IR 05000322/1987011
| ML20238B025 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/11/1987 |
| From: | Cowgill C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20238B006 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-322-87-11, NUDOCS 8708210152 | |
| Download: ML20238B025 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-322/87-11 Docket No.
50-322 License No.
Long Island Lighting Company P. O. Box 618 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Wading River, New York 11792 Inspection At: Wading River, New York Inspection Conducted: May 16, 1987 - July 10, 1987 Inspectors:
C. C. Warren, Senior Resident Inspector F. J.
rescenzo, Resident Inspector Approved By:
Niku il X7 C. J. (Towgid,\\ Chief, Reactor Projects Section 10 Date Division of'Rhactor Projects Inspection Summary: During the period covered by Inspection Report 87-11 the licensee completed the scheduled source replacement outage and resumed startup testing to 5% of rated thermal power. Following completion of operations at power, the facility was returned to a cold shutdown condition.
One hundred and fif ty two hours of direct inspection effort were expended for this inspection.
Areas Inspected:
Routine Resident Inspection of plant operations, radiation protection, security, plant events, maintenance, surveillance, outage activ-ities, and reports to the NRC.
Results:
No unacceptable conditions were observed.
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l DETAILS 1.
Status of Previous Inspection Items 1.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item b3-20-01, I&E Information Notice 84-17,
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Failure of Nitrosen Inerting and Purge Lines l
I&E Information Notice No. 84-17. identified a concern related to the failure of the Primary Containment nitrogen inerting and purge line at Hatch Unit 1. It was determined that this failure was thermal stress induced with the thermal stress caused by the application of cold nitrogen during the purging process.
The licensee - Fas completed station modification SM-85-107 which ac-complished the following to address the concerns identified in the information notice:
1.
Installation of temperature control valves upstream of the nitrogen vaporizer.
2.
Control panels local to the vaporizer and within the Reactor Building Access lock. These will signal the temperature control valves to close when the nitrogen temperature downstream of the vaporizer falls below 40 F.
3.
A pressure relief valve upstream of the temperature control valves.
These installations represent completion of licensee commitments made in letters SNRC-1082, dated September 18, 1984, and SNRC-1098, dated November 8, 1984. Additionally, the licensee has installed heat tracing and thermal insulation on nitrogen piping outside heated or ventilation controlled areas to preclude system shutdown during low ambient temperature conditions.
A walkdown visual inspection of the modification installation, a review of the installation procedure, and a review of the system operating procedure were conducted by the inspector. No discre-pant conditions were identified. The inspector had no further questions or concerns related to this matter.
1.2 (Update) Unresolved Item 87-05-01, Loss of Offsite Power One violation was identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-322/87-05 involving inadequate implementation of procedural controls during modification work on emergency switchgear RSS*SWG-103. This resulted in the inadvertent shorting of current transformers in 4.16KV buses 101, 102,11, and 12. As a result, on March 18, 1987 when a conden-sate pump powered from bus 11 was started, it caused a differential current trip of both the Normal and Reserve Station Service trans-formers. This condition led to a loss of offsite power.
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The licensee responded to the Notice of Violation by letter dated June 12,1987 (Ref: SNRC-1174, J. D. Leonard, LILCo to W. T. Russell, NRC). The inspector reviewed the licensee's implementation of the
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corrective actions outlined in that letter. The results of that review follow.
NRC Inspection report 50-322/87-05 noted that the Design Output Pack-age (DOP) developed by the Nuclear Engineering Department was incor-rectly interpreted by the engineer responsible for preparing the Station Modification Package (SMP). As a result, the SMP incorrectly required the shorting of all the current transformers. This defic-iency was not detected by the licensee's technical review process.
The licensee has revised Station Procedure 12.010.01 (Station Modif-ication Activities) to improve the technical review process involved with station modifications. These improvements include the following:
l a.
A modification package review check sheet containing specific signoffs for various specific attributes of the modification implementation. This will include a checkoff signature indica-ting that the implementation of the modification will not ad-versely affect safety or designed operation of the plant.
b.
A requirement that the modification package technical reviewer be someone other than the originator (s).
c.
A requirement to include in the 00P a description of the effects on plant operation as a result of plant configuration during the modification implementation.
