ML19350A815
| ML19350A815 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 02/25/1981 |
| From: | Hancock J FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19350A814 | List: |
| References | |
| CS-81-035, CS-81-35, NUDOCS 8103160905 | |
| Download: ML19350A815 (3) | |
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CS-81-035
!3-011-11 Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director Docket No. 50-302 Office of Inspection & Enforcement Licensee No. CPR-72 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Ref:
RII:MBS 101 Marietta St., Suite 3100 50-302/80-38 Atlanta, GA 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
We offer the following responses to the Items of Noncompliance in the referenced inspection report.
..l requires that the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (F.FAS) instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE and when inoperable take the action shown in Table 3.3-3.
Table 3.3-3 requires, that with less than the Minimum Channels UPERABLE, operation may continue provided the con-tainment purge and exhaust valves are maintained closed.
Contrary to the above, during the period from about 4:00 a.m. on October 26, 1980, to 11:23 p.m. on October 28, 1980, the Reactor Building Purge Exhaust Gaseous Channel was inoperable and the con-tainment purge and exhaust valves were not closed.
B.
Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 requires that the containment iso-lation valves specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE with iso-lation times as shown in Table 3.6-1.
Table 3.6-1 specifies the action to be taken when one or more of the valves are inoperable.
Contrary to the above, on August 3,1980, at 0119 hours0.00138 days <br />0.0331 hours <br />1.967593e-4 weeks <br />4.52795e-5 months <br />, Core Flood Valve (CFV)-ll was inoperable and the valve was not deactivated until 0615 hours0.00712 days <br />0.171 hours <br />0.00102 weeks <br />2.340075e-4 months <br /> on August 5,1980. On October 26, 1980, at approximately 0400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br /> due to maintenance activities conducted on the Reactor Building Purge Exhaust Radiation Monitor, Air Handling Valves (AHV)-lA, 18,1C and'lD were made inoperable and the valves were not closed and/or deenergized during the periods of October 26, 1980, at approximately 0400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br /> through October 29,1980, at 1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br />.
A&5 Response:
Unusual Operating Event Report (U0ER) 80-12 was written; it evaluated the incident and made the following recommendations to preclude recurrence:
8103160TOSl.
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- o Notice o1 'iolation 50-302/8C 18 RII:MBS Page 2
- Revision to SP-355, " Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Functional Testing: to require cycling of detector suction isolation valve to verify systen integrity and low flow alarm. This item has been com-pleted.
- Establishing ontrol in procedures to assure coordination of all required activities involving radiation monitors. This item is scheduled for completion on March 1,1981.
- Persons performing safety and regulatory related activities covered by procedure have the procedure in hand. This item is complete. A Plant Manager's Memo to all Operation and Maintenance personnel was issued-on ll/13/80 which addressed " Adherence to Procedures".
- Improving crafts training to emphasize the importance of doing as-signed tasks properly, the way things are expected to operate, and craft verification of proper working order prior to leaving tre task.
This item is scheduled for completion on March 1,1981 by the Train-ing Manager.
LER 80-33 reported that CFV-ll was inoperable, and, contrary to STS 3.6.3.1 Actions, the valve was not deactivated within four (4) hours, nor was it isolated with a closed manual valve.
The following actions have been taken to emphasize and correct the subject findings:
(a)
Short tenn instruction 80-71; Handling of Failed Containment Iso-lation Valves and Manual Isolation Requirements.
(b)..Short term instruction 80-83; Method-of Deactivating Electric and Solenoid (air operated) Containment Isolation Valves.
(c)
Lesson Plan for Unusual Operating Event Report (U0ER) No. 80-12 addressed Technical Specification requirements 3/4.6.3.1 and the basis for those requirements.
(d)
Full compliance will be achieved by March 1,1981.
C.
10 CFR 73.55(d)(6) requires that individuals not authorized by the licensee to enter protected areas without escort shall be escorted by a watchmen, or other individual designated by the licensee, while in a protected area and shall be badged to indicate that an escort is required. The Security
, P.lancrequires that all. personnel not issued one of_ the Nuclear Plant.
~ badges shall be handled ~ as v'isitofs an~d~ escorted at all times' while within the Protected Area.
.. Contrary:to the above on October 21,1980, at 1115 hours0.0129 days <br />0.31 hours <br />0.00184 weeks <br />4.242575e-4 months <br />, an individual not authorized to enter the protected areas without an escort was ob-served to be inside the protected area withoet an esort.
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Notice of Violation 50-302/80-38 RII:MBS Page 3 C. Response: The imediate action taken by the inspector ensured that the unescorted individual was placed under the escort of licensee personnel. The contract employee that had the escort responsibility was verbally disciplined and his escort responsibilities were re-emphasized. Re-emphasis of escort responsibilities has been dis-seminated to all other contract personnel working in this area.
Full compliance has been achieved.
D.
Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b., requires that conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode be the subject of written reports to the Director of the Regional Office within 30 days of occurrence of the event.
Contrary to the above, on August 6, 1980, at 0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br />, Decay Heat Valve (DHV)-110 became inoperable; thereby, placing the Emergency Core Cooling System low pressure injection subsystem into a degraded mode for operation. This event was not reported as of October 29, 1980.
D. Response:
Corrective steps were taken immediately to initiate the re-quired thirty (30) day Licensee Event Report tc report this event.
At the time of this occurrence tnere was a lacA of understanding by the reportability evaluator as to what constituted inoperability of DHV-110 flow switches. The present evaluator has been made aware of this deficiency and understands the reportability of this event.
Full compliance will be achieved prior to 11 March 1981.
Should there be further questions, please contact us.
Very truly yours, FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION b
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Nu6 tear Plant Manage J. A. Hancock Assistant Vice President Nuclear Operations JC/rc e
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