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e OPS~G Publ!c Servic.e Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 272/97-001-01 DEC 24 1998 LR-N980560 SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERA TING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-311 Gentlemen:
_This Licensee Event Report entitled "FAILURE TO PERFORM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM CHECK VALVES" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations ****10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1)(B) ****
Attachment
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Distribution LER File 3.7 The po\\\\*er is in rnur hands.
Sincerely,
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A. C. Bakken Ill General Manager Salem Operations
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95-2168 REV. 6/94
e NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY am NO. 3150-0104
( 6-1998)
EXPIRES 06/30/2001 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
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FACIUTY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
PAGE (3) 1 OF 4 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 TITLE (4)
FAILURE TO PERFORM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM CHECK VALVES EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR I ENTlAL I REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER SE:lJMBER I NUMBER Salem Unit 2 05000311 0 2 15 9 7 9 7 0 0 1 0 1 12 2 4 9 8 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER I OPERATING I N I THIS REPORT IS SUBMIITED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Oleck one or more) 11)
MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
X 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)
I POWER I o o o I 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)
S0.73(a)(2)(x)
LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71
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20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
UCENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Robert B. Knieriem, Licensing Engineer 609-339-1782 COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
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'""'!'¥1' SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES x INO SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
This supplemental LER reports a TS non-compliance identified during a review of the Salem In-service Test program (IST).
On February 15, 1997 a review of the Salem IST program determined that the IST surveillance of Component Cooling Water system check valves CC195 and CC210 was not performed as required. CC195 and CC210, which serve as a part of the ASME Class 3 boundary, were exempted from IST program testing in 1991 under the provision that they remain isolated by closure of manual valves CC145 and CC146.
Contrary to the requirements of the IST program, changes were made to the required positions of CC145 and CC146 that permitted at least one of these two manual isolation valves to remain open during plant operation.
Because these changes were made without consideration of IST program requirements, reverse flow testing of CC195 and CC210 to verify the integrity of the ASME Class 3 boundary was not performed.
This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B), any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
Specifically, the requirements of TS 4.0.5 regarding in-service inspection and testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components.
The cause of this event was a lack of programmatic interface between the IST program personnel and Operations department personnel responsible for programs used to control system configuration.
To prevent recurrence, procedural controls will be implemented to inform IST program personnel of changes to normal valve positions before those changes are implemented so that adjustments to the IST program can be made when warranted to comply with TS 4.0.5.
NRC FORM 366 (6-1998)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOI\\
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 97 -
001 01 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Fann 366A) (17)
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
Westinghouse -
Pressurized Water Reactor Safety Injection {BP/-}
Component Cooling {KB/-}
Main Steam {SB/-}
- Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CC}
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE PAGE (31 2
OF 4
At the time of the occurrence Salem Unit 1 was defueled and Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 5.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On January 18, 1997 a review as a result of a recent NRC inspection determined that the Inservice Test (IST) surveillance on motor operated valves SJ4 {BP/V} and SJ5, Safety Injection Charging Pumps to Boron Injection Tank {BP/TK}, was not properly performed in the past. Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) SGTR-1 requires the operators to close these valves to terminate safety injection during the steam generator tube rupture event.
This method implements UFSAR Section 15.4.4 to terminate safety injection.
The closure of these valves is an active safety function of the design basis of the plant.
Because it is an active safety function, testing of these valves to close is required by Technical Specification 4.0.5 and must be included in the IST program.
Subsequent review of the SJ4 and SJS issue determined that there were 12 additional Unit 2 valves that were not being tested in the IST program in the direction contained in the EOPs.
These 12 valves are 21CC16 {KB/V}, 22CC16, 2SJ12 {BP/V}, 2SJ13, 21SJ54, 22SJ54, 23SJ54, 24SJ54, 21CS36 {BE/V}, 22CS36, 21MS45 {SB/V} and 23MS45.
The corresponding Unit 1 valves are likewise affected.
