ML20149M588
| ML20149M588 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/18/1987 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149M340 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-322-86-99, NUDOCS 8802260143 | |
| Download: ML20149M588 (56) | |
See also: IR 05000322/1986099
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ENCLOSURE 2
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
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SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE
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REPORT 50-322/86-99
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
i ASSESSMENT PERIOD: MARCH 1, 1986 - JULY 31, 1987 1
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BOARD MEETING DATE: SEPTEMBER 18, 1987
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gDR ADOCK 05000322
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION................................................ 1
A. Purpose and Review..................................... 1
B. SALP Board Members..................................... 2
C. Background............................................. 3
II. CRITERIA.................................................... 5
III. SUMMARY O F R E S U LT S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7'
A. Facility Performance................................... 7
B. Overall Facility Evaluation............................ 8
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSES........................................ 9
A. Plant Operations and Startup Testing................... 9
B. Radiological Contrc1s.................................. 13
C. Maintenance............................................ 17
D. Surveillance........................................... 19
E. Engineering and Corporate Technical Support............ 21
F. Emergency Preparedness............................ .... 24
G. Security and Safeguards................................ 26
H. Training and Qualification Effectiveness............... 28
I. Licensing Actions...................................... 30
J. Assurance of Quality................................... 33
V. $UPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES............................... 35
A. Investigation and Allegation Review.................... 35
B. Escalated Enforcement Actions.......................... 35
C. Management Conferences................................. 36
D. Licensee Event Reports................................. 37
E. Licensing Activities................................... 39
Tables and Figures
Tabl e 1 - Li ce n see Event Repo rt s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . T1-1
Table 2 - Inspection Hours Summary............................... T2-1
Table 3 - Enforcement Summary.................................... T3-1
Table 4 - Insoection Report Activities........................... T4-1
Table 5 - Unplanned Automatic Trips and Shutdowns................ TS-1
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose and Overview
The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) is an inte-
grated NRC staff effort to collect the available observations and
data on a periodic basis and to evaluate licensee performance based
upon this in forma tion. SALP is supplemental to normal regulatory
processes used to ensure compliance with NRC rules and regulations.
SALP is intended to be sufficiently diagnostic to provide a rational
basis for allocating NRC resources and to provide meaningful guidance
to the licensee's management to promote quality and safety of plant
construction and operation.
An NRC SALP Board, composed of the staff members listed below, met
on September 18, 1987 to review the collection of performance obser-
vations and data to assess the licensee performance in accordance
with the guidance in NRC Manual Chapter 0516, "Systematic Assessment
of Licensee Performance." A summary of the guidance and evaluation
criteria is provided in Section II of this report.
This report is the SALP Board's assessment of the licensee's safety
performance at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station for the period
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March 1,1986 through July 31, 1987. The Summary fiadings end totals '
reflect a 17-month assessment period.
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B. SALP Board ,
Board Chairman
S. Collins, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
Members
W. Johnston (see note), Acting Director, Division of Reactor Safety
(DRS)
T. Martin, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
(DRSS)
W. Butler, Director, Project Directorate I-2
L. Bettenhausen, Chief, Projects Branch 1, DRP
R. Gallo (see note), Chief, Operations Branch, DRS <
C. Cowgill, Chief, Reactor Projects Section (RPS) 10, DRP
C. Warren, Senior Resident Inspector, RPS 10, DRP
R. Lo, Licensing Project Manager, NRR
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NOTE - R. Gallo was alternate voting member in absence of W. Johnston
Other Attendees
F. Crescenzo, Resident Inspector, RPS 10, DRP ,
P. Habighorst, Reactor Engineer, RPS 10, DRP
P. Eapen, Chief, Quality Assurance Section, Operations Branch, DRS
M. Shanbaky, Chief, Facilities Radiation Protection Section, DRSS
W. Kushner, Safeguards Scientist, Security, DRSS
E. Fox, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist, DRSS
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C. Background
Licensee Activities
Operations at the Shoreham Station are authorized and governed by an
operating nuclear plant license not to exceed five percent rated
power (NPF-36). The unit began this evaluation period in cold shut-
down since the requirements of the Low Power Test Program were essen-
tially completed during the previous assessment period. However,
modifications made to the High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor
Core Isolation Cooling Systems required a return to low power opera-
tions for retesting of these systems.
Two periods of low power operations occurred during this assessment
period; the first began on August 4,1986 and the facility returned
to a cold shutdown on September 1, 1986. Curing this first period
of operation, retesting of HPCI and RCIC was completed and a major
milestone was achieved when the Main Generator was synchronized to
the Long Island Grid. The second period of low power operations
began on May 22, 1987. This period of operation involved some
retesting and system tuning along with another period of synchroniza-
tion of the main generator with the grid and ended on June 8,1987.
4 Outages between periods of operation have been used to effect plant
modifications, complete major surveillance items and replace defec-
tive components. The facility successfully completed a Containment
,. Integrated Leak Rate Test in January 1987, completed replacement of
HPCI turbine exhaust rheck valves, replaced the neutron sources, and
. completed modifications to the Standby Liquid Control and Alternate
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Rod Insert Systems. Modi fications to the Emergency Power System
which would tie the Colt Emergency Diesel Generators into this system
have continued throughout the assessment period.
One major operational event occurred during this period. On
March 18,1987 the faci! My :.:ffc. sd a loss of Off site Power when
both the Normal and Reserve Station Service transformers tripped.
The event was caused by personnel error during ..odification of the
103 Emergency Bus. This event was the subject of an NRC/ Licensee
Management Meeting held in King of Prussia, Pa. on April 4, 1987.
Organizational changes at the facility occurred throughout the i
assessment period. An Assistant Vice President Nuclear position was
created and filled to further increase senior management presence on
site. Organization changes within the Quality Assurance organization
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have been instituted to make the organization conform more closely
, with similar organizations at other facilities. Formation of a
. separate Office of Training also occurred during this period.
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At the end of the assessment period, the facility was in cold shut-
down, with Emergency Power Supply modifications in progress. Full
power license issuance is contingent on resolution of Emergency
Planning issues.
l Inspection Activities
Two NRC resident inspectors were assigned to the site for twelve
months of the period with at least one inspector assigned for the
entire period. The total NRC inspection hours for the 17 month
assessment period was 3562 hours0.0412 days <br />0.989 hours <br />0.00589 weeks <br />0.00136 months <br />. This was equivalent to 2514 inspec-
tion hours for a twelve month period. Distribution of these hours
for each functional area is depicted in table 2 of this document.
During the assessment period three NRC team inspections were conduc-
ted covering the following functional areas:
1. Radiochemistry Section Corrective actions
2. Training and Qualification Effectiveness
3. Engineering and Corporate Support
This report also includes assessment of "Training and Qualification
Effectiveness" and "Assurance of Quality" as separate functional
areas. Although these topics are assessed in other functional areas
through their use as evaluation criteria, these two areas are summar-
ized separately to provide a synopsis. For example, quality assur-
ance effectiveness was assessed on a day-to-day basis by the resident
inspector and as a part of most specialist inspections. Quality
Assurance is an integral responsibility of every employee; one of the
management tools to measure effectiveness is reliance on quality
assurance inspections and audits. Other major factors that influence
quality, such as involvement of first-line supervision, safety com-
mittees, and worker attitudes, are discussed in each functional area
as appropriate. Engineering support was evaluated as a separate
functional area for the first time in this report.
Tabulations of associated enforcement actions, inspection activities
and unplanned shutdowns are contained in Tables 3 and 4 and 5
respectively.
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II. CRITERIA
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Licensee performance is assessed in selected functional areas, depending
upon whether the facility is in a construction, preoperational, or opera-
ting phase. Functional areas normally represent areas significant to
nuclear safety and the environment. Some functional areas may not be
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assessed because of little or no licensee activities, or lack of meaning-
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ful observations. Special areas may be added to highlight significant
observations.
l One or more of the following evaluation criteria were used to ussess each
functional area.
1. Management involvement and control in assuring quality
2. Approach to the resolution of technical issues from a safety stand- ,
point
Responsiveness tn NRC initiatives
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4. Enforcement history
5. Operational and Construction events (including response to, analysis !
of, and corrective actions for)
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6. Staffing (including management)
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7. Tsaining and Qualification Effectiveness
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However, the SALP Board is not limited to these criteria and others may
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have been used where appropriate.
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l. Based upon the SALP Board assessment, each functional area evaluated is ,
classified into one of three performance categories. The definitions of l
these performance categories are: '
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Category 1. Licensee management attention and involvement are aggressive
and oriented toward nuclear safety; licensee resources are ample and
effectively used so that a high level of performance with respect to
operational safety and construction quality is being achieved. Reduced
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NRC attention may be appropriate.
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Category 2. Licensee management attention and involvement are evident and ,
.. are concerned with nuclear safety; licensee resources are adequate and l
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reasonably effective so that satisfactory performance with respect to
i operational safety is being achieved. NRC attention should be maintained
at normal levels.
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Category 3. Licensee management attention or involvement is acceptable
and considers nuclear safety, but weaknesses are evident; licensee
resources appear to be strained or not effectively used so that minimally
satisfactory performance with respect to operational safety is being
achieved. Both NRC and licensee attention should be increased.
The SALP Board may determine to include an appraisal of the perforr.ance .
trend of a functional area. Normally, this performance trend is only used f
where both a definite trend of performance is discernible to the Board and
! the Board believes that continuation of the trend may result in a change
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of performance level. Improving (declining) trend is defined as: Licen-
see performance was determined to be improving (declining) near the close
of the assessment period.
While the definitions of categories stated above are those which apply to
all licensees, NRC as a matter of policy does not reduce inspection ef-
- fort, regardless of Category 1 performance, for newly licensed plants or
those in unique licensing status such as Shoreham. Inspections will not -
be reduced in any functional area and will remain at levels consistent
with plant activities.
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III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
A. Facility Performance ;
Functional~~
Categary Category Trend
Araa Last Period * This Period ** If Assessed
A. Plant Operations 2 1
& Startup Testing
B. Radiological 3 1
Controls
C. Maintenance 2# 2 Improving
D. Surveillance 2# 2
E. Engineering and ***
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Corporate Technical
Support
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Prer 1 redness 1 1
G. Security and -
- Safeguards 1 1
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Qualification *
Effectiveness
I. Licensing
Activities 3 1
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J. Assurance of 2 1
Quality l
K. Outage Management, ***
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- Modifications and '
Technical Support
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Activities
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March 1,1985 through February 28, 1986 .
March 1,1986 thrcugh July 31, 1987 [
! *** Not evaluated as a separate functional area ~
- # Haintenance and Surveillance were previously assessed as a combined
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- B. OVERALL FACILITY EVALUATION
In this seventeen month evaluation period, the Shoreham Nuclear Power
Station staf f and management has maintained the high performance
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levels for areas previously assessed as strengths and effected
improvements in other areas.
Plant operations and the conduct of startup testing during two
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low power test intervals was found to be well executed, with
intensive management involvement, good procedural compliance and
performance-oriented Quality Assurance audits and checks. A notable
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decrease in personnel errors, particularly in operations and surveil- .
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I lance activities, was observed. Several areas discussed in detail in
this evaluation showed conciderable improvement as a result of
management attention and expenditure of resources; these areas
include radiological controls, training and qualification effective-
ness and licensing activities. .
