IR 05000322/1987018
| ML20236V960 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/27/1987 |
| From: | Dragoun T, Loesch R, Shanbaky M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236V937 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-322-87-18, NUDOCS 8712070196 | |
| Download: ML20236V960 (8) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No. 87-18-Docket No. 50-322 l
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Ca tegory C License'No. NPF-36 Priority
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Licensee:
Long Island Lighting Company
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i P.O. Box 618 Wading River, New York 11792
.l Facility Name:
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station l
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Inspection At: Wading River, New York 11792
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t Inspection Conducted:
September 28 - October 2, 1987 l
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Inspectors-
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---r T.~Dragoun, Sr. Radiat Mn Specialist date l
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N-f/$7 h R. Loesch, Radiation Spe(ialist
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l Approved by:
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M. Shanbaky, Chief ~
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date Facilities Radiation Protection Section Inspection Summary: _ Inspection on Sept. 28-Oct. 2, 1987 (Report No.
f 50-322/87-18)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of the licensee's radiological controls program. Areas reviewed included: management and
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organization, training and qualifications, high radiation area key control and the Process Control Program (PCP).
~Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8712070196 87f191 PDR ADDCK 05000322 G
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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted During the course of this routine inspection, the following personnel were contacted or interviewed:
1.1 Licensee Personnel
- S. Skorupski, Assistant Vice President - Nuclear Operations
- W. Steiger, Plant Manager
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J. Scalice, Assistant Plant Manager
- J. Alexander, Operations Engineer F. Bowles, Radwaste Coordinator
- M. Buring, Health Physics Engineer
- J. Carey, Licensing Engineer
- N. DiMascio, Radiological Controls Division Manager
- R. Grunseich, Operational Compliance Engineer R. Hall, Radwaste Shipping Engineer M. InFranco, Plant Engineer
- P. Kwaschyn, Radwaste Engineer
- J. Notaro Nuclear QA Department Manager
- W. Maloney, Quality Control Division Manager
- J. Manso, Compliance Engineer
- J. McCue Technical Training Manager D. Miller, Health Physics Instructor
- J. Schmitt, Senior Consultant, OAG
- C. Seaman, Quality Systems Division Manager D. Smith, Compliance Engineer R. Smith, ALARA Engineer J. Stroh, Leading Engineer, Radwaste Operations L. Wolanski, Radwaste Foreman 1.2 NRC Personnel
- F. Crescenzo, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit meeting on October 2, 1987.
2.0 Purpose i
The purpose of this safety inspection was to review the licensee's radiation protection program with respect to the following elements:
Status of Previously Identified Items; Management and Organization;
Health Physics Technician Training; Process Control Program (PCP);
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High Radiation Area Access Control.
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- 3.0 Status of Previously Identified Items 3.1 (Closed) Follow-up Item (85-04-10(C)) - Tagging of air-operated valve (ADV) rack behind PASS panel. The inspector conducted an independent review of the ADV tagging.
All ADVs were appropriately tagged for identification.
3.2 (Closed) Follow-up Item (85-04-10(M)) - Establish a designated area for storage of PASS samples. Offsite samples will be stored in the Reactor Building Truck Access Bay in their respective shipping casks. Onsite samples will be stored in one of two locked storage cages near the 37' NW Turbine Building Heater Bay. The later is a low traffic area and can be shielded as required.
Procedures EPIP 2-10, 2-12, and 2-26 properly reference these storage areas.
3.3 (Closed) Follow-up Item (85-04-13) - Environmental qualification of the drywell high radiation monitors.
Current detectors utilize drawn stainless steel cables with silver 'O' ring connectors.
Documentation of the vendor's environmental qualification and the in-house system QC were reviewed and deemed acceptable.
3.4 (Closed) follow-up Item (85-04-20) - Licensee to provide training of personnel in PASS operations.
Procedure SP 71.006.01, Rev. 13, documents the training of radiochemistry personnel in the PASS system. Eighty percent of the technicians are fully qualified, the remainder are currently qualified in fifteen of eighteen procedures.
3.5 (Closed) Follow-up Item (85-38-02) - Start-up testing of the offgas system.
Licensee has established procedure STP-40, "Offgas and Gaseous Radwaste System," dated 4/23/87. This start-up procedure is referenced in the FSAR as part of the required power ascension testing and requires the plant to be at a mininum of 20% power.
This will be reviewed as part of the normal power ascension test program.
