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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217K3161999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards Amend 195 to License DPR-61 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Deletes Certain TSs Either No Longer Applicable to Permanently Shutdown & Defueled State of Reactor or Duplicate Regulatory Requirements CY-99-137, Notifies NRC of Intent to Apply Haddam Neck Plant 10CFR50 App B,Qa Program to Activities Related to Development of ISFSI at Haddam1999-10-12012 October 1999 Notifies NRC of Intent to Apply Haddam Neck Plant 10CFR50 App B,Qa Program to Activities Related to Development of ISFSI at Haddam DD-99-11, Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-11) Expired & That Commission Declined Any Review.Decision Became Final Action on 9910041999-10-0808 October 1999 Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-11) Expired & That Commission Declined Any Review.Decision Became Final Action on 991004 ML20212L1261999-10-0404 October 1999 Forwards Viewgraphs Presented by Licensee at 990923 Meeting with Nrc,In Response to Request ML20212D0341999-09-20020 September 1999 Expresses Appreciation for Accepting NRC Request for Tour of Haddam Neck Facility During on 991014.Invites R Mellor to Participate in NRC 1999 Decommissioninng Power Reactor Work- Shop:Nrc Insp Program at Decommissioning Power Reactors CY-99-111, Submits Clarification of Changes Made to Connecticut Yankee QA Program,Per Util 990810 Submittal.Change Will Be Submitted to NRC in Dec 1999 as Part of Annual Update1999-09-0202 September 1999 Submits Clarification of Changes Made to Connecticut Yankee QA Program,Per Util 990810 Submittal.Change Will Be Submitted to NRC in Dec 1999 as Part of Annual Update ML20211E8051999-08-20020 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-213/99-02 on 990420-0719.No Violations Noted.Completion of Corrective Actions for Spent Fuel Bldg Ventilation Issues Adequate ML20210J6021999-08-0202 August 1999 Informs That Info Re Orise Technical Survey Assistance to NRC at CT Yankee Is to Include Copies of Listed Documents CY-99-048, Forwards Cyap Rept CY-HP-0031,Rev 0, Bounding Dose Assessment for Offsite Radioactive Matls1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards Cyap Rept CY-HP-0031,Rev 0, Bounding Dose Assessment for Offsite Radioactive Matls CY-99-066, Forwards Revised Plan for Recovery of Licensed Matl from Offsite Locations.Completion of Implementation of Plan During Summer of 1999 Is Planned,Contingent on Support Extended by Property Owners,Weather & Uncontrolled Factors1999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Revised Plan for Recovery of Licensed Matl from Offsite Locations.Completion of Implementation of Plan During Summer of 1999 Is Planned,Contingent on Support Extended by Property Owners,Weather & Uncontrolled Factors ML20210C1491999-07-0101 July 1999 Responds to ,Which Responded to NRC Ltr & NOV & Informs That Engagement in Any Similar Wrongdoing in Future May Result in More Significant Enforcement Action. No Further Action Will Be Taken at This Time ML20209C3911999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards TS Page 6-3 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20195H1741999-06-15015 June 1999 Forwards Original & Copy of Request for Approval of Certain Indirect & Direct Transfer of License & Ownership Interests of Montaup Electric Co (Montaup) with Respect to Nuclear Facilities Described as Listed ML20195F9011999-06-0909 June 1999 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp 50-213/98-06 on 990226. Util Did Not Agree with Disposition of Issue Cited as Severity Level IV Violation.Violation Will Be Noncited ML20195H3591999-06-0202 June 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp of License DPR-61.Corrective Actions:Disciplinary Actions Were Taken by Util Against Jm Foley & Individual & Departmental Emphasis Is Placed on New HP Stds & Expectations ML20207E9031999-06-0202 June 1999 Informs That NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Reorganized Effective 990328.As Part of Reorganization,Div of Licensing Project Mgt Created.Mt Masnik Will Be Section Chief for Haddam Neck.Organization Chart Encl ML20207B9301999-05-25025 May 1999 Responds to 990114 Correspondence Re Changes to Plant Defueled Physical Security Plan Rev 1 Submitted Under 10CFR50.54(p).Implementation of Changes Subj to Insp to Confirm Changes Have Not Decreased Security Plan ML20207G1761999-05-21021 May 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-213/99-01 on 980119-990419 & Closure of CAL 1-97-010.No Violations Noted.Conduct of Activities Associated with Control of Radiological Work at Haddam Neck Generally Characterized as Careful & Thorough ML20206R7221999-05-12012 May 1999 Refers to Investigation 1-97-031 on 970616-0718 & Forwards Nov.Investigation Found That Recipient Deliberately Did Not Follow Radiation Protection Procedures,Falsified Documents & Provided Incomplete & Inaccurate Info to NRC ML20206R8051999-05-12012 May 1999 Responds to 3 Investigations,Repts 1-97-031,008 & 1-98-008 Between 970314 & 980722 as Well as Insp Conducted Between 980720 & 1102.Forwards Synopsis of 3rd OI Investigation ML20206R7021999-05-12012 May 1999 Refers to Investigation 1-97-008 Conducted by Region I & Forwards Notice of Violation.Investigation Found That Recipient Deliberately Attempted to Conceal Release of Contaminated Video Equipment ML20206J2801999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Financial Repts for CT Light & Power Co,Western Ma Electric Co,Public Svc Co of Nh,North Atlantic Energy Corp,Northeast Nuclear Energy Co & North Atlantic Energy Svc Corp,License Holders CY-99-057, Forwards 1998 Annual Radioactive Effluent Rept for HNP, & Rev 10 to Remodcm. with Summary of Quantities of Solid Radwaste & Liquid & Gaseous Effluents,As Well as Summary of Assessment of Max Individual Dose1999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Radioactive Effluent Rept for HNP, & Rev 10 to Remodcm. with Summary of Quantities of Solid Radwaste & Liquid & Gaseous Effluents,As Well as Summary of Assessment of Max Individual Dose ML20206C8631999-04-28028 April 1999 Forwards Amend 194 to License DPR-61 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Authorizes Relocation of Requirements Related to Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation from TSs to Technical Requirements Manual ML20206A6871999-04-22022 April 1999 Informs of Completion of Review of Re Nepco in Capacity as Minority Shareholder in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp,Yaec,Myap & Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co ML20210V5221999-04-0808 April 1999 Discusses Continued Performance of Technical Assistance Activities for NRC & Environ Survey & Site Assessment Program (Essap) Survey Assistance at Cy IR 05000213/19960121999-04-0505 April 1999 Discusses NRC Insp Repts 50-213/96-12 & 50-213/98-04 on 961102-27 Re Airborne Radioactivity Contamination Event That Occurred in Fuel Transfer Canal & Reactor Cavity in Nov 1996.Notice of Violation Encl ML20205J7931999-04-0505 April 1999 Discusses NRC Insp Repts 50-213/96-12 & 50-213/98-04 on 961102-27 Re Airborne Radioactivity Contamination Event That Occurred in Fuel Transfer Canal & Reactor Cavity in Nov 1996.Notice of Violation Encl CY-99-042, Provides Info on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Haddam Neck Plant1999-03-31031 March 1999 Provides Info on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Haddam Neck Plant CY-99-024, Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-06. Corrective Actions:Meetings Were Held with Contractor Mgt, Disciplinary Action Against Worker Was Taken & Notices Alerting Workers to HRA Controls Were Posted1999-03-29029 March 1999 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-06. Corrective Actions:Meetings Were Held with Contractor Mgt, Disciplinary Action Against Worker Was Taken & Notices Alerting Workers to HRA Controls Were Posted ML20206A6951999-03-29029 March 1999 Request Confirmation That No NRC Action or Approval,Required Relative to Proposed Change in Upstream Economic Ownership of New England Power Co,Minority Shareholder in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp,Yaec,Myap & Connecticut Yankee B17697, Notifies NRC of Amount of Property Insurance Coverage, Effective 990401,for HNP & Mnps,Units 1,2 & 3,per Provisions of 10CFR50.54(w)1999-03-12012 March 1999 Notifies NRC of Amount of Property Insurance Coverage, Effective 990401,for HNP & Mnps,Units 1,2 & 3,per Provisions of 10CFR50.54(w) CY-99-032, Clarifies Info Re TRM Change Submitted with Re Proposed Rev to TSs on Seismic Monitoring1999-03-0909 March 1999 Clarifies Info Re TRM Change Submitted with Re Proposed Rev to TSs on Seismic Monitoring ML20207B6641999-02-26026 February 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-213/98-06 on 981103-990118 & Notice of Violation Re Locked High Radiation Area Doors That Were Found Unlocked by Staff.Security Program Was Also Inspected ML20204C6901999-02-22022 February 1999 Informs That Public Citizen Waives Copyright for 5th Edition of Nuclear Lemon So NRC May Reproduce for Purpose of Contributing to NRC Recommended Improvements to Oversight Process for Nuclear Power Reactors ML20203H9621999-02-17017 February 1999 Responds to to Dk Rathbun