05000272/LER-1982-056, Forwards LER 82-056/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-056/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20027B113
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	08/25/1982
From:	Midura H Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20027B114	List: 05000272/LER-1982-056, Forwards LER 82-056/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000272/LER-1982-056-03, /03L-0:on 820802,during Performance of Procedure SP(o)4.0.5-P on Auxiliary Feed Pump 11,recirculation Valve 11AF40 Would Not Open.Caused by Isolated Low Side of Transmitter.Operator Counseled
References
NUDOCS 8209160440
Download: ML20027B113 (3)

LER-1982-056, Forwards LER 82-056/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2721982056R00 - NRC Website

text

O PSIEG Public Service Electnc and Gas Comp.iny P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station August 25, 1982 Mr.

R.

C.

Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-056/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No.

1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-056/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

/

.%&fAc H.

J.

Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RH:ks((dp CC:

Distribution 8209160440 820825 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S

PDR b

The Energy People gf,t

Report Number:

82-056/03L Report Date:

08-25-82 Occurrence Date:

08-02-82 Facility:

Salem Generating Station, Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Auxiliary Feedwater System - No. 11 Auxiliary Feed Pump -

Inoperable.

This report is initiated by Incident Report 82-207.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 84% - Unit Load 860 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On August 2, 1982, at 0630 hours0.00729 days <br />0.175 hours <br />0.00104 weeks <br />2.39715e-4 months <br />, during performance of Surveillance Procedure SP (O) 4. 0. 5-P on No. 11 Auxiliary Feed Pump, the operator discovered that Recirculation Valve llAF40 would not open as required.

No. 11 Auxiliary Feed Pump was declared inoperable and Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement 3.7.1. 2a was entered a t 0630 hours0.00729 days <br />0.175 hours <br />0.00104 weeks <br />2.39715e-4 months <br />.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Investigation revealed that the low side of the flow transmitter had been inadvertently left isolated, causing indication of high flow to the valve positioner which shut recirculation Valve llAF40.

Prior to this, an operator had repositioned the flow transmitter low side isolation valve to facilitate maintenance which was being performed.

Because this valve was not part of the maintenance tag-out, it was missed when the tag-out was cleared and the valves repositioned.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The operability of the Auxiliary Feedwater System ensures that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down to less than 350 F from normal operating conditions in the event of a total loss of offsite power.

The Auxiliary Feedwater System in each unit is equipped with two parallel pumping systems for redundancy.

The system is designed such, that should either pumping system be unavailable, the redundant system is fully capable of cooling down the unit.

Therefore, because the alternate auxiliary feed-water pumping system was operable, this occurrence involved no risk to the health and safety of the general public.

LER 82-056/03L +

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:Action Statement 3.7.1.2a requires:

With one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, restore the required auxiliary feedwater pumps to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in hot shutdown within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Inoperability of one auxiliary feedwater pump, therefore, constitutes operation in a degraded mode allowed by a limiting condition for operation and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

Instrument isolation valves are the responsibility of the I&C Department and are not normally repositioned by Operations personnel.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The low side of the flow transmitter was unisolated and Surveillance Procedure SP (O) 4. 0. 5-P was performed satisfactorily.

No. 11 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was declared operable and Action Statement 3.7.1.2a was terminated at 1415 hours0.0164 days <br />0.393 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.384075e-4 months <br />, August 2, 1982.

A valve lineup was conducted to ensure that no other sensing line isolation valves for No. 11 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump were improperly positioned.

The Shift Supervisor counseled the operator on the implications of this occurrence.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable.

/i!,

Prepared By R.

Heller Gendral Manager -

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No.

82-78