IR 05000277/1998012

Insp Repts 50-277/98-12 & 50-278/98-12 on 981116-19.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness full-participation Exercise Evaluation

ML20198D422
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	12/16/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198D410	List: IR 05000277/1998012 ML20198D407
References
50-277-98-12, NUDOCS 9812230083
Download: ML20198D422 (11)

Text

., . - - . . . .. ~ .- . . - . _ . . - . . - . - .. . - . - . . . . . - - . -

. .

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket Nos: 50-277 '

50 278 License Nos: DPR-44 DPR-56 Report Nos: 50-277/98-12 50-278/98-12 Ucensee: PECO Energy Company Correspondence Control Desk P. O. Box 195 Wayne, PA 19087-0195 Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 Dates: November 16-19,1998

' Inspectors: D. Silk, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist W. Sartor, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, NRC Region 11 W. Maier, Emergency Preparedness Specialist  !

M. Buckley, Resident inspector, Peach Bottom D. Florek, Project Engineer N. McNamara, Emergency Preparedness Specialist Approved by: Michael C. Modes, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Safety l

-

,

! 9812230083 981216 i

,

PDR ADOCK 05000277 '

PM

'

G 'i

!

< - . . . .__ , - . . ., . _ . .

._ _ _ .. . - - . _ ._- _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _

,

i

.

.

,

l

! TABLE OF CONTENTS l

l PAGE

I t

,

!

EX EC UTIV E S U M M ARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii t P Staf f Knowledge and Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 P8 Miscellaneous EP Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 l

P8.1 _ Pager inconsiste ncies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 l

!

XI Exit M e e ti ng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 l

l PARTI AL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

<

LI ST O F AC RO NYM S US ED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 i

?

l i

.

i i

i l

I i

! ii i

,

!

~

!

!

! ,- , ,, ,

. .--- - - - . . . - _ . - . - _ - . ~ _ - _ - . - - - . . - _ - - -

,

. .

l l

,

'

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Peach Bottom Units 2&3 Emergency Preparedness Full-Participation Exercise Evaluation 50-277&278/98-12 November 16-19,1998 l

Overall exercise performance was good. Off-normal conditions were quickly recognized '

and appropriately classified. Offsite notifications were timely. There was good interfacing with offsite officials at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) were appropriate and timely based upon plant conditions and dose projections. The Dose Assessment Group (DAG) in the EOF performed "what if" I calculations and kept the management informed of radiologicalissues. Also, there was good control and coordination of Field Monitoring Teams (FMTs) to confirm the radiological l releas Communication problems were noted because the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) electronic data display boards in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and EOF ,

malfunctioned and the Emergency Notification System (ENS) communicator located in the TSC, had difficulty providing complete information to the NRC communicator,

Overall performance in the OSC was adequate. The OSC Director demonstrated a good !

command and control. Repair teams were well-briefed prior to dispatch and provided l usefulinformation from the field on a real-time basis. Discrepancies were found in the !

Operations Support Center (OSC) concerning inadequate maintenance of the status board I the priority to restom drywell cooling was not aggressively pursued, controller performance i issues were identified and no formal post-exercise facility critique was conducte I Post-critique comments were generated by the players and controllers and formally I presented by the EP staff to the NRC and licensee management. Both positive and negative comments were presented and the significant findings were also those that the l NRC had independently observed. The inspectors assessed the post-critique as very goo The newly designed electronic notification pager system did not activate automatically as l expected. Emergency responders were notified within 20 minutes after the Alert I

declaration after the pagers were manually activated. This did not negatively impact the outcome of the exercise with regards to meetY.a the facility timeliness requirements because it was a daytime exercise and most responders were in position within 10 minutes of the plant announcemen !

i l

I

!

'

I iii l'

l t

l

. - - - - . - .- . - . - . - . - ..- - . - _ _. - - .. . . . - _ . - _ - - - - - . - . _

.

