B17102, Proposed Tech Specs Changing TSs 3.4.4, RCS - Pressurizer, 3.6.1.5, Containment Sys - Air Temp & 3.7.1.5, Plant Sys - Msli Valves

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Proposed Tech Specs Changing TSs 3.4.4, RCS - Pressurizer, 3.6.1.5, Containment Sys - Air Temp & 3.7.1.5, Plant Sys - Msli Valves
ML20216C076
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 04/06/1998
From:
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20216C048 List:
References
B17102, NUDOCS 9804140277
Download: ML20216C076 (17)
v • d • e


Text

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Docket No. 50-336 817102 Attachment 3

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Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2

Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Compliance issues Number 3 Marked Up Pages l

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April 1998 9804140277 980406 PDR ADOCK 05000336 p PDR

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. a;1y 7, 10 s s- - .

i REACTOR.C0btANTSYSTEM PRESSURI7ER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.4 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

A water volume greater than or equal to 525 cubic feet (35%) but I less than or equal to 1050 cubic feet (70%), and I b.

At least two groups of pressurizer heaters each having a capacity of at least 130 kW capable of being supplied by emergency power.

APPLICABillTY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

,I a.

With oniy one group of pressurizer heaters OPERABLE, restore at least two least groups to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the'following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

b. With the pressurizer otherwise' inoperable, be ii. at least HOT STANDBY with the reactor trip breakers o HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. pen within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in i l
  • URVE1LLANCE REQUIREMENT

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l 4.4.4 limits a!atTheleastpressurizer once per 12water volume shall be determined to be within its hours. ,

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4. 4.1.1 Ve<,6 al has+ k gmps dyrsserv h~hs, w GI, an u,ylied b yrwges,cy pu, each have a cyuJ y &

a + ka s 4

/30 uv a f lea s+ osce y<< 92 e4ys.

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MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-4 AmendmentNo.JJ,JJ,p6(([

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- Auvvii.1,107

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS AIR TEMPERATURE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION .

3.6.1.5 Primary containment average air temperature shall not exceed 120'F. ,.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the containment average air temperature > 120*F, reduce the average air temperature to within the limit within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.5 The primary containment average air temperature shell im um-withmetic:1 Ov:r:; ef the tes,+eretores et the fellerin; locatica: ;r,d shall be determinedpt least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> /g ,

Lacetien --

de d /J o'A' e.- 00 ft. elevatier., ';C uuni.ain-nt WaW

t. 28 f t. elev:ti:n, Sh' cer,taire,cni. waii .

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MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-9

-August 1,4975-- l l

PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be OPERABLE. i APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

l ACTION:

MODE 1 -

With one main steam line isolation valve inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable pro 0E A Io

' valve is either restored to OPERABLE status or closed in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; otherwise, be in liOT 0l"T00dwithin the ~

next hours.

f ,, f,, ,,,, c.dm n MODES 2 - f pnwd<d and 3 With one%ain steam line isolation valvepoperable,/sub-sequent operation in MODES t,- 2 or 3 may ,r;;::d :f t:r #

the inoperable Jelve is restored to OPERABLE _ status or valve (s) the isolationN:1ve is :::: int:inci clos

/s (are) in "0T S!,"JTOOLi? within ... ....,. . , . .. , otherwise , be --

w,o 1 hou,, o inoDE 3 win,~ The neaf C has Vebfoe'./ chs,J a f  ;

      1. " " "* *^ "*"# #
  1. ""f"'7d )

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS "# '

y3 <

4.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve th:t i: :;:n shall be demonstratedOPERABLEbyf

4. P:rt-sti Uke e;;ercisir.g the valve et4 east-once per 92-daysr

-and-

-tn- -Verifying full closure within 6 seconds on any closure actuation signal while in HOT STANDBY with T > 515'F during within closure each-r:::^5econds 6 need not be detemined more oftenr shutdm ex than once per 92 days, jy pg, 7Xx yo.nsw.vr of hhnuu/ r Spno La he+ %. Y do m /

afply & c by4 mor 3, g 1% maio deam /,are ade% vaIves mey de opewed h pe<W Jhava;tta ,ee Reguna<wI M, t. S.  ;

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 7-9

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c ,

I CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4 . 6.1. 4 INTERNAL PRESSURE The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that the contain-ment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 54 psig during MSLB or LOCA conditions.

The maximum peak pressure is obtained from a MSLB event. The limit of 1.0 l psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to less than the design pressure and is consistent with the accident analyses. .

1 3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE j The limitation on containment air temperature ensures that the contain-ment air temperature does not exceed the worst case combined LOCA/MSLB air ,

temperature profile and the liner temperature of 289'F. The containment air  !

and liner temperature limits are consistent with the accident analyses. l 3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY ERT This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment vessel will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the i vessel will withstand the design pressure of 54 psig in the event of a LOCA or MSLB. The measurement of containment tendon lift off force, the visual and metallurgical examination of tendons, anchorages and liner and the Type A leakage tests are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. -

The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the containment's struc-tural integrity are in compliance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.35 " Inservice Surveillance of Ungrouted Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Containment Structures."

