ML20206R805

Responds to 3 Investigations,Repts 1-97-031,008 & 1-98-008 Between 970314 & 980722 as Well as Insp Conducted Between 980720 & 1102.Forwards Synopsis of 3rd OI Investigation

ML20206R805
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	05/12/1999
From:	Miller H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	Mellor R CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
References
50-213-98-05, 50-213-98-5, EA-97-164, EA-98-164, NUDOCS 9905200202
Download: ML20206R805 (5)

Text

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% ,8 KING OF PRUSSIA. PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415 May 12, 1999 EAs97-164 98-164 Mr. R. A. Mellor, Vice President Operations and Decommissioning I Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company 362 injun Hollow Road East Hampton, CT 06424-3099

SUBJECT:

NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-213/98-05 AND NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION REPORT NOS. 1-97-031,1-97-008, AND 1-98-008 l

Dear Mr. Mellor:

This refers to three investigations at the Haddam Neck facility conducted by the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) between March 14,1997, and July 22,1998, as well as an inspection conducted between July 20,1998, and November 2,1998. The first two investigations involved certain i radiation protection activities in December 1996 and February 1997. The results of the first two  !

investigations were provided in the letter that transmitted NRC Inspection Report 50-213/98-05, which was sent to you on December 21,1998. That inspection report documented an apparent violation involving the failure to survey contaminated equipment before it was shipped to an offsite vendor. The third investigation was conducted to determine whether a former health physics (HP) technician was discriminated against as a result of raising safety concems.

Based on the results of the first investigation and information provided at a predecisional  !

enforcement conference, the NRC concluded that a lead HP technician deliberately failed to follow radiation protection procedures, in violation of Technical Specification (TS) requirements, by using only one functioning survey meter during surveys performed in preparation for dive activities in -

December 1996. The NRC also concluded that the results of the dive survevs, information which j i is required by the NRC to be maintained, were not recorded accurately, in violation of 10 CFR 50.9.  :

On August 12,1997, a Notice of Violation was issued to Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power l Company (CYAPCo) for failure to follow radiation protection procedures for performance of the dive I surveys in December 1996. New information conceming the circumstances and nature of the '

violations was identified during the investigation, including the fact that the violations were willful.

You took prompt action to investigate the issue, recognized the willful nature of the violations, and 1 took appropriate corrective actions, including disciplinary action against the responsible individual.

Therefore, in accordanca with Section Xill of the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, the NRC determined that the circumstances of this case do not warrant reopening the enforcement action.

9905200202 990512 PDR ADOCK 05000213 G PDR u

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power 2 Company Based on the results of an inspection of the circumstances surrounding the release of contaminated video equipment from the Haddam Neck plant to a non-licensed vendor in February 1997, the NRC concluded that an adequate survey of the video equipment was not performed prior to release of the equipment. The failure to perform an adequate survey and the resultant loss of control of material, constituted a violation of 10 CFR Part 20. However, you promptly restored compliance by retrieving the contaminated equipment, took appropriate actions to investigate the cause of the release of the contaminated material, and took corrective actions to prevent recurrence. Therefore, because the release of the contaminated material, and the resultant loss of material were not willful, this Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy. Additionally, based on the results of the second Ol investigation and information provided at a predecisional enforcement conference, the NRC i concluded that another individual (who was a senior HP technician at the time) attempted to conceal the release of the contaminated video equipment by retuming it himself in an authorized manner which would have resulted in a continuation of the violation. Because appropriate action was taken to retrieve the contaminated material, no additional violations occurred and therefore further i enforcement action against CYAPCo is not warranted based on the results of the investigation.

Based on the results of the third Ol investigation, the NRC determined that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the employment of a HP technician was terminated as a result of raising a safety concem. The NRC also determined that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the former HP technician was blacklisted as a result of raising concerns to the Nuclear Safety Concems Program. The synopsis of the third Ol investigation is enclosed (Enclosure 1).

If you contest the violation or severity level of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this letter, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. l l

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and your

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response, if provided, will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). To the extent j possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards J information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction.

Should you have any questions conceming this letter, please contact Dr. Ronald Bellamy, at (610) 337-5200. {

Sincerely,  !

{

/ ]

Hu rt J. Miller l Regional Administrator i

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power 3 Company Docket No. 50-213 I License No. DPR-81

Enclosure:

Synopsis 01 Report 1-98-008 cc w/enci:

D. Davis, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer T. Bennet, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer K. Heider, Decommissioning Director G. Bouchard, Unit Director J. Haseltine, Strategic Planning Director l G. van Noordennen, Regulatory Affairs Manager j J. Ritsher, CYAPCO Counsel j R. Bassilakis, Citizens Awareness Network  !

J. Block, Attorney for CAN i J. Brooks, CT Attorney General Office K. Ainsworth, Town of Haddam l T. Concannon, NEAC l State of Connecticut SLO l 1

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9 PPR Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power i Company DISTRIBUTION:

SECY CA PUB!.lC WTravers, EDO MKnapp, DEDE FMiraglia, DEDR JLieberman, OE ,

HMiller, RI I DDambly, OGC SCollins, NRR

' BSheron, NRR BKane, NRR I Enforcement Coordinators Rl, Ril, Rlli, RIV BBeecher, GPNPA GCaputo, Ol PLohaus, OSP HBell, OlG OE:EA File (2) (Also by E-Mail)

NUDOCS 1 Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

DScrenci, PAO-RI NSheehan, PAO-RI l

MMasnick, NRR Region l Docket Room (with concurrences)

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ENCLOSURE SYNOPSIS l l

This investigation was initiated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of Investigations (0I), Region I Field Office, on February 24, 1998, to determine whether a former Health Physics (HP) Technician, Haddam Neck Plant (HNP), Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CY), was terminated on March 7, 1997, as a result of raising a safety concern. In addition, the investigation sought to determine if, subsequent to his termination, the former HP was blacklisted as a result of raising concerns to the Nuclear Safety Concerns Program (NSCP).

Based upon the evidence developed during the investigation. OI did not substantiate the allegation that the former HP was terminated on March 7, 1997, as a result of raising a safety concern. Further, the OI investigation did not substantiate that the former HP was blacklisted as a result of raising concerns to the NSCP.

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