IR 05000322/1987001

Insp Rept 50-322/87-01 on 870101-0215.No Unacceptable Condition Observed.Major Areas Inspected:Radiation Protection,Security,Plant Events,Maint,Surveillance,Outage Activities & Repts to NRC

ML20205T546
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	03/30/1987
From:	Wiggins J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205T525	List: IR 05000322/1987001 ML20205T522
References
50-322-87-01, 50-322-87-1, NUDOCS 8704070319
Download: ML20205T546 (10)

Text

, . . . . . . . ._

.

. .

E A

i.

!

3 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /87-01

Docket N License No. NPF-36 Licensee

Long Island Lighting Company P.O. Box 618 i Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Wading River, New York 11792

!

Inspection At: Wading River, New York Inspection Conducted: . January 1, 1987 - February 15, 1987 Inspector: C. C. Warren, Senior Resident Inspector

Approved By: Ou J. T/ Wfgginsf,, C$1ef, Reactor Projects

-

3- Bo-F 7 date

, Sec(onIB,DtvisionofReactorProjects

Inspection Summary: Inspection on January 1,1987 - February 15, 1987 lInspectionReport 50-322/87-01)

-!

Areas Inspected: Routine resident Inspection of plant operations, radiation

protection, security, plant events, maintenance, surveillance, outage activ-i ities and reports to the NRC.

'

Results: No unacceptable condition were observe : , ,

"

j ,

i

l 8704070319 870331 i PDR ADOCK 05000322

G PDR i

!

--. __- -_ _ _ . _ _ _ . - _ - _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . . - _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ ,-

. _ ._ ___ . _ _ _ _ _ .

. . .

. ,

l

'

-

DETAILS 1. Status of Previous Inspection Items 1.1. (Closed) Deviation 85-08-0 The subject deviation contained the following concerns: Station Qualification Procedures (SP 12.003.01, Rev.12) refer-enced a different revision of the applicable ANSI standard than the Quality Assurance Manua . A " Certificate of Qualification" for one Level I Examination /

Inspection Technician was approved without verification of the required eye exa ~

i

! Corrective action for conditions adverse to quality had not been promptly taken in that conditions identified by Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) Quality Assurance Audit No. 84-03 (June 15, 1984) continued to exist in January 1985. The condi-1 tion noted was the absence of an Eye Test Certificate in seven i employee qualification history record The licensee has updated station procedure SP 12.003.01 to reference

, the applicable Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) section in lieu of 1 the ANSI standard. The FSAR references the applicable revision of the ANSI standard. The licensee's QA Organization has reviewed all personnel training qualification records to insure that ' certificates of qualification are properly completed and that current eye' test

certificates are on fil Timely resolution of Quality Assuiance Audit findings has a high

priority with licensee management and a biweekly report is issued by

, the Quality Assurance Department to track resolution of these find-ings. In addition to the tracking report a Quality Assurance Depart- '

! ment Corrective Action Request is issued anytime a commitment date is

not me The aggressive manner in which the QA Department and plant management track corrective actions should prevent excessive time delays in the future, j

'

1.2 (Closed) Open Item 86-16-01, Evaluation in LER 86-43 of the Diesel *

.

Generator 103 output breaker (No.103-08) failure to close was insuf-fic,ient to determine it was not a valid diesel generator test failure.

The inspector expressed concern to the licensee that the information

presented in LER 86-43 did not clearly establish that the breaker i

103-08 failure to close was due to a generator synchronization circuit failure.

.1

_ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ , , _ ,,., , , _a. _ , . ,

_ _

.. .;

In response to the inspector's concerns, the licensee conducted addi-tional investigation into the inability to close breaker 103-0 Results of this investigation showed instability in the governor i signal to be the cause of the synchronizing circuit failure. While

! this condition prevented synchronizing the generator with the 103 bus, the inspector noted it would not have prevented the breaker from closing during a loss of offsite power and was not a valid test failure. The inspector had no further question .3 (Closed) Open Item 86-14-03, License Response to Information Notice 86-7 IE Information Notice 86-74 informs the recipients of the potential for draining the reactor vessel to the suppression chamber due to Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System valve misalignmen The licensee initially addressed vessel draining via the Residual Heat Removal System after the draining event at Shoreham on

