IR 05000320/1981023
| ML20041A263 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/1982 |
| From: | Conte R, Fasano A, Oneill B, Thonus L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041A215 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-320-81-23, NUDOCS 8202190343 | |
| Download: ML20041A263 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0lHISSION 50320-820108 50320-820911 50320-820113 50320-821007
Region I 50320-820805 50320-821014 50320-82U809-50320-821028'
50320-820830 50320-821030 50320-820902 < 50320-821113 50320-820909 Report No.
50-320/81-23 Docket No. 50-320 Category C
License No. DPR-73 Priority
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Licensee :
GPU Nuclear Corporation P.O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057
Facility Name: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Inspection at: Middletown, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted: December 13, 1981 - January 16, 1982 Inspectors :
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R. Conte, Senior Resident Inspector (TMI-2)
date signed h & O (^J IlLf TL L. Thonus, _ Resident Inspector (TMI-2)
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B. O'N/ill,, Radiation Specialist date s'igned Approved by:
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//.2 s-/82 A. Fasano,/Chidf, Three Mile Island Section, d' ate signed Projects Branch No. 2 Inspection Summary:
No. 50-320/81-23)
_ 13,1981 -_ _ January 16,1982 (Inspection Report Inspection on December Areas Inspected _: Routine safety inspection by site inspectors of plant-operations; radiological and environmental-protection; reactor building entries; radioactive material shipments; licensee event reports; unusual event of January 8,1982; and borated water storage tank leak.
The inspection involved 135 inspector-hours.
Resul ts : No items of noncompliance were identified.
8202190343 820201 PDR ADOCK 05000320
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted General Public Utilities (GPU) Nuclear Corporation
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- W. Bondik, Effluent and Dose Assessment Manager
- S. Chaplin, Licensing Engineer
- J. Chwastyk, Nuclear Plant Operations Manager M. Cooper, Shift Foreman
- W. Heysek, Audits Supervisor
- G. Kunder, Technical Specialization Compliance Supervisor D. Weaver, Lead Foreman, Instrumentation and Control Bechtel Northern T. Morris, Command Center Supervisor Other licensee personnel were interviewed.
- denotes those present at the exit meeting.
2.
Routine Plant Operations Review The inspector, on a periodic basis, obtained informaticn on plant conditions, reviewed selected plant parameters for abnonnal trends, ascertained plant status from a maintenance / modification viewpoint, and verified logkeeping practices were in accordance with admini-strative controls.
Tours were' made of the auxiliary building and service building to observe housekeeping, plant conditions, and equipment operability.
The inspector made random inspections of the control room during the regular and back-shift hours.
During these inspections, ongoing evolutions, planned evolutions, and ' plant status were
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discussed with control room personnel.
The shift ~ foreman's log and -
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control room operator's log were reviewed -for the week of January 11-15, 1982.
The inspector observed selected licensee plan-of-the-day meetings.
No items of noncompliance were' identified.
3.
Routine Health Physics and Environmental Review a.
Plant Tours The onsite radiation specialists completed routine plant inspection tours.
These inspections included all control points and selected radiologically controlled areas.
Observations included the below areas.
Access control to radiologically controlled areas
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Adherence to Radiation Work Permit (RWP) requirements
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Proper use of respiratory protection equipment I
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Adherence to radiation prc,tection procedures
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Usefof survey meters including personnel frisking techniques
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Cleanliness and housekeeping conditions
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Fire protection measures b.
Measurement Verifications Measurement were independently obtained by the inspector to -
verify.the quality of licensee-performance in the following selected areas.
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' Radioactive material shipping
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Radiological control, radiation and contamination surveys
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Onsite environmental air and water samples and analysis
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No' items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Reactor Building Entries a.
The onsite staff monitored reactor building (RB) entries conducted during the inspection period to verify the following on a sampling basis.
The RB entry was properly planned and coordinated for
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effective task implementation including adequate as low as is reasonably achievable ( ALARA) review, personnel training, and equipment testing.
Proper radiological precautions were planned and implemented
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including the use of a RWP.
Specific procedures were developed for unique tasks and
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properly implemented.
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The onsite staff attended RB entry status meetings, reviewed selected documents, applicable procedures, and RWP's concerning these entries.
Entry Nos. 25, 26, 27, 28. and 29 were conducted on December 15 and 17,1981 and January 5, 7, and 14, 1982', respectively.
The licensee continued to prepare for the gross decontamination experiment by: test borings (surface contamination samples),
installation of an electrical power lift from the 347' elevation to the polar crane, and various other support tasks.
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-4-The start of the gross decontamination experiment, which is a prerequisite activity for polar crane repair and reactor disassembly, has been delayed to February 1982.
The decontamination experiment was originally scheduled to be completed in December 1981.
Delays have been experienced in completing prerequisite activities to support the decontamination experiment.
Specifically, two, 10-inch flanges which are to be installed at both ends of a spare RB penetration to route decontamination water into the RB have not been built due to engineering delays.
