IR 05000244/2007003

IR 05000244-07-003, on 04/01/07 - 06/30/07, R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, NRC Integrated Inspection Report

ML072120361
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	07/30/2007
From:	Glenn Dentel Reactor Projects Branch 1
To:	John Carlin Ginna
Dentel, G RGN-I/DRP/BR1/610-337-5233
References
IR-07-003
Download: ML072120361 (38)

Text

UNITED STATES uly 31, 2007

SUBJECT:

R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000244/2007003

Dear Mr. Carlin:

On June 30, 2007, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 5, 2007, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-244 License No. DPR-18 Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000244/2007003 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000244/2007-003; 04/01/2007 - 06/30/2007; R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Routine

Integrated Report.

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections by regional specialists. No findings of significance were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

iii

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Ginna) began the period operating at full rated thermal power (RTP). On May 14, 2007, power was reduced to 67 percent power at the request of the local transmission system operator to facilitate maintenance activities on the offsite transmission grid. The power reduction lasted for approximately 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. On June 6, 2007, power was reduced to 67 percent to facilitate similar transmission work. Full RTP was achieved the following day and remained at that level for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - One sample)

a. Inspection Scope

Using Ginna procedure O-23, Hot Weather Seasonal Readiness Walkdown, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as a reference, during the week of May 21, the inspectors reviewed station preparations for hot weather by walking down plant areas. As part of the walkdown, local area temperatures were checked as well as the operability of ventilation and air conditioning cooling systems to ensure that the plant was prepared to handle warm weather conditions. Areas of focus were the north end of the intermediate building where the auxiliary feedwater and control rod drive cabinets are located, and the standby auxiliary feedwater (SAFW) pump room. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

Partial System Walkdown (71111.04Q - Three samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the alignment of system valves and electrical breakers to ensure proper in-service or standby configurations as described in plant procedures and drawings. During the walkdown, the inspectors evaluated material conditions and general housekeeping of the system and adjacent spaces. The inspectors also verified that operations personnel were following plant TS and that alignments were consistent with plant technical specifications (TS), operating procedures, piping and instrument drawings (P&ID), and the UFSAR. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

The following system alignments were reviewed:

• On May 1, 2007, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the B train of Component Cooling Water (CCW) while the A CCW pump and heat exchanger were out of service for planned maintenance.

• On May 30, 2007, the inspectors conducted a walkdown of the A and B residual heat removal (RHR) trains following identification of a boric acid leak from the spent fuel transfer canal that had collected on RHR system piping.

• On May 30, 2007, the inspectors conducted a walkdown of the spent fuel pool (SFP) cooling system and isolation valves when the gate between the pool and the transfer slot was removed for gasket replacement.

b Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05Q - Eight samples)

a. Inspection Scope

Using Ginnas Fire Protection Program documents as a guide, the inspectors performed walkdowns of the following fire areas to determine if there was adequate control of transient combustibles and ignition sources. The material condition of fire protection systems, equipment and features, and the material condition of fire barriers were also inspected against industry standards. In addition, the passive fire protection features were inspected, including the ventilation system fire dampers, structural steel fire proofing, and electrical penetration seals. Documents reviewed are listed in the

. The following plant areas were inspected:

• A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Room (Fire Area EDG1A);

• 'B' EDG Room (Fire Zone EDG1B);

• Screenhouse (SH) Basement, (Fire Zone SH-1);

• SH Operating Floor, (Fire Zone SH-2);

• SH Circulating Water Pump Area, (Fire Zone SH-3);

• 'A' Battery Room, (Fire Area BR1A);

• 'B' Battery Room, (Fire Area BR1B); and

• Air Handling Room, (Fire Zone AHR).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06 - One sample)

a. Inspection Scope

To evaluate Ginnas external flood protection measures, the inspectors reviewed the UFSAR, plant procedures SC-3.17, Auxiliary Building Flood Barrier Installation/Removal/Inspection, and ER-SC.2, High Water Flood Plan, and drawings.

