IR 05000322/1987007

Insp Rept 50-322/87-07 on 870401-0515.No Unnaceptable Conditions Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Radiation Protection,Security,Plant Events,Maint, Surveillance,Outage Activities & Repts to NRC

ML20216H224
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	06/23/1987
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20216H174	List: IR 05000322/1987007 ML20216H169
References
50-322-87-07, 50-322-87-7, NUDOCS 8707010353
Download: ML20216H224 (10)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No.: i 50-322/87-07 <

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Docket N .

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Licensee: Long Island Lighting Company P. O. Box 618 i Wading River, New York 11792 l

Facility: Shoreham Nuclear Power Station j Inspection At.: Wading River, New York i

Inspection Conducted: April 1, 1987 - May 15, 1987 Inspector: C. C. Warren, Senior Resident Inspector j l

Approved By: C. J. Cowgill, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 10 Division of Reactor Projects i

Inspection Summary: Inspection on April 1, 1987 - May 15, 1987 (Inspection J Report 50-322/87-07)

Areas Inspected:

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Routine Resident Inspection of plant operations, radiation i protection, security, plant events, maintenance, surveillance, outage activ- !

ities and reports to the NR Results: No unnacceptable conditions were observe \

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DETAILS 1. Status of Previous Inspection Items 1.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item 84-36-01, Square D Company Motor Control Centers

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The following items were found in the wiring performed by the Square D Company which differ from the criteria of the licen-see's specification SH1-115:

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MCC cubicle ground wires are connected to cabinet ground and not to terminal block Minimum bending radius of 5 times the cable diameter was exceede Cable harnesses were not supported in the equipmen !

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The licensee has determined that the method of grounding used in d the Square D Motor control cabinets is in accordance with the Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) approved ven-dors wiring diagram and the applicable equipment specification (SH1-115) has been changed to reflect this informatio Bend radius measurements were conducted and any cables that .

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exceeded the minumum bend radius of 5 cable diameters were cor-rected to meet the requirements of specification SH1-115. These repairs have been documented in SWEC Nonconformance and Dispo-sition Report No. 62-6 Cable harness fastening methods in the installed Square D Motor ,

Control centers do not differ from the fastening method used in i the seismic test sample unit This information is documented in correspondence between SWEC and Square D-(LIL - 26988, ,

October 18,19Ep).  !

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The inspector has rePiewed all licensee and vendor documents relating to these matters arji is satisfied with the licensee's resolution These items are clos .2 (Closed)Unresolveditem 84-46-17, Licensee Response to Generic Letter 81-12  !

NRC letter from Robert M. Bernero, Director, Division of BWR Licensing to LILC0 d=ted February 25, 1987 closed this ite i e

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1.3 (Closed) Open Item 85-36-01, Qualification / Fitness for Duty Training

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The licensee has completed fitness for duty training for all j first line supervisors at the Shoreham plan '

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During the reorganization of the Office of Training a new Train- )

ing Qualification Program has been placed in service which ade- 1 quately tracks the qualification status of all individuals on i sit The inspector is satisfied with the licensee's action This item is close I I

2. Review of Facility Operations 4 2.1 Plant Status Summary During the period covered by Inspection Report 87-07 the facility j remained in a cold shutdown condition. The licensee conducted rou- '

tine surveillance and maintenance items as required by License NPF-  !

36. In addition to routine items, the licensee conducted block top i inspections of EDG 101 and 102 to comply with Attachment 3 of Facil- i ity License NPF-36, completed installation and testing of the Aug- j mented Alternate Rod Insert System and continued to make plant pre-parations to support a late May startup dat .2 Operational Safety Verification The inspector toured the control room daily to verify proper shift manning, use of and adherence to approved procedures, and compliance with Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation. Con-trol panel intrumentation and recorder traces were observed and the status of annunciators was reviewed. Nuclear instrumentation and reactor protection system status were examined. Radiation monitoring instrumentation, including in plant Area Radiation monitors and ef-fluent monitors were verified to be within allowable limits, and observed for indications of trend Electrical distribution panels were examined for verification of proper lineups of backup and emerg-ency electrical power sources as required by the Technical Specifica-tio The inspector reviewed Watch Engineer and Nuclear Station Operator logs for adequacy of review by oncoming watchstanders, and for proper entries. A periodic review of Night Orders, Maintenance Work Re-quests, Technical Specification LCO Log, and other control room logs and records were made. Shift turnovers were observed on a periodic basi .

