ML17249A296

Discussion of TMI Lessons Learned Short-Term Requirements.

ML17249A296
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	11/19/1979
From:	ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17249A295	List: ML17249A294 ML17249A296
References
RTR-NUREG-0578, RTR-NUREG-578 NUDOCS 7911260290
Download: ML17249A296 (85)

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DISCUSSION OFTMILESSONSLEARNEDSHORTTERNREQUIRENENTS ThisdocumentprovidesonlyaportionoftheRochester Gasand.Electric Corporation responsetoTMILessonsLearnedShortTermRequirements.

Additional information isfoundinRochester GasandElectricletterfromL.D.White,Jr.toDennisL.Ziemann,USNRC,datedOctober17,1979.v911260+90 TABLEOFCONTENTSSectionTitlePacae2.1.1Emergency PowerSupply-Pressurizer Heaters.............1-Pressurizer LevelandReliefBlockValves..32.1.2Performance TestingforBWRandPWRReliefandSafetyValves................42.1.3.a2.1.3.bDirectIndication ofPower-Operated ReliefValveandSafetyValvePositionforPWRsandBWRSInstrumentation forDetection ofInadequate CoreCooling-Subcooling Meter-Additional Instrumentation 57112.1.42.1.5.a2.1.5.c2.1.6.aDedicated H2ControlPenetrations.

Capability toInstallHydrogenRecombiner ateachLightWaterNuclearPowerPlant1819integrity ofSystemsOutsideContainment LikelytoContainRadioactive Materials forPWRsandBWRS................20Containment Isolation.

............122.1.6.b2.1.7.aDesignReviewofPlantShielding andEnviron-mentalQualification ofEquipment.

forSpaces/Systems WhichMayBeUsedinPostAccidentOperations.

AutoInitiation oftheAuxiliary Feedwater Systems(AFSW)22242.1.7.bAuxiliary Feedwater FlowIndication toSteamGenerators

.................262.1.8.a2.1.8.bTables2.1.8.b.1 2.1.8.b.2 2.1.8.b.3 ImprovedPost.-Accident, SamplingCapability.

.28Increased RangeofRadiation Monitors.

....32InterimProcedures forQuantifying HighLevelAccidental Radioactivity Releases.

..36HighRangeEffluentMonitor..........37HighRangeContainment Radiation Monitor...38 l0Section2.1.8.cTitleTABLEOFCONTENTS(Continued)

PacCeImprovedIn-PlantIodineInstrumentation UnderAccidentConditions.

............402.1.92.2.1.a2.2.l.b2.2.1.G2.2.2.a2.2.2.b2.2.2.cTransient andAccidentAnalysis.

Containment, PressureIndication.

Containment WaterLevelIndication Containment HydrogenIndication.

'ReactorCoolantSystemVenting.ShiftSupervisor Responsibilities.

ShiftTechnical Advisor.ShiftandReliefTurnoverProcedures ControlRoomAccess.OnsiteTechnical SupportCenter.OnsiteOperational SupportCenter.4243444546495254555663 Section2.1.1-ENERGENCY POWERSUPPLYPressurizer HeatersPOSITIONConsistent withsatisfying therequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria10,14,15,17and20ofAppendixAto10CFRPart50fortheeventoflossofoffsitepower,thefollowing positions shallbeimplemented:

Pressurizer HeaterPowerSu1Thepressurizer heaterpowersupplydesignshallprovidethecapability tosupply,fromeithertheoffsitepowersourceortheemergency powersource(whenoffsitepowerisnotavailable),

apredetermined numberofpressurizer heatersandassociated controlsnecessary toestablish andmaintainnaturalcirculation athotstandbyconditions.

Therequiredheatersandtheircontrolsshallbeconnected totheemergency busesinamannerthatwillprovideredundant powersupplycapability.