The inspectors walked down the external perimeter of the auxiliary building to verify areas that could be submerged during a flood were structurally intact. The inspectors examined the physical condition of flood barriers installed in the auxiliary building and verified that deficiencies associated with the barriers had been entered into the corrective action program (CAP). The inspectors also reviewed the preventative maintenance program that had been established for the auxiliary building flood barriers and verified that station personnel had received training on the installation and use of the auxiliary building flood barriers.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q - One sample)

a. Inspection Scope

On April 24, 2007, the inspectors observed a licensed operator simulator scenario, ECA1112-07, Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) Outside Containment. The inspectors reviewed the critical tasks associated with the scenario, observed the operators performance, and observed the post-evaluation critique. The inspectors also reviewed and verified compliance with procedure OTG-2.2, Simulator Examination Instructions.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12 - Three samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated work practices and follow-up corrective actions for selected system, structure, or component (SSC) issues to assess the effectiveness of Ginnas maintenance activities. The inspectors reviewed the performance history of those SSCs and assessed extent-of-condition determinations for those issues with potential common cause or generic implications to evaluate the adequacy of corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed Ginnas problem identification and resolution actions for these issues to evaluate whether the station had appropriately monitored, evaluated, and dispositioned the issues in accordance with procedures and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance. In addition, the inspectors reviewed selected SSC classification, performance criteria and goals, and corrective actions that were taken or planned, to verify whether the actions were reasonable and appropriate. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

The following issues were reviewed:

• intermediate building block wall degradation;

• A service water (SW) pump test failure; and

• SAFW room cooler inlet gasket repeat failures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - Five samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of Ginnas maintenance risk assessments required by paragraph a(4) of 10 CFR Part 50.65. The inspectors discussed with control room operators and scheduling department personnel regarding the use of the stations online risk monitoring software. The inspectors reviewed equipment tracking documentation and daily work schedules, and performed plant tours to gain reasonable assurance that actual plant configuration matched the assessed configuration.

Additionally, the inspectors verified that risk management actions, for both planned and/or emergent work, were consistent with those described in procedure IP-PSH-2, "Integrated Work Schedule Risk Management." Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

Risk assessments for the following out-of-service SSCs were reviewed:

• Planned maintenance on the B EDG (April 17-20, 2007);

• Planned maintenance on instrument bus inverter A (May 23, 2007);

• Risk associated with plant calorimetric power changes associated with a main feedwater pump load sharing issue and subsequent feedwater regulation valve oscillations (June 10 - 13, 2007);

• Planned replacement of one cell in the technical support center (TSC) battery (June 18, 2007); and

• Risk associated with the failure of the SAFW room cooler inlet gasket. (June 20, 2007).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15 - Two samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability evaluations and/or condition reports (CRs) in order to verify that the identified conditions did not adversely affect safety system operability or plant safety. The evaluations were reviewed using criteria specified in NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-20, Revision to Guidance formerly contained in NRC Generic Letter 91-18, Information to Licensees Regarding two NRC Inspection Manual Sections on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability and Inspection Manual Part 9900, Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety. In addition, where a component was inoperable, the inspectors verified the TS limiting condition for operation implications were properly addressed.

The inspectors also reviewed the following operability evaluations to determine if system operability was properly justified in accordance with CNG-NL-1.01-1003, Conduct of Operability Determinations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

The inspectors performed field walkdowns, interviewed personnel, and reviewed the following items:

• CR 2007-4155, A SW pump failed PT-2.7.1; and

• CR 2007-4278, LT-3006, transmitter out-of-calibration.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - Six samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed portions of post-maintenance testing activities in the field to determine whether the tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures.

The inspectors assessed the tests adequacy by comparing the test methodology to the scope of maintenance work performed. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the test acceptance criteria to verify that the tested components satisfied the applicable design and licensing bases and TS requirements. The inspectors reviewed the recorded test data to determine whether the acceptance criteria were satisfied. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The following post-maintenance testing activities were reviewed:

• PT-3Q, Containment Spray (CS) Pump Quarterly Test, for B CS Pump following maintenance under Work Order (WO) 20502794, Wet Boron at Motor Side Pump Gland (April 11, 2007);

• WO 20603944, Open Inspect Eddy Current B D/G Heat Exchangers;

• PT-2.8Q, Component Cooling Water Pump Test, for CCW Pump A following maintenance under WO20600611, Component Cooling Water Pump A Breaker Preventive Maintenance (PM) (May 1, 2007);

• WO2070315, Calibrate Flow Controller for RM-10A/11/12 (May 5, 2007);

• WO20504928, Inspect/Perform Maintenance and Test of Emergency Sirens (May 23, 2007); and

