IR 05000320/1981012
| ML20010H368 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/27/1981 |
| From: | Ronald Bellamy, Conte R, Fasano A, Forgie B, Oneill B, Joel Wiebe NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20010H357 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-320-81-12, NUDOCS 8109240392 | |
| Download: ML20010H368 (17) | |
Text
f U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (See page 2 for 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT TERA Document t
Control Numbers)
Region I Report No.
50-320/Rl-12 Docket No.
50-320 Category c
License No.
DPR-73 Priority
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Licensee:
Metropolitan Edison Company P.O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Facility Name: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Inspection at: Middletown, 'ennsylvania Inspection conducted: June 14,1981 - July 29,1981 Inspectors:
k edC 6 L7 F)
R. Conte',' Senior Resident Inspector (TMI-2)
date signed
&~ oda0 kb/
B. O'Nei/ll, Rydiatfon Specialist date s~igned Accompanied by:
h ou2o/3. M A y 27h/
B. [orgie, Reactor Injpector d&te ' signed
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ummer Technical lntern
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O 87
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J.
He~be, Nuclear Engineer dyte s4gned N C TMI Program Office k,0. N N(uwt P / Z 7 /8 /
R. Bellamy, Chief, Technical Support Section date signed NRC TMI Program Office Approved by: b htWh 87d27/cP[
A. Fasano, Chief, Three Mile Island Resident date 'si gned r
Section, PB#2
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on June 14 - July 29,1981 (Inspection Report No. 50-320/81-12)
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of licensee actions on previous-inspection findings; plant operations; reactor building entries; Submerged Demineralizer System (SDS); licensee event reports (in-office review);
radioactive material shipments; and routine health physics / environmental areas.
Staff members of the Technical Support Section reviewed reactor building entries and the SDS.
The inspection involved 199 inspector-hours by 2 resident inspectors.
8109240392 810901' ~
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-2-Resul ts : Of the seven areas reviewed, four items of noncompliance were identified in one area (failure to properly control drawings, paragraph 5,c(1); failure to properly implement SDS procedures, paragraph 5.c(2); failure to properly change procedures, paragraph 5.c(3); failure to properly control pr6cedures/instruccions, paragraph 5.c(4)).
TERA Document Control Numbers 50-320-80-11-10
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50-320-80-11-13 50-320-80-11-17 (two events)
50-320-80-11-27
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50-320-80-12-12 50-320-80-12-17 50-320-80-12-26 i
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53-320-81-01-26 50-320-81-02-02 50-320-81-03-28 50-320-81-02-07 50-320-81-02-26 50-320-81-03-11 i
50-320-81-04-16 50-320-81-04-20 i
50-320-81- 04-22 50-320-81 '4-23 50-320-81-05-07 50-320-81-05-08
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50-320-81-06-13 i
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted General Public Utilities Nuclear Group
- S. Chaplin, Nuclear Licensing Engineer
- J. Chwastyk, Manager - Plant Operations (TMI-2)
W. Craft, Deputy Radiological Field Operations Manager (TMI-2)
B. Della Loggia, Radiological Engineer (TMI-2)
- J. Garrison, Quality Assurance Engineer (Assistant Senior III)
E. Hemmila, Shift Foreman (TMI-2)
M. Herlihy, Manager TMI-2 Starcup and Test R. Hoyt, Shift Foreman (TMI-2)
- L. King, Plant Operations Director (TMI-2)
H. McGovern, Shift Foreman (TMI-2)
- R. Parks, Senior Startup Engineer
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- M. Pastor, Rec.very Programs Director
- T. Rekart, Project Engineer (Submerged Deminerlizer System)
- P. Ruhter, Radiological Support Manager (TMI-2)
- B. Slone, Operations Engineer (TMI-2)
Tri-State Industries E. Juteau, Manager Tri-State Industries Mobile Laundr" Bechtel Northern ' Corporation
- 0. Machiela, Engineer (Containment Assessment Group)
NRC TMI Program Office t
- L. Barrett, Deputy Program Director
- R. Bellamy, Chief, Technical Support Section
- J. Wiebe, Nuclear Engineer Other members of the operations, engineering, radiological controls, quality assurance and administrative staffs were also interviewed.
