ML20153H213

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Submits Summary of 980715 Workshop with Representatives from All Region II Facilities Re Operator Licensing Exam Techniques.Invitation Extended to Members of Operations & Training Staff to Attend 981105 Training Manager Conference
ML20153H213
Person / Time
Site: Brunswick  Duke energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/24/1998
From: Peebles T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Herrell M
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
NUDOCS 9809300348
Download: ML20153H213 (96)


Text

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. August 24,1998 l Carolina Power and Light Company l ATTN: Mr. Max E. Herrell Training Manager Brunswick Steam Electric Plant P. O. Box 10429 Southport, NC 28461-0429

SUBJECT:

MEETING

SUMMARY

AND

PUBLIC MEETING ANNOUNCEMENT

-JULY 1998 NRC REGION 11 EXAMINATION WORKSHOP AND NOVEMBER 1998 TRAINING MANAGERS' CONFERENCE - BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT

Dear Mr. Herrell:

Region 11 facilitated a workshop on Operator Licensing Examination Techniques on July 15, 1998, conducted at the Richard B. Russell Building. The workshop attendees included representatives from all Region il facilities. It is our opinion that the workshop was beneficial and provided an excellent opportunity for open discussion on the operating test portion of the operator licensing examination process.

During the workshop, we covered a preliminary response to concerns expressed at the January 1998 workshop and a synopsis was promised, but due to the status of the program, cannot be provided. The slides used for our discussions are enclosed.

Also, I would like to extend an invitation to you, and to members of your operations and training staff, to attend this year's Training Managers' Conference to be held on November 5,1998. Our goal for the meeting is to provide an open forum for discussion of operator licensing issues.

The site for this year's conference will be in the Richard B. Russell Building Auditorium on Spring Street in downtown Atlanta. As of this date, the agenda is open. We encourage you to submit, via telephone, a list of topics that you would like to have discussed.

Additionally, we would appreciate an update of the home addresses of your licensed operators.

Please send them in an envelope marked "To Be Opened by Addressee Only" to either Ms.

Beverly Michael or myself. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Bev at (404) 562-4640 or me at (404) 562-4638.

Sincerely, (Original signed by T.A. Peebles)

Thomas A. Peebles, Chief Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos.: DPR-71 and DPR-62

Enclosures:

As Stated 9909300349 990824 PDR ADOCK 05000324 V PDR a ,

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CP&L 2 cc w/encls:

J. S. Keenan, Vice President,  ;

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant ,

Distribution:

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OPERATING TEST WORKSHOP Richard B. Russell Auditorium July 15,1998 8:00 Opening Remarks (Johns Jaudon) l 8:20 - Standard JPM format (SSNTA) 8:40 JPM critical tasks (Hopper & Mellen)

What constitutes a critical task?

The importance of measurable criteria?

  • Good examples
  • Bad examples  ;

i Discrimination (it has to be failable!) l

  • Good examples l
  • Bad examples 9:30 JPM Questions (Baldwin)

Direct look up. As defined in ES-602. Attachment 1,8.2.e (p.15) l

  • examples
  • " fixes" to those examples Use of Open and Closed Reference items as defined in ES-301, D.1.1 (p.9) which states:" closed reference items may be used to evaluate the immediate actions for l i

emergency and other procedures, certain automatic actions, operating characteristics, interlocks, and set points..."

  • examples
  • " fixes" to those examples I

-10:30 Administrative JPMs (Steiner) 11:00 Scheduling (Steiner) .

  • ways to optimize the material developed
  • simulator bottle necks
  • reasonable daily work loads
  • candidate stress
  • exam delays 11:30 Lunch 1:00 Exam predictability and exam security (Payne) 1:30 Simulator scenario development (Payne & Hopper)
  • scheduling and crew makeup
  • evaluation tool
  • malfunctions in relation to mi.jor event
  • level of detail

'3:30 Questions and Answers j .4:30 Closing 5

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REGION 11 WORKSHOP - OPERATING TEST JULY 15.1998 Richard B. Russell Building Strom Auditorium David Lane Examiner - Sonalysts Larry Kelley Training Advisor- OHN/Pickering John Brewer Manager- Authorization Training - Ontario Hydro Nuclear Carolina Power and Liaht Company Tom Hackler Requal Training - Brunswick Curtis Dunsmore initial Training - Brunswick Tony Pearson Initial Training - Lead - Brunswick Terry Toler instructor - Harris R!ck Gamer Sperviisor - Ops Training - Harris Dwayne Coffey LOCT Supervisor - Robinson Dave Neal OIT Lead - Robinson Scott Poteat Support Lead - Robinson Duke Enerav Corooration - Catawba. McGuire. and Oconee David Re' ' Training instructor Charles Sawyer Senior Tech Spec James Presten Instructor Brent Moore instructor Bill Caudill Nuclear Instructor E. T. Beedle Instructor- Catawba Reggie Kimray Nuclear Instructor - Catawba John Supte. Operations - Catawba Rob Billings Instructor - McGuire Steve Helms Instructor - McGuire Robby Pope Supervissor - Mcguire Rick Robinson Ops Training Coordinator - Oconee Robin Lane Training Instructor - Oconee J. R. Steely Training Instructor - Oconee David Covar Nuclear Instructor - Oconee Randall Yarbrough Nuclear Instructor - Oconee

. Bobby Ayers Ops Instructor - Oconee Florida Power Corooration Ivan Wilson Ops Manager L Jack Springer Supervisor - Training - Crystal River Johnie Smith Ops Training Supervisor - Crystal River i

l Operating Test Workshop 2 July 15,1998 Florida Power and Liaht Company Dave Brown initial Training - St. Lucie Tim Bolander Simulator and Exams - St. Lucie Mike Croteau Instructor - Training - Turkey Point Rich Bretton LOCT Supervisor - Training - Turkey Point South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Jim Callicott Senior instructor Perry Ramicone instructor - V. C. Summer Southern Nuclear Operatina Comoanv. Inc. (SNC) i Tom Blindauer Senior Plant instructor - Simulator - Farley Bill Oldfield Taining - Farley

)

i Steve Be Training - Hatch j Ken Drawdy Training Instructor - Vogtle I Thad N. Thompson - Ops Training Instructor - Vogtle i Perry Tucker Ops Training Instructor - Vogtle Michael Henry Nuclear Instructor - Vogtle Leon Ray Ops Training Supervisor- Vogtle Fred Howard Ops Reg instructor- Vogtle Perry Vannier Initial Training - Vogtle Charlton Sal Requal Training - Vogtle Steve Dyer Requal Training - Vogtle Tennessee Vallev Authority Phillip H. Case Simulator Instructor- NC Training Denny Campbell Ops instructor-Browns Ferry Marvin Meer Ops Instructor - Browns Ferry Jim Kea.ney Ops Instructor - Sequoyah Dave Davidson ~ Ops instructor - Sequoyah Steve Taylor Ops instructor - Sequoyah Ricky C. King Senior Ops instructor - Sequoyah Ed Keyser Simulator Instructor - Sequoyah Tom Wallace Supervisor- Watts Bar Terry L. Newman ops Instructor- Watts Bar Jack Cox Training Manager- Watts Bar John Roden Ops Training Manager - Watts Bar Randy Evans HLT Lead - Watts Bar

I Operating Test Workshop 3 July 15,1998 Virainia Electric and Power and Power Comoany Walt Shura Supervisor - Training - North Anna Steve Crawford . Senior Instructor (Nuclear)- North Anna 1 Ken Grove Senior instructor- Surry Ray Simmons Senior Instructor - Surry 1

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EXAH REVIEW GUIDELINES I. TECHNICAL ACCURACY l -

Is there more than one correct answer?

Is the given answer correct?

Adecuate data in the stem?

Is cata in the stem consistent and plausible?

II. PSYCHOMETRICS: The process of applying sound qualitative processes to mental measurements.

l PSYCHW1ETRIC FLAWS THAT COULD DIMINISH THE VALIDITY OF THE EXAMIN FLAW . GUIDANCE APPENDIX B REFERENCE

1. Low level of Question should be written to reflect App. B

./ knowledge the level of knowledge most 1.d appropriate for a specific K/A.

When there is a choice, try to write the question to reflect the higher level.

  • SEE LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE BELOW
2. Low operational Does the question test the intent of App. B validity the K/A? 1.a/b/e Could someone do the job safely and 2.k effectively without being'able to answer the question?
3. Low discriminatory Will a less than competent candidate App. B validity miss the item? 1.d Can a person understand the principle 2.g being tested and still miss the item?
  • SEE LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY BELOW.
4. Implausible Can a distractor be eliminated with App. 8 Distractors out understanding the concept being 2.b/f/h/m tested?
5. Confusing or State the question as concisely as App. B ambiguous language possible but provide all necessary 1.c information.
6. Confusing negatives Avoid negative stems. App.B 2.e l 7. Collection of Each item should focus on one K/A App.B true/ false item determined by the stem. 1.f 2.c
8. backwards logic Examine on a topic in a way that is App.B consistent with how the K/A should be 1.h remembered and used.

LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY Establish a level of difficulty that will enable an applicant who is capable of safely operating the plant to complete and review the examination within four hours and achieve a grade of 80 percent or greater. [ES-401 p.4]

Since item difficulty can usually be decreased or increased by revision, the ,

examination author need not be overly preoccupied with difficulty when writing  !

the items. The author should focus on achieving a valid measure of the l concept he is attempting to evaluate. [ Appendix B. p. 6]

]

LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE  !

-Level 1: FUNDAMENTAL KNOWLEDGE The recall or recognition of discrete bits of information.

- knowledge of terminology

- definitions

- set points

./

- other specific facts Level 2: COMPREHENSION Involves the metal process of understanding the material through relating it to.its own parts or some other material.

- describing or recognizing relationships

- recognizing how systems interact ,

- consequences or implications of events '

Level 3: ANALYSIS. SYNTHESIS OR APPLICATION Involves assembling sorting or integrating information to predict'an event or outcome. Requires mentally using the knowledge and its meaning to solve problems.

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NUREG-1021. APPENDIX B. GUIDANCE

. 1. Generic Princioles

a. Ensure that the concept being measured has.a direct, important relation ship to the ability to perform the job.
b. Make sure that the question matches the intent of the K/A.
c. State the question unambiguously and precisely.
d. Write the question.at the highest level of knowledge reflected in the testing objective.
e. Avoid questions that are unnecessarily difficult or irrelevant.

