ML20196J233

Summary of 880208 Meeting W/Util Re NRC 870930 Request for Addl Info Concerning Facility Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability

ML20196J233
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	03/07/1988
From:	Wang A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TAC-66169, NUDOCS 8803140204
Download: ML20196J233 (5)

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I March 7, 1988

. " Docket No. 50-213 LICENSEE: Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company FACILITY: Paddam Neck Plant

SUMMARY

OF FEBRUARY 8, 1988 MEETING REGARDING HADDAM NECK PLANT SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS (TACNO.66169)

On February 8,1988, the NRC met with Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPC0) to discuss a letter dated September 30,1987, "Request for Additional Information Concerning Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability." CYAPC0 stated they are updating their fire protection reanalysis and that with the completion of the new switchgear room will be in compliance with Appendix R.

The NRC stated CYAPC0 needs to provide sufficient review time (3-4 months) for the review of the submitted fire analyses. - The NRC also stated that a formal response to the September 30, 1987 Request for Additional Information (RAI) is required for completion of.our review.

CYAPC0 then described their responses to the RAI. The following are a sumary of the discussion of each question:

Question 1 a) There will be a specific section on Hi/Lo interface in the new submittal, b) Closed in I/E Report 213/87-05 c) Maximum allowable to reach cold shutdown is 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> but can be done in approximately 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br />.

d) Will provide information as part of RAI.

e) No current plans but left open as option for future changes.

f) The diesel fuel is gravity fed with a 100-150 hour supply. The NRC asked who is the local fuel supplier and do they have contingency plans to supply Haddam, fuel in an emergency?

g) Seals are protected via charging.

h) CYAPC0 stated procedures do exist. The NRC asked that these procedures be provided in CYAPC0's response.

Question 2 Iten closed in I/E Report 213/86-17.

Question 3 l

Will provide discussion of how CYAPC0 examines post-fire shutdown with and without offsite power.

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Question 4

'The resubndttal will provide a minimum set of equipn.ent necessary to protect the plant for_ a fire. The ADV is not necessary and CYAPC0 will clarify in response.

Qu_estion 5 CYAPC0 will provide a more explicit answer on actions required.

Qu_e_stion 6 The '.hree areas mentioned are three separate fite areas in the control room as defined for III-G.2.

Question 7 CYAPC0 will reply to this question in the response to the RAI.

Question 8 CYAPC0 will provide a more specific answer in the response to the RAI.

Question 9 The bubble is collapsed before entering the RHR mode.

_ Question 10 CYAPC0 stated five areas outside of those specified in Appendix R will not affect nomal shutdown.

Question 11 CYAPC0 stated they do not take credit for positive spurious signals and will clarify this in the response to the PAI.

Question __12 Key parameters are read in the cable vault room as allowed by their Appendix R exemption until the new switchgear rocn2 rmedifications are completed CYAPC0 will provide a written. response to all questions even though the verbal response during the meeting seemed adequate. Enclosed is a copy of our September 30, 1987 RAI and the attendance list.

original signed by Alan B. Lang, Project Manager Project Directorate I-4 Division of Reactor Projects I/II l

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/ enclosures: See next page LA:f p ' PM:PDI-4 l SNoTris AWang:bdt# JSt l OJ/7 /88 03/;t/88 03/0 7/

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• ' Mr. Edward J. Mroczka Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company Haddam Neck Plant ec:

Gerald Garfield, Esquire R. M. Kacich, Manager Pay, Rerry and Poward Generation Facilities licensing Counselors at Law Northeast Utilities Service Corrpany City Place Post Office Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06103-3499 Hartford, Connecticut CElal-0270 W. D. Renterg, Vice President D. O. Not dquist Nuclear Operations Manager of Ouality Assurance Northeast Utilities Service Company Northeast f:uclear Energy Company Post Office Box 270 Post Office Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270 Kevin McCarthy, Director Regional Administrator Radiation Control Unit Region I Cepartment of Environtrental Protection U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conrission State Office Building 475 Allendale Road Hartford, Connecticut C6106 King of Prussia, Penrsylvania 19406 Bradford S. Chase, Under Secretary Board of Selectmen Energy Division Town Hall Office of Policy and Management Har' dam, Connecticut 06103 80 Washington Street Hartford, Connecticut 06106 J. T. Shedlosky, Resident Inspector Haddam Neck Plant D. B. Miller, Etation Superintendent c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Consnission Haddam Neck Plant Pcst Office Box 116 Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company East Haddam Post Office RFD 1, Post Office Box 127E East Haddam, Connecticut 06423 East Hampton, Connecticut 06424 G. H. Bouchard, Unit Superintendent Haddam Neck Plant RFD #1 Post Office Box 127E East Hampton, Connecticut 06424 l

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.E FEBRUARY 8, 1988 NU/NRC MEETING CY SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS NAME TITLE ORGANIZATION Mike Ciccone Senior Licensing Engineer NUSCO Gerard van Noordennen Licensing Supervisor NUSCO George Corneius Supervisor - RPS NUSCO Jim Brossord Engineer - RPS NUSCO Bohdan Pokora Sanior Engineer - RPS NUSCO Bill O'Hara Engineer - Transient Anal. NUSCO Jim Naylor Senior Engineer - Fire NUSCO Protection Steve Vick CY Licensing Engineer NUSCO Alan Wang NRC - PSB NRC Cris Cristallo Er.gineer - I&C NUSCO Tony Patrizi Fire Protection Specialist NUSCO William Lepper Engineer - Elect. NUSCO 4

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I September 30, 1987 l l

Docket No.: 50-213 ,

Mr. Edward J. Mroczka, Senior Vice President  !