Report Details P Staff Knowledge and Performance Exercise Evaluation Scone (82301)-

The inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's biennial full-participation exercise in the simulator control room (SCR), the TSC, OSC and the EOF. The inspectors assessed licensee recognition of off-normal plant conditions, classification of emergency conditions, notification of offsite agencies, development of the PARS, command and control, communications, and the overall implementation of the Emergancy Plan (E-Plan) and implementing Procedures (EPIPs). In addition, the inspectors observed the post-exercise critique to evaluate ,

the licensee's self-assessment of the exercis Emeraency Response Facility Observations S.GB The SCR crew responded well to the exercise scenario and the Shift Manager (SM)

demonstrated a good command and control as the Emergency Director (ED). The declarations were correct and timely as well as the notifications to offsite federal and state agencies. The SCR crew appropriately executed the applicable abnormal and emergency operating procedures. The shift technical advisor appropriately supported the ED and the crew in his assessment of current conditions as well as anticipating changes to directions based on possible changing conditions. Also, staff communications were considered appropriate and ED briefings were conducted regularly, SCR Conclusions Overall performance in the SCR was good. Off-normal conditions were quickly recognized and appropriately classified. Notifications to offsite federal and state agencies was timel I Licensee personnel staffed and activated the TSC within one hour of the Alert declaration, after a thorough turnover from the SCR. The ED and Assistant ED demonstrated effective command and control throughout the exercise. The ED frequently conducted informative and timely briefings and accurately classified the Site Area Emergency (SAE) using the emergency action level tables. The ED was very good at s,oliciting information from the TSC group leaders, prioritizing repair activities and communicated those activities effectively to the OS The inspectors found overall communications in the TSC to be good. However, some communication discrepancies were noted. The electronic data display of the SPDS malfunctioned causing confusion and time lags for updating the information on the display boards. At a point when significant plant parameters were quickly changing, the licensee switched to manual display, but this information wasn't

l l

l 1 l l l

l l transferred until an hour later. During that time frame, the ED had to rely on verbal

input, notes and memory. The SPDS problem was also noted in the EOF but it was determined that it had no direct impact on the overall outcome of the exercise. At the end of the inspection, the licensee was still troubleshooting the causes for the SPDS electronic display boards' malfunctioning. The EP Manager stated that the staff has had little practice on manually displaying the information. He also stated that from this time forward, it will be included in upcoming training sessions to i ensure a better and more efficient turnover should this happen agai '

Another communication problem was that the ENS communicator had difficulty providing complete information to several NRC questions. For example: (1) the loss l of power (E12 bus) issue, (2) extent of fuel damage and (3) what was the actual PAR made by the licensee. The inspectors discussed this issue with the licensee and determined that apparently the communicator believed that he could not leave the phone line to seek answers to the questions. The licensee noted this to be a i training issue and has committed to retrain the individual and assess the adequacy of the training program for communicator c.1 TSC Conclusions Overall performance in the TSC was good. However, communication problems were noted because the SPDS electronic data display boards malfunctioned and the ENS communicator had difficulty providing complete information to the NRC communicato OSC Activation of the OSC was timely and management and control was effective. The OSC Director utilized his subordinates well. He made frequent briefings to the OSC responders and chanrated briefings from other facility managers over the public address system for his staff's benefit. The information contained in the briefings was informative and useful to the responder Personal logs were adequately kept at the OSC but the repair team tracking status board was not maintained satisfactorily. Dispatch times were not entered for many of the teams and at least two repair teams were not entered on the status board at all. Also, operations tasks were not tracked to the same extent as the repair team They were kept in a corner of the board with only the names of the team members and a one word description of the task to be accomplished. Neither dispatch times, priorities, nor detailed job descriptions were included on the status board for these teams. This lack of detail prompted the OSC Director to question his staff directly for information that should have been included on the status boar The OSC quickly mobilized its resources to pursue both the investigation of plant damage and the return of damaged components to service. One of these l

