ML20057E273
| ML20057E273 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 09/27/1993 |
| From: | Gray E, Lohmeier A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057E272 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-93-18, 50-278-93-18, NUDOCS 9310080234 | |
| Download: ML20057E273 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000277/1993018
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 1
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REPORT NOS:
50-277/93-18
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50-278/93-18
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LICENSE NOS:
DPR-44 .
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LICENSEE:
Philadelphia Electric Company
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P.O. Box 195
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Wayne, Pennsylvania 19087-0195
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FACILITY NAME:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3
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INSPECTION AT:
Delta, Pennsylvania
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INSPECTION DATES:
August 2-6,1993
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INSPECTOR:
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E Lohmeier, Sr. Reactor Engineer
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Materials Section
Engineering Branch, DRS
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APPROVED BY:
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Edwin H. Gray, Chief
Materials Section
Engineering Branch, DRS
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9310000234 930927
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ADOCK 05000277
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Areas Insnected: The engineering organization and division of responsibilities after the
Nuclear Effectiveness ai.3 Efficiency Design Study (NEEDS) reorganization, operational
objectives and goals, effectiveness of performance, self-assessment, communication, the role
of system managers and shift engineers, transient operating cycle monitoring, training of
engineering personnel, engineering issue resolution, and engineering quality assurance.
Results: The reorganization under the NEEDS program provided a potentially improved
format for efficient plant engineering operation. The transfer of engineering and
management personnel to new responsibilities requires training and the attainment of
experience in tLese responsibilities while the transition is in progress. Support and emphasis
of management will be required for some time, and the performance of engineering personnel
under the changed organization must be monitored. The inspector found that the data with
which to compare actual cycles to design cycles was not kept current. A program is under
way to provide such data in accordance with recommendations of the steam supply system
vendor,
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DETAIIS
1.0
SCOPE OF INSPECTION (Inspection Procedure 37700)
The scope of this inspection included the inspection of engineering and technical support
activity at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS). Included in the inspection were
engineering organization and division of responsibilities after the Nuclear Effectiveness and
Efficiency Design Study (NEEDS) reorganization, operational objectives and goals,
effectiveness of performance, self-assessment, communication, the role of system managers
and shift engineers, transient operating cycle monitoring, training of engineering personnel,
and engineering quality assurance.
2.0
FINDINGS
2.1
Engineering Organization and Division of Responsibilities
The inspector reviewed the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) engineering and
technical support activity reorganized under the NEEDS program. Under the new
engineering organization, the Director of Site Engineering reports ta the Vice President of
PBAPS. Reporting to the Director of Site Engineering are four Section Managers: Plant
Engineering, Component Engineering; Programs, Procedures, and Performance, and Design
Engineering.
The Plant Engineering Section has four groups: Nuclear Steam Supply Systems (NSSS),
Balance of Plant, Reactor, and Instrument and Control (I&C) Engineering. The inspector
noted that the System Managers in the Plant Engineering Group have been reduced from 58
to 36 engineers. Their activities have been focused toward management of plant systems
rather than implementation of system maintenance and changes. The qualification
requirements for the system managers have been made more comprehensive.
The Component Engineering Group consists of 12 engineers having the responsibility for
wide range of component engineering activities on snubbers, valves, instrumentation,
erosion-corrosion (E/C) monitoring, in-service inspection (ISI), nondestructive examination
(NDE), and special testing and monitoring of component operation.
The Programs, Procedures, and Performance Group responsibilities include NCR and
engineering change request (ECR) procedure development, defining and coordinating the
minor modification process, and performance monitoring.
Design Engineering consists of four groups: Mechanical, Electrical, Piping, and I&C
Engineering. Their responsibilities
He small modification design, design basis
documentation, configuration control, e..gineering change requests, and nonconformance
report (NCR) disposition. The Design Engineering staff has been increased from 19 to 40
engineers to assume the responsibility of day-to-day issue resolution, formerly the
responsibility of the Nuclear Engineering Division (NED).
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The inspector reviewed the source of engineering management personnel under the NEEDS
reorganization program and found the Director of Site Engineering, Manager of Plant
Engineering, NSSS Manager, and the I&C Manager have plant operations background. The
Design Engineering Manager, Mechanical Engineering Manager, and Piping Engineering
Manager were formerly with NED engineering.
The inspector reviewed the NEEDS site engineering plan to transfer each responsibility (such
as modification programs) on an engineer to engineer basis and found the plan to have been
comprehensively implemented.
The inspector noted the addition of operations experience in the engineering organization
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management to focus the engineering attention to addressing problems related to effective
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operation of the plant. It was further noted that several managers in specialized engineering
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areas were transferred from NED to implement the increased responsibilities in designing all
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minor modifications. The changing management focus will take some time to develop
experience of those managers in new responsibilities, but interviews with these managers
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indicated that they had the capability to provide the leadership necessary for their new
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responsibilities.
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2.2
Engineering Organization Operational Objectives and Goals
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The inspector reviewed the 1993 Philadelphia Electric Company (PECo) Nuclear Group
statements of Vision, Mission, and Values. Included with these statements are the
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operational and strategic objectives for the Nuclear Group. The inspector also reviewed the
Mission statement and Operational Objectives of PBAPS. The Operational Objectives cover
safety, regulatory performance, financial performance, investment protection, internal and
external relations, and organizational objectives.
The inspector found the PECo Nuclear Group and PBAPS goals and objectives consistent
with those to be found in effectively managed utilities. Reorganization of PBAPS
engineering activity under the NEEDS program is consistent with the goal of PBAPS
organizational effectiveness to provide for support of NEEDS recommendations.
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2.3
Assessment of Engineering Performance
The inspector reviewed several PBAPS documents that provide for the basis for an
assessment oflicensee engineering department performance. These included Licensee Event
Reports (LERs), Engineering Open Items (EOIs), Reportable Event Investigation Forms
(REIFs), and Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) Reports. Another means of
engineering department assessment is from the Daily leadership Meeting, during which the
ongoing plant operational probiena me uixod with the participation of engineering
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representatives. The top thirteen chronic issues at the plant, called the " Baker's Dozen,"
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also provide for an assessment of engineering performance in resolution of these issues.
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These sources of performance assessment are discussed in sections 2.3.1,2.3.2,2.3.3, and
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2.3.4.
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2.3.1 Licensee Event Reports (LERs)/Engrg. Open Items (EOIs)/ Reportable Events
(REIFS)
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As a result of the inspector's review of LERs, EOls, and REIFs, the inspector found that
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neither specific engineering deficiencies, nor isolated engineering section weakness were
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found to be the cause of the majority of events.
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2.3.2 Daily Leadership Meetings
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The inspector attended the Daily Izadership Meeting on August 3,1993. At this meeting,
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Chaired by the Senior Manager of Operations, the agenda included review of daily plant
operational issues. The inspector attended that meeting during which engineering issues were
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discussed. The inspector found the communication between all divisions represented was
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good. Meaningful issues were discussed relative to operation of the plant and the
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implementation of changes to this operation. Organization of the subject matter discussed
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was effective and the opportunity was given to all to contribute to the discussions.
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The inspector noted that disrasion of a list of chronic items called " Baker's Dozen" was
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scheduled for the meeting, but was not held because the list of thirteen chronic problems was
being revised. The March 1993 list was reviewed by the inspector and he noted the chronic
problem areas included reactor water cleanup, containment atmospheric dilution, nitrogen
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injection system, control room recorders, auxiliary boilers, water treatment plant, cooling
towers, electro-hydraulic control, sewage plant, plant heating system, cathodic protection, In-
Service Test (IST) performance criteria, and the Unit 1 electrical system. The review of
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progress toward solution of each of these problem areas is conducted on a weekly basis.
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2.3.3 Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC)
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The inspector reviewed a summary report of a PORC meeting of July 12, 1993. The repon
described the meeting discussions, including the monthly operations report for Units 2 and 3,
reactor recirculation system problems on Unit 2, reactor water level issues on Unit 3,
emergency core cooling system (ECCS) room cooler problems, thermal overloads, high
pressure coolant injection (HPCI) pump operational problems, failed radiation indicator on
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Unit 2, reactor feed pump problems, Unit 3 reactor core isolation coolant (RCIC) system
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blown fuse, chemistry status, predictive maintenance on the fuel pool service water booster
pump, nonconformance repons, event investigations by the experience assessment group, and
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the motor-operated valve (MOV) testing plan.
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This wide range of problems was reviewed effectively at the PORC meeting with full
participation of all plant functions including engineering. The summary report was a concise
summary of the meeting and the supporting documentation on each issue was well prepared.
The Chairman of the PORC was the Senior Manager of Operations.
2.3.4 PBAPS Monthly Update of Performance
The inspector reviewed the PBAPS monthly update of performance report that covered
safety, regulatory performance, financial performance, investment protection,
internal /exterr.al relations, and organizational effectiveness. Of particular interest to the
inspector were those trends related to engineering and the effect of the NEEDS program.
Outstanding performance was indicated for Unit 2 emergency core cooling system
availability, including HPCI, RCIC, and residual heat removal (RHR) system. Needed
improvement was shown for Unit 3 trends of HPCI, RCIC, and RHR availability. NEEDS
related changes generally did not affect these performance indicators adversely.
Regulatory performance indicators showed problems in REIF reporting and ageing trends
requiring management attention. LER trends indicate increased number of events reported,
less technical specification and license violations, rnaintenance of equipment failures,
procedure / program deficiencies, and design issues less than the 1992 average. Events
reported to the NRC and NRC open commitments show a decreasing trend.
The licensee has not attributed weaknesses to the ongoing transformations under the NEEDS
reorganization. The inspector finds that, in the short term, the new organization under
NEEDS requires careful observation of engineering managemect to ascertain that problem
areas are given atte.non. While inspector discussions with several engineering section
managers have indicated high caliber individuals have been chosen in the leadership roles,
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many have not had recent direct experience in management of the disciplines for which they
have been assigned responsibility. The inspector believes it premature to assess the
prognosis for success in such cases. Time will be required for training and adjustment of
these personnel to their new assignments.
2.4
Engineering Self-Assessment
The inspector reviewed the Peach Bottom 1993 Self-Assessment Report related to
engineering and technical support activity. Included in the review were the reports of plant
engineering, design engineering, component engineering, and performance, procedures, and
programs. Included in the reports was a comprehensive review of the strengths, weaknesses,
and watch areas self-identified by each engineering group.
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The inspector found areas of general engineering strength identified include technical
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capability, responsiveness to requests, work prioritization, ownership of responsibilities,
performance indicators, training opportunity, teamwork, depth of experience, and
coordination with other groups and divisions.
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The inspector noted that the licensee identified weaknesses in the reactive mode of
engineering operation, large backlogs of work, cumbersome processes, base line
documentation development, communications with other groups, system manager
responsibilities not fully implemented, and interface teamwork with other divisions regarding
development of effective processes and procedures. The reactor pressure vessel fatigue cycle
monitoring program was also considered to be a weakness.
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Watch areas identified in the licensee report included the effect of the NEEDS reorganization
on the people, procedures, and responsibility transformation of people and assignments.
Training adequacy was an area of concern that required watching.
The foregoing list only reflected some of the critical assessments made in the report. There
were many more assessments included. It was noted by the inspector that some areas
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identified as weak in some groups were also indicated as strengths in others. It appears that
the self-assessments were truly self-critical and that the sensitivity level for documenting the
criticism was quite high. Used as a section wide tool for corrective action, this self-
assessment program is effective. The inspector believes the sensitivity to weaknesses
identified are, in part, the result of uncertainties related to the NEEDS reorganization with
many engineers and managers assuming new responsibilities.
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The inspector reviewed another means of engineering department self-assessment by the
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experience assessment group. This group provided for an event investigation data review for
1992, which identified the top eight performance indicators that were the most significant
problem areas during the past year (1991) and indicated whether the corrective actions taken
to date were effective.
During the 1992 period, there were 875 reportable event investigation forms (REIFs) filed,
of which only 8% were classified as significant or conditionally significant. The large
number of reported events was due to the higher reporting sensitivity.
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The eight problem areas monitored by the experience assessment group for 1992 were ESF
actuation (human and equipment performance), mispositioning events, technical specification
violations, missed surveillance tests, equipment damage, temporary procedure changes, and
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clearance and tagging of quipment. The inspector found no general engineering weakness
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as the root cause of all these events.
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The inspector found that PBAPS self-assessment program is a comprehensive one and
provides a good management tool from which to assess where the judicious application of
resources can be made effectively toward increasing plant operational efficiency and safety.
2.5
Communication
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The inspector found the good communication between PBAPS sections was exemplified by
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the PORC meetings, daily leadership meetings, publicizing performance indicators,
publicizing chronic problem areas, such as the " Baker's Dozen," and identification of the
problem areas through reports of the experience assessment group. PBAPS has a regular
publication to all employees, "Today at PBAPS," which updates employees on events related
to operation of PBAPS.
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2.6
Role of System Managers
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The inspector met with the Senior Operations Manager (SOM) to discuss cooperation of
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engineering with operations. The management changes that transpired as a result of NEEDS
included appointment of managers with operations experience as Manager of selected
technical sections. For example, the Senior Manager of Plant Engineering has experience
background in plant operations. The value of engineering experience with plant operation is
important to understanding the operational difficulties commensurate with systems changes.
As a result of the changes consequent from the NEEDS program, the SOM indicated that the
engineering action has become more responsive, there are fewer crises, and the backlog of
nonconformance reports is reduced. The system managers, prior to NEEDS who have had
problems in covering their responsibilities prior to NEEDS, have shown improvement with
more experience. The SOM stated that a weakness that could be improved upon by the
engineering organization was in the writing of procedures.
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The SOM stated that there is excellent off-shift coverage by systems engineers. Since system
engineering assignments are the proving ground for developing managers, the off-shift
assignments are much in demand by those engineers wanting to improve their career-path
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development.
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As a result of this discussion, the inspector finds the NEEDS reorganization has provided for
an increase in overall effectiveness of engineering system managers in contributing to
efficient plant operation by assignment of some plant engineering responsibilities to engineers
with previous operations background.
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2.7
Role of Shift Engineers
Recognizing the important role of the shift engineer in safe operation of the plant, the
inspector reviewed a proposed copy of the shift engineer's role and responsibilities. The
shift engineer provides technical support to the operating shift and is the bridge between the
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technical, operations, and maintenance organizations. The shift engineering function also
provides for that plant engineering experience necessary in developing the engineering
prcficiency necessary for a safe and efficient operating plant.
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The inspector recognizes the shift engineering position as defined to be important to effective
plant operations and is an experience training ground for engineering progression.
2.8
Transient Operating Cycle Monitoring of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
2.8.1 Background
The reactor coolant primary system components are designed to meet the requirements of
Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code for Nuclear Vessels. The Code
requires a " design by analysis" approach to evaluating not only whether the components can
sustain the prescribed steady state pressure and thermal loadings but also the cyclic
application of these loadings in view of the fatigue strength of the component materials.
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The utility (owner of the components) specifies the types and circumstances of loadings that
are anticipated during the plant lifetime. Components are designed in accordance with these
specifications. Therefore, in the case of cyclic loading, the specification will state the
numbers and types of transient operation that can be anticipated throughout the plant life.
These transients are described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for the
nuclear power plant. Operation beyond the specified numbers of cycles is outside the design
bases described in the UFSAR.
Since primary system components are designed to sustain limited numbers of transients, the
plant technical specifications (TS) reflect the requirement that records and documents relating
to the cyclic operation of the plant must be maintained through the plant lifetime. These
data identify critical areas of the components subject to the operating transients for
monitoring to determine whether the design life of the component has been expended.
The criteria for exhaustion of fatigue life are reflected in a cumulative usage factor (CUF),
which is an integrated summation of the ratio of expected numbers of cycles at the applial
strain range to the cycles at that strain range necessary to cause fatigue failure. An
appropriate factor of safety in terms of strain level or cycles is utilized in the same sense as a
factor of safety for stress level in relation to fracture stress.
2.8.2 UFSAR and Technical Specification Requirements
The inspector reviewed the UFSAR for Peach Bottom 2 and 3, which specifies the number
and types of reactor coolant system (RCS) transients for which the reactor pressure vessel
has been designed over the duration of its 40 year operating license. The number and type
of transients are listed in the UFSAR in Table 4.2.4 (Reactor Design Cycles for 40 Year
Life).
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Review of the TS by the inspector indicated that Section 6.10.2(f) requires that records of
transient or operational cycles for those facility components designed for a limited number of
transients or cycles be retained for the life of the facility.
As a result of this review, the inspector found that the licensee is required to operate the
RCS within the limits of the design basis expressed in the UFSAR and that the records of
cyclic operation for each component designed for limited numbers of transients or cycles be
retained for the life of the license. Operation of the reactor pressure vessel must be within
the transient operating conditions specified.
2.8.3 Retention of Operational Cycle Records
The inspector examined the system used by the licensee to collect, retain, and disseminate
operational data records. It was found that the licensee had collected the operational records
and provided for storage temporarily at the site and subsequently shipped these records to a
permanent retention site in Pittsburgh. The data was stored in the form of strip charts and
logs from plant operations. Tne inspector found no evaluations of the operating data relevant
to the design operating transients shown in UFSAR Table 4.2.4.
The licensee initiated cyclic counting in 1984 but only for feedwater-related operating
transients. The counting included review and tally of the cyclic operation twice each year
together with a historic review of feedwater-related cycles from 1974 through 1984. In
1985, the main steam relief valve (MSRV) blowdowns had exceeded the maximum allowable
number of cycles (UNR 85-08) and the issue was resolved in a General Electric Company
(GE) Study SASR 85-54.
The licensee recognized that the number of reactor start up cycles was approaching the
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maximum allowable limit. On January 2,1992, the licensee requested GE to provide an
overall analysis of cyclic operation limits together with the projected cyclic needs for
continued operation during the remaining part of the expected 40 year life. The GE Fatigue
Evaluation was completed in April 1992. The GE study reevaluated fatigue life expectancies
and included changes in event occurrences at both PBAPS units. They also evaluated the
effect on 40 year fatigue life usage of power uprating. Four components were identified as
having significant 40 year life fatigue usage factors (UFs). These include the feedwater
nozzle (UF 0.795), support skirt (UF exceeding 1.0), Refueling containment skirt (UF
0.583), closure studs (UF exceeds 1.0), and recirculation inlet nozzles (UF was not evaluated
but recommended for evaluation by GE).
The inspector reviewed a preliminary copy of GE report GE-NE-523-61-0493, May 1993,
which provided for the detailed reevaluation of the fatigue life usage under the modified
numbers of cycles and the additional cycles due to power rerate. The summary of the report
identified the fatigue usage with recommendations for improvement of fatigue life usage
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where appropriate. The feed water nozzle modified usage factor is 0.795. Under power
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rerate conditions the usage factor increases to 0.894. The nozzle must be refurbished in
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accordance with NUREG-0619. The modified usage factor of the support siirt is 0.896 and
the usage factor after power rerate exceeds 1.0. In such a case, the support skirt surveillance
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must be revised. The modified usage factor of the refueling containment skirt is 0.583 and
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the usage factor after power rerate increases to 0.777. Closure studs, under modified and
power rerate conditions, have usage factors exceeding 1.0. It becomes necessary to reduce
the numbers of allowabE: events and/or provide for improvements in inspection to reveal
fatique cracking. The recirculation inlet nozzle, including modified cycles, is .511, and the
usage factor under power rerate is determined to be .549.
The licensee stated that Table 4.2.4 of the UFSAR will be revised to include the modified
numbers of transients for 40 year life and increased power rerate.
The inspector finds that in all the foregoing studies the licensee has not indicated the ongoing
status of fatigue life usage. Only the 40 year life usage factors have been discussed.
It is believed that good engineering practice would mandate that the numbers of cycles
indicated in the 40 year design life Table 4.2.4 be provided with an additional list of " cycles
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to date" for each transient. This procedure would be consistent with the recommendation of
the primary system component vendor in General Electric Service Information Letter (GE
SIL No. 318, December 1979, "BWR Reactor Vessel Cyclic Duty Monitoring") to monitor
the duty cycles, cycle frequency rate and to extrapolate the duty cycles to a 40 year life.
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Monitoring of transient cycles is safety significant in that it provides continuing assurance
that the primary system components remain within the UFSAR design bases by identifying
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those operating transients which approach or have exceeded the original design specification
values.
The resolution of the foregoing finding is discussed in section 3.1 of this report, which
covers the unresolved item UNR 50-277/90-14-02 related to the absence of ongoing
operational cycle counting and recording of a particular event.
2.9
Training of Engineering Personnel
The inspector discussed with the licensee the specific training that is given engineers such
that they may be qualified to accept increased or new responsibilities. As an example, the
licensee submitted a detailed educational assignment matrix for engineer qualification. The
matrix bdicated the training status for all engineers in the design engineering group and the
progress of each engineer in completing his required courses for qualification. PBAPS has a
good educational facility that has been responsive to the training needs of PBAPS.
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The inspector noted that no specific training was given to management personnel transferred
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under the NEEDS reorganization to lead sections in which they have not had specific
experience. Training in the discipline of technical management responsibility would be
useful in the technical decision process of the manager to augment his managerial
effectiveness.
2.10 Engineering Quality Assurance
The inspector reviewed examples of Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA) oversight of PBAPS
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engineering activities. The results of engineering activity oversight can be found in
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surveillance reports, monitoring reports, audit reports, and safety system functional
inspections. Examples of NQA include a surveillance report of Environmental Qualification
Program A0647945, monitoring report of modification acceptance test PMR-92-0297, and an
audit report of modifications A0167281. Also reviewed by the inspector was results of
Safety System Functional Inspection of Feedwater System.
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The inspector found the PBAPS NQA program to be extensive and comprehensive. The
reports provided for clear discussions of the scope and results of each inspection of
engineering activities.
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3.0
UNRESOLVED ITEMS
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Unresolved items (URis) are matters about which more information is required to ascertain
whether they are acceptable items or violations. The examination of an unresolved item
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previously identified in inspxtion report 50-277/90-14,50-278/90-14, was reviewed for
closure by the inspector. As a result of this review, the inspector found that the UNR could
not be closed. This review is discussed in Section 3.1 below.
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3.1
(Open) Unresolved Item 50-277/UNR 90-14-02
In inspection report 50-277/90-14, it was stated that an iraproper heatup was performed,
which General Electric classified as an improper start of an idle recirculation loop. Nuclear
engineering (NED) performed a review of this operating transient and determined that
continued operation was permissible. The vessel was designed and evaluated for 5 events of
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this type with significant margin for extending occurrence of additional similar events. The
licensee believed that one additional event of this type had previously been experienced. The
licensee program for tracking such occurrences was weak and warranted a confirmatory
review. Procedure ST 12.4, " Reactor Pressure Vessel Transients - Cycles Record," tracks
various thermal / hydraulic events but not improper recirculation loop starts. Certain other
types of events for which analysis spxifies a limit were also not tracked. At that time, the
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licensee was working to revise the system and update the data. (50-277/UNR 90-14-02).
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The inspector reviewed the UNR in order to determine whether or not the item can be
closed. It was noted that the tracking system was weak and a confirmatory review was
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necessary. Furthermore, certain other types of events for which analysis specifies limits
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were also not tracked.
Therefore, to close the open item, it is necessary for the licensee to perform the following
corrective actions:
(1)
Determine whether one previous improper start of an idle recirculation line had
occurred prior to that indicated in UNR 90-14-02.
(2)
Perform a review of other events for whi:h tracking is required and has not been
done.
(3)
Strengthen the tracking system to provide for monitoring, recording, and storage of
cyclic operation data.
(4)
Review charts and logs of cyclic operation to determine the numbers of cyclic
transients affecting components designed to sustain limited numbers of transients.
(5)
Prepare a Table of cycles expended to date for comparison with each transient
listed in UFSAR Table 4.2.4 and evaluate the percentage of total life that has been
expended to date.