Which Forwarded Number of Questions from Constituent Re Spent Fuel Decommissioned Nuclear plants.NUREG-1628, Staff Responses to Frequently Asked Questions Re Decommissioning of NPPs Encl.W/O Encl CY-99-005, Responds to NRC 981221 RAI Re Amend 193 to License to Reflect Permanent Shutdown Condition of Plant.Licensee Withdrawing 981030 (CY-98-199) Request & Will Submit Corrections in Future Proposed Rev to TS1999-01-29029 January 1999 Responds to NRC 981221 RAI Re Amend 193 to License to Reflect Permanent Shutdown Condition of Plant.Licensee Withdrawing 981030 (CY-98-199) Request & Will Submit Corrections in Future Proposed Rev to TS CY-99-023, Provides Summary of Understandings Reached During 990108 Meeting Between Util & CT Dept of Environ Protection Re Dike Area Rainwater Reporting Protocol1999-01-28028 January 1999 Provides Summary of Understandings Reached During 990108 Meeting Between Util & CT Dept of Environ Protection Re Dike Area Rainwater Reporting Protocol ML20203H9711999-01-21021 January 1999 Requests Response to Concerns Raised by Constitutent M Marucci Re Spent Fuel at Decommissioned Nuclear Plants CY-99-002, Forwards Response to NRC 981203 RAI Re Proposed License Amend to Relocate Requirements for Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation from Section 3/4.3.3.3 of TS to Trm. Supporting TSs Encl1999-01-18018 January 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 981203 RAI Re Proposed License Amend to Relocate Requirements for Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation from Section 3/4.3.3.3 of TS to Trm. Supporting TSs Encl CY-99-010, Provides Special Rept Concerning Potential of Radiation Exposure Due to Hypothetical Explosive Attack to Facility. Without Encl1999-01-14014 January 1999 Provides Special Rept Concerning Potential of Radiation Exposure Due to Hypothetical Explosive Attack to Facility. Without Encl CY-99-009, Forwards Rev 1 to Haddam Neck Plant Defueled Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 & 2.7901999-01-14014 January 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Haddam Neck Plant Defueled Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 & 2.790 ML20206R6051999-01-11011 January 1999 Ack Receipt of Submiting Sf Mgt Plan.Staff Has Reviewed Plan & Notes Plan to Store Sf in SFP Until DOE Takes Physical Possession of Fuel DD-98-12, Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision DD-98-12 Has Expired.Decision Became Final Agency Action on 981211. with Certificate of Svc.Served on 9812221998-12-22022 December 1998 Informs That Time Provided by NRC Regulation within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision DD-98-12 Has Expired.Decision Became Final Agency Action on 981211. with Certificate of Svc.Served on 981222 CY-98-142, Forwards Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Info & Approval of Exception Number 8 of App E of Cy Qap.Copy of Rev 2 Showing Changes from Rev 1 Also Included1998-12-22022 December 1998 Forwards Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Info & Approval of Exception Number 8 of App E of Cy Qap.Copy of Rev 2 Showing Changes from Rev 1 Also Included ML20198R1321998-12-21021 December 1998 Forwards Insp Rept 50-213/98-05 on 980720-1102.No Violations Noted.Insp Completes Review of Licensee Actions Described in ,In Response to NOV & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties ML20198K8651998-12-21021 December 1998 Ack Receipt of ,Requesting Corrected Pages to Be Issued for License Amend 193,issued on 980630.Informs That Inconsistencies Found When Comparing Corrected Pages Submitted on 981030 & License Amend Application CY-98-201, Provides Clarification of NRC Staff SE for Amend 193 Which Approved HNP Defueled TSs1998-12-0303 December 1998 Provides Clarification of NRC Staff SE for Amend 193 Which Approved HNP Defueled TSs IR 05000213/19980041998-11-27027 November 1998 Forwards Special Insp Rept 50-213/98-04 of Licensee Performance During Reactor Coolant Sys Chemical Decontamination ML20195J3571998-11-19019 November 1998 Forwards Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50.54(w) & 10CFR140.Exemption Submitted in Response to 971007 Application & Suppls & 1218,requesting Reduction in Amount of Insurance Required for Facility 1999-09-20
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARCY-99-137, Notifies NRC of Intent to Apply Haddam Neck Plant 10CFR50 App B,Qa Program to Activities Related to Development of ISFSI at Haddam1999-10-12012 October 1999 Notifies NRC of Intent to Apply Haddam Neck Plant 10CFR50 App B,Qa Program to Activities Related to Development of ISFSI at Haddam CY-99-111, Submits Clarification of Changes Made to Connecticut Yankee QA Program,Per Util 990810 Submittal.Change Will Be Submitted to NRC in Dec 1999 as Part of Annual Update1999-09-0202 September 1999 Submits Clarification of Changes Made to Connecticut Yankee QA Program,Per Util 990810 Submittal.Change Will Be Submitted to NRC in Dec 1999 as Part of Annual Update CY-99-048, Forwards Cyap Rept CY-HP-0031,Rev 0, Bounding Dose Assessment for Offsite Radioactive Matls1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards Cyap Rept CY-HP-0031,Rev 0, Bounding Dose Assessment for Offsite Radioactive Matls CY-99-066, Forwards Revised Plan for Recovery of Licensed Matl from Offsite Locations.Completion of Implementation of Plan During Summer of 1999 Is Planned,Contingent on Support Extended by Property Owners,Weather & Uncontrolled Factors1999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Revised Plan for Recovery of Licensed Matl from Offsite Locations.Completion of Implementation of Plan During Summer of 1999 Is Planned,Contingent on Support Extended by Property Owners,Weather & Uncontrolled Factors ML20209C3911999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards TS Page 6-3 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20195H1741999-06-15015 June 1999 Forwards Original & Copy of Request for Approval of Certain Indirect & Direct Transfer of License & Ownership Interests of Montaup Electric Co (Montaup) with Respect to Nuclear Facilities Described as Listed ML20195H3591999-06-0202 June 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp of License DPR-61.Corrective Actions:Disciplinary Actions Were Taken by Util Against Jm Foley & Individual & Departmental Emphasis Is Placed on New HP Stds & Expectations CY-99-057, Forwards 1998 Annual Radioactive Effluent Rept for HNP, & Rev 10 to Remodcm. with Summary of Quantities of Solid Radwaste & Liquid & Gaseous Effluents,As Well as Summary of Assessment of Max Individual Dose1999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Radioactive Effluent Rept for HNP, & Rev 10 to Remodcm. with Summary of Quantities of Solid Radwaste & Liquid & Gaseous Effluents,As Well as Summary of Assessment of Max Individual Dose ML20206J2801999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Financial Repts for CT Light & Power Co,Western Ma Electric Co,Public Svc Co of Nh,North Atlantic Energy Corp,Northeast Nuclear Energy Co & North Atlantic Energy Svc Corp,License Holders ML20210V5221999-04-0808 April 1999 Discusses Continued Performance of Technical Assistance Activities for NRC & Environ Survey & Site Assessment Program (Essap) Survey Assistance at Cy CY-99-042, Provides Info on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Haddam Neck Plant1999-03-31031 March 1999 Provides Info on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Haddam Neck Plant ML20206A6951999-03-29029 March 1999 Request Confirmation That No NRC Action or Approval,Required Relative to Proposed Change in Upstream Economic Ownership of New England Power Co,Minority Shareholder in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp,Yaec,Myap & Connecticut Yankee CY-99-024, Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-06. Corrective Actions:Meetings Were Held with Contractor Mgt, Disciplinary Action Against Worker Was Taken & Notices Alerting Workers to HRA Controls Were Posted1999-03-29029 March 1999 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-06. Corrective Actions:Meetings Were Held with Contractor Mgt, Disciplinary Action Against Worker Was Taken & Notices Alerting Workers to HRA Controls Were Posted B17697, Notifies NRC of Amount of Property Insurance Coverage, Effective 990401,for HNP & Mnps,Units 1,2 & 3,per Provisions of 10CFR50.54(w)1999-03-12012 March 1999 Notifies NRC of Amount of Property Insurance Coverage, Effective 990401,for HNP & Mnps,Units 1,2 & 3,per Provisions of 10CFR50.54(w) CY-99-032, Clarifies Info Re TRM Change Submitted with Re Proposed Rev to TSs on Seismic Monitoring1999-03-0909 March 1999 Clarifies Info Re TRM Change Submitted with Re Proposed Rev to TSs on Seismic Monitoring ML20204C6901999-02-22022 February 1999 Informs That Public Citizen Waives Copyright for 5th Edition of Nuclear Lemon So NRC May Reproduce for Purpose of Contributing to NRC Recommended Improvements to Oversight Process for Nuclear Power Reactors CY-99-005, Responds to NRC 981221 RAI Re Amend 193 to License to Reflect Permanent Shutdown Condition of Plant.Licensee Withdrawing 981030 (CY-98-199) Request & Will Submit Corrections in Future Proposed Rev to TS1999-01-29029 January 1999 Responds to NRC 981221 RAI Re Amend 193 to License to Reflect Permanent Shutdown Condition of Plant.Licensee Withdrawing 981030 (CY-98-199) Request & Will