
Results:
Review of the loss of Offsite Power event which occurred on March 18, 1987 revealed the root cause as an inadequate modification procedure for work being performed on Bus 103 (See Section 6.0). Also, 'a weakness in 'the valve locking device program was identified (See Section.5.0).
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DETAILS 1.
Status of Previous Inspection Items 1.1 (Closed) Open Item 86-08-03, Evaluation of I&E Notice 86-14 Overspeed Trips of AFW, HPCI and RCIC Turbines.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation of IE Notice 86-08-03 and conducted an independent evaluation of the equipment installed at Shoreham.
The inspector agrees with the licensee's evaluation that the notice is not applicable to Shoreham. This item is closed.
1.2 (Closed) 86-12-02, Personnel Errors by Radiochemistry Personnel.
During the period from 5/15/86 through 6/11/86, personnel errors by i
Radiochemistry Personnel resulted in three Technical Specification
required samples being missed.
In response to these deficiencies,
the licensee has conducted additional training in this area with all l
Radiochemistry Personnel, revised existing procedures and developed l
a formal shift turnover procedure for the chemistry lab.
The inspector is satisfied with the licensee's response in this area.
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This item is closed.
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1.3 (Closed) 86-08-01, Non-Representative Sampling Due to Incorrectly
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Installed Radiation Purge Valves.
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Licensee Event Report 86-10 reported a non-conservative sampling l
error for Particulate and Iodine samples due to an incorrectly mounted solenoid purge valve. The licensee's investigation included all skid mounted radiation monitors installed at Shoreham, and iden-tified three monitors with the identical problem. It has been deter-mined that the equipment was supplied by the vendor, Nuclear Measure-ments Corporation (NMC), with the purge valves installed backwards.
The valve orientation has been corrected on the equipment installed
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at Shoreham.
The vendor has been notified of this defect and indus-
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try notification has been made via the INPO Nuclear note pad.
The inspector is satisfied with the licensee's actions in this matter.
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This item is closed.
1.4 (Closed) Open Items 84-46-03, Lack of Comprehensive Analysis for
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l Hi/Lo Pressure Interfaces, and 84-46-03, Lack of Comprehensive
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i Analysis for General Fire Instigated Spurious Signals.
l These items were closed by NRR and are referenced in a letter from Robert M. Bernero to John D. Leonard dated April 29, 1986.
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Review of Facility Operations j
r 2.1 Plant Status Summary 4.i j
During the period covered by Inspection. Report 87-01. the facility c;
remained in a cold shutdown condition.
The licensee conducted ro'u-tine surveillance and maintenance items as required by License
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In addition to routine items, the licensee. continued Colt i
i Diesel Generator Tie-In work on the 103 bus, completed the neutron source replacement, completed modifications to reactor vessel intru-i mentation to enhance the venting evolution, and began modifications
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to install the Augmented Alternate Rod Insertion System.
2.2 Operational Safety Verification
i The inspector toured the control room daily to verify proper ' shift manning, use of, and adherence to, approved procedures, and compli-ance with Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation.
Control panel instrumentation and recorder' traces were observed and the status of annunciators was reviewed. Nuclear instrumentation and
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reactor protection system status were examined. Radiation monitoring i
instrumentation, including in plant area radiation monitors and' ef-fluent monitors were verified to be within allowable limits, and ob-
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i served for indications of trends.
Electrical distribution - panels were examined for verification of proper lineups of backup and emerg-
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ency electrical power sources as required by the Technical Specifica-tion.
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The inspector reviewed Watch Engineer and Nuclear Station Operator logs for adequacy of review by oncoming watchstanders, and for proper
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'i entries.
A periodic review of Night Orders, Maintenance Work Requests, Technical Specification LC0 Log, and other control rooin logs and records were made.
Shift turnovers ' were observed on a
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periodic basis.
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The inspector also observed and reviewed the adequacy of access con-i trols to the Main Control Room, and verified that no loitering by unauthorized personnel in the Control Room Area was permitted.
The inspector observed the conduct of Shift personnel to ensure adherence:
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to Shoreham Procedures 21.001.01, " Shift Operations," and 21.004.01,
" Main Control Room - Conduct for Personnel"..
