IR 05000277/1988036
| ML20204H891 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 10/12/1988 |
| From: | Conklin C, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20204H823 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-88-36, 50-278-88-36, NUDOCS 8810240495 | |
| Download: ML20204H891 (6) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS5 ION
REGION I
Report Nos:
50-277/88-36 and 50-278/88-36 Docket Nos:
50-277 and 50-278
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License Nos:
Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 Facility Name:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Inspection At: Delta, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted:
September 26-28, 1988 Inspectors:
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C. popKlin,Oentor Emergentif date Preparedness Specialist, FRSSB, DRSS E. Fox, EPS FRSSB C.Amato,EhS,FRSSB C. Gordon, EPS, FRSSB D. Perrotti L.Myers,Rl,PEPB,NRR
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Peach Bottom
Approved by:
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W. J/ Lyzar s, Chief Emergency date'
Prepar'ednes ection, FRSSB, DRSS
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Inspection Summary: Inspection on September 26-28, 1988 (Report Nos.
50-277/88-36 and 50-778/88-36).
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s Areas Inspected: A routine, unannounced emergency preparedness inspection
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and observatten of the licensee's annual full-participation emergency
exercise performed on September 27, 1988.
The inspection was performed bj a j
team of six NRC Region I and headquarters personnel.
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Results: No violations were identified.
Emergency response actirns were
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adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safet; of the pub ic.
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8810240495 G81017
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J PDR ADOCK 05000277 l
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DETAILS
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1.0 Persons Contacted D. Smith, Vice President, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station R. Kankus, Staff Engineer J. Cotton, Superintendent Operations E. Fogarty, Manager, Nuclear Support F. Weigand, Director, Emergency Preparedness W. Alden, Director, Licensing D. Meyers, Support Manager
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R. Gallagher, Site Emergency Planning Coordinator D. LeQuia, Superintendent Plant Services B. Clark, Superintendent Administration W. Eckman Nuclear Quality Assurance C.Wike,technicalAdvisor
A. Engler, Emergency Planning Other licensee representatives, including exercise controllers and
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observers attended the exit meetilig as well.
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2.0 Emergency Exercise
The Peach Bottom Atomic Powe* Station full participation exercise was conducted on September 27, 1988 from 1700 to 2400. The exercise was i
unannounced and after normal working hours.
Subsequently, the Cc'monwealth of Pennsylvania,d the State of Maryland and the counties of the counties of York, Lancaster and Chester and 13 local towns an
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i Cecil and Harford participated.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency
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(FEMA) observed all off-site activities.
2.1 Pre-Exercise Activities
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Priortotheemerbcyexercise,dhadtelephonediscussionswith NRC Region I and FEMA
representatives h meetings an r
the licensee to discuss objectives scope and content of the
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exercise scenario. As a result min i
i order to clarify certain objectives,or changes were made in revise certain )ortions of
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the scenario and ensure that the scenario provided t1e
opportunity for the licensee to demonstrate the stated i
objectives as well as those areas previously identified by NRC and FEMA as in need of corrective action.
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NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on September 27,
1988, and participated in discussions of emergency response actions expected during the exercise.
The licensee's l
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controllers were responsible for controlling exercise activities to prevent deviations from the scenario and to ensure that normal plant operations were not disrupted. The exercise scenario included the following events:
1.
Air ejector discharge monitor alarm due to fuel cladding
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failure; 2.
Damage to the condensate pumps; 3.
Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) due to a Low Pressure Coolant injection rupture; 4.
Loss of all Emergency Core Cooling Systems resulting in major fuel damage;
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Subsequent release to the atmosphere through the stack; 6.
Declaration of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency and General Emergency; 7.
Calculation of off-site dose consequences; and 8.
Recommendation of protective actions to off-site officials.
2.2 Activities observed During the conduct of the exercise, six NRC team members made observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities and t
actions of emergency response personnel during the operatlon of the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed:
1.
Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events; 2.
Direction and coordination of the emergency response; 3.
Augmentation of the emergency organization and response j
facility activation; 4.
Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies of pertinent plant status information*
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Communications /information flow, and record keeping;
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Assessment and projection of offsite radiological dose and consideration of protective actions;
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Provisions for inplant radiation protection; 8.
Performance of offsite and inplant radiological surveys; 9.
Maintenance of site security and access control; 10.
Performance of technical support, repair and corrective actions; 11.