2.Procedures andtrainingshallbeestablished tomaketheoperatorawareofwhenandhowtherequiredpressurizer heatersshallbeconnected totheemergency buses.Ifrequired, theprocedures shallidentifyunderwhatconditions selectedemergency loadscanbeshedfromtheemergency powersourcetoprovidesufficient capacityfortheconnection ofthepressurizer heaters.3.Thetimerequiredtoaccomplish theconnection ofthepreselected pressurizer heatertotheemergency busesshallbeconsistent withthetimelyinitiation andmaintenance ofnaturalcirculation conditions.

4.Pressurizer heatermotiveandcontrolpowerinterfaces withtheemergency busesshallbeaccomplished throughdevicesthathavebeenqualified inaccordance withsafety-grade requirements.

CLARIFICATION l.Inordernottocompromise independence betweenthesourcesofemergency powerandstillprovideredundant capability toprovideemergency powertothepressurizer heaters,eachredundant heaterorgroupofheatersshouldhaveaccess,to onlyoneClass1Edivisionpowersupply.2.Thenumberofheatersrequiredtohaveaccesstoeachemergency powersourceisthatnumberrequiredtomaintainnaturalcirculation inthehotstandbycondition.

3.Thepowersourcesneednotnecessarily navethecapacitytoprovidepowertotheheatersconcurrent withtheloadsrequiredforLOCA.4.Anychange-over oftheheatersfromnormaloffsitepowertoemergency onsitepoweristobeaccomplished manuallyinthecontrolroom.

5.Inestablishing procedures tomanuallyreloadthepressurizer heatersontotheemergency powersources,carefulconsideration mustbegivento:a.WhichESFloadsmaybeappropriately shedforagivensituation.

b.ResetoftheSafetyInjection Actuation Signaltopermittheoperation oftheheaters.c.Instrumentation andcriteriaforoperatorusetopreventoverloading adieselgenerator.

6.TheClasslEinterfaces formainpowerandcontrolpoweraretobeprotected bysafety-grade circuitbreakers.

(SeealsoReg.Guide1.75)7.Beingnon-Class IEloads,thepressurizer heatersmustbeautomatically shedfromtheemergency powersourcesupontheoccurrence ofasafetyinjection actuation signal.(SeeitemS.b.above)RGSEResonsesThepressurizer heaterpowersupplyattheGinnaNuclearPlantconformstoallrequirements setforthabove.Procedures tomanuallyloadtheheatersontoemergency powersourceswillbecompleted byJanuary1,1980.Theywillincludecriteriatopre-ventoverloading adieselgenerator.

Consideration willbegiventothenecessity toshedESFloadsandtheresetofthesafetyinjection signal.

e>~~~1 Section2.1.1-EMERGENCY POWERSUPPLYPressurizer LevelandReliefBlockValvesPOSITIONHConsistent withsatisfying therequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria10,14,15,17and20ofAppendixAto10CFRPart50fortheeventoflossofoffsitepower,thefollowing positions shallbeimplemented:

PowerSu1forPressurizer ReliefandBlockValvesandPressurizer LevelIndicators 1.Motiveandcontrolcomponents ofthepower-operated reliefvalves(PORVs)shallbecapableofbeingsuppliedfromeithertheoffsitepowersourceortheemergency powersourcewhentheoffistepowerisnotavailable.

2.Motiveandcontrolcomponents associated withthePORVblockvalvesshallbecapableofbeingsuppliedfromeithertheoffsitepowersourceortheemergency powersourcewhentheoffsitepowerisnotavailable.

3.Motiveandcontrolpowerconnections totheemergency busesforthePORVsandtheirassociated blockvalvesshallbethroughdevicesthathavebeenqualified inaccordance withsafety-grade requirements.

4.Thepressurizer levelindication instrument channelsshallbepoweredfromthevitalinstrument buses.Thebusesshallhavethecapability ofbeingsuppliedfromeithertheoffsitepowersourceortheemergency powersourcewhenoffsitepowerisnotavailable.