- denotes those present at exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action On Previous Inspection Findings (0 pen) Noncompliance (320/79-20-06):
Failure to properly control drawings.
Recurrent examples of certain aspects of the noncompli-ance were noted during this inspection (paragraph 5.c(1)).
Discussion with licensee rep.esentatives indicated that a problem continues to exist in the updating and use of as-built drawings.
Resolution of a licensee quality assurance audit finding in 1979 (Audit Finding No. 79-04-03) continues as indicated in a licensee internal memorandum dated May 1,1981 from Records Control Administration to Quality Assurance.
This memorandum notad that a new system for drawing control was to be issued; however, no date was listed.
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-4-As noted in a licensee response letter, dated October 18,1979, to the cited item, measures to prevent recurrence included procedure revision in this area: Administrative Procedure (AP) 1001, Revision 24, dated June 11, 1381, Document Control, was revised; however, it appears from this inspection cthat these measures were not adequate to prevent recurrence.
3.
Plant Operations a.
The resident ir.spector, on a periodic basis, obtained infor-cation on plant conditions, reviewed selected plant parameters for abnomal trends, ascertained plant status from a m.intenance/
modification viewpoint, and assessed logkeeping pract ices in accordance with administrative controls.
The resident inspector made random visits to the control room during the regular and back shift hours, discussed operations with control room parsonnel, reviewed selected control room logs and records, and observed selected licensee plan-of-the-day meetings. A plant tc,ur was conducted to assess housekeeping and fire protection measures.
Selected key evolutions were reviewed by the NRC onsite staff as denoted in paragraphs 4 and 5.
i b.
During observations made in the control room on July 2,1981 the inspector noted that drawing JRW 050280, dated October 12, 1979, Standby Pressure Control (SPC) System, was posted by the SPC panel and was marked with a red stamp "For Information Only".
According to the licensee's Quality Assurance Plan such drawings are not updated, and therefore, are not to be used for plant operations.
Other drawing discrepancie: were noted at the Submerged Deaineralizer System area and are descr*~ id in paragraph 5.c(2).
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The onsite staff reviewed tha implementation of selected (
sections of AP 1012, Revision 11, May 28,1981, Shift Relief l
and Log Entries, to verify the below listed items.
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Legible log entries with identification to the responsible
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operator / shift foreman Annotation and clear description of significant changes
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in plant status including major equipment out of service,
I and return to service, entered technical specification l
action statements, and/or violations l
Recording of major evolution / events such as liquid / gas l
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processes or releases from the site Recording of test start and completion times and indication
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of test disposition
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-5-On July 24. 1981 the Shift Foreman's Logbook for the period May 29 - July 24,1981 and the Control Room Operator's logbook for the period May 29 - July 24,1981 were reviewed.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Reactor Building Entries a.
The onsite staff monitored Reactor Building (RB) entries conducted during the inspection period to verify the following on a sampling basis.
The entry was properly planned and coordinated for
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effective task implementation including adequate as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) review, personnel training, and equipment testing Proper radiological precautions were planned and implemented
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including the use of a Radiation Work Permit (RWi; Specific 7rocedures were developed for unique tasks and
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proper'., implemented b.
The following entries were conducted by the licensee: Entry No.12 on June 25, 1981; Entry No.13 on July 1,1981; and Entry No.14 on July 23, 1981.
During -Entry No.12 the licensee accomplished the below listed items.
Lighting circuit repairs and installation of lights in
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the enclosed stairwell Intercom and closed circuit television repairs
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Smear surveys and : ump water samples
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During Entry No.13 the licensee completed the inspection of j
the Unit 2 RB polar crane.
I During Entry No.14 the licensee =- omplished the below listed items.
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Installation of two radiation area monitors Removal of the Core Flood Tank "B" Transducers
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Maintenance of the closed circuit TV system, and miscellaneous sample collections
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-6-Radiation survey of the shallow end of the refueling pool
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Photographs of air cooler equipment
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The onsite staff attended RB entry status meetings, reviewed selected documents, applicable procedures and RWP's.