While improvements were achieved in maintenance, surveillance and
technical support, some performance shortcomings were noted. In the
maintenance area, it was determined that first line supervisors are
limited in the amount of time spent at work sites; one resulting
j symptom is poor housekeeping following maintenance work. Corrective
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action to reduce the number of challenges to the Reactor Building
Standby Ventilation and the Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling
Water systems has been slow, The loss of offsite power event
resulted from a weakness in technical review of a modification '
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involving safety-related electrical buses, for which corrective
j action has been taken. '
The weaknesses noted in the previous Systema tic Assessment of
4 Licensee Performance regarding chemistry and radiochemistry staffing,
. training and performance have been addressed, but warrant continuen
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management attention to ensure long-term ef fective performance. The ;
licensee maintains the station and staff. to support site operation.
In the future, this readiness must be maintained to sustain the same
levels of high performance and effect ongoing improvements. '
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IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSES
A. Plant Operations and Startup Testing (1144 Hours, 32.2*o)
Analysis
During the previous assessment period, the area of Plant Operations ;
and Startup Testing was rated a category 2. The recommendation of the
board was to focus greater attention on personnel adherence to
procedures.
Startup Testing
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In this assessment period startup testing activities were conducted
during two periods of low power operations over a period of approxi- ,
mately seven weeks. Although the majority of the low power testing !
program was completed during the previous assessment period, exten-
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sive retests were conducted on the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling,
A High Pressure Coolant Inje'ction and Reactor Vessel Level Instrumen-
tation Systems to satisfy the requirements of the Startup Program.
Inspection coverage of the Startup Program by the QA/QC department i
was evident at all levels from direct inspection of testing to review
of test results. QA/QC personnel covering startup activities were
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well trained in the activities under surveillance and were effective
in identifying problem areas and following proposed resolutions. The
planned QA/QC coverage for the remainder of the Startup Program is
scheduled to include surveillance coverage and test result review.
Plant Operations
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, During this assessment period, the bulk of activities conducted by
operations personnel involved the support of maintenance, modiff a-
tion, and outage activities. For approximately seven weeks the faco-
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ity was operated at power levels not exceeding five percent power
primarily for the conduct of low power testing.
Management involvement has been evident in all areas of plant opera- '
tions during this inspection period. At all times during major
, evolutions including startups and major tests, at least one member
l of senior management has been present in the control room. Plant
l t9urs by operations management are made on a daily basis and the
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interface between management and staff is good. It is also signifi-
cant to note that senior management presence on site extends beyond 1
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normal working hours. The licensee Vice President Nuclear, Assistant ,
Vice President Nuclear, and the Plant Manager routinely made back- '
shift tours of the facility. The licensee initiated this program of
j backshift monitoring following notification of NRC identified prob-
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le:ns at other operating facilities. This program demonstrates a sen-
sitivity to NRC concerns and has enhanced manage:nent oversight of
plant operations during off-normal iiours.
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Operations personnel performance has been effective and professional.
Personnel errors attributed to operations have been greatly reduced
during this assessment period as evidenced by the reduction in LER's
from twelve in the previous assessment period to four during this
period. Of these four errors, all occurred while the facility was in
a cold shutdown condition, and one was attributed directly to an
error on the part of a licensed individual. This reduction in per-
sonnel errors can be directly attributed to increased diligence on
the part of operations personnel and to increastd en:phasis placed by
plant management on quality of operation and adherence to procedures.
Operations personnel response to plant operating transients and
equipment problems has been very good throughout this assessment
period. During the loss of offsite power event on March 18, 1987,
the onshif t personnel quickly analyzed the problem, restored offsite
power, returned plant systems to normal, and completed emergency plan
actions in a timely manner.
Operator procedural compliance has been good throughout this period.
Use of alarm response procedures when reacting to infrequently re-
ceived alarms has also been good and operator feedback has been ef-
fectively used to improve procedure quality and usability. A major ;
revision of the Residual Heat Removal system operating procedure and '
revisions to numerous surveillance and alarm response procedures
resulted from operator feedback. Technical Specification interpreta- r
tions by licensed persm nal have been accurate throughout this
assessment period. -
Formality in the com.ol room has been enhanced during this assess-
ment period. Interactions between plant staff and startup personnel
are currently on a more professional level than previously noted and
effective use of two Day Watch Engineers in interfacing with support
staff has reduced traffic in the control room. Improvements made to
the Control Room decorum have been particularly effective in reduc-
ing traffic in the Controls Area and reducing distractions to the
licensed operators. These initiatives included movement of plant
drawings from the Controls Area to a backpanel area, restructuring
the process by which work authorization paperwork is processed, and
placement of a first line supervisor directly in the Controls Area.
Staffing levels of licensed and non-licensed operators increased dur-
ing this rating period as the licensee continued to hire and train
operators. Although there was some attrition in the non-licensed
area, these losses were offset by individuals who had recently com-
. pleted the required training programs. Additional licensed personnel !
became available through the completion of a license class in January '
when all ten candidates who underwent NRC license examination were
successful and received their licenses. As noted elsewhere in this
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assessment report, performance of these individuals during the NRC
licensing process was found to be exceptional, with no outstanding
generic weaknesses noted. The licensee plans to complete two replace- i
ment licensing classes during the next year. These actions demon- i
strate a commitment on the part of licensee management to maintain
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the current staffing level of five licensed personnel on each of six
shifts in the foreseeable future. It is also significant to note that
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although Shoreham Technical Specifications do not require five ;
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licensed personnel on shift during shutdown conditions, the licensee
has made a practice of maintaining a full complement of licensed
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personnel on shift regardless of the mode of operation. This factor
- coupled with the recent acquisition of a site specific simulator
- facility contribute greatly to the operational readiness of the
i licensed staff despite prolonged periods of cold shutdown.
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While the plant was not operated at greater than 5 percent power,
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operations continued for approximately seven weeks total over two *
separate occasions. Plant activities at low power included all
phases of operation up to rated reactor pressure and temperature '
conditions along with the completion of various system startup tests.
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Additionally, on two occasions during the assessment period, the main
) generator was placed on line supplying power to the Long Island Grid.
) Reactor operations at low power for extended periods of time can be
demanding, from an operational standpoint, providing substantial '
opportunity to assess operating performance and capabilities. This
, is due in part, to the fact that many of the automatic control fea-
4 tures available at higher power levels are either unavailable or in
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undesirable ranges or conditions while at low power.
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- Plant operations during these periods were consistently conducted by
l the operations staff in a highly proficient manner resulting in no
l inadvertent trips or significant operational problems. Equipment
j problems with feedwater pumps, Automatic Depressurization System
l valves and the main turbine which required relatively prompt response '
j were all handled in a proept and prudent manner which resulted in
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continued plant operations uninterrupted by forced or automatic <
- shutdowns.
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The quality of LERs submitted during this assessment period has been i
evaluated by the NRC and the results indicate that overall LER qual- i
, ity has improved and is above the industry standard. The quality of
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text discussions concerning root cause, safety consequences, person-
) nel error, and operator actions has improved over previous evalua-
tions. While the quality of the text discussions improved substan-
l tially, the quality of the abstracts remained virtually unchanged.
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' The primary weakness in the abstracts is that the causal analysis i
and corrective action information are not being adequately i
summarized. !
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l Quality Assurance organization activities in the operations areas
- have included routine performance based audits of operator perform-
ance, monitoring of startup tests and reviews of the test results.
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In conclusion, during this assessment period, which involved limited ,
operational activities, management involvement has been extensive and
- 1 effective in improving quality of Plant Operations and Startup Test-
ing. Overall performance has improved. Management involvement in the
startup program was evident throughout the period. Senior management -
, presence in the Control Room during major evolutions has been a
positive influence on Control Room formality and demonstrates a -
commitment on the part of the licensee to ensuring senior management
involvement in plant operations and testing.
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Rating: Category 1
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While the operations area was rated as Category I, NRC as a matter
3 of policy will not reduce inspection effort in this area because of "
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the unique licensing status of Shoreham.
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B. Radiological Controls (299 Hours, 8.4%)
Analysis
In the previous assessment period, the licensee conducted an effec- '
tive radiation safety program with a fully qualified staff. Minor
weaknesses were observed in regards to the control of beta radiation
exposures, ensuring that the staff was aware of all significant pro-
cedure changes, and oversight of radwaste shipping activities. How-
ever, as a result of serious weakness in the licensee's chemistry and
radiochemistry programs, particularly in the areas of staffing,
qualification and laboratory QC, the licensee received an overall
SALP category 3 rating in this area.
During the current assessment period, the licensee made
substantial effort to understand and effectively address deficiencies
in program performance. This assessment is based upon observations
of ongoing plant activities and evaluations of programs. Since radio-
! logical conditions were limited, this assessment emphasized program-
matic and operational readiness considerations, rather than demon-
strated implementation of radiological controls. While not signif t-
cantly challenged operationally, a meaningful evaluation is possible
based upon observed activities such as source replacement and con-
trols in place,
l Occupational Radiation Safety
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During the assessment period there were three detailed radiation pro-
I tection specialist inspections. Areas reviewed included audits,
! internal and external dosimetry, staf fing, ALARA, training, routine
, surveys and recordkeeping. The resident inspectors also routinely
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reviewed selected program areas. No violations were identified. !
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There were five minor radiological Licensee Event Reports (LER) all
j attributable to errors by technicians: four instances involved fail-
ure to take acceptable samples and one instance involved failure to
make periodic neutron source leak checks. These events were of min-
imal safety significance and to a large extent reflected the develop-
ment of the staff in gaining experience with operating conditions and
requirements,
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The radiation protection program has not yet faced significant opera-
a tional challenges, since plant operation has been minimal and limited
to 5% power. However, management has continued in efforts to achieve ,
excellence and prepare for full power operation. In addition to up-
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grading supervisory oversight of the radiation protection program,
reviews conducted by the Quality Assurance organization have stressed
performance assessment. Indepth and comprehensive audits by knowl-
edgeable personnel were completed of the ALARA, training and radwaste
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areas. The reports of these audits identified to licensee management
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other performance weaknesses and areas deserving improvement, initi-
ating an additional round of corrective actions and performance
enhancements. Weak areas were subsequently reaudited at 6 month
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intervals until management was satisfied with the performance of the
radiation protection program.
The Quality Control department has also developed a series of check-
lists for review of routine raciation control activities. Teams con-
sisting of knowledgeable and experienced QC and radiation protection
personnel conduct weekly checks of routine activities using these
checklists. Discrepancies are transmitted to management and formally
l tracked until findings are completely resolved.
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Management response to these findings, as well as those identified
by the NRC, has been excellent. The technically sound resolution of
.
'
the issues indicates a good understanding and technical competence
of the staff.
The radiation protection department remains fully staffed with highly
, experienced contractors used for certain supervisory positions. Re-
quired procedures are fully developed with extensive detail and
instructions, previding valuable aids to minimally experienced staff. .
To buildup staff experience, technicians and supervisors are sent to '
other facilities to participate in outages at operating stations.
The licensee's commitment to training is substantial as evidenced by
the construction of a large modern training center. Of particular i
note, the inplant laboratories and radiation protection equipment are j
i duplicated in the training center laboratories. i
Minor weaknesses were observed by NRC during routine activities at-
3'
tributable to lack of technician field experience during the extended .
licensing delays. Workers did not always receive adequate briefing
'
.
regarding the Radiation Work Permit (RWP). The Whole Body Counter
(WBC) operator did not maintain charts to trend equipment perform-
ance. Pumps used for air sampling were inadequately calibrated at
low flow rates. Maps used to record routine radiation survey data
j were confusing and inconsistent. Exposure records did not have pro-
l visions to record multiple special dosimetry. In each case, the
! licensee took prompt and effective action to resolve these issues
'
! during the assessment period. In addition, excellent radiation pro-
tection program performance was noted in regards to the maintenance
'
. of instruments and use of automated systems and computers for pro-
'
cessing TLD Dosimetry.
j Licensee initiatives in the ALARA area have corrected previously
, identified weaknesses. The ALARA program policies are particularly
] good with followup provided by a competent corporate staff of radio-
~i logical engineers. Of note, various plant equipment changes were
made to minimize buildup of future radiation exposures; including
! elimination of crud traps, reduction of stellited surfaces and
i
enhanced equipment reliability and maintainability.
