IR 05000289/1981024
| ML20032B371 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/19/1981 |
| From: | Conte R, Fasano A, Haverkamp D, Troskoski W, Young F, Thomas Young NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20032B310 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-289-81-24, NUDOCS 8111050480 | |
| Download: ML20032B371 (12) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATOPY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No.
50 _2_89/81-24 Docket No.
50-289 License No.
DPR-50 _
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c Licensee :
Metropolitan Edison Company P.O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Facility Name: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Inspection at: Middletown, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted: August 13, 1981 and September 1 - October 2,1981 Inspectors :
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D. Haverkamp, Senfor Resident Inspector (TMI-1)
date signed
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R. Conte, Senior Resident Inspector (TMI-2)
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/ell4 lfI W. Troskoski, React @ Irdhector da'te signed
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16//9101 F. Yjun, Resident Inspector (TMI-1)
date signet Approved by:
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A. Fasano, Chief, Three Mile Island Resident d6te' signed Section, PB#2
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Inspection Summary _:
Ir.spection on August 13, 1981 and September 1 - October 2,1981 (Report Number 5_0-289/81-24 )
Areas Inspected:
Routine safety inspection by resident and regional based inspectors (227 hours0.00263 days <br />0.0631 hours <br />3.753307e-4 weeks <br />8.63735e-5 months <br />) of licensee action on a previous inspection finding;
. plant operations during long term shutdown including facility turs and log and record reviews; selected restart modifications; preliminary hot functional test (HFT), including HFT witnessing and HFT procedure and test results review;-
IE Bulletins and Circulars followup; and main steam-safety valves surveillance.
Results,:
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8111050480 811021 yDRADOCK 05000289 PDR
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Details
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Persons Contacted
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General Public Utilities Nuclear Group (GPUNG)
J. Colitz, Plant Engineering Director TMI-l T. Hawkins, Manager Startup and Test' TMI-1, Technical Functions
- G. Miller, Director Startup and Test, Technical Functions V. Orlandi, Lead Instrument and Controls Engineer TMI-l I. Porter, Supervisor Startup and Test TMI-l, Technical Functions M. Ross, Manager Plant Operations TMI-1 M. Snyder, Preventive Maintenance Manager TMI-l
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- C. Stephenson, Nuclear Licensing Engineer, Technical Functions
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- R. Toole, Operations and Maintenance Direccor TMI-l L. Zubey, Supervisor Contractor Services, Maintenance and Construction Catalytic Incorporated L. Moyer, Electrical Supervisor T. Reddington, Project Superintendent The inspector also interviewed several other licensee employees during the inspection.
They included control room operators, maintenance personnel, engineering staff personnel and general office personnel.
- denotes those present at the exit meeting 2.
Licensee Action on a Previous Inspection Finding (Closed) Unresolved Item 289/78-24-02:
Inadequate procedure for testing main steam safety valves in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI. Surveillance Procedure 1303-11.3, Revision 5, " Testing the Main Steam Safety Pelief Valves," requires testing of 25 percent of the valves each refueling outage.
This procedure previously did not contain the requirement of ASME Code Section XI for additional tests when a valve failed to function properly during testing.
The procedure was revised to require this additional valve testing.
Due to test failures which occurred in September 1981, all main steam safety relief valves were tested in accordance with the revised Procedure 1303-11.3.
The inspector reviewed the procedure, witnessed portions of the valve testing in September 1981, and had no further questions cncerning this item.
3.
Plant Operations During Long Term Shutdown a.
Plant Logs and Operating Records The inspector reviewed the following plant procedures to determine the licensee established requirements in this area in preparation for a review of selected logs and records.