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The inspector also observed and reviewed the adequacy of access con-trols to the Main Control Room, and verified that no loitering by

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unauthorized personnel in the Control Room Area was permitted. The inspector observed the conduct of Shift personnel to ensure adherence to Shoreham Procedures 21.001.01, " Shift Operations" and 21.004.01,

" Main Control Room - Conduct for Personnel". '

i 2.3 Plant and Site Tours i The inspector conducted periodic tours of accessible areas of the plant and the site throughout the inspection period. These included:

the Turbine and Reactor Buildings, the Rad Waste Building, the Con-

trol Building, the Screenwell Structure, the Fire Pump House, the Security Building, and the Colt Diesel Generator Buildin I i

During these tours, the following specific items were evaluated: }

-- 1 Fire Equipment - Operability and evidence of periodic inspection I of fire suppression equipment; i

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Housekeeping - Maintenance of required cleanliness levels;

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Equipment Preservation - Maintenance of special precautionary measures for installed equipment, as applicable;

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QA/QC Surveillance - Pertinent activities were being surveilled on a sampling basis by qualified QA/QC personnel;

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Component Tagging - Implementation of appropriate equipment tag-ging for safety, equipment protection and jurisdiction;

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Personnel adherence to Radiological Controlled Area rules, in-ciuding proper Personnel frisking upon RCA exit;

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Access control to the Protected Area, including search activ- -

ities, escorting and badging, and vehicle access control;

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Integrity of the Protected Area boundar No unnacceptable conditions were identifie . Licensee Reports 3.1 In Office Review of Licensee Event Reports The inspector reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) submitted to the NRC to verify that details were clearly reported, including accuracy of the cause description and adequacy of corrected action. The in-spector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were involved, and whether the event warranted onsite follow-up. The following LERs were reviewe _

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LER 87-004: Fire watches required by Technical Specifications sus-pended in the Reactor Building due to Bomb Threa LER 87-007: Bomb Threa The inspector has no further question I I

4. Monthly surveillance and Maintenance Observation 4.1 Surveillance Activities The inspector observed the performance of various surveillance tests to veri fy that the surveillance procedure conformed to technical specification requirements, administrative approvals and tagging requirements were reviewed and approved prior to test initiation, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel, current approved procedures were used, test instrumentation was currently calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, test data was accurately I and completely recorded, removal and restoration of affected compo- '

nents was properly accomplished, and tests were completed within the required Technical Specification frequenc l Observations of the following Surveillance Activities were made:

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RHR Pump Operability and Flow Rate Test

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RHR Valve Operability Test l

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RHR Pump Vibration Testing No unnacceptable conditions were identifie .2 Maintenance Activities The inspector observed the conduct of various maintenance activities throughout the inspection period. During this observation, the in-spector verified that maintenance activities were conducted within the requirements of the plant's administrative procedures and tech-

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nical specifications, proper radiological controls were implemented and observed, proper safety precautions were observed, and that activities which have the potential to impact plant - operations are properly coordinated with the control roo The following activities were observed:

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"D" RHR Pump Replacement

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EDG 101 and 102 Block Top Inspections No unnacceptable conditions were note _

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. ESF Actuation - Shutdown Cooling Isolation At the 1800 on May

"B" Residual Heat5,1987 the plant experienced a high pressure isolation Removal Syste of RHR System in The licensee was operating the "B" running and bypassing the RHR heatthe shutdown "B" andcooling

"0" RHRmodepumps with the temperatur exchanger to increase reactor vessel Reactor vessel temperature was being raised to allow the conduct of a Reactor vessel hydrostatic pressure tes With the plant in the above condition, the on shift personnel to decided place to anfacilitate further additionalplantRHRheatu pump (A) in service in the shutdown cooling mod RHR loop was initially lined up in the safety suppression pool, not injection mode with the pump suction path lined up to the reactor vesse the pump suction prior to starting the "A" pump.The operator failed to transfer level at 240 inches on the shutdown range and the RHR "A" pump transferWith the initial v