2.3 Plant and Site Tours The inspector conducted periodic tours of accessible areas of plant and site throughout the inspection period. These included:
the Tur-
- bine and Reactor Buildings, the Rad Waste Building, the Control
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Building, the Screenwell Structure, the Fire Pump House, the Security
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Building, and the Colt Diesel Generator Building.
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' During these tours, the following specific items were evaluated:
Fire Equipment - Operability and evidence of periodic inspection
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of fire suppression equipment; Housekeeping Maintenance: of required cleanliness levels;
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Equipment Preservation c-Maintenance of special precautionary.
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measures for. installed equipment, as applicable;
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QA/QC Surveillance:- Pertinent activities"were being surveilled
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on a sampling basis by qualified QA/QC personnel;
Component Tagging - Implementation of_ appropriate equipment tag-ging for safety, equipment protection, and jurisdiction;.
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Personne16 adherence to Radiological Controlled Area rules, in-
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cluding proper Personnel frisking upon RCA exit; Access control to the Protected - Area, ' including search activ-
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ities, escorting and badging, and vehicle ' access control; :and,-
Integrity of the Protected Area boundary.
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,j No unacceptable conditions were identified
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l-3.
. Licensee Reports I
3.1. In Office Review of Licensee Event Reports
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The inspector reviewed, Licensee-Event Reports (LERs) submitted to the NRC to verify that dre; ails were clearly reported, including accuracy i
of the cause description, and adequacy of corrective action.
The inspector determined whether further information ~was required - from
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the licensee, whether generic implications were involved, and whether i
the event warranted onsite follow-up.
The following LER was reviewed.
t Inst'umentation in the Control and -
LER 87-02:
Seismic Monitoring r
Reactor Building out of service for greater than 30 days.
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4.
Monthly Surveillance and Maintenance Observation 4.1 Surveillance Activities
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The inspector observed the performance of various surveillance tests to verify that the surveillance procedure conformed to Technical Specification requirements ~ that administrative approvals were ob-
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tained prior to commencing the test, and that tagging requirements were reviewed and approved prior to test initiation. The inspector observed if testii g was accomplished by qualified personnel, current approved procedures were used, test instrumentation was currently calibrated, Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, test data were accurately and completely recorded, removal and restoration of affected components were properly accomplished, and tests were com-pleted withi'.1 the required Technical Specification frequency.
Observations of the following surveillance activities were made:
Core Spray Pump Operability and Flow Rate Test
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Core Spray Valve Operability Test
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TDI Emergency Diesel Start and Load Test No unacceptable conditions were identified.
4.2 Maintenance Activities The inspector observed the conduct of various maintenance activities throughout the inspection period.
During this observation, the inspector verified that maintenance activities were conducted within the requirements of the plant's administrative procedures and Tech-nical Specifications, proper radiological controls were implemated and observed, proper safety precautions were observed, and that activities which had the potential to impact plant operations were properly coordinated with the control room staff.
The following activities were observed:
103 Bus - Colt EDG Modifications
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"D" RHR Pump Removal
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Reactor Vessel Instrumentation Venting Modification -
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No unacceptable conditions were noted.
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5.
Licensee Valve Control Program During the conduct of a routine plant tour, the inspector noted that the chain used to control valve manipulations appeared inadequate. The licen-see's method of valve control uses lightweight chain and tamper seals to ensure that unauthorized valve manipulations do not take place.
The inspector found no evidence of broken tamper seals, or mispositioned valves, however, a number of the chains in use had chain links that were open which could allow chain removal and valve operation without breaking the tamper seal.
The inspector presented his concern to plant management and the licensee took rapid positive corrective action to correct this condition.
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valves controlled under SP 27.001.01, Valve Locking Device Verification,
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have had the lightweight, open link chain replaced with a chain of closed link design. In addition to the valves controlled under SP 27.001.01, all fire water system controlled valves have also had their chains replaced.
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During the performance of the chain replacement, all valve positions where checked by the licensee and no valves were found out of position.
Fur-ther, the licensee's review identified no instances of unauthorized' valve manipulations.
In addition, the licensee made a Night Order entry regard-ing the changeout of the chains and the locked valve verification.
