IR 05000320/1981010
| ML20009E385 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/01/1981 |
| From: | Ronald Bellamy, Conte R, Fasano A, Gage L, Moslak T, Oneill B, Joel Wiebe NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009E381 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-320-81-10, NUDOCS 8107280119 | |
| Download: ML20009E385 (14) | |
Text
-
.
,
50-320-80-08-22 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 50-320-01-06-13 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No.
50-320/81-10 Docket No.
50-320 Category c
License No.
DPR-73 Priority
--
Licensee:
Metropolitan Edison Company P.O. Box 480 Middletown, Penn_sylvania 17057_
Facility Name: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Inspection at: Middletown, Pennsylvania Inspection conducted: May 3 - June 13,1981 Inspecto A
n
i R)
.
R.
nio~ R id nt Inspector (TMI-2)
date signed 7/I / Rl a
,
c T. Moslar, Radiation pen alist bete / sighed A*/ b thAl B. '0' Ne/ l l,
diafionSpecialist dhte signed 7///h Accompanied by:
/
v i
L. Gage, Engineer, NRC TMI Program Office date signed
!
L1 MJ4b 9hh/
, Wiebe, Engineer, NRC TMI Program Office ddt6 signed
'
V$.h Whbwu Y/)f)
j R. Bellamy, Chief, TecMical Support Section, date Signed
'
C TMI Program Office Approved by:
a.4 G Y
fI A. Fasano, Chief, Three Mile Island Resident date signed Section, Projects Branch #2 8107280119 810710 PDR ADOCK 05000320
. _
-
.
-2-Inspection Summary:
Inspection on May 3 - June 16,1981 (Inspection Report No. 50-320/81-10)
Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings; plant operations; emergency planning (training session / drill; reactor building entries; licensee eventin-office r reports of annulus area; radioactive material shipments; routine health physics and environmental areas and the submerged demineralize, system.
Staff members of the Technical Support Section, NRC TMI Program Office reviewed licensee action on previous inspection findings and the submerged demineralizer system.
The inspection involved 54 inspector-hours by 3 resident inspectors and 44 staff-hours by two engineers.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.
I
,. -
__,
...,__.~___,s
_ _ _ _, _, _ _ _. _.. _, _. -, _ -.,, _. _.,
_ _ _ _. _ _.,. -,. -. _,,.... _ _ - _., _. _. _ _, _ _,
- _ _ _..,
_. _
.
...
...
-
-
-.-
-
--
-
.
.
,
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted General Public Utilities Nuclear Group J
- J. Barton, Director, Site Operations TMI-2
- J. Brasher, Radiological Controls Director TMI-2
- S. Chaplin, Nuclear Licensing Engineer
,
J. Chwastyk, Manager Plant Operation W. Craft, Deputy Manager Radiological Control Field Operations G. Hovey, Vice President TMI-2
- L. King, Plant Operations Directon G. Kunder, Supervisor Technical Soecification Compliance
,
- J. Marsden, Unit 2 Project Coordination, Quality Assurance W. Marshall, Operations Engineer
.
- M. Pastor, Recovery Programs Director
- J. Potter, Engineer Assistant Senior III, Quality Assurance P. Ruhter, Manager Radiological Technical Support
!
B. Sloan, Operations Engineer B. Smith, Shift Supervisor W. Wattson, Radiological Engineer M. Williams, Radiological Engineer EG&G C. McIssac, Engineer Bechtel Northern Corporation T. Fritz, Senior Engineer (Entry Coordinator)
- T. Morris, Supervisor Data Acquisition
- R. Rider, Project Engineer i
NRC TMI Program Office l
- L. Barrett, Acting Deputy Program Director
- J. Wiebe, Engineer, Technical Support Section Other members of the operations, engineering, radiological controls, quality assurance and administrative staffs were also interviewed.
- denotes those present at exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Deviation (320/80-12-02): Lack of weld procedure speci-fications (WPS) at the vicinity of work for the submerged demineralizer system (SDS).
The licensee instituted a practice of utilizing WPS's at the job site.
Further,a revision to GP 3803, Weld History Records, incorporates requirements that all work packages, work permits and work authorization notices submitted to the field to
initiate welding will include the WPS for review and utilization at the work location.