In addition to the above procedural changes, the licensee has com-mitted to developing a lesson plan which will address configuration control of the station during maintenance, test, and modification activities which could change the operational configuration of the plant. This lesson plan will be used to conduct training of personnel whose work activities could change plant configuration. The lesson plan will be developed by July 30, 1987 and training of plant per-sonnel will be implemented upon completion of the lesson plan. This
item will remain open pending NRC review of the subject lesson plan and training program implementation.
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1.3 (Closed) Unresolved Item 85-36-01, Fitness for Duty Inspection report 50-322/85-36 discussed problems identified with the fitness for duty program. These problems related specifically to indications that approximately 20 supervisors had not completed Fit-ness for Duty training. During a followup inspection it was further identified that the computer system used to track Fitness for Duty training status was inadequate as it did not identify the 20 super-visors as delinquent in training status.
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In response to the identified problems, the licensee has completed the following corrective actions:
i a.
Of the supervisors identified as delinquent in training status, l
17 have completed the required training. The remaining three are l
no longer employed by LILCo.
b.
A new Training Qu'.lification Program has been developed which tracks the qualifications required for the particular function an individual may occupy. This program tracks which individual's qualification are about to elapse within the rext eight weeks as well as those which have elapsed. Reports of training status l
will be periodically issued for management review.
The inspector has no further questions or concerns related to this matter. This item is closed.
2.
Review of Facility Operations
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2.1 Plant Status Summary During the period covered by this report, the reactor was brought critical for the first time since placing the plant in cold shutdown on August 31, 1986. Operation at power was necessary to perform re-tests on systems modified or repaired during the outage, to perform dynamic testing of valves per I.E.Bulletin 85-03, and to conduct startup testing of the RCIC and HPCI systems.
The reactor was made critical on May 22, 1987 at 4:30 PM and was sub-sequently brought subcritical at 10:48 PM to allow for minimum staff-ing through the holiday weekend. Critical operations were resumed on May 26 at 3:50 AM and reactor heatup commenced. Minor problems were encountered during surveillance of ADS and HPCI. However, these prob-lems were promptly corrected and the surveillance were completed satisfactorily. Minor problems were also encountered during initial operations of the reactor feedwater turbines.
These problems were also corrected promptly and did not significantly delay heatup.
Rated reactor pressure conditions were attained on May 28, at 2:52 AM. Testing of HPCI and RCIC constituted the majority of activities at rated pressure. RCIC operation from the remote shutdown panel was conducted along with dynamic testing of system MOV's. HPCI endurance run testing was completed satisfactorily.
However, operational problems were identified with HPCI valves MOV 37 and 38 (CST test line return valves) as a result of MOV dynamic testing. This item is discussed in greater detail in paragraph 5 of this report.
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l On June 1, 1987, a power alert was issued for Long Island due to unseasonably warm weather coupled with maintenance outages on two of LILC0's other generating facilities. Because of this, the Shoreham j
facility commenced a reactor shutdown and cooldown in anticipation
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of supplying site power via the onsite Electro-Motive Diesels. This is allowable per Shoreham Technical Specifications while in mode 4 (cold shutdown). The reactor achieved a subcritical state and was cooled down to approximately 250 psig. The power alert was lifted at 8:00 PM and critical operations resumed.
On June 4,1987, the main Generator was synchronized with the grid for approximately eight hours and supplied 10 MWE throughout that time.
Operations at power were continued through June 6, to allow further investigations of HPCI valves MOV-37 and MOV-38. All rods were inser-ted on June 6 however the reactor remained in mode 2 (startup) in anticipation of performance of training startups. No training start-ups were performed and on June 8 the reactor was placed in mode 4 (cold shutdown).
Following shutdown the licensee inerted the containment for the first time. The system worked well with exception of the oxygen analyzers which tended to read higher than samples obtained and analyzed by radiochemistry department. The licensee was still investigating the cause of this discrepancy at the time this report was written.
2.2 Operational Safety Verification The inspector toured the control room daily to verify proper shift manning, use of and adherence to approved procedures, and compliance with Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation.
Con-trol panel instrumentation and recorder traces were observed and the status of annunciators was reviewed.