3.6 (Closed) Follow-up Item (86-06-04) - QA program applied to transport packages. A,udit QC-86-05 (and supplement) addressed shipping of I
radioactive materials. QA Manual was revised by adding sections K and M to address the required aspects of Reg Guide 7.10.
" Establishing Quality Assurance Programs for Packaging used in the Transport of Radioactive Materials." In addition, new procedures and checklists were established covering the appropriate aspects to i
the Radwaste Program.
4.0 Organization and Staffing The organization and staffing of the functions in the Radiological Controls Division were reviewed with respect to criteria contained in:
Technical Specification 6.2, " Organization";
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Technical' Specification 6.3, "Unii Staff Qualifications";
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Technical Specification 6.4, " Training";
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ANSI N18.1 - 1971, " Selection and Training of Nuclear Power Plant
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Personnel";
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Technical Specification 6.13. "hotess Control Program";
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Station Procedure 12.002.01. " Organization and Administration";
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Station Procedure 61.001.01, " Conduct of Health Physics";
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.s1 Station Procedure R 1.001.01, "Radwaste Program Policy and
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Objective"; and Nuclear Operations-Policy #28.
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The licensee's performance relative to these criteria was determined from interviews with the Radiological Controls Division Manager, Radiological Affairs Manager and selected personnel and a' review of selected documents.
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Within the scope of this review, no violations were identified. The licensee completed a major reorganization of the radiation protection section in May,1987, and similarly, for tha radwaste section in
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September, 1987. The licensee stated that tue changes in radiation protection organization were made to change from a, program development.
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mode to program implementation.
However,the radwaste organization was restructured to respond to extensive programmatic weaknesses.idcnrified by in-house QA audits.. The changes appear to have' strengthened the radwaste organization and positioned it to resolve the problems. The
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chemistry / radiochemistry section was significantly improved by the
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replacement of contractors with permanent employees.
Interviews with the supervisory staff indicated that the incumbents were qualified for their positions.
Each supervisor indicated a good understanding of the position responsibilities including the recently appointed radwaste supervisors. The attitude and team spirit of cooperation of the staff appeared to be excellent.
An Operational Assessment Group was formally created in July,1987, by Nuclear Operations Policy #28.
This small group will consist of highly experienced nuclear personnel with extensive managerial backgrounds to assist the plant staff in achieving operational excellence.
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staff consists of the Nuclear Operation's Vice President and a
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The licensee was commended for this effort.
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5.0 iHealth Physirs1 Technician Training a
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The selection, training and qualification of Health Physics 78fP)
technicians was reviewed with respect to criteria contained"in-jz c
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Technical. Speci fication 6.3, " Unit Staff Qualifications";_
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Technical Specification 6.4 " Training";
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ANSI N1h.1 - 1971, " Select 3cnwJ 1 raining of Nucle Power Plant-
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Perswtel"; and
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Station Procedure 61.001.01, " Health Physics Tec'hnician Selection.
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Training and Qualification Program."
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l The status of this program was'Jetermined from:
j Interviews with the Radiological Controls DfO sion Manager, Technical Training Division Mr.acer, and a HP Anstructor;
- o Review of Instructor Quam 1icat g,as; and
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Review of selected, training records, lesson plans. student
handout material,' quizzes, and student " Qualification Code" manual.
a Within the scope of this review, no violations'were otserved. The
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technician training and qualification progrr.m is divided into five
phases and requires M oat one year to complete. The f'rst two phasesp eal with basic skills and HP fundamentals The training raaterials were dtveloped and presented tcIthe current
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grodp of 12 trainees by a co"ntractor (NUS). The remaining phases, J
including the final on-the-job training, was developed by LILC0 based upon a thorough job task analysis. Accreditation from INP0
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for this program is saaerway.
The inspector noted that the training material was of,7
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Excellent quality with good techNul depth. However, the progthm to qualify instructors was still under development and the current staff relies primarily on military experienco<
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To improve retention, candidatesifer the qualification program are now selected from the localities ' surrounding the plant.
Final screening is done by in-plant HP supervision to select the most qualified and motivated trainees. Thelicensee anticipates that this policy will result in a stable and experienced technician
staff.
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During the final phase of qualification, trainees are allowed to
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qualification code.
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\\Forexample[atraineewhohassucc$bsfullycompletedallthe
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VlD modules related to use of. survey. instruments and survey techniques,
is allowed to perform the rot:ti.ne p.lant sutveys for the record.
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inspector advised.the licensee) that the ANSI standard requires two
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years of experience before technicians are allowed to perform N
" responsible )ork" which impacts worker safety or regulatory compliance,}i.
