05000272/LER-1982-001, Forwards Revised LER 82-001/03X-1.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Revised LER 82-001/03X-1.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20041A129
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 02/05/1982
From: Midura H
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20041A127 List:
References
NUDOCS 8202190142
Download: ML20041A129 (3)


LER-1982-001, Forwards Revised LER 82-001/03X-1.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
2721982001R00 - NRC Website

text

i PSEG Public Service Elecinc and Gas Company P.O. Box #168 Hancocks Bridge. New Jersey 08038 February 5, 1982 Mr.

R. C. Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-01/03X-1 Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-01/03X-1.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

//.

%f..

H.

J. Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations FD:al CC:

Distribution i

I 8202190142 820205 PDR ADOCK 05000272 O

PDR The Energy Peopk:

v:v w n

Report Number:

82-01/03X-1 Report Date:

02-05-82 Occurrence Date:

01-06-82 and 01-07-82 Facility:

Salem Generating Station, Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Reports82-001 and 82-004.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 5 - Rx Power 0% - Unit Load 0 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0730 hours0.00845 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.77765e-4 months <br />, January 5, 1982, due to Pressurizer Overprotection System (POPS) relief valve 1PR1 leaking through, and adding exces-sively to the plant liquid waste system, the control operator isolated it by closing blocking valve lPR6.

He erroneously neglected to enter Action Statement 3.4.9.3.a.

At 0730 hours0.00845 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.77765e-4 months <br />, January 6, 1982, the oversight was discovered.

1PR6 was opened immediately.

All requirements of Action Statement 3.4.9.3.a had been satisfied.

Therefore, the Action Statement was considered entered at 0730 hours0.00845 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.77765e-4 months <br />, January 5, 1982.

At 0800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br />, January 6, 1982 Action Statement 3.4.9.3.a was terminated.

On January 7, 1982, while draining the Reactor Coolant System, POPS relief valve lPR2 would not open in manual and was declared inoperable.

At 1310 hours0.0152 days <br />0.364 hours <br />0.00217 weeks <br />4.98455e-4 months <br /> Action Statement 3.4.9.3.a was entered.

This occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Failure of Copes-Vulcan D100-160 relief valves has been previously identified as a generic problem.

c ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.4.9.3.a requires:

With one POPS inoperable, either restore the inoperable POPS to operable status within 7 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through a 3.14 square inch vent (s) within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until both POPS have been restored to operable status.

LER 82-01/03X-1.

The lPR1 was open, venting the Reactor Coolant System to the atmosphere, prior to the discovery that 1PR2 would not open.

Therefore the requirements of the Technical Specification were met.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

At 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br />, January 22, 1982, the reactor _ vessel head was removed, and since the limiting condition for operation is not applicable under this condition, Action Statement 3.4.9.3.a was terminated.

Subsequently, 1PR2 was disassembled and is awaiting parts.

A Supplemental Report will be issued upon completion.

Also, the control operator was counselled as to the importance of proper action statement entry.

FAILURE DATA:

Copes-Vulcan D100-160 Valve Prepared By F. Dickey

/

Gener'al Manager -

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No.

82-14