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During Entry No, i3, four men spent 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> in the RB conducting assigned tasks on the polar crane.
Upon exiting the RB, the entry team underwent routu.e " frisking" for radioactive contamination.
Contamination was found on the skin of all four individuals.
The primary areas of contamination included the buttocks, elbows, and knees.
Personnel decontamination procedures were initiated and after several hours, three of the four individuals were decontaminated.
The buttock of the fourth individual was not completely decontaminated until the following day.
Radio:ogical Investigative Report (RIR) No.81-028 was initiated by the. licensee regarding the contamination incident. Because consultant medical assistance and advice was requested, the licensee made a 10 CFR 50.72 report to the NRC Operations Conter on July 1,1981.
It was determined that the skin contamination apparently resulted from climbing on contaminated crane surfaces in perspiration soaked protective clothing.
Following several instances of personnel exhaustion during RB entries, the licensee on this entry relaxed the criteria for use of plastic protective clothing in the RB to reduce fatigue; and therefore, i
members of the crane inspection team were wearing only two
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sets of protective clothing.
The outer layer of protective clothing was advertised by the manufacturer as water impermeable.
The same type of protective clothing had been worn during the initial climb on the crane with no instances of skin contamination.
The second crane climb was physically more demanding, and all team members exited from the RB exhausted with the inner layer of protective clothing completely soaked.
The resident inspector conducted a review of the contamination incident; the licensee investigation; the corrective measures recommended as a result of RIR No.81-028, and the Unit 2 Radiological Control Procedure 4170, Revision 1, dated December 23, 1980, Decontamination of Personnel.
The inspector acknowledged the licensee's concles kn that the cause of the contamination incident was due to the reduced ability of the special protective clothing to prevent spread of contamination.
In RIR No.81-028, the licensee stated that
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-7-in the future two new sets of coveralls, with increased padding or sleevings to increase protection of pivot points, will be used by all personnel attempting demanding tasks in the RB.
During the course of the NRC review of the July 1,1981 contamination incident, licensee radiological controls personnel i
stated that they had identified and carrected inventory shortages discovered on the day of the incident, the inventory shortages involved suggested decontamination reagents contained in the Unit 2 Personnel Decontamination Locker, and decontamination reagents maintained by the onsite medical personnel.
i The resident inspector later verified that an adequate supply of decontamination material and reagents was on hand at Unit 2 No items of noncompliance were identified.
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5.
Subme.ged Demineralizer System Onsite staff review of the Submerged Demineralizer System (SDS)
preoperational testing, and operation phases continued in specific areas addressed below, a.
Training Program for SDS During this period the audit of operator training for the SDS system was completed.
The review consisted of selected training session observations and selected operator interviews to assess operator knowledge of the SDS.
Programmatic review of training was conducted during the previous inspection period.
Based on the above review, it appears that operators have sufficient knowledge of the SDS and its function to sa feif operate the system.
b.
Startup and Test Program for SDS The resident inspector continuec the review of implementation aspects of the Startup and Test Frogram for the SDS with particular emphasis on the cont v,1 of problem. areas identified
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during test conditions, such a-failures to meet test acceptance criteria. Selected sections of the following program documents were reviewed.
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Administrative Procedure (AP) 1047, Revision 0, January 26, 1981,
-tup and Test Manual
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AP 1043, Revision 0, January 15, 1981, Work Authorization Procedure
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-8-Test Instruction (TI) No.1, Revision 0, March 18,1981,
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Test Procedure Documents
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TI No. 2, Revision 0, March 18,1981, Test Index
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TI No. 3, Revision 0, February 23, 1981, Conduct of Test's
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TI No. 7, Revision 0, March 17,1981, Startup Problem Reports Selected test data for the below listed test procedures were also reviewed.