Further,it cas determined that the licensee intends to replace GP 3803 by AP 1042 and continue the use of the above requirements.
.
l
--w-..-r-,r,-,w.
- ,.. - - - -,
,,.rr+***-e c--7--=--'wwe-*---*-+-m-'e=verv
-
-t'~ww*a----ne'wusm-N-
- -
+++r+-
-e----+--*
- - - - * * * - +-
-*-+=e*'"-'--*
- __ _-.
.
-
.. _ _
- _ _
.
-
-
-
. _ _
.
.
--
.
.
.!
-4-Additional details in this area are documented in Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) Inspection Report No. 50-320/81-07, paragraphs 2
.
and 3.
(Closed) Unresolved (320/80-12-03): Adequacy of inspection of
'
in-process welding activities on the SDS pending further NRC:I review.
IE Report No. 320/81-07, paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 documents NRC:I additional review in this area.
(Closed) Unresolved (320/81-01-01): SDS system design, procedures and operator training was to be further reviewed by the onsite NRC staff. The additional review was conducted during this inspection period. These areas are addressed in paragraph 10.
(Closed) Unresolnd (320/81-07-01): Licensee to Document Justi-fication for SDS Non-Seismic Desig'n.
The licensee documented in an internal report (Memorandum TMI-II-R-20852, dated April 14,1981)
the effect of a seismic impact due to components of the SDS in A or B Fuel Pools with respect to weight considerations of SDS components
.
in both pools.
The analysis concludes that the construction of the SDS components in A and B Fuel Pools has n) adverse effect on the seismic analysis
>
for the Fuel Pool and the Fuel Handling Building based on a weight comparison of normal (fuel and water) versus SDS components.
,
Resolution of findings warranting further review are listed below.
I i
Rubber tubing was used in lieu of metallic tubing for SDS Off-
--
Gas System flow indicator RI-527-18 (later re-designated i
FI-VA-17).
The rubber tubing was replaced by metallic tubing l
to within f inches of the instrument as required by Specification 527-J-5001.
This area is considered closed (320/81-05-01).
!
l NRC was to evaluate removal of a check valve in series with
--
butterfly isolation valve for SDS Off-Gas System.
The NRC staff reviewed this area and considered this an acceptable modification to the system.
The potential for release of radioactive material at the suction point to the Off-Gas Fan was evaluated as being unlikely since the system is under vacuum conditions with the Fuel Handling Building (FHB)
Ventilation System in operation.
SDS operation will not. be permitted unless FHB ventilation is operational.
This area is considered closed (320/81-05-02).
The following Quality Assurance (QA) items can be considered closed based on a review of the close-out inspection conducted at TMI-l (Office of Inspection and Enforcement Inspection Report No. 50-289/80-16).
(Closed) Noncompliance (320/79-20-01):
Changes to QA Plan
--
l
I k
.
.
.
...
.
..
.
.
.
..
.
..
.
.
,.
-5-(Closed) Unresolved (320/79-20-02):
Licensee organization
--
(Closed) Unresolved (320/79-20-04):
Connizant engineer signature
--
(Closed) Unresolved (320/79-20-08):.;evision needed to
--
GP 4414 or to the 0QAP (Operational Quality Assurance Plan)
(Closed) Noncompliance (320/79-20-09):
Periodic inspection of
--
warehouses (Closed) Noncompliance (320/79-20-10): Timely corrective
--
action in reference to audit findings The following references are applicable:
(1) Combined IE Inspection Report 50-289/79-16 and 50-320/79-20, (2) IE Inspection Report 50-289/80-16.
Reference (1) is a combined inspection report for TMI-1 and TMI-2; reference (2) is a later inspection report for TMI-i only. The were closed in reference (2)pplicable to both TMI-l and TMI-2, and items identified above are a It was determined that these items
.
could also be closed for TMI-2, due to these QA findings being applicable to the one QA Department that reviews TMI-1 and TMI-2.
3.
Plant Operations a.
The resident inspector, on a periodic basis, obtained information on plant conditions, reviewed selected. plant parameters for abnonnal trends, ascertained plant status from maintenance /-
modification viewpoint, and assessed logkeeping practices in accordance with administrative controls.
The resident inspector made random visits to the control room during the regular and back shift hours, discussed operations with control room personnel, reviewed selected control room logs and records and observed selected licensee plan-of-the-day meetings.