On February 15, 1997 further review determined that the IST surveillance on Component Cooling Water system check valves CC195 and CC210, was not performed as required. CC195 and CC210, which serve as a part of the ASME Class 3 boundary, were exempted from IST program testing in 1991 as a part of the IST Ten-year Update.
This change was made under the provision that CC195 and CC210 remain isolated by closure of manual* valves CC145 and CC146.
Contrary to the requirements of the IST program, changes were made to the required positions of CC145 and CC146 to allow one of these valves to remain open to permit filling of the Component Cooling Water surge tank from the control room.
Because these changes were made without consideration of IST program requirements, reverse flow testing of CC195 and CC210 to verify the integrity of the ASME Class 3 boundary was not performed.
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of the failure to perform the IST surveillance on the SJ4 and SJ5 valves was inadequate communication between the EOP group and the IST reviewers in determining what valves were manipulated in the EOPs and were therefore required to be included in the IST Program.
The cause of the failure to perform the IST surveillance on CC195 and CC210 was the lack of a programmatic interface between Operations department and IST program personnel to communicate changes to the normal positions of valves that could affect the IST program.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
~CILITY NAME (1)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 97 -
001 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Fann 366A) (17)
PRIOR SIMII,.AR OCCURRENCES PAGE (3) 01 3
OF A review of LERs for Salem Units 1 and 2 for the past two years did not identify any reportable occurrences that were caused by an inadequate programmatic interface between the Operations department and IST program personnel to communicate changes to the normal positions of valves affecting the IST program.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
4 There were no safety consequences associated with the occurrences in this LER.
Evaluation of other testing performed on the identified valves provides confidence that.the valves would have operated if needed.
This is based on the following.
The 21CC16, 22CC16, 2SJ4, 2SJ5, 2SJ12, and 2SJ13 valves are in the GL 89-10 program and are stroke timed quarterly in the open direction.
The 21CS36 and 22CS36 valves are in the GL 89-10 program and open stroked during cold shutdown.
After the open stroke test, the valve is returned to the closed position.
The 21SJ54, 22SJ54, 23SJ54, 24SJ54 valves are in the GL 89-10 Program and are operated when transitioning in and out of cold shutdown.
The 21MS45 and 23MS45 valves are manual valves and do not have any scheduled stroke tests.
These valves are closed which provides assurance that they were capable of being closed in the past.
The 2CC195 and 2CC210 valves were radiographed to verify that they were closed.
The results were satisfactory and the valves were determined to be operable.
The health and safety of the public was not affected.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1. The Salem EOPs were reviewed for similar problems and the results are noted above.
- 2. The Operations Department Emergency/Abnormal Operating Procedure Program procedure, SC.OP-AP. ZZ-0113, will be revised to include IST notification of proposed changes.
This will be completed by May 5, 1997.
- 3. As a result of the issues in this LER and other recently identified IST issues, a plan has been developed and will be completed to ensure that the Unit 2 IST Program is satisfactory prior to Unit 2 entering Mode 4.
- 4. The Salem Generating Station IST Manual will be revised to include the addition of the stroke test to the required valve tests for these valves.
This will be completed by March 31, 1997.
- 5. The revised surveillance test for the identified valves will be performed prior to entering the applicable mode when the valve is required to be operable for Units 1 and 2.
- 6. A review of the normal valve positions in the IST Manual and the normal valve positions listed in the Tagging Request Information System (TRIS) was conducted to identify other discrepancies.
Three other valve position discrepancies were identified.
Appropriate changes were made to obtain agreement between the IST Manual and TRIS.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER ru-IBER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 97 -
001 01 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
PAGE (3) 4 OF 4
- 7.
Procedure SC.RA-IS.ZZ-0007(Q), Exercise Closed Verification Check Valve Radiography, was revised to include quarterly radiography of 1CC195, 2CC195, 1CC210, and 2CC210 to verify that those valves are closed.