It is anticipated that the flanges will be built and installed in time to support the decontamination experiment in February 1982.
The site staff will continue to monitor these preparations.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Radioactive Material Shipnentjs a.
The onsite radiation specialists inspected all raoloactive material shipments during the inspection pec.od to verify the below items:
Licensee had complied with approved packaging and shipping
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procedures; Licensee had prepared shipping papers, which certified
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that the radioactive materials were properly classified, described, packaged, and marked for transport;
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Licensee had applied warning labels to all packages and placarded vehicles; and,
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Licensee controlled the radioactive contamination and dose rates below the regulatory limits, b.
Inspector review in this area consisted of: examination of shipping papers, procedures, packages, and vehicles; and performance of radiation and contamination surveys for each shipment.
During this period,18 radioactive material shipments were made by the licensee.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Licensee Event Reports The inspector reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LER's) required to be submitted in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 6.9.1.3 and.9 (and NUREG-0161) to verify the following:
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-5-Event and cause description clearly reported event information;
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The required LER form was properly completed; and,
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Adequate corrective action was specified.
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Initial screening of these events was completed to determine generic applicability, need for site review, and the necessity for additional NRC management review.
The below listed LER's were reviewed.
LER.81-17/0ll-0 of August 5,1981, Two Emergency Diesel Generators
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inoperable simultaneously LER 81-18/03L-0 of August 9,1981, Fuel Handling Building
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Ventilation System inoperable due to flow switch failure LER 81-20/03L-0 of August 30, 1981, Fuel Handling Building
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HEPA (High Efficiency Particulate Activity) Filter out of service due to excessive loading LER 81-21/03L-0 of September 7,1981, Control Room Ventilation
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System Supply Fan Inlet Damper failed closed due to loose set scred LER 81-22/03L-0 of September 9,1981, Gas partitioner calibration
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not performed within required time interval LER 81-23/0ll-0 (03) of September 11, 1981, Control Building
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Ventilation Charcoal Filters test procedures had less conservative efficiency acceptance criteria
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System (RCS) leakage (0.7 gpm) developed after post modification test of RC-V122, RCS Sample Isolation Valve LER 81-25/03L-0 of September 14, 1981, Fire Barrier Penetration
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Seals found inoperable and were not inspected during last
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required surveillance LER 81-26/03L-0 of September 2,1981, Auxiliary Building
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Ventilation System inoperable due to vortex damper broken control linkage
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LER 81-27/03L-0 of October 7,1981, Fire Barrier Penetration
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seals failed surveillance acceptance criteria
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LER 81-28/0ll-0 of October 14, 1981, Auxiliary Building Ventilation System inoperable due to failed vortex damper control linkage
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LER 81-29/Oll-0 of October 28, 1981, No nitrogen relief protection provided in Submerged Demineralizer System (SDS) dewatering station LER 81-30/0ll-0 of October 30, 1981, Procedures for control of
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certain containment isolation valves not properly approved by NRC
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LER 81-33/01 L-0 of November 13, 1981, The B Steam Generator Level Indication became inoperable due to power supply failure
- Site review conducted, NRC Inspection Report No. 50-320/81-14 No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Fol' wup on Unusual _ Event a.
Sequence of Events At approximately 9:15 AM on January 8,1981, licensee decon-tamination personnel conducted a service air line blowdown.
into the auxiliary building drain system.
The drain system was dry and highly contaminated; the air disturbance apparently caused airborne radioactivity to be discharged from other openings in the drain system.
Local continuous air monitors (CAM's) alarmed in the auxiliary and fuel handling buildings.
At approximately 9:40 AM, these buildings were evacuated until radiological conditions in the area could be defined.
At 9:49 AM HPR-219, one of the ventilation stack monitors, reached the alert setpoint of 150 CPM (counts per minute) on the particulate channel.
This indicated a particulate concentration of 2.8 E-10 uCi/cc and a release rate of approximately 1 uCi/ min.
This is less than 10% of technical specification (TS) limits.
The licensee declared an unusual event at approximately 9:53 AM based on Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure 1054.1, Revision 1, November 25, 1981, Unusual Event, paragraph 3.21
" plant conditions warrant increased awareness".
The alternate stack monitor (HPR-219A) showed no inoications of a release.
The licensee secured from the unusual event at approximately 11 :30 AM.
NRC site staff responded by monitoring events and licensee actions as they occurred.
The staff also responded to media inquiries.
As a result of the equipment problems (noted below) an NRC review of the unusual event was initiated, b.
Scope / Review Licensee activities in response to the unusual event of January 8,1982, were reviewed to assess the following:
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" Event _ description, including date,' time, cause, and
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systems or plant components affected including a sequence of events formulated and reviewed; Safety significance of the event, and compliance with TS
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or other license requirements; Reportability of the event and licensee plans regarding
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a press release; Necessity to notify state or local government officials;
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Amount of radioactivity released; and,
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Proper implementation of selected emergency plan implementing
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procedures.
Observations were made in the control room and on effluent monitor equipment / records, and discussions with cognizant licensee representatives occurred.