A plant tour was conducted to assess house-keeping and fire protection measures.
Selected key evolutions were reviewed by the NRC onsite staff as denoted in paragraphs 5 and 7.
b.
During the review of outstanding inspection findings (paragraph 2)
associated with the SDS, observations were made at the 347' elevation of the Fuel Handling Building (FHB).
A drawing table with drawing racks nearby was established at the north end of the there and only a few (pproximately 50 drawings were located FHB 347' elevation. A 2 actually observed) had a red stamp indicating approval for contruction use.
In general most of the drawings were marked for information cnly.
l
_ _ _..
- _.
_
_
.
_
_.
-.
_
.
-
.
..
-.
_- --
. - -.
.--.
.
._.
.
- _ -
-
.
.__- -.
-
i
.
,.
,
-6-
!
i Subsequent observation of work activities and discussions with licensee personnel confirmed that information only drawings i
would not be used for construction purposes.
Observation of work at the Processed Water Storage Tank indicated personnel were using a drawing that was approved for construction use and properly marked.
The resident inspector discussed this item with licensee i
management and expressed concern about information only drawings being out at a job site; and therefore, these drawings
could be used for construction if questions came up outside the scope of a job package. The lice _nsee representatives
acknowledged the above and had the drawings removed from the subject location.
'
The inspector had no further coments in this area.
,
4.
Emergency Planning Training Session / Drill On May 12,1981, the resident inspector attended a training session that was a part of a series of lectures for emergency preparedness of essential personnel.
The attended session was Phase "A" of a three phase program on indoctrination and training for site essential and nonessential personnel and local agencies in preparation for the TMI-l Emergency Drill conducted on June 2,1981.
Phase "A" (4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> session) was for essential personnel and the content was on indoctrination in the new terminology and site specific applicability of the new TMI-1 and TMI-2 Emergency Plans.
i
!
l Another aspect to the Phase "A" training was for nonessential
personnel (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> session) which involved a similar indoctrination but not as intense in material.
Phase "B" was for essential personnel and these sessions were specific to emergency position location and function.
Phase "C" involved offsite local agency l
indoctrinations.
These other training aspects were not observed by the inspector.
l The training session on May 12, 1981 for essential personnel was I
conducted in an orderly manner with good participation / discussion l
by the student personnel.
For that aspect of the training it appeared that the training objectives were met in accordance with AP 1054, Revision 0, February 27, 1981, Emergency Plan (TMI-2),
'
'
Section 4.8, " Maintaining Emergency Preparedness."
The inspector had no furthercomments in this area.
On June 2,1981, the onsite NRC staff participated in the TMI-1 Emergency Drill.
The drill was observed concurrently by other NRC personnel headed by Region I staff.
The purpose of the participation was to assist the NRC observers in their functions and also to j
demonstrate the implementation of the onsite NRC staff emergency
' preparedness.
Details of this drill were documented in Office of i
l Inspection and Enforcement Inspection Report 50-289/81-15.
!
. -. - - -. -. -
-.. -
- -
-. -.. -
-
-.
..
.
.
,.
l
.
-7-5.
Reactor Building Entries The onsite staff monitored Reactor Building (RB) entries conducted i
during the inspection period to verify the following on a sampling basis.
The entry was properly planned and coordinated for effective
--
task implementation including adequate as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) review, personnel training, and equipment testing.
Proper radiological precautions were planned and implemented
--
including the use of a Radiation Work Permit (RWP).
Specific procedures were developed for unique tasks and properly
--
implemented.
The following entries were conducted by the licensee: Entry No. 10
'
on May 14, 1981 and Entry No. 11 on May 28, 1981.
i During Entry No.10 the licensee accomplished the below listed items.
Eight samples of RB sump / basement water at various elevations
--
were taken for offsite analysis.
Radiological surveys were performed at the control rod drive
--
structure in preparation for future work in the reactor vessel head area.
A decontamination experiment on a 2,000 foot area was conducted
--
utilizing high and low pressure hot water sprays.
During Entry No.11 the licensee accomplished the below listed items.
Personnel safety equipment for the building polar crane was
--
installed in preparation for crane restoration to operation.
Sump / basement radiological survey was performed with a portable
--
gamma spectrometer.