Submit Corrections in Future Proposed Rev to TS ML20203H9711999-01-21021 January 1999 Requests Response to Concerns Raised by Constitutent M Marucci Re Spent Fuel at Decommissioned Nuclear Plants CY-99-002, Forwards Response to NRC 981203 RAI Re Proposed License Amend to Relocate Requirements for Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation from Section 3/4.3.3.3 of TS to Trm. Supporting TSs Encl1999-01-18018 January 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 981203 RAI Re Proposed License Amend to Relocate Requirements for Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation from Section 3/4.3.3.3 of TS to Trm. Supporting TSs Encl CY-99-009, Forwards Rev 1 to Haddam Neck Plant Defueled Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 & 2.7901999-01-14014 January 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Haddam Neck Plant Defueled Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 & 2.790 CY-99-010, Provides Special Rept Concerning Potential of Radiation Exposure Due to Hypothetical Explosive Attack to Facility. Without Encl1999-01-14014 January 1999 Provides Special Rept Concerning Potential of Radiation Exposure Due to Hypothetical Explosive Attack to Facility. Without Encl CY-98-142, Forwards Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Info & Approval of Exception Number 8 of App E of Cy Qap.Copy of Rev 2 Showing Changes from Rev 1 Also Included1998-12-22022 December 1998 Forwards Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Info & Approval of Exception Number 8 of App E of Cy Qap.Copy of Rev 2 Showing Changes from Rev 1 Also Included CY-98-201, Provides Clarification of NRC Staff SE for Amend 193 Which Approved HNP Defueled TSs1998-12-0303 December 1998 Provides Clarification of NRC Staff SE for Amend 193 Which Approved HNP Defueled TSs CY-98-191, Provides Notification That Util Implemented Defueled Emergency Plan for HNP on 981001.Util Completed Annual Exercise Required by Subj Plan & 10CFR50.471998-11-0505 November 1998 Provides Notification That Util Implemented Defueled Emergency Plan for HNP on 981001.Util Completed Annual Exercise Required by Subj Plan & 10CFR50.47 CY-98-140, Provides Commitment to Maintain Water Chemistry Requirements in HNP Technical Requirements Manual1998-11-0202 November 1998 Provides Commitment to Maintain Water Chemistry Requirements in HNP Technical Requirements Manual CY-98-183, Forwards Revised License Amend 193 TS Pages to Correct Amend Number on Pages Not Changed by Amend 193.No Commitments Contained within Ltr1998-10-30030 October 1998 Forwards Revised License Amend 193 TS Pages to Correct Amend Number on Pages Not Changed by Amend 193.No Commitments Contained within Ltr CY-98-199, Forwards Listing of Corrections Made & Revised Pages for Proposed License Amend 193.Ltr Also Transmits Repaginated Pages for TS Index & Section 1,per Request of NRC Project Manager1998-10-30030 October 1998 Forwards Listing of Corrections Made & Revised Pages for Proposed License Amend 193.Ltr Also Transmits Repaginated Pages for TS Index & Section 1,per Request of NRC Project Manager CY-98-062, Updates Info of Historical Nature in Response to Both NRC Historical Review Rept & NRC Insp Rept 50-213/97-11 Open Items1998-10-28028 October 1998 Updates Info of Historical Nature in Response to Both NRC Historical Review Rept & NRC Insp Rept 50-213/97-11 Open Items CY-98-154, Forwards Sf Mgt Plan for Haddam Neck Plant.Plan Submits Info on Mgt & Funding for Program to Safely Store Sf Following Permanent Cessation of Power Operations Until Title Is Transferred to DOE1998-10-28028 October 1998 Forwards Sf Mgt Plan for Haddam Neck Plant.Plan Submits Info on Mgt & Funding for Program to Safely Store Sf Following Permanent Cessation of Power Operations Until Title Is Transferred to DOE CY-98-129, Provides Supplemental Info to 980629 Response to 2.206 Petition Questions on Spent Fuel Cooling Methods.Util Pending Commitment Made within Ltr Stated1998-10-14014 October 1998 Provides Supplemental Info to 980629 Response to 2.206 Petition Questions on Spent Fuel Cooling Methods.Util Pending Commitment Made within Ltr Stated CY-98-186, Provides Notification of Organizational Changes Which Affect Cyap.Organization Chart,Biographical Profile of K Heider & Revised Distribution List for NRC Correspondence,Encl1998-10-0202 October 1998 Provides Notification of Organizational Changes Which Affect Cyap.Organization Chart,Biographical Profile of K Heider & Revised Distribution List for NRC Correspondence,Encl CY-98-153, Forwards Final Response to NRC 961009 RAI Re Configuration Mgt Project at Plant.No New Commitments Made within Ltr or Attachment1998-09-30030 September 1998 Forwards Final Response to NRC 961009 RAI Re Configuration Mgt Project at Plant.No New Commitments Made within Ltr or Attachment CY-98-157, Responds to NRC Request That Cyap Submit Proposed License Amend to Include Fuel Storage Pool Water Chemistry Program within Haddam Neck Plant Ts.Cyap Considers That Amend Is Not Necessary for Listed Reasons.Procedure Encl1998-09-28028 September 1998 Responds to NRC Request That Cyap Submit Proposed License Amend to Include Fuel Storage Pool Water Chemistry Program within Haddam Neck Plant Ts.Cyap Considers That Amend Is Not Necessary for Listed Reasons.Procedure Encl B17440, Corrects Errors in Ltrs & 980225 Re semi-annual Fitness for Duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1998 & July-Dec 19971998-09-24024 September 1998 Corrects Errors in Ltrs & 980225 Re semi-annual Fitness for Duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1998 & July-Dec 1997 CY-98-151, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-03.Corrective Actions:Root Cause Team Has Determined That Shift Managers Initial Reportability Decision Was Not Correct1998-09-21021 September 1998 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-213/98-03.Corrective Actions:Root Cause Team Has Determined That Shift Managers Initial Reportability Decision Was Not Correct ML20153G3891998-09-14014 September 1998 Informs That Union of Concerned Scientists Fully Supports Citizens Awareness Network Petition Filed Pursuant to 10CFR2.206,seeking to Revoke or Suspend License for Haddam Neck Nuclear Plant ML20154J9861998-09-11011 September 1998 Forwards for Service Upon Lj Callan,Jc Hoyle & Commission, Request for NRC to Revoke Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co License to Operate Haddam Neck Reactor Pursuant to 10CFR2.206 ML20154J9991998-09-11011 September 1998 Requests NRC Take Immediate Action to Revoke Util License to Operate Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station Pursuant to 10CFR2.206 B17420, Forwards Semiannual fitness-for-duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1998,per 10CFR26.71(d)1998-08-31031 August 1998 Forwards Semiannual fitness-for-duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1998,per 10CFR26.71(d) CY-98-107, Forwards Decommissioning Cost Study for Connecticut Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. Adjustments to Cost Estimate Will Be Made as Necessary as Detailed Work Planning Progresses & Elements of Cost Estimate Periodically Reviewed & Updated1998-08-25025 August 1998 Forwards Decommissioning Cost Study for Connecticut Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. Adjustments to Cost Estimate Will Be Made as Necessary as Detailed Work Planning Progresses & Elements of Cost Estimate Periodically Reviewed & Updated B17384, Submits fitness-for-duty Program Rept for Investigations Re Unsatisfactory Performance Test Results,Per 10CFR26,App a, Subpart B,Section 2.8(e)(4).No New Commitments Are Contained in Ltr1998-08-20020 August 1998 Submits fitness-for-duty Program Rept for Investigations Re Unsatisfactory Performance Test Results,Per 10CFR26,App a, Subpart B,Section 2.8(e)(4).No New Commitments Are Contained in Ltr CY-98-141, Requests Postponement of Defueled Emergency Plan Exercise Until 980923.Ltr Contains No New Commitments1998-08-13013 August 1998 Requests Postponement of Defueled Emergency Plan Exercise Until 980923.Ltr Contains No New Commitments CY-98-145, Provides Remediation Plans for Offsite Location 9621.Work Associated W/Location 9621 Scheduled to Begin on 9808171998-08-13013 August 1998 Provides Remediation Plans for Offsite Location 9621.Work Associated W/Location 9621 Scheduled to Begin on 980817 CY-98-132, Provides NRC W/Addl Info on Plant Defueled Emergency Plan. Util Stores Resin Liners Inside Area Protected by Vehicle Barriers1998-07-31031 July 1998 Provides NRC W/Addl Info on Plant Defueled Emergency Plan. Util Stores Resin Liners Inside Area Protected by Vehicle Barriers CY-98-127, Provides Clarifying Info Re Spent Fuel Pool make-up Capability at Hnp.Conclusions Reached by NRC Staff in SER Contained in Issuance of License Amend 193 Not Impacted & & Remain Valid1998-07-30030 July 1998 Provides Clarifying Info Re Spent Fuel Pool make-up Capability at Hnp.Conclusions Reached by NRC Staff in SER Contained in Issuance of License Amend 193 Not Impacted & & Remain Valid CY-98-118, Informs NRC Staff That Rev 38 to Plant Emergency Plan Has Been Implemented1998-07-21021 July 1998 Informs NRC Staff That Rev 38 to Plant Emergency Plan Has Been Implemented CY-98-121, Responds to NRC Request for Addl Info on Recent Operational Events at Plant.Corrective Actions That Have Been Taken, Discussed1998-07-16016 July 1998 Responds to NRC Request for Addl Info on Recent Operational Events at Plant.Corrective Actions That Have Been Taken, Discussed ML20151Z0221998-07-10010 July 1998 Informs That R Bassilakis & Gejdenson Share Same Concerns Re Recent Incidents at Connecticut Yankee Reactor in Haddam Neck,Ct & Hope That NRC Address Concerns Promptly ML20236P0971998-07-0909 July 1998 Inquires About Truth of Cyap Having No Shift Compliment of Licensed Operators at Haddam Neck Reactor ML20239A0651998-07-0707 July 1998 Discusses 980620 Inadvertent Radwaste Discharge from Plant Reactor.Team of NRC Inspectors,Completely Independent of Region I,Requested to Investigate Region I Ability to Regulate Effectively 1999-09-02