.f . Limit the question to one concept or topic. unless a synthesis of concepts is being tested.

./

g Avoid copying text directly forma training or other reference material.

h. Avoid backward logic questions.
2. Other Construction Guidelines
a. Use four answerr,
b. Do not'use "none of the above" or "all of the 'above".
c. Do not present a collection of true-false statements.
d. Define the question task or problem in the stem.
e. Avoid using negatively stated stems when possible.
f. Provided sufficient. counter balance in questions with multi-part answers,
g. Include common misconceptions as Distractors.
h. Make all answer options homogeneous and highly plausible.

I. If the answers have a logical sequence put them in order.

j. Avoid overlapping answer options.
k. Do not include trivial distractors with more important distractors.
1. Vary the location-of the correct answer.

.m. Avoid. specific determiners that give clues as to the correct answer.

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(1) distractors that do not follow grammatically from the stem.

l (2) options that can be judged correct or incorrect without reading the stem.

(3) equivalent and /or synonymous options which rule out both options.

l (4) an option which includes another option.

(5) implausible distractors.

(6) a correct answer which is longer that the distractors.

(7) cualifiers in the correct answer unless they are used in cistractors. (e.g. probably, ordinarily) 1 (8) words such as "never" . "always" which suggest a wrong answer.

(9) a correct option that differs from the distractors in

./ favorableness, style, or terminology.

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III. BEANS 1

Ei-WL .55'5. . 55 ' .b^

BEAN LIMIT REFERENCE Knowledge level questions < 50 ES-401 p.4 SRO / R0 overlap 5 75 ES-401 p.5 Questions from training class quizzes 5 25 ES-401 p.5 OR last two NRC exams.

Questions from licensee audit exam 50 ES-401 p.5

.(same author for audit exam)

./ Questions from licensee audit exam 55 ES-401 p.5 (independent author for audit exam)

Questions from licensee bank 5 50 ES-401 p.5 New questions at comprehension or > 10 ES-401 p.5 analysis

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3. DeveloD Performance Criteria .

The JPM should have meaningful performance requirements that will provide a legitimate basis for evaluating the examinee's ability to safely operate the system or the plant. Artificially subdividing .,

existing tasks to generate new ones may dilute the value of the JPMs to a point where they become meaningless.

The JPM shall identify specific performance standards, or check points, that will permit the examiner to evaluate successful progress toward completing the task in-accordance with the procedural references.

Detailed control and indication nomenclature and criteria (e.g., switch positions and meter readings) should be identified whenever possible, even if these criteria are not specified in the procedural step. The JPM should also note any important observations that should be made by the examinee while performing the task.

The JPM must clearly identify the task standard; i.e., the predetermined outcome (qualitative and/or quantitative) against which task performance will be measured. (vetysp.nocedurah e step that the -e (dbfieatjy,g(4 req? accurately,iin-thepropersequehce.xamineemustperform ,.2and-at.:the proper,:

siisi)Tjnsor~defilto2laEcomplishlthe task standard shall be identified as*d

critica7 step'and shall have an associated performance standard.

Ifi. there are any specific procedural restrictions on the sequence in which the steps are performed they shall be clearly noted in the JPM.

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,Measuraile Per"ormance l Incicators incica :or

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A measura.3 e Jer =ormance l consis:s o='30sitive actions :la: an I oaserver can 03jec:ive~y icen: 1=y taken ay an incividual(/ crew).

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Exam 3 es:

Ac:1ons :acen in :le E03s suc1 as in res3onse :o an A WS.

Con ~;ro mani 3u' a: ions suc1 as a s:ar:

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an ECCS Jum3.

Veraa~ reJor:s or ncr:1=ica: ion o=

Jarame:ers or conci: ions.

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\on-measura.J e Jer=ormance

nciga : ors:

Veri =ica: ion :la: an exJec:ec resJonse las occurrec:

.) Veri =ica; ion anc/or ensure s:eJs w1ic1 recuire no ac: ion.

DassiVe o.Jserva: ions suc, as moni :oring :le Jer =ormance o = a sys:em.

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T1e accentance criteria must Je aa e to discriminate /icen:i =y noor performance  !

3ac Exam]~ es:

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measure :1a: is no: 03jec:ive.

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vio~ a:e :le Jerformance measure s:a:ec in :le Jrocecure, even :lougl

le =aci i:y icensee ex3ec:s :le oJera:or :o s:ar: :le Juma sooner. ~

1e \RC anc =aci~i~:y icensee slou c

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agree in wri:ing :1a: :le imi :s =or ~

eac, CS or C-~ are acce3-aa e Je= ore

le examina: ion Jegins. or :le exam 3 e given a3ove, accing an

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EX:erna' s :imu' Us slou' C 'Drom'J: an l o'Jera:or :o res'Jonc Jy : acing cer:ain

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JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

  1. ' Provide this page to the Candidate initial conditions:

A Station Blackout has occurred on Unit 2. Unit 1 is in a LOOP with both Emergency Diesel Generators in service. The NPS and ANPS have determined the need to crosstie electrical power fmm the 1 A EDG to the 2A3 4.16 KV switchgear via the SBO AB Bus Crosstie.

l Initiating Cue:

The ANPS has directed you to accomplish the Unit to Unit crosstie to the 2A3 4.16 KV Bus by performing 2-EOP-99, Table 7 and then 2-EOP-99, App. V within 10 minutes. j l

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0821129, Rev 02 Page 16 of 16

l JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST l

1. (C) Element / Step OPEN and GREEN FLAG the following startup transformer breakers: -

A. Standard: S.U. Transformer 2A (2-30102)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN ,

B. Standard: S.U. Transformer 2B (2-30202)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN C. Standard: S.U. Transformer 2A (2-20102)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN D. Standard: S.U. Transformer 2B (2-20302)

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Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN

2. (C) Element / Step Ensure the folle ving breakers are GREEN FLAGGED and OPEN A. Standard: Aux Transformer 2A (2-30101 ) (2WB7)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Standard: Aux Transformer 2B (2-30201) (2WB5)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Comments:

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(C) indicale's a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST l

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2. (Cont'd) 'B. Standard: Aux Transformer 2A (2-20101) (1WBS)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN l Standard: Aux Transformer 2B (2-20301) (1W84)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN l

l C. Element / Step Tie breakers between normal and emergency 4160V buses:

Standard: 4.16 KV Bus Tie 2A2-2A'. g2-20109)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Standard: 4.16 KV Bus Tie 2A3-2A2 (2-20209 l l

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Standard: 4.16 KV Bus Tie 2B2-2B3 (2-20309)

Cue: GREEN LIG'HT ON, FLAG GREEN l

Standard: 4.16 KV Bus Tie 283-2B2 (2-20411)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN t ..

D. Element / Step 4.16 KV Bus 2AB Tie breakers Standard: Feed to 4.16 KV Bus 2AB (2-20208) l Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Standard; incoming feeder from 4.16 KV bus 2A3 (2-20505) l GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Cue:

Page 7 of 16 0821129. Rev C2

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JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

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(C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST 2.D. (Cont'd) Standard: Incoming feeder from 4.16 KV bus 283 (2-20504)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Standard: Feed to 4.15 KV Bus 2AB (2-20409)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN ,

3. (C) Element / Step QPEN the following 4.16 KV feeder breakers to the station service transformers:

A. Standard: Station Service Transformer 2A1 (2-20110)

.- Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON B. Standard: Station Service Transformer 2A5 (2-20210)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON C. Standard: Station Service Transformer 2A2 (2-20213)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON D. Standard: Station Service Transformer 2B1 (2-20310)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON E. Standard: Station Service Transformer 282/285 (2-20402) l Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON oe21129. Rev 02  % e of 1s l

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JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

, s' (C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST

4. (C) Element / Step OPEN and GREEN FLAG the following 480V feeder breakers from the station service transformers:

, A. Standard: 480V Bus 2A1 Feeder (2-40103) l Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN B. Standard: 480V Bus 2A5 Feeder (2-40361)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN - I C. Standard: 480V Bus 2A2 Feeder (2-40219)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN D. Standard: 480V Bus 281 Feeder (2-40419)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN

,,- E. Standard: 480V Bus 285 Feeder (2-40653)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN F. Standard: 480V . Bus 2B2 Feeder (2-40503)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN SAT UNSAT Comments:

0821129, Rev 02 Page 9 of 16

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l JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (C) Indicatis a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST l

S. (C) Element / Step OPEN the following 480V bus tie breakers l A. Standard: 480V Bus Tie 2A2-2AB (2-40220)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON B. Standard: 480V Bus Tie 2AB-2A2 (2-40702)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON C. Standard: 480V Bus Tie 2AB-2B2 (2-40706)

Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON D. Standard: 480V Bus Tie 2B2-2AB (2-40504)

..- Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON SAT UNSAT Comments:

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1 0521129, Rev D2 Page 10 of 16

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JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST l

S. (C) Element / Step Establish communications with Unit 1 Standard: ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS with Unit 1 via GaiTronics or plant radio (if available).

Cue: COMMUNICATIONS ARE ESTABLISHED

7. Element / Step PLACE the following pump switches in the PULL TO LOCK position: -

(C) A. Standard: 2A ICW Pump Cue: SWlTCH IN PULL TO LOCK B. Standard: 2B ICW Pump Cue: SWITCH IN PULL TO LOCK

. Standard: 2C ICW Pump Cue: SWITCH IN PULL TO LOCK (C) D. Standard: 2A CCW Pump Cue: SWITCH IN PULL TO LOCK E. Standard: 2B CCW Pump Cue: SWITCH IN PULL TO LOCK Standard: 2C CCW Pump Cue: SWITCH IN PULL TO LOCK SAT UNSAT Comments:

0821129, Rev D2 Page it of 16

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1 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

. (C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLtST

8. (C) Element / Step Verify the EDG output breaker on the selected 4.16 KV bus is open Standard: VERIFY the EDG output breaker on the selected 4.16 KV bus (2- l 20211) is .QPEN I Cue: GREEN LIGHT IS ON. REPORT UNIT 1 IS READY TO CROSSTIE AB 4.16 KV BUSES.
9. (C) Element / Step Close in the Unit 2 SBO breaker Standard: CLOSE IN the Unit 2 SBO breaker 2-20501.

l Cue: RED LIGHT ON l

10. (C) Element / Step Request the Unit 1 control room to close the Unit 1 SBO breaker Standard: REQUEST the Unit 1 control room to close the Unit 1 SBO breaker

, 1-20501.