'
1,
'
, -. .. - - _ - , -
- _ _ _ _ _ -.
..
.
.
15
o
Chemistry and Radiochemistry
There was one special team inspection of the licensee's radiological
and nonradiological chemistry programs during the assessment period.
The inspection examined organization and management, technician
training and qualification, radioactive effluent control program, and
nonradiological water chemistry. The findings indicated that the
licensee has made significant organization and management changes to
address identified problems. Aggressive recruitment resulted in
almost complete staffing of the chemistry department management and
professional positions by licensee personnel. This can be compared
to the previous assessment period when approximately 40*4 of the chem-
istry staff were contractor employees. In addition, a Radiochemistry
Improvement Task Force was formed which reports directly to the plant
manager. The organizational changes as well as the recruitment
actions demonstrate management involvement in correcting previously
identified deficiencies in the chemistry program.
Training and qualification of chemistry technicians, a central area
of inadequate performance during the previous assessment period, also
improved during the assessment period. The licensee has initiated an
aggressive and effective program, conducted by the Radiochemistry
Improvement Task Force, to requali fy all chemistry technicians.
The licensee has also improved their nonradiological water chemistry
program. In the area of laboratory quality assurance, the licensee
is now using two independent standard solutions (instead of one) for
calibration and measurement control in order to cross-check and
verify the integrity of the standard solutions. Draft procedures
have been generated for quality control (QC) in the nonradiological
and radiological laboratories which show significant improvement over
past QC practices. They are also revising appropriate analytical
procedures to include a statistical curve fitting method for
calibration.
The licensee has implemented an effectiv'e radioactive effluent con-
trol program. All Technical Specification limits for sampling,
analysis, use of radioactive waste treatment systems, and reporting
are being met. The implementation of the laboratory QA/QC program,
particularly as it relates to measuring radioactivity in effluents,
has improved as a result of management attention to this area. All
licensee analytical results of spiked NRC radioactivity standards,
submitted to the licensee for analysis, were found to be in agreement
with expected values. Because of the low source term present, it
should be noted that this area has also not been fully challenged,
- --
l
O
16
1
Conclusion
In conclusion, the licensee implemented an effective radiation pro-
tection program and substantially corrected all previous concerns for
the past deficiencies in their chemistry program. This outcome has
been the direct result of significant senior management involvement
in oversight, problem discovery and corrective actions. It is clear
that programmatic changes have been implemented to correct deficien-
cies in the training, qualification and staffing in the chemistry
area. The positive contribution of aggressive and knowledgeable
quality assurance and quality control staffs, to the enhancement of
this program area, is clearly evident. Although the functional area
was not significantly challenged by plant operations during the
assessment period, levels of planning, preparation, staff and program
development were those of a plant ready for operation. Performance
observed and assessed during this period indicates that site radio-
logical, effluent control and chemistry programs have the capability
to support plant operations. Management efforts should continue to
ensure programmatic improvements remain effective.
Rating: 1
While the radiological controls area was rated as a Category I in
performance, NRC as a matter of policy will not reduce the
inspection effort in this area due to the unique licensing status of
Shoreham.
.
17
.
C. Maintenance (528 Hours, 14.8%)
Analysis
This area was rated category 2 during the previous assessment period.
No major concerns were identified during that assessment period and
the maintenance programs were judged to be performing well.
A number of initiatives were undertaken to address areas of concern
identified in the previous assessment period. These initiatives have
been successful with one exception, the amount of time spent in the
field by first-line maintenance supervisors. Preparation of work
packages is currently the responsibility of the appropriate first-
line supervisor. Although job planning has been complete and accur-
ate, placing this planning workload upon the first-line supervisors
reduces the time spent in the field. A symptom of this lack of field
supervision has been noted in the area of post-maintenance house-
keeping. Instances have been noted when work areas have not been
returned to their original condition upon completion of maintenance
activities. Tools and loose debri s have been left behind at job
sites, and scaffolding has not always been removed when work was
complete. This may be attributed to a lack of attention to detail
on the part of first-line supervision and is an area of weakness that
warrants additional management attention. It should be noted that
although this problem has not been a deterrent to quality workman-
ship, increases in maintenance workloads will further decrease direct
supervision and could result in more significant manifestations.
The large backlog of evaluations needed to address industry problem
notifications was an area of concern in the previous SALP assessment.
The licensee has instituted an aggressive prog ram to reduce this
backlog as evidenced by a steadily decreasing number of items await-
ing resolution. Currently there are no items awaiting disposition
which are greater than sixty days old.
Implementation of a Material Management Information System and other
enhancements to the material control program has improved tLe avail-
ability and retrievability of spare parts. This previous area of con-
cern appears to be functioning well and the licensee is continuing to
make improvements in this area.
The well controlled maintenance program has produced quality work
during this assessment period. Program challenges have been met by
maintenance personnel as demonstrated by the absence of equipment
deficiencies and no backlog of safety related maintenance. Mainte-
nance supervision demonstrated affective work planning, responded
capably to contingencies, and maintained a well trained and staffed
organization.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
.
18
.
Upper management scheduling has been a strength during this assess-
ment period. Schedules have been well conceived and realistic in
goals. In very few cases were schedules not met due to problems
internal to the Maintenance Division.
Significant demands for maintenance were met during the neutron
source replacement outage and during major equipment repairs such as:
overhaul of "D" RHR pump, inspection and repair of the RHR heat
exchangers, circulating water pump overhauls, and emergency diesel
generator disassembly for inspection.
Craft training programs have been submitted to INP0 for accreditation
during this assessment period. Completion of the new Corporate
Training Center has made available a valuable training tool. In addi-
tion to formal classroom and on the job training provided by the
licensee, laboratories and mock-ups are available at the training
center. Also, vendors are used to provide specialized training, when
necessary, as part of the craf t training program. The licensee ulti-
mately intends to implement a full scope training program whereby
individuals with little or no experience will start as apprentices
and proceed through the journeyman level. This demonstrates a commit-
ment on the part of the licensee to maintain a qualified work force.
The current level of knowledge and abilities of craft personnel has
been good. Evidence of this has been shown by a la:k LER's resulting
from craft personnel error and minimal rework items caused by inade-
quate craft skills or technician errors.
In conclusion, maintenance programs during this period were performed
in a manner which provided excellent equipment availability for the
limited plant operation. Safety related work was properly prior-
l itized and planned and no instances of improper maintenance were
identified which caused equipment or system inoperability. Quality
Assurance Division was involved in all safety related activities and
Engineering support of maintenance was gooa. Efficient use of craft
personnel by management resulted in an adequately implemented main-
tenance program. Further management attention should be directed to
ensuring adequate first-line field supervision; housekeeping and job
followup problems have been noted and increases in maintenance work-
load can exacerbate these problems.
Rating: Category 2, Improving
(
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_ . . __
,. -
I
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19
.
'
4
0. Surveillance (509 Hours, 14.2%)
Analysis
This area was rated a category 2 during the previous assessment
period. Personnel errors resulting in challenges to ESF systems were
noted. as a weakness. The board recommended increased management
4
attention to correcting this deficiency.
Surveillance activities during this assessment period involved normal
Technical Specification surveillances, weekly and monthly, and also
included a large number of eighteen month surveillances that were
necessary to support plant operating cycles.
Management oversight of surveillance programs has been evident
throughout the period. Surveillances required prior to mode changes
remained highly visible through scheduling meetings which were always
attended by plant management. The Review of Operations Committee ,
meetings reviewed all surveillance procedure changes prior to imple- l
mentation and performed these reviews in a timely manner. "
The major eighteen month surveillances were performed prior to August
1986 startup. Conduct of these surveillances generally was performed i
without difficulty; however, a number of procedural revisions were
necessary during the performance of various tests. Procedural
changes were developed, reviewed and approved in a timely manner and
were not a major factor during the performance of these tests. Major
testing conducted to return EDG 103 to service after the second phase
of the Colt Diesel Generator Tie-In was successfully completed
without incident.
Challenges to ESF equipment due to routine surveillance activities
have decreased significantly since the last assessment period (down
from 24 LERs in the last assessment period to 12 in this period). '
The reduction can be generally attributed to increased attention to
3 detail on the part of the technicians performing the surveillances
I and increased emphasis placed on quality workmanship. Challenges to
1
equipment during performance of surveillances on Reactor Building
Standby Ventilation / Control Room Air Conditioning (RBSV/CRAC) and i
, Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water (RBCLCW) have occurred at
'
a relatively high rate with nine LERc during this period. This high
- number of challenges can be attributed to a number of causes; pro-
l cedural deficiencies, technician error, and design deficiencies.
While licensee awareness of this probles is apparent, progress to
i implement effective solutions has been slow,
r
-
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- .- -. , _ . . _ - - - . -- - _ - - . . - - _ - - - _ . - _ - -
.
, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
.
20
.
Overall surveillance program activities have been conducted in an
effective manner. Quality Assurance activities in support of sur-
veilla.1ce has been extensive, including pragram review, direct obser-
vation of work and results review. The containment integrated leak
rate test was highly successful, passing in the as-found condition.
Generally, the surveillance program is isighly successful. However,
the licensee failure to promptly correct identified problems in
specific areas such as RBSV/CRAC and RBCLCW continues to be a
weakness.
Rating: Category 2
.. - - . - . -. ._ - -. _. - - _ -
<
!
<
21
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E. Engineering and Corporate Technical Support (186 Hours, 5.2%)
Analysis
This area has not been rated in previous assessments. During this
assessment period the inspectors reviewed the plant modification and
design change process and assessed the quality of engineering support '
'
for plant operations, maintenance, QA and training.
Licensee management is dedicated to maintaining timely and effective '
engineering support.-The Nuclear Engineering Department (NED) report-
ing directly to the Vice President, Nuclear Operation is responsible
for providing technical and engineering support as requested for all '
aspects of the nuclear plant. NED responsibilities are clearly estab- '
lished in the department procedures. NED is located at the facility ;
which enhances communications and coordination with plant staff. '
The Nuclear Engineering Department staffing is almost at full comple-
. ment with an average nuclear experience of 9.6 years. The licensee
l is actively recruiting qualified personnel to fill existing vacan- !
! cies. The licensee maintains a pool of dedicated engineering per- ,
i
sonnel to assist Shoreham site at the Office of Engineering at '
Melville, New York and at its Architect-Engineer. Additionally, six
,
NED engineers are on call to provide around-the-clock coverage at the
4
plant. These on-call engineers provided good support coverage during
the plant evolutions and transients. Thus, the licensee management
has provided a complement of well qualified and trained engineers to
provide timely and effective support to the plant. ;
, To ensure continued high level of engineering support to the plant,
j the licensee committed in the USAR to implement an Interim Station
i
Modification Program using the Services of the Architect-Engineer
l (A/E). This program has been implemented effectively and will con-
'
tinue through the first refueling outage. During the Ittterim Pro-
l gram, the A/E retains verification authority for safety related
j design, maintains the design bases for the facility and provides
assistance for engineering support to the plant,
'
i The licensee has developed a Technology Transfer Program to assure
j effective transfer of engineering and design responsibility from the !
l A/E. This program is well on its way to completion. Towards the end i
of this SALP period about one third of the Work Packages and one ,
fourth of the documents were transferred. Engineering personnel have
l been hired and trained and implementing procedures were being writ-
ten. The licensee was independently performing about fif ty percent i
of the facility design changes. This is another example of licensee l
management support to engineering activities at the site. !
t
. - -_ - ,_ , . . _ - - - - - - - - - - _ , . - - - , . . - - , - , _ , . - - . . , _
,_ -____ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
.