- 8. Salem procedure SC.OP-AP.ZZ-0103(Q) and Hope Creek procedure HC.OP-AP.ZZ-0103(Q) were revised to require that IST Program personnel review and approve valve position changes for valves in the IST program.
(PIR 970220076, CRCA 05, CRCA 04).
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| 05000272/LER-1997-001, :on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With |
- on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000311/LER-1997-001-01, :on 970115,inadequate Surveillance for PORV Accumulator Discharge Check Valves Was Noted.Caused by Reviewers Not Identifying That Test Method Did Not Meet Requirements of ASME Code.Revised Procedure |
- on 970115,inadequate Surveillance for PORV Accumulator Discharge Check Valves Was Noted.Caused by Reviewers Not Identifying That Test Method Did Not Meet Requirements of ASME Code.Revised Procedure
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000272/LER-1997-001-02, :on 970117,discovered Inadequate IST Surveillance of B Injection Inlet Valves.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP & Ist.Reviewed Salem EOPs for Similar Problems |
- on 970117,discovered Inadequate IST Surveillance of B Injection Inlet Valves.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP & Ist.Reviewed Salem EOPs for Similar Problems
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1997-002-01, :on 970210,chilled Water Sys Single Failure Vulnerabilities Identified.Caused by Design Deficiency. License Change Request S97-05 Submitted |
- on 970210,chilled Water Sys Single Failure Vulnerabilities Identified.Caused by Design Deficiency. License Change Request S97-05 Submitted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000311/LER-1997-002-02, :on 970213,discovered non-seismically Qualified Pressure Switches in Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation.Caused by Pressure Switches Being Replaced w/non-qualified Pressure switches.Re-installed Qualified Switches |
- on 970213,discovered non-seismically Qualified Pressure Switches in Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation.Caused by Pressure Switches Being Replaced w/non-qualified Pressure switches.Re-installed Qualified Switches
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | | 05000272/LER-1997-003-01, :on 970131,new Alignment Assumes Single Failure of 125 Volt Dc Channel Resulted in Two SWS Pumps in Runout Condition Which Caused Insufficient SWS Flow Rates.Modified SW223 Valves for Five Unit 2 Cfcus |
- on 970131,new Alignment Assumes Single Failure of 125 Volt Dc Channel Resulted in Two SWS Pumps in Runout Condition Which Caused Insufficient SWS Flow Rates.Modified SW223 Valves for Five Unit 2 Cfcus
| | | 05000311/LER-1997-003-02, :on 970319,excessive Debris in Unit Two Containment Was Caused by Poor Enforcement & Lack of Mgt Expectations Over Life of Plant,Coupled W/Poor Worker Practices.Debris Removed |
- on 970319,excessive Debris in Unit Two Containment Was Caused by Poor Enforcement & Lack of Mgt Expectations Over Life of Plant,Coupled W/Poor Worker Practices.Debris Removed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000311/LER-1997-003-03, :on 970909,loss of Fire Protection Water to Auxiliary Bldgs & Containments Was Noted.Caused by Human Error Due to Inattention to Detail.Loss Prevention Tours Have Been Revised |
- on 970909,loss of Fire Protection Water to Auxiliary Bldgs & Containments Was Noted.Caused by Human Error Due to Inattention to Detail.Loss Prevention Tours Have Been Revised
| | | 05000311/LER-1997-004-02, :on 970408,failed to Comply W/Ts Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing Due to Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment by Shift Personnel.Procedures Were Revised |
- on 970408,failed to Comply W/Ts Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing Due to Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment by Shift Personnel.Procedures Were Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000311/LER-1997-004, :on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With |
- on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1997-004-01, :on 970221,inadequate Surveillance Testing of Molded Case Circuit Breakers Were Identified.Caused by Instantaneous Function Not Accurately Specified in Procedure.Tssip Has Been Initiated |
