IR 05000277/1986014
| ML20203M745 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 08/22/1986 |
| From: | Gray E, Wiggins J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203M738 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-86-14, 50-278-86-15, NUDOCS 8609040257 | |
| Download: ML20203M745 (5) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report Nos.
50-277/86-14 50-278/86-15 Docket Nos.
50-277 50-278 License Nos.
DPR-44 DPR-56 Licensee:
Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101 Facility Name:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Inspection At:
_ Delta, Pennsylvania Inspection Condu ted:
August 4-8, 1986 8/2L/%
Inspector:
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E H. Gray, Lead Rejffor Engineer date M&PS, Df;S Approved by:
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.W1791ns,C)fieyf,Materialsand
' date I:
jocesses SectYorf, EB, DRS
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Inspection Summary:
Inspection on August 4-8, 1986 (Report Nos. 50-277/86-14 and 50-278/86-15 Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of spent fuel racks - removal and replacement, emergency service water (ESW) piping system siltation control and review of licensee action taken on previously identified items.
Results: No violations were identified.
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8609040257 860825 PDR ADOCK 05000277 G
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Persons Contacted Philadelphia Electric Company (PECO)
P. Bushek, Operating Reactor Engineer
- J. Cotton, Superintendent of Services G. Dawson, Supervisor, Project Engineering Group J. Diletto, Metallurgical Engineer F. Hoelzle, Construction R. Lefneski, E&R QA B. Merryman, System Engineer, ESW J. Pizzola, E&R QA Group Leader E. Sawchuk, System Engineer, ESW Backup
- D. Smith, Superintendent of Operations J. Stanley, ISI Engineer A. Wasong, Projects Test Group NRC
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- T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector
- H. Williams, Resident Inspector
- Present at Exit Meeting on August 8, 1986 2.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Violation (277/83-28-01). Transducer size for Ultrasonic Examination (UT) of weld overlay to piping bond. The violation of using a 1" diameter UT transducer when a 1/2" diameter transducer was specified
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by procedure UT-38, Revision 0, was addressed in the response to the NRC q
Region I dated December 15, 1983.
Procedure UT-38 was field revised to
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specify a transducer size of up to 1" as acceptable for overlay bond
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examination as is consistent with the ASME Code Section V, Article 5, 1980 Edition. The inspector reviewed the UT-38 procedure and the response to the violation noting the field change dated October 7, 1983 and the procedural requirement to calibrate the complete UT system including the transducer under various conditions including calibration at intervals not to exceed four hours.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (277/85-04-01).
Censumable insert segment behind the thermal shield of the 90 safe end. The inspector reviewed the root pass radiographs of this safe end to nozzle weld showing a loose segment of consumable insert and the subsequent radiographs dated January 20, 1985 that were reshot to show removal of this loose insert segment. The inspector noted the work traveler to not contain specific details on how the insart segment was removed. The GE memo dated August 8, 1986 (Kepler to Hoelzle) providing the details of the segment removal was reviewed.
The inspector concluded that the insert segment was removed and adequately documented.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (277/85-05-02).
Procedural control of QA audit or surveillance findings to obtain corrective actions and closecut. The Electric Production Quality Assurance (EPQA) procedure QADP-9 was revised to Revision 12 to provide guidance for responses to findings and follow-up for closecut of findings. The inspector reviewed Revision 12 of QADP-9 dated February 1986 and sampled recent QA audit findings to establish that QA findings are being more effectively followed to obtain timely actions and closeout. The QA findings reviewed include AP 86-14-09, 14-03, 14-04, 02-05 and 25-01.
(Closed) Unvesolved Item (278/85-37-01). Weld overlay design of N1-B safe end joint 2BS-2 in vicinity of the 1-3/8 inch diameter plug remcval area.
The inspector reviewed the portions applicable to the plug removal area of the weld overlay design and analysis report DRF #137-0010 for Peach Bottom Unit 3 as transmitted to the NRC on December 20, 1985. This report states that the overlay design maintains ASME Code safety margins including ASME Code Section XI fracture mechanics considerations.
The inspector inde-pendently calculated the weld reinforcement required to meet the ASME Code Section III, Part NB 3643.3. On this basis, the weld overiay desig, dimension of 0.34"x6" is greater than the NB 3643.3 required cross section
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in the area of the plug not counting the first layer of overlay or plug seal weld.
(0 pen) Inspector Follow Item (277/85-08-04, 278/85-08-04).
Intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) of control rod drive hydraulic unit (HCU) scram outlet valve isolation valves (13-112).
During inspection 278/85-41, review of MRFs 3-3-M8506123 indicated no cracking was found on the ten of 185 of the HCUs inspected in Unit 3 by PECo. The discs of the
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HOU valves on Unit 3 are Type 410 stainless steel.