Special Operating Procedure (S0P) R-2-81-21, dated May 1,1981,
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SDS Leakage Containment Functional Test (Revision 1), for test performed June 27, 1981
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SOP R-2-81-23, dated May 1,1981, SDS Monitor Tank System Functional Test, for test performed May 13-14, 1981 S0P R-2-81-16, dated Ap'ril 20, 1981, SDS Process Flow
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Functional Test, for test performed on May 6,1981
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f,DS-34, Revision 0, SDS Post Filter Piping System (Hydrostatic Test Method), for test performed May 28, 1981 S0P., 2-81-36, dated June 26, 1981, SDS Process Flow
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Fu1ctional Test, for test performed on July 2-3, 1981 S0P R-2-81-35, dated June 26, 1981, SDS Filtration System
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Flow Functional Test, for test performed on June 28, 1981 Monitor Tank Level Calibration Data (SDS-LTl and 3), for
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test performed on April 21,1981 During this review, the resident inspector observed on July 2,1981, the inability of chemistry technicians to draw an effluent sample from a point downstream of the SDS Leakage Containment (LC) System Ion Exchangers (Effluent Sample).
Further inspector
review in this area revealed that startup and test personne:
l also had a similar problem in drawing the effluent sample.
Apparently fluid turbulence at the sample point caused a low
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pressure area to exist with respect to atmospheric pressure
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and air was drawn into the sample line which caused air / water mixture discharge at a point further downstream (LC return to the fuel pool).
Startup and test personnel did obtain an effluent saaple to satisfy the test criteria, but only by altering the sample valve lineup to reduce fluid turbulence.
This technique, however, was not incorporated into the sampling
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procedure.
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As a result of this, the inspector reviewed the licensee system for handling startup and test discrepancies. The major controls that exist are problem reports, exception / deficiency reports, turnover packages, and action item lists for the correction / evaluation of discrepancies on test procedural implementation. The inspector observed the use of these mechanisms for other SDS tests / components.
Previous inspet.tions also nott.d licensee progress in the overall control of the transfer of recovery systems from the preoperational status through the startup and test phase, to the operations mode (Office of Inspection and Enforcement Inspection Report Nos. 50-320/81-04 and 81-08).
The licensee acknowledged that the effluent sample problem was to be formally identified for appropriate hardware / procedural
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corrective action.
The licensee later modified the system to preclude _ any special valve alignment (or an LC effluent sample.
The inspector concluded that the effluent sample problem was an isolateo case and not symptomatic of a programmatic deficiency.
The inspector had no further comments in this area.
c.
SDS Operations During the periods June 30 - July 2,1981, and July 9-17, 1981, j
the onsite staff, with assistance from NRC personnel, TMI Program Office, Bethesda, monitored the initial use of the SDS
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system for the transfer and processing of Reactor Coolant Bleed Tank Water (radioective concentration of approx!mately 1 uCi/ml).
This processing was in preparation for the processbg of Reactor Building Sump / Basement Water (approximately 150 uCi/ml).
NRC personnel worked shifts and verified the below listed items.
Licensee proper implementation of SDS operating procedures l
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revision / changes l
Assess the performance of the SDS system to adequately
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process radioactive water During the review, observations were made concerning operator actions and implementation of various procedures associated with the SDS. As a result of this review, four apparent items of noncompliance were identified and are addressed belog.
(1) Between June 30
. July '2,1981 the below listed observations by a resident inspector were made around the SDS (fuel)
pool area and in the centrol room with respect to drawing control.
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On July 2,1981, Revision 4, dated June 4,1981 and Revision 5, dated June 18, 1981 to the same drawing JS 082080, Submerged Demineralizer System, were posted at the SDS pool area.
Revision 5 had an
"Information Only" stamp on it which meant it should not be used for plant operation since it would not be k2pt updated per Quality Assurance Plan (QAP).
Section 3.2.2.
Revision 4 was not marked and was referenced by operators during a valve alignment for a sampling evolution of Reactor Coolant Bleed Holdup Tank (RCBHT) water being transferred to the SDS Feed Tank. Minor differences existed between Revision 4 and 5; none affected the section referenced by the operators.
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On July 2,1981, SDS Vessel Status Map, JS 042781, (not dated) was also marked " Records /Information Only-Not for Construction", implying that it too, would not be updated.
It was posted at the SDS pool area.
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In the control room on July 1,1981, drawing JRW 052080, dated October 12, 1979, Standby Pressure Control (SPC)
System was also marked "Information Only" and ws posted near the SPC operating panel.