Visual and radiological surveys in the vicinity of the Pressurizer
--
were conducted.
Hose connections were made up for the. floating sump pump
--
discharge to the submerged demineralizer system (SDS).
An inoperable radiation monitor was replaced.
--
A lighting relay and RB intercom system repair work was performed.
--
.
..
.
.
-.
- - _ - -
-... - -. - - - - -
_
_.
-.
,....- -.
- - - _ -
-
- - - -.. __
-.
_
.
.
..
-
-
- -..
.
.
,
-8-
$
The onsite staff attended RB entry status meetings, reviewed selected documents, applicable procedures and RWP's. Monitoring of each er.try will continue.
6.
In-Office Review of Licensee Event Reports
'
The resident inspector reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
submitted to NRC: Region I to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported, including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action.
The inspector determined
-
whether further information was required from the licensee, whether
<
generic implications were indicated and whether the event warranted
i onsite followup.
LER 80-39/03L-0, (Cable / Transformer Roc.n Halon System bottles failed weight surveillance test). was reviewed during inspection
.
period October 19 - December 6,1980, but documentation of review was inadvertently missed in Office of Inspection and Enforcement
-
Inspection Report No. 50-320/80-17. This documents that review.
i No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Significant Event - Radioactive Water in 281' Elevation of Annulus Area a.
Background'
At approximately 3'00 p.m. on June 12, 1981, an in.fividual was
.
i; found to have skin contamination on the head.
The contamination was measured to be approximately 4,700 disintegrations per minute (DPM).. The contamination resulted while working at the 305' elevation in the annulus area between the south wall of l
the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) and the North wall of the Reactor Building (RB). This event prompted a licensee investigation thinking that the source of contamination was overhead water-leakage.
A second entry later that day into the same area
'
revealed a relatively large puddle of water at the 281' elevation as observed through the 305' floor grating.
At approximately 11:00 p.m., on June 12, 1981, a sample of the puddle water was obtained by lowering a sample bottle from the 305' elevation.
!
Sample results, which became available during the fg}1owing 6.8 uCi/ml Cs 4 ;
indicatedgefollowing(:
mid shift 8.6 x 10-g Ci/ml Csl
,
u
- 3254 ppm parts per million) Boron.
.
Certain shift licensee personnel began to suspect RCS (Reactor
'
'
Coolant System) or RCS support system leakage.
The shift foreman reported the event and sample results to the NRC site representative who was on call at approximately 5:30 a.m., on June 13,1981.
.
Betwaen 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. on June 13, 1981, the licens2e
!
continued the investigation through visual and radiological surveys with the following information provided to the NRC onsite staff members, who had reported to the site by 6:30 a.m.
!
j
.-,--,..-,.,___,~_.--~....,.-.,_,_._,,--mm_..---,,_.,___~~-.-,..m.m.,,,.,~.-,--,__---.,_m_,.,.
_.--
__
_
-
__
__.
-
. _ _
_
.
,.
l
.g.
-
i
<
A grab air sayle at the 305' elevation of the annulus
--
was 1.6 x.10-' uCi/cc.
RCS leakage rate was normal (= 0.1 gpm) with no trend
--
upward.
Plant airborne effluent monitor HP-R-219A read normal and
--
showed no upward. trend.
,
Visual observations at the 305' elevation revealed no
--
active leaks.
,
The puddle was estimated to be 30-50 gallons covering
--
'
a part of the annulus floor.
The closest drain was reported to be outside the annulus door which drains into the Auxiliary Building (AB) Sump.
It appeared no water flowed outside the annulus door.
'
Upon completion of f'1e review the licensee concluded that the water was there for a long period of time (most of the post i
accident period) in light of known rain water inleakage to the annulus compartment and water in the AB as a result of the accident on March 28, 1979.
The NRC resident inspectors responded to this event on Saturday, i
June 13, 1981, and initiated a review as noted below.
l b.
Scope of Review i
Licensee activities in response to the reported event were
,
reviewed to assess the following areas.
Event description, including date, time, cause, and
--
systems or plant components affected including a sequence
of events formulated and reviewed j
Safety significance of the event, and compliance with TS
--
or other license requirements
<
Reportability of the event and licensee plans regarding a
--
,
press release, if applicable
'
Necessity to notify state or local government officials
--
Amount of radioactivity released if applicable
--
c.