22
.
I
An effective use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques
was evident at the site. The licensee recognized the importance of
PRA in the design process and initiated a study in 1981. The engi-
neering insights gained from the use of PRA have already been applied
to emergency procedure development, training, containment design and
detailed system design. PRA techniques were used to support licen-
see's request to the NRC dated April 14, 1987 for authorization to
increase power to 25% at the station, to' independently verify the
results of the Independent Plant Evaluation (IPE), arid to analyze the
performance of the licensee's supplemental containment design. PRA
techniques were effectively used to justify (1) the use of - 90%
enriched Boron-10 in the Standby Liquid Control System, (2) raising
the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System trip set point, and
(3) comparison of risks associated with various emergency diesels and
others. A good understanding of PRA application in design was evident
among engineering, maintenance and operating personnel. The recom-
mendations resulting from PRA were implemented, with good management
and staff support.
The licensee has etablished an effective Engineering Assurance
Division (EA). EA monitors routinely the work performed under the
Interim Station Modification Program, work performed to support such
license related activities as plant Technical Specification related
set point development, license proceedings, 10 CFR 50.59 safety
evaluations, 10 CFR 21 evalu <tions, equipment qualifications, fire
protection, security and emergency planning.
A satisfactory assessment by EA is required before any division
assumes design responsibility from the A/E, EA's assessments appear
effective in identifying problem areas and corrective actions. EA's
assessment of the Instrument and Control Section's readiness to
assume design responsibility identified a lack of clear interfaces
with other organizations, absence of a permanent section head, and a
lack of backup engineers. In another assessment of the Engineering
Mechanics Section's readiness to assume design responsibility, EA
identified that the concern of combustion in the off gas system was
not discussed by the A/E. The satisfactory solution to these problems
has demonstrated EA's effectiveness. The licensee has established a
Reliability Group within the QA Department which is functioning
effectively. For example, reliability analyses were developed for the
Low Pressure Coolant Injection System, Reactor Water Cleanup System,
Control Rod Drive System, and the Staridby Liquid Control System. The
reports were well received by the organizations requesting the study.
.
23
4
The licensee has established the Independent Safety Engineering Group
(ISEG) required by Technical Specifications, as a dedicated full time
organization within the QA organization. The ISEG is staffed with
qualified personnel. This dedicated staff may be augmented, on an as
needed basis, by borrowing personnel from other licensee organiza-
tions or contractors. The ISEG routinely examines plant operating
characteristics and industry and NRC issues. ISEG evaluations of HPCI
check valve failures, response time of scram instrument volume level
detectors, Radiation Monitoring System, and improper installation of
heat shrinkable tubing were well planned with clear statements of
purpose and work scope. The final reports contained details of the
methodology, a discussion of the concern and available solutions,
good discussions of the findings, conclusions, and observations.
Specific recommendations were also provided in the report when apper.-
priate. Open items resulting from the ISEG reviews are tracked by
the group to closure. The ISEG is functioning effectively in accord-
ance with its charter and the Technical Specification requirements.
During this assessment period problems were identified in the follow
up actions for NRC Information Notice 86-03 to address concerns
regarding Limitorque Motor Operated Valves. These actions were slow
and not geared to identify all deficiencies. As noted in section D
of this assessment, procedural and design deficiencies have con-
tributed to repeated ESF actuations during surveillances. Although
the frequency of these actuations has decreased during this assess-
ment period, they continue to occur. Further, these types of actua-
tions will likely persist until system hardware modifications are
completed. Engineering evaluation requirea to implement these modif-
ications has been slow. Additionally, an erroneous assumption incor-
porated into a modification procedure resulted in an isolation of the
Station Reserve Transformer and a loss of offsite power.
In summary, the licensee has established a strong engineering support
organization to provide effective support to site organizations. The
Interim Station Modification Program is functioning well as evidenced
by the support f rom operations, maintenance, QA, training and other -
site organizations. Communications and interactions with plant staff
have been effective. The quality and timeliness of designs and engi-
neering support are steadily improving; however, improvement ef forts
should be concentrated in this area. Continued licensee attention is
required to assure ef fective engineering support during full power
operation of the facility.
Rating: Category 2
. _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
.
24
.
F. Emergency Preparedness (116 Hours, 3.3*4)
Analysis
During the previous assessment period, the licensee performance in
this area was rated Category 1 (consistent), based upon performance
during the first annual exercise, and a high degree of management
involvement in emergency preparedness as evidenced by responsiveness
to identifying and correcting program deficiencies, and in response
to actual emergencies.
During the current assessment period, two routine safety inspections
were conducted, and changes to e:nergency plans and procedures were
reviewed. The two routine safety inspections performed in February
and June, 1987, related to new emergency response f acilities and
follow up of corrective actions taken as a result of previous inspec-
tions and maintenance of the emergency preparedness program.
During the assessment period, the licensee completed the construction
of an Emergency Operations facility (EOF) and Emergency News Center
(ENC). These facilities are large, well equipped, and designed to
enhance the effectiveness of personnel utilizing them.
The licensee has been responsive to NRC initiatives as evidenced by
the training of all Watch Supervisors in the duties of Emergency
Director. The drill program tests each emergency team every quarter,
Additionally, the drill and training program is structured to enhance
personnel effectiveness during different types of events, such as
sabotage or other security events and events that develop quickly,
and to test the on-shift operating crews prior to activation of the
emergency response facilities,
i
'
The licensee has reacted quickly and correctly to several events dur-
ing the assessment period, most notably threats against the station.
Assessment actions, notifications, and communications have been pro-
per and conservative. Actions taken were with due regard to safety.
Problems encountered were analyzed and prompt corrective actions
taken to prevent recurrence. During the Loss of Offsite Power event,
notifications were found to be less timely than during previous
events. Although the licensee completed these notifications within
1 the required time, corrective actions were implemented to improve the
notification process following complex plant transients. This
demonstrates a continued commitment on the part of the licensee to
- self-assess its potential faults and implement corrective actions
without regulatory prompting,
i
i
i
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e
1
__
_ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . .___ _ .
J
.
25
.
In summary, the licensee continues to exhibit the qualities necessary
to ensure excellence in their emergency preparedness program. Train-
ing of all levels of personnel is extensive. Programs and facilities
are continually analyzed and upgraded as appropriate to maintain a
high level of preparedness. It is evident that the high degree of
management attention and commitment to emergency preparedness has
resulted in a high degree of performance in all areas of the onsite
organization.
Rating: Category 1
While the emergency preparedness area was rated Category I, NRC
inspection efforts will not be reduced in this area due to the
unique licensing status of Shoreham,
i
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4
!
,
_ _ _ . _ . _ . - __ _ _ _-
.
e
o
26
.
G. Security and Safeguards (104 Hours, 2.9Q
Analysis
During the previous SALP period, the licensee was found to be imple-
menting an ' effective program and received a Category 1 rating. Spec-
ific strengths were identified by audits and self appraisals that
resulted in improvements and enhancements, prompt and effective
response to events, and an effective training program. A minor prob-
lem with clerical support for the program was identified. No viola-
tions were identified.
During the current assessment period, three unannounced routine
physical security program inspections were performed by region based
inspectors. Routine inspections were conducted throughout the
assessment period. One Severity Level IV violation was identified,
The violation was not indicative of programmatic problems.
The licensee's involvement in support for and oversight of the
security program remained evident and resulted in highly effective
program implementation. Management oversight of the contract secur-
ity force provided the licensee with the necessary and current know-
lodge of program implementation to preclude significant problems.
The licensee continued to utilize its audit and appraisal programs to
indicate areas where changes would benefit program implementation.
,
Program improvements and enhancements are evident in systems opera-
tions and reliability, testing and maintenance, and facilities.
The licensee initiated the inclusion of safeguards contingency events
in its emergency preparedness exercises in December 1986. Two such
exercises have been conducted since, requiring the active participa-
tion of both the security and the operations organizations for their
execution and successful completion. The licensee found those
s exercises very effective in surfacing organizational interface prob-
lems that had previously been overlooked. The licensee is also
active in industry organizations formed to enhance nuclear power
plant security and to discuss issues of mutual interest. These
initiatives are evidence of the licensee's interest in developing and
maintaining an effective security program.
Prograa implementing procedures and instructions were updated and
improved, as necessary, to provide the security force with current,
, clear and concise directions in carrying out its duties. The effec-
tiveness of the procedures and instructions, and also the training
'
j program, which is administered by the security force contractor, is '
apparent by the relatively small number of personnel errors identi- ;
l
fied during the period.
'
c
'
l
- - - -
_____ _-________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
,
27
Both the licensee's and the contractor's staffing levels for the pro-
gram are appropriate to ensure proper program implementation. The
minor problem with clerical support, which was identified in the pre-
vious assessment period, has been corrected. All members of the
security organization appear to be well qualified and exhibit high
morale and a professional demeanor. Additionally, the turnover rate
in the force is relatively low, which is indicative of a well run
organization and job satisfaction.
There were five events that required reporting in accordance with
10 CFR 73.71 during the assessment period. Three of the events
involved bomb threats, one event involved a computer failure, and one
involved the degradation of a vital area barrier. The response by
the security force to each of the events was prompt and appropriate
for the circumstances, indicating a well disciplined and knowledge-
able organization and an effective program. The event reports sub-
mitted to the NRC were clear, concise and adequate for NRC analysis.
The quality of the event reports is indicative of thorough management
review.
Three incidents involving security guards sleeping on duty occurred
late in the assessment period. The licensee aggressively implement?d
corrective actions to prevent future occurences. These included new
disciplinary rules along with staffing changes intended to enhance
the first-line supervision of the security guard force.
During the assessment period, the licensee submitted four revisions
to the Security Plan under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p) and
provided its response to the August 4,1986 Miscellaneous Amendments
to 10 CFR 73.55 codified by the NRC. The plan changes were of high
. quality and indicative of management's continuin; oversight of the
program to ensure it is consistent with NRC performance objectives
and to achieve consistency. Security personnel involved in maintain-
'
ing plans current and consistent with NRC objectives are knowledge-
able of NRC requirements.
j
'
In summary, the licensee has sustained a high level of performance
during this assessment period. Minor problems occurred, but were
promptly corrected effective with actions to prevent recurrence. It
is evident by this performance that the licensee is determined to
implement and maintain a high quality security program.
Rating: Category 1
,
While the security area was graded as Category I, the inspection
effort will not be reduced in this area due to the unique licensing /
1
status of Shoreham. (
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28
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H. Training and Qualification Effectiveness (586 Hours,16.5M
Analysis
i
The various aspects of this functional area have been considered and
discussed as an integral part of the other functional areas and the
respective inspection hours have been included in each one. Conse-
quently, this discussion is a synopsis of the assessments related to
training conducted in other areas. Training effectiveness has been
measured primarily by the observed performance of licensee personnel
and, to a lesser degree, as a review of program adequacy. A special
team inspection to evcluate training and qualification programs was
completed late in the assessment period. This discussion addresses
three principal areas: licensed operator training, non-licensed
staff training, and the status of INPO training accreditation.
During the previous assessment period, training and qualification
effectiveness was considered as a separate functional area for the
first time and rated Category 3. The previous assessment was highly
critical of the licensee's training program in the area on non-
licensed personnel training, and direct management attention to
improve this area was recommended by the Board. The current assess-
ment is based on resident and specialist inspector observations, as
'
,
-
well as two specific inspections into the training area.