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARB13622, Forwards Crdr Human Engineering Discrepancy Info for Plant1990-08-30030 August 1990 Forwards Crdr Human Engineering Discrepancy Info for Plant B13617, Requests NRC Revise Confirmatory Order for Plant to Specify New Completion Date of Cycle 16 Refueling Outage for Item II.E.1.2.Util Intends to Implement Design Change During Next Refueling Outage to Resolve Listed Issues1990-08-22022 August 1990 Requests NRC Revise Confirmatory Order for Plant to Specify New Completion Date of Cycle 16 Refueling Outage for Item II.E.1.2.Util Intends to Implement Design Change During Next Refueling Outage to Resolve Listed Issues B13615, Requests That 900705 Request for Amend to License DPR-61 Be Approved on Emergency Basis & That Temporary Waiver of Compliance from Tech Spec 4.4.6.2.1.g Be Given Until NRC Acts on Emergency Amend1990-08-20020 August 1990 Requests That 900705 Request for Amend to License DPR-61 Be Approved on Emergency Basis & That Temporary Waiver of Compliance from Tech Spec 4.4.6.2.1.g Be Given Until NRC Acts on Emergency Amend B13611, Forwards, Semiannual Radioactive Effluents Release Rept for Jan-June 19901990-08-16016 August 1990 Forwards, Semiannual Radioactive Effluents Release Rept for Jan-June 1990 B13595, Notifies NRC That Utils Volunteer to Participate in Emergency Response Data Sys Project for All Four Nuclear Units,Per Generic Ltr 89-15 & NUREG-13941990-08-14014 August 1990 Notifies NRC That Utils Volunteer to Participate in Emergency Response Data Sys Project for All Four Nuclear Units,Per Generic Ltr 89-15 & NUREG-1394 B13602, Submits Addendum to Plant Control Room Design Review Summary Rept,Per .Lists 10CFR50 App R-related Mods Outside Control Room That Could Not Be Reviewed Until After Final Implementation of Changes1990-08-14014 August 1990 Submits Addendum to Plant Control Room Design Review Summary Rept,Per .Lists 10CFR50 App R-related Mods Outside Control Room That Could Not Be Reviewed Until After Final Implementation of Changes B13580, Discusses Revised Tech Spec Conversion Program,Reflecting Conversion of Tech Spec to Westinghouse Sts.Future Upgrade of Tech Specs Should Be Conducted on Voluntary Basis Consistent W/Nrc Policy Statement1990-08-10010 August 1990 Discusses Revised Tech Spec Conversion Program,Reflecting Conversion of Tech Spec to Westinghouse Sts.Future Upgrade of Tech Specs Should Be Conducted on Voluntary Basis Consistent W/Nrc Policy Statement B13603, Withdraws 900731 Request for Temporary Waiver of Compliance W/Tech Spec 3.7.1.2 Re Inoperability of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps1990-08-0202 August 1990 Withdraws 900731 Request for Temporary Waiver of Compliance W/Tech Spec 3.7.1.2 Re Inoperability of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps B13601, Requests Temporary Waiver of Compliance from Tech Spec 3.7.1.2,allowing Plant to Remain in Mode 3 for Addl 14 Days Beyond Current Action Statement Limits W/One or of Two Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Inoperable1990-07-31031 July 1990 Requests Temporary Waiver of Compliance from Tech Spec 3.7.1.2,allowing Plant to Remain in Mode 3 for Addl 14 Days Beyond Current Action Statement Limits W/One or of Two Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Inoperable B13585, Provides Supplemental Response to Generic Ltr 89-19 Re Request for Action Concerning Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-47.Plant Procedures Modified to Provide Operability Verification of Steam Generator Protection Sys1990-07-26026 July 1990 Provides Supplemental Response to Generic Ltr 89-19 Re Request for Action Concerning Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-47.Plant Procedures Modified to Provide Operability Verification of Steam Generator Protection Sys B13571, Clarifies 900625 Tech Spec Change Request Re Limit of 160 Failed Fuel Rods for Cycle 16 Operation1990-07-19019 July 1990 Clarifies 900625 Tech Spec Change Request Re Limit of 160 Failed Fuel Rods for Cycle 16 Operation B13569, Forwards, Haddam Neck Plant Decommissioning Financial Assurance Certification Rept1990-07-18018 July 1990 Forwards, Haddam Neck Plant Decommissioning Financial Assurance Certification Rept ML20055E6791990-07-0606 July 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 88-008, Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Rcs. All Socket Welded Joints from Header Isolation motor-operated Valves to RCS for All 4 Loops Examined.No Recordable Indications Found ML20055D3461990-07-0303 July 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 90-001 Re Loss of Fill Oil Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount.Operability Determinations Performed & Documented for All Rosemount 1153 & 1154 Transmitters at Facility ML20055D7191990-06-29029 June 1990 Amends 900604 Rev 13 to QA Program B13564, Provides NRC W/Info Re Plant Pressurizer as follow-up to 900607 Meeting.Info Particularly Concerns Disposition of Three Indications on Pressurizer Inner Surface & Discussion of Resolution of Previous Indication1990-06-29029 June 1990 Provides NRC W/Info Re Plant Pressurizer as follow-up to 900607 Meeting.Info Particularly Concerns Disposition of Three Indications on Pressurizer Inner Surface & Discussion of Resolution of Previous Indication B13550, Responds to Generic Ltr 90-04, Request for Info on Status of Generic Safety Issues Resolved W/Imposition of Requirements or Corrective Actions. Implementation & Completion Tables for staff-imposed Requirements Encl1990-06-27027 June 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 90-04, Request for Info on Status of Generic Safety Issues Resolved W/Imposition of Requirements or Corrective Actions. Implementation & Completion Tables for staff-imposed Requirements Encl B13364, Forwards Rev 19 to Modified Amended Security Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(a))1989-10-0505 October 1989 Forwards Rev 19 to Modified Amended Security Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(a)) B13376, Forwards Util Response to Generic Ltr 89-04 Re Guidance on Developing Acceptable Inservice Test Programs1989-10-0202 October 1989 Forwards Util Response to Generic Ltr 89-04 Re Guidance on Developing Acceptable Inservice Test Programs A08598, Provides Clarification of Util Position Re Emergency Notification Sys (ENS) & Health Physics Network (Hpn).Util Intends to Provide Two Separate Qualified Individuals for ENS & HPN Communications During Exercise Drills1989-10-0202 October 1989 Provides Clarification of Util Position Re Emergency Notification Sys (ENS) & Health Physics Network (Hpn).Util Intends to Provide Two Separate Qualified Individuals for ENS & HPN Communications During Exercise Drills B13375, Responds to Request for Addl Info Re Electrical Distribution Sys Design Associated W/New Switchgear Bldg.New Switchgear Bldg Provides Opportunity to Minimize Dependence on Motor Control Ctr 5 & Further Reduce Level of Risk1989-09-29029 September 1989 Responds to Request for Addl Info Re Electrical Distribution Sys Design Associated W/New Switchgear Bldg.New Switchgear Bldg Provides Opportunity to Minimize Dependence on Motor Control Ctr 5 & Further Reduce Level of Risk ML20248E4521989-09-29029 September 1989 Forwards Proposed Tech Spec Pages Omitted from 890728 Application for Amend to License DPR-61 Re Cycle 16 Reload B13374, Forwards Bimonthly Progress Rept 18 Re New Switchgear Bldg Const1989-09-27027 September 1989 Forwards Bimonthly Progress Rept 18 Re New Switchgear Bldg Const B13352, Requests Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50,App J to Assure That Containment Leakage During Design Basis Event Will Not Exceed Applicable Leakage Limits. Justification Encl1989-09-0808 September 1989 Requests Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50,App J to Assure That Containment Leakage During Design Basis Event Will Not Exceed Applicable Leakage Limits. Justification Encl A08170, Forwards Updated Schedules for Operator Licensing & Requalification Exams for Plants,Per Generic Ltrs 89-12 & 89-031989-08-30030 August 1989 Forwards Updated Schedules for Operator Licensing & Requalification Exams for Plants,Per Generic Ltrs 89-12 & 89-03 B13346, Forwards Tornado Missile Risk Analysis of Bleed & Feed & Auxiliary Feedwater Safe Shutdown Sys at Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Station, Per SEP Topics III-2 & III-4.A1989-08-30030 August 1989 Forwards Tornado Missile Risk Analysis of Bleed & Feed & Auxiliary Feedwater Safe Shutdown Sys at Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Station, Per SEP Topics III-2 & III-4.A B13351, Provides