In review of Metal-
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lurgical Laboratory Note No.85-903, a laboratory conclusion is that the N
IGSCC condition of the Type 420 stainless steel disc material cannet be
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detected by the liquid penetrant examination method.
Valve discs of 410 stainless steel from Unit 3 were requested by the PEco Lab for metallur-gical examination to determine if IGSCC is a problem with the Type 410 disc material. As of the date of this inspection report, no Unit 3 Type 410 stainless steel valve discs have been provided for metallurgical examination. This item remains open pending review of laboratory results to establish if the Type 410 valve discs' of Unit 3 are subject to IGSCC and clarification of an effective field inspection method to find the presence of IGSCC in this material.
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Emergency Service Water (ESW) System, Units 2 and 3 s
The ESW system is normally inactive but when in use, routes river water to various room coolers, pump seal coolers and the diesel generator heat exchangers.
During periods of inactivity, the system has shown the tendency for deposition of silt from the river water and pitting on inside pipe surfaces.
During 1985, this system for Units 2 and 3 was extensively
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hydrolazed to remove internal pipe deposits.
Piping under 1" in diameter which could not be hydrolaze cleaned was replaced.
Provisions were made for chemical additicn to the ESW system to form a protective coating on
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the interior of the piping and minimize pitting as discussed in Inspection Report 278/85-41. As part of the hydrolaze process, cuts were made in piping to ramove silt deposits and hydrolaze inlets and~ drains were added providing an opportunity for visual examination of the interior surfaces of the ESW piping in the vicinity af pipe cuts, which established the presence of isolated pits in the ESW piping.
Isolation valves were added to Unit 3 ESW piping but. not to the Unit 2 ESW piping.
In June 1986, as noted in Inspection Report 277/86-12, a leak developed in the 3" line to the Unit 2 RHR room cooler requiring plant shutdown for repair. The inspector reviewed the status and controls on ESW Chemical Addition, monthly flow testing of the 2SW system per Surveillanca Test ST 21.5 and the use of acoustic (ultrc onic) flow measurement equipment.
The licensee was found to have the chemical additions made under con-trolled conditions intended by modification package MOD 1693. The monthly surveillance testing of the ESW flow through ECCS room coolers, RHR seal coolers and core spray motor oil cooler establish continuity of ESW water flow as verified by an ultrasonic flow meter. A demonstration of the-ultrasonic flow meter on piping at various flow rates was observed. The flowmeter in use is Series 240 Clampitron Flowater by Controlotron Corporation.
In addressing the pitting probic, the plant was noted to have initiated engineering review of the addition of isolation valves on Unit 2 and replacement of portions of the ESW piping in Units 2 and 3, by letter dated June 24, 1986. The ESW piping to tha diesel generator heat exchangers, possibly due to weekly testing af the diesel generators, have not exhibited the siltation and corresponairg flow reduction problem typical of other portions of the carbon steel ESW piping.
No violations were identified.
h 4.
Fuel Pool and Spent Fuel Racks 4.1 Spent Fuel Storage Rack Replacement The License Amendments No.116 for PB Unit 2 and No.120 for PB Unit 3 provide for spent fuel storage capacity expansion from 2,608 to 3,819 fuel storage cells for each unit. This increased fuel storage capacity is achieved by reducing the center to center cell distance from 7.0 to 6.28 inches and by plar.ement of the cell racks closer to the fuel pool sidewalls. The replacement of the existing spent fuel racks with higher density spent fuel racks includes underwater fuel movement, decontamination of fuel racks, modification
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of fuel pool cooling piping within the fuel pool and removal of some
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fuel pool floor swing bolts to avoid interference with feet of the new fuel racks.
The inspector reviewed the Technical Specification SP-M-616 for the spent fuel storage racks, observed the first two newly installed fuel racks in position, examined removal-installation procedure (SP-910)
and records; and visually inspected portions of new fuel racks in l
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storage at the site prior to installation. The involvement of Engineering and Research (E&R) Quality Assurance in auditing the fuel rack manufacturer was reviewed.
No violations were identified.
4.2 Fuel Pool Liner Repair During removal of a pipe support gusset from the spent fuel pool floor, a diver error resulted in a small hole (1/16" () being put in the 11/64" thick stainless steel liner of the fuel pool.
Noncon-formance Report (NCR) CD-P-604 issued May 21, 1986 provides details of the liner hole with the subsequent disposition providing for repair design and. repair completion. The repair included sealing the leak with epoxy material and underwater welding a lh"x3 " box over the leak area.
The inspector reviewed NCR CD-P-604, the weld procedure qualification, and welder performance qualification for the welding of the box to the fuel floor and reviewed the QC video inspection tape for the completed weld.
No violations were identified.
5.0 Exit Interview The ins ~pector met with licensee representatives (denoted in p.ragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on August 8, 1986.
The purpose, scope and findings of the inspection were summarized and discussed. At no time during the inspection was written material orovided to the licensee by the
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inspector.
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