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ring 5000 gpm from the suppression pool to the reactor vessel, level the 125 pound isolation setpoint was reached. rapidly rose and co the "B" and "0" RHR pumps tripped automatically,At the isolation setpoint suction valves closed and the operator tripped the "A"the shutdown cooling RHR pum cating range (+240").The operators took corrective action to return vessel Radiochemistry section Reactor water sampled taken and analyzed by the n

meters out of specification.showed no Technical Specification chemistry para-Thecompleted has operatorremedial that initiated training.the event was removed from licensed s and dutie The inspector reviewed the proposed remedial training programs and concluded that it was acceptable .

event and has no further questions.The inspector closely s followed the Protection Assembly Breakers. Trip of Reactor Protection System Alternat On May 8, 1987 the "B" Reactor Protection powered from the Alternate power supply while the set was out of service for planned maintenance. RPS motor gener tSystem (RPS) bus

"B" a or At 6:36 a.m. ,

Alternate Power Supplythe Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) breakers for the

"B" RPS bus. This loss of power initiated a half scram, shutdown cooling

, Reactor isolationtripped Water initiation. Cleanup Isolation, and a Reactor Building Standby s em Ventilation Sy

"B" fected equipment to RPS the MG pre-event configuration.The set to service and restored ef- all licensee re

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l There was no increase in Reactor Vessel coolant temperature and system restorations were complete by 7:05 a. There have been a number of events caused by the tripping of the Alternate Power Supply EPA Breakers and the licensee has developed a Modification Package that will install a voltage surge suppressor on the input to the Alternate Power Suppl The modification will be installed as soon as parts procurement is complet The licensee's electrical engineering ,

department believes this change will preclude additional spurious trip l The resident inspector will continue to monitor the licensee's actions in this area and will continue to track this matter as Open Item 86-14-0 l l Bomb Threats '

During the period covered by Inspection Report 87-07 the licensee recieved two bomb threats against the facilit The details of these events are contained in the paragraphs below-l

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At 2:05 a.m. , on April 2,1987, the Suffolk County Police Department j reported to the Shoreham security organization that it had just re- "

ceived a threat over the 911 Police Emergency Notification System indicating that there was a bomb planted at Shoreha About the same time, the licensee's offsite Emergency Response Center in Hicksville, Long Island, New York also received a telephone call indicating that a bomb had been planted at the facility and at the home of the utility's Board Chairma At 2:44 a.m. , the licensee declared an Unusual Event and a Security Alert, which included imple-mentation of bomb search procedures. The Suffolk County Police re-sponded to the site and at about 4:55 a.m. initiated a search with a do The dog was taken to the facility control room at about 5:10 The dog immediately went into an alert at a first-aid storage ki Except for one senior reactor operator, the operators were evacuated to the control room lunchroom. Further search disclosed that the dog had detected a nitrate compound that was stored in the first-aid ki Normal control room staffing resumed at 5:40 At 12:08 a.m. , on April 25, 1987, the Suffolk County Police Depart-ment advised the licensee that they had received a call at 11:50 p.m.,

April 24,1987, from an AT&T telephone operator at the Dix Hill, New York telephone exchang The AT&T operator stated that at about 11:43 p.m. , April 24, 1987, a male caller, probably in his late 30's, telephoned stating, "A bomb was going off at 12:10 a.m., at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station and that there was going to be a nuclear disaster". The licensee declared an Unusual Event at 12:17 a.m., April 25, 1987 and initiated a plant searc The search was

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completed in the protected and vital areas at 1:15 a.m., and in the owner controlled area at 2:12 a.m. with negative results. Security surveillance was increased upon receipt of the threat and was re-turned to normal at the completion of the search at 2:25 a.m. , when the Unusual Event was terminate The inspector has reviewed the licensee's response to both events and is satisfied with these action . Organizational Changes During this inspection period the licensee submitted the following infor-mation to the NRC regarding organizational changes to the Quality Assur-ance organization:

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The positions of Director, Quality Assurance, Safety & Compliance and Manager, Quality Assurance Department are combined into one new position: Manager, Quality Assurance, Safety and Reliability Depart-men This position continues to report to the Executive Vice Presiden A new position of Manager, Safety Engineering and Reliability is created and will be responsible to perform reliability studies of plant systems and components and perform Independent Safety Engineer-ing Group activities as described in the Shoreham Technical Specifi-cations and the Shoreham Updated Safety Analysis Repor Thus, a division manager will now be assigned full time to the management of these function Additionally, coordination of the administrative activities of the Nuclear Review Board (NRB) will be a responsibility of this division, however; the chairmanship of the NRB will remain with the senior manager, the department hea The position of Manager, Quality Assurance Division is eliminated and the functional responsibilities of this division have been split and transferred to the Quality Systems and Quality Control division The inspector has no questions regarding these change . Anti Shoreham Demonstration