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.s 6.0 Process Control Program
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The ALARA aspect'of the licensee's Processi. Control Program (PCP)'was i
reviewed with respect,to criteria contained in:
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' 10 CFR 20.1, "!hrpose"; and '.
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Technical Specification 6.13, fP,rocess Control Program".
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The evaluation of the licensee's pe'rforaance in this area was' based upon:
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Interviews with the Radwaste Ingitiecr, Radwaste Foreman,
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itARA Engineer, and Senior Consultant, Operational-Assessment Group;
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'Toud of the'A
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facility;
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Licensee documerts;
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,e-1 PCP Audits NM-86-01 and NM-87-01;
i QC Audit QCO-86-05; and
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" Evaluation of Current and Proposed Methods of Dewatering High I
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Integrity Contain?rs @ ICs)", August 24, 1987.
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Current solid radwaste generation is small compared to projected
< quantities, comprised mostly of compatibles, floor drain sludge and I
resins, all of low radiological' activities.
In an effort to determine j
f the facility's ability to support future operations, the licensee has
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performed several evaluations of the process equipment and associated
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operating, procedures. pin addition, both QC audits and inspections by the
1 Nuclear Rdview Bond have been completed.
A review by the inspector of
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this dor.urentation revealed that the licensee has identified and analyzed
many d the current' process limitettons, provulng good insight into the
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h vario W problem areas.
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- During a tour of the facility and after discussions with cognizant radwaste personnel, several concerns were raised that question the program's ability to support full power operations.
Under current operating procedures, the processing of a " hot" HIC would require the expenditure of an unacceptable amount of man-rem. Although many of the process steps where a bulk of this exposure would be accrued have been identified, possible solutions are still under review and have yet to be implemented. The inspector suggested that during the course of these reviews various accident scenarios, such as a ruptured HIC or a crane failure which could leave a HIC " hanging", should also be considered.
The later situation has the possibility of creating a problem if the HIC were left hanging directly above the shipping cask due to a lack of shielding in the truck bay door and the close proximity (80 feet) of an unrestricted area immediately outside the door.
Although the licensee's program is improving, several improvements need completion prior to full power operations. The analyses performed and actions taken will be reviewed in a future inspection (87-18-01).
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High Radiation Area Access Control The licensee's program for the control of access to high radiation areas was reviewed against criteria contained in the following:
10 CFR 20.203, " Caution signs, labels, signals and controls";
Technical Specification 6.12 "High Radiation Area";
Licensee procedures:
Work Instruction 005-0, Rev. O, " Control of High Radiation Area
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Door Keys";
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Station Procedure 62.065.02, Rev. 3, " Traversing Incore Probe
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Room Access Controls."
i The evaluation of the licensee's performance in this area was based upon:
Interviews with the Health Physics Engineer; Discussions with the Watch Engineer and Radiological Controls Foreman; Review of the Health Physics Key Storage Box, issue logs and shiftly
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audits.
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The licensee has established an effective program for the control of access to locked high radiation areas as documented in Work Instruction 005-0, " Control of High Radiation Area Door Keys." Keys for each of the locked, potential high radiation areas are maintained in a control box located at the main Health Physics control point. Only qualified Health
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i Physics technicians are issued keys, thereby guaranteeing their' control l
of all entries.
Two master ke one under control of the Watch Engineer (Control Room) ys are available:for emergency use only, and o Health Physics control point. Accountability of all keys is verified and
.j documented on a shiftly basis.
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I Due to the lack of a full power license and any areas that could be l-classified as high radiation areas, the key issue program has been temporarily suspended and current access is with the supervisor's master key.
In light _of ~ a recent potential over-exposure report involving the
Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) Room at another facility, the licensee has
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taken special precautions and has continued to maintain this area under
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close control. ~ Procedure SP 62.065.02, " Traversing Incore Probe Room Access Controls", has been implemented and demonstrates the licensee's awareness of the TIP room's unique radiological significance.
Long term plans are underway to patch all locked high radiation doors into both the security computer and an annunciator panel to be located at
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This will. allow immediate determination of the door's status (open or closed) and notification if an unauthorized individual attempts access.
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I Work Instruction 005-0, Rev. 0, did not specify exactly what actions would be taken upon notification of a lost high radiation area key. The licensee stated that the appropriate paragraph would be revised to clarify actions to be taken under such circumstances. This item will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (87-18-02).
8.0 Exit Interview
The inspector met with licensee management denoted in Section 1.0 on October 2, 1987, at the conclusion of the inspection. The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed at that time.
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