Review
In addition to observations made on plant process parameters in the control room and discussions with cognizant licensee representatives, selected portions of the following documents
,
i were reviewed.
!
~ _ _ -. _ _ _. _ _
. -.
.
- -.
_ _ _ _ _,. _
.
-
-.
-
.
.
-.
_-
.
-10-Health Physics Log for the period June 12-13, 1981
--
Radiation Work Permit (RWP) No.1249, dated June 13, 1981,
--
and associated radiation survey data Gama Analysis Suninary Sheets, Chemistry Results, Gross
--
Beta-Gamma / Alpha Data Sheets for samples taken in the annulus area between June 12-13, 1981 d.
Findings The event was determined to be not reportable and it was not necessary to notify local / state government officials. A press release was not issued for the event and no radioactivity was released to the environment.
The resident inspectors agreed with the licensee's conclusion that the water probably accumulated over a long period of time and was not necessarily related to an active and large RCS lealerate. The inspectors had no further comments in this area.
8.
Radioactive Material Shipments The resident inspectors inspected all radioactive material ship-ments during the inspection period to verify the below items.
Licensee had verbatim compliance with approved packaging and
--
shipping procedures.
Licensee had prepared shipping papers which certified that the
--
radioactive materials were properly classified, described, packaged and marked for transport.
Licensee had applied warning labels to all packages and
--
placarded vehicles.
Licensee controlled the radioactive contamination and dose l
--
rates below the regulatory limits.
<
During the inspection period the licensee shipped the following materi al s.
Six reactor coolant sample shipments to Lynchburg, Virginia
--
Six TMI-l solidified evaporator bottom liners to Richland,
'
--
Washington Nine TMI-l solidified evaporator bottom liners to Barnwell,
--
. -
.
-.
.
.
-
--
. - -
-.
-
. - - -.
.-
.
-11-s One EPICOR-II 6' x 6' resin liner (PF-16) by DOE to Battelle
--
Columbus Laboratories, Columbus, Ohio Three EPICOR.I 4' x 4' dewatered resin liners to Richland,
--
Washington Five EPICOR-II 6' x 6' dewatered resin liners to Richland,
--
Washington Two laundry shipments to Utica, New York
--
Four assorted sample shipments and. equipment shipments to
--
Westwood, New Jersey; Madison, Penns. lvania; Alburquerque, New Mexico; and Lusby, Maryland One TMI-l LSA waste shipment to Barnwell, South Carolina
--
Nine TMI-2 reactor building sump samples to EG&G, Idaho Falls,
--
Idaho Resident inspector review in this area consisted of:
review of shipping papers and procedures, examination.of packages and vehicles, and performance of a survey of the radiation and contamination levels of each shipment.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Routine Health Physics and Environmental Review a.
Plant Tours Resident inst ectors completed a general plant inspection tour i
daily. These inspections includad all control points and selected radiologically controlled areas.
Observations included the below area.
Access control to radiologically controlled areas.
--
Adherence to RWP requirements.
--
Proper use of respiratory protection equipment.
--
Adherence to Health Physics and Operating procedures.
--
Use of survey meters including personnel frisking techniques.
--
Cleanliness and housekeeping conditions.
--
Fire protection measures.
--
.
...
-.
--
-___.
-_
_ _
..
..
.
.
-.. -
.
.
,
-12-b.
Measurement Verifications Measurements were independently obtained by the resident inspectors to verify the quality of licensee performance in the following selected areas.
Radioactive material shipping.
--
.
Radiological control, radiation and contamination surveys.
--
Onsite environmental air and water samples (Strontium-90
--
analysis on the East Dike sample sent to Idaho Falls, Idaho during the past inspection period was reported as
,
1.0 + 0.8 E-9 'i/ml.
This is not an abnormal result.)
No items of noncompliance were identified.
,
'
10. Submerged Demineralizer System Review of the submerged demineralir.r system (SDS) continued.
Additional review by the onsite staff as notes in inspection finding 320/81-01-01 was also ac0c.mplished in the following areas:
Training, Procedures and Design.
a.
Training Program for SDS From May 25, 1981, to June 6,1981, selected portions of the operator training program for the SDS operation were reviewed by the Technical Support staff to ascertain the depth and quality of information presented to the operators and ascertain the level of knowledge of personnel in charge of shift activities.
i Observations were made in the below areas.