Cue: UNIT 1 ACKNOWLEDGES REQUEST.

END Element / Step TERMINATION Standard: Student requests Unit 1 to close the Unit 1 SBO crosstie breaker.

Comments:

-=

i 0821129, Rev 02 Page 12 of 15 l

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JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE i

(C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST

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1. Eiernent/ Step: Review the EOOS log and deterrnine if channel RM-26-18 (PAG-203) has been declared out of service.

Standard: Verifies RM-26-18 is not out of service, i

.,,*" ed l Cue: RM-26-18 IS NOT OUT OF SERVICE j

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2. Element / Step: . Check the Met Towerfor operability -

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Standard: Verifies Met Tower chart recorder working property..

Cue: MET TOWER CHART RECORDER TRACKING PROPERLY. j

3. Element / Step: Verify gas release permit properly filled out and authorized, enter release permit number and tank to be released on procedure.

Standard: Verifies permit filled out properiy and authorized, enters release permit number (96-007) and 2C GDT on procedure.

Cue: 98-007 AND 2C GDT ENTERED ON PROCEDURE

4. (C) Element / Step: Verify the following valve alignment:

V6745 Closed V06142 Open V7071 Open V7070 Open V7072 Locked Closed VB742 Locked Closed Standard: Verify all above listed valves in pmper positions Cue: V6745 FULLY CLOCKWISE V06142 FULLY COUNTERCLOCKWISE V7071 FULLY COUNTERCLOCKWISE V7070 FULLY COUNTERCLOCKWISE V7072 FULLY CLOCKWISE WITH LOCK ATTACHED V6742 FULLY CLOCKWISE WITH LOCK ATTACHED SAT UNSAT Comments:

os211as. nw oo Page5 et12

, JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

- (C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST

4. Element / Step Check closed FCV-25-9," Continuous Containment / Hydrogen Purge Control Valve Filter inlet."

Standard: At the NON-SAFETY VENTILATION HVAC PANEL:

VERIFY CLOSED FCV-25-9 Cue: 0%, GREEN LIGHT ON, RED LIGHT OFF

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SAT UNSAT Comments:

5. (C) Element / Step Throttle FCV-25-28," Continuous Containment / Hydrogen Purge Control Valve Bypass" to approximately 10% OPEN position.

Standard: At the NON-SAFETY VENTILATION HVAC PANEL: POSITION FCV 28 to the open position UNTIL the valve position indicates 10% OPEN

.- Cue: 10%, BOTH RED & GREEN LIGHTS ON i

SAT UNSAT Comments: l S. Element / Step Start HVE-6B,

Standard: At the B TRAIN EMERGENCY VENTlLATION HVAC PANEL:

. POSITION HVE-6B control switch to START Cue: RED LIGHT ON, GREEN LIGHT OFF SAT UNSAT Comments:

os21ose, b os  % 6en2

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JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE l l

t i C. #_ The system / equipment status reflects the overallintent of what the JPM required

)

upon completion. I l

D. Conectly perform all critical steps.

All steps where procedural guidance exists may be considered critical. Performance of

, Off-Normal Operating Procedure immediate actions will be from memory.

During the course of the JPM, there may be some tasks you will have tn perform that will require you to implement contingency actions in order to complete them. Even in these' cases, you are expected to make decisions and take actions based on the indications available and in accordance with the facility's' procedural guidance.

l Inienc Cue (st l i

The ANPS has directed you to respond to the abnormal alarm IAW 1-0120035. l l

References:

ONP 1-0120035, Rev 18 During the performance of the task I will tell you which steps to simulate or discuss.

Vert >alize each step before you do it. This gives you a chance to seif-check and use STOP during the performance of each task element.

Verify the position or condition of equipment or components by pointing to the instrumentation and providing a brief explanation of how the indication is used for verification.

I will provide you with the appropriate cues for steps which are simulated or discussed.

You may use any approved reference materiais normally available in the execution of this Job Performance Measure, including logs.

- Do you understand these directions?

- if you have any questions, ask them now, and I will answer them.

- During the test I cannot answer questions.

. When you complete all steps correctly, you will pass this job performance measure.

. Begin the task now.

d os21 M3.Rev os  % d # 'O

. . . - . . ~ . . . - - . - - . . - - - _ _ . . . - - _ _ _ - . . . . . .-.. . - . . . . . . - . - . .

t JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE f 8 PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST

1. Element / Step Verify pmssurizer spray, proportional and backup heaters are operating properly in automatic.

Standard: OBSERVE any of the following Pressurizer pressure indications on RTGB 103 and/or RTGB 106 to DETERMINE improper automatic response:

PR-1100 Plo1100X PIC-1100Y Pb1102A PI-1102B PI-1102C PI-1102D PIA-1102ALL PIA-1102BLL PIA-1102CLL PIA-1102DLL Observe the proportional heater control and indication for P-1 and P-2 Observe the B/U heater control and indication for banks B 1 through B-6

Observe the spray valve controller HIC-1100 NOTE TO EXAMINER: The CUES should provide suNicient information to diagnose the failure of the selected pressure channel LQ_W. It should be recognized that Pressurizer pressure is

.e actually incmasing. All of the indicators listed may not be used by the operator when diagnosing this pmblem. The student rnay refer to Appendix "A" for expected automatic responses.

Cue: For PR-1100, PIC-1100X, PIC-1100Y :

SELECTED CHANNEL- DOWNSCALE LOW, NONSELECTED CHANNEL IS =2300 PSIA AND SLOWLY INCREASING For other PIinstruments:

INDICATED PRESSURE IS =2300 PSlA AND SLOWLY INCREASING For Pressurizer heaters:

SWITCHES IN AUTO, HEATERS LIGHTS INDICATE ON e

For Pressurizer spray controller HIC-1100:

INDICATES NO OUTPUT SAT UNSAT Comments:

082100, Ret 06 Page 5 cf 10

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE l s (C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST 1

2. (C) Element / Step 11the selected pressure channel has failed, Then shift to the operable pressure channel.

Standard: At RTGB 103: POSITION HS-1100 to the attemate pressure control channel Cue: ALTERNATE CHANNEL SELECTED. PROPORTIONAL HEATER

OUTPUT REDUCING, SPRAY VALVE OUTPUT RISING, PZR l

PRESSURE RETURNING TO NORMAL.-'

l NOTE - The ANPS directs tnat the rest of the ONP be carried out.

SAT UNSAT Comments:

3. Element / Step Verify SE-02-03 and SE-02-04 " Auxiliary Gpray Valves", are closed

, Standard: At RTGB 103: DETERMINE keyswitches and indicating lights for SE-02-03 and SE-02-04 to be CLOSED Cue: SE-02-03, SE-02-04 GREEN LIGHTS ON AND RED LIGHTS OFF SAT UNSAT Comments:

4. Element / Step Verify power operated relief valves are closed.

Standard: At RTGB 103:: DETERMINE position indicating lights for both power

l. operated relief valves CLOSED Cue: PORV-1402, PORV-1404 GREEN LIGHTS ON AND RED LIGHTS OFF SAT UNSAT Comments:

on:noc. Rev os  % 6 M

1 1

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 8 PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST l

l S. Element / Step Ensure that PORVs V1402 and V1404 hand switches are in the proper position for existing plant conditions. l i

i Standard: At RTGB 103: DETERMINE PORVs hand switches are in NORMAL Cue: PORVs HAND SWITCHES IN NORMAL SAT. UNSAT l

l Comments:

1 6.

Eiernent/ Step Verify pressure anomaly is NOT caused by a large rate of change of Tavg.

Standard: At RTGB 103: OBSERVE any of.the following indications and DETERMINE that Tavg is fairiy stable:

TR-1111X/1121X, TI-1102A, TR-1115/1125. Tb11028, TIA-1111X, TI-1102C, TIA-1121X, TF1102D, TIC 1111Y, TIC-1121Y

..- l Cue: Tavg HAS BEEN STABLE THROUGHOUT THE EVOLUTION SAT UNSAT Comments:

1

. END Element / Step TERMINATION Standard: The pmssurizer pressure control system is responding properiy to control pressure at 2250 psia.

I 0521043, Rev 06 Page 7 of 10 l

~

OPERATING TEST WORKSHOP RUSSELL BUILDING JPM QUESTIONS RICK BALDWIN JULY 15,1998

--.---.----.e - -, - _ . --

1 ES-301, D1(l}

Sta':es:

T1e 3rescriotec cuestions for Categories A anc B may incluce a com 3l nation o~ 03en- anc c osec-reference items. Open-reference items  :

that require a 33 icants to anolv their l knowledge of the alant to '30s':ulatec normal abnormal anc emergency l situatio,ns are oreferred. Closed-reference iterhs may be used to evaluate the immeciate actions of emergency anc other arocecures certain automatic actions characteristics, inter oc <s, o 3eratin, :s as a33roariate to ':he facili':y., Minimize t1e set use o" closed-reference c uestions tlat re y sole y on memory use of o3en-reference a, uestions anc avoid t7e whose answer can sirh alv be looked un if the aoolicant can "idd the c6rrect do'c'ument.

Re"er to Section B.6 of Appendix C for more guidance regarcinc the cevelopment anc use o~ 03en reference c uestions "or the walk-taroug 1 test.

Appendix C:

States:

6. Deve 03 Pre-scriatec Fo ow-u a Questions If the JPM will be used curing an initial licensinc examination, it shalfincluce a sufficieri: number of 3rescriatec cuestions references <'\with answers to evaluate anc the examinee's uncerstancinc of two knowlecge anc/or aaility (K/A1 s:atements relatec to the system or fask. More than one cuestion may be recuirec to effective y evaluate some K/A statements.

The most a33roariate format for this a33lication is the short-answer c uestion recuires the examinee to compo, se which a response rather than select from among a set of alternative res3onses as is the case with mu tiale-choice ma,tching, anc true/fa se cuestio,ns. Kee3 the following guidelines, in accition to the generic item construction 3rinciales in A33encix

B, in minc when are3arinc t1e c uestions:

! a. Provice clear, exa icit cirections

/guice ines for answering the cuestion so that t1e examinee uncerstancs what constitutes a l fully correct response.