CLARIFICATION 1.Whiletheprevalent consideration fromTMILessonsLearnedisbeingabletoclosethePORV/block valves,thedesignshouldretain,totheextentpractical, thecapability toopenthesevalves.2.Themotiveandcontrolpowerfortheblockvalveshouldbesuppliedfromanemergency powerbusdifferent fromthatwhichsuppliesthePORV.3~Anychangeover ofthePORVandblockvalvemotiveandcontrolpowerfromthenormaloffsitepowertotheemergency onsitepoweristobeaccomplished manuallyinthecontrolroom.4.Forthosedesignswhereinstrument airisneededforoperation, theelectrical powersupplyrequirement shouldbecapableofbeingmanuallyconnected totheemergency powersources.RG&EResonsesTheattachedFailureModeandEffectsAnalysissystematically reviewstheconsequences ofallsinglefailuresinthepressurizer PORV/block valvesystem,including themotiveandcontrolpowersystems.Thesystemisshowntobecapableofperforming itssafetyfunction(closure) afteranysinglefailure.It,isalsoshownthatpressurizer pressurerelief(usingPORVs)maybeaccomplished afteranysinglefailure.

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~CCIOSIDToCNTAIXISJXAZIIXl 4)VCCIXOHOL'LD~1CIROOORTALYESY4414A'EDCXDAMllLNFVALVtAVAMAlLE'llNttolDToRILIITSrtfssokfe onlitVNCif1$ISOLACD~ACCCCIAIORS I41CANtACHCTC1tAFORV1$0TINES Section2.1.2-PERFORMANCE TESTINGFORBWRANDPWRRELIEFANDSAFETYVALVESPOSITIONPressurized waterreactorandboilingwaterreactorlicensees andapplicants shallconducttestingtoqualifythereactorcoolantsystemreliefandsafetyvalvesunderexpectedoperating conditions fordesignbasistransients andaccidents.

'LARIFICATION 2.Expectedoperating conditions canbedetermined throughtheuseofanalysisofaccidents andanticipated operational occurrences referenced inRegulatory Guide1.70.Thistestingisintendedtodemonstrate valveoperability undervarious'flowconditions, thatis,theabilityofthevalvetoopenandshutunderthevariousflowconditions shouldbedemonstrated.

3.Notallvalvesonallplantsarerequiredtobetested.Thevalvetestingmaybeconducted onaprototypical basis.4.Theeffectofpipingonvalveoperability shouldbeincludedinthetestconditions.

Noteverypipingconfiguration isrequiredtobetested,buttheconfigurations thataretestedshouldproducetheappropriate feedbackeffectsasseenbytherelieforsafetyvalve.5.Testdatashouldincludedatathatwouldpermitanevaluation ofdischarge pipingandsupportsifthosecomponents arenot,testeddirectly.

6.Adescription ofthetestprogramandtheschedulefortestingshouldbesubmitted byJanuary1,1980.7.TestingshallbecompletebyJuly1,1981'G&EResonseRGSEisamemberofanOwnersgroupformedbyutilities owningandoperating Westinghouse reactors.

TheWestinghouse OwnersGroupisworkinginconjunction withotherPWRownersandtheElectricPowerResearchInstitute (EPRI)todevelopaprogramforqualification ofreliefandsafetyvalvesunderexpectedoperating conditions.

Wewillfollowtheprogramandscheduledeveloped andcarriedoutbyEPRI.Althoughtheprogramisnotyetcomplete, theintent,istocomplywiththeNRCclarifications.

Section2.1.3.a-DIRECTINDICATION OFPOWER-OPERATED RELIEFVALVEANDSAFETYVALVEPOSITIONFORPWRSANDBWRSPOSITIONReactorsystemreliefandsafetyvalvesshallbeprovidedwith-apositiveindication inthecontrolroomderivedfromareliablevalvepositiondetection deviceorareliableindication offlowinthedischarge pipe.CLARIFICATION 1.Thebasicrequirement istoprovidetheoperatorwithunambiguous indica-tionofvalveposition(openorclosed)sothatappropriate operatoractionscanbetaken.2.Thevalvepositionshouldbe.indicated inthecontrolroom.Analarmshouldbeprovidedinconjunction withthisindication.