• PT-2.7.1, Service Water Pump Test, for SW pump B following maintenance under WO20603857 and WO20603858 for SW pump B motor PM Inspection and Pump Rebuild (June 2, 2007).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - Four samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the performance and/or reviewed test data for the following four surveillance tests that are associated with selected risk-significant SSCs to verify that TSs were followed, and that acceptance criteria were properly specified. The inspectors also verified that proper test conditions were established as specified in the procedures that no equipment preconditioning activities occurred, and that acceptance criteria had been met. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• PT-2.1Q, Safety Injection (SI) System Quarterly Test (April 10, 2007)

• PT-12.1, Emergency Diesel Generator A (May 28-29, 2007)

• PT-32A, Reactor Trip Breaker Testing - Train A (June 8, 2007)

• PT 2.9, Check Valve and Manual Valve Exercising Quarterly (June 14, 2007)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications(71111.23 - One sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following temporary plant modification, 2007-0008, seal weld on B CS pump casing drain, to determine whether the temporary change adversely affected system or support system availability, or adversely affected a function important to plant safety. The inspectors reviewed the associated system design bases, including the UFSAR and TS, and assessed the adequacy of the safety determination screening and evaluation. The inspectors also assessed configuration control of the temporary change by reviewing selected drawings and procedures to verify whether appropriate updates had been made. The inspectors compared the actual installation with the temporary modification documents to determine whether the implemented change was consistent with the approved documented modification. The temporary modification was reviewed by the inspectors in the field to verify it was installed in conformance with the instructions contained in procedure IP-DES-3, Temporary Modifications. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - One sample)

a. Inspection Scope

On April 24, 2007, the inspectors observed licensed operator simulator scenario, ECA1112-07, LOCA Outside Containment, that included a limited test of Ginnas emergency response plan. The inspectors verified that emergency classification declarations and notifications were completed in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.72, 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E, and emergency plan implementing procedures. Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP7 Force-On-Force (FOF) Exercise Evaluation (71114.07 - One sample)

a. Inspection Scope

On June 28, 2007, the inspectors observed Ginnas control room drill player response during one site emergency preparedness drill conducted in conjunction with a Force-on-Force exercise, documented in inspection report 05000244/2007202. The inspectors observed utilization of the security response procedures including classification of the scenario within time requirements. The inspectors also observed portions of the post drill critique to determine whether observed deficiencies were also identified by the stations evaluators.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01 - 13 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

During the period April 9 to 12, 2007, the inspectors performed the following activities to verify that Ginna was properly implementing physical, administrative, and engineering controls for access to locked high radiation areas (LHRA), and other radiologically controlled areas (RCA) during normal power operations, and that workers were adhering to these controls when working in these areas. Implementation of these controls was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR Part 20, Ginna TSs and procedures.

This activity represents the completion of 13 samples relative to this inspection area partially completing the annual inspection requirement of 21.

Plant Walkdown and RWP Reviews The inspectors toured accessible RCAs and, with the assistance of a radiation protection technician, performed independent radiation surveys of selected areas and components to confirm the accuracy of survey data and the adequacy of postings.

Surveys were performed in the intermediate building (hot side), auxiliary building, contaminated storage building, radioactive material storage building, upper radwaste storage building, and old steam generator storage mausoleum.

The inspectors identified plant areas where radiologically significant work activities were being performed. These activities included cutting out and replacing the drain line on the C SI pump, installation of supports for V-9640B, and camera repair in the contaminated storage building. The inspectors reviewed the applicable Radiation Work Permit (RWP)for these activities (RWP 7001) and the electronic dosimeter dose/dose rate alarm set points for the associated tasks to determine if the radiological controls were acceptable and if the set points were consistent with plant policy.

There were no current RWPs for airborne radioactivity areas with the potential for individual worker internal exposures of greater than 50 mrem.

During 2006, there were no internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposures greater than 50 mrem committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE). The inspectors reviewed selected CEDE dose assessments for 2007. The inspectors also reviewed assessments for shallow dose equivalents and total effective dose equivalents.

Problem Identification and Resolution A review of quality performance assessment quarterly reports, bench marking reports, and RP departmental self-assessment reports was performed to determine if identified problems were entered into the corrective action program for resolution.

Nineteen CRs, associated with radiation protection control access, initiated between December 1, 2006 and April 9, 2007, were reviewed and discussed with station staff to determine if the follow-up activities were being performed in an effective and timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance.