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Findings (1) The following problems with plant and control room instrumentation and recorders were observed during and after the unusual event.
The moving filter paper on HPR-219 became inoperable.
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The particulate channel of HPR-219 recorded as
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point No. 24 rather than point No.1 (as it should)
on multipoint recorder No. 4.
T ie multipoint recorder, No. 5, for HPR-228 (auxiliary
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building filter effluent) was out of service.
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HPR-219 and HPR-219A indications were not in agreemen':.
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The problem with multipoint recorder No. 5 was previously identified by the licensee and on December 28,1981, i t was scheduled for repair.
The repairs were completed by January 11, 1982.
The cause of the HPR-219 paper sticking was determined to be a broken spring on the takeup reel.
This was also repaired by January 11, 1982.
The recording of HPR-219 particulate activity (recorder No. 4) on the wrong point number was due to apparent mechanical slippage
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of. a rotating wheel.
This area will be reviewed in a
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subsequent l inspection (320/81-23-01).
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-8-(2) Instrument readings taken by licensee and NRC personnel during the event, chart recordings, and post event analyses were reviewed.
This review indicated that effluents were less than 10% of technical specification limits.
The monitors which sample the influent to the auxiliary building (AB) ad fuel handling building (FHB) filter trains (HPR-222 and 221 A, respectively) showed increases in particulate activity.
Their count rates remained below 1000 cpm, which corresponds to 1.9 E-9 uCi/cc.
The monitors at the effluent of the AB and FHB filter trains and one of the stack monitors also indicated a rise in particulate activity.
These increases in count rate were smaller and less quantifiable and were on the order of 100 cpm.
This would indicate the possibility of less than desirable performance by the AB and FHB filter trains or bypassing of these filter trains.
The licensee representative indicated that this discrepancy is being reviewed.
This area is unresolved pending further evaluation of the filter train performance by the licensee and subsequent NRC review (320/81-23-02).
(3) The particulate filter papers from the AB efflu?nt monitor and one of the ventilation stack monitors (HPR-219) were removed and analyzed at the licensee's site counting facility after the monitors. indicated a release.
Analysis results indicated approximately 50 uCi were released.
The other ventilation stack monitor (HPR-219A) did not show an increase in activity during the event.
The filter paper from HPR-219A was analyzed in the licensee's 5.ite counting facility; the results were an order of magnitude less than HPR-219.
There are several differences between the monitors including location, sampling flowrate, s
and fixed versus moving filter paper.
The licensee representative indicated that further filter analysis and evaluation of the difference in readings of HPR-219 and HPR-219A will be conducted.
This is unresolved pending completion of action by the licensee as stated above and subsequent NRC review (320/81-23-03).
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Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) Leak a.
Sequence of Events On January 12, 1982 at approximately 9:00 AM, a chemistry technician attempted to obtain a weekly BWST sample.
No water came out of the sample point (DH-IV-ll and 12).
(The BWST is an outside storage tank.)
That afternoon, a work request was initiated to investigate the sampling problem and a heat lamp was installed in the sampling area due to suspected freezing.
The following morning chemistry personnel again attempted to sample the BWST; again no sample could be obtained.
Electrical maintenance personnel were contacted to check the heat tracing and to manually energize the backup heat tracing at approximately 9:30 AM.
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At approximately 11 :30 AM, a chemistry technician ' returned and again could not obtain a sample.
The chemistry technician continued in his effort to obtain a sample. At approximately 12:30 PM, the ~ chemistry technician; found water leaking in a cabinet located approximately 15 feet from the normal sample cabinet.- The weekly. BWST sample was obtained from the leaking water and the leak was stopped'by closing a sample isolation val ve (DH-lV-29).
Freezirg temperatures existed at the time of this event.
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Scope / Review
Although no emergency level classification occurred for this event, the inspector initiated a review to determine the cause of the leak and to determine the extent of contamination in the area around the BWST.
Observations were made around the BWST area and discussions occurred with cognizant licensee representati ves.
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Findings The cause of the leak was apparently a break in the line due 6 freezing.
There are two heat tracing systems for the BWST a;d associated piping, a primary and a secondary system.
At the time of the inspection, it was not clear why the heat
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tracing system did not operate properly to keep the sample line from freezing.
The licensee representative indicated that an internal report on this event will be issued.
This area is unresolved pending the licensee's issuance of the subject report and NRC review of the ~11censee's analysis of this event (320/81-23-04).
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Unresolved Items
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Unresolved items are findings about which more information is
needed to ascertain whether it is an item of noncompliance, a deviation, or acceptable.
Unresolved items disclosed during this inspection'are discussed in paragraphs 7.c(2), (3) and 8.c.
10.
Exit Interview
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On January 19, 1982, a meeting was held with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
In addition to the reporting inspectors, other NRC personnel in attendance are noted below.
L. Barrett, Deputy Program Director, NRC TMI Program Office
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A. Fasano, Chief, Three Mile Island Section, Projects Branch No. 2
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