Initiatives by the licensee to improve training effectiveness within
this assessment period were extensive. Weaknesses identified in the
previous assessment period have been largely addressed as the forma-
tion of the Office of Training has evolved. Record keeping defici-
encies have been corrected, formal training for non-licensed person-
nel is now conducted primarily by Office of Training staff, and the
reliance on plant staff for training activities other than on the job
training has been greatly reduced. The development and implementation
of formal, structured training courses for Chemistry Technicians,
Health Physics Technician and non-licensed operators has been com-
pleted and appears to be effective,
Efforts to increase staffing levels within the Office of Training
have generally been successful, plant staf f department head involve-
ment in training plan development and implementation is very good and
overall program implementation is now uniform in all facility
divisions,
i
Completion of the corporate training center and procurement of a
plant specific simulator were both accomplished during this assess-
ment period and are indicative of corporate commitment to a quality f
- training program. Completion of the transfer of training records onto j
a computer tracking system will enhance the quality and availability
of those records.
l
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29
.
The number of reportable events attributed to personnel error is down
a
'
significantly when compared to the previous assessment period, espec-
ially in the operations, maintenance, and surveillance areas. This ,
reduction may be attributed to increased management attention and
increased training effectiveness. Improvement in the performance of
Control Room personnel can be attributed to an effective requalifica-
tion training program which stresses "lessons learned" from previous
events.
Use of the Quality Assurance department to monitor training has been
particularly effective in identifying problems and effecting changes.
Training of auditors and inspectors from the QA/QC department was
ertensive and has been particularly effective. The increased level
of knowledge in the QA department has led to an increased number of
technically significant findings and better acceptance of QA findings
by plant staff.
During this assessment period the NRC administered one set of license
examinations with five candidates participating in the R0 exam and
'
five candidates participating in the SRO exam. All candidates were
successful in their attempts and were especially proficient in the
use of plant drawings and Technical Specifications. The success of
the plant staff in this area indicates that the licensed operator <
training program is performing well. '
INPO accreditation of Shoreham training programs continued through
the assessment period. Developmer.t and implementation of training .
programs are in varying stages of completion. The licensee has sub-
mitted, and INPO has accepted, Self Evaluation Reports (SER) for
"
several of the training programs. An INP0 Accreditation Team Visit
is scheduled early in the next assessment period (October 26 - 30,
1987).
I
In summary, senior management involvement in resolving training
deficiencies identified in the previous assessment period have
yielded positive results. Training programs appear to be effectively
4
implemented at all levels and positive results can be seen in the
reduced number of LERs and personnel errors. Full implementation of
all training programs is still in a transitional status. As such, an
accurate assessment of the effectiveness of these programs cannot be
'
made until this transitional period is complete. The commitment to
quality training on the part of senior management should continue to
'
provide improved staff performance,
1
I
Rating: Category 2, Improving
i
>
!
I
- - .-.
.
30
.
I. Licensing
Analysis
'
For the previous assessments period, this area was ral.ed Category 3.
It was noted that the licensee's analysis accompanying its requests
for license amendments were perfunctory and with a minimal amount of
bases. It was also noted that the licensee's responsiveness was slow
on issues not on the critical path for full power licensing. Those
concerns were attributed to two fundamental causes. First, the
licensee had an overly cautious attitude about formal submittals to
the NRC because of the atmosphere of litigation that surrounds this
project. A second cause appeared to be understaffing in the licen-
see's licensing organization. Since the beginning of this evaluation
period, the licensee has taken aggressive actions for improvement.
Although the atmosphere of litigation has not abated, the corrective
actions taken by the licensee's senior management produced notable
improvements in the area of licensing activities.
During this SALP evaluation period, the licensee performed two rounds
of low power testing. The reactor was critical for a total period of
about seven weeks. Ex..ept for issues related to emergency planning,
all pre-full power licensing issues have been resolved. During this
period, two important issues; compliance with Appendix R and the
Anticipated Transient Without Scram Rule were reviewed and approved
by the NRC. On April 14, 1987, the licensee submitted a request
, before the Commission for authorization to operate Shoreham at 25%
1
power. The request was accompanied by an extensive analysis on
severe accidents at 25% power level and the demands on emergency
planning under those ci rcumstances, Although the NRR technical
review was subsequently suspended, the licensee's interaction with
the NRR staff during the review demonstrated that its staff has
significant technical capability and a thorough understanding of the
Shoreham plant and its safety systems.
Management involvement in the licensing area has been extensive.
b
Progress in licensing activities was not inhibited by the effort
necessary to support two Licensing Board hearings related to emer-
gency planning contentions. The Licensing Division management met
with the NRR Project Manager and technical reviewers on a regular
'
basis to discuss the status and progress in the resolution of open
licensing actions. These meetings were of ten attended by represent-
atives from intervenor groups. In these meetings the discussions
were open, non-inhibitive, and extremely productive. In addition,
,
the licensee's Licensing Division issued weekly summary reports and
held scheduled weekly triefings with the licensee's technical depart-
'
ment managers. This close coordination enabied the licensee to sub- (
stantially improve the quality of analysis that accompanied the sub-
mittals for licensing actions. In general, these submittals were
- timely, thorough and of high technical quality.
,
.
31
.
The licensee's responses to address safety issues continued to be
technically sound. During this SALP evaluation period, the NRR staff
completed its review of the outstanding fire protection issues re-
lated to the control of the Automatic Depressurization System and the
controls of high-low pressure systems interfaces in the event of a
severe fire in the Control Room. The approach by the licensee to
resolve these issues showed a clear understanding of the plant sys-
tems and the analyses were realistic and yet allowed for substantial
rafety margins to exist. There were, however, some cases where the
licensee's initial submittals appeared to be superficial and required
additional information to enable the NRC staff to complete their
review. Two of those cases were issues related to quantification of
post-accident effluents and the surveillance requirements of the
Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Systems. However, it should
be noted that those two issues were initiated prior to this SALP
evaluation period and do not fully reflect the recent efforts for
improvements.
The licensee made good progress in responding to NRC initiated ac-
tions. The much improved capability of the Standby Liquid Control
System, the change of the Main System Isolation Valve set poin^. and
the improved reliability of Alternate Rod Insertion are some examples
of these accomplishments. In addition, the licensee has initiated
the conceptual design of a filtered containment vent for enhancement
of containment integrity in the event of a severe accident. The
staff's initiatives for containment enhancement were primarily
directed at Mark I containments and the licensee recognizes that a
number of areas the staff has suggested for possible improvements
were already satisfied by the Shoreham Mark II containment configura-
tion. The licensee's commitment to this major effort demonstrates
its willingness to exceed the minimum regulatory requirement in
l
responding to NRC's initiatives to enhance safety.
During the previous SALP evaluation period, the licensee appeared to
be overly cautious in its interactions with the staff because of
ongoing litigations; this resulted in ambiguities and delays. The
licensee has since made substantial progress to be more direct and
responsive. This was demonstrated during the discussions the NRC
staff had with the licensee on the analysis related to the 25's power
request.
During the period the licensee has increased staff to strengthen its
Licensing Division staff. The Licensing Division is staf fed with
personnel who are technically competent and knowledgeable about the
Shoreham facility. The group does an outstanding job in coordinating
the efforts required from other technical departments. As a result,
licensing activities were timely and of high technical quality. Con-
sidering the increased workload for the 25*4 power request and the
licensee's ability to cope with it, it appears that the Licensing
Division is adequately staffed for operations exceeding the present
5's power level.
-, .. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
32
.
In summary, the licensee has made substantial improvement in licen-
sing activities. This resulted from a number of factors; intense
involvement by the management, strengths in ib technical capability,
effectiveness of its licensing group and improvements in its training
programs,
Rating: Category 1
l
[
I
l
t
I
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
33
.
i I
J. Assurance of Quality
Analysis
,
Management involvement and control in assuring quality was initially
considered as a separate functional area in the previous SALP, in '
addition to being one of the evaluation criteria in the other func-
tional areas. The various aspects of Quality Assurance program re-
quirements have been considered and discussed as an integral part of
each functional area and the respective inspection hours are included
in each area. This discussion is therefore a synopsis of the assess-
1 ments relating to quality work conducted in all areas but it is not
solely an assessment of the QA/QC Division. The previous SALP Assess-
ment rating in this area was a Category 2 with a declining trend. A
declining trend in this functional area can be a precursor to an
overall decline in plant performance and therefore places additional
emphasis on NRC assessment efforts in this area. In assessing how the
licensee assures quality, the attributes considered are implementa-
tion of management goals, planning and control of routine activities,
worker enthusiasm and attitudes, management involvement, staffing,
training, and the use of QA/QC as a management tool.
Throughout this assessment period, there has been evidence that the
- work in the facility was performed to high quality standards at the
operator-technician-mechanic level . This high quality work can be
directly attributed to a positive attitude on the part of the first-
line personnel, the quality of training they have received, a strong
QC presence at the individual job level and increased management
involvement and presence in the day-to-day activities of the plant
Quality Assurance involvement in plant activities has been extensive
throughout this assessment. The coverage typically consists of hold
points on all safety related work requests, and physical coverage is
given to items such as terminations, closure of mechanical components ,
'
and paperwork reviews. In addition to safety related coverage, a
greater percentage of important nonsafety related items are receiving
QA/QC coverage. The QA/QC Department also conducted 46 performance
based audits during the assessment period expending 15,330 man hours.
Tne audits were conducted in all plant areas and audit findings were
effectively used to improve plant programs. Auditor performance has
been enhanced by increased training initiatives by QA/QC management
personnel. Training programs for QA/QC personnel were greatly
expanded during this assessment period and now include simulator
training and visits to other sites. ,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
.
34
.
Facility response to QA and Nuclear Review Board Audit findings and
QC deficiency reports had been previcusly identified as an area
lacking sufficient management attention. This area has received
extensive senior management attention during this assessment period ,
and, as a result, there has been a significant reduction in the
number of overdue responses. Improvement in the format of the QA/QC
monthly report has made it a valuable tool for plant management in
assuring that responses are made by the appropriate division managers
has focused additional management awareness on QA/QC findings and has
improved facility response to identified problems.
The facility Review of Operations Committee (ROC) was convened on 179
occasions and the Nuclear Review Board (NRB) was convened on 11
occasions during this assessn.ent period. Both have been instrumental
in maintaining plant sa'ety as a priority. Reviews of station modi-
fications and procedure changes by ROC have been thorough and con-
ducted with safety impact in mind. NRB commissioned 18 audits during
the assessment period and the results were valuable in assessing
licensee program effectiveness.
Development of a Quality Assurance Hotline by which employees can
voice concerns anonymously to the QA division has opened another line
of communication between plant staff and upper management. The hot-
line surfaced one valid safety concern regarding installed mechanical
jumpers which was ouickly resolved by plant management. Another
initiative that upper management has taken to assure quality was the
formation of an Operational Assessment Group which inalyses plant
performance and reports findings to the Vice President, Nuclear
Operations.
Management actions in response to SALP comments have been extensive
and timely. Tracking of comnitments was a function of the Nuclear
Review Board and progress toward resolution of these issues was an
agenda item at every NRB meeting. This closely watched agenda insu~ed
that extensive management attention was given to noted areas of
weakness.
1 In conclusion, the quality programs in effect at Shoreham have
included QA/QC, NRB and ROC committees, ISEG and effective first line
supervision of all disciplines. Senior management involvement in
improving staff awareness of the importance attention to detail in
improvement of quality has yielded positive results. The overall
result has been an increase in manning levels, and decreases in
Licensee Event Reports, ESF actuations, and personnel errors.
Rating: Category 1
While the assurance of quality area was rated as Category I,
'
' inspection efforts will not be reduced due to the unique status of
the Shoreham facility.
l
-_. __ _.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
.
.
35
i
V. Supporting Da.a and Summaries
A. Investigation and Allegation Review
During this SALP assessment period nine allegations were received and
evaluated. Two licensee empicjee drug use allegations were re:eived;
however, these allegations were unsubstantiated due in part to a lack
of cooperation on the part of the allegers and have been closed.
