05000272/LER-1998-001, :on 980116,AFP Internal Flooding Protection Was Installed Incorrectly.Caused by Installation Error During Construction.Pipe Alley Flood Gate counter-weight Was Properly Positioned on 980124

:on 980116,AFP Internal Flooding Protection Was Installed Incorrectly.Caused by Installation Error During Construction.Pipe Alley Flood Gate counter-weight Was Properly Positioned on 980124

ML18106A330
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	02/16/1998
From:	Bakken A, Enrique Villar Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-98-001, LER-98-1, LR-N980081, NUDOCS 9802250022
Download: ML18106A330 (6)

LER-1998-001, on 980116,AFP Internal Flooding Protection Was Installed Incorrectly.Caused by Installation Error During Construction.Pipe Alley Flood Gate counter-weight Was Properly Positioned on 980124

Event date:
Report date:
2721998001R00 - NRC Website

text

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Public Service Electric and Gas Company. P~O. Box 236 * -Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit FEB 14 1998 LR-N980081 u. 's.***:Nucle~r *Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk

, Was_hin.g~on, DC,2055.5 Geri t 1 ern'.en :.. * *

• LER 212/98~601-oo SALEM GENERATING STATION -

UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272

• • • *~n.is.. Licensee Event Report entitled "Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Internal Flooding protection Ins~alled Incorrectly" is being

• submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of.Federal Regulations 10CFR50. 73 (a) (2) (i) (B).

• EHV C

Distribution LER File 3.7 9802250022 980216 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S

PDR

• The power is in your hands.

A. C. Bakken III General Manager -

Salem Operations I If 1111 lllll lllll f 1111[1111 Jlll/{11/ If II 95-2168 REV. 6/94

NRCFORM 366 U.S. NUCL REGULATORY COMMISSION APP OVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 04/30/98.

(4-95). *.

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS

~ \\ MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)..

REPORTED.LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY.

FORWARD

. COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F3~,.U.S. NUCLEAR (See reverse for required number of REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 2 55-0001, AND TO digits/characters for each block)

THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAllE (1)

DOCKET NUllBER (2)

PAGE (3)

SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 1 OF 5 TITLE (4)

Auxiliary Feedwate:i::- Pump Internal Flooding. Protection Installed Incorrectly.

EVENT DATE (5)

LER NUMBER (6)

REPORT DATE (7)

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

YEAR..I MONTH DAY FACILITY NAME.

DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR.

SEQUENTIAL I REVISION YEAR NUMBER NUMBER

.98 01 16 98

.001 00 02 16 98 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Checkoneormore) (11)

MODE(9) 5 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) x 50. 73( a)(2)(i)

50. 73(a)(2)(viii)

POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

50. 73(a)(2)(ii)

50. 73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

50. 73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4)

50. 73(a)(2)(iv)

OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1)

50. 73(a)(2)(v)

Spec!iin Abstract below or in C Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2)

50. 73(a)(2)(vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

E. H. Villar (Station Licensing Engineer) 609 339 5456 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REP.ORT (13)

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT.

MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE I TONPRDS II

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR IYES x1NO SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

During a System Readiness Review walkdown by the assigned System Manager, it was noted that the flood gate counter-weight in the pipe alley on elevation 84 foot of the Salem Unit 1 Auxiliary Building was not functioning properly.

At this time, an action request was written to correct this condition.

During the maintenance activity that followed from this request, it was discovered that the failure to function properly was the result of improper installation. The flood gate is a part of the protection against the postulated effects of pipe ruptures. In the event of a line break inside the pipe alley and flooding of the alley, the flood gate must function properly to protect the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump from internal flooding. The exact cause of this occurrence cannot be determined.

The apparent cause of this condition was an installation error during initial construction.

The condition was corrected, and an action request was written to address this condition adverse to quality.

This Licensee Event Report (LER) is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

NRC FORM 366 (4-95)

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'\\. :i. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)

FACILITY NAME (1)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6) 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PLANT. IDENTIFICATION:.. _;

• '-~'.

Salem Generating Station-: Unit.1.

Public Service Electric and Gas*compariy Hancocks Bridge,*New Jersey* 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRE.NCE:

98 001 00 "Auxiliary Feedwater Pump*Internal Flooding Protection Installed Incorrectly" Date of Occurrence:

Date of Identification Report Date:

.January 16, 1998 January 16, 1998 February 16,~1998 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Salem Unit 1 - Mode 5 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

PAGE (3) 2 OF 5

During*a System Readiness Review walkdown by the assigned System Manager, it wai noted that the flood gate counter-weight in the pipe alley on elevation 84 foot of the Salem Unit 1 Auxiliary Building was not functioning properly.

At this time, an action request (AR) 971204233 was written to correct this condition~ During the maintenance activity that followed from this request, it was discovered that the failure to function properly was the result of improper installation.

AR 980116245 was written address this condition.

The flood g*ate counter-weight was oriented 180 degrees out of alignment (upside-down).

