ML102110270

Enclosure 6: STP Nuclear Operating Company - South Texas Project Presentation

ML102110270
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	08/04/2010
From:	NRC/NRR/DIRS/IHPHPB, South Texas
To:
Ramey-Smith A 415-6877
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ML102110189	List: ML102110259 ML102110266 ML102110268 ML102110270
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Download: ML102110270 (11)

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Enclosure 6: STP Nuclear Operating Company Presentation Meeting Summary of July 28, 2010 Public Meeting with NEI Dated August 4, 2010 STP Nuclear Operating CompanyNuclear Safety Culture PilotTim Bowman, General Manager, OversightDavid RencurrelSite Vice PresidentJuly 28, 2010 1

2OverviewIncorporated NEI 09-07 process into a station specific procedureBinned quantitative and qualitative data against the INPO Nuclear Safety Culture Principles and AttributesNRC cross-cutting aspect findings are one of the data inputs Actions are tracked in the Corrective Action ProgramIndependent oversight built into the processNRC observed meetings from first two panel and SMT assessmentsCompleted three (3) quarterly panel and SMT assessments Nuclear Safety Culture AssessmentSurvey performed in December 2009Site assessment in January 2010Survey had 73 questions, completed by 981 site personnel77 site interviewsOne strength, 11 positive comments, 4 negative comments and 4 general comments 3

The Process

_._-I ., T T T T T T T 5Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (NSCMP)Consists of department-level managers plus leaders in leadership development and human resourcesAn independent organizational development consultant either participated or provided feedbackMet each quarter to review dataMade recommendations to the Senior Management Team (SMT) regarding the health of each PrincipleDeveloped proposed actions to address areas of concernReviewed progress of previously identified actions 6Senior Management TeamLed by the Site Vice PresidentReviewed and dialogued on the NSCMP recommendationsProvided additional insight and clarificationAgreed to or modified NSCMP recommended actionsCreated additional actions as necessaryAssigned ownership of actions 7Process Improvements Binned process inputs directly to an INPO Nuclear Safety Culture Principle and Attribute.Improved the definitions of observation types.Added members to Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel including member from new build organization.to learn from successes.Development of a communications plan for the process and results.

8ResultsImprovement Opportunity identified against Principle 3, Trust Permeates the Organization.Personnel in some organizations lacked confidence that some concerns would be fully addressed by their supervisors.This issue did not deter individuals from expressing nuclear safety concerns in each organization.Actions were put in place to improve supervisory behaviors that build trust.This issue had the potential to impact the safety culture if not addressed at a low threshold.

9ResultsCommunicate more clearly to station personnel the relationship between the STP Incentive Compensation Plan and nuclear safetyImprove manager and supervisor visibility in the fieldImprove strategic benchmarkingResolve relationship issues between organizations that are hindering station performance 10ConclusionsThe Nuclear Safety Culture process:Provides a method to identify nuclear safety culture issues and take actionProvides a forum for perception issues (i.e., faint signals) to be addressedIs transparentIs well-defined and repeatablePromotes management accountability for nuclear safety culture