Jobs-In-Progress Review Based on Ginnas schedule, on-going jobs were selected for observation. The inspectors observed replacement of a drain line on the C SI pump, installation of supports for V-9640B, and camera repair in the contaminated storage building. The inspectors attended the pre-job briefing for the drain line replacement (WO-20402442)to determine that the radiological work conditions were adequately communicated to the workers.

There were no significant dose gradients requiring relocation of dosimetry for the radiologically significant jobs reviewed during this inspection.

High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls Procedures for controlling access to high radiation areas (HRA) and very high radiation areas were reviewed to determine if the administrative and physical controls were adequate. Keys to LHRA were inventoried and accessible LHRAs were verified to be properly secured and posted during plant tours.

Radiation Worker and Radiation Protection Technician Performance Several radiologically related CRs were reviewed to evaluate if the incidents resulted from repetitive worker errors and to determine if an observable pattern traced to a similar cause was evident. Radiation protection technicians and workers were interviewed regarding their knowledge of plant radiological conditions and associated controls.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02 - Eight samples)

a. Inspection Scope

During the period April 9 to 12, 2007, the inspectors performed the following activities to verify that Ginna was properly implementing operational, engineering, and administrative controls to maintain personnel exposure as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) for past activities performed during the 2006 fall refueling outage (2006 RFO). The inspectors also reviewed the dose controls for current activities and the forecasted dose during power operations for 2007. Implementation of these controls was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR Part 20, applicable industry standards, and station procedures.

Radiological Work Planning The inspectors reviewed pertinent information regarding cumulative exposure history, current exposure trends, and ongoing activities to assess 2006 outage performance and dose challenges for 2007.

The inspectors reviewed the ALARA challenge board questionnaires and ensured Ginna had established procedures, engineering, and work controls to achieve occupational exposures that are ALARA. Questionnaires reviewed included inspections of the auxiliary building A & B sump pump motors, and B accumulator piping/valves.

The inspectors evaluated the departmental interfaces between radiation protection, operations, maintenance crafts, and engineering to identify missing ALARA program elements and interface problems. The evaluation was accomplished by attending a pre-job briefing for a SI pump drain line replacement, reviewing recent station ALARA committee meeting minutes and ALARA challenge board questionnaires, and interviewing the ALARA supervisor.

Verification of Dose Estimates The inspectors reviewed the assumptions and basis for the annual (2007) site collective exposure projections for routine power operations.

The inspectors reviewed Ginnas procedures associated with monitoring and re-evaluating dose estimates when the forecasted cumulative exposure for tasks differed from the actual dose received. The inspectors reviewed dose extension requests for selected individuals to determine if administrative procedures were appropriately implemented for monitoring and controlling worker dose.

Jobs-In-Progress The inspectors observed the pre-job briefing for replacing the pipe and elbows at V-2814, a drain line on the C SI pump, during power operations, on April 10, 2007.

The inspectors reviewed the RWP (#07001) and various visual aids used for communicating the radiological/industrial safety controls applied to auxiliary building entries during power operations.

Declared Pregnant Workers The inspectors reviewed the procedural controls for managing declared pregnant workers (DPW) and determined that no DPWs were employed at the site since the last inspection of this area.

Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed elements of Ginnas corrective action program related to implementing the ALARA program to determine if problems were being entered into the program for timely resolution. Five CRs related to controlling individual personnel exposure and programmatic ALARA challenges were reviewed. Details of this review are contained in Section 4OA2 of this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems (71122.01 - Ten samples)

a. Inspection Scope

During the period June 25 to 29, 2007, the inspectors conducted the following activities to verify that the station was properly maintaining the gaseous and liquid effluent processing systems to ensure that radiological releases were properly mitigated, monitored, and evaluated with respect to public exposure. Implementation of these controls was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20 and 50, TS, the Off-site Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), and station procedures.

The inspectors reviewed the 2006 Annual Radiological Effluent Release Report to verify that the effluent programs were implemented as required by the ODCM (Revision 20).

On June 26, 2007, the inspectors walked down the major components of the sites gaseous and liquid effluent monitoring systems with the Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) engineer, to verify that the system configuration complied with the UFSAR description, and to evaluate equipment material condition. The inspectors also reviewed calibration records, current quarterly system health reports, and related condition reports for malfunctioning equipment.