Choose words carefully to ensure that the stipulations anc

^

requirements of the cuestion are a33ro3riately convey'ec. Worcs such as " evaluate." out ine " anc "ex3 lain " can invi:e a ot of,cetail tla: is n,ot necessari y relevant.

! 3. Make sure tlat the answer key i response matches and is limited to)'the requirement (s posed in the

. question. When a33roariate,

! incicate the amoun': of 3ar:ial creci':

! to 3e grantec for an incomalete

answer.

i i For cuestions recuiring comautation,

! specify the dearee of precision

! expected. Try'lo ma<e the answer i turn out to 3e w1o e num3ers.

c. Avoic givinc away aart or al .o" the l answer ay_he way ':he cuestion is worc ec -or exam 31e:.

"If the letdown line 3ecame obstructec, coulc boration o" the alant De accom3lislec shortly after a reactor tria to aut the alant in colc shutcown? If so, how?" i A test-wise examinee can realize that the answer has to 3e yes, or else the seconc 3 art of the cuestion woulc have reac something ike "If

~

not, why not?"

c. Avoic what coulc 3e consicerec

" trick" questions in whic7 the answer key coes not arecisely match the '

q~ uestion. For exam 3Te, asking "How co the SI termination criteria 6ha]nge followinca SI reinitiation?"

im3lies that the":ermination criteria will change, when in actuality they do not.

i -

e. Avoid direct look-up questions i

that only require the examinee to i recall where to find the answer to l

the question.

l The 03erational orien:a: ion recuirec

! of c uestions on the wal<-throug1 tes':

! anc the examinee's access to i reference cocuments, araue against

! the use o" c uestions ':laf' test for i recall anc memorization. Any l questions that do not requi.re a l analysis, synthes,s, i or appl.icat ion ny

! of inTormafion by the examinee i

should be answerable without the aid of reference materials. Re"er to ES-602, Attacament ', for a more

cetailec ciscussion of cirect loo <-ua l c ues'
ions.

Form ES-602 '

"NRC Checklist for l 03en-Reference, Test Items "

i con':ains a ist o" c uestions tha.t.can .

! 3e usec to eva ua':e ':le suita31 r:v o~

! ':he "ollow-u a c uestions alannec for

! t7e wal<-through 3ortion of the l 03erating tes':. A tloug1 the j clec< istwas cevelo3ec for use .in 3

l evaluating recua ncation written 1

examinations,t i.e., all exce a 9most o" the criteria l i

a33l.

</A rating anc t7eicaole on 7 item,10,11,y coulc} ae areusec anc generica as a i

basis for revising or rejectinc l 3roaosec walk-throug a c ues: ions.

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t i

ES-602 NRC Checklist for Form ES-602-1

= Open-Reference Test Items Test Item level

1. Does each test item have a documented link to important licensee tasks, K/As, and/or facility learning objectives?
2. Is each question operationally oriented (i.e., is there a correlation between job demands and test demands)?
3. Is the question at least at the comprehension-level of knowledge?
4. Is the context of the questions realistic and free of window dressing and backwards logic?
5. Does the item require an appropriate use of references (i.e., use of analysis skills or synthesis of information either to discern what procedures were applicable or to consult the procedures to obtain the answer)?

l

6. Is the question a " direct look-up" question, or does one question on the i examination compromise another? A " direct look-up question"is defined as a l question that immediately directs an licensee to a particular refe. ence where the answer is readily available.
7. Does the position? question possess a high K/A importance factor (3 or greater) for the job
8. Does the question discriminate a competent licensee from one who is not?
9. Is the question appropriate for the written examination and the multiple choice format?
10. Do questions in Section A take advantage of the simulator control room setting?
11. Does any question have the potential of being a " double-jeopardy" question? ,
12. Is the question clear, precise, and easy to read and understand?
13. is there only one correct answer to the question?
14. Does the question pose situations and problems other than those presented during training?
15. Does the question have a reasonable estimated response time?

+ l CONCLUSIONS

. @ 03en-reference cuestions whose i answer can simaly 3e loo <ec ua if the a331icant can finc the correct cocument are NOT acce3taale.

i @ Analy. sis, Synthesis, Comarehension cues':lons s'loulc be usec to avoic i cirect look-u a problems.

J

! @ On all questions where the exaectec resaonses are multiaart, v,9 will

! notify the cancicate of fle rum 3er of known correct answers anc the j

1 numoer neecec for full crecit.

I @ Examiners will ask non-arescriatec

! follow ua questions, as necessary, to clarify or confirm the cancicate's uncerstancing of 3rescriatec

! guestions or pre-alannec tasks. The

! followua questions should be to

further ex3l ore the lack of cancicate i knowl quest.ecge ion in the saecific area in 4

4 l @ Assign ooint values to eac1 answer

. that has multiole aarts. to ensure

{

t examiner gracing consistency.

! @ Icentify on the candicate's sheet the j status of reference material usage.

! @ There is aro30 sal to im30se an

! allowance o"only 30% closed-

! reference questions of either j Category A or B. l I

i  ;

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. . . . . - . - . - . ~ . . - . _ . _ . _ . . _

e DIRECT LOOK QUESTIONS l l

WITH ACCEPTABLE I

CORRECTIONS 4

i

RO Admin. A.1 (Fuel Handling), Question 1 2.1.23 3,9/4.0 QUESTION:

Given the following plant conditions:

e Reactor shutdown for refueling outage l

  • Unit offline: 1/1/9712:01 AM l Entered Mode 3: 1/1/97 2:10 AM e Entered Mode 4: 1/1/97 6:17 AM

= Entered Mode 5: 1/1/97 11:45 PM What is the earliest date/ time core offload can commence?

ANSWER:

1/5/97 6:10 AM 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after shutdown

REFERENCE:

GP-010, " Refueling", step 5.3.1 01/06/98 5:43 AM

l AUTHORIZED COPY e INIT

~

5.2:28 !F needed for SFP water clarity, THEN place the SFP skimmer in service IAW OP-910.

' ~ ' '

5.3 Fuel Assembly and Core Component Movement NOTE: A case evaluation has been performed IAW PLP-037 for each major evolution in this section. The case determination is defined prior to each applicable evolution.

1 5.3.1 Check that the Reactor has been suberitical for at least 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> AND record hours suberitical. (TRMS 3.12) hrs '

5.3.2 Verify EST-001 is complete.

ENG j l

NOTE: The following equipment tests need to be completed prior to )

moving fuel.

l 5.3.3 Verify the following equipment necessary to support fuel

~. off-load has been tested IAW EST-030 AND mark the equipment that is not needed to support fuel off-load N/A.

- Fuel Transfer System (Section 8.6.2)

ENG

- Manipulator Crane (Section 8.6.3)

ENG

- CV RCC Change Fixture (Section 8.6.4)

ENG

- New Fuel Handling Equipment (Section 8.4)

ENG

- NFB New Fuel Lift (Section 8.5.1) i ENG '

- SFP New Fuel Monorail (Section 8.5.2)

ENG

- SFP Bridge Crane (Section 8.5.3)

ENG

- SFP New Fuel Elevator (Section 8.5.4)

ENG 1

l Rev.36 Page 24 of 79 I I 1

l

)

. l Decay Time l 3.12 l i

3.12 . DECAY TIME TRMS 3.12 Movement of fuel within the core shall not be (CTS 3.8.1.h) initiated prior to 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after shutdown. l APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

1 COMPENSATORY MEASURES CONDITION REQUIRED COMPENSATORY MEASURE COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TRMS A.1 Sus and movement of fuel Immediately not met. wit 11n the core.

TEST REQUIREMENTS l

TEST FREQUENCY None. NA 3.12-1

Decay Time B 3.12 B 3.12 DECAY TIME BASES The restriction of not moving fuel in the reactor for a period of 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after shutdown reduces the consequences of a fuel handling accident by providing for decay of short lived fission products and the reduction of fission gas inventory in any potentially failed fuel. Fuel handling accidents in containment and the Spent Fuel Building have been evaluated by postulating that the failure of all fuel rods in one assembly occurs 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after shutdown.

I I

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B 3.12 1 -

RO Admin. A.1 (Fuel Handling), Question 1 2.1.2319/4.0 l REFERENCE ALLOWED i

QUESTION:

Given the following plant conditions:

  • Reactor shutdown for refueling outage i a Unit offline: 1/1/9812:01 AM i

. Entered Mode 2: 1/1/9812:38 AM I e Entered Mode 3: 1/1/98 2:10 AM

  • Entered Mode 4: 1/1/98 6:17 AM

= Entered Mode 5: 1/1/98 11:45 PM 1

What is the earliest date/ time core offload can commence?

ANSWER:

1/5/98 6:10 AM (100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after shutdown)

REFERENCE:

GP-010, " Refueling", step 5.3.1

~

PLP-100 (Technical Requirements Manual), section 3.12 h3 o.;> - ~

02/13/98 9:58 AM

RO'JPM CR-019, Question 2 i 006 Ki 03 s 4.2/4.3 l QUESTION:

! Given the plant conditions:

l

. Mode 1,100% power

  • Accumulator levels / pressure i "A" 68 % 600 psig "B" - 70% 630 psig "C" . 70% 645 psig Annunciator APP-002-B4 "SI ACCUM A HI/LO PRESS" illuminated l Describe the basis for NOT being allowed to raise the pressure in the "A" Accumulator and lower the pressure in the "C" Accumulator by simultaneously opening the vent valves for the two accumulators.

ANSWER: 1 Simultaneously opening the accumulator vent valves would connect the two accumulator gas spaces. If a large break LOCA were to occur on either of the loops ("A" or "C") both accumulators would depressurize invalidating the LOCA analysis.

.(Not required for credit: Accumulator design capacity is based on one accumulator spilling to the containment floor through the break, the other two accumulators fill the

. core to the mid-plane.) 1

REFERENCE:

FSAR section 6.3.2.2.6 OP 202, step 4.20 APP-002-B4 "S1 ACCUM A HI/LO PRESS" 01/06/98 5:43 AM

, UPDATED FSAR

3. Finally the second low level alarm on the RWST sounds. At this time, the operator performs the switchover operation.

The changeover from injection to recirculation is effected by the operator in the Control Room via a series of manual switching operations according to written procedures. Valves SI-856A and B are manually closed at the valves.