Clarifications of Util & NRC 890525 Insp Rept 50-213/89-200.Util Proposes to Extend Schedule for Completion of Sampling and Evaluation Program to 900930 & Valves That Fail Systematic Testing Will Be Replaced1989-08-28028 August 1989 Provides Clarifications of Util & NRC 890525 Insp Rept 50-213/89-200.Util Proposes to Extend Schedule for Completion of Sampling and Evaluation Program to 900930 & Valves That Fail Systematic Testing Will Be Replaced A08237, Confirms Receipt of Listed Invoices for Costs Incurred During Routine Insps1989-08-28028 August 1989 Confirms Receipt of Listed Invoices for Costs Incurred During Routine Insps B13340, Submits Results of Svc Water & Primary Auxiliary Bldg Equipment Operability Analyses Not Provided in 890428 Submittal of Results of ECCS Single Failure Analysis1989-08-24024 August 1989 Submits Results of Svc Water & Primary Auxiliary Bldg Equipment Operability Analyses Not Provided in 890428 Submittal of Results of ECCS Single Failure Analysis A08211, Ack Receipt of Listed Invoices for Cost Incurred During Routine Insps at Plants.Payment Will Be Made on 8909061989-08-22022 August 1989 Ack Receipt of Listed Invoices for Cost Incurred During Routine Insps at Plants.Payment Will Be Made on 890906 B13341, Forwards WCAP-12196, Svc Water Sys Design Basis Temp Increase to 95 F for Connecticut Yankee & Haddam Neck Plant, Per Request in Amend 112 to License DPR-61.Northeast Utils Svc Co Suppl to Rept Also Encl1989-08-21021 August 1989 Forwards WCAP-12196, Svc Water Sys Design Basis Temp Increase to 95 F for Connecticut Yankee & Haddam Neck Plant, Per Request in Amend 112 to License DPR-61.Northeast Utils Svc Co Suppl to Rept Also Encl B13339, Forwards Addl Info Re Util 881026 & 890306 Revised Tech Specs Requests,Per NRC Request.Existing 8 H Shift Frequency Does Not Provide Enough Latitude within 8 H Shift Whereas 12 H Shift Would1989-08-21021 August 1989 Forwards Addl Info Re Util 881026 & 890306 Revised Tech Specs Requests,Per NRC Request.Existing 8 H Shift Frequency Does Not Provide Enough Latitude within 8 H Shift Whereas 12 H Shift Would B13342, Provides Util Position Re Procurement of non-code Class Fasteners in ASME Code Class Applications from Mfg or Matl Suppliers,Per Util to NRC & Insp Rept 50-423/88-18.App B Program Assures Use of Equivalent Items1989-08-15015 August 1989 Provides Util Position Re Procurement of non-code Class Fasteners in ASME Code Class Applications from Mfg or Matl Suppliers,Per Util to NRC & Insp Rept 50-423/88-18.App B Program Assures Use of Equivalent Items A08186, Ack Receipt of Listed Invoices for Cost Incurred During Insps.Funds Will Be wire-transferred on 8908241989-08-0808 August 1989 Ack Receipt of Listed Invoices for Cost Incurred During Insps.Funds Will Be wire-transferred on 890824 B13336, Forwards Annual Occupational Exposure Rept 19881989-08-0808 August 1989 Forwards Annual Occupational Exposure Rept 1988 ML20247Q7691989-08-0303 August 1989 Forwards Rev 12 to QA Program Topical Rept B13323, Comments on Draft Reg Guide, Assuring Availability of Funds for Decommissioning Nuclear Reactors. Changes to Stated Phrases Re Certification Amounts Discussed1989-08-0303 August 1989 Comments on Draft Reg Guide, Assuring Availability of Funds for Decommissioning Nuclear Reactors. Changes to Stated Phrases Re Certification Amounts Discussed A08153, Advises That Payment for Invoices H1386,H1387,H1410 & H1411 Will Be wire-transferred on 890810,per NRC Instructions1989-08-0101 August 1989 Advises That Payment for Invoices H1386,H1387,H1410 & H1411 Will Be wire-transferred on 890810,per NRC Instructions B13321, Informs of Inability to Submit plant-specific Analyses for Util as Planned,Due to Delays Encountered in Completing Sensitivity & Break Spectrum Analysis.Meeting Between NRC & Util Representatives Arranged for 8908101989-08-0101 August 1989 Informs of Inability to Submit plant-specific Analyses for Util as Planned,Due to Delays Encountered in Completing Sensitivity & Break Spectrum Analysis.Meeting Between NRC & Util Representatives Arranged for 890810 A07974, Advises That No Agreements Restricting Employees to Inform NRC of Potential Safety Issues Exist,Per V Stello1989-07-31031 July 1989 Advises That No Agreements Restricting Employees to Inform NRC of Potential Safety Issues Exist,Per V Stello ML20248B7931989-07-31031 July 1989 Forwards Response to NRC Request for Addl Info Re Util 890421 Application for Amend to License DPR-61,revising Tech Spec 3.6, Eccs. Revised Tech Spec Also Encl B13307, Responds to Generic Ltr 89-06, Task Action Plan Item I.D.2 - SPDS - 10CFR50.54(f). SPDS for Plants Meet Applicable Requirements of Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737 & Consistent W/ Majority of Positions Provided in NUREG-13421989-07-21021 July 1989 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-06, Task Action Plan Item I.D.2 - SPDS - 10CFR50.54(f). SPDS for Plants Meet Applicable Requirements of Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737 & Consistent W/ Majority of Positions Provided in NUREG-1342 A08037, Responds to Generic Ltr 89-08, Erosion/Corrosion-Induced Pipe Wall Thinning. Plants Have Programs & Procedures in Place to Monitor Erosion/Corrosion for Both single-phase & two-phase Flow Sys1989-07-13013 July 1989 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-08, Erosion/Corrosion-Induced Pipe Wall Thinning. Plants Have Programs & Procedures in Place to Monitor Erosion/Corrosion for Both single-phase & two-phase Flow Sys A08007, Requests Extension of Deadline for Response to Generic Ltr 89-06, Task Action Plan Item I.D.2-SPDS-10CFR50.54(f), to No Later than 890721.Addl Time Needed to Allow for Completion of Thorough Internal Review of Response1989-07-12012 July 1989 Requests Extension of Deadline for Response to Generic Ltr 89-06, Task Action Plan Item I.D.2-SPDS-10CFR50.54(f), to No Later than 890721.Addl Time Needed to Allow for Completion of Thorough Internal Review of Response B13282, Forwards Response to 890501 Request for Addl Info Re Util Const of New Switchgear Bldg at Plant1989-07-10010 July 1989 Forwards Response to 890501 Request for Addl Info Re Util Const of New Switchgear Bldg at Plant A08093, Advises That Fourth Quarterly Installment of 1989 Annual Fees Will Be Wire Transferred on 890731 in Payment of Invoices H1146,H1222,H1190 & H1151,per 10CFR1711989-07-0707 July 1989 Advises That Fourth Quarterly Installment of 1989 Annual Fees Will Be Wire Transferred on 890731 in Payment of Invoices H1146,H1222,H1190 & H1151,per 10CFR171 A08111, Advises That Payment for 10CFR170 Fee Sent to Jm Rodriquez Re NRC Review of Rev 11 to QA Topical Rept1989-07-0707 July 1989 Advises That Payment for 10CFR170 Fee Sent to Jm Rodriquez Re NRC Review of Rev 11 to QA Topical Rept A07951, Responds to Suppl 3 to NRC Bulletin 88-008, Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Rcs. Issue Represents No Problem at Any Millstone Unit.Haddam Neck Valves Will Be Inspected for Leakage During Upcoming Refueling Outage1989-06-30030 June 1989 Responds to Suppl 3 to NRC Bulletin 88-008, Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Rcs. Issue Represents No Problem at Any Millstone Unit.Haddam Neck Valves Will Be Inspected for Leakage During Upcoming Refueling Outage B13268, Submits Addl Info Re 890425 Proposed Rev to Tech Specs Administrative Controls Section Concerning High Radiation Areas,Per NRC 890505 Conference Call1989-06-26026 June 1989 Submits Addl Info Re 890425 Proposed Rev to Tech Specs Administrative Controls Section Concerning High Radiation Areas,Per NRC 890505 Conference Call B13215, Advises That One Technically Qualified & Trained Individual Per Site Will Man Health Physics Network & Emergency Notification Sys Telephone Lines at Plants,Per NRC Ltrs1989-06-23023 June 1989 Advises That One Technically Qualified & Trained Individual Per Site Will Man Health Physics Network & Emergency Notification Sys Telephone Lines at Plants,Per NRC Ltrs 1990-08-30
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NORTHEAST LTILITIES o.nore Orc.. . s io.n sir .i. Beriin. Connecticut i ea cc " P.O. BOX 270 HARTFORD. CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 k k J 7 $U N "~co,",
Y (203)64 5-5000 June 10, 1988 Docket No. 50-213 8
fu2_8_68 Re: 10CFR50, Appendix R V.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:
Haddam Neck Plant Fire P atection-Response to ,
Reauest for Additional Information (TAC No. 66169)
By letter dated September 30, 1987(I) , the NRC Staff pro'/ided Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPC0) with a "Request for Additional Information (RAI)" concerning fire protection of safe shutdown capability.
Subsequently, on February 8, 1988, a meeting was held between the NRC Staff and CY/.PC0 to discuss the questions included in the RAI. CYAPC0 agreed at this meeting to provide the NRC Staff with written responses to the questions addressed at the February meeting. The purpose of this letter is to provide the NRC Staff with the requested information. The responses to the RAI are included as Attachment 1. In addition, the next revision to Haddam Neck's Appendix R Compliance Review, reflecting these responses, is expected to be submitted to the NRC Staff by December 31, 1988.
We trust you will find this information satisfactory and we remain available to answer any additional questions you may have.
Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY MV _
l E. W ) Vocika y Seniot Vice President cc: W. T. Russell, Region 1 Administrator J. T. Shedlosky, Senior Resident Inspector, Haddam Neck Plant A. 3. Wang, NRC Project Manager, Haddam Neck Plant (1) Letter dated September 30, 1987, F. M. Akstulewicz to E. J. Mroc,.ka, "Request for Additional Information Concerning Fire Protection of sad Shutdown Equipment."
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/ Attachment 1 Response to Request for Additional Information (TAC No. 66169) l l
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- s. -l Attachment 1 Page 1/812868 Attachment 1 Responses to Reauest for Additional Information Ouestion 1: Your recent submittals of September 16, 1985, February 6, 1986, April 30, 1986, June 10, 1986, June 13, 1986 and September 9,1986 concerning post-safe and alternate shutdown do not address the following concerns:
(a) High/lo pressure interfaces (b) Communication between operators (c) Time required to attain cold shutd on (d) Instrumentation for process monitoring (e) Repairs required, if any (f) Emergency diesel generator fuel supply and replacement time (g) Protection of reactor coolant pump seals (h) Procedures for attaining hot standby and cold shutdown Provide the above indicated information.
Response 1(a): The high/lo pressure interfaces for Haddam Neck have been evaluated by CYAPC0. This evaluation was included in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) section of the Haddam Neck "Fire Protection Evaluation / Shutdown System Availability" Report, transmitted to the NRC Staff on June 13, 1986. This evaluation is titled "System Interfaces with the Reactor Coolant System."
l lib): After the June 16 - 20, 1986 Appendix R audit, additional information was requested by the NRC. Additional information was sent to the NRC on August 19, 1986, which clarified the availability of different communication systems.
t In the last sentence of paragraph 2 of that letter, it stated that channel F1 has emergency backup power, which should have been independent of site power. This was corrected in a letter sent to the NRC on September 26, 1986.
l On March 2, 1987, the NRC sent a summary of Appendix R
( issues, subject "Haddam Neck Inspection 50-213/87-05," and i
closed items. Paragraph 2.9.2 addresses communications saying that the subject of communications has been adequately addressed and is a closed item. Communications for the New l Switchgear Room will be verified prior to start-up from the 1989 Refueling Outage.
! 1(c): The time required to reach cold shutdown was previously provided to the NRC in a letter dated August 19, 1986, l "Haddam Neck Plant Actions Resulting From Appendix R l Inspection of June 16-20, 1986." Item #12 of this letter l states that cold shutdown is reached within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
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Attachment 1 Page 2/B12868 1(d): In a letter dated August 19,1986, "Haddam Neck Plant Actions Resulting From Appendix R Inspection of June 16-20, 1986",
CYAPC0 committed to provide certain instrumentation to meet the requirements of Appendix R. Information concerning the method of implementation was provided to the NRC Staff in detail in a letter dated December 8, 1987, "Haddam Neck Plant, Bimonthly Progress Report No. 7, Design Information Submittal, New Switchgear Building Construction". The parameters to be monitored include the following:
- 1) RCS Hot leg gr CET (core exit thermocouple) Temperature (wide range)
- 2) RCS Cold leg Temperature (wide range)
- 3) Steam Generator Wide Range Level (1 per steam generator)
- 4) Steam Generator Pressure (1 per steam generator)
- 5) Pressurizer Level
- 6) Pressurizer Pressure
- 7) RCS Wide Range Pressure
- 8) Neutron Count Rate
- 9) Demineralized Water Storage Tank (DWST) Level
- 10) Metering Pump Control and Indication The design being implemented provides displays of key parameters at the Appendix R Instrument Panel (ARIP) by utilizing isolated outputs from existing or planned safety grade instrument signals normally feeding the control room.
In the worst postulated series of events concerning fires in the Old Switchgear Room (0SR), Cable Vault (CV) or Control Room (CR), Train "B" of these parameters remains operable.
Existing Train "A" instruments will be utilized for monitoring from the control room during a fire in the new switchgear building (SGB). During this fire, all Train "B" l
powered instruments are assumed lost with the loss of their l normal power sources.
This set of RCS parameters has been reviewed and determined sufficient to meet Appendix R monitoring requirements to achieve cold shutdown during the postulated fires.
1(e): There are currently no repairs required, however this option may be used if warranted by future changes. The "Fire Protection Evaluation / Shutdown System Availability" will be revised if the need for this option arises from future changes.
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L Attachment 1 Page 3/812868 Iff): The technical specification capacities of the fuel oil tanks are as follows:
I101 Capacity TK-33-2A/2B Underground Storage Tanks 3,250 gallons /ea.
Day Tanks 400 gallons /ea.
The Main Fuel Oil Storage Tank (TK-33-1A) is not identified in the technical specifications. This tank, while not credited for design basis accidents (DBA), has a storage capacity of 42,000 gallcns. For Appendix R scenarios, it is reasonable to assume this volume would be available.
The fuel consumption rate for the emergency diesels are specified for a full load condition where all the engineered safeguard components are in operation. For this condition, the fuel consumption rate is approximately 220 gallons per hour. This consumption rate is conservative for Appendix R conditions in that the emergency diesel generators are powering components limited to Appendix R safe shutdown. The diesels are at a low load condition, therefore, actual fuel consumption will be less than 220 gallons per hour.
The operating time capability of an emergency diesel generator, crediting only the technical specification capacity, can be calculated as follows:
Operating Time = F/0 Storace Capacity F/0 Consumption Rate
= (3.250 + 400) gallons 220 gallons per hour
- 16.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> If a single diesel is operating, the operating time capability is approximately 33 hours3.819444e-4 days <br />0.00917 hours <br />5.456349e-5 weeks <br />1.25565e-5 months <br />. Realistically assuming that part or all of the Main Fuel Oil Storage Tank capacity is available for any Appendix R shutdown scenario significantly lengthens the diesel generator operating time.
In the event that e:aergency diesel operation is required beyond the capacity of the on-site fuel oil storage, a supplier is readily available to replenish the supply.
Specifically, Amerada Hess Company is the fuel oil distributor utilized. This distributor has branches located in New Haven and Glastonbury which are in close proximity to Haddam Neck. Under normal circumstances, Amerada Hess can provide fuel oil within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Under emergency conditions such as an Appendix R scenario, this time can be reduced.
This supplier will be contacted by Operations as required.
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- Attachment 1 Page 4/B12868 In addition, fuel oil may be transferred from the fuel oil storage tank to the underground tanks and the day tanks. The elevations of these tanks relative to each other facilitate gravity feed as a passive means to transfer fuel oil. The base elevation of the TK-33-1A is approximately 21' 6" (site grade) while the maximum elevation of the underground tanks is approximately five feet below grade. The relative elevation of the day tanks is lower than TK-33-1A, therefore, gravity feed is available under all cases. Level control valves F0-LCV-1700A and B are the only active isolation components in the flowpath between the F/0 storage tank and the underground tanks. These valves fail open upon loss of air or power, thus, the passive gravity feed flowpath can not be compromised by a loss of power or air. Potential fire induced spurious closure of these valves can readily be compensated for by having Operations physically vent the air supply of the valves.
The method by which fuel oil is transferred to the emergency generators has been reviewed for all fire areas. A method exists to transfer the fuel to the underground tanks via gravity feed. No fire induced failure of an active component can compromise this flowpath.
1(q): The Westinghouse Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) functional requirements for normal operations state that seal injection flow should be maintained to the RCP whenever th2 RCS is 1 being filled or when the RCS pressure is above atmospheric pressure. The intent is to provide a continuous source of cooling and flushing (preventing reactor coolant from entering the seal) during all modes of plant operation.
The RCP seals are normally protected by seal injection flow, with the RCP thermal barrier heat exchanger acting as a backup cooling source when seal injection flo v is interrupted. The thermal barrier heat exchanger is cooled by the circulation of component cooling water. Both methoos of seal cooling are typically in service when the RCP is running. Although both sources are required for normal operation, pump operation is permitted with the loss of either or both cooling sources for limited prescribed time periods.
RCP operation is permitted, under Westinghouse guidelines, for twenty-four hours with the loss of either seal injection flow or cooling water flow to the thermal barrier heat exchanger, but not the loss of both. However, in a non-design basis event, it is expected that seal integrity, under loss of all cooling due to a loss of all AC, will be maintained for many hours.
During normal plant operations, the No. I seal injection flow is provided by the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)
. s Attachme..t 1 Page 5/B12868 charging pumps. The charging pumps discharge into a common seal injection supply line that distributes flow to each individual RCP seal injection line. The injection flow enters the RCP below the No. I seal where the flow splits.
The majority of the flow enters the RCS while a portion of the remaining flow passes up through the No. I seal and returns to the CVCS through the No.1 seal leakoff line. The continuous seal injection flow provides a supply of filtered water to the No. I seal maintaining the seal faces cool and clean.
The injection flow enters the pump above the thermal barrier region. Here the flow splits with a portion passing through the pump radial bearing, the controlled leakage seal package and returning to the CVCS. The remaining portion passes through the thermal barrier heat exchanger and into the RCS where it constitutes a portion of the makeup flow. During Appendix R safe shutdowns, this is the pathway used to provide RCS makeup.