3.Thevalvepositionindication maybesafetygrade.Ifthepositionindication isnotsafetygrade,areliablesinglechanneldirectindication poweredfromavitalinstrument busmaybeprovidedifbackupmethodsofdetermining valvepositionareavailable andarediscussed intheemergency procedures asanaidtooperatordiagnosis andaction.4.Thevalvepositionindication shouldbeseismically qualified consistent withthecomponent orsystemtowhichitisattached.

Iftheseismicqualification requirements cannotbemetfeasiblybyJanuary1,1980,ajustification shouldbeprovidedforlessthanseismicqualification andascheduleshouldbesubmitted forupgradetotherequiredseismicqualifi-cation.5.Thepositionindication shouldbequalified foritsappropriate environment (anytransient oraccidentwhichwouldcausetherelieforsafetyvalvetolift).Iftheenvironmental qualification programforthispositionindication willnotbecompleted byJanuary1,1980,aproposedscheduleforcompletion oftheenvironmental qualification programshouldbeprovided.

RGSEResonseThepoweroperatedreliefvalveshavedirectstempositionindi-cationfunctionally conforming withtheStaffposition.

Functional indication ofsafetyvalvepositionisprovidedinaccordance withthefollowing position.

Thethermocouple locatedinthedischarge pipeofeach(oftwo)pressurizer safetyvalveprovidesunambiguous indication ofvalvemovement, orsignificant.

seatleakage.Openingofasafetyvalvewillcausearapidelevation indischarge temperature whichisalarmedandannunciated intheControlRoom.Thethermocouple responsetimeisshortwithrespecttooperator"capability toobserve,evaluateandtakeaction.Sincetheonlyothervalveswhichcannormallydischarge steamintothissystemarethePORV's,whichhavedirectindication ofstemposition, anypossibleambiguity isremovedbycheckingthePORVpositionindication.

Whentheoperatorhasdetermined thatapressurizer safetyvalvehasopened,hemustinitiateacourseofactionbasedontheassumption thatthesafetyvalvewillnotreseat.Itshouldbenotedthatthisdiffersinprinciple withactiontakeninresponsetoanopenPORV,whereinitialoperatoractionistoeitherclosethevalveitselfortoclosetheassociated blockvalve.Theoperator's subsequent actionsfollowing theopeningofthesafetyvalvemustbebasedonprimarysystemtemperature andpressureandnotonthesafetyvalveposition.

Inthiswaytheoperatorisnotdependent onsafetyvalveclosureforsaferecoveryoftheplant.Reseating ofasafetyvalveafteropeningwillresultinarapidinitialdropindischarge temperature'lthough nottonormallevels.Thisindication maybeusedwiththeprimarypressureandtemperature andpressurizer relieftanklevel,temperature andpressuretoprovideabasisforthedecisiontoterminate actionstakentomitigatetheeffectsofanopensafetyvalve.However,itshouldbenotedthatsuchactionshouldneverbetakenonsafetyvalvepositionindication alone,sinceunlikePORV's,thesafetyvalvesdonothavebackupblockvalves,andincorrect positionindication couldleadtheoperatortoterminate mitigating actionsprematurely unlessprimarysystemparameters areproperlyconsidered.

VItisourpositionthat.theabovetechnical reviewprovidesatotallyadequateandsoundbasisforsafeplantoperation untilatleastthescheduled refueling outageofMarch1980.Littleadditional safetymarginisprovidedbydirectsafetyvalveposi-tionindication.

Nevertheless, RG&Eproposestoinstalldirectvalvestempositionindication duringtherefueling outage'toaugmenttheinstrumentation described above.TheRG&Edesignwillutilizelinearvariabledifferential transformers (LVDTs)topro-videcontinuous valvestempositionindication, fromfullyclosedtofullyopen.Theenvironmental qualification ofelectrical components hasbeenreviewedwithrespecttoaccidents associated withsafetyandPORVlifting.Thematerials andcomponents aresuitableforsuchenviron-ments.Webelievethisresponsetobetechnically soundandtotallyresponsive totheStaffconcernsinthismatter.

Section2.1.3.b-INSTRUMENTATION FORDETECTION OFINADEUATECORECOOLINGSUBCOOLING METERPOSITIONLicensees shalldevelopprocedures tobeusedbytheoperatortorecognize inadequate corecoolingwithcurrently available instrumentation.