Remotely operated valves for the injection phase of the SIS (Figures 6.3.1-1 and 6.3.1-2) which are under manual control, (this is, valves which normally are in their ready position and do not receive a SI signal) have their positions indicated on a common portion of the control board. At any time during operation, when one of these valves is not in the ready position for injection, it is shown visually on the board. Table 6.3.2-1 is a listing of the instrumentation readouts on the control board which the operator can monitor during recirculation. In addition, an audible annunciation alerts the operator to the condition.

6.3.2.2.5.1 Location of the major components required for recirculation. The RHR pumps are located in the RHR pump pit (Elevation 203 ft 0 in.) which is below the basement floor of the Auxiliary Building (Elevation 226 ft 0 in). The RHR pump pit is located between the Containment I

Building and the Auxiliary Building. The residual heat exchangers are located on the first floor of the Auxiliary Building.

The high head SI pumps, component cooling pumps and component cooling heat exchangers are located in the Auxiliary Building (Elevation 226 ft 0 in). l The service water pumps are located in the intake structure, and the redundant piping to the component cooling heat exchangers is run underground.

6.3.2.2.6 Accumulators. The accumulators are pressure vessels filled '

with borated water and pressurized with nitrogen gas. During normal plant operation, each accumulator is isolated from the RCS by two check valves in series.

Should the RCS pressure fall below the accumulator pressure, the check valves open and borated water is forced into the RCS. Mechanical operation of the swing-disc check valves is the only action required to open the injection path from the accumulators to the core via the cold leg.

The accumulators are passive engineered safety features (ESF) because the gas forces injection; no external source of power or signal transmission is needed to obtain fast-acting, high-flow capability when the need arises.

One accumulator is attached to each of the cold legs of the RCS.

The design capacity of the accumulators is based on the assumption that flow from one of the accumulators spills onto the containment floor through the ruptured loop. lne flow from the remaining accumulators provides sufficient water to fill the volume outside of the core barrel below the nozzles, the bottom plenum, and one-half the core.

6.3.2-6 Amendment No. 12

4.0 (Continued) i ,

1

16. A case evaluation has been performed for each section of this procedure IAW PLP-037. The case determination and any associated additional requirements are defined at the beginning of each section.

I

17. The Dedicated Operator utilized for filling SI Accumulators shall be any active licensed individual other than the Reactor Operator on watch, and shall remain at the RTGB until the filling evolution is complete.

l

18. If any SI Acewmulator level increases greater than 10% (70 gal) due to inleskage when the RCS pressure is >1000 psig, then the affseted accumulater shall be sampled within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

(ITS SR 3.5.1.4)

19. When drawing an oil sample from an SI Pump, remove the Control Power Fuses. Reinstall the Control Power Fuses when sampling has been completed 632 the oil reservoir has been refilled to the l

normal level. During the interval with fueses removed, the SI '

Pump is inoperable.

20. Do E2I open more than one SI Accumulator Vent valve at a time

, when the SI Accumulators are required to be operable to prevent invalidating the LOCA Analysis. (Westinghouse Memo CPL-96-210) 1

21. Operation with RWST level greater than the high level setpoint should be avoided to prevent water level at the Spring Line of the RWST.

1 i

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l OP-202 Rev. 44 Page 10 of 120 i

RO JPM CR-019, Question 2 006 Kl.03 4.2/4.3 REFERENCE ALLOWED QUESTION:

Given the plant conditions:

  • Mode 1,100% power

. Accumulator levels / pressure "A" 68 % 600 psig "B" 70% 630 psig "C" 70 % 645 psig Annunciator APPa2-B4 "SI ACCUM A HI/LO PRESS" illuminated QUESTION A:

Determine which accumulator parameter (s) are outside the normal operating band.

ANSWER A:

"A" Accumulator pressure is low (normal band = 614 to 646 psig)

REFERENCE ALLOWED QUESTION B:

Can this evolution be performed and describe the basis for your response.

ANSMTR B:

No, not allowed. Simultaneously opening the accumulator vent valves would connect the

, two accumulator gas spaces. If a large break LOCA were to occur on either of the loops

("A" or "C") both accumulators would depressurize invalidating the LOCA analysis.

(Not required for credit: Accumulator design capacity is based on one accumulator spilling to the containment floor through the break, the other two accumulators fill the core to the mid-plane.)

REFERENCE:

FSAR section 6.3.2.2.6 OP 202, step 4.20 APP-002-B4 "SI ACCUM A HI/LO PRESS" 02/13/98 9:58 AM \ l

[r_

l

. l RO JPM CR-025, Question 1 005 K4.07 3.2/3.5 QUESTION:

Given the following plant conditions:

  • RCS cooldown is in progress '
  • Plant is in Mode 4
  • RCS T.v,is 348 F

.

{

i

+ PT-402 = 468 psig

+ PT-403 = 470 psig

+ PT-404 = 472 psig

. . l What must be done to operfMOV-750951 to place RHR in service?

ANSWER:

Reduce RCS pressure (sensed by PT-403) to less than 465 psig

. Verify SI-862A/B "RWST TO RHR" and SI-863A/B "RHR LOOP RECIRC" closed l with breakers closed and control power switches in " NORMAL" l

REFERENCE:

l OP-201, " Residual Heat Removal System", : .

System

Description:

Residual Heat Removal System i

l l

l t

i l

l 4

'01/08/98 12:51 PM

w AUTHORIZED COPY 4.0 PMECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 4.1. Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure shall be less than 350*F and 375 psig before the Residual Heat Removal System is put in service, and the RHR system will be removed from service before RCS pressure and temperature are raised above these values.

4.2 To prevent boiling the CCW liquid contained in an RHR HX, CCW flow should not be isolated to an RHR HX when the temperature of the RHR System is greater than 200*F. (CR 95-00565)

C.3 'Neither RHR-750 nor RHR-751 will open unless the following conditions are satisfied:. ,

'~

f ~

l

- The breakers for SI-862A and B are closed.

- The breakers for SI-863A and B are closed.

- The control power switches for SI-862A and B are in NORMAL.

- The control power switches for SI-863A and B are in NORMAL. l

,, Valves SI-862A and B are closed.

Valves SI-863A and B are closed.

RCS pressure is less than 465 psig.

4.4 SI-362A & B, and SI-863A & B are interlocked so they cannot be opened unless the RHR loop pressure is less than 210 psig.

4.5 When the Residual Heat Removal System is providing Core Cooling AND seal injection flow is desired to maintain a positive AP across the Thermal Barrier of the Reactor Coolant Pumps, letdown flow through HCV-142 and PCV-145 should be maintained to provide makeup to the VCT.

4 4.6 When RHR-757C or RHR-757D is closed,3,350 gpm flow, indicated on F1-605, with one RHR pump running or 6,700 gpm flow with two RHR pumps running shall not be exceeded, except as allowed / required by approved test procedures for which flowrates on F1-605 may be as high as 3800 gpm for one pump or 7600 gpm for two pumps.

Rev. 34 Page 6 of 67

RO JPM CR-025, Question 1 005 K4,07 3.2/3.5 REFERENCE ALLOWED 1 QUESTION:

Given the following plant conditions:

  • RCS cooldown is in progress e Plant is in Mode 4
  • RCS T,,,is 348'F e RCS pressure

+ PT-402 = 461 psig

+ PT-403 = 470 psig

+ PT-404 = 472 psig What conditions must be satisfied to open MOV-750/751 to place RHR in service?

l ANSWER:

l

[.5] Reduce RCS pressure (sensed by PT-403) to less than 465 psig

. [.5] Verify SI-862A/B "RWST TO RHR" and SI-863A/B "RHR LOOP RECIRC" closed with breakers closed and control power switches in " NORMAL"

REFERENCE:

OP-201, " Residual Heat Removal System", step 4.3 System

Description:

SD-003, Residual Heat Removal System l

l L

1

] cl dv Q 01/13/98 9:58 AM

RCS Specific Activity 3.4.16 L

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3 with 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion T , < 500*F.

Time of Condition A not met.

QB DOSE EQUIVALENT I 131 in the unacceptable region of Figure 3.4.16 1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.16.1 Verify reactor goolant gross specific 7 days activity s 100/E pCi/gm.

SR 3.4.16.2 - ------- - -

NOTE - -- - -- - - b'Y Only required to be performed in MODE 1.

Verify reactor coolant DOSE EQUIVALERT 14 days I 131 specific activity 5 1.0 pCi/gm.

AND {

Between 2 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after a THERMAL POWER change of a 15% RTP within a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period (continued) l l

3.4 46

~ _ . - . -- - - - - . . - - . _ - - . - . . ~ - - . - - . . . . - - . - . . - . - - - .

RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.16 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.16.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.16.1 requires performing a gamma isoto)ic analysis as a measure of the gross specific activity of t1e reactor coolant at least once every 7 days. The analysis shall consist of a qualitative measurement of the total radioactivity of the primary coolant in units of yC1/gm. ,

While basically a quantitative measure of radionuclides with half lives longer than 15 minutes, excluding iodines, this measurement is the sum of the degassed gamma activities and the gaseous gamma activities in the sample taken. This Surveillance provides an indication of any increase in gross specific activity.

Trending the results of this Surveillance allows proper remedial action to be taken before reaching the LCO limit under normal operating conditions. The Surveillance is applicable in MODES 1 and 2. and in MODE 3 with T , at least 500*F. The 7 day Frequency considers the unlikelNood of a gross fuel failure during the time.

SR 3.4.16.2 This Surveillance is performed in MODE 1 only to ensure  !

iodine remains within limit during normal operation and following fast power changes when fuel failure is more apt to occur. The 14 day Frequency is adequate to trend changes in the iodine activity level, considering gross activity is monitored every 7 days. The Frequency, between 2 and

'Y h

6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after a power change = 15% RTP within a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period, is established because the iodine levels peak during this time following fuel failure: samples at other times would provide inaccurate results.

S_R 3.4.16.3 A radiochemical analysis for $ determination is required every 184 days (6 months) with the plant operating in MODE 1 equilibrium conditions. The E determination directly relates to the LCO and is required to verify plant operation  :

within the specified gross activity LCO limit. The analysis for E is a measurement of the average energies per disintegration for isotopes with half lives longer than

. (continued) 4 ,

B 3.4 102

SRO(I) Admin. A.1,(Plant Chemistry), Question 1 2.1.14 2.5/3.3 REFERENCE ALLOWED QUESTION:

Given the following plant conditions:

The plant is at 100% power, equilibrium Xenon, all systems aligned for normal operation (Jan 15,1998,12:01 AM)

Chemistry personnel report they have completed obtaining RCS and Pressurizer liquid samples (9:00 AM)

  • A runback due to a dropped rod occurred at 9:15 AM e Recovery actions are in progress QUESTION A:

What are the chemistry sampling requirements for this plant condition?