- on 970221,inadequate Surveillance Testing of Molded Case Circuit Breakers Were Identified.Caused by Instantaneous Function Not Accurately Specified in Procedure.Tssip Has Been Initiated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) | | 05000272/LER-1997-005-02, :on 970625,radioactive Liquid Effluent Samples Were Not Analyzed within Required Surveillance Interval. Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of TS Sr.Training Will Be Provided to Chemistry Supervisors |
- on 970625,radioactive Liquid Effluent Samples Were Not Analyzed within Required Surveillance Interval. Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of TS Sr.Training Will Be Provided to Chemistry Supervisors
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000311/LER-1997-005-01, :on 970430,discovered Violation in Pressurizer Overpressure Protection Sys Ts.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Revised Procedures for 115 Volt Vital Instrument Bus & 125 Vdc Bus Operations |
- on 970430,discovered Violation in Pressurizer Overpressure Protection Sys Ts.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Revised Procedures for 115 Volt Vital Instrument Bus & 125 Vdc Bus Operations
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000272/LER-1997-006, :on 970312,determined Relays That Are Part of Logic for Opening PORVs Were Not Tested.Caused by Lack of Adequate Control for Maint of TS Surveillance Procedures. Initiated New Procedures & Revised Procedures |
- on 970312,determined Relays That Are Part of Logic for Opening PORVs Were Not Tested.Caused by Lack of Adequate Control for Maint of TS Surveillance Procedures. Initiated New Procedures & Revised Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000311/LER-1997-006-02, :on 970404,seismic Adequacy of Svc Water Header Was Invalidated Due to Unclear Work Instructions.Piping Has Been Reinstalled Correctly |
- on 970404,seismic Adequacy of Svc Water Header Was Invalidated Due to Unclear Work Instructions.Piping Has Been Reinstalled Correctly
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000272/LER-1997-007-02, :on 970630,failure to Perform Independent Verification for Radioactive Release Lineup as Required by TS 3.3.3.8,noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Cr Supervisor Was Held Accountable for Actions |
- on 970630,failure to Perform Independent Verification for Radioactive Release Lineup as Required by TS 3.3.3.8,noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Cr Supervisor Was Held Accountable for Actions
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000311/LER-1997-007-01, :on 970623,TS 4.0.5 ISI Requirement to Perform Radiography of Check Valves 2CC195 & 2CC210 Every 92 Days Determined to Have Been Missed.Caused by Personnel Error. Check Valves Subsequently Tested |
- on 970623,TS 4.0.5 ISI Requirement to Perform Radiography of Check Valves 2CC195 & 2CC210 Every 92 Days Determined to Have Been Missed.Caused by Personnel Error. Check Valves Subsequently Tested
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1997-008, :on 970321,inadequate Surveillance Testing of PORV Accumulators & Check Valves Was Attributed to Lack of Adequate Controls for Development & Maintenance of TS Surveillance Procedures.New Procedure Made |
- on 970321,inadequate Surveillance Testing of PORV Accumulators & Check Valves Was Attributed to Lack of Adequate Controls for Development & Maintenance of TS Surveillance Procedures.New Procedure Made
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000311/LER-1997-008-02, :on 970715,failure to Enter Action Statement for Having Both Radiation Monitors in Same Control Room Air Intake Duct Was Inoperable.Caused by Misjudgement by CR Supervisor.Personnel Was Held Accountable |
- on 970715,failure to Enter Action Statement for Having Both Radiation Monitors in Same Control Room Air Intake Duct Was Inoperable.Caused by Misjudgement by CR Supervisor.Personnel Was Held Accountable
| | | 05000311/LER-1997-009-02, :on 970711,failure to Stroke Pump Discharge Valves for Potential Pressure Locking Concern Was Noted. Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedures to Address Addl Instances of CS Pump Operation |