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gLSTONE-UNIT 2 8 3/4 6-2 Amendment No. JJ. 77, 777, 19J 209 l l

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INSERT A - Pace B 3/4 6-2 The temperature detectors used to monitor primary containment air temperature

'ere located on the 38 ft. 6 in floor elevation in containment. The detectors are located approximately 6 feet above the floor, on the southeast and southwest containment walls.

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PLANT _ SYSTEMS

-Mary 17,100F E

3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY (Continued) of 10 CFR Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture. The dose calculations for an assumed steam line rupture include the effects of a coincident 1.0 GPM primary to secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line and a concurrent loss of offsite electrical power. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses. .

3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES-The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blowdown in the event of a steam line ruptGre. This restriction is required to 1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and 2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment. The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the surveillance requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the acjidentanalyses. g- qg7. g 3/4.7.1.6 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION COMPONENTS (MFICs) l Feedwater isolation response time ensures a rapid isolation of feed flow ti the steam generators via the feedwater regulating valves, feedwater bypass

  • valves, and as backup, feed pump discharge valves. The response time includes signal generation time and valve stroke. Feed lire block valves also receive a feedwater isolation signal since the steam line break accident analysis credits them in prevention of feed line volume flashing in some cases. Since the block valves are cot credited with isolation, they are not required to operate as fast as the isolation valves although equal response times for all valves are specified. Feedwater pumps are assumed to trip isusediately with an MSI signal,.

3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 70*F and 200-psig are based on a steam generator RT ,, of 50*F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.

3/4.7.3 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the reactor building closed cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of vital components and Engineered Safety Feature equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

I MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-3 AmendmentNo.U,p

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INSERT B - Pace B 3/4 7-3 The ability of the main steam line isolation valves (MSIVs) to close is verified after the plant has been heated up. Since it is necessary to establish a high Reactnr  :

Coolant System temperature before the surveillance test can be performed, an I exception to Technical Specification 4.0.4 has been added to SR 4.7.1.5 to allow entry into Mode 3. This is necessary to allow plant startup to proceed with equipment that is believed to be OPERABLE, but that cannot be verified by performance of the surveillance test until the appropriate plant conditions have been established. After i entering Mode 3, and establishing the necessary plant conditions (Tavg >_515 F), the MSIVs will be declared inoperable if SR 4.7.1.5 has not been performed within the required frequency, plus 25%, in accordance with Technical Specifications 4.0.2 and 4.0.3. The action statement for Modes 2 and 3 would then be entered. However, the  !

required actions can be deferred for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (Technical Specification 4.0.3) to allow performance of SR 4.7.1.5. If the surveillance test is not performed within this 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time period, the requirements of the action statement for Modes 2 and 3 apply, and the MSlV(s) must be either restored to OPERABLE status or closed. Closing the MSIV(s) put the valve (s) in the required accident condition. However, the MSIVs may be opened to perform SR 4.7.1.5. If the MSIV(s) cannot be closed, the plant must be shut down to MODE 4.

. Docket No. 50-336 B17102 Attachment 4 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Compliance lasues Number 3 Retyped Pages i

1 April 1998 ,

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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURIZER LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.4 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with:

a. A water volume greater than or equal to 525 cubic feed (35%) but I less than or equal to 1050 cubic feet (70%), and
b. At least two groups of pressurizer heaters each having a capacity of at least 130 kW capable of being supplied by emergency power.

APPLICABILITY: N0 DES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a. With only one group of pressurizer heaters OPERABLE, restore at least two groups to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

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b. With the pressurizer otherwise inoperable, be in at least HOT l STANDBY with the reactor trip breakers open within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in l HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.4.4.1 The pressurizer water volume shall be determined to be within its l limits at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

4.4.4.2 Verify at least two groups of pressurizer heaters, which are supplied by emergency power, each have a capacity of at least 130 kW at least once per 92 days.

i NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4-4 Amendment No. M. 7f, #. #P.

0366

CONTAINNENT SYSTENS AIR TEMPERATURE LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.5 Primary containment average air temperature shall not exceed 120*F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the containment average air temperature > 120*F, reduce the average air temperature to within the limit within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, or be in C3LD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENT$

4.6.1.5 The primary containment average air temperature shall be determined to be s 120*F at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

I NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6 9 0356 Amendment No.

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PLANT SYSTENS NAIN STEAN LINE ISOLATION VALVES i

LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1

3.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

MODE 1 -

With one main steam line isolation valve inoperable, l POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is either restored to OPERABLE status or closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; otherwise, be in MODE 2 within the next l

, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

MODES 2 -

With one or more main steam line isolation valves and 3 inoperable, subsequent operation in MODES 2 or 3 may continue provided the inoperable valve (s) is(are) i restored to OPERABLE status or the isolation valve (s) is(are) closed

  • within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and verified closed at least once per 7 days; otherwise, be in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS i

4.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 6 seconds on any closure actuation signal while in HOT STANDBY, with T~ 1515'F during each plant startup except that verification of full i closure within 6 seconds need not be determined more often than  !

once per 92 days. The provisions of Technical Specification I i 4.0.4 do not apply for entry into MODE 3. j l I l

I

, Requirement 4.7.1.5.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 7-9 Amendment No.