ANSWER A:

[.5] Between 2 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> following a reactor power change of 215% in I hour (in Mode 1), RCS Dose Equivalent I-131 shall be verified i 1.0 micro-curies / gram.

(Between 11:15 AM and 3:15 PM) l NO REFERENCE ALLOWED 1

QUESTION B:

j What is the basis for the time frame after the power change?

ANSWER:

[.5] Ensure Iodine remains within limit following fast power changes when fuel failure is l more apt to occur. 2 to b hours following a power change of 215% in a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period is I established because this is when the Iodine level in the RCS would peak due to fuel l failure.

t

REFERENCE:

OMM-001-13," Plant Chemistry", section 5.2 ITS, SR 3.4.16.2 A

r\ . (.~ d . L * -

02/13/98 9:58 AM

I SRO(I) Admin. A.1,(Plant Chemistry), Question 1  ;

2.1.14 - 2.5/3.3 i l

QUESTION: I Given the following plant conditions:  ;

  • The plant is at 100% power, equilibrium Xenon, all systems aligned for normal  !

operation (Jan 15,1998,12:01 AM)  !

. Chemistry personnel report they have completed obtaining RCS and Pressurizer liquid samples (9:00 AM) l

  • A runback due to a dropped rod occurred at 9:15 AM e The plant is now stable at ~68%

. Recovery actions are in progress What are the chemistry sampling requirements and basis for this plant condition?

ANSWER: i Between 2 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> following a reactor power change of 215% in I hour (in Mode 1),

RCS Dose Equivalent I-131 shall be verified s.1.0 micro-curies / gram. (Between 11:15 l AM and 3:15 PM)

Ensure Iodine remains within limit following fast power changes when fuel failure is more apt to occur. 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> following a power change of215% in a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period is established because this is when the Iodine level in the RCS would peak due to fuel I failure.

l

REFERENCE:

l Plant Chemistry", section 5.2 4 E P. 3.4.16.2 l

l l

I l

01/08/98 1038 AM l

. .. ._ . . . - _ _ _ _ . . . - ~ . . . . _ - - . . - _.

1

)

POOR QUESTIONS KA: 062AA1.01 Importance: 3.4/3.8 Reference allowed (FSAR)

Question: What is the limiting factor on the amount of current that can be passed from Unit 1 to Unit 2 through the SBO crosstie? l l

l Expected Response: The electrical cable between i the two units is the limiting factor.

KA:033000K303 Importance: 3.0/3.3 Reference allowed Question: What is the response of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System :KF;, and why, regarding temperature and level following a Blackout?

' NOTE: Assume NO operator action is taken' Expected Response: Spent Fuel Pool level and temperature will increase due to decay heat of the spent fuel assemblies.

Conduct of Operation (SRO 1)

Fire Brigade 1

E KA: 194001K116 3.5/4.2 Lesson Plan: EAP-SEP

Reference:

Fire Plan, (E-Plan) RP/1000/29 Fire Brigade Response, NSD 112, Fire Brigade Organization, Training, and Responsibilities Task: 2610000, 3710001 Source: NEW PRA 3-18-97.

4. As the Operations Shift Supervisor serving as the Fire Brigade Leader during an actual fire or fire drill, you have several responsibilities. Describe the normal duties as the Fire Brigade Leader at the fire scene?

ANSWER:

1- Serve as the Fire Brig;de Commander and direct the Fire Brigade during the event.

2- Obtain support as needed such as Security, Radiation Protection, Chemistry, Offsite Fire Department and Hazmat.

(3- Ensure all fire protection equipment is restore to full capability immediately following the event).

(4- Complete the Fire Emergency Report and forward the report to the EP (Emergency Planning) Section).

1

KA: 062000A401 (3.3/3.1)

Lesson Plan: EL EPD Objective R8 page 25

Reference:

- OMP Task: 002630001 Source: Bank EL 96 (JPM CRO 08) RO QUESTION:

Describe the safety and personnel requirements for manual operation of switchyard disconnects.

i ANSWER:  :

Rubber safety gloves and safety glasses must be worn.

At-least two people in the crew performing the task, one of which 1

! is a supervisor, i Nomex suits should be worn by the breaker operator. '

f l

Conduct of Operations (SRO 1)

Self Checking / STAR KA: 194001K101 (3. 6 /3. 7)

Lesson Plan: ADM-OMP

Reference:

OMP 1-22, Job Assignments I Task: 3610052 Source: PRA 3-6-97 NEW )

i

1. As an SRO (Shif t Supervisor) you have the responsibility of l performing Pre-Job Briefs with other operators on your shift, you make the decision of the level of detail and ,

information within the Pre-job Brief. '

What are several guidelines that you will use to determine the amount of detail of the Pre-Job Brief presentation and describe the " STAR" component of the Pre-Job Brief?

ANSWER:

(2 of 5)

1) Complexity of the task Consequences of the task Importance of the task Frequency of the task Unfamiliarly of the task to the performer
2) " STAR" is a self checking method (that operators use to reduce the potential of errors).

("S" - Stop)

("T" - Think)

("A" - Act)

("R" - Review)

ACCEPTABLE QUESTIONS Importance
2.6/3.0 j

Reference:

Steam Tables

! Question: The RCS is at 2250 psia, Quench tank j pressure is 3.5psig. If a small leak developed in j the seat of Code Safety V 1201, what temperature l would you expect to see on TIA-1107?

i

! Expected Response: 230 degrees i

i i

l

...__ __ . __._ _ ______...._ _ .__ _ _ _ __ _ _ . . __. _ _ _ _ _ . _ _____ _ . _ . ~ ..__ _ .. _ _ _ _ --__. _ __ _ _

i .

l I

i i Question #1.

l KA: 001K5.02 l Importance; 2.9/3.4 i

Reference:

Unit 2 Plant Physics Curves l

! 1

! Question: Unit 2 has 6,000 EFPH on the core and l experiences a dropped rod resulting in the Ni power level changes from 100% to 93%, what is the I approximate worth of the dropped rod?

l Expected Response: Approximately 75 to 100 j pcm.

j Question # 2.

KA: 001K5.28 l Importance: 3.5/3.8 l

Reference:

Unit 2 Plant Physics Curves l Question: In order to withdraw the same CEA l without changing the power level or temperature of i the RCS, how much would RCS boron concentration i have to be changed?(PPM) i l **lf Question 1 is missed: Assuming the worth of a i dropped CEA was 100 pcm, how much would boron

! concentration have to be changed to withdraw the j rod without changing power level or temperature?

i l Expected Response: approximately 12 PPM j (Boron worth for the present conditions is

{

8.38pcm/ ppm)

l l

l "ELC EXAM DEVELOPMENT EXAM BANK" TEST ITEM DATA SHEET

==============------=======================================

l I. CROSS-REFERENCE DATA l

RECORD NUMBER::1427 TYPE: General Use LESSON 1: LOR-SIM-JP-019-A05 LESSON 1 OBJECTIVES: 01 STYLE: Short Essay /Other POINT VALUE: 1.00 REVISION: 3 TIME TO COMPLETE: 4 Minutes ENTERED BY: DATE ENTERED: 10/10/94 MODIFIED BY: DATE MODIFIED: 04/27/98 DATE LAST USED:

(approved by:

ASSOCIATED TASKS:

No Tasks are currently referenced to this question.

ASSOCIATED K/A's:

206000 A1.01 ROI: 4.3 8ROI: 4.4 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating HIGE PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM REACTOR WATER LEVEL: BWR-2,3,4 controls

REFERENCES:

2 APP A-01 3-1 /R21

==================-========================================

II. QUESTION:

HPCI started on high drywell pressure, but tripped on high RPV level.

Explain how HPCI responds as level lowers from the high level trip to Lo Level 3.

Additionally, if you wanted to restart HPCI at 120", what actions would be required to perform that action?

:u================================================================

III. AN8WER:

As level lowers, HPCI will not restart until level reaches LL-2 (105").

HPCI will then reset its trips and start and inject with no operator action. HPCI will continue to run as level lowers to LL-3.

To restart HPCI prior to reaching LL-2, depress the high water level trip reset pushbutton, the drywell signal will then restart HPCI and' cause it to inject.

PAGE 1 OF 1

s l

    • "NRC JPM 98, Rev O" EXAMINATION **

1 QUESTION 3 POINT VALUE: 1.00

(

l Using the attached diagram, explain how it is possible to reset a scram )

with the mode switch in SHUTDOWN.

l l

l l

i l

l l ,

l l

PAGE 3

. ..m._...___ . _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ . = . . . . . . . . _ . . . _ _ . . _ . . . . . _ . . . . ~ . . - . . . . . . . . ._.____.,..__..m_.~

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  • r l 5 pK17A I44 K19A :,=  ::K15A :: K15C :.:K19C s K1tM (D, 2 SEC.

RESCTl l RESET II I i m REACTOR MANUAL SCRAW !m SHUTDOWN SCRAW RESET INTERLOCA I TRIP CHANNEL "A3" g' Trip Sy37Ey g Figure 03 Shutdown Scram Reset interlock

-c--- page ?C :i :C' au- m e ', .:.

.-_ . _ _ --. _ . . - . . - - - . -. =_. . _. . . . .- . . . - . . . . .

l l

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Provide this page to the Candidate 4

l Health Physics has performed a survey of the Unit 2 Charging Pump rooms and hallway. Given a survey map, determine how each room and hallway should be posted.

l l

Page 6 of 7

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(- - - ----

Figure 4 2301205, Rev. 7

  • 7 FOA TRAINING USE ONLY

1 JPF SC-DJ_::NG

~

PAUL STEINER 1

l l

l w

J w SM)_  ::\G CO\S::J~RA~~::0\S

  • Amount of material to be generated:

Licensee Cost.

Licensee Manpower.

Examiner Review Time.

Validation Time on Simulator During Prep-Week.

  • The current trend is a shift towards a single JPM set, administered piece by

. piece, with all applicants receiving the same piece each day.

  • Considerations with this technique:

Availability of both Simulator and Booth Operators for two shifts.

Sequestering.

Candidate Stress.

Examiner Stress. (No laughing please!)

l 1 1 i

Currerr: 3roi ems  ;

1

  • JPMs are lasting 30 minutes to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Longer is not better.