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Administrative Procedure (AP) 1002, " Rules for the Protection
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of Employees Working on Electrical and Mechanical Apparatus,"
Revision 22 AP 1007, " Control of Records," Revision 4
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AP 1010, " Technical Speci fication -Surveillance Prt gram,"
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Revision 18 AP 1012, " Shift Relief and Log Entries," Revision 14
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AP 1013. " Bypass of Safety ' Functions and Jumper Control,"
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Revision 8 AP 1016, " Operations Surveillance. Program," Revision 13
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AP 1033, " Operating Memos and Standing Orders," Revision 2
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AP 1037, " Control of Caution and DN0 Tags," Revision 2
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AP 1044, " Event Review and Reporting Requirements,"
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The inspector reviewed the following plant logs and operating recorGs.
i-Shift Foreman Log and Control Room Log Book
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Primary Auxiliary Operator's Log-Tour Readings, Secondary Auxiliary Operator's Log Sheets, and Auxiliary Operator Log Sheets - Out-Building Tour Unit 1 Operations Memo Book
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Shift Turnover Checklist
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Temporary Change Notice (TCN) Log Book
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Active Tagging Application Book L0cked Valve Log
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ISI Tag Book
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Night OrJer Book Do Not Operate and Caution Tag Log
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b.
Facility Tours During the course of the inspection, the inspector conducted tours of the following plant areas.
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Control. Room (daily)
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Auxiliary Building (September 9 and October 2)
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Fuel Handling Building (September 3 and September' 9)
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Intermediate Building (September 8 and October 1)
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Vital Switchgear Rooms (September '6)
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Diesel Generator Building (September 8 and October 1)-
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Yard Area (September 4 and September 17)
Site Perimeter (September 11)
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Plant logs and operating records were reviewed to verify _the
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following items.
Log keeping practices and log book reviews are conducted
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in accordance with established administrative controls.
Log entries involving abnormal conditions provide sufficient
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detail to communicate equipment status, lockout status, correction and restoration.
Operating orders do not conflict with Technical Specification
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(TS) requirements.
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Jumper log and tagging log entries do not conflict with TS requirements.
Problem identification reports confirm compliance with TS
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reporting and LC0 requirements.
Jumper / lifted lead / mechanical modification and tagging
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operations are conducted in conformance with established administrative controls.
The following observations / discussions / determinations were made.
Control room annunciators : Selected l_ighted annunciators
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were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, -if-required, was being taken.
Control room manning: By frequent observation through
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the inspection, the inspector verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(k) and the Techr.ical
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Specifications were being met.
In addition, the Mspector
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observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity of system status was maintained.
The inspector periodically questioned shift personnel relative to their awareness of plant conditions and knowledge of emergency procedures.
Fire protection: The inspector verified that selected
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fire extinguishers were accessible and inspected on schedule, that fire alarm stations were unobstructed, and that adequate control over ignition sources and fire hazards was maintained.
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Technical Speci fications : Through log review and direct observation during tours, the inspector verified compliance with selected Technical Specification Limiting Conditions during shutdown plant operation.
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Plant housekeeping conditions : No unsatisfactory plant housekeeping conditions were observed which had not been identified by station personnel and for which corrective action had not been initiated, as necessary.
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Monitoring instrumentation: The inspector verified that selected instruments were functional and demonstrated parameters within Technical Specification limits.
Valve positions: The inspector verified that selected
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valves were in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications for the applicable plant mode.
This verification included control board indication and field observation of valve positions.
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Radiation controls: The inspector verified by observation that control point procedures and posting requirements were being followed.
The inspector identified no failures to properly post radiation and high radiation areas.
Fluid leaks : No fluid leaks were observed which had not
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been identified by station personnel and for which corrective action had not been initiated, as necessary.
Piping snubbers / restraints : Selected pipe hangers and
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seismic restraints were observed and no adverse conditions were noted.
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Equipment tagging: The inspector selected plant components for which valid tagging requests were in effect and verified that the tags were in place and the equipment in the condition specified.
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-6-Security: During the course of these inspections,
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observations relative to protected and vital area security requirements were made.. including access controls, boundary integrity, search, escort, and badging.
No notable conditions were identified.
Licensee meetings: The inspector frequently attended the
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Plan-of-the-Day (P0D) morning meetings and the daily status afternoon meetings held by licensee management and supervisory personnel.
