AECM-82-295, Final Deficiency Rept PRD-82/17 Re GE Type Hma Relays W/Excessive Length of Uninsulated Leads to Contacts, Initially Reported 820406.Relays Inspected & Insulating Tubing Installed Per GE Ltr.Also Reported Under Part 21

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Final Deficiency Rept PRD-82/17 Re GE Type Hma Relays W/Excessive Length of Uninsulated Leads to Contacts, Initially Reported 820406.Relays Inspected & Insulating Tubing Installed Per GE Ltr.Also Reported Under Part 21
ML20063D131
Person / Time
Site: Grand Gulf  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 06/25/1982
From: Mcgaughy J
MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
REF-PT21-82 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, AECM-82-295, NUDOCS 8207010217
Download: ML20063D131 (5)


Text

. A MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

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Helping Build Mississippi P. O. B O X 16 4 0. J A C K S O N. M I S S I S S I P P I 3 9 2 0 5j June 25, 1982 ci c JAMES P. McGAUGHY, JR. ' -

  • assistant vicE PRESIDENT  %

~

Office of Inspection & Enforcement ,

s' U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission /-~$

Region II ,,

101 Marietta Street, N.W.  :

Suite 3100 _

Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator .

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SUBJECT:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Do cke t No s . 50-416/417 File 0260/15525/15526 PRD-82/17, Final Report, HMA Relays AECM-82/295 Ref erence : AECM-82/206, 5/7/82 On April 6, 1982, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. R.

Butcher, of your office, of a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction site. The deficiency concerns GE Type HMA Relays which have an excessive length of uninsulated leads to the moveable contacts.

As stated in AECM-82/206, we have determined that this deficiency is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e). Since that time, we have determined that this deficiency is also reportable under the provisions of 10CFR21. On June 16, 1982, MP&L notified Mr. R. Butcher, of your office, of Part 21 applicability for MP&L and confirmed that the 10CFR50.55(e) time requirements for submission of a written report could be applied.

Our Final Report is included as Attachment A.

Yours truly,

/

J. P. McGaughy, Jr.

RDC:dr ATTACHMENT A

See page 2 IllCJg 0,0 cc: /3 O

-T[. }

Member Middle South Utilities System

1 Mr. J. P. O' Reilly AECM-82/295

- NRC Page 2 1

cc: Mr. N. L. Stampley .

. Mr. R. B. McGehee

! Mr. T. B. Conner il i Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director

Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 1

Mr. G. B. Taylor South Miss. Electric Power Association

P. O. Box 1589 Hattiesburg, MS 39401 2

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., .. Attachm:nt to AECM-82/295 Page 1 of 3 '

FINAL REPORT FOR PRD-82/17

1. Name and address of the individual ... informing the commission:

J. P. McGaughy, Jr.

Assistant Vice-President, Nuclear Production P.O. Box 1640 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 Notification of Part 21 applicability made to Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, NRC, Region 11 by letter AECH-82/295, June 25,1982. This deficiency was also reported under 10CFR21 by the General Electric Company to the NRC in their letter dated April 1, 1982.

2. Identification of the facility ... which ... contains a deficiency:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) Units 1 and 2 Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150

3. Identification of the firm ... supplying the basic component which ...

contains a deficiency:

Supplied to Grand Gulf by the General Electric Company, San Jose, California.

4. Nature of the deficiency ... and the safety hazard which ... could be created by such a deficiency ...:

A. Description of the Deficiency A deficiency exists in GE Type HMA auxiliary relays manufactured during 1976 through June, 1981. The length of the uninsulated flexible leads connected to the moveable contacts of some HMA relays exceeds the allow-able dimensions and can result in reduced spacing between the leads and the coil circuit terminals. The reduced spacing introduces the possi-bility of a short circuit between the flexible leads of the HMA contact circuits and the adjacent coil circuit terminals. These relays are identified by a date code on the QC Acceptance sticker.

One (1) relay with the applicable date code has been identified in Unit 1 at GGNS and ten (10) in Unit 2.

B. Analysis of Safety Implications The safety impact is the postulated failure of a safety-related logic circuit or the failure of the safety circuit due to a fault introduced by a failure of the relay to properly isolate a non-safety circuit.

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Attachasnt A to AECM-82/295 Page 2'uf 3 In Unit 1, the type HMA Relay is'used in the Residual Heat Removal Pump stop control circuit. In Unit 2, the systems affected are Residual Heat Removal, High Pressure Core Spray, and Low Pressure Core Spray. These

.are all in the NSSS scopy of supply. We have determined that failure of this relay could affect the safe operation of the nuclear power plant.

5. The date on rhich the information of such ' deficiency ... was obtained.

Mississippi Power and Light received information of the deficiency on April 6, 1982. We reported the deficiency to Mr. R. Butcher, of your office, as a Potentially. Reportable Deficiency on that date. Since that date MP&L has filed one (1) Interim Report to inform the Commission of the' progress and status of this deficiency. An' evaluation for Part 21 has been completed and the MP&L " Responsible Of ficer," Mr. J. P. McGaughy, Jr. , will be notified when he returns to his' office.

6. In the case of the basic component ... the number and location of all such components.

At GGNS the extent is limited to only one (1) relay in Unit I and ten _(10) relays in Unit 2.

Defective equipment located other than at GGNS was covered'by General Electric Company. in their Part 21. report to the _-NRC on' April 1, ~1982.

7.. The corrective action which has been taken ... the name of the individualT...

responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been ... taken to.

complete the action.

A. Corrective Actions Taken The cause of the deficiency was a manufacturing error of using longer flexible leads in the relay than was specified.

General ~ Electric has issued Field Disposition Instruction (FDI) WAVC for

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Unit 1 and FDI-WBSJ for Unit 2 to inspect the relays and to install insulating tubing over the contact terminals and part of the flexible leads as necessary. To prevent recurrence, General Electric is insti-tuting better controls of manufacturing quality. All work for GGNS Unit I has been completed.

B. Responsible Individual C. K. McCoy T. H. Cloninger-Plant Manager Unit 2 Project Manager Mississippi Power & Light Co. Mississippi Power & Light Co.

Responsible for Unit 1 Responsible for Unit '2 o

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,. Attschmsnt A to AECM-82/295 Paga 3 of 3 C. Length of Time to Complete Actions Mississippi Power & Light Company received information of the deficiency on - April 6, 1982.

All work for GGNS Unit 1_has been completed.

8. Any advice related to the deficiency ... that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees:

As the deficiency did not originate with MP&L, we have no advice to offer.

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