Two allegations concerning questionable practices in the warehousing
area were received; one of these resulted in a specialist inspection
which discovered no instances of noncompliance with NRC requirements
and has been closed: the other is under review at this time and
remains open. Three concerns alleging falsification of documents
were received; two have been investigated, with no evidence of falsi-
fication, and closed; one remains open while investigation continues.
One allegation was made in both the Radiochemistry and Training and
Qualification areas, both have been evaluated, found unsubstantiated,
and closed.
During this assessment period the Office of Investigations conducted
one investigation into the alleged falsification of doc;ments by
members of the Radiochemi stry Section. These concerns were orig-
inally surfaced during the previous SALP period. NRC action is
pending.
B. Escalated Enforcement Actions
There was no escalated enforcement action taken during this assess-
ment period.
_
.
36
.
-
C. Management Conferences
1. NRR/ Licensee Meetings
Licensing Status 08/01/86
09/04/86
10/16/86
11/25/86
01/13/87
02/19/87
04/22/87
Fire Protection 10/02/86
Control Room Design Review 11/03/87
25% Power License Proposal 04/30/87
Supplemental Containment
System Conceptual Design 07/21/87
NRR Site Visits / Meetings
Emergency Planning 05/29-06/05/86
Management Discussions 03/12/87
25% Power Proposal 05/12-05/13/87
2. Region I/ Licensee Meetings
l SALP Management Meeting 07/29/86
l
l Review of Loss of Offsite Power
Event 04/05/87
l
l
l
l
. .
.
., e
3, ,e
,,. "-
G f ".
'
!.f ,
37
. .
..,
D. Licensee Event Reports
a
a 1. Tabular Listing
!
.t
/ a. Personnel Error 16
s
b. Design Management 12
c. External 5
d. Defective Procedure 9
e. Component Failure 8
f. Other 10
2. Causal Analysis
Personnel Errors
There were 16 LERs generated this SALP period as a result of
personnel errors. This number is a significant improvement over
the previous assessment period when 32 LERs resulted from per-
sonnel error. Of the 16 personnel errors,12 resulted in chal-
1enges to ESF Systems. The ESF system challenge number is mis-
leading in that over half of those challenges occurred during
the performance of work on two systems: Reactor Building
Standby Ventilation / Control Room Air Conditioning and Reactor
Building Closed Loop Cooling Water. There does not appear to be
a common factor which has resulted in the large number of LERs
associated with these two systems, but rather a number of fac-
tors appear to contribute. Surveillance procedures in these
areas are quite complex and require numerous lifted leads and
jumpers, access to terminal strips and relays are frequently in
areas of limited visibility and accessibility and both systems
are highly sensitive.
Radiochemistry and Fire protection
During this assessment period there were 6 LERs generated as a
,. result of Radiochemistry problems. The majority of these LERs
resulted from personnel error, however, it is important to note
- -
'
that no LERs have occurred in this area since the last quarter
of 1986. Six LERs can be directly attributed to the Fire Pro-
tection activities and, in all cases, directly involved the
inability to meet Technical Specification fire watch
requirements.
- .
e , .. - - - - - , , ,,
. - - - - - - . - - . . - - - - - , ,, ,,- _. ,-
r.- , _ ,
.
38
.
Syerall Analysis
The mber of LERs in this assessment period, 54, appears on the
surfac to be indicative of some performance problems, however,
assessmen of the types and frequency of LERs indicates other-
wise. Ther has been a steady decline in the number of LERs per
quarter since he last assessment period. There has also been a
significant dec ase in LERs when compared to the last rating
period: 58 in 1 months for 85-98 versus 54 in 17 months for
86-99. Although the were 54 LERs in assessment period 86-99,
28 of those can be lum d into three discrete areas. Activities
on Reactor Building Stan y Ventilation System / Control Room Air
Conditioning and Reactor uilding Closed loop Cooling Water
accounted for 14 LERs, Che,istry LERs totalled 8 and Fire
Protection related LERs totalle 6.
The licensee is aware of these pro em areas and is attempting
to reduce the numbers of LERs by co ecting root causes. The
licensee has generally addressed the oblems associated with
activities on the above mentioned sys ms, No LER's have
occurred in the radiochemistry area since e last quarter of
1986. This decrease in LERs can be directly tributed to the
aggressive program that was undertaken by licens management to
improve the Radiochemistry program after the la assessment
rating of Category 3. The licensee is also making fforts at
this time to reduce the number of required firewatch , which
should in turn reduce the number of LERS in the fire pro ction
area. Licensee awareness and activities in these areas ave
significantly reduced the number of LER's in the last
months.
__ . _ _ . _ . _- ._ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ __j
.
1
38a l
.
i
Overall Analysis j
The number of LERs in this assessment period, 60, appears on the
surface to be indicative of some performance problems, however,
assessment of _the types and frequency of LERs indicates other-
wise. There has been a steady decline in the number of LERs per
quarter since the last assessment period. There has also been a
significant decrease in LERs when compared to the last rating
period: 58 in 12 months for 85-98 versus 60 in 17 months for
86-99. Although there were 60 LERs in assessment period 86-99,
28 of those can be lumped into three discrete areas. Activities
on Reactor Building Standby Ventilation System / Control Room Air
Conditioning and Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water
accounted for 14 LERs, Chemistry LERs totalled 8 and Fire
Protection related LERs totalled 6.
The licensee is aware of these problem areas and is attempting
to reduce the numbers of LERs by correcting root causes. The '
licensee has generally addressed the problems associated with
activities on the above mentioned systems. No LER's have
occurred in the radiochemistry area since the last quarter of
1986. This decrease in LERs can be directly attributed to the
aggressive program that was undertaken by licensee management to
improve the Radiochemistry program after the last assessment
rating of Category 3. The licensee is also making efforts at
this time to reduce the number of required firewatches, which
should in turn reduce the number of LERS in the fire protection
area. Licensee awareness and activities in these areas have
significantly reduced the number of LER's in the last six
months.
._. . _ _ _
... . _ .. _. .-
.
39
.
E. Licensing Actions
License Amendments Issued
Amendment No. Title Date
2 Noble Gas Monitoring 03/04/86
3 Process Control Program, 11/03/87
Radwaste Management
4 Radwaste Sampling and 12/09/86
Milk Samples
5 Main Steam Isolation 05/04/87
Valve Setpoint Changes
6 Stand-by Liquid Control 05/18/87 ,
System !
Technical Request Approvals
-
Post Maintenance Testing (ATWS 3.1.3,3.2.3) 04/09/86
-
Analysis of Post Accident Radio-
Chemistry Samples 05/20/86
-
Qualifications of Backup STAS 05/07/86
12/09/86
-
Post-Accident Effluents Monitoring 02/13/87
-
Appendix R Compliance 02/25/87
-
ATWS Rule Compliance 06/08/87
Orders Issued
Numerous Commission Orders related to EP Proceedings
i
1
1
1
- -- ,-- , ,. , _ - ,- - . , - . _ , - . _ . - . . _ . , - , ,.-.7 ,- .7 y. - , - ,,,,,m,.-_.y,-.,,., - ,,_y..- ,,
..
.
.
TABLE 1
A. LISTING 0F LERs BY FUNCTIONAL AREA
CAUSE CODES
AREA A B C D E X TOTAL
_ _ ___ ___ .__ __.
OPERATIONS 4 2 1 1 1 9
RAD PROTECTION 4 2 6
MAINTENANCE 3 1 3 7
SURVEILLANCE 4 5 4 2 1 16
EMERGENCY PREP.
SECURITY / SAFEGUARDS 1 1 2
OUTAGES 1 2 3
TRAINING
LICENSING 1 1 2
QUALITY ASSURANCE
TECHNICAL SUPPORT 2 1 3 6
FIRE PROTECTION-HK 2 2 1 2 7
OTHER 1 1 2
___________________ __ __ __ __ __ __ __
TOTALS: 16 12 5 9 8 10 60
Cause Codes *: A - Personnel Error
B - Design, Manufacturing, Construction or
Installation Error
C - External Cause
D - Defective Procedure
E - Component Failure
X - Other
- Cause Codes in this table are based on inspector
evaluations and may differ from those specified by the
licensee in the LER
i
!
!
, . , - ,_ . - ~ -
l
.
Table 1 T1-2
.
B. LER SYN 0PSIS 1
LER NUMBER EVENT DATE CAUSE CODE DESCRIPTION
---------- ---------- .........--
- 86-011 03/18/86 C ULTIMATE HEAT SINK, ACCUMULATION OF
SEDIMENT
86-012 03/03/86 D FAILURE TO MEET ACTION STATEMENT FOR
LOSS OF CONTINUQUS MONITORING 0F THE
STATION VENTILATION EXHAUST DUE TO
POWER LOSS TO SAMPLE PUMP
86-013 03/05/86 A CONTINUOUS FIRE WATCH IN RELAY ROOM
NOT MET DUE TO FIRE WATCH PERSON BEING
ASLEEP
86-014 03/05/86 B FULL REACTOR LOW LEVEL TRIP WHILE I&C
TECHNICIAN WAS VALVING IN PRESSURE
TRANSMITTER.86-015 D3/10/86 X CONTINUOUS FIRE WATCH MISSED DUE TO
FIRE WATCH BEING STUCK IN ELEVATOR
86-016 03/04/86 X SEISMIC MONITORING RECORDERS IN
CONTROL BUILDING OUT OF SERVICE FOR
MORE THAN 30 DAYS.86-017 03/20/86 D SEALED SOURCE LEAK TEST NOT PERFORMED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECH SPEC DUE TO
PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCY.86-018 04/10/86 A UNMONITORED DISCHARGE OF
NON-RADI0 ACTIVE WATER (LESS THAN
MINIMUM DETECTABLE ACTIVITY) FROM THE
CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK SUMP.86-019 05/09/86 D PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCY RESULTED IN A
RBSVS/CRAC "A" INITIATION DUE TO LOW
REACTOR BUILDING DIFFERENTIAL
PRESSURE.86-020 05/12/86 A FULL REACTOR TRIP DURING AN
OPERATIONS SURVEILLANCE TEST RESULTING
FROM PERSONNEL ERROR.86-021 05/12/86 B FULL RPS ACTUATION WHILE I&C
TECHNICIANS WERE VALVING IN A LEVEL
TRANSMITTER AFTER A SURVEILLANCE TEST.
.
.
Table 1 T1-3
.
LER NUMBER EVENT DATE CAUSE CODE DESCRIPTION
__________ __________ __________ ___________
86-022 05/15/86 A FAILURE TO RETAIN PARTICULATE FILTERS
FROM THE STATION VENTILATION EXHAUST
MONITOR DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR.86-023 05/20/86 A MISSED NOBLE GAS GRAB SAMPLES REQUIRED
BY ACTION STATEMENT 120 0F TECH. SPEC.