Thelicenseeshallprovideadescription oftheexistinginstrumentation fortheoperators tousetorecognize theseconditions.

Adetaileddescription oftheanalysesneededtoformthebasisforoperatortrainingandprocedure development shallbeprovidedpursuanttoanothershort-term requirement, "Analysis ofOff-Normal Conditions, Including NaturalCirculation" (seeSection2.1.9ofNUREG-0578).

Inaddition, eachPMRshallinstallaprimarycoolantsaturation metertoprovideon-lineindication ofcoolantsaturation condition.

Operatorinstruc-tionastouseofthismetershallincludeconsideration thatisnottobeusedexclusive ofotherrelatedplantparameters.

CLARIFICATION 1.Theanalysisandprocedures addressed inparagraph oneabovewillbereviewedandshouldbesubmitted totheNRC"Bulletins andOrdersTaskForce"forreview.2.Thepurposeofthesubcooling meteristoprovideacontinuous indication ofmargintosaturated conditions.

Thisisanimportant diagnostic toolforthereactoroperators'.

Redundant safetygradetemperature inputfromeachhotleg(oruseofmultiplecoreexitin(sic)T/C's)arerequired.

4.Redundant safetygradesystempressuremeasuresshouldbeprovided.

5.Continuous displayoftheprimarycoolantsaturation conditions shouldbeprovided.

6.EachPWRshouldhave:(A.)Safetygradecalculational devicesanddisplay(minimumoftwometers)or(B~)ahighlyreliablesinglechannelenviron-mentallyqualified, andtestablesystemplusabackupprocedure foruseofsteamtables.Iftheplantcomputeristobeused;itsavailability mustbedocumented.

7.Inthelongterm,theinstrumentation qualifications mustberequiredtobeupgradedtomeettherequirements ofRegulatory Guide1.97(Instrumenta-tionforLightMaterCooledNuclearPlantstoAssessPlantConditions Dur-ingandFollowing anAccident) whichisunderdevelopment.

8.In.allcasesappropriate steps(electrical, isolation, etc.)mustbetakentoassurethattheadditionofthesubcooling meter'doesnotadversely im-pactthereactorprotection orengineered safetyfeaturessystems.9.Theattachment providesadefinition ofinformation requiredonthesub-coolingmeter.

I'~(ptRGSEResonsesRGSEisinstalling tworedundant.

channelsofsubcooling marginmonitoring.

Eachchannelwillbecomposedof1)existingRCStemperature andpressuremeasurements, 2)adedicated, fullyqualified, analog,saturation temperature calculator andalarm,and3)ananalogdisplayshowingsubcooling margin.Theprinciple components forthissystemareonorder,withprojected deliverydatesinmidDecember.

Delaysinprocurement whichmightbecausedbycomponent testing,manufacturing difficulties orshippingproblemsmayresult,inanextendedschedule, however,weareexpediting thedeliverytotheextentpossible.

Basedontheprojected deliveryscheduleRG&Ewillinstallthisequipment, priortoJanuary1,1980.Theequipment datarequested bytheStaffisattached.

Procedure guidelines that.areusedbytheoperatorinrecognizing inadequate corecoolingwillbesubmitted bytheWestinghouse OwnersGroupforreviewbytheBulletins andOrdersTaskForce.

INFORIIATION REUIREDONTHESUBCOOLING HETERD~ialaInformation Displayed (T-Tsat,Tsat,Press,etc.)DisplayType(Analog,Digital,CRT)Continuous oronDemandSingleorRedundant Display.Location ofDisplaySAT-HOTAnaloContinuous SinledislachannelControlRoomAlarms(includesetpoints)

Overalluncertainty (OF,PSI)RangeofDisplayQualifications (seismic, environmental, IEEE323)Calculator Type(processcomputer, dedicated digitaloranalogcalc.)oneperTchannel/

SAT-HOT<50F25oF0-100FNoneDislanon-1E)AnaloIfprocesscomputerisusedspecifyavailability.