The inspector observed the meetings to assess licensee evaluation of plant conditions, status and problems and'to review the licensee's plans for conducting certain major plant operations and maintenace activities.
The inspector also attended a bi-weekly project status meeting to assess licensee progress and
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-difficulties related to plant modifications required for restart.
Acceptance criteria for the above items included inspector judgement and requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(k), Regulatory Guide 1.114, Technical Specifications, and the following procedures.
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AP 1002, " Rules for the Protection of Employees Working on Electrical and Mechanical Apparatus," Revision 22 AP 1008, " Good Housekeeping," Revision 7
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AP 1037, " Control of Caution and DN0 Tags," Revision 2 No items of noncompliance were identified.
Selected Restart Modifications Review On August 13, 1981 the inspector reviewed the below listed modifications to determine the status of installation, construction testing and preoperational testing.
The inspector verified proper implementation of work packages in accordance with.Techcical Specification 6.8.1, ANSI 18.7-1972 and associated work package procedures.
Performance of safety ' evaluations in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 was also veri fied. The following modifications were reviewed.
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Task RM-17 - Upgrade Power Supply to the Integrated Control System (ICS)/Nonnuclear Instrumentation (NNI).
This modi-fication provides a manual transfer switch, which could be controlled from the control room, to supply electric power to the ATA bus from the TRA bus in ' case of Inverter l A output power failure.
The ATA bus provides power to ICS/NNI.
A control room alarm is provided to indicate loss of power to the ATA bus.
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-7-Task LM-43A - ICS/NNI Power Supply Indication.
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fication implements part of the lessons tearned from the Crystal River Incident.
The modification provides an indicating light status panel in a relay room and an clarm in the control room for loss of various ICS feeder circuits.
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Task LM-43B - Atmospheric Dump, Pressurizer Spray, Turbine Bypass Valve Closure.
This modification implements another aspect of the lessons learned from the Crystal River Incident.
The modification orovides a manual controller for the atmospheric dump valves (ADV) with a power supply that is independent of the ICS/NNI. A feature to automatically shift to an alternate power source on loss of ICS power is included.
Low pressurizer level signals (ie, due to loss of power) could be overridden by a key switch.
Turbine bypass valves will automatically close on loss of power.
Task LM-43C - Critical Plant Parameters Independent of ICS/NNI.
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This modification provides new indicators for a critical plant parameter (digital) display in the control room.
Signals will come from the remote shutdown panel via isolation amplifiers.
Critical plant parameters are noted below.
Once Through Steam Generator A and B Pressures
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React:r Coolant System (RCS) Pressure A and B (wide range)
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RCS Hot Leg Temperatures A and B (extended range)
RCS Cold Leg Temperature A and B (wide range)
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Makeup Tank Level
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Pressurizer Level (compensated)
Selected sections of the following documents were reviewed.
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Engineering Change Memorandum (ECM) (RM-17), Modification of Power Supply to ICS/NNI System, Revision 0, dated January 29, 1981; Revision 1, dated January 29, 1981; Revision 2, dated May 6,1981
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Field Questionnaires R 426, dated December 19,1980; R 524, dated March 18,1980; R 698, dated July 6,1981 ECM S-177, (LM-43A) ICS/NNI Loss of Power Indication and
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Annunciation; Revision 0, dated June 11, 1981; Revision 1, dated June 3, 1981 ECM S-233, (LM-43B) ICS/NNI Improvements; Revision 0, dated
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June 4,1981 ; Revision 1, dated June 4,1981
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-8-ECM S-232 (LM-43C), Critical Plant Farameters Independent.of
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ICS/NNI; Revision 0, dated June 10, 1981; Revision 1, dated June 10,1981 The below listed observations were made at selected plant areas to assess status of construction work for the subject modification.
RM-17. -- This is complete except for Operations Department
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acceptance of test data for system turnover. ' A transfer switch was installed alongside Inverter l A in the Inverter l A room. Appropriate control switches and an annunciator were installed in the ' control room.