0357

1 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that the contain-ment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 54 psig during MSLB or LOCA conditions.

I The maximum peak pressure is obtained from a MSLB event. The limit of 1.0 l psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to l 1ess than the design pressure and is consistent with the accident analyses.

L 3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE The limitation on containment air temperature ensuras that the contain- I' l ment air temperature does not exceed the worst case combined LOCA/MSLB air

temperature profile and the liner temperature of 289'F. The containment air l l and liner temperature limits are consistent with the accident analyses.  !

l l The temperature detectors used to monitor primary containment air temperature are located on the 38 ft. 6 in. floor elevation in containment.

The detectors are located approximately 6 feet above the floor, on the l southeast and southwest containment walls.

3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY l This limitation ensures that the structural integrity' of the containment vessel will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the l Vessel will withstand the design pressure of 54 psig in the event of a LOCA or

! MSLB. The measurement of containment tendon lift off force, the visual and metallurgical examination of tendons, anchorages and liner and the Type A leakage tests are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the containment's struc-tural integrity are in compliance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide l 1.35 " Inservice Surveillance of Ungrouted Tendons in Prestressed Concrete l Containment Structures."

L l

l l

l MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-2 Amendment No. 75, 77. J # , 7 # ,

one 7#,

~

, PLANT SYSTEMS Rain 3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY (Continued) of 10 CFR Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture. The dose calculations for an assumed steam line rupture include the effects of a coincident 1.0 GPM primary to secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line and a concurrent loss of offsite electrical power. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blowdown in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to 1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and 2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment. The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the surveillance requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the

! accident analyses.

The ability of the main steam line isolation valves (MSIVs) to close is verified after the plant has been heated up. Since it is necessary to

! establish a high Reactor Coolant System temperature before the surveillance l test can be performed, an exception to Technical Specification 4.0.4 has been added to SR 4.7.1.5 to allow entry into MODE 3. This is necessary to allow plant startup to proceed with equipment that is believed to be OPERABLE, but that cannot be verified by performance of the surveillance test until the appropriate plant conditions have been established. After entering MODE 3 and establishing the necessary plant condition (T 2 515'F), the MSIVs will be j declared inoperable if SR 4.7.1.5 has not bee,n performed within the required frequency, plus 25%, in accordance with Technical Specifications 4.0.2 and 4.0.3. The action statement for MODES 2 and 3 would tnen be entered.

l However, the required actions can be deferred for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (Technical l Specification 4.0.3) to allow performance of SR 4.7.1.5. If the surveillance

test is not performed within this 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time period, the requirements of the I action statement for MODES 2 and 3 apply, and the MSIV(s) must be either I restored to OPERABLE status or closed. Closing the MSIV(s) put the valve (s) l in the required accident condition. However, the MSIV(s) may be opened to perform SR 4.7.1.5. If the MSIV(s) cannot be closed, the plant must be shut down to MODE 4.

3/4.7.1.6 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION COMPONENTS (MFICs) l Feedwater isolation response time ensures a rapid isolation of feed flow l l

to the steam generators via the feedwater regulating valves, feedwater bypass i valves, and as backup, feed pump discharge valves. The response time includes signal generation time and valve stroke. Feed line block valves also receive MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 7-3 Amendment No. 77 177, om

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES a feedwater isolation signal since the steam line break accident analysis credits them in prevention of feed line volume flashing in some cases. Since the block valves are not credited with isolation, they are not required to operate as fast as the isolation valves although equal response times for all valves are specified. Feedwater pumps are assumed to trip immediately with an MSI signal.

3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION t

l The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures l that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed l the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations l of 70*F and 200-psig are based on a steam generator RTuor of 50*F l and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture. I l

l l 3/4.7.3 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER SYSTEM l

i The OPERABILITY of the reactor building closed cooling water system l

, ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation i

of vital components and Engineered Safety Feature equipment during normal and l accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

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NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 7-3a Amendment No. 77, Jpp, 0359

. Docket No. 50-336 817102 Attachment 3 Millstone Nuclear Power Gtation, Unit No. 2 Proposed Revision to Tecnnical Specifications Compliance isstes Number 3 NNECO Commitments 1

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April 1998 )

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, U. S. Nucl:ar Regul: tory Commission 817102/ Attachment 5/Page 1 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Compliance issues Number 3 List of Regulatory Commitments The following table identifies those actions committed to by NNECO in this document.

Please notify the Manager - Regulatory Compliance at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 2 of any questions regarding this document or any associated regulatory commitments.

Commitment Committed Date or Outage NONE N/A l

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