July 26,1985. As a result of this effort, all applicable operating and surveillance procedures were revised to include caution state-

!

ments warning of the vessel draining events and providing adequate instructions to prevent them. In addition to procedural changes, the licensee also initiated a plant design change which will add an electrical interlock between the suppression pool suction valves and reactor vessel suction valves to the RHR system. This electrical interlock will prevent opening of either valve unless the others are closed. .4 (Closed) Violation 86-08-02, Failure to Establish a Procedur A discrepancy between Maintenance Section Procedure 31.010.01 and Technical Specification 6.8.1 (Regulatory Guide 1.33) allowed work to be performed on Emergency Diesel Generator 103 without approved written procedure Maintenance Section Procedure 31.010.01 has been revised to more closely conform to Section 9.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.33 which defines the scope of maintenance activities which may be performed without a written procedur .5 (Closed) Open Item 85-30-02, Open Electrical and Instrumentation Panel Covers.

.

This item relates the inspector's concern over numerous electrical and

'

instrumentation panels and junction boxes that had been left unfast-ened in the reactor buildin . _ . .... . - - - _ . . -

- _ _ - _ - . .- . .

. ~.

9 The licensee has revised applicable maintenance, surveillance, and

~ operations procedures to address the requirements for reclosure of-plant equipment. In addition to the procedural changes, the licensee performs an in depth walkdown of reactor building equipment! prior to entry into the startup mod Recent walkdowns of reactor building equipment by the inspector indi-cate that the licensee's actions have effectively corrected this conditio .6 (Closed) Open Items 86-12-01 and 86-13-02, Limitorque Valve Operator

!

Cover Bolting Material.

'

Open items 86-12-01 and 86-13-02 relate to numerous Limitorque motor operators that were missing cover bolts or had bolting material composed of aluminum rather than mild stee The licensee contacted the valve operator manufacturer (Limitorque)

to determine the bolting material composition and torque require-ments.

j Limitorque informed the licensee that the operators were originally supplied with steel bolting material and that replacements should also be stee LILCO was also informed that there were no torque l requirements for the cover bolt Using this information, the

! licensee conducted a 100% inspection of Limitorque valve operator covers and replaced missing and incorrect bolting materials with steel fastener To insure that cover fasteners are returned to their proper condition the licensee has revised all appropriate maintenance and surveillance

<

procedures to include a restoration step for cover replacemen i 2. Review of Facility Operations 2.1 Plant Status Summary During the period covered by Inspection Report 87-01 the facility

remained in a cold shutdown condition. The licensee conducted rou-

tine surveillance and maintenance items as required by. License NPF-3 In addition to routine items, the licensee performed the I inspections required by NPF-36 on Diesel Generator 103 (Section 7),

J made preparations to replace in core neutron sources (Section 8), and

-

successfully completed the type "A" containment leak rate tes ;

.a

.. _ . , - . . _

- . - , - . _ _ _ _ . . -

.- - . _ . - - _- - . -

. . -

.

,

2.2 Operational Safety Verification The . inspector toured the control room daily to verify proper shift .

manning, use of and adherence to approved procedures, and complia'nce with Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO).

Control panel instrumentation and recorder traces were observed and

,

'

the status of annunciators was reviewed. Nuclear instrumentation and reactor protection system status were examined. Radiation monitoring instrumentation, including in plant Area Radiation monitors and effluent monitors were verified to be within allowable limits, and

, observed for indications of trend Electrical distribution panels were examined for verification of proper lineups of backup and emerg-ency electrical power sources as required by the Technical Specifica-tio The inspector reviewed Watch Engineer and Nuclear Station Operator logs for adequacy of review by oncoming watchstanders, and for proper entrie A periodic review of Night _ Orders, Maintenance Work Requests, Technical Specification LCO Log, and other control room logs and records were made. Shift turnovers were observed on a periodic basi The inspector also observed and reviewed the adequacy of access con-trols to the Main Control Room, and verified that no loitering by unauthorized personnel in the Control Room Area was permitted. The inspector observed the conduct of Shift personnel to ensure adherence j to Shoreham Procedures 21.001.01, "Shif t Operations" and 21.004.01,-

" Main Control Room - Conduct for Personnel".