LM-43A - The status panel remains to be mounted in' the relay
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room.
The concrete for the panel pad was poured.. The appropriate annunciator in the control room has been designed but wiring remains to be connected.
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LM-43B - The control room panel has been modified (cut.out) to install the ADV manual controller.
The pressurizer level bypass function key switch and modification was not installed.
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LM-43C - Digital indicators are mounted on the appropriate control room panels. Wiring remains to be connected.
Current estimates for completion of the construction work associated i
with LM-43A, LM-43B and LM-43C was 4-6 weeks of work as of August 13, 1981.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Preliminary Hot Functional ;est (HFT)
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Overall Conduct of HFT The inspector reviewed the Prerequisite List for HFT, Revision 0, dated May 18, 1981, to verify that all pretest requirements were met by the licensee prior to conducting the test.
Surveillance procedures and system line-ups were reviewed on a sampling basis and compared with the appropriate sections of the prerequisite list.
The inspector determined that the licensee had exercised adequate control in preparation for the HFT.
Test Procedure (TP) 600/1, Controlling Procedure for HFT, Revision 0, dated August 17, 1981, was reviewed by the inspector at various temperature and pressure plateaus during completion of the test.
Items verified included specified prerequisites for individual test procedures being performed under TP 600/1, documentation of data taken, and documentation / resolution of test deficiencies and exceptions.
The inspector's findings on satisfactory performance of individual TP's, including descriptions of the test objectives, acceptance criteria and results, are discussed belo._
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b.
Review of Selected HFT Procedures and Test Results
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TP 664/1, PORV Flow Indication Functional Test, Revision 0,t
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dated August 28, 1981
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Items tested by TP 664/1 are noted below.
Operation of the newly installed electromatic relief
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valve (via PORV manual opening switch in the control room).
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Response and operability of-the accelerometer (accoustic monitor), differential pressure taps, and tailpipe thermocouples.
Ability of the PORV block valve to close under full flow
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conditions.
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During the performance of TP 664/1, the PORY was opened from the control room and the block valve (RC-V2) closed in 10.9 seconds with the reactor coolant system pressure at 2105 psig.
Tail pipe thermocouple data showed the expected response, but did not initiate a computer alarm.
This was documented as a test deficeniency for the licensee to determine the cause.
The accelerometer and differential pressure transmitters.showed a qualitative response to the PORV opening.
Through discussions
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with test personnel the inspector was informed 1 ? at a final sensitivity setting for these instruments was not determined due to operational considerations.
Pending final licensee reviev and resolution of test deficiencies and exceptions prior to accepting the test, the inspector had no further
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questions on this TP.
TP 645/1, TSAT Functional _ Test, Revision 0,_ dated August 25, 1981 TP 645/1 was conducted at reactor coolant system temperature plateaus of 140F, 250F, 330F, 400F, 450F, 500F, and 532F.
Items tested by TP 545/1 are noted below, s
Selection of the hight amperature and lowest pressure
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in each loop to determine the available saturation margin
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in each loop by comparison of Tsat meter indications verrus hand calculations.
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Accuracy of the computer program that computes temperature and pressure saturation margins by comparing these values
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with manual calculations based on the steam tables.
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The inspector reviewed TP 645/1. data sheets and oLierved data being taken at 140F, 330F and 532F.. The intial data taken at 140F was incorrect due to improper computer interface. After proper documentation and realignment of the input-to the computer, the data taken showed correct correlations at all plateaus.
The inspector had no further questions on the matter.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
IE Bulletin and Circular Followup The inspector reviewed the licensee's fdlowup action regarding the IE Bulletins (IEB) and Circulars (IEC) listed below.