Nuclear instrumentation and reactor protection system status were examined. Radiation monitoring instrumentation, including in plant Area Radiation monitors and ef-fluent monitors were verified to be within allowable limits, and observed for indications of trends. Electrical distribution panels were examined for verification of proper lineups of backup and emerg-ency electrical power sources as required by the Technical Specifica-tion. Sixteen (16) hours of this inspection effort were expended during backshift or weekend periods.
The inspector reviewed Watch Engineer and Nuclear Station Operator logs for adequacy of review by oncoming watchstanders, and for proper entries. A periodic review of Night Orders, Maintenance Work Requests, Technical Specification LCO Log, and other control room logs and records were made. Shift turnovers were observed on a
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periodic basis.
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l The inspector also observed and reviewed the adequacy of access con-
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trols to the Main Control Room, and verified that no loitering by l
unauthorized personnel in the Control Room Area was permitted. The
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inspector observed the conduct of Shift personnel to ensure adherence
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to Shoreham Procedures 21.001.01, " Shift Operations" and 21.004.01,
" Main Control Room - Conduct for Personnel".
2.3 Plant and Site Tours The inspector conducted periodic tours of accessible areas of the plant and site throughout the inspection period. These included: the Turbine and Reactor Buildings, the Rad Waste Building, the Control Building, the Screenwell Structure, the Fire Pump House, the Security Building, and the Colt Diesel Generator Building.
During these tours, the following specific items were evaluated;
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Fire Equipment - Operability and evidence of periodic inspection of fire suppression equipment;
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Housekeeping - Maintenance of required cleanliness levels;
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Equipment Preservation - Maintenance of special precautionary measures for installed equipment, as applicable;
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QA/QC Surveillance - Pertinent activities were being surveilled on a sampling basis by qualified QA/QC personnel; j
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Component Tagging - Implementation of appropriate equipment tagging for safety, equipment protection and jurisdiction;
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Personnel adherence to Radiological Controlled Area rules, including proper Personnel frisking upon RCA exit; Access control to the Protected Area, including search activ-
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ities, escorting and badging, and vehicle access control;
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Integrity of the Protected Area boundary.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
3.
Licensee Reports 3.1 In Office Review of Licensee Event Reports The inspector reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) submitted to the NRC to verify that details were clearly reported, including accuracy of the cause description and adequacy of corrective actions. The t
inspector determined whether further information was required fron the licensee, whether generic implications were involved, and whether the event warranted onsite follow-up.
The following LERs were reviewed.
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LER 8'7-008:
Shutdown Cooling Partial Isolation due to Isolation of pressure switch.
LER 87-009:
RPS actuation due to I&C technician valving in a level transmitter.
LER 87-010:
Failure of RHR pump breaker to trip.
LER 87-011:
Loss of RPS bus.
LER 87-012:
RBCLCW unplanned automatic system split.
LER 87-013:
Shutdown Cooling Isolation due to high reactor pres-sure
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LER 87-014:
ESF actuation due to personnel error.
LER 87-015:
Control Room Air Conditioning initiation due to low reactor building differential temperature.
LER 87-016:
Unsealed hole through the control building exterior i
wall.
i LER 87-017:
RWCU isolation LER 87-018:
Loss of security computer resulting in a moderate loss of security effectiveness.
LER 87-019.:
Bomb Threat The inspector has no further questions regarding the above LERs.
4.
Monthly Surveillance are. iaintenaw e Observation 4.1 Surveillance Activities The inspector observed the performance of various surveillance tests to verify that the surveillance procedure conformed to technical specification requirements, administrative approvals and tagging requirements were reviewed and approved prior to test initiation, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel, current approved procedures were used, test instrumentation was currently calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, test data was accurately l
and completely recorded, removal and restoration of affected com-F ponents was properly accomplished, and tests were completed within
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the required Technical Specification frequency.
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Observations of the following Surveillance Activities were made:
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Source Range Monitor Functional, SP-24.601.01
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EDG Operability testing, SP-24.307.01
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Core Spray System Operability, SP-24.203.01 No unacceptable conditions were identified.
4.2 Maintenance Activities The inspector observed the conduct of various maintenance activities throughout the inspection period.
During this observation, the inspector verified that maintenance activities were conducted within the requirements of the plant's administrative procedures and' tech-nical specifications, proper radiological controls were implemented and observed, proper safety precautions were observed, and that activities which have the potential to impact plant operations are properly coordinated with the control room. No unacceptable condi-tions were noted.