- on 970711,failure to Stroke Pump Discharge Valves for Potential Pressure Locking Concern Was Noted. Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedures to Address Addl Instances of CS Pump Operation
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000272/LER-1997-009, :on 970418,determined That Past Operation of ECCS Was Outside of Plant Design Basis.Caused by Failure to Address All Accident Scenarios Affecting Assumptions Made. Issued New NPSH Calculation Re RHR Pumps |
- on 970418,determined That Past Operation of ECCS Was Outside of Plant Design Basis.Caused by Failure to Address All Accident Scenarios Affecting Assumptions Made. Issued New NPSH Calculation Re RHR Pumps
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000311/LER-1997-010, :on 970819,CR Operators Initiated Plant Shutdown to Comply W/Requirements of Ts.Caused by Design, Mfg Const/Installation Deficiencies.Calibr Procedure Revised |
- on 970819,CR Operators Initiated Plant Shutdown to Comply W/Requirements of Ts.Caused by Design, Mfg Const/Installation Deficiencies.Calibr Procedure Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000272/LER-1997-010-01, :on 970819,position Indication Sys Were Shutdown as Required by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Design, Mfg Const/Installation.Successfully Recalibrated Rod Position Indication Sys |
- on 970819,position Indication Sys Were Shutdown as Required by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Design, Mfg Const/Installation.Successfully Recalibrated Rod Position Indication Sys
| | | 05000272/LER-1997-011-02, :on 971119,failure to Test Isolation of Sgb & SS on Automatic Start of Afps Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Incorporation of DBA Mitigation Features Into Plant Tp.Pse&G Committed to Complete GL 96-01 Evaluations by 971231 |
- on 971119,failure to Test Isolation of Sgb & SS on Automatic Start of Afps Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Incorporation of DBA Mitigation Features Into Plant Tp.Pse&G Committed to Complete GL 96-01 Evaluations by 971231
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | | 05000272/LER-1997-011, Forwards LER 97-011-00,re Failure to Test Isolation of SG Blowdown & Sampling Sys on Automatic Start of Afp,Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) | Forwards LER 97-011-00,re Failure to Test Isolation of SG Blowdown & Sampling Sys on Automatic Start of Afp,Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | | 05000311/LER-1997-011-01, :on 970902,improper Scheduling of Staggered Surveillance Testing Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error. Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Disciplinary Policies & Addl Training Provided |
- on 970902,improper Scheduling of Staggered Surveillance Testing Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error. Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Disciplinary Policies & Addl Training Provided
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1997-012-01, :on 970709,identified Failure to Perform Surveillance Channel Checks of Loop Average Temp Channels. Caused by Misinterpretation of Info in Operating Logs. Revised Control Room Operating Logs |
- on 970709,identified Failure to Perform Surveillance Channel Checks of Loop Average Temp Channels. Caused by Misinterpretation of Info in Operating Logs. Revised Control Room Operating Logs
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000311/LER-1997-012-03, :on 970907,declared Reactor Coolant Loop 24 Overtemperature Differential Temp Inoperable Due to Differential Temp Being Lower than Acceptable.Returned Loop 23 Pressure Instrumentation to Service |
- on 970907,declared Reactor Coolant Loop 24 Overtemperature Differential Temp Inoperable Due to Differential Temp Being Lower than Acceptable.Returned Loop 23 Pressure Instrumentation to Service
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000311/LER-1997-013-01, :on 970902,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Noted Due to Two Inoperable Pressurizer Level Channels. Caused by Error in RCS P&ID Drawing.Pressurizer Channel I Was Restored within Six Minutes of Event |
- on 970902,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Noted Due to Two Inoperable Pressurizer Level Channels. Caused by Error in RCS P&ID Drawing.Pressurizer Channel I Was Restored within Six Minutes of Event