Take the time it takes a staff instructor to perform the task, with questions, and double it.  !

  • The last three examinations have run past 10:00 pm and were scheduled to end at 6:00 pm.
  • Applicants are arriving at 7:00 am and are not being exam.ined until 7:00 pm.
  • No margin for error or simulator failure.

l

J d

T l

1 03 ERA ~~::NG EXAV:: NA~~::C \

J .. n J

i V _ nl l v ..V 4

6 n

_)yS u .

VS w ..u

.S__..n\S Paul Steiner I

1 1

i 4

4

l l l l ES-301 Specific Instructions for Category A l

i l .

  • Although Admin topics may be examined separately, it .is preferable, whenever l l possible, to link, associate, or integrate l them with tasks and events conducted during l Categories B and C e Using a single Admin JPM is generally 1 preferred, however, two prescripted j

questions may be used.

  • If the applicant has a "U" in only one Admin topic, the examiner may fail the applicant in Category A depending on the importance of the identified deficiency.

- Topics in the administrative portion of the NRC initial examination are weighted the highest of all examination areas, and are thus the most likely to result in a failing grade.

- A single knowledge weakness / or applicant error can result in an initial examination i failure.

Common Single Failure Points:

  • Clearance Error.
  • Reactivity Balance Error.

The key is a balance between questions and JPM's.

All JPMs will result in a long Admin exam, with a high potential to fail a candidate for a single error.

l All questions usually results in a weak

- Admin exam.

w +w- , --

-e- - - +m .-e-

Exami es o= Gooc Acmin J3ys
  • Approval of a Clearance Order. '
  • ECP Calculation.
  • Manual Leak Rate Calculation.
  • Risk Matrix Utilization. l
  • Off-Site Dose Projection. i e Review a Survey Map and Demonstrate Knowledge of Radiological Hazards in a Work Zone.
  • Evaluate the Applicants Scenarios for Emergency Plan Application and Make Protective Action Recommendations.

The key to success with these types of tasks is solid and thorough validation.

- If the task is not clear. and well defined, the applicants will become confused.

l - If the task is too long, it will begin to l loose its evaluating abi11ty.

Examples of Poor Admin JPMs l

e Check out a key from the key locker.

  • Make a log entry.
  • Frisk out an item.

l -

Do you want an applicant to fail for touching the surface?

  • Make a call-in for emergent work while reading from a procedure.

I .

  • Perform a pre-job brief.

These are items of Low Discriminatory Validity, and if performed poorly can result in l severe grading.

l.

Otler Ji = =icu~ ties dit1 Acmin l

  • SRO applicants should be evaluated at l greater depth on Admin topics.

There must be a difference between the R0 and SRO Admin examinations.

  • Control Room Software not available on the simulator or applicants don't have the  !

proper password.

  • The question does not solicit the answer.

Put validators in the mind set of appli cant.

  • Assigning point values to multiple answer questions.

The limit is 80%. If there are four answers, the applicant must get all four correct.

  • Don't require applicants to catch integrity l issues, or misspelled words when approving I clearances or valve line-ups.
  • Direct look-ups are prohibited!

l

l l

)

I i

m

.EXAV :: NK~::0N S.ECJ1::-~Y ANJ EXAV:: NK ION 31.E2::C-~A3I_::TY C. 3AY\E i

EXAMINATIOYi SECURITY -

  • PER 10 CFR 55.49 - " APPLICANTS, LICENSEES, AND FACILITY LICENSEES

' SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN ANY ACTIVITY THAT COMPROMISES THE INTEGRITY OF ANY APPLICATION, TEST, OR  :

EXAMINATION BY THIS PART"  ;

RULE IMPLEMENTED IN NUREG-1021 e E5-201 - C.1 & C.2 & C.3 (RESPONSIBILITIES) '

e ES-201 - D.2 (PERSONNEL RESTRICTIONS) e ES-201 - ATTACHMENT 1 (PHYSICAL SECURITY & EXAM BANK LIMITATIONS) e ES-201 - FORM ES-201-3 (SECURITY AGREEMENT) e ES-205 - GFES EXAM ADMINISTRATION e ES-402 - C.1 (RESPONSIBILITIES) -

e ES-402 - E.3 (POST-EXAM REVIEWS) i e ES-501 - POST-EXAM DOCUMENTATION .

e APPENDIX D, SECTION F (SIMULATOR SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS) i

EXAMPLES INSTRUCTOR SIGNED SECURITY AGREEMENT AND DISCUSSED EXAM CONTENT WITH EXAMINEES -

REVEALING OF WHAT IS NOT ON THE EXAM (APPLICANTS SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PREDICT OR NARROW THE POSSIBLE SCOPE OR CONTENT OF EXAM BASED ON YOUR TEST DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES)

BIAS OF SCOPE, CONTENT, OR LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY OF AN EXAM TO ENHANCE CHANCES OF CANDIDATES PASSING TEST LOSS OF CONTROL OF EXAM MATERIAL (NOT LOCKED UP WHEN LEAVE OFFICE, PARTS OF EXAM LEFT IN COPIER, PARTS OF EXAM LEFT IN. SIMULATOR BOOTH AFTER VALIDATION)

INSTRUCTOR ON SECURITY AGREEMENT INTERACTS WITH SR0(U) CANDIDATE DURING REQUAL (TAUGHT CLASS, EVALUATED SIM. SCENARIOS, SAT ON AUDIT BOARD)

WRITE EXAM TO SAME FORMAT EVERY TIME S0 IT BECOMES PREDICTABLE CHANGING K/A NUMBERS ON OLD QUESTIONS IN ORDER TO FIT NEW SAMPLE PLAN PERSONNEL NOT ON SECURITY AGREEMENT IGNORE WARNING SIGNS AND WALK IN ON EXAM DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES -

DRAFT EXAM MATERIAL NOT PROPERLY PACKAGED WHEN SENT TO NRC AND WAS DELIVERED OPEN

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CONSE0 ENCES NUREG-1600, " GENERAL STATEMENT OF POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR NRC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS" APPLIES s IF HAVE INDICATION OF COMPROMISE, ACTION WILL BE TAKEN TO ENSURE AND RESTORE THE INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF PROCESS. INCLUDES: '

e NOT GIVING EXAM ,

e MAKING ADDITIONAL CHANGES TO EXAM e VOIDING EXAM RESULTS IF EXAM ALREADY GIVEN - -

e '

REEVALUATING LICENSING DECISIONS PER 55.61(b) . ,

e POSSIBLY IMPOSING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS INCLUDING: '

CIVIL PENALTIES

~

ORDERS '

IMPLEMENTATION OF DELIBERATE MISCONDUCT RULE (10 CFR 50.5) l I

^

EXAM PREDICTABILITY -

APPLICANTS SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PREDICT OR NARROW THE POSSIBLE SCOPE OR CONTENT OF EXAM BASED ON YOUR TEST DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES ~

EXAM DEVELOPMENT TECHNIQUES OR RULES SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH THE CANDIDATES (e.g., 25% OF WRITTEN WILL_BE OFF THE MOST RECENT EXAM)

EXAM METHODOLGY SHOULD BE VARIED FROM EXAM TO EXAM (e.g., SECTION A.4 SHOULD NOT ALWAYS BE " CLASSIFY THE SCENARIO" FOR SRO's)

EXAM DEVELOPMENT CRITERIA LIMITATIONS SHOULD NOT ALWAYS BE THE BASIS OF THE EXAM CONTENT (e.g., NO OVERLAP WITH THE AUDIT TEST SHOULD NOT BE A RULE STRICTLY FOLLOWED WITH NO EXCEPTION) IF DONE CANDIDATES CAN EXCLUDE EVERY THING FROM THEIR AUDIT AS NOT BEING ON THEIR TEST WHICH i NARROWS THE SCOPE.

ALLOW AUDIT AND LICENSE EXAMS TO DEVELOP INDEPENDENTLY AND IDENTIFY TO THE CHIEF EXAMINER THOSE AREAS THAT OVERLAP WITH A PROPOSED RESOLUTION, IF NEEDED.

  • AREAS TO WATCH: NO OVERLAP FROM AUDIT EXAM -

25% FROM THE LAST TWO NRC EXAMS 50% FUNDAMENTAL KNOWLEDGE NO TEST ITEM REPEATS FROM DAY TO DAY WRITTEN EXAM ANSWERS FAVOR a,b,c, OR d ALL JPMs DONE ONLY ON A SPECIFIC UNIT

aM.. /CJ.*__

J -e- m,mem, -

W.ee 4*--NJ. 54-M--me.J a_,.a,, uui.h,, eum,u gas. A. 2 ..,M_4JEm,#m.u_dJ.s_3__e_meJ ma . _ m a a d , __ , uA ge mAm.._44af am _ A _a e A4. +a_,ama, h

4 4

SIMULATOR SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT 1

l C. 3AY\E G. - 033ER 5

2 4

e i

e 4

j e

1 i

l

)

1 4

1 e

i 3

i 4

. l CR::  ::CA_ ~~AS (S  !

na: cons:1:u:es a cri:ica~

as(? ,

1 le recua r lca:lon examina:lon uses i cri :ica~ ~;as(s (C-~s) =or eva~ ua :ing  !

crew Jer#ormance on :as(s :la: lave  !

sa=e:y signi=icance :o :le '3 an~; or

~

le Ju] ~ic. The cts are objective  ;

measures for de:ermining w1etler an inc.ividual's or a crew's performance ,

is satisfactory or unsatisfactory.

A~ : 1ougl C-~s are no: cirec:~ y usec :o ,

~

eva ua:e oJera:or 'Jer=ormance on ~:le ini:ia~ ~ icensing examina: ions, :le conce'] o

=

focusing on t1ose tas(s  ;

that have a significant im3act on tae  !

safety of t1e i ant or t1e 'au]~ic ,

valid

~

remains anc slou c .Je :acen

~

in~;o consicera: ion w1en eva ua:ing I

~;1e com'Je:ence o= ini: 1a~ ~icense  !

aJ']~ican:s. I i

The Importance Of Safety Significance and Measurable Criteria

n reviewing eac13roJosec C- , assess
le :asc :o ensure :lat i: is essen~ia~ ~;o sa=e:y. A task is essential to safety if t1e im3rocer performance or omission of this task by an operator will resu~t in direct adverse consequences or in significant degrac.ation in t1e mitigative capaaility of the 3 ant.

