IR 05000313/2005301
| ML053080304 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 11/01/2005 |
| From: | Gody A Operations Branch IV |
| To: | Forbes J Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR-05-302 | |
| Download: ML053080304 (16) | |
Text
ber 1, 2005
SUBJECT:
ERRATA FOR ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT 1 - NRC EXAMINATION REPORT 05000313/2005301
Dear Mr. Forbes:
Please replace NRC Examination Report 05000313/2005301 transmitted to you on October 25, 2005, with the revised report attached to this letter. The purpose of the change is to correct the error made in numbering the report. Since an examination was conducted at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, earlier this year, the report number for the Unit 1 examination conducted in September 2005 should be 05000313/2005302.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Should you have any questions concerning this examination or this change, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Anthony T. Gody, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket: 50-313 License: DPR-51
Entergy Operations, Inc. -2-Enclosure:
Corrected NRC Examination Report 05000313/20053012 cc w/enclosure:
Senior Vice President
& Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286-1995 Vice President Operations Support Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286-1995 Manager, Washington Nuclear Operations ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power 12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 Rockville, MD 20852 County Judge of Pope County Pope County Courthouse 100 West Main Street Russellville, AR 72801 Winston & Strawn LLP 1700 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006-3817 Bernard Bevill Radiation Control Team Leader Division of Radiation Control and Emergency Management Arkansas Department of Health 4815 West Markham Street, Mail Slot 30 Little Rock, AR 72205-3867 James Mallay Director, Regulatory Affairs Framatome ANP 3815 Old Forest Road Lynchburg, VA 24501
Entergy Operations, Inc. -3-Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (BSM1)
DRP Director (ATH)
DRS Director (DDC)
DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)
Senior Resident Inspector (RWD)
Branch Chief, DRP/E (DNG)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/E (VGG)
Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)
RITS Coordinator (KEG)
J. Dixon-Herrity, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JLD)
RidsNrrDipmIipb ANO Site Secretary (VLH)
SISP Review Completed: Y __ ADAMS: X Yes G No Initials: ______
X Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive X Non-Sensitive OE/OB C:OB Mhaire ATGody
/RA/ /RA/
11/1/05 11/1/05 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
ENCLOSURE ERRATA FOR ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT 1 NRC EXAMINATION REPORT 05000313/2005302
October 25, 2005 Jeffrey
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
ER 05000313/2005-302; 09/12-15/2005; Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1; Initial Operator
Licensing Examination Report.
NRC examiners evaluated the competency of 8 applicants for reactor operator licenses, applicant for an instant senior operator license and 4 applicants for upgrade senior operator licenses at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1. The facility licensee developed the examinations using NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 9. The written examination was administered by the facility on September 9, 2005.
NRC examiners administered the operating tests on September 12-15, 2005. The license examiners determined that 12 of the 13 applicants satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR Part 55, and the appropriate licenses have been issued.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the examiners. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and its corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
REPORT DETAILS
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA5 Other Activities (Initial Operator License Examination)
1. License Applications
a. Scope
The examiners reviewed the applications submitted by the licensee for each of the license applicants. The applications were submitted on NRC Form 398, Personal Qualification Statement, and NRC Form 396, Certification of Medical Examination by Facility Licensee. The examiners also audited a sample of the license applications to confirm that they accurately reflected the subject applicants qualifications. This audit focused on the applicants experience and on-the-job training, including control manipulations that provided significant reactivity changes.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2. Operator Knowledge and Performance
a. Examination Scope
On September 9, 2005, the licensee proctored the administration of the written examinations to all 13 applicants. The licensee staff graded the written examinations, analyzed the results, and presented their analysis to the NRC on September 20, 2005.
The NRC examination team administered the various portions of the operating examination to all 13 applicants on September 12-15, 2005. The 8 applicants for reactor operator licenses participated in two dynamic simulator scenarios, in a control room and facilities walkthrough test consisting of 11 system tasks, and an administrative test consisting of 4 administrative tasks. One of the 8 applicants for a reactor operator license also participated in a third dynamic simulator scenario. The applicant seeking an instant senior operator license participated in two dynamic simulator scenarios, a control room and facilities walkthrough test consisting of 10 system tasks, and an administrative test consisting of 5 administrative tasks. The 4 applicants for upgrade senior operator licenses participated in two dynamic simulator scenarios, a control room and facilities walkthrough test consisting of 5 system tasks, and an administrative test consisting of 5 administrative tasks.
b. Findings
All 13 of the applicants passed all parts of the operating test. One reactor operator applicant failed the written examination. For the written examinations, the reactor operator applicants average score was 89.4 percent and ranged from 71.6 to
97.3 percent, and the senior operator applicants average score was 90.7 percent and ranged from 82.8 to 93.9 percent. The overall written examination average was 89.9 percent.
Chapter ES-403 and Form ES-403-1 of NUREG-1021 require the licensee to analyze the validity of any written examination questions that were missed by half or more of the applicants. The licensee conducted this performance analysis for the six questions that met this criteria and submitted the analysis to the chief examiner on September 20, 2005. This analysis concluded that three of the questions (2, 82, and 83) were technically accurate and required no post-examination changes. The licensee recommended accepting two answers as correct for two of the questions (16 and 94)and recommended one question
- (73) be deleted from the examination because of there being no correct answer among the choices. None of the recommended changes had a net impact of changing a passing grade to a failure or a failing grade to passing.