) I j On Saturday, May 2,1987 at 1755 hrs. , members of the SHAD Alliance con- 1 ducted a peaceful anti-Shoreham demonstration at the plant entrance on i North Country Road. The number of protestors participating in the demon- 1 stration was estimated at 75-150 individuals and dispersed peacefully at

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9 The licensee was forewarned of the planned activities and had taken meas-ures to increase plant security prior to the demonstratio ;

The inspector has no further questions regarding this even . Emergency Diesel Generator 101 and 102 block Top Inspections In response to the loss of offsite power event of March 18, 1987 (See IR 87-03) and to comply with the requirements of Attachment 3 of Facility Operating License NPF-36, the licensee conducted block top inspections of the 101 and 102 Emergency Diesel Generator l NPF-36 Attachment 3 requires that two adjacent cylinder block tops be inspected for cracking following a black start. The license condition requires that liquid penetrart testing be conducted to locate surface crack indications and Eddy current testing be conducted to confirm surface indications and establish crack depth. The inspection requires removal of

wo adjacent cylinder heads, surface preparation and testin While both the EDG 101 and 102 have numerous stud to cylinder wall liga-ment cracks it has been concluded that these cracks do not threaten engine operability (See Atomic Safety Licensing Board Partial Initial Decision on TDI engines). Of greatest concern are stud to stud and stud to end cracks which would require additional engineering evaluation by NRC to determine acceptabilit The conduct of the inspection on EDG 101 showed no ligament crack depth greater than 1.5" and no stud to stud or stud to end crack There are ligament cracks that did not appear on the 1984 inspection crack map and have initiated since that time, however, these are not of significanc Inspection of EDG 102 also showed no stud to stud or stud to end crack Ligament cracks that were not shown on the 1984 crack map did appear, but, again, these ligament cracks are not of safety significance. One ligament crack on EDG 102 did exceed the predicted 1.5 inch depth at which crack arrest should occu Failure Analysis Associates (FAA) Report N .1 predicted that ligament crack growth would arrest at approxi-mately 1.5 inches, where the stress field changes from tensile to compres-sive. The ligament crack on Stud 6 on cylinder number 7 has extended to an indicated depth of 1 11/16 inches at this tim i l

The licensee has concluded that crack growth beyond 1.5 inches does not l constitute a degraded condition nor does it effect engine operabilit The licensee draws this conclusion based on the following information:

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Ligament crack propagation is in the direction of the coolant channel and would have to extend to 2.5 inches prior to breaching the coolant boundar J

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Leakage from the coolant channel would be within the makeup capacity of the jacket water makeup system because the cracks are very tight and the driving force is small (25 psi).

Licensee analysis indicates that further crack growth is not expected, however, the licensee intends to increase the scope and frequency of sur-veillance activity on EDG 102 to confirm their conclusions. The increased surveillance will include the following:

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During an EOG 102 operation, the block top area between adjacent cylinder heads and particularly cylinder N , will be visually )

inspected by an equipment operator for any signs of coolant leakag l If leakage is observed, the engine shall be removed from service as soon as is safely possible and an investigation and evaluation per-formed to determine the cause of the leakag At each refueling outage, in addition to the two cylinder heads nor-mally removed from EDG 101 and 102 for block top inspection, EDG 102 No. 7 cylinder head shall also be removed and all the ligament cracks mapped and the crack depth measure The inspector has closely followed the licensee's actions in this matter including observation of the inspection process and in depth review of all available background material relating to block top cracking. Based on his review of the available information, and discussion with Region I and NRC Headquarters are engineering personnel. The inspector agrees with the licensee conclusion that the ligament crack on stud number six of cylinder seven exceeding 1.5" does not constitute a condition that would threaten the operability of EDG-10 The inspector has no further question . Nuclear Review Board Meeting Attendance The inspector attended sessions the Nuclear Review Board Meetings held on April 15, 198 The inspector monitored performance of the board to insure that all requirements of the NRB charter were me The inspector has no l question . Management Meetings At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with licensee management to discuss the scope and findings of this inspectio I Based on NRC Region I review of this report, and discussions with licensee I representatives, it was determined that this report does not contain I information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restriction )

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