No unacceptable conditions were identifie .3 Plant and Site Tours

The inspector conducted periodic tours of the accessible areas of the

'

plant and site throughout the inspection perio These included:

the Turbine and Reactor Buildings, the Radioactive Waste Building, I

the Control Building, the Screenwell Structure, the Fire Pump House, the Security Building, and the Colt Diesel Generator Building.

During these tours, the following specific items were evaluated:

.

-

Fire Equipment - Operability and evidence of periodic inspection

,

of fire suppression equipment;

,

-

Housekeeping - Maintenance of required cleanliness levels; j l

.

.

s

- - . , , --. , - -_ . - , -,,_ - - - - . - - . . , _ , - . _ - - _ - - ,. .

. - _ - . _ _ . . - - -

.. .

.

6

-

Equipment Preservation - Maintenance of special precautionary measures for installed equipment, as applicable;

-

QA/QC Surveillance - Pertinent activities were being surveilled on a sampling basis by qualified QA/QC personnel;

-

Component Tagging - Implementation of appropriate equipment tagging for safety, equipment protection, and jurisdiction;

-

Personnel adherence to Radiological Controlled Area (RCA) rules, i

including proper personnel frisking upon RCA exit;

-

Access control to the Protected Area, including search activ-ities, escorting and badging, and vehicle access control; and

-

Integrity of the Protected Area boundar No unacceptable conditions were identifie . Licensee Reports 3.1 In-Office Review of Licensee Event Reports The inspector reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) submitted to the NRC to verify that the details were clearly reported, including accuracy of the cause description and adequacy of corrective action.

,

The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were involved, and whether the event warranted on-site followup. The following LERs

, were reviewed:

,

'

LER 86-046: Inadequate Backflow Protection Identified For EDG Rooms 101 And 103 LER 86-038, Rev. 1: RBSVS "A" Side Initiation During An I&C Surveil-

<

lance Procedure LER 87-001 RBSVS Initiation Caused By I&C Technician

Monthly Surveillance and Maintenance Observation 4.1 Surveillance Activities ,

The inspector observed the performance of the following surveillance tests to verify that: the surveillance procedure conformed to Tech-nical Specification requirements; administrative approvals and tagging requirements were reviewed and approved prior to test initi-ation; testing was accomplished by qualified personnel; current approved procedures were used; test instrumentation was currently

i

_ ,-- - - - - -- .- -. - - _ - - , , . , , . , ,, - - _

- .

. .

.

-

limiting conditions for operation were met; test data was accurately and completely recorded; removal and restoration of affected com-ponents was properly accomplished; and tests were completed within the required Technical Specification frequenc Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test

-

Emergency Diesel Generator 102 Head Block Eddy Current Testing No unacceptable conditions were note .2 Maintenance Activities The inspector observed the conduct of various maintenance activities throughout the inspection perio During this observation, the inspector verified that: maintenance activities were conducted with-in the requirements of the plant's administrative procedures and technical specifications; proper radiolcgical controls were imple-mented and observed; proper safety precautions were observed; and that activities which have the potential to impact plant operations are properly coordinated with the control room operator The inspector observed the following licensee maintenance activities during the inspection period:

-

Reactor Vessel Disassembly

-

103 Bus - Colt EDG Modifications

-

Liquid Penetrant Testing on EDG 103 Crank Pin and Main Journal Bearings

-

Cold web deflection on EDG 103 5. Organization Changes 5.1 Effective January 15,1987, Mr. Russel C. Youngdahl joined the Long Island Lighting Company as President and Chief Operating Officer. The l position reports to the Chairman of the Board, Mr. William Catacasinos, i and had been vacan '

I 5.2 Effective February 15, 1987, Mr. John Schm~itt the Radiological Con-trols Division Manager, was transferred to the newly formed Opera-tional Assessment Group reporting directly to Mr. John Leonard, Vice President-Nuclear Operation !

l The position of Radiological Control Division Manager will be filled by Mr. N. DiMasci Mr. DiMascio's previous position as Health Physics Engineer will be filled by Mr. M. Burin *

I h

' '

.. ..