Further discussion with licensee representatives indicated that many of these "Information Only" drawings incorporated the latest system information in light of the numerous modifications to the systems during the recovery effort.
At the close of the inspection, JS 082080 drawings were
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removed.
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The resident inspector acknowledged the above, but indicated that the posted drawings were not controlled.
Speci fically, these drawings were not under a formal system of document issuance with periodic updating and/or referencing to other documents to adequately reflect as-built conditions.
The instances of failure to control drawings represent apparent noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VI; NRC Approved QAP, Section 3.1.2, first paragraph f; AP 1001, Enclosure 11, Section 5.1 (320/81-12-01).
(2) The resident inspector noted two instances where procedures were not properly implemented.
Operating Procedure (0P) 2104-8.0, Revision 1, July 9,1981, SDS Operational Guidelines, paragraph 3.11, required that the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) truck bay (roll up) door be closed except when it was required to be open for movement of materials /
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-11-equipment in or out of the FHB.
(Revision 0, dated June 28,1981, to this procedure also roficcts this requirement.) On June 30, 1981 at approximately 10:00 PM, the truck bay door was found to be open by a resident inspector. No material / equipment movements were in progress.
The licensee representative shut the door-upon identification by the resident inspector, and a security guard was posted at the door.
On July 16, 1981, at approximately 2:00 AM, area radiation monitor, CN-RIT-IX-03, for the SDS pool area was taken out of service for troubleshooting a spurious alarm on another process radiation monitor.
This was contrary to OP 2104-8.15, Revison 0, July 9,1981, SDS Submerged Ion Exchanger (IX) System Operation Using 'IX IA or IX 1 A&B Only, paragraph 3.4 which required that CN-RIT-IX-03 be operational as a prerequisite to SDS processing of radioactive water. SDS processing was not stopped.
The monitor was restored to service prior to the end of the shift subsequent to further questioning by the resident ins pector.
These examples of failure to properl.y implement procedures represent an apparent noncompliance with Technical Speci-fication 6.8.1 ; OP 2104-8.0, paragraph 3.11 ; OP 2104-8.15, paragraph 3.4 (320/81-12-02).
(3)
During this review, two instances were noted on failure to properly change a procedure.
On July 1,1981, resident inspector review of the Shift Foreman's Logbook indicated that on June 30,1981 at 11:27 PM, a " deviation" occurred from OP E.o,-4.123, Revision 0, June 26,1981, Transferring RCBHT's to Tank Farm (Fuel Pool Waste Storage Tanks or SDS Feed Tanks) paragraph 4.1.4.
The " deviation" was that flow could not be observed on WDL-FR-3117 for the water transfer because the recorder was out of service.
Other indication was used to verify fluid transfer. The procedure was not fonnally changed in accordance with AP 1001, to include the measures actually used to verify fluid transfer when the recorder was not in service.
On July 2,1981, during the 11:00 PM - 7:00 AM shift, the resident inspector observed that no operator was stationed at the Radwaste Panel as required by paragraph 4.1.6 of OP 2104-4.123 to monitor RCBHT level and pressure.
Review of the Shift Foreman's Logbook indicated that at 8:00 PM on July 1,1981 control of RCBHT level and pressure was shifted to the control room due to personnel shortage considerations.
This also was logged as a " deviation" from procedure.
The procedure was not formally changed in accordance with AP 1001
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-i2-The Operations Manager. subsequently reported the log entries were due to one operator's misunderstanding of administrative controls in the procedure adherence area, when dealing with emergency situations.
The above instances were not emergency situations, and it was reported by the licensee representative that the one individual was counseled in this area.
This failure to properly change procedures represents an apparent noncompliance with TS 6.8.2 and 6.8.3.1; AP 1001, forms 1001-3 and 5 (320/81-12-03).
The below listed observations around the SDS (fuel) pool o.
area were made with respect to document control of procedures.