components was the 28 drywell chiller. Return of this component was desirable to l prevent excessive drywell pressure in the event of a coolant leak into the drywell, which did occur later in the scenario. After the initialinvestigation of the loss of the

l l

chiller, the OSC did not pursue its return to service nor prompt the TSC to prioritize its return. Although the scenario was designed to preclude its return, the response organization should have pursued the task of restoration of drywell coolin Repair teams were well-briefed prior to dispatch, maintained reliable communications with the OSC and provided usefulinformation from the field on a real-time basis. The inspector accompanied two repair teams in the field and determined they demonstrated excellent radiological safety precautions, performed continuous radiation and contamination surveys and acquired air samples. Results were promptly communicated to the OSC which helped to direct future repair teams. OSC Conclusions Overall performance in the OSC was adequate. The OSC Director demonstrated a good command and control. Repair teams were well-briefed prior to dispatch and provided usefulinformation from the field on a real-time basis. However, discrepancies were found concerning inadequate maintenance of the status board, the priority to restore drywell cooling was not aggressively pursued, cont oller performance issubs were identified and no formal post-exercise facility critique was conducte EOF Good emergency management and player response was observed in the EO Staffing was efficient, activation of the facility was timely and emergency procedures were reviewed and followed. The ERM provided good command and control and status briefings were frequent which kept the facility responders apprised oi the changing condition The ERM communicated effectively with the representatives from the State Agencies that were located in the EOF, The ERM and his assistant were attentive to the changing conditions and were proactive in formulating the PARS as conditions were approaching a general emergency (GE). Following the GE declaration, PARS were provided to the offsite agencies promptly within the 15-minute requiremen The SPDS electronic data displays, which provided personnel with up-to-date plant parameters, malfunctioned resulting in manually scripting the information on the display boards. The inspector noted that it took more than an hour for key plant parameters to be posted. This problem was also identified in the TS Dose Assessment (EOF)

The DAG personnel arrived promptly and activated their area as a result of the alert declaration. Dose assessment group was quick to recognize changing plant or radiological conditions. A good questioning attitude was demonstrated regarding plant parameter data as information was validated or clarified as necessary. There

.ai .

,

"diAri/ti*ufhh%K

__ . .. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ . . _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _

.

i was good monitoring and updating of the meteorological data status boar Frequent "what if" calculations were performed throughout the exercise. Early in the exercise, the dose assessment computers malfunctioned and had to be service No adverse performance resulted from the computer malfunctions as the computers were unavailable for only a few minutes and they performed as designed throughout

the remainder of the exercise. The DAG leader kept the ERM informed of l radiological issues and was proactive in anticipating classification upgrades from a SAE to a GE. When the GE was declared, the DAG team leader was ready with the appropriate PAR. There was good control and coordination of FMTs to confirm the l l

'

radiological release and to determine the plume's footprint. However, a FMT, wh!ch l was out of radio contact for about 50 minutes, should have taken the initiative to establish radio contact instead of waiting to be located by another FMT. Overall performance in this area was very good as the DAG members effectively performed their duties in an orderly and professional manne EOF Conclusions l Overall performance in the EOF was determined to be good. Emergency conditions l were recognized and appropriately classified. Offsite notifications were timely and there was good interfacing with offsite officials. PARS were appropriate and timely based upon plant conditions and dose projections. The DAG performed "what if" l calculations and kept the ERM informed of radiologicalissues. Also, there was

.

good control and coordination of FMTs to confirm the radiological releas Ucensee Exercise Evaluation and Critiaue Processes l

With the exception of the OSC, the inspectors observed good post-exercise facility debriefs in which both positive and negative comments were solicited from the players and the controllers. Unlike the other facilities, there was no formal, l centralized post-exercise facility debrief in the OSC. The critique was divided

!

between an informal discussion among facility management and a separate debrief with the facility technicians. The facility management discussion included some l

'

feedback from the controllers to the participants, but it chiefly consisted of the controllers answering questions from the participants on scenario items which l confused the On November 19,1998, critique comments were generated by the players and controllers and formally presented by the EP staff, to the NRC and licensee management. Both positive and negative comments were presented and the

_

significant findings were also those that the NRC had independently observed. The j inspectors assessed the critique as very goo Exercise Conduct and Scenario Control

-

Overall, the conduct of the facility exercise controllers was good. However, there i were some examples of inappropriate interaction between the controllers and the exercise participants in the OSC In one instance early in the exercise, controllers j were discussing upcoming scenario events to a limited extent while exercise

!