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IEC 78-06, " Potential Common Mode Flooding of ECCS Equipment
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Rooms," dated May 31, 1978--
IEC 7d-15. "Limitorque Valve Actuators," dated July 26, 1978
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IEB 79-21. " Temperature Effects on Level Instruments," dated
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October 31, 1980 IEB 73-24 " Frozen Lines," dated November 6,1979
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IEC 79-19, " Loose Locking Devices on Ingersoll-Rand Pumps,"
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dated September 13, 1979 l
IEC 79-22, " Stroke Times for Power Operated Relief Valves,"
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dated November 16, 1979
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I IEB 80-06, " Engineered Safety Feature Reset Controls," dated
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June 24, 1980 IEB 80-18, " Maintenance of AdeqJate Minimum Flow Thru Centrifugal
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Charging Pumps Following Secon6ary Side High Energy Line Rupture," dated July 22, 1980 l
IEB'80-19. " Failures of Mercury - Wetted Matrix Relays in
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l Reactor Protective Systems of Operating Nuclear Power Plants Designed by Combustion Engineering," dated July 31, 1980
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IEB 80-21, " Valve Yokes Supplied by Malcolm Foundry Company,
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Inc.." dated November 6,1980 i
IEB 80-23, " Failure of Solenoid Valves Manufactured by Valcor l
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Engineering Corporation," dated November 14, 1980 The review included di;cussions with licensee personnel, review of selected facility records, and observations of selected facility o
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equipment and components.
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With respect to the abovt aulletins, the inspector verified that licensee management forwarded copies of the bulletin response to appropriate onsite management representatives, that informatich and corrective action discussed in the reply was accurate and implemented as described, and that the reply was submitted within the time period described in the bulletins.
With respect to the above circulars, the inspector verified that the circular was received by appropriate licensee management, a review for applicability was performed, and that uction taken or planned is appropriate.
Acceptance criteria for the above review included inspector judgement and requiren,cnts of applicable Technical Specificar. ions and facility procedures.
Licensee followup to the above bulletins and circulars was acceptable unless otherwise noted below.
The licensee response to IEB 79-21 committed to revisi q applicable s
emergency procedures and conducting specific operator tr iining dealing with the potential error in steam generator and pressurizer level indication due to post accident containment ambient temperatures.
Previous NRC review of licensee followup to this bulletin is discussed in paragraph 6 of NRC Region I Inspection Report 50-289/80-29.
The inspector determined that the corrective actions to be taken before restart were not yet completed.
IEB 79-21 will remain open pending further review of licensee's actions during a subsequent inspection (289/79-BU-21'
7.
Main Steam Safet; Valvcs Surveillance The inspector observed portions of Surveillance Procedure (SP) 1303-11.3, Revision 7, " Testing the Main Steam Safety Relief Valves".
The observations and review of surveillance were performed to determine the following items.
Conformance to Technical Specifications
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Proper review end approval to perform surveilla7ce
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Proper ccnduct of the surveillance test
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Correct restoration of the system to service
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Accuracy and completeness of test data
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Testing performed by qualified personnel
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-12-As part of the licensee's inservice inspection program, a 25 percent sample (five valves) of the main steam safety valves (MSSV's) were tested per Sp 1303-11.3. Acceptance criteria allow a permissible setpoint drift of + 1 percent of the value specified in the Sp. far each MSSV.
The inspector witnessed portions of the test where the valves were tested and the setpoints calculated.
Of the five MSSV's initially tested, one valve (MS-V-178) lifted at a lower pressure than allowed and a second valve (MS-V-21B) lifted at a higher pressure than allowed. Both valves were adjusted and satis factorily. retested.
Based on the setpoint drifts of two of the five MSSV's initially tested, the licensee decided to test all remaining MSSV's.
Data obtained during tha tests were reviewed by the inspector, and the calculations that were specified in the surveillance were independently checked for accuracy.
Based on the inspectors observations of the test, as conducted in the field, and subsequent review of test data, no items of noncompliance were identified.
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Ex!t Interview Meetings were held periodically with senior facility management during the course of the inspection to discuss the inspection scope -
and findings.
The -inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on l
October 2,-1981, and summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings. The licensee representatives acknowledged the
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findings.
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