Classroom training for control room operator / auxiliary
--
operators, health physics technicians, and chemistry technicians Practical training for control room operators
--
Practical training for chemistry technicians
--
i l
Selected portions of the below documents were reviewed.
t SDS Radiochemistry Training Program
--
Process Operator Qualification Sheet for the SDS System
--
SDS Course Outline (for health physics technicians)
--
SDS Training Program for Operators
--
!
L
-
.
-13-Auditioral review in this area will continue with operator interviews.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
b.
SDS Operating Procedures The below listed SDS procedures were submitted for approval to the NRC onsite staff.
The NRC staff reviewed these procedures l' ascertain quality of the procedure with respect to technical adequacy and human factors considerations.
2104-8.6, Cation Vessel Replacement (Procedure Change
--
Request PCR No. 281-637)
2104-8.8, Leakage Containment Vessel Replacement (PCR 2-81-636)
--
Staff coments on these two procedures were as noted below.
Verbatim compliance with the procedures would not result
--
in the desired evalution due to valve lineup errors.
In some steps inadequate information was given to the
--
operator to conduct the desired evolution.
Verbatim compliance with the procedure could result in
--
spread of radioactivity to non-contaminated equipment.
Implementation of these procedures would result in
--
similar evolutions not being performed in the same manner or sequence such as various vessel dewatering evolutions.
As a result of these coments a meeting with licensee representatives occurred on June 9,1981, to discuss these discrepancies.
The licerisee representative acknowledged the above and indicated l
that a review would occur on the subject procedures and the
'
generic ideas from the staff coments would be incorporated into other SDS procedures.
At the close of the inspection the licensee was in the process of reviewing the SDS procedures.
Therefore,this area is unresolved pending completion of action as stated above by the licensee representative and subsequent NRC approval of SDS operating procedures (320/81-10-01).
c.
SDS Instrumentation Design / Construction
,
Previous review in this area questioned the non-use of analog instrumentation on the SDS and the adequacy of the use of polyethelyne instrument tubing rather than rigid instrument tubing in the leakage containment system flow detection manometers.
-
. -
-.
.
- -.
,
..
.... - - -. -
.. _.
_ _.
-14-
,-
,
.
The flow detection manometers are made of a rigid polyethelyne instrunent tubing and this was evaluated as acceptable for use
in the SDS by the NRC steff.
System design including instrumentation was evaluated as being in accordance with applicable reguletory guides for liquid radioactive waste system as noted in the draft NRC Safety Evaluation for the SDS (later issued on June 18,1981).
Licensee monitoring of SDS instrumentation including hourly log readings and overall process control administration is being evaluated by the NRC staff as part of the final approval
,
l of procedures required by (proposed) Technical Specifications
!
6.8.2.
Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) Inspection Report No. 50-320/81-05, paragraphs 4.b(1) and (2) documented cases of instrument tubing not properly secured and radiation i
instruments not properly labeled. The inspector verified that the specific. items listed in this report were corrected and during these observations no ir. stances were noted where similar problems existed except in paragraph 8.d below.
d.
Miscellaneous Items IE Inspection Report No. 50-320/81-04, paragraph 4 documented several outstanding questions for later resolution.
IE Inspection Report No. 50-320/81-11 docuants the resolution of
,
these items with the exception of the noted items below.
The procedure for handling a loss of station power in tenns of
placing the SDS in a safe shutdown condition remains to be
reviewed. The applicable emergency procedure will be submitted for approval to the onsite staff in accordance with TS 6.8.2.
In addition the system still needs labels for valve / reach rod position indications and flow charts / diagrams as aides for the operator. The licensee representative indicated that the
,
labels were in order. The inspector noted progress in getting certain labels installed.
j This area is unresolved pending completion of action as noted j
above by the licensee representative and final NRC walkdown of j
the system to support SDS operations (320/81-10-02).
11. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are findings above which more infonnation is needed to ascertain whether it is an item of noncompliance, a deviation, or acceptable.
Unresolved items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 10.b and 10.d.
12.
Exit Interviews
-
On June 17, 1981, a meeting was held with; licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
-~
.
-
..
..
.
.
-
.