During the 11:00 PM - 7:00 AM shift on July 2,1981,
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the resident inspector noted that Table 1.5.1.3, Calculated Volume vs. Liquid Level - Waste Storage Tanks (WG-T-2A/28/2C/2D) Upper Tanks to OP 2104-4.50, Fuel Pool Waste Storage System, was posted on the east wall of the FHB near the tank level manometer and Heise gage indicator.
Revision 0 was posted while Revision 4, dated January 4,1980 was the effective table.
This indication system was us,ed as backup to the newly installed gage, WG-L1-1 A, for the same set of tanks (redesignated "SDS Feed Tanks").
Further, no substantial change in gage correlation to gallons appeared te have occurred between Revision 0 and Revision 4.
The posted table did not have an indication of controlled status.
The licensee representative removed this posted table after identification by the inspector.
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(gallons vs. inches) for WG-L1-1 A were posted at the SDS Feed Pump control panel, and at the operator's desk.
Both tables dealt with the same gage.
Gie gave more intermediate readings between gage end points.
Neither had indications of being in a controlled status.
The licensee representative removed these tables from the SDS operating area after identification by the inspector.
During the same shift, a procedure for op cating the
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Particulate, Iodine Noble Gas (PING) Process Monitor was placed on the monitor; other copies were at the operator's desk.
This procedure consisted of three handwritten pages,. and it was not properly reviewed and approved by facility management.
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-13-On July 5,1981 the NRC representative observed the
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implementation of OP 2104-8.4, Revision 0, May 1,1981, SDS Monitor Tank, by witnessing the performance of the Appendix A valve lineup.
This particular procedure was not reviewed and approved by NRC onsite staff in accordance with TS 6.8.2.
Apparently these tanks were not to be used during SDS processing of RCBHT water at that time. However, since another RCBHT could not be ' sed as an effluent tank due to residual contamination in the tank, the licensee changed
plans and intended to use the SDS Monitor Tanks as effluent receiving tanks.
The Monitor Tank operating procedure was never reviewed and approved by the onsite NRC staff.
This procedure was sim1:ar to other SDS procedures not to be used for RCEHT processing through SDS since the associated ccinponents would not be operated.
The procedure OP 2104-8.4 was subsegaently approved by NRC on July 7,1981.
Collectively, these failures to control the issuance of procedure / instructions represent noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VI, NRC approved QAP, Section 3.1.2, first paragraph f, and AP 1001, Section 3.2.1 (320/81-12-04).
In-Office Review of Licensee Event Reports The resident inspector reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
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submitted to NRC: Region I to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported, incicding the accuracy of the description of tause, and adequacy of corrective action.
The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic' implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted onsite followup.
l LER 80-51/03L-0, Deficient fire barrier seal was discovered
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during routine observations.
LER 80-52/01L-0, Reactor Building Personnel Airlock No. 2
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inner door seal failed the leak test.
LER 80-53/01L-1, Incore thermocouples, N-8 and N-9, fa led.
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LER 80-54/03L-0, Emergency diesel generator, DF-X-1B, failed
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to start.
LER 80-55/03L-0, Emergency diesel generator, DF-X-1B, failed
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LER 80-So/01L-0, During an evolution to drain the Core Flood Tanks (CFT's), the "A" CFT level instrumentation was found inoperable.
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LER 80-57/03L-0, During surveillance test, the air intake tunnel chlorine monitor was found inoperable,
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LER 80-59/03L-0, The " A" emergency diesel generator, DF-X-1 A, was started during a training exercise but tripped after approximately 9 seconds.
LER 81-02/0ll-0, The "B" emergency diesel generator, DF-X-1 A,
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was inoperable due to cooling water source being isolated.
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LER 81-13/03L-0, The fire protection system deluge valve FS-V-426A failed to operate properly.
LER 81-04/03L-0, Emergency diesel generator, DF-X-18, failed
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to start.
LER 81-05/0ll-0, Incore thermocouple, K-12, began to exhibit
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erratic behavior,
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LER 81-06/03L-0, The " A" emergency diesel generator, DF-X-1 A, started per surveillance requirements and tripped after 15-20 seconds, LER 81-07/OlL-0, Radiatinn monitor ALC-RM-18 in EPICOR-II
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building was taken out of service for mainte ice without shift foreman permission.