5.
Operational difficulties encountered with HPCI valves noted during MOV dynamic testing During HPCI testing it was found that valves MOV-37 and MOV-38 (located in the test return line to the CST) would not close against system design differential pressure. MOV 37 is a globe valve used to throttle test flow to obtain design pressures during routine surveillance and MOV-38 is a gate isolation valve. Both valves are interlocked to close if an initia-tion of HPCI occurs during testing. If the valves do not close during an initiation, HPCI system flow to the reactor vessel would be partially diverted to the CST.
The licensee attempted to cycle the valves at design differential pressure several times to obtain data. Following plant cooldown the valve vendor (Velan) was brought onsite and the valves were disassembled for inspec-tion. No indications of mechanical binding were found during disassembly of MOV-37. However, the Limitorque valve operator gear ratio was found to be incorrect. Design calculations used by Velan assumed the Limitorque operator to have a gear ratio of 150:1. 1he as found ratio was 124:1. This was determined by observing the specification plate on the operator and by counting gear teeth and calculating the ratio. Additionally, the vendor stated that the valve seat collar may have created a reactive force as the disc seated against system flow. The licensee believes these conditions were the cause of the operational problems with valve MOV-37. To correct this, the licensee is considering drilling holes in the disc collar (to reduce the reactive force) and replacing the Limitorque operator (to increase the gear ratio). The licensee will inspect other valves in the HPCI and RCIC systems to determine if improper operator gearing ratios exist for other valves.
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- No apparent cause for the MOV-38 operational problems were found although a minor defect was found or the seating surface. The licensee intends to replace the valve disc and will evaluate replacing the Limitorque operator to increase the available turque.
The inspector will monitor the license.t's progress in this area and will follow this action as Open Item 87-11-J1.
6.
Bomb Threats On July 4,1987, at 0640, and 0655, two bomb threats were phoned in to the LILCO Security Organization stating that a bomb was to go off at 12 noon at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant. The plant was in Operational Condi-tion 4. A Security Alert was declared and a search of the site was con-ducted. The Watch Engineer was notified and he declared an Unusual Event at 0657. The NRC was notified at 0728 and Emergency Plan Unusual Event procedures were implemented. The site was not evacuated. At 1145, fire watches in the Turbine Bldg., Reactor Bldg. and Control Bldg. were sus-pended. for personnel safety reasons. The search failed to uncover any explosive devices and the threats were assessed to be unfounded. At 1220, the fire watches were restored. The Unusual Event and the Security Alert were terminated at 1317.
The inspector has reviewed the licensee's response to this event and is satisfied with these actions.
7.
Licensee Request for Authorization to Increase Power to 25%
On April 14, 1987, the licensee submitted to the Secretary of the Commission a request for authorization to increase power to 25% power and a motion for expedited Commission review. The request for authorization to increase power was based on a reanalysis of the original PRA adjusted to account for, among other things, the restriction in power to 25% and recent procedural and hardware modifications.
This reanalysis indicated that the risk associated with operation of Shoreham up to 25% power would be such that Emergency Preparedness would be unnecessary at distances I
greater than 1 mile. With this argument, the licensee reques.ed that the motion be considered under 10 CFR 50.47(c). This would allow operations above 5% power notwithstanding the existence of unresolved Emergency Plan-ning issues. The licensee also motioned for an expedited Commission review l
based primarily on LILCr" s perceived need for additional generation capacity during the summer. On June 11, 1987, the Commission issued Memorandum and Order CLI-87-04 denying LILC0's request for authorization to increase power to 25%.
The Commission stated that LILCO had not presented adequate justification for circumventing the usual route for l
decision making per 10 CFR 50.57 and as such, the factual issues could not
be resolved before the end of the summer. The Commission further stated
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that no views were presented by the Staff regarding the technical merit of
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the request and that the licensee could resubmit the request at a later date under 10 CFR 50.57.
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Management Meetings At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with licensee managment to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection. The inspectors also attended entrance and exit interviews for inspections conducted by region-based inspectors during the period.
l Based on NRC Region I review of this report, and discussions with licensee
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representatives, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject te 10 CFR 2.790 restrictions.
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