The inspector reviewed the plant's valve control procedure, and the licen-see's corrective actions, and found both to be satisfactory. The inspec-tor had no further questions.
6.
Loss of Normal and Reserve Station Service Transformers i
On March 18,1987, at 0146, Shoreham Station suffered a loss of both the Normal and Reserve Station Service Transformers. The event occurred dur-ing the conduct of breaker testing on the "A" condensate pump. When the i
reactor operator closed the breaker for the condensate pump, the Normal Station Service Transformer (NSST) tripped on differential current and caused a fast transfer to the Reserve Station Service Transformer (RSST).
The RSST then also tripped on' differential current.
Two of the three Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) started and loaded as designed; the third EDG was out of. service at the time to support ongoing modification work.
Power to the station was restored, via the RSST, at 0202. The licensee declared an Unusual Event at 0215, based on a loss of offsite power for greater than 15 minutes.
The licensee notified the State of New York, Suffolk County and the NRC.
The Unusual Event was terminated at 0500.
At the time of the event, the plant was in the refueling mode with the refuel cavity flooded and no Reactor Coolant System. temperature increase occurre,
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Licensee management immediately initiated an investigation to determine the cause of the event. Investigation of the event revealed that the pro-tective relaying differential circuits on the NSST and RSST had been biased as a result of jumpers installed on Bus 103 Current Transformers (cts) as a prerequisite for installation of a modification (Station Modification 86-064) which was in progress on 4.16KV emergency switchgear 1 R22*SWG-103.
The circuits involved had the differential current trans-former outputs in switchgear 103 cubicles 103-1 (NSST feeder) and 103-2 (RSST feeder) jumpered.
By jumpering the cts located in the 103 Bus, plant staff had effectively shorted the output of cts in 4.16KV switchgear cubicles 101-1, 102-1 11-11, 12-1 for the NSST differential relays and cubicles 101-2, 102-2, 11-1, 12-11 for the RSST differential circuit because all of the involved cts are electrically corrected in parallel to represent a simulation of transformer secondary current. This resulted in the differential relays for both the NSST and the RSST sensing a very low value of transformer secondary current.
With these conditions in effect, when the condensate pump was started (being powered from the NSST via Bus 11), the NSST differential relays sensed a differential current increase on the transformer due to a corres-ponding current increase on the primary side cts which were not shorted at the time. This increase in differential current exceeded the differential trip setpoint and therefore resulted in an NSST isolation.
The tripping of the NSST feeder breakers to switchgear 101, 102, 11 and 1A activated the fast transfer scheme to the RSST feeder breakers in the same switchgear.
Because the RSST differential circuit was in the same condition as the NSST differential circuit, the RSST also tripped and locked out. At this point, offsite power was completely isolated from the station and the available Emergency Diesel Generators started and supplied power to their respective buses.
To assess the cause of this event, the inspector reviewed the licensee's modification control process.
The modification development process at Shoreham is a two step process.
In the first step, a Design Output Pack-age (DOP) is developed by the Nuclear Engineering Department. The Design Output Package includes a 10 CFR 50.59 review on the final design and shows system design after the modification is completed. The second step includes the developement of a Station Modification Procedure.
The Station Modification Procedure (SMP) is the document that details how a modification will be implemented and includes a 10 CFR 50.59 review of the modification's effect on the plant during implementation.
The inspector concluded that the modification process at Shoreham is well defined and controlled.
Adequate safety and technical reviews are included in the station procedures and adverse effects on plant systems have thus far been minimal.
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In this event, the inspector determine that the root cause was a proced-ural deficiency in that the Station Modification Procedure for installa-tion of modification 86-064 did not detati specifically which cts were to be shorted. The DOP instructions on CT shorting were incorrectly inter" preted by the engineer preparing the -Station Modification Package, which resulted. in the SMP requiring shorting of all the cts. This deficiency was not detected by the licensee's technical review process. The inspec-tor concluded that this procedural deficiency is a violation of NRC re-
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quirements(50-322/87-05-01).
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Management Meetings At periodic ~ intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with licensee management to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection. The inspectors also attended entrance and exit interviews for inspections conducted by region-based inspectors during the period.
Based on NRC Region-I review of this report, and discussions with licensee representatives, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restrictions, i
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