(~of(time)Singleorredundant calculators Selection Logic(highestT.,lowestpress)onecalculator/channel NoneQualifications (seismic, environmental, IEEE323)SeismicEcEnvironmental, IEEE-323&344Calculational Technique (SteamTables,Functional Fit,ranges)functiontofittosaturation curve~innaTemperature (RTD'sorT/C's)RTD-200ohmPt.Temperature (numberofsensorsandlocations)

Rangeoftemperature sensorsonesensor/channel RCShotle500-700F 10Uncertainty*

oftemperature sensors('Fat1)Qualifications (seismic, environmental, IEEE323)Pressure(specifyinstrument used)seenote1seenote2Foxboro611GI1Pressure(numberofsensorsandlocations)

RangeofPressuresensorsUncertainty*

ofpressuresensors(PSIat1)one/channel, Pressurizer 1700-2500 si2siQualifications (seismic, environmental, IEEE323)Qualified for60psigand286'Fnote3BackuCaabilitAvailability ofTemp&PressCoreexitTCandpres-surizerpressureindica-tioninthecontrolroomAvailability ofSteamTablesetc.Trainingofoperators Procedures available incontrolroomcornletecornlete*Uncertainties mustaddressconditions offorcedflowandnaturalcirculation Note1:AccuracyofRTD'sTemperature

('F)Accuracy(4F)32525625.011~055.065Note2:RTDQualifications

(

Reference:

Rosemount Engineering Co.Drawing176JA)1.RTD(exceptleadwires)capableofexposureof-30to650OF.Leadwires:-30to200F2.Vibration:

10Gpeakfrom20to2000HZalongandthroughmutuallyperpendicular axisfor15minutes.3.Radiation:

200R/hour Note3:Qualification information isgiveninRG&EletterfromL.D.White,Jr.toA.Schwencer, USNRC,datedFebruary24,1978.

11Section2.1.3.b-INSTRUHENTATION FORDETECTION OFINADEUATECORECOOLINGADDITIONAL INSTR'ENTATION POSITIONLicensees shallprovidea.description ofanyadditional instrumentation orcon-trols(primaryorbackup)proposedfortheplanttosupplement thosedevicescitedinthepreceding sectiongivinganunambiguous, easy-to-interpret indica-tionofinadequate corecooling.Adescription ofthefunctional designrequire-mentsforthesystemshallalsobeincluded.

Adescription oftheprocedures tobeusedwiththeproposedequipment, theanalysisusedindeveloping thesepro-cedures,andascheduleforinstalling theequipment shallbeprovided.

CLARIFICATION 1.Designofnewinstrumentation shouldprovideanunambiguous indication ofinadequate corecooling.Thismayrequirenewmeasurements toorasynthesis ofexistingmeasurements whichmeetsafety-grade criteria.

2.Theevaluation istoincludereactorwaterlevelindication.

3.Acommitment toprovidethenecessary analysisandtostudyadvantages ofvariousinstruments tomonitorwaterlevelandcorecoolingisrequiredintheresponsetotheSeptember 13,1979letter.4.Theindication ofinadequate corecoolingmustbeunambiguous, inthat,itshouldhavethefollowing properties:

a)itmustindicatetheexistence ofinadequate corecoolingcausedbyvariousphenomena (i.e.,highvoidfractionpumpedflowaswellasstagnantboiloff).Pb)itmustnoterroneously indicateinadequate corecoolingbecauseofthepresenceofanunrelated phenomenon.

Theindication mustgiveadvancedwarningoftheapproachofinadequate corecooling.6.Theindication mustcoverthefullrangefromnormaloperation tocompletecoreuncovering.

Forexample,ifwaterlevelischosenastheunambiguous indication, thentherangeoftheinstrument (orinstruments) mustcoverthefullrangefromnormalwaterleveltothebottomofthecore.RG&EResonseAnalysesofsmallbreaklossofcoolantaccidents, symptomsofin-adequatecorecoolingandrequiredactionstorestorecorecooling,andanalysisoftransient, andaccidentscenarios including operatoractionsnot,previously analyzedhavebