IR 05000277/1986015

Insp Repts 50-277/86-15 & 50-278/86-16 on 861008-10.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee full-scale Annual Emergency Exercise Conducted on 861009

ML20214D425
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	11/17/1986
From:	Craig Gordon, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214D406	List: IR 05000277/1986015 ML20214D404
References
50-277-86-15, 50-278-86-16, NUDOCS 8611240076
Download: ML20214D425 (8)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report Nos. 50-277/86-15 50-278/86-16 Docket No License Nos. DPR-44 DPR-56 Priority --

Category C Licensee: Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 Facility Name: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Inspection At: Delt'a, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: October 8-10, 1986 Inspector: .

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C.'Z. g on, Regional Team Leader / dat/e NRC Team Members: E. Hickey, Battelle, PNL J. Jamison, Battelle, PNL T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector i H. Williams, Resident Inspector S. Kucharski, Resident Inspector, Limerick J. Schumacher, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist Approved by: // 7 ![6 W. J gafar , Chief, Emergency date P'Fepare ness Section Inspection Summary: Inspection on October 8-10, 1986 (Report Nos. 50-277/86-15 '

and 50-278/86-16 Areas Inspected: Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's full-scale annual emergency exercise conducted on October 9, 1986. The inspection was performed by a team of seven NRC Region I and NRC contractor personne Results: No violations were identified. The licensee's response actions for this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the publi h G

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on October 10, 1986:

G. Anderson, Emergency Plan Training Department A. Beward, Personnel Safety Team Leader-J. B. Cotton, Superintendent, Plant Services S. B. Goldman, NUTECH Engineers

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R. Harper, Corporate Communications J. V. Kaufman, NUTECH Engineers W. B. Keller, NUTECH Engineers W. Knapp, Director, Radiation Protection T. Krippenburg, NUTECH Engineers G. M. Leitch, Superintendent, Nuclear Generation W. Lorenz, Senior Health Physicist R. W. McAllister, Senior Technical Assistant R. Palazzo, NUTECH Engineers M. J. Roache, Emergency Planning Coordinator, Limerick I

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D. Rombold, Physicist K. Schleckter, Corporate Emergency Planner'

D. C. Smith, Superintendent, Operations R. M. Sware, Technical Assistant

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J. J. Tucker, Emergency Planning Coordinator J. E. Winzenried, Engineer S. Wooley, Training Coordinator In addition, the inspectors interviewed and observed the actions of numerous licensee emergency response personne .0 Emergency Exercise The Peach Bottom full-scale exercise was conducted on October 9, 1986, from 2:30 p.m. until 9:45 l Pre-Exercise Activities

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The exercise objectives, submitted to NRC Region I on July 25, 1986, 1

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were reviewed and, following revision, determined to adequately test l the licensee's Emergency Plan. On August 25, 1986, the licensee ,

submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evalua- '

tio Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenario. As a result, minor revisions were ri.ade to the scenario and supporting data provided by the licensee. The revised scenario allowed adequate testing of the major portions of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP)

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and also provided the opportunity for licensee personnel to demon-strate those areas previously . identified by the NRC as in need of corrective actio NRC observers attended a-licensee briefing on October 8, 1986, and participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the scenario. Suggested NRC changes to the scenario were made by the licensee in the areas of technical support and radio-logical data. In addition, missing information was provided. These changes were also discussed during the briefing. The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviations or disruption of normal plant operation The exercise scenario included the following events:

RWCU pipe break with failure to isolate

Fuel handling accident Scram Discharge Instrument Volume drain valve stuck in closed position Contaminated injuries of personnel

Fire in diasel generator area

Offsite release of radioactive material Declaration of unusual event, alert, site area emergency, and general emergency classifications Release termination Reentry and recovery The above events caused the activation of the licensee's onsite emergency response facilitie b. Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of

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the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed:

Detection, classification, and assessment of the scenario events;

Direction and coordination of the emergency response; Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies;

i Communications /information flow, and record keeping; Assessment and projection of radiological dose and consideration of protective actions; Provision: for in plant radiation protection;

Performarce of offsite and in plant radiological surveys;

Maintenanc' of site security and access control; Performance of technical support;

Performance of repair and corrective actions; Performance of first aid and rescue;

Performance of fire fighting activities; Assembly and accountability of personnel; Provisions for communicating information to the public; and Management of recovery operation c. Exercise Observations The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. The team also noted the following actions of the licensee's emergency response organization that were indicative of their ability to cope with i

abnormal plan conditions:

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Health physics in plant teams demonstrated good knowledge of dressout, radiation surveillance, and sample collection proce-dures, and contamination control technique *

Prior to obtaining PASS samples, efficient preparation was observed in planning for protective clothing, respiratory equipment, and anticipated dose rate Site Emergency Coordinators displayed an excellent understanding regarding origination and significance of dose assessment results, bases for protective action recommendations, and interface with Pennsylvania and Marylan *

Deployment and control of offsite field teams was effective in that teams were prepositioned to allow a rapid response for plume trackin __ _ _ _ - - _ . _ - _ . ,

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Emergency response personnel were knowledgeable in their assign-ments and demonstrated use of the emergency procedures, and, in general, demonstrated they were competent in performing assigned function d. Open Items The NRC identified the following areas which need to be evaluated by the licensee for corrective action (the licensee conducted an ade-

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quate self-critique of the exercise which also identified some of

these areas):

Dose assessment operators lack thorough training in the computer code and in basic health physics principles to be able to input proper parameters into the mode In addition, personnel were

, unable to adequately advise decision makers of the significance i of the result reports (50-277/86-15-01, 50-278/86-16-01).

The performance of the dose assessment team was observed to be non-integrated since individual members shared their information and insights strictly through the formal reporting process i.e., discussions between team members was limited thereby reducing overall team effectiveness (50-277/86-15-02; 50-278/86-16-02).

Discussions of protective action recommendations did not con-sider essential information such as proper engineering assess-ment or an accurate interpretation of dose projections (50-277/86-15-03, 50-278/86-16-03).

The control room was not adequately staffed with the required players for part of the exercise in that non qualified personnel were substituted for qualified licensed personnel after the day shift. A full complement of on-shift staff including a chief operator, reactor operators, and shift superintendent positions were at times unavailable (50-277/86-15-04, 50-278/86-16-04).

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Confusion was observed in the transfer of authority in that, (for approximately two hours) the control room was not aware that the Emergency Director function was turned over to the TSC~

(50-277/86-15-05,50-278/86-16-05).

The high range monitor was used by TSC-and E0F staff for dose assessment, logging, and tracking purposes instead of the low (normal) range monitor (50-277/86-15-06, 50-278/86-16-06).

TSC status boards were observed to be deficient or do not provide for critical information to be~ displayed. For example, code safety valves (RV-70A and B) missing; incorrect main stack high range monitor units; torus pressure missing; diesel genera-tor status confusing (50-277/86-15-07, 50-278/86-16-07).

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Technical staff in the TSC were not effectively utilized in that all TSC personnel were instructed to focus their attention on only one specific problem at a time (rather than dividing the staff to work on each plant abnormality concurrently)

(50-277/86-15-08,50-278/86-16-08).

The medical team did not quickly or correctly assess the medical status of the injured individual (50-277/86-15-09, 50-278/86-16-09). Recurring Items During the previous emergency exercise, nine concerns associated i with TSC practices and six concerns associated with OSC practices were identified as Open Item Nos. 50-277/85-36-02; 50-278/85-34-02, 50-277/85-36-03; 50-278/85-24-03, and 50-277/85-36-04; 50-278/85-34-04, respectively. Observations made during this exercise indicated that of these previously identified concerns, the following items were found to recur:

The size and space limitations of the OSC will inhibit an integrated and coordinated response by both augmented licensee staff and outside support personnel if a severe and prolonged -

emergency should occur (50-277/86-15-10, 50-278/86-16-10).

Public address announcements near the OSC and in other high noise areas throughout the plant are not clearly audible (50-277/86-15-11,50-278/86-16-11).

Although adequate: judgment and conservatism was exhibited in declaration of the General Emergency, conservatism was not demonstrated when issuing protective action recommendations

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to Pennsylvania and Maryland. Also, the guidance contained in IE Information Notice 83-28 was not used since no immediate recommendation to either shelter or evacuate was made to offsite authorities (50-277/86-15-12; 50-278/86-16-12).

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f. Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items

(Closed) 50-277/85-36-01; 50-278/85-34-01 Certain practices re!r.ad d

to control room activities contributed to a degraded respo.is Deficiencies previously identified relating t-o control room activi-ties were corrected in that personnel recognized and tracked critical plant parameters; drill logs were adequately maintained; and status boards displayed current informatio I i

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(Closed) 50-277/85-36-02; 50-278/85-34-02 Certain practices conducted within the TSC contributed to a degraded response Aside from the items identified in Section 2.e. above, significant ,

deficiencies previously identified relating to TSC performance l were. corrected in that plant mitigation by TSC staff was adequate, l responsibility of the Emergency Director and Site Emergency Coordinator have been clarified in the Emergency Plan, and conservative judgment was exercised in classifying event (Closed) 50-277/85-36-03; 50-278/85-34-03 Additional activities conducted in the TSC contributed to a degraded respons Aside from the items identified in Section 2.e. abcVe, other deficiencies previously identified relating to TSC performance were corrected in that Emergency Director briefings were informative; technical information provided by PECo headquarters was effectively used; accident assessment appeared adequate; and notifications to offsite authorities were timel (Closed) 50-277/85-36-04; 50-278/85-34-04 Certain practices related to operational support or in plant activities could have contriubed to a degraded respons Aside from the items identified in Section 2.e. above, the OSC !

practices previously identified as deficiencies were corrected in that simulations were kept at a minimum, PASS was demonstrated; and contamination control technique; were adequat (Closed) 50-277/85-36-05; 50-278/85-34-05 Certain practices in the EOF contributed to a degraded respons ~

Deficiencies previously identified relative to the Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) were corrected in that appropriate information was considered by EGF personnel prior to issuance of protective action recommendations (PAR), revisions to PAR procedures made, and news releases appeared to be accurately prepare (Closed) 50-277/85-36-06; 50-278/85-34-06 Certain practices relating to the dose assessment capability could have contributed to a degraded respons Deficiencies previously identified relative to dose assessment capability were corrected in that the recommendation to authorize KI to workers was adequately considered; dose rate results reported by field teams was clarified; and E0F habitability was maintained throughout the exercis .

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. Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on October 10, 1986 during which key licensee controllers discussed observa-tions of the exercise. The critique was adequate in that licensee partici-pants highlighted both areas for improvement (which the licensee indicated would be evaluated and appropriate actions taken) and areas in which improvements have been mad Specific improvement areas which were identified by the licensee related to:

(1) revising the General Emergency procedure to provide for immediate PAR's, (2) poor information flow between OSC and Auxiliarr O'C; CF, use of an unqualified Emergency Director in the car.tvoi nuvv. (4) transfer of'

direction and control hbt al' ways exbiicit, and (5) accumulated doses of in plant team members not tracke . Exit Maeting and NRC Critique Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report. The team leader {

summarized the observations made during the exercis The licensee was informed that previously identified items were adequately addressed with the exception of those identified in Section 2.e. and that ea yfc)ations were observed. 'Although there were areas identified for correcisve action, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitats'ons of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the publi Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that appro-priate' action would be taken regarding the identified open item At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the license . . . . . -