~

~

~~= an au:oma:ica~~y

~

ac;ua:ec 'J an:

sys:em wou c lave .Jeen recuirec :o mi: iga:e :le consecuences o= an incivicua~ 's incorrec: Jer=ormance or

le Jer=ormance necessi:a:es :le crew

~

acing com3ensa:ory ac: ion :la: wou

~

c com3 ica:e :le even~; mitiga: 1on s :ra :egy, :le :as( is sa=e:y signi =ican~;.

J

~

Exam 3 es of C-~s invo~ving essentia~

safe y accions inc~uce close =or

^

w1iol o'Jera ion or correc Jerformance prevents--

i e cegrac.ation o= any Jarrier 30 "ission Jrocuc re ease.

~

e degraded emergency core coo ~ing sys em (ECCS) or emergency Jower ca3aci y.

vio~ation 0"

~

e a a sa"ecy 1 min .

4 i e a vio~ation o" le =aci~ icy l

~ icense conci:: ion. j i

e incorrec reac ivi y con:ro~ (suc1 as =ai~ ure no inicia e emergency ~

Joracion or s;anc3y ic uic

~ ~~

con ro ~

, or manua y inser con:ro rocs).

. a signi=ican; recuccion o= sa=eny margin Jeyonc cla: 1rreJara] y incrocucec Jy cle scenario.

~

! Exam 3 es 0= C-s invo~ving essen:1a~

sa =e::y ac: ions inc~ uce : lose =or I W1ic1 a crew cemons:ra:es :le a3i~1 y

o

l cirec: or mani'Ju

~

  • e =~=ec:ive~ y a :e l engineerec sa=e:y ~=ea:ure

~ ~

(ES )

con ~;ro s :1a: wou c 3reven: any l

conci: ion cescriaec in :le

'3revious 'Jaragra 31.

  • recognize a =ai ure or an 1ncorrec: au:oma:1c ac;ua:1on o-~

an ES: sys:em or com3onen~;.

  • ~: ace one ~

or more ac: ions

~ ~

1a: ~

wou c 3reven: a cla enge :o 3 an:

sa =e :y .

. areven: ina33roaria:e ac: ions :1a:

~ ~

crea:e a cla ienge :o 3 an: sa =e:y (suc1 as an unin~:en~:iona~ Reac:or l 3ro:ec: ion Sy1cem (RJS) or ES:

ac :ua :1 on) .

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...Q Appendix _D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

, e Facility: Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 1 Objectives: To evaluate the students ability to implement ONOPs for loss of a vital 480V load center, an off-normal Pressurizer pressure and Letdown condition, and failure of a Steam Generator level transmitter; to perform a normal power reduction; and to execute EOPs for a Steam Generator Tube Rupture combined with an Excess Steam Demand (EOP-15) ._

initial Conditions: Unit 2 is at 100% power, MOL.

Turnover: Unii 2 is at 100% power MOL. the 2B Char a is out of service for packing replacement, expected back in four hours.ging The 2Apum Heater Drain Pump has a unisolable oilleak requiring the instructions is to reduce power to 92% pump and to be remove thetaken out ofDrain 2A Heater service. Shift Pump from service.

Additional failures: 2A Containment Spray Pump fails to start on CSAS i

I

. Event Malf. Event Event

. No. No. Type' Description

.- 1 N-BOP Power reduction from 100% to 92%

R-R O LN 2 1-RO PIC-1100X (PZR pressure transmitter) drifte!ch 3 C-BOP, 2AB Load Center deeneraizes ..l,'.a ,,L m A 4 C-RO 2B CCW Pump trips 5 1-BOP FIC-9011,2A Steam Generator flow transmitter fails low.

6 M- 2A Steam Generator tube rupture (250 GPM),2A BOP main steam line break inside containment on reactor M-RO trip.

r.

ch me Se he &d TS

, r '

I

,i l

l

  • ~

.e (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor L

i I

W l

l Facility.- Scenario No.: la Op-Test No.: 1 Objectives: To evaluate the students ability to implement ONOPs for loss of a vital 480V i load center, an off-normal Pressurizer pressure and Letdown condition, and failure of a l t Steam Generator steam flow transmitter; to perform a normal power reduction; and to l l execute EOPs for a Steam Generator Tube Rupture combined with a Main Feeowater line l break inside containment (EOP-15)

Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is at 100% power, MOL.

Tumover: Unit 2 is at 100% power MOL. The 2A Charging pump is out of service for a lube oil PM, expected back in three hours. The 2B Main Feedwater Pump has a unisolable discharge flange leak requiring the pump to be taken out of service. 2A Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor is out of service, not expected back this shift. 2-HVS-1 A l containment cooler is out of serviae. Chemistry reports a 15 GPD tube leak on the 2B S/G. Management has decided to continue power operations due to the system load.

Shift instructions are to reduce power to 45% and remove the 2B Main Feedwater Pump from service. Thunderstorms have been reported to be approaching the St. Lucie County area Additional failures: A train CSAS fails to actuate and FCVO71 A fails to fully open 2B Containment Spray pump develops a sheared shaft on start.

2A Main Feedwater pump fails to trip on low suction pressure 2A Main Feedwater isolation valves fail to close on MSIS l

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type

  • Description 1 N-BOP Power reduction from 100% to 45%

R-RO 2 1-RO PIC-1100X (PZR pressure setpoint) drifts high 3 C-RO 2AB Load Center deenergizes,2B Charging pump trip (a o 4 N-DOP - Realignment of charging and letdown 5 C-BOP 2B CCW Pump trips 4 '"Oo 2 o, *21 " , 2 ^ S 'O ctccr - t=:-ter 12:!: 5!;b 7 M-BOP 2A Steam Generator tube rupture (250 GPM),2A main M-RO feed line break inside containment on reactor trip l

C A train CSAS fails to actuate

! C 2A Main Feed isolation valves fail to close on MSIS

! (MFIV failure, continues to feed containment)

C FCV 071 A fails to fully open (N)ormai, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor l

t

4 I

0 l

i l

ES-301 Simulator Scenario Quality Assurance Checklist Fonn ES-301-4 '

Feedisty* Does of Exem: Seeneno Wmbers / / Opereeing Test No.:

OMAUTATWE ATTRmUTES initials a b c

1. The seenones howe steedy steeed eheneves in the sceneno summenes
2. The initial condimens are remisstic, in that some espapment and/or instr. . . - . rney be out of serwooe, but it slees not eue the aperatore into espected events.
3. The seenenes sensest mesdy of esisted evenes.
4. Each event alesenpeen eenmets of
  • the point in the seeneno when it is to be iseested a the meNuncoende) that are enested to iseeste the event
  • the eympeams/eues that wSI be visible to the evow
  • the espected operator actens (by shift peerten)
  • the event L. _ _ point Of apobombie)
5. No mese then ene ...., 6. -. failure (e.g pipe breek) is incorporated into the seeneno without e credeble oveoeding inadent such as e seismic event.

S. The events are welid with vegard to simpsies and themmedynorvees

7. Seeueneing and siming of ewones is reemenshie, ec.:I esiews the examination team to obtain eengslote eweiuseen vooutts ._. _ orate with the ooenerio objectives.

, 8. If time esmpreemen eachnseques are used the soonano summary eieerty so ivefiestes.

Opeestors have suf6osent time to carry out espected acewnses wrthout undue twne constremts Cues are given.

9. The esmuletor modeling is not einered
10. The econeries have been validated
11. *wery operator will be eweiusted using at leert one new seenerio. All other scenanus have been medined in sooerdance writh Section D.4 of ES-301.
12. Allindieuel operaser sempotenoses een be eweiusted, as wonfied veng Form ES-301-6 doubmit the form eieng with the emulater scenense).
13. Each appF.oent we be : . J'- -

i i rweived in the nommurn number of trennents and events eseoitied on Ferrn ES-301-5 leubmrt the form along with the annuieter scenevies).

.14. The level of diffieulty is apprepnets to support Esensmo cleassens for each evow peernon.

TARGET GUA8f71TATWE ATTvimUTES fpWI SCSIAfilO) Actual Attnbutes - - -

1

1. Teeni malfunceens (5 8) / /
2. Malfunesens efter EDP entry (12) / /
3. Abnormel events (2-4) / /
4. Maior treneents (1-2) / /
5. EDPs entered /reouiving substantive actions (12) / /

i

~

6. EDP eenenpenoies voeuiring substantive acteens @2) / /
7. Catice! teoks (2-3) / /

NUREG-1021 24 of 26 Interim Rev. 8, January 1997

. - _ . . .- . ._. ._.- - . - - . - - . = . . . - - - . - . _ - . - . . . - . - . . . - . _- - . . . . _ - - _ . - . _ .

1 ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Fom ES-301-5 OPERATING TEST NO.:

Applicant Evolution Minimum Scenario Number Type Type Number 1 2 3 4

~

Reactivity 1 Norma 1 1

- RO Instrument 2 Component 2 Major 1 Reactivity J l Nomal 0 As RO Instrument 1 Component 1 Ma_ior ]

l

.- SRO-1 Reactivity 0 Nomal 1 As SRO Instrument 1 ,

Component 1 Major 1 Reactivity 0 Nomal 1 SRO-U Instrument 1 Component 1 Major 1 l Instructions: (1)' Enter the operating test number and Fom ES-D-1 event numbers for each evolution type.

l (2) Reactivity manipulations must be significant as I defined in Appendix D.

! Author:

Chief Examiner:

l NUREG-1021 25 of 26 Interim Rev. 8, January 1997

. - - . . . - . - - - . . . - - . _ .~.. - . ..~. - .. _ . - - . - . .

L l

  • l
ES-301 Competencies Checklist i Form ES-301-6 Applicant #1 Applicant #2 . Applicant #3 RO/SRO-I/SRO-U R0/SRO-I/SRO-U RO/SRO-I/SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO
2 3 4 1 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Understand and Interpret Annunciators and Alarms Diagnose Events and Conditions l

Understand Plant and System Response Comply With and Use Procedures (1)

Operate Control Boards (2)

Communicate and .

Interact With the Crew Demonstrate Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SR0s.

Instructions:

Circle the applicant's license type and enter the event numbers that test the competency for each scenario in the set.

i l Author:

l Chief Examiner:

l l

NUREG-1021 26 of 26 Interim Rev. 8, January 1997 l

l

. . -- - . -