Nuclear Engineering and Operations Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company Post Office Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270 I Oear Mr. Mroczka:

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNI'NG FIRE PROTECTION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY Re: Haddam Neck Plant By letters dated September 16, 1985, February 6, 1986, April 30, 1986,

- June 10, 1986, June 13, 1986 and September 9,1986, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company submitted, in support of several exemption requests, a revised fire protection analysis. The staff has completed its preliminary review and has detennined that additional infonnation is necessary in order to complete its review. Enclosure 1 to this letter contains our request for additional information. .

The staff requests that you provide responses to these requests within 90 days of receipt of this letter. If this schedule is not possible, please have your licensing department contact me to establish a new response date.

The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements contained in this letter affect ,

fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L .96-511.

Sincerely, original signed by Francis M. Akstulewicz, Jr. Project Manager Integrated Safety Assessment Project Dirictorate Division of Reactor Projects Ill/IV/V and Special Projects

Enclosure:

cc: see next page

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s Mr, Edward J. Mroczka Haddam Neck Plant Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company cc: Gerald Garfield, Esquire Kevin McCarthy, Director Day, Berry & Howard Radiation Control Unit Counselors at Law Department of Environmentar City Place Protection Hartford, Connecticut 06103-3499 State Office Building Hartford, Connacticut 06106 Superintendent Richard M. Kacich, Manager Haddam Neck Plant Generation Facilities Licensing RFD #1 Northeast Utilities Service Company Post Office Box 127E Post Office Box 270 East Hampton, Connecticut 06424 Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270 Wayne D. Romberg Donald O. Nordquist, Director Vice President, Nuclear Operations Quality Services Department Northeast Utilities Service Company Northeast Utilities Service Department Post Office Box 270 Post Office Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270 Board of Selectmen Town Hall Haddam, Connecticut 06103 e Bradford S. Chase, Under Secretary Energy Division Office of Policy and Management 80 Washington Street Hartford, Connecticut 06106 Resident Inspector Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station c/o U.S. NRC P. O. Bo). 116 East Haddam Post Office East Haddam, Connecticut 06423 Regional Administrator, Region I l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 l

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION HADDAM NECK ptAt'T APPENDIX R, FIRE PROTECTION - SAFE SHUTD0h'N CAPABILITY In order to complete our revier of the Appendix R post-fire safe and alternate shutdown capability at Faddam Neck, the staff finds that additional information is required as indicated below. The licensee ray provid? separate responses to these requests, or may refer to previous docurentation to complete 'their response to the staffs request.

1. Your recent submittals of September 16, 1985, February 6,1986, April 30, 1986, June 10,1986, June 13,1986 and September 9,1986 concerning post-safe and alternate shutdown to not address the folloving concerns:

(a ) High/lo pressure interfaces (b) Comunication between operators (c) Time required to attain cold shutdown (d) Instrumentation for process monitoring (e) Repairs required, if any (f) Emergency diesel generator fuel supply and replacement time (p) Protection of reactor coolant pump seals (h) Procedures for attaining hot standby and cold shutdown Frovide the above indicated infonnation.

2. Provide examples nf the results of your review of breaker coordination

.- to ensure protection against associated circuit concerns.

3. Your fire protection reanalysis (June 13, 1986 submittal)doesnotshow that you have examined post-fire shutdown with and withcut offsite power available. Provide information to show that you have considered both cases.

4. In Appendix F of your letter of September 16, 1985, you noted that the atmospheric dump valve (ADV) had "limited heat removal capacity" and therefore, edditional steam reifef paths may be needed for the required hot shutdown heat removal service. You also noted that the ADY may nnt be available after a control room fire. However, in Section IV, subsection "Main Steam / Auxiliary feedwater," of your June 13, 1986 reanalysis no mention is made of loss of the ADV in a control room fire.

There is also ne definite statement as to what process is available to remove the steam generated during shutdown except in the paragraph discussing the Terry turbine in which you mention a heat sink via the turbine exhaust. Later, however, in the section related to a turbine building fire, you note the "--adequate capacity of the ADV, steam oenerator vents, and auxiliary feedwater steam turbine exhausts."