The flood gate is a part of the protection'against the postulated effects of pipe ruptures.

The pipe alley contains portions of both the high energy Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) letdown lines and the steam line to the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine.

The pipe alley is connected with the.turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump room.

In the event of a line break inside the pipe alley and flooding of the alley; the flood gate must function properly to protect the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump from internal flooding.

k-*-

• (4-95)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6) 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 98 001 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd):

PAGE (3) 3 OF Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 requires that three auxiliary feedwater pumps be OPERABLE in Modes 1-3.

The "as found" physical configuration of the flood gate counter-weight indicated that this flood gate was unable to perform it5'iritended function, and the exact period of time that this*

condition existed cannot be determined.

Therefore, PSE&G concluded that Salem Unit 1 was operated in Modes 1 through 3 with the flood gate inoperable.

Based:on the above, this condition is reportable as a condition prohib~.ted by the Planes Technical Specifications per 10 CFR so.73 (a) (2) (i) (bl.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The exact cause of this occurrence cannot be determined.

The apparent cause of this condition is believed to be an installation error during initial construction.

Because the flood gate does not have a component

. identifier, it.is not possible to develop a maintenance history or determine how it occurred.

PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES:

A search of the LER database using the phrases "flood gate" and "counter-weight" did not identify any LERs within the past two years related to mispositioned flood gate counter-weight.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

5 Although the flood gate counter-weight was oriented 180 degrees out of alignment (upside-down), the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was never chailenged from a line break and flooding of the pipe alley during this period.

Therefore, there were no safety consequences associated with this event.

Technical Specification allows only 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of power operations with one inoperable pump and allows no power operation with two pumps inoperable.

The discussion below will show that within reasonable engineering judgment one motor driven pump would have been available to meet the Salem design basis, and demonstrate that the safety consequences and implications associated with this event were minimal.

- ::.~

)' (4-95)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6) 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 98 001 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form ~66A) (17)

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS (cont'd):

PAGE (3) 4 OF. 5 Salem has a desi~n complement of one turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (located in its own enclosure) and two motor driven pumps.

The two motor driven pumps are located in an adjacent open area on pedestals*.

approximately 6 inches above the floor.

The Salem design bas.i:s requires one motor driven pump to be available to supply two steam generators.

Drains installed in this area, as well as the openness of the area, further reduces the possibility of flooding.

Overpressurization of the pipe alley is prevented by venting the compartment through the mechanical penetration through a vent penthouse to the atmosphere.

Drains are also installed to minimize the potential for flooding.

Features designed to minimize (if not eliminate) a high energy pipe break in the alley are described in the Salem UFSAR.

Specifically, Sections 3.6.5.4 and 3.5.5.6 describe the results of postulated break of the letdown line of the eves (300psig/300 deg F) and the steam supply to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (790psig saturated steam).

The letdown line portion of the eves is constructed of Nuclear Class 2, Seismic II standards from ASTM-A312 TP-304 steel pipe.

Postulated break locations have been sl~eved and restrained to minimize the mass flow rate and preclude damage from pipe whip events.

These design features in conjunction with the venting of the pipe alley show that a postulated break would not affect any safety related equipment.

Similarly, the steam lines to the turbine-driven pump have been sleeved and restrained.

The design criteria associated with these sleeves is also described in the.Salem UFSAR, and is based on ASME Section III, Nuclear Power Plant* Components Code, for Class 2 Components, and the applicable revision of the ANSI Standard Code for Pressure Piping, ANSI B31.l.

The analysis concluded that the only anticipated consequence of the rupture of the steam supply to the turbine driven pump (larger pipe) is the loss of the turbine driven pump.

Note that this brea*k is assumed in the pump enclosure area itself, where the flood gate counter-weight mispositioning would not be a factor.

Therefore, as a result of the physical location of the pumps, as well as the design features associated with these high energy lines, it is within reasonable engineering judgment to expect that the motor driven pumps would have been unaffected by a high energy pipe break and flooding of the pipe alley, and at least one pump would have been available (assuming one motor driven* pump inoperable).

\\,\\.

• U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)

FACILITY NAME (1)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6) 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 98 001 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS (cont'd):

PAGE (3) 5 OF 5

However, notwithstanding the above discussion, the limiting case scenario of this condition is the*total loss of auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators.*.,Al though a* highly. unlikely event, as described above, control room licensed operators are trained and written instructions are provided (in the_ fo*:rm of_ Em.ergency Operating procedures) to mitigate the consequences of this event.

The Emergency Operating Procedures provide direction for identification and isolation of the break, as well as restoration of heat sink.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN:

1. The pipe alley flood gate counter-weight was properly positioned on January 24, 1998 via work-order *9712b4233.

2. The Salem Unit 2 flood gate counter-weight was verified to be in the proper position.

3. A preventive maintenance recurring.task for these flood gates will be evaluated.

This evaluation will be completed by March 31, 1998.