The licensees recommendations and the NRC responses follow:
Reactor/Senior Operator Question 16 The licensee recommended that both answers A and C be accepted as correct for this question. The question asked what action is required during the re-establishment of SW flow through the DH cooler and why? Answer A says establish SW slowly to prevent DH cooler water hammer, and C says establish SW slowly to prevent DH cooler thermal shock. Procedure 1203.028, Loss of Decay Heat Removal, directs that SW flow to DH cooler be restored slowly out of concern for both water hammer and thermal shock, which makes both A and C correct.
NRC Response: The NRC agrees with the licensees recommendation to accept two answers for Question 16. The procedure is clear that both water hammer and thermal shock are concerns for restoring cooling in this condition.
Reactor/Senior Operator Question 73 The licensee recommended deletion of this question since a typo in the answer intended to be correct actually makes the answer incorrect, which leaves no correct answer. The question asked: During performance of the ESAS procedure with BWST level at 8 ft.,
which of the following actions is performed specifically to reduce plant personnel exposure? The intended correct answer was C, which said aligning HPI to provide PZR Aux Spray. However, in order for answer C to have been correct, it would have had to refer to LPI instead of HPI - HPI was a typographical error that makes the answer incorrect. Procedure 1202.010, ESAS, step 13 clearly directs aligning Pressurizer AUX Spray to LPI system. Since there is not a correct answer, the question should be deleted.
NRC Response: The NRC agrees with the licensees recommendation to delete Question 73 since there is no correct answer. The use of HPI in this circumstance is clearly not correct.
Senior Operator Question 94 The licensee recommended that both C and D be accepted as correct on this question. The question gave conditions indicating quadrant power tilt (QPT) was 3 percent above the steady state limit and asked what action was required by Technical Specification 3.2.4. Technical Specification 3.2.4, Required Action A.1.2.2, states that appropriate trip setpoints should be reduced by >2% RTP from the ALLOWABLE THERMAL POWER for each 1% of QPT greater than the steady state limit. This means the required reduction is >6%, which makes both C (reduce applicable RPS trip setpoints 6%) and D (reduce applicable RPS trip setpoints 8%) correct.
NRC Response: The NRC agrees with the licensees recommendation to accept two answers for Question 94. Clearly, if >6% adjustment is directed by the technical specification, then both C and D are correct.
3. Initial Licensing Examination Development
a. Examination Scope
The licensee developed the examinations in accordance with NUREG-1021, Revision 9.
All licensee facility training and operations staff involved in examination preparation and validation were on a security agreement. The facility licensee submitted the integrated examination outlines on May 16, 2005. The chief examiner reviewed the outlines against the requirements of NUREG-1021, Revision 9, and provided comments to the licensee. The facility licensee submitted the draft examination package on July 14, 2005. The chief examiner reviewed the draft examination package against the requirements of NUREG-1021, Revision 9, and provided comments to the licensee on the examination on July 29, 2005. The NRC conducted an onsite validation of the operating examinations and provided further comments during the week of August 22, 2005. The licensee satisfactorily completed comment resolution on August 26, 2005.
b. Findings
The NRC approved the initial examination outline and advised the licensee to proceed with the operating examination development.
The examiners determined that the written and operating examinations initially submitted by the licensee were within the range of acceptability expected for a proposed examination.
No findings of significance were identified.
4. Simulation Facility Performance
a. Examination Scope
The examiners observed simulator performance with regard to plant fidelity during the examination validation and administration.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
5. Examination Security
a. Examination Scope
The examiners reviewed examination security for examination development and during both the onsite preparation week and examination administration week for compliance with NUREG-1021 requirements. Plans for simulator security and applicant control were reviewed and discussed with licensee personnel.
b. Findings
A compromise of the reactor operator written examination occurred during examination development that resulted in the licensee-identified non-cited violation documented in section 4OA7 of this report. The compromise occurred when the licensee accidentally distributed an early draft version of the reactor operator written license examination during administration of the audit examination. The examination proctor realized the mistake within minutes of distributing the wrong examination, and quickly collected all copies of the license examination. Copies of the reactor operator audit examination were then prepared and distributed. During subsequent investigation, it was determined that no applicant had worked beyond or gained knowledge of any question beyond question #3. To ensure a valid examination, the following changes were made to the reactor operator license examination:
! Replacement KAs were selected and replacement questions were developed for questions #1-10.
! An additional 27 questions were selected among the remainder of the examination to be replaced or significantly modified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
The chief examiner presented the examination results to Messrs. Brad Berryman, Unit One Operations Manager, Tom Mayfield, Acting Training Manager, Randal Martin, Unit One Operations Training Manager, and other members of the licensee's management staff on September 15, 2005. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The licensee did not identify any information or materials used during the examination as proprietary.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements, which meet the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation.
! 10 CFR 55.49 prohibits licensees from compromising any portion of a license examination by engaging in activities that, but for detection, would have affected the equitable and consistent administration of the examination. Contrary to this, on August 5, 2005, the licensee mistakenly distributed the actual NRC reactor operator license examination to the license candidates during the audit examination administration; the first three questions on the NRC license examination were compromised before the error was detected and the examinations collected by the proctor. The licensee documented this compromise in Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2005-01144. This finding is of very low safety significance because it was detected and the compromised aspects of the examination were replaced before the actual NRC license examination was administered.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
-5- Enclosure
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
Randal Martin, Unit One Operations Training Manager
Robert Byford, Simulator Training Supervisor
Steve Pullin, Examination Author
John Cork, Examination Author
NRC Personnel
- R. Deese, Senior Resident Inspector
-1- Attachment