3.3.7.11 DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR
86-024 05/22/86 A kDCLCW "A" SIDE ISOLATION WHILE I&C
TECHNICIANS WERE PERFORMING A
SURVEILLANCE TEST.86-025 06/11/86 A N0BLE GAS SAMPLES REQUIRED BY ACTION
STATEMENT 120 0F TECH. SPEC.3.3.7.11
WERE DISCARDED PRIOR TO BEING ANALYZE 0
FOR GROSS ACTIVITY.86-026 07/03/86 A UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC INITIATION OF
RBSVS "A" TRAIN DURING AN I&C
SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE WHEN A
TECHNICIAN DROPPED A SCREWDRIVER IN
PANEL. ,
a
86-027 08/15/85 E REACTOR POWER EXCURSIONS AB0VE 5% DUE
TO FAILURE OF MECHANICAL LINKAGE
BETWEEN POSITION FEEDBACK ARM AND
CONTROLLER ON STARTUP LEVEL CONT.86-028 07/10/86 8 NON ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED JUMPER
WIRE INSTALLED IN MOTOR OPERATED
VALVES86-029 07/18/86 X ESF ACTUATIONS DUE TO EPA BREAKER
'
TRIPS WHILE RPS POWER WAS BEING
SUPPLIED BY THE ALTERNATE FEED
TRANSFORMER.86-030 07/27/86 C UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC ACTUATIONS OF ESF
SYSTEMS CAUSED BY POWER SPIKES ON THE
GRID VOLTAGE DUE TO THUNDERSTORMS.86-031 07/16/86 X SEISMIC MONITORING RECORDERS IN
CONTROL BUILDING OUT OF SERVICE FOR
MORE THAN 30 DAYS.
.
Table 1 T1-4
..
LER NUMBER EVENT DATE CAUSE CODE DESCRIPTION
__________ __________ __________ ___________
86-032 07/28/86 X UNEXPLAINED RWCU ISOLATION WHILE
PLACING THE FILTER DEMINERALIZERS IN
OPERATION.86-033 08/06/86 D EDG 101 MANUALLY SHUT DOWN DURING
SURVEILLANCE TEST DUE TO HIGH LUBE OIL
TEMPERATURE.86-034 08/11/86 X REACTOR WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENT
PROVIDING ERR 0NE0US LEVEL INDICATION
DUE TO IMPROPER CALIBRATION.86-035 08/28/86 A RWCU ISOLATION DURING AN I&C
SURVEILLANCE TEST DUE TO TECHNICIAN
ERROR.86-036 08/05/86 D VIOLATION OF TECH. SPEC. 3.4.3.1 DUE
TO THE HEAT TRACING TO PRIMARY
CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE DETECTION
RADIATION MONITORING PANEL TURNED OFF.86-037 09/08/86 E MISSED CONTINUOUS FIRE WATCH IN RELAY
ROOM REQUIRED BY TECH. SPEC. 3.7.7.3
DUE TO CO2 INJECTION IN THE NORMAL
SWITCHGEAR ROOM.86-038 10/04/86 B RBSVS "A" SIDE INITIATION DURING AN
I&C SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE WHEN A
TECHNICIAN ACCIDENTALLY BRUSHED A RELAY
WITH A LIFTED LEAD.
.86-039 10/06/86 A RBSVS "B" SIDE INITIATION WHILE
PERFORMING MAINTENANCE ON THE VALVE
ACTUATOR FOR THE RBNVS SYSTEM INTAKE
VALVE.86-040 10/07/86 E NSSSS INITIATION OF RBSVS/CRAC DURING
I&C SURVEILLANCE DUE TO FAULTY RELAY
SOCKET.86-041 10/29/86 A UNCONTROLLED ACCESS TO THE PRIMARY
CONTAINMENT OCCURRED FOR APPROXIMATELY
TWO HOURS DUE TO THE HATCH NOT BEING
PROPERLY SECURED.
O
Table 1 T1-5
d
LER NUMBER EVENT DATE CAUSE CODE DESCRIPTION
__________ __________ __________ ___________
86-042 10/09/86 0 FAILURE TO SUBMIT A COPY OF SHOREHAM
NUCLEAR POWER STATION'S SPDES
RENEWAL APPLICATION TO THE NRC
AT THE TIME OF SUBMITTAL TO THE
NYDEC.86-043 10/10/86 E EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR 103
FAILURE REACH RATED SPEED DUE TO POOR
GOVERNOR OIL QUALITY
86-044 10/11/86 B NSSSS INITIATION OF RBSVS/CRAC "B"
SIDE DUE TO WIRE SLIPPING OUT OF I&C
TECHNICIANS HANDS DURING A
'
SURVEILLANCE.86-045 11/27/86 A RBSVS/CRAC INITIATION WITH A 1/2 RPS
ACTUATION DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR WHILE
AN EQUIPMENT OPERATOR REPLACING
'
RADIATION MONITOR SUPPLY BULB.86-046 11/21/86 B INADEQUATE BACKFLOW PROTECTION
.
IDENTIFIED FOR EDG. ROOMS 101 AND 103.87-001 01/13/87 A RBSVS INITIATION CAUSED BY I&C
TECHNICIAN DURING SURVEILLANCE TEST.87-002 01/13/87 D SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION IN
CONTROL AND REACTOR BUILDING OUT OF
SERVICE FOR MORE THAN 30 DAYS. t
87-003 03/18/87 D LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER OCCURRED OUE TO
A PROCEDURAL INADEQUACY IN A
MODIFICATION WHICH CAUSED THE
ISOLATION OF THE STATION SERVICE
TRANS.87-004 04/02/87 C FIRE WATCHES REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC
.
WERE SUSPENDED IN THE REACTOR BUILDING
DUE TO BOMB THREAT.87-005 04/06/87 E METEOROLOGICAL AIR TEMPERATURE
MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION IN0PERABLE
FOR MORE THAN 7 OAYS.
.,
- _ . , - - , _ - . - , . - - - - , . - - - , - - . - ----r--.------._,_ -
m
- - - -
I
..
Table 1 T1-6
.
LER NUMBER EVENT DATE CAUSE CODE DESCRIPTION
__________ __________ __________ ___________
87-006 04/10/87 A CONTINU0US RELAY ROOM FIRE WATCH NOT
MET DUE TO FIRE WATCH PERSON BEING
ASLEEP
87-007 04/25/87 C B0MB THREAT
87-008 04/14/87 B SHUTDOWN COOLING PARTIAL ISOLATION DUE
TO ISOLATION OF PRESSURE SWITCH.87-009 04/27/87 X FULL RPS ACTUATOR WHILE AND I&C TECH
WAS VALVING IN A LEVEL TRANSMITTER TO
'
THE REFERENCE LEG AFTER MAINTENANCE
HAD BEEN PERFORMED ON IT.87-010 02/10/87 E VOLUNTARY REPORT ON FAILURE OF RHR
CIRCUIT BREAKER,87-011 04/27/87 X LOSS OF POWER TO "A" RPS BUS DUE TO
SPURIOUS TRIPPING OF EPA BREAKER
RESULTING IN ESF ACTUATIONS. >
87-012 05/04/87 X RBCLCW UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC l
SYSTEM-SPLIT WHILE INSTRUMENT &
CONTROLS TECHNICIANS WERE PERFORMING A
SURVEILLANCE TEST.
,87-013 05/05/87 A SHUTDOWN COOLING ISOLATION DUE TO HIGH
REACTOR PRESSURE RESULTING FROM
OPERATOR ERROR.87-014 05/07/87 A ESF ACTUATION DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR:
'
R95W SYSTEM-SPLIT AND A START SIGNAL
TO EDG 102.
!87-015 05/15/87 B CRAC "B" INITIATION SIGNAL RECEIVED
l
CAUSED BY LOW REACTOR BUILDING
OIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE.87-016 05/21/87 X UNSEALED HOLE THROUGH THE CONTROL
BUILDING EXTERIOR WALL.87-017 05-26-87 8 REACTOR WATER CLEANUP ISOLATION ON A
HIGH DIFFERENTIAL FLOW SIGNAL DURING
NORMAL STATION STARTUP
_- . _ ,.__ . - . - - ~ _ _ _ _ . _ . . . . _ . . _ . . _ _ _ _ __ -- _ , _ _ , _ _ . . . , _ . _ . -
"
,3
' Table 1 T1-7
.
LER NUMBER EVENT DATE CAUSE CODE DESCRIPTION
__________ __________ __________ ___________
i
,87-018 06-29-87 E FAILURE OF SECURITY COMPUTER RESULTED
IN A MODERATE LOSS OF SECURITY
EFFECTIVENESS WHICH WAS NOT PROPERLY
COMPENSATED FOR i
1
87-019 07-04-87 C CONTINUOUS RELAY ROOM FIRE WATCH
REQUIRED BY TECH SPECS NOT MET DUE TO
BOMB THREAT
87-021 07-15-87 B HVAC PENETRATION DESIGN DEFICIENCIES
IDENTIFIED AFTER DETAILED REVIEW OF <
- INFO NOTICE 83-69 RESULTING IN ;
LICENSE VIOLATION
87-022 06-04-87 E VOLUNTARY REPORT ON MOV DYNAMIC :
TESTING FAILURE OF THE HPCI i
'
RECIRCULATION VALVES87-023 07-17-87 B RBCLCW SPLIT DUE TO A LOW "A" HEAD I
TANK WATER LEVEL !
' ;87-024 07/24/87 0 I&C TECH SPEC SURVEILLANCE
CALIBRATION AND RESPONSE TIME !
PROCEDURES FOUND TO
NOT ADEQUATELY SATISFY TECH SPECS -
DURING PERIODIC REVIEW
i
87-025 07/25/87 X HOURLY FIRE WATCH PATROLS REQUIRED BY
.
'
THE FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM WERE NOT ,
MET DUE TO PERSONNEL INJURY
- ,
!
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_ . _ . _ ~ . - _ . _, _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ . . - - _ . . - - _ _ ..,,. - _ _ _ _ _ , , _ - - . - -
- - . . . - _ - - - . _ ._ _-
.-
. .
. TABLE 2
INSPECTION HOUR SUMMARY
AREA HOURS % OF TIME
OPERATIONS 1144 32.2'
RAD PROTECTION 299 8.4
HAINTENANCE 528 14.8
SURVEILLANCE 509 14.2
EMERGENCY PREP. 116 3.3
SECURITY / SAFEGUARDS 104 2.9
TRAINING 586 16.5
LICENSING 0 0
QUALITY ASSURANCE 10 0.3
TECHNICAL SUPPORT 186 5.2
, FIRE PROTECTION-HK 80 2.2 ;
___________________ ____ _____
TOTALS: 3562 100.0
i
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4 6
i L
f
[
.
4 ,
i
6-
< . + - < - - - ,.-m.--- ~ . , ,-r. - - - , - -,. , , + w -e- m-, , . -,n,,. -. ...,,-.-,,--=.--------,e-,,, , , ~ -
, vg .r.---r-
.
.
TABLE 3
ENFORCEMENT SUMMARY
SEVERITY LEVEL
AREA 1 2 3 4 5 DEV TOTAL
_ _ _ _ ___ _ -.
OPERATIONS
RAD PROTECTION
MAINTENANCE 2 2
SURVEILLANCE 1 1
EMERGENCY PREP.
SECURITY / SAFEGUARDS I 1
TRAINING
LICENSING
QUALITY ASSURANCE
- TECHNICAL SUPPORT 1 1
FIRE PROTECTION-HK
___________________ __ __ __ __ __ .. __
TOTALS: 3 2 5
NRC Action on a potential violation in this area has not
been completed due to the environmental qualification issues
involved.
l
l
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1
__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
.
Table 3 T3-2
.
INSPECTION VIOL. FUNCTIONAL
REPORT REQUIREMENT LEVEL AREA VIOLATION
_________ ___________ _____ __________ __________________________
!