Fire Fighting practices; 12. Assembly, accountability and evacuation of personnel; and 13.
Preparation of information for dissemination at the Emergency News Center.
3.0 Exercise Observations 3.1 Exercise Strengths The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization,he facilities were activation of the emergency response facilities and use of t generallyconsistentwiththeiremergencyresponseplanand implementing procedures. The team also noted the following actions that provided strong positive indication of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:
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Very good command and control of all emergency response facilities (ERF's) was demonstrated;
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Classification was timely and conservative; 3.
Staff notification and augmentation, and subsequent ERF activation was timely; 4.
Protective Action Recommendations (PAR's) were prompt and conservative.
Plume arrival times and plant conditions were effectively utilized in determining the PAR's; 5.
The Dose Assessment staff demonstrated a very good utilization of field monitoring teams, including compensating for a team taken out of service due to a real time problem not associated with the exercise; and
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The engineering staff employed good engineering solutions in response to the scenario.
3.2 Exercise Weaknesses The NRC identified the followin exercise weaknesses which need to be evaluated and corrected b the licensee. The licensee conducted an adequate self crit que of the exercise that also identified these areas.
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The Shift Manager should utilize his staff in a manner to ensure that he is not over burdened. Several times tise Shift Manager was tied up with PEC0 management and NRC briefin s, as well as being on the Emergency Notification System ENS);
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Personnel manning the ENS as well as the Health Physics discusstechn)icalissuesinthedetailrequestet,werenotalways Network (HPN and 3.
During the activation of the E0F and subsequent operation, threeindividualsassumedtheroleoftheEmergency Response Manager. Although there was no impact on E0F operations, it was not clear who was in charge of the E0F prior to activation, or that a turnover had taken place during operation.
i 4.0 Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items The following items were identified during p/87-36, 50-277/88-08 and revious inspections (Inspection Report Hos. 50-277/87-36,50-278 50-278/88-08 Based upon observations made by the NRC team during the exercise,the). following open items were acceptably demonstrated and are closed:
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(Closed) 50-277/87-36-01 and 50-273/87-36-01: Notifications to off-site authorities were delayed and not in accordance with the implementing procedures; classif)ication /8/-36 02 and 50-278/87-36-02: Concerns regarding the (CLOSED 50-277of emergencies; (CLOSED) 50-277/87-36 03 and 50-278/87-36 03: Deficiencies observed in
direction control and communications to inplant teams following turnoverIntheOSCfromtheOSCManager;and
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Emergency action level 09-02:
50-277/88-09-02 and 50-278/88-was submitted to (CLOSED)ith the Comonwealth is inadequate.
Documentation si;ication of Emergencies,t. he Comonwealth review and comen review w t
l tion forthe inspection that shows FRP 101, Revision 1, C as Bureau of Radiation Protec was provided at the time ofdid review and come 101 on critique the licensee's post exercisecontrollers dis b rvations Licensee Critique exercise. iate corrective act i h the key licensee The NRC Team Leader attended 5.0 during wh c 28 1988, Septemberobservations of thewould be evaluated and a pr
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d in licensee representatives listeThe Tea Exit Heeting and NRC Critique
't team Leader met with the' of this report at t
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xercise.
'he obserir.tions made during the e Although there RC team determine d
'nd no violations were observe.
-r corrective action, tb Hio,ir Emergency Plan limitations of the scenar the ld they could implement"rocedur of the
- and indicated they would changes where nke es provide any written
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(CLOSED 50-277/88 09-02 and 50-278/88-09-02: Emergency action level review w)ith the Commonwealth is inadequate.
ERP-101 Revision 1 Classification of Emergencies, was submitted to BureauofRadiationhrotectionforreviewandcomment.
Documentation was provided at the time of the inspection that shows the Commonwealth did review and comment on ERP-101.
5.0 Licensee Critique The NRC Team Leader attended the licensee's post exercise critique on September 28 1988, during which the key licensee controllers discussed observations of the exercise.
The licensee indicated these observations
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would be evaluated and appropriate corrective actions taken.
6.0 Exit Meeting and NRC Critique The NRC team Leader met with the licensee representatives listed in I
Section 1 of this report at the end of the inspection.
The Team Leader summarized the observations made during the exercise.
The licensee was informed that previously identified items were adequately addressed and no violations were observed. Although there were areas identified for corrective action, the NRC team determined
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that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's
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performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated they would evaluate the NRC comments and observations and make changes where appropriate.
At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.
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