!

-- . _ _ _ _ - , _ _ - - -- , _. _. - - - -

.

.- -.

l

'

l

!

!

participants and plant personnel were in the area. In another instance late in the exercise,'a controller conducted a conversation of the upcoming scenario schedule with snother controller while seated at the OSC conference table with exercise l participants. Also, the controllers distributed " request for feedback" forms to the participants over an hour before the end of the exercis !

P Miscellaneous EP issues

! P8.1 . Paaer inconsistencies

!

! Observations and Findings Th's licensee experienced problems in activating the emergency responders'

electronic notification pagers. After two failed attempts to activate the pagus automatically, the operator had to activate them manually. In addition, the wrong j l- activation code was sent out and the beepers had to be activated again to make the

!

correction. The overall time for notifying the emergency responders was approximately 20 minutes after making the Alert declaration; however, since this  ;

,

was a daytime exercise, most onsite responders were in position within 10 minutes l

!

of the plant announcemen ;

Due to pager activation problems (timeliness) in the past, the licensee completely upgraded their electronic notification system in early 1998. The inspector reviewed

! monthly surveillance test records which Indicated an overall improvement on the

' timeliness of activation. Immediately following the exercise, the licensee tested the pagers again and was able to demonstrate activation of the beepers within 5 minutes of receiving the signal. The licensee believed the problem was related to the modem, but they were continuing to investigate other avenues and initiated an action request in their Performance Enhancement Process.

l Conclusions

!

j' The newly designed electronic notification pager system did not activate l' automatically as expected. Emergency responders were notified within 20 minutes I

after the Alert declaration after the pagers were manually activated. This did not negatively impact the outcome of the exercise with regards to meeting the facility l timeliness requirements because it was a daytime exercise and most responders were in position within 10 minutes of the plant annountement. The NRC will

. review the licensee's corrective actions for this issue in an upcoming program i inspection scheduled in early,'1999. (IFl 50-277/98-12-01)

XI Exit Meeting

'

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee managsment at the conclusion of the inspection on November 19,1998. The licensee acknowledged the

Inspector's finding i

- - . .

,, . . . . . ., -- . , - - ,

. . . - -- -- - . . , - .

.

l .

.

i

) PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED i

l Licensee

! J. Doering Site Vice President l

'

R. Kinnard Manager, Emergency Preparedness  ;

l D. Lerch EP analyst '

J. Slaymaker Manager, Security and EP  ;

M. Taylor - Experience Assessment M. Warner Plant Manager l

'

I l

!

t.

I

- - -e, , ,

- - .

. .

i INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

'

.82301: Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opene_d IFl 50-277/98-12-01 Responder electronic pagers had to be manually activate Closed None

!

. .. . . - . . .. . .- .. . . . . . .

,

>

( .- .

t i

l l

! LIST OF ACRONYMS USED i

l

'

i DAG Dose Assessment Group i .E Emergency Director

! ENS Emergency Notification System EP Emergency Preparedness EPIP Emergency Procedure implementing Procedure EOF ~ Emergency Operations Facility ERM Emergency Response Manager ERO Emergency Response Organization j FMT Field Monitoring Team  !

GE General Emergency l NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission '

OSC Operations Support Center PAR Protective Action Recommendation i

'SCR Simulator Control Room l TSC Technical Support Center

!

t l-l'

l t

?

f l

i i .

_ ._-