IR 05000278/1985032

Insp Rept 50-278/85-32 on 850909-13.Violations Noted:Failure to Implement QA Program Requirements for Independent QC Insps & Failure to Follow Approved Upper Tie Plate Removal Procedures

ML20198C283
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	10/17/1985
From:	Jerrica Johnson, Kucharski S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198C255	List: IR 05000278/1985032 ML20198C247 ML20198C264
References
50-278-85-32, NUDOCS 8511120041
Download: ML20198C283 (5)

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s U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No. 50-278/85-32 Docket N License N DPR-56 Licensee: Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 Facility Name: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 3 Inspection At: Delta, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: September 9-13, 1985 Inspector: *

S. Kuch&rski, Reactor Engineer

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' date Approved by: *

f J. Uohnson,' Chief, date Operational Programs Section, 08, DRS Inspection Summary: Inspection on September 9-13, 1985 (Report No. 50-278/85-32)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of fuel reconstitution activities, which included review of the fuel handling procedures, QA/QC involve-ment, HP involvement, and general tours of the facility. The inspection involved 41 hours4.74537e-4 days <br />0.0114 hours <br />6.779101e-5 weeks <br />1.56005e-5 months <br /> onsite by one region based inspecto Results: Two violations were identified (failure to implement QA program requirements for independent QC inspections, paragraph 2.4; and failure to follow approved procedures, paragraphs 3 and 5).

8511120041

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f DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted 1.1 Philadelphia Electric Company (PECO)

• J. T. Budzynski, Reactor Engineer

• R. S. Fleirchmann, Plant Manager A. Fulvio, 16;haical Engineer

• C. A. Mengus, General Supervisor, QA

- Sattler, Engineer

• D. C. Smith, Superintendent of Operations

• W. A. Teater, General Supervisor, QC

• J. T. Wilson, Site Supervisor, QA 1.2 General Electric C. M. Berry, QC Inspector M. L. Burton, QC Inspector

• J. Kasik, Engineer, Supervisor F. Strumpf, QC Inspector R. Swanson, QC Inspector 1.3 Catalytic In V. Dent, QC Inspector 1.4 NRC

• T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector

• Denotes those present at the exit meeting on September 13, 1985.

2.0 Fuel Reconstitution Effort 2.1 Documents Reviewed

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FH-5 Appendix A, Radiation Protection Criteria, Revision 8, 02/04/80

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FH-6C, Fuel Movement and Core Alterations Procedure Ouring a Fuel Handling Outage, Revision 18, 07/02/85

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FH-26, Sipping, Revision 3, 01/10/84

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FH-35, Fuel Pool Accountability, Revision 4, 12/02/82

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FH-59, Fuel Assembly Rechanneling, Revision 1, 11/29/84

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FH-61, Fuel Bundle Upper Tie Plate Removal / Replacement and Individual Rod Handling, Revision 0, 11/29/84

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FH-GE-9, Peach Bottom Unit 3, Reload 4, Reconstitution, Revision 0, 08/30/85 2.2 Procedure Review The inspector reviewed the above documentation for technical adequacy and for consistency with regulatory requirements, guidance and licensee commitments. The inspector noted in reviewing procedure FH-61, Fuel Bundle Upper Tie Plate Removal / Replacement and Individual Rod Handling, that there are 10 QC check points which provide an adequate check on the performance of the personnel performing the fuel handling procedure. No unacceptable conditions were identifie .3 Calibration The inspector reviewed the calibration record for the 0-200 in-lb torque wrench and the Upper End Plug (UEP) dial gauge tool. The UEP dial gauge tool is calibrated prior to use by placing it on a flat surface and zeroing the gauge when the center rod is all the way down. No unacceptable conditions were identifie .4 Feel Reconstitution Witnessing On September 10, 1985, the inspector witnessed the fuel reconstitution effort on the refueling floor. The licensee and General Electric Company (G.E.) personnel were involved in fuel bundle movement, fuel bundle disassembly, pin swapping and fuel bundle reassembly. During these activities the inspector questioned the PECO QC inspector on the refueling floor about his duties. His only involvement was with the movement of fuel, which included the placement of the fuel bundles into the Fuel Preparation Machine (FPM), the fuel pin swapping, and the movement from the FPM's; not the disassembly or reassembly effort. The inspector then witnessed the G.E. personnel involvement in the activity, which dealt with the disassembly, pin swapping, and reassembly of the fuel bundle During this operation it was noted that there are several Q.C. check points in which an independent reviewer is required to witness the activity and initial the procedure confirming that certain parts of the procedure were completed. This activity was being performed by G.E. personnel involved in the performance of the procedure and not by personnel independent of the activity. The inspector notified the G.E. supervisor, the PECO reactor engineer in charge of the effort and PEC0 QC personnel. Once reviewed by PECO QC a Stop Work Order (SWO) was issued. The inspector noted the following discrepancies:

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Inspection activities to verify the quality of work were being performed by the same persons involved in the activit Such persons were reporting directly to the immediate supervisor who is responsible for the work being inspecte Personnel performing the QC inspection were not qualified in accordance with the PECO Q.C. training program, and

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There was no certification of inspector qualification being maintaine The licensee stopped the fuel reconstitution effort and issued a special purchase order to use the services of four (4) of the personnel as QC inspectors reporting to the PECO QC departmen Also PEC0 QA agreed to perform a full audit of the work that was previously performed. The licensee then determined that work could continu Performance of the fuel reconstitution effort without proper Quality Control as required in station procedures is a violation (50-278/85-32-01).

2.5 Staffing The licensee contracted GE to perform the fuel reconstitution. The inspector interviewed all the work crews and witnessed their perform-ance. The personnel preforming the work were very knowledgeable of their responsibilities and how to perform their duties. No unaccept-able conditions were identifie .0 QA/QC Involvementi During the performance of the Fuel Reconsitution effort the inspector verified licensee QC involvement in monitoring the activity. One QC in-spector was responsible for fuel movement and accountability. He was also responsible for verifying proper pin movement. A second QC inspector was responsible for the disassembly and reassembly of the fuel bundles. The inspector witnessed the performance of the QC inspector during the disas-sembly and reassembly of. bundles LJH209 and LJW915. The NRC inspector noted the following discrepancy:

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During the performance of procedure FH-61 (Fuel Bundle Upper Tie Plate Removal / Replacement and Individual Rod Handling) there are several check points which have to be verified by a QC inspecto One such check point involves recording the distance required to bottom out the tie rod during the disassembly. The QC inspector is responsible for recording this information on QC check sheet No. This was being performe The discrepancy occurred when the QC inspector also initialled QC check point No. 5 which refers to the verification of the tie rods being bottomed out during reassembly,

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t not disassembly. When the fuel bundle was reassembled the QC inspec-tor did not perform check point No. 5, due to the fact that he thought it was in reference to the disassembly and not the reassembly. The fual bundle was reassembled correctly and the check was performed by the operator as witnessed by the NRC inspecto The licensee agreed with this discrepancy and immediately notified all the QC inspectors of the proper way to perform the inspectio Failure to follow approved procedure FH-61 is a violation (50-278/85-32-02). '

4.0 Independent Verification During the fuel reconstitution effort the inspector independently verified the donor fuel bundle (LJH 209) and the bundle to be reconstituted (LJW 915) by visual inspection with the use of a magnifier glass on an exten-sion tool. The inspector also verified that the following pins were swapped. Pins C-3, F-2, and C-7 from LJH 209 were inserted in LJW 915 at placements B-5, E-2 and C- The inspector requested to review the safety evaluation that is required according to 10 CFR Part 50.59. The licensee will not be finished with this evaluation until end of September. This will be an inspector's follow-up item pending completion and review (50-278/85-32-03).

5.0 Facility Tours The inspector made several tours of the facility during the course of the inspection including the reactor building, turbine building, refuel floor and control roo The inspector observed work in progress, housekeeping and cleanlines While on the refuel floor the inspector noticed the following event. Dur-ing shift change a PECO QC inspector reached into a contaminated area to sign a log without using the proper precautions, such as protective gloves before touching contaminated material. The inspector pointed this out to the H.P. technician on duty who acted immediately and handled the incident correctly. The following discrepancy was noted:

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HP0/CO-10a - Conduct in Controlled area. A PECO employee did not take the proper precautions when crossing a tape barrie This is a second example (violation 50-278/85-32-02) of failure to follow approved procedure .0 Exit Interview Anoexit meeting was held on September 13, 1985, to discuss the inspection scope and findings as detailed in this report (See paragraph 1 for attendees). At no time during the inspection was written material given ,

to the license !

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