The second method of seal cooling is the RCP thermal barrier heat exchanger. The heat exchanger cools any reactor coolant which may enter the seal inlet chamber prior to the coolant passing through the seal area. The heat transfer medium for the thermal barrier heat exchanger is the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS). Thermal barrier cooling provides the required seal support function and satisfies the RCP r auxiliary functional requirements.
1 i From the above discussion, it can be concluded that, for Appendix R safe shutdown scenarios, that either RCP seal
- injection or RCP thermal barrier cooling must be available to l protect the RCP seals. An evaluation on the availability of each method, evaluated on fire area basis, was performed and concluded that for all fire areas there is a method to protect RCP seals.
i 1(h): Haddam Neck's Appendix R Safe Shutdown procedures are on a l fire area basis. The procedures are listed below.
Procedure No. Title A0P 3.2-8 Plant Operation Outside of the Control Room l A0P 3.2-6 Control Room Fire A0P 3.2-34 PAB Fire A0P 3.2-35 Diesel Generator Room Fire A0P 3.2-36 Fire in Screenwell House or manway A0P 3.2-37 Cable Vault Fire A0P 3.2-38 Auxiliary Feed Pump Room Fire A0P 3.2-39 Containment Fire A0P 3.2-40 Switchgear Room Fire
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, Attachment 1 Page 6/B12868 New procedures will be added for fire scenarios in the new Switchgear Building prior to startup from the 1989 refueling outage.
Qu_qttion 2: Provide examples of the results of your review of breaker coordination to ensure protection against associated circuit Concerns.
Response 2: During the June 16-20, 1986 NRC Special Team Inspection, a review of breaker coordination to ensure protection against associated circuit concerns was performed.
In the NRC inspection report I/E Inspection Report 213/86-17, dated August 1,1986, Section 7.3. Protection for Associated Circuits. Part 7.3.1, Common Bus Concern, it explains that on a sampling basis of a review of circuit breaker coordination was made for associated circuit concerns. Result was "All I
breaker settings were found to be properly coordinated."
Questinn i Your fire protection reanalysis (June 13, 1986 submittal) does not show that you have examined post-fire shutdown with and without offsite power available. Provide information to
( show that you have considered both cases.
Resoonse 3: It was not directly stated in our June 13, 1986 submittal that our post-fire shutdown analysis examined the conditions of offsite power available and unavailable. Our electrical analysis considered both conditions. For equipment that we l credited to be operational for various fire scenarios, the
! equipment is free from fire damage and powered by an l emergency diesel generator. Normal offsite power is not l relied upon to power equipment necessary in bringing the plant to hot and cold shutdown.
Question 4: In Appendix F of your letter of September 16, 1983, you noted that the atmospheric dump valve (ADV) had "limited heat l removal capacity" and therefore, additional steam relief l paths may be needed for the required hot shutdown heat removal service. You also noted that the ADV may not be
! available after a control room fire. However, in Section IV, i subsection "Main Steam / Auxiliary feedwater," of your June 13, 1986 reanalysis no mention is made of loss of the ADV in a control room fire. There is also no definite statement as to what process is available to remove the steam generated during shutdown except in the paragraph discussing the Terry turbine in which you mention a heat sink via the turbine exhaust. Later, however, in the section related to a turbine building fire, you note the "--adequate capacity of the ADV, steam generator vents, and auxiliary feedwater steam turbine exhausts." Explain these apparent discrepancies and show any l corrections, as necessary to the previous discussion.
Resoonse 4: The secondary steam paths available to the operator following a fire are dependent on the fire location and the 1
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Attachment 1 Page 7/812868 availability of o' rs ite power. In order to determine the maximum time to reach cold shutdown and the maximum condensate requirement, the fire scenario which results in the minimum available steaming paths was analyzed. This is a fire in the control room with concurrent loss of offsite power. This fire results in the loss of the condenser steam paths and the ADV. The remaining steam paths are: the two steam driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, the four 1" steam generator vents, and the priming steam jet air ejector (hogger). The Appendix R Shutdown Report will reflect this information in the next ravision.
Questians 5: Your June 13, 1986 letter seems to lack explicitness. For example, in discussing blowdown trip valves (BDTV), you note that the operator has the option to close manual valves to eliminate blowdown in the case of a switchgear room fire.
Further, for the RHR system, you note that one RHR pump must be available by protecting its cable or separating the cable from the other RHR pump's cable. In these and other cases you do not state, specifically, whether the blowdown from one or more lines must be stopped, nor do you mention which RHR pump will be protected against a switchgear room fire.
Provide more specific information regarding the particular train or system required to bring the plant to cold shutdown in the event. of a fire.
Response 5: Under startup and normal operating conditions, blowdown of the steam generator (S/G) from the tube sheet region is maintained at a predetermined flowrate in order to ensure that proper chemistry conditions are maintained in the S/Gs.
During Appendix R shutdown scenarios, it is necessary to maintain inventory and steaming capability in the S/Gs for i decay heat removal, therefore, Operations will take action to isolate blowdown from all four S/Gs. This approach is documented in the Main Steam /Auxi',iary Feed portion of the Shutoown Report.
The blowdown from each S/G is capable of being isolated by l two methods. Each blowdown line has an air operated blowdown
! trip valve (BDTV) and a manual isolation valve. The BDTVs which are located in the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB)
(A-1A) are designed to automatically go closed upon loss of l offsite power or a high containment pressure signal. A loss i of control air or power will cause the BDTVs to fail closed.
l A hot short of the power / control cables for the solenoid of a l
BDTV would cause a valve to remain open.
Because of the potential for a spuriously opened BDTV, an operator will physically verify BDTV valve position in the PAB and take manual action to isolate the open blowdown line l using the appropriate manual isolation valve. While at full l power operation, blowdown is typically present and pre-set and maintained at approximately 10 gpm per S/G using the l
1
' Attachment 1 Page 8/812868 manual throttle valves, therefore, only a minimal amount of S/G inventory loss would result prior to isolation.
For a fire in the PAB manual action is also required. For this scenario, the PAB is inaccessible due to the fire for a period of approximately 30 minutes. After the fire has been extinguished, an operator will be dispatched to verify BDTV position and take manual action to isolate blowdown as required. Once again, at 10 gpm per S/G, the inventory loss is negligible and can be compensated for by auxiliary feedwater.
It is desirable to isolate S/G blowdown to maximize the heat removal potential of S/G inventory during the Appendix R safe shutdown scenario. It has been demonstrated that for all fire areas, a means to isolate S/G blowdown exists. For certain fire scenarios, there may be a short period of time for which 5/G blowdown is not isolated. The S/G inventory loss that occurs before blowdown can be isolated has been determined to be negligible.
Operability of one residual heat removal (RHR) pump must be maintained for all fire areas in order to achieve cold shutdown conditions. Currently, both RHR pumps are powered from buses located within the switchgear room (s-2).
Additionally, the power and control ccbles for the pumps run through common fire areas. Haddam Neck has requested, and has been granted, schedular exemptions in order to justify continued operation with this condition until modifications can be performed in 1989 to separate / protect the power sources and cable routings for the RHR pumps. Specifically, the B RHn pump will be re-powered from the new switchgear building and the cabling will be re-routed independent of the A RHR pump.
Question 6: Show that you have the ability to shut the plant down in the event a postulated control room fire damages each of the following individually:
a) Main control board b) Auxiliary control boards, c) Safety system lockout display panel (SSLD)
You should assume that the control room becomes uninhabitable for at least one hour after the postulated fire in each case.
Response 6: CYAPC0 is not required to assume the Haddam Neck Control Room becomes uninhabitable for one hour after a postulated fire in the control room.
The NRC Staff evaluated and granted Haddam Neck's request for exemption from the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R Section III.G for the control room. This evaluation is documented in a lotter dated November 14, 1987, "Exemption From the 1
. o e ,
' Attachment 1 Page 9/B12868 Requirements of Appendix R to 10CFR50, Section III.G" (SER portion). In the NRC Staff's SER, it is concluded that:
"in the event of a fire damaging the main control board panel, there is sufficient time and capability for operator action inside and outside the control room to assure safe shutdown".
The NRC Staff also concludes that:
"in the event of a fire which damages the auxiliary control boards, there is sufficient time and capability for operator actions inside and outside the control room to assure safe shutdown."
Alth respect to a fire in the SSLD panel, the ability to override spurious operation of RCS pressure reliefs (PORVs) and the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) will not be compromised. This conclusion is also stated in the SER.
Question 7: In your fire protection reanalysis of June 13, 1986, you do not discuss which systems are used to provide for the following needs throughout the shutdown process:
a) Reactor coolant inventory control, b) Reactivity control, c) Primary system pressure d) Heat removal (hot and cold shutdown)
(1) From primary system (RCS),
(2) From secondary system, e) Support system functions such as heating, ventilating and air conditioning, as required.
Provide this information for each area which contains equipment and cabling for which you take credit for bringing the plant to cold shutdown after a fire.
Response 7: In the June 13, 1986 submittal to the NRC, a systems approach to documentation of the Appendix R shutdown method was used.
That is, each system utilized for the ApDendix R safe shutdown was listed with a fire area circuit analysis for the components of that system utilized for safe shutdown.
Additionally, components in those systems that could adversely impact safe shutdown capability were analyzed and documented.