Effluent Monitors examined included:

Liquid:

• R-16, containment fan cooler monitor

• R-18, overboard waste liquid monitor

• R-19, steam generator blowdown monitor

• R-20A/B, spent fuel pool A/B SW monitors

• R-21, retention tank monitor

• R-22, high conductivity waste tank monitor Gaseous:

• R-10A, containment iodine monitor

• R-10B, plant iodine monitor

• R-11, containment air particulate monitor

• R-12, containment gas monitor

• R-13, plant particulate monitor

• R-14, plant gas monitor

• R-15, condenser air ejector monitor

• R-15A, condenser air ejector monitor (wide range)

The inspectors reviewed the liquid waste release procedure (CH-RETS-LIQ-REL) and observed a technician collecting and analyzing a sample in preparation for discharging the A monitor tank. The inspectors reviewed recent liquid discharge permits to verify that the effluent was properly analyzed and dose projections made in accordance with ODCM requirements.

The inspectors reviewed the current site surveillance monthly test procedure for process radiation monitors R-11 and R-22, and iodine monitors R-10 A/B to confirm that the instrumentation and related interlocks were operable.

The inspectors reviewed the most current air cleaning system surveillance test results for high efficiency particulate absolute (HEPA) and charcoal filtration systems and discussed the results with the ventilation system engineer. The inspector confirmed that the air flow rates were consistent with ODCM values.

The inspectors reviewed the status of ongoing enhancements to the radiological effluent monitoring program including the implementation of new dose assessment software, R-15A upgrades, development of RETS/REMP training, and installation of new charcoal in plant ventilation systems.

The inspector reviewed the monthly dose projections for liquid and gaseous effluents performed during the past 12 months to verify that the effluent was processed and released in accordance with ODCM requirements. The inspector also confirmed that grab sampling was performed during periods when the installed instrumentation was not operable.

The inspectors reviewed radioactive gaseous effluent release permits for the fall 2006 refueling outage, including the projected doses to members of the public. The inspectors confirmed that no RETS/ODCM performance indicator was exceeded.

The inspectors reviewed the calibration records and daily quality control records for the counting room gamma spectroscopy instrumentation, located in the counting room (Detectors Nos. 1 and 2) and in the environmental laboratory, and the beta scintillation counter to determine if the required lower limits of detection (LLD) were achievable and that effluent samples were adequately characterized and quantified.

The inspectors reviewed the results of the sites inter-laboratory quarterly cross check program for 2005, 2006, to date, to verify the quality and accuracy of effluent sample analysis performed by the station. The inspectors confirmed that discrepancies in data were entered into the CAP.

The inspectors reviewed Ginnas actions to evaluate and monitor potential groundwater pathways that may contain radioactive materials from past spills and leaks. This review included the Groundwater Protection Action Plan, Groundwater Notification and Reporting Requirements procedure (CHA-RETS-GRNDWTR-RPT, Rev 0), the Collection and Analysis of Groundwater Sampling procedure (CH-SAMP-GRNDWTR, Rev 9), recent monitoring well sampling results, and the 10 CFR 50.75 (g)decommissioning records.

Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed sixteen 16 condition reports, two audit reports, and two quality performance assessment reports to evaluate the licensees threshold for identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems in implementing the ODCM. This review was conducted against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20 and 50, the ODCM, and station procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151 - Two samples)

a. Inspection Scope

Using the criteria specified in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 4, the inspectors verified the completeness and accuracy of the performance indicator data for unplanned power changes per 7,000 critical hours and safety system functional failures. To verify the accuracy of the data, the inspectors reviewed monthly operating reports, NRC inspection reports and Ginna event reports issued during calendar year 2006.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Continuous Review

a. Inspection Scope

As specified by Inspection Procedure (IP) 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems," and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into Ginnas CAP. This review was accomplished by reviewing electronic copies of each CR, periodic attendance at daily screening meetings, and accessing Ginnas CAP computerized database.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings or observations of significance were identified.

.2 Semi-Annual Review (71152 - One sample)

a. Inspection Scope

In order to identify trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue, the inspectors reviewed a sample of system health reports, department performance indicators, and CRs initiated from January 2007 through mid-May 2007.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a trend report for the first quarter 2007, the temporary modification log, the MR status report and a 2007 Top 10 Issues List. The inspectors also discussed trends and potential trends with appropriate station personnel.