Explain these apparent discrepancies and show any corrections, as necessary to the previous discussion. '

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5. Your June 13, 1986 letter seems to lack explicitness. For example, in discussing blowdoven trip valves (BDTV), ycu note that the cperator has the option to close manual valves to elimiriate blowdown in the case of a switchgear room fire. Further, for the PPR system, you note that one RHR pump must be available by protecting its cable or separating the cable from the other RHR pump's cable. In these and other cases ycu do not state, specifically, whether the blowdown from one or more Ifnes must be stopped, nor do you mention which RHR pump will be protected against a switchgear room fire.

Provide more specific information regarding the particular train or system required to bring the plant to cold shutdown in the event of a fire.

6. Show that you have the ability to shut the plant down in the event a postulated control room fire damages each of the following individually:

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a) Main control boerd b) Auy.iliary control boards, c) Safety system lockout display panel You should t.ssume that the control room becomes uninhabitable for at least one hour after the postulated fire in each case.

7. In ycur fire protection reenalysis of June 13, 1986, you do not discuss which systems are used to provide for the following needs througbcut the shutdown process:

a. Reacter coolant inventory control,

b. Reactivity control, l c. Primary system pressure i

d. Heat removal (hot and cold shutdown)

(1) From primary system (RCS),

(2) From secondary system,

e. Support system functions such as heating, ventilating and air conditioning, as required.

Provide this infomation for each area which contains ecufpment and cabling for which you take credit for bringing the plant to cold shutdown after a fire.

8. In Section d.3.2 of your June 13, 1986 submittal relating tc the CVCS, you state "--Essentially the same corrponents are impacted by these fires as by a control room fire. -- loss of operability for the majority of the components."

Use of the words "essentially", and "majority" do not contain sufficient information so as to permit a detailed review of this area. Provide detailed infomation in this section showing what failures occur as a result of a fire. Then, review your entire June 13, 1986 submittal and provide such detailed inforination as is necessary to pemit the staff to review the entire sutedttel.

9. In Section 4.3.8 of your June 13, 1986 submittal relating to tile CVCS you state that manuel action is required to open the pressurizer auxiliary spray Fov to collepse the pressurizer steam bubble during the cooldown process. Discuss at what point ycu plar to collapse the steam babble in the event of a fire in the cable vault (FA-R-1) or containment (FA-P-3).

Explain whethcr a fire in any other plant area would change the point at which bubble collapse initiatier would occur.

10. In the sheet entitled "Sumary of Circuit Failure Analysis by Fire Area" for the RHR system in your June 13, 1986 submittal, yeu show that PPR components fati in an area (Y-14) other than those which you discuss in Section 3.3, "Appendix R Fire Impacts and Compensatory Measures." This appears to be true for other systems er well. Discuss where this applies and provide assurance that safe shutdown can be effected in all areas in which fires may occur.

11. Your approach to spurious signals / operation seems to be inconsistent with the staff position. On pages 3 and 4 of the section Main Steam / Auxiliary Teedwater" of your June 13, 1986 submittal you state:

Page 3 "A fire in area S-2 causes MOV-160 to spuriously fail . closed and MOV-35 to spuriously fail open."

Page 4 "The Terry turbine steam admission valves are manually opened by the operater at the Terry turbine to co:>pensate for loss of cperability or spurious actuation.

In the first case, you seem to be postulate a simultaneous detrimental spurious action (closure of MOV-160) and compensatory beneficial one (opening ofMOV-35). The staff's position continues to be that no credit can be taken for a damage state resulting from a fire nor are two(2) or more simultaneous spurious signals postulated. In the second case you seem to equate loss of operability and spurious action. Destruction of power and/or power circuits results in inoperability. Spurious action would occur as a result of a hot short in a fire.

On the basis of the above, show that you have properly considered spurious action in all areas where a fire could affect equipment required for safe

! shutdown. Such consideration should include wire-to-wire and cable to cable

! faul ts.

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12. In your August 19, 1986 submittal entitled, "Haddam Neck Plant - Action l

Items Resulting from Appendix R Inspection of June 16-20, 1986" you noted l a temporary arrangement for monitorino the following plant parameters in I

the cable vault in the event of a control room fire:

Pressurizer Pressure Pressurizer Level Steam Generator 1, 2, 3 & 4 Pressure Steam Generater 1, 2, 3 & 4 Level (wide ranDe)

Peactor Coolant System 1, 2, 3 A 4 T ot l

Reactor Coolant System 1, 2, 3 8 4 old

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l-Does the use of tHs inst umentation require some means of transferring

,. from control room circuits *to the cable vault in order to e#fect suitable inanitoring? If so, show that a control room fire would not affect such

. tra ns fer. Show, also, how protection is afforded inadvertent transfer during nemal operation. Further, show that a cable vault fire would not result in l lo:s of sufficient centrol room instrumentation to achieve a safe shutdown.

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he DISTRIBUTION

'. Docket:-

'NRC'&^ local PDRs PDI-4 RF JStolz AWang OGC-WF EJordan JPartlow NRC Participants - Alan Wang ACRS (10)

HBClayton, ED0 l

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