| | | 05000272/LER-1997-013-02, :on 970702,determined That EDG Should Have Been Declared Inoperable W/Test Instrumentation Connected.Caused by Personnel Error.Performed Satisfactory follow-up Test, Removed Equipment & Signed Off Procedure |
- on 970702,determined That EDG Should Have Been Declared Inoperable W/Test Instrumentation Connected.Caused by Personnel Error.Performed Satisfactory follow-up Test, Removed Equipment & Signed Off Procedure
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000311/LER-1997-014-01, :on 971002,Unit 2 Manually Tripped.Caused by Failure of Analog Input Circuit Board in Westrac Data Acquistion Sys.Westrac Data Acquisition Sys Removed from Digital Fws |
- on 971002,Unit 2 Manually Tripped.Caused by Failure of Analog Input Circuit Board in Westrac Data Acquistion Sys.Westrac Data Acquisition Sys Removed from Digital Fws
| | | 05000311/LER-1997-016-01, :on 970909,loss of Fire Protection Water to Auxiliary Bldgs & Containment Was Noted.Caused by Human Error Due to Inattention to Detail.Loss Prevention Tours Have Been Revised to Include Once Per Shift Verification |
- on 970909,loss of Fire Protection Water to Auxiliary Bldgs & Containment Was Noted.Caused by Human Error Due to Inattention to Detail.Loss Prevention Tours Have Been Revised to Include Once Per Shift Verification
| | | 05000272/LER-1997-016, ;on 970909,loss of FP Water to Salem,Units 1 & 2 Auxiliary Buildings & Containment Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Control of 1RP5.Valves Were Opened & Locally Verified by Loss Prevention Personnel | ;on 970909,loss of FP Water to Salem,Units 1 & 2 Auxiliary Buildings & Containment Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Control of 1RP5.Valves Were Opened & Locally Verified by Loss Prevention Personnel | | | 05000311/LER-1997-016-02, :on 971125,inadequate TS Testing Main Steam Isolation Valve Hydraulic Unit Override Contacts Were Noted. Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls.Operability of MSIV Hydraulic Unit Will Be Verified |
- on 971125,inadequate TS Testing Main Steam Isolation Valve Hydraulic Unit Override Contacts Were Noted. Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls.Operability of MSIV Hydraulic Unit Will Be Verified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000311/LER-1997-016, Forwards LER 97-016-00 Re Loss of Fire Protection Water to Auxiliary Bldgs & Containments.Ler Was Originally Submitted on 971015 as LER 97-003-00.Encl Is Being Resubmitted W/Next Sequential LER Number | Forwards LER 97-016-00 Re Loss of Fire Protection Water to Auxiliary Bldgs & Containments.Ler Was Originally Submitted on 971015 as LER 97-003-00.Encl Is Being Resubmitted W/Next Sequential LER Number | | | 05000311/LER-1997-017-01, :on 971212,discovered That non-essential Heat Loads for Chilled Water Sys Were Not Isolated IAW TS Action Statement 3.7.10.a.1.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Involved Held Accountable & Revised Procedures |
- on 971212,discovered That non-essential Heat Loads for Chilled Water Sys Were Not Isolated IAW TS Action Statement 3.7.10.a.1.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Involved Held Accountable & Revised Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000311/LER-1997-018-01, :on 971125,inadequate TS Testing of MSIV Hydraulic Unit Override Contacts,Was Identified.Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls.Procedure S1(2).OP-ST.MS-0003(Q) Revised to Include Testing of MSIV Hydraulic Unit Override |
- on 971125,inadequate TS Testing of MSIV Hydraulic Unit Override Contacts,Was Identified.Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls.Procedure S1(2).OP-ST.MS-0003(Q) Revised to Include Testing of MSIV Hydraulic Unit Override
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000311/LER-1997-018, Forwards LER 97-018-00, Inadequate TS Testing - Main Steam Isolation Valve Hydraulic Unit Override Contacts. LER Was Originally Submitted on 971224 as LER 97-016.Number Was Already Assigned to Special Rept | Forwards LER 97-018-00, Inadequate TS Testing - Main Steam Isolation Valve Hydraulic Unit Override Contacts. LER Was Originally Submitted on 971224 as LER 97-016.Number Was Already Assigned to Special Rept | |
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