Although several trends or potential trends were identified by the inspectors, plant personnel were aware of these and had initiated corrective actions as necessary.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings or observations of significance were identified.

.3 Annual Sample - Welding Quality Issues Review (71152 - One sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspection was performed using IP 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, to follow-up actions taken by the plant staff to address a number of weld related problems identified during and after the Fall 2006 refueling outage.

The inspectors reviewed the CRs and action items listed in the Attachment, which involved the welding application and work control related problems to determine if these issues were properly identified and addressed by corrective actions. Work packages for completed work and work in the planning stage were reviewed to verify how welding requirements were documented in the work control documents. The inspection included a walkdown of the weld material storage and issuing location and an examination of the weld material issuing process. Additionally, the inspectors observed the use of a work package (WO 20702566) for in-progress welding work of valve CV-5924A replacement to determine if welding requirements were being met.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified.

The inspectors determined that weld program procedures and processes were in the process of undergoing change to strengthen the welding program and the related work planning and documentation. Additional conditions for enhancement that were identified as a result of inspection observations and questions were included in the condition reporting system as CRs or action items.

.4 Annual Sample - Operator Workarounds (71152 - One sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the operator workaround program to verify that workaround problems were identified at an appropriate threshold and entered into the CAP. To perform this review, the inspectors performed a control room walkdown and discussed deficiencies with control room operators to determine if deficiencies were appropriately identified and that their impact on operations was assessed. Workarounds that affected a mitigating systems function or the operators ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures were reviewed more closely. As part of this review, the inspectors reviewed the procedure for workaround control and a recent self-assessment report regarding the aggregate impact of the active operator workarounds, challenges, and degraded operability items.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings or observations of significance were identified.

.5 Annual Sample - Safety Culture Survey (71152 - One sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted an in-office inspection of Ginnas 2007 Safety Culture Survey data, and compared the results with the survey conducted in 2006. The inspectors also reviewed the self-assessment report on safety culture performed in March 2007, and the CRs initiated as a result of the effort.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified.

The inspectors noted that the survey sample sizes were relatively small compared to the available population for Ginna. For the 2006 survey, 53 individuals participated, and in the 2007 survey, there were 42 participants; and the total Ginna staff (including contractors) is approximately 440. This equates to about 12 percent in 2006, and about 9.5 percent in 2007.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

.1 Reactor Compartment Cooler Service Water Leak

a. Inspection Scope

(71153 - One sample)

On May 30, 2007, the reactor compartment sump A level (rate of increase) sharply increased. Subsequent investigation over the next several days determined that the source of the increase was from the A reactor compartment cooler SW system. The inspectors followed Ginnas response to the event and verified that proper and timely corrective actions as well as compensatory actions were taken to ensure adequate leakage detection capabilities continued for the plant. The leak was temporarily repaired on June 6, 2007, and permanently isolated on June 14, 2007, by plugging the leaking tube. The reactor compartment cooler is a non-safety component.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 (Closed) LER 05000244/2007002-00, Closure of Main Steam Isolation Valve Results in

Safety Injection Signal and Plant Trip This event was reviewed in section 4OA3.5 of Ginna quarterly inspection report 2007002. Further review of the trip indicated that contrary to the last report, no steam generator safety valves opened during the transient. The trip was documented in CR 2007-2172. No deficiencies were noted in the submitted LER and it is closed.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Deputy Regional Administrator (DRA) Site Visit.

On May 21, 2007, a site visit was conducted by Mr. M. Dapas, DRA for Region I. During Mr. Dapas visit, he toured the plant and met with Constellation managers.

Resident Inspector Quarterly

Exit Meeting Summary

On July 5, 2007, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. John Carlin and other members of his staff. The inspectors asked Ginna whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.

No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee-identified Violations

None.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Ginna Personnel

J. Carlin Vice President, Ginna

S. Adams Manager of Operations

D. Blankenship Manager, Radiation Protection

E. Groh Assistant Operations Manager (Shift)

D. Holm Plant Manager

S. Kennedy Emergency Preparedness Manager

B. Randall Nuclear Safety and Licensing Manager

W. Thomson Chemistry Supervisor

R. Whalen Manager Nuclear Engineering Services

J. Yoe Scheduling Manager

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Closed

05000244/2007002-00 LER Closure of Main Steam Isolation Valve Results in Safety Injection Signal and Plant Trip