Included in this document are descriptions of the systems utilized to achieve safe shutdown, however, an explicit breakdown of the systems used for each of the aforementioned functions was not provided. This is a recognized shortcoming of the format of the existing documentation for haddam Neck.
l Attachment 1 Page 10/B12868 As part of the 1989 Switchgear Project, a reformatting of the documentation package will be performed while the information for the project is being incorpnrated. Under the revised format, the systems and components used to fulfill each safe shutdown function will be explicitly listed. As a starting point for the reformatting effort, a. summary worksheet has been developed. The worksheet provides a general summary of the systems utilized for safe shutdown. These systems are listed below and provide an interim response to this question. .
SYSTEMS USED TO SUPPORT APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN o Reactivity Control Scram reactor for hot shutdown Boration with CVCS for cold shutdown o Reactor Coolant Inventory Control Isolate PORVs Isolate RCS letdown All high/ low pressure interfaces inherently isolated Makeup to the RCS with CVCS via RCP seals o Reactor Coolant System Pressure Control CVCS charging to maintain RCS pressure Depressurization via manual actuation of CVCS auxiliary pressurizer spray M0V o Decay Heat Removal a) Hot Shutdown
-AFW system b) Cold Shutdown
-RHR system o Support Systems Service water system Diesel generators Ventilation as required
.Qns_ tion 3: In Section 4.3.2 of your June 13, 1986 submittal relating to the CVCS, you state "---Essentially the sama components are impacted by these fires as by a control room fire. --loss of operab'iity for the majority of the components."
Use of the words "essentially". and "majority" do not contain sufficient information so as to permit a detailed review of r
' Attachment 1 Page 11/B12868 this area. Provide detailed information in this section showing what failures occur as a result of a fire. Then, review your entire June 13, 1986 submittal and provide such detailed information as is necessary to permit the staff to review the entire submittal.
Response 8: The June 13, 1986 submittal equates the impact of control room and switchgear room fires on the CVCS by using such statements as "essentially the same" and "majority of components". This choice of wording is perhaps confusing in that the statements do not reflect the detailed analysis that was performed for e_afh a individual fire area. The narrative portion of the submittal was intended to summari u the detailed analysis that was performed and is documented in the body of the report and reflected in Haddam Neck's safe shutdown procedures.
To address the NRC's specific concern in Section 4.3.2, the circuit failure analysis matrix is provided in Attachment 2.
This matrix reflects CVCS component availability on a fire area basis. This matrix demonstrates that the only difference between the switchgear room and control room fire area is availability of the charging pump main lube oil pumps, P-149-1A and 18.
The NRC also requested that the entire June 13, 1986 submittal be reviewed to ensure that sufficient information is available to permit a detailed review by the NRC. CYAPC0 is currently in the process of defining the shutdown scenario l for the new switchgear building configuration. The new design and shutdown methodology will be incorporated in the Appendix R documentation package. During this revision and formatting process, CYAPC0 will be reviewing the entire package and correcting any sections containing ambiguous statements such as noted in Section 4.3.2.
Question 9: In Section 4.3.8 of your June 13, 1986 submittal relating to the CVCS you state that manual action is required to open the l pressurizer auxiliary spray M0V to collapse the pressurizer l steam bubble during the cooldown process. Discuss at what point you plan to collapse the steam bubble in the event of a fire in the cable vault (FA-R-1) or containment (FA-R-3).
i Explain whether a fire in any other plant area would change l the point at which bubble collapse initiation would occur.
Response 91 During the initial RCS cooldown, pressurizer pressure is l maintained by controlling pressurizer level via the CVCS.
l This is true for all fire areas. Once RCS temperatures have I
been reduced to the RHR entry window, auxiliary pressurizer spray will be manually initiated from inside containment.
, , The auxiliary spray valve will be operated using a handwheel, and will not be damaged by a fire inside containment. Manual operation of auxiliary pressurizer spray is only required
- Attachment 1 Page 12/812868 immediately prior to RHR entry. For an inside containment fire, sufficient time exists to extinguish the fire prior to requiring operation of the auxiliary spray valve.
Question 10: In the sneet entitled "Summary of Circuit Failure Analysis by-Fire Area" for the RHR system in your June 13, 1986 submittal, you show that RHR components fail in an area (Y-14) other than those which you discuss in Section 3.3, "Appendix R Fire Impact and Compensatory Measures." This appears to be true for other systems as well. Discuss where this applies and provide assurance that safe shutdown can be effected in all areas in which fires may occur.
Resoonse 10: In the Cable Routing Matrixes and Circuit Failure Analysis, "Y" areas are indicated on various pages of the evaluation report. The "Y" was used to designate specific outside yard areas. Ti;is was done for two reasons. The routing of raceways, either in underground duct banks or in some cases above grade conduit, traverses outside yard areas to get from one building to another. This was documented to show complete raceway routing, rather than leaving a gap. Also, a "Y" indicator was used to show the location of a component when it was located in an outside area. The "Y's" are not fire areas and were only used as a means of providing a complete description of raceway routing. An example of using "Y" indicators would be in the routing of power cables for the service water pumps. In this example, the power cables go through yard area Y-16 in an underground duct bank to the screenwell building. Each power cable is in its own conduit in the underground duct bank. In summary, safe shutdown can be effected in all areas in which fires may occur once the new switchgear room is completed.
Question 11: Your approach to spurious signals / operation seems to be inconsistent with the staff position. On pages 3 and 4 of the section "Main Steam / Auxiliary Feedwater" of your June 13, 1986 submittal you state:
Page 3 "A fire in area S-2 causes M0V-160 to spuriously fail closed and M0V-35 to spuriously fail open."
Page 4 "The Terry turbine steam admission valves are manually opened by the operator at the Terry turbine to compensate for loss of operability or spurious actuation. <
In the first case, you seem to be postulate a simultaneous detrimental spurious action (closure of MOV-160) and compensatory beneficial one (opening of MOV-35). The staff's position continues to be that no credit can be taken for a damage state resulting from a fire nor are two (2) or more simultaneous spurious signals postulated. In the second case you seem to equate loss of results in inoperability.
' Attachment 1 Page 13/812868 Spurious action wot'ld occur as a result of a hot short in a fire.
On the basis of the above, show that you have properly considered spurious action in all areas where a fire could affect. equipment required for safe shutdown. Such consideration should include wire-to-wire and cable to cable faults.
Resoonse 11: In our analysis, we examined all the effects of fire damage which included: . hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to ground. The results were documented. In respect to FW-M0V-35, we first described the normal position of the valve which is closed and the required position which is open. We then analyzed the fire areas that all the electrical conductors of the valve pass through and described all the effects of fire damage. The results were, in fire areas S-1, S-2, S-3A, R-1, and R-2 fire damage results in not being able to electrically operate the valve due to open circuits and shorts to ground. We also described that hot shorts could possibly open the valve in the following fire areas: S-1, S-2, S-3A, and R-1. Since the open circuit condition is the worst case, we have to assume manual operation of the M0V for a fire in fire areas S-1, S-2, S-3A, R-1 and R-2. We do not credit a hot short to place the valve in its desired position in fire areas S-1, S-2, S-3A, and R-1.
Question 12: In your August 19, 1986 submittal entitled, "Haddam Neck Plant - Action Items Resulting from Appendix R Inspection of June 16-20, 1986" you noted a temporary arrangement for monitoring the following plant parameters in the cable vault in the event of a control room fire:
l Pressurizer Pressure l Pressurizer Level l Steam Generator 1, 2, 3 & 4 Pressure l Steam Generator'1, 2, 3 & 4 Level (wide range) l Reactor Coolant System 1, 2, 3 & 4 T l Reactor Coolant System 1, 2, 3 & 4 T hot cold Does the use of this instrumentation require some means of transferring from control room circuits to the cable vault in
! order to effect suitable monitoring? If so, show that a
! control room fire would not affect such transfer. Show, also, how protection is afforded inadvertent transfer during normal operation. Further, show that a cable vault fire would not result in loss of sufficient control room instrumentation to achieve a safe shutdown.
l l Resoonse 12: In a CYAPC0 letter to the NRC, dated August 19, 1986, CYAPC0 identified certain methods of connecting temporary instrumentation in the cable vault for Appendix R monitoring outside of the control room. This configuration was
Attachment 1 Page 14/812868 identified as an interim method for monitoring until completion of permanent modifications scheduled for completion in 1989.
Indication of key parameters in the cable vault is achieved by rewiring and re-powering circuits, which normally are powered and indicated in the control room, to a temporary local instrument panel. The details of accomplishing the retermination of these instruments is included in A0P 3.2-8, Plant Operation Outside Control Room. A0P 3.2-6, Control Room Fire, directs the use of A0P 3.2-8 if the Control Room must be abandoned. Since all activities concerning retermination of the circuits are accomplished in the cable vault, the control room will not effect the transfer. During normal operation, inadvertent transfer is not considered credible because of the nature of transfer (reterminating, by procedure, installed plant wiring), and the limited access to the cable vault as a vital area.
Loss of sufficient control room instrumentation to prevent safe shutdown in the event of a cable vault fire is not credible. The cable vault has fire detection and suppression systems to mitigate the onset of a cable vault fire. Also, the combination of: 1) location of cable in conduit (limited intervening combustibles); 2) separate routing of power and instrument cables; and 3) general physical separation of the penetrations for redundant trains, ensures that at least one redundant indication of key parameters would be available following a cable vault fire during this interim period.
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Docket No. 50-213 B12868 i Attachment 2
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