322/86-08 TECH SPEC 5 MAINTENANCE FAILURE TO PROVIDE WRITTEN
t
6.8.1 INSTRUCTIONS DESCRIBING
MAINTENANCE ON EMERGENCY
DIESEL GENERATOR 103
322/87-05 TECH SPEC 4 TECHNICAL LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER DUE
6.8.1 SUPPORT TO INADEQUATE PROCEDURE
REVIEW
322/87-10 TECH SPEC 4 SURVEILLANCE FAILURE TO ANALYZE SLC B-10
4.1.5.e.1 ENRICHMENT PER TECH SPEC 4.1.5.e.1
322/87-10 E&DCR 5 MAINTENANCE INSTALLATION OF RAYCHEM END
CAPS IN VIOLATION OF E&DCR
322/87-08 SHOREHAM 4 SECURITY SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION
PHYSICAL
SECURITY
PLAN
_ . _ _
O
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TABLE 4
INSPECTION REPORT ACTIVITIES
REPORT / DATES INSPECTOR HOURS AREAS INSPECTED
____________ _________ _____ _______________
86-07 SPECIALIST 86 ROUTINE, UNANNOUNCED, RADIOLOGICAL
05/05/86 05/09/86 CONTROLS INSPECTION.
86-09 SPECIALIST 27 ROUTINE UNANN0UNCED INSPECTION OF
0?/24/86 03/27/86 LICENSEE ACTIONS ON PREVIOUS INSPECTION
FINDINGS.
86-10 RESIDENT 192 ROUTINE RESIDENT INSPECTION.
04/16/86 05/31/86
86-11 SPECIALIST 181 SPECIAL ANN 0UNCED SAFETY INSPECTION OF
07/28/86 08/01/86 THE LICENSEE'S CHEMISTRY PROGRAM.
86-12 RESIDENT 189 ROUTINE RESIDENT INSPECTION.
06/01/86 07/15/86
86-13 SPECIALIST 17 UNANN0UNCED INSPECTION OF LIMITORQUE
06/30/86 07/02/86 MOTOR VALVE OPERATOR INTERNAL WIRING.
86-14 RESIDENT 297 ROUTINE RESIDENT INSPECTION.
07/16/86 08/31/86
86-15 SPECIALIST 38 ROUTINE UNANN0UNCED INSPECTION OF THE
08/25/86 08/29/86 RADIATION SAFETY PROGRAM.
86-16 RESIDENT 370 ROUTINE RESIDENT INSPECTION.
09/01/86 11/15/86
86-17 SPECIALIST 51 NON LICENSED STAFF TRAINING.
09/08/86 09/12/86
86-18 SPECIALIST 31 ROUTINE UNANNOUNCED INSPECTION OF
09/29/86 10/03/86 LICENSEE ACTIONS ON PREVIOUS INSPECTION
FINDINGS
86-19 RESIDENT 76 ROUTINE RESIDENT INSPECTION
11/16/86 12/31/86
..
-Table 4 T4-2
.
REPORT / DATES INSPECTOR HOURS AREAS IN3PECTED
__ _________ _________ _____ _______________
86-21 SPECIALIST -72 SECURITY PLAN AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES
12/08/86 12/12/86
87-01 RESIDENT 118 ROUTINE RESIDENT INSPECTION.
01/01/87 02/15/87
87-02 SPECIALIST 34 ROUTINE UNANN0UNCED INSPECTION OF
01/17/87 01/21/87 PROCEDURE REVIEW.
87-03 SPECIALIST 38 ROUTINE ANNOUNCED EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
02/10/87 02/12/87 INSPECTION.
87-05 RESIDENT 179 ROUTINE RESIDENT INSPECTION OF PLANT
02/16/87 03/31/87 OPERATIONS, SEC. , RAD CONTROLS
SURVEILLANCE / LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER EVENT
- WAS REVIEWED
87-06 SPECIALIST 96 ROUTINE SAFETY INSPECTION OF RADIOLOGICAL
03/30/87 04/03/87 CONTROLS.
87-07 RESIDENT 69 ROUTINE RESIDENT INSPECTION
04/01/87 05/15/87
87-13 SPECIALIST 35 ROUTINE UNANNOUNCED INSPECTION OF STARTUP
06/01/87 06/05/87 TEST PROGRAM
87-14 SPECIALIST 313 SPECIAL TEAM INSPECTION OF TRAINING AND
06/22/87 06/26/87 QUALIFICATION PROGRAM
EFFECTIVENESS / REVIEW OF SELECTED
LICENSEE'S CORRECTIVE ACTION
!
)
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k
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ .
.
.
TABLE 5
FORCED OUTAGES AND UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC SCRAMS
j
.
POWER
DATE LEVEL' DESCRIPTION CAUSE* & AREA * i
03/05/86 S/D In bility to vent bourbon tube Design
, pro rly prior to placing in Deficiency
servi Area: Technical
Support
05/10/86 S/0 During res oration of a LOCA, Personnel Error :
LOOP survei ance test, Area: ,
personnel cau ed an inadvertent Operations i
{
05/12/86 S/0 Valving in a leve transmitter Design
due to original pip g Deficiency
arrangement, technic ns could Area:
not adequately vent th Technical
transmitter Support
(
'
03/18/87 S/D Loss of offsite power due t Personnel Error
I
personnel isolating station Area:
- service transformer Technical
4 Support
I
04/27/87 S/D Valving in a level transmitter; esign
due to original piping, ficiency
technician could not adequately Ar :
i vent the transmitter Tech ical
- Suppo
l
-
- Note - the cause attributed to these shutdowns is the NRC assessment of he
! cause, and may not agree with the licensee's assessment.
I
!
t
l
l
l
l
!
- _ . .. - .. . - .. - - - - - .- - . _ -_-- -_.-
.. -
.o
- <
TABLE Sa
FORCED OUTAGES AND UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC SCRANS
,
l
POWER
OATE LEVEL DEfCRIPTION CAUSE* & AREA *
r
03/05/86 S/D Inability to-vent bourdon tube Design
properly prior to placing in Deficiency
service Area: i
Technical Support
05/10/86 S/D During restoration of a LOCA, Personnel Error !
LOOP surveillance test, Area: '
personnel caused an inadvertent Operations t
\
05/12/86 S/D Valving in a level transmitter Design
'
-
due to original piping Deficiency 1
arrangament, techni sans could Area: !
not adequately vent the Technical i
transmitter Support ;
03/18/87 S/D Loss of offsite power due to Personnel Error .
personnel isolating station Area: l
service transformer Technical -
Support >
04/27/87 S/D Valving in a level transmitter; Design !
- due to original piping, Deficiency
technician could not adequately Area: .
vent the transmitter Technical '
Support
l
l
- Note - the cause attributed to these shutdowns is the NRC assessment of the l'
cause, and may not agree with the licensee's assessment.
!
t
!
i
4
4
4 l
l
,- , - - _ . _ . ~ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ - . , , _ . . _ . .
-- -
._--. - _ , _ - , _ _ . . . . _ . , -. .__ _. , - _ _ _
1
/
- "% #o UNITED STATES
~
-ENCLOSURE 3
g
e !' n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
$ I REGION 1
o -
63) PARK AVENUE
g
. KtNG OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA IMOS
4,*. **
Docket No. 50-322 EC 01387
Long Island L1ghting Company
ATTN: Mr. John D. Leonard, Jr.
Vice President - Nuclear
P. O. Box 618
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station
W ding River, New York 11792
Gentlemen:
Subject: Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) Report
No. 50-322/86-99
The NRC Region I SALP Board has reviewed and evaluated the performance of
activities at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station for the period March 1,1986
to July 31, 1987. The results of this assessment are documented in the
enclosed SALP Board report. A meeting to discuss the assessment will be
scheduled in the near future. This meeting is intended to provide a forum for
candid discussions of the performance evaluation. At the meeting, you should
, be prepared to discuss our assassment and your plans to enhance the program
,
'
effectiveness in those areas that warrant additional attention. Additionally,
you may provide written comments within 30 days after the meeting.
Following our meeting and receipt of your response, the SALP final report and
your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Your cooperation is appreciated.
Sincerely,
hWilliam 7. Russell
Regional Administrator
Enclosure: SALP Report No. 50-322/86-99
V b>ff'
_
^
Long Island Lighting Company 2 j){CQ{j@@7
%
cc w/ enc 1:
W. Steiger, Plant Manager
B. McCaffrey, Manager, Nuclear Operations Support
R. Kubinak, Director, QA, Safety and Compliance
E. Youngling, Manager, Nuclear Engineering
Anthony F. Earley, Jr. , General Counsel
Jeffrey L. Futter, Esquire
J. Notaro, Manager, QA Department
Director, Power Division
Shoreham Hearing Service List
Public Document Room (PDR)
local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector
State of New York
Chairman Zech
Commissioner Roberts
Commissioner Bernthal
Commissioner Carr
Commissioner Rogers
bec w/ encl:
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
'
Management Assistant, DRMA (w/o enc 1)
Director, DRS
T. Martin, DRSS
DRP Se: tion Chief
B. Bordenick, OGC
R. Bachmann, DGC
R. Goddard, ELD
R. J. Bores, DRSS
J. Taylor, DEDO
W. Russell, RA
J. Allan, DRA
D. Holody, ES
Board Members
PA0(11)
8. Clayton, EDO
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.
.
SHOREHAM HEARING SERVICE LIST
Gerald C. Crotty, Esquire Alan S. Rosenthal, Esquire
Ben Wiles, Esquire Chairman, Atomic Safety and Licensing
Counsel to the' Governor Appeal Panel
Executive Chamber U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
State Capitol Washington, D. C. 20555
Albany, New York 12224
Mr. Jay Dunkleberger Fabian G. Palomino, Esquire
New York State Energy Office Suffolk County Attorney
Agency Building 2 Executive Chamber
Empire State Plaza State Capitol
Albany, New York 12223 Albany, NY 12224
Energy Research Group, Inc. Gary J. Edles, Esquire
400-1 Totten Pond Road Atomic Safety and Licensing
Waltham, Massachusetts 02154 Appeal Panel
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555
W. Taylor Reveley, III, Esquire Howard A. Wilbur, Esquire
Hunton & Williams Atomic Safety and Licensing
Post Office Box 1535 Appeal Panel
Richmond, Virginia 23212 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555
'
Honorable Michael Logrande Robert Abrams, Esquire
Acting Suffolk County Executive Peter Bienstock, Esquire
County Executive / Legislative Bldg. Department of Law
Veteran's Memorial Highway State of New York
Hauppauge, New York 11788 Room 46-14
Two World Trade Center
Martin Bradley Ashare, Esquire Richard M. Kessel
Suf folk County Attorney Chairman and Executive Director
H. Lee Dennison Building New York State Consumer Protection Board
Veteran's Memorial Highway Room 1725
Hauppauge, New York 11788 250 Broadway
James B. Dougherty, Esquire
3045 Porter Street, N.W. ,
Washington, D.C. 20008
_ _
'
r
2
.
MHB Technical Associates francis J. Gluchowski
1723 Hamilton Avenue, Suite K Assistant Town Attorney
San Jose, California 95125
Town of Brookhaven
Department of Law
Stephen Latham, Esquire 3233 Route 112
John F. Shea, Esquire Medford, New York 11763
Twomey, Latham & Shea
Post Office Box 398 Paul Sabatino, II, Attorney at Law
33 West Second Street Counsel to Legislature
Riverhead, New York 11901
Legislative Building
Veteran's Memorial Highway
Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esquire Joseph I. Lieberman, Attorney General
New York State
Department of Public Service State of Connecticut
Three Empire State Plaza
30 Trinity Street
Albany, New York 12223 Hartford, Connecticut 06106
Ezra I. Bialik, Esquire Brookhaven Town Attorney
Assistant Attorney General 3233 Route 112
Environmental Protection Bureau Medford, New York 11763
New York State Department of Law
2 World Trade Center Department of Public Service
New York, New York 10047 Director, Power Division
Three Empire State Plaza
Herbert H. Brown, Esquire Albany, New York 12223
Lawrence Coe Lamnpher, Esquire
, Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Hill,
Christopher & Phillips
1900 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Karla J. Letsche, Esquire
Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Hill,
Christopher & Phillips '
1900 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
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. - . .. _ ..