To date, the licensee corrective action in this matter has resulted in a report by GE that
covers the lifetime fatigue usage for 5 new types of transients heretofore not considered and
new estimates of the desired numbers of cycles given by PECo to GE for analysis. This
document is presently under review by the licensee.
The Component Engineering Section will furthermore include new cycles in transient
monitoring program by 12/15/93 and perform historical review of 18 types of events
described in Table 4.2.4 of the UFSAR. This is expected to be completed by 12/94. It is a
formidable task since much of the data has been stored in the permanent archives in
Pittsburgh. This program is reported in licensee action request A/R A0003781 El.
The licensee agreed to provide, within 60 days of receipt of this inspection report, a schedule
covering items (1) through (5) toward which this UNR can be closed.
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4.0
CONCLUSIONS
The licensee added operations experience to engineering management to focus the
engineering attention on effective operation of the plant. Several managers of
specialized engineering areas were obtained from NED. New management has
leadership capability but will require time to develop experience in their new
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responsibilities. (Section 2.1)
The PECo Nuclear Group and PBAPS goals and objectives are consistent with the
Nuclear Division Goals and those found to be in effectively managed utilities.
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(Section 2.2)
LERs show that neither specific engineering deficiencies nor isolated engineering
section weaknesses were found to be the cause of the majority of events. (Section
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2.3)
PBAPS performance trends show areas of outstanding performance and others whose
performance trends indicate management attention is needed. Trends requiring
corrective action may be the result of the increased sensitivity in identifying
weaknesses of minor problems. (Section 2.3)
The PBAPS self-assessment program is a comprehensive one and provides a good
management tool from which to assess where the application of resources can be
made effectively toward increasing plant operational efficiency and safety. (Section
2.4)
Communications between PBAPS departments were good. Cooperative interests were
noted. (Section 2.5)
The NEEDS reorganization at PBAPS increases overall effectiveness of engineering
system managers. (Section 2.6)
The shift engineering position at PBAPS is an experience training ground for
engineering progression. (Section 2.7)
The licensee has not evaluated the ongoing status of fatigue life usage but has initiated
a program of data retrieval and evaluation. (Section 2.8)
No specific training has been given to management personnel transferred under the
NEEDS reorganization. (Section 2.9)
The PBAPS NQA program is extensive and comprehensive. (Section 2.10)
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MANAGEMENT MEETINGS
5.0
The inspector met with licensee representatives at the entrance meeting on August 2,1993,
and at the preexit and exit meetings on August 6,1993, at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power
Station in Delta, Pennsylvania. The names of licensee personnel contacted is shown on
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Attachment A.
The findings of the inspection were_ discussed with licensee management at the August 6
preexit and exit meetings. The licensee did not disagree with the findings of the inspector.
Attachment: Entrance and Exit Meeting Attendance List
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ATTACllMENT A
Entrance and Exit Meeting Attendance List
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Peach Bottom Atomic h /er Station
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J Armstrong
Sr Mgr Plant Engineering
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- R. J. Blomquist
Engineer /PBAPS
- W. W. Bowers
Independent Safety Evaluation Group
R. Gambone
NSSS Branch Manager
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- J. V. Gilbert
Operations Support Manager
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G. Gellrich
Senior Manager Operations
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- D. C. Keene
Mgr Design Engrg/I&C
O. A. Limpias
Mgr Design Engineering / Civil-Mech
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- D. B. Miller, Jr.
Vice President, PBAPS
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J. F. Mitman
Mgr Component Engineering
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T. Niessen
Director, Site Engineering
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- R. K. Smith
Regulatory
J. Stanley
Component Engineering
J. Stankiewicz
Mgr PBAPS Training
F. Valentino
Mgr Engrg Assurance /NED
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J. B. Verner
Independent Safety Evaluation Group
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Site Representatives
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- H. R. Abendroth
Site Representative / Atlantic Electric
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J. Carey
Site Representative /PSEG
- R. B. Knieriem
Site Representative /Delmarva
United States Nuclear Reculatory Commission
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B. Norris
Sr Resident Inspector /RI
Those names with an asterisk (*) attended the exit meeting on August 6,1993.
Those names with a double asterisk (**) attended a preexit summary meeting on
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August 6,1993.
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