LER 81-08/03L-0, While flushing fire system loop, Unit 2
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diesel driven fire pump failed to start.
LER 81-10/0ll-0, Several shift surveillance checks to be
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performed or a shift basis were performed on a daily basis.
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LER 81-ll/0ll-0, The "A" nuclear service water pump was declared inoperable.
l LER 81-12/03L-0, The " A" emergency diesel generator was
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declared inoperable.
This was due to a failed latching
mechanism in the K-1 relay, LER 81-03/0ll-0, Incore thermocouple, L-11, failed.
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LER 81-14/03L-0, Site personnel observed corrosion on battery
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erminals of the Unit 2 fire pump.
The surveillance pro-cedure 3301-R1 had not been rescheduled or performed since l
September 1977, l
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-15-LER 81-15/0ll-0, Control room ventilation monitor alarmed and
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the control rool ventilation system failed to automatically switch to the r. circulation mode.
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Radioactive Material Shipments The resident inspectors inspected all. radioactive material shipments during the inspection period to verify the below items.
Licensee had verbatim comoliance with approved packaging and
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shipping procedures Licensee had prepared shipping papers which certified that the
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radioactive materials were properly classified, described, packaged and marked for trar sport
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Licensee had applied warning labels to all packaged and placarded vehicles.
Licensee controlled radioactive contamination and dose rates
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to be within regulatory limits During the inspection period the licensee shipped the following
materials.
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Seven reactor coolant sample shipments to Lynchburg, Virginia Six EPICOR-II 4' x 4' dewatered resin liners to Richland,
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Washingten Two EPICOR-II 6' x 6' dewatered resin liners to Richland,
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Washington Four TMI-l Low Speci fic Activity (LSA) waste and liner snipments
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to Barnwell, South Carolina Three TMI-2 LSA waste shipments to Richland, Washington
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Eight TMI-l Hittman liners containing solidified evaporator
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bottoms to Richland', Wash ngton
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Three laundry shipments to Utica, New York
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Four assorted sample and equipment shipments to Rockville,
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Maryland; Westwood, New Jersey; and Columbia, Maryland Resident inspector review in this area consisted of: review of shipping papers and procedures, examination of packages and vehicles, and performance of a survey of the radiation and contamination levels of each shipment.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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-16-8.
Routine Health Physics and Environmental Revie_w, a.
Plant Tours Resident inspectors completed a general plant inspection tour daily. These inspections included all control points and selected radiologically controlled areas.
Observations included the be"ow areas.
Access control to radiologically controlled areas
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Adherence to RWP requirements
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Proper use of respiratory prote. 'on equipment
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Adherence to Health Physics and Operating procedures
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Use of survey meters including personnel frisking techniques
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Cleanliness and housekeeping conditions
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Fire protection measures
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b.
Measurement Verifications Measurements were independently obtained by the resident inspectors to verify the qJality of licensee performance in the following selected areas.
Radioactive material shipping
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Radiological control, radiation and contamination surveys
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Onsite environmental air and water samples
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c.
A specific area reviewed was the onsite laundry facility operated by Tri-State Industrial Laundries.
Inspections were conducted on June 29, 1981 and July 28, 1981.
These inspections verified completion of corrective measures to problems identified during licensee internai audits conducted between May 25 and June 5,1981 by Radiological Control Assessment.
The resident inspectors reviewed new monitoring equipment which was installed to perform the final radiation surveys of cleaned protective clothing.
The licensee audit findings had dealt primarily with improved sensitivity to survey equipment, and operating procedural requi rements.
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-17-At the close of the inspection period, OP 2104-4.70, Special Maintenance Procedtre for the Mobile Laundry, was being revised to reflect the audit finding corrective actions.
This area is unresolved pending completion of licensee and NRC review of the revision to OP 2104-4.70 (320/81-12-05).
9.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are findings about which more information is needed to ascertain whether it is an item of noncompliance, la deviation, or acceptable. Unresolved items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 8.c.
10.
Exit Interviews G1 June 17,1981 a meeting was held with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) to discuss the inspection scope and finoings.
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