8 Failure of 'D' Residual Heat Removal Pump Minimum Flow Check Valve On January 8,1987, the 'D' residual heat removal pump minimum flow check valve was disassembled as part of an effort to determine the cause for reduced flow. Upon disassembly it was found that the valve disc attach-ment bolts had backed out and were missing and the valve disc was laying in bottom of valve bod !

LILC0 subsequently disassembled the minimum flow check valves for "A", "B" and "C" residual heat removal pumps and found them to be intact; however the bolt locking tabs did not appear. to be bent to a sufficient angle to

assure positive locking and the licensee subsequently replaced the locking devices on all four check valves i A search of the suppression pool by a contract diving firm produced one bolt but because of its length the licensee could not positively conclude

-

that it came from the 'D' check valve. A loose parts analysis has been performed by the nuclear steam supply system vendor, General Electric, to analyze the effects of the missing bolts. The analysis concluded that the material will have no impact on safe plant operatio The inspector is satisfie.d with the licensee's resolution of this ite . Emergency Diesel Generator Overload During Governor Tuning On January 30, 1987, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 103 was tripped

,

simultaneously by the licensed control room operator and the equipment operator at the local panel when diesel generator load exceeded the opera-t*'g limit specified in Attachment 3 of facility operating license NPF-36 (3 00 KW).

During the governor tuning, two governor power supply fuses blew. This

, caused the electrical governor to pick up excessive load. At the time the fuses blew, the engine was in parallel with the LILCO grid and carrying approximately 900 KW. The engine was being run as part of a test follow-ing governor replacement. The engine overload condition existed for less than 3.9 seconds. An overload alarm at 3200 KW with 3.9 second time delay was not received prior tu manually tripping the engine, and the peak load

was estimated to be 4000.K The licensee immediately removed the engine from service, declared it inoperable and performed the inspections required by NPF-36 Attachment 3.

i The results of these tests, hot and cold web deflection readings and inspections of the number 5, 6 and 7 crankpin and main journal bearings, i

showed no engine damage. Upon completion of the required inspections the licensee conducted the required Technical Specification retests and declared the engine operable.

The inspector has no further questions.

I

__ _,_ ._., , r. ~ ._ s - -

_ _ - _

- ' . Source Replacement Outage On February 7,1987, the licensee commenced reactor vessel disassembly for the purpose of replacing the installed neutron sources. This replacement is necessitated by the relatively short half life of the currently in-stalled sources. The rapid decay of the installed sources would have caused the indicated count rate to fall below the Technical Specification minimum acceptable level sometime in the autumn of 198 The replacement procedure involves removal of the drywell head, reactor vessel head and moisture separation equipment. After vessel disassembly -

is completed the reactor cavity water level will be raised to the normal refueling level, With water level at two normal refueling level the licensee will remove four fuel bundles adjacent to each source holder, remove the source holder, replace the source pins and then reverse the order for reassembl The inspector will closely monitor these activities until completion and update this item in inspection report 87-0 . Failure of a General Electric 4.16 KV Magna Blast Breaker to Open On Demand On February 10, 1987, the licensee received a spurious reactor vessel low level signal while placing a level transmitter in service. Control room personnel were aware of the possibility that this signal would be received and were prompt in resetting the scram signal and verifying the Residual Heat Removal system isolated as designed. The operator found that the system had isolated but the running pump did not trip and would not trip from the control roo An equipment operator was dispatched to the switchgear to trip the pump breaker manuall Investigation into the breaker failure to trip revealed that a pin welded to the trip crank had failed rendering the breaker untrippable elec-tricall The failed component has been sent to the General Electric breaker facility for evaluation of the failure mechanis The licensee is conducting an inspection of all GE 4160v breaker's trip cranks for evidence of pin cracking. The results of that inspection and subsequent corrective action will be updated in inspection report 87-0 . Management Meetings At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with licensee management to discuss the scope and findings of this inspectio '

i

. . .~ -. .-

. . . ,

s

'

.:

.

Based on NRC Region I review of'this report, and discussions with licensee representatives, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restriction .

The inspectors also attended entrance and exit interviews for: inspections

!

conducted by. region-based inspectors during the period.

3 '

b

1. .

.

t

!

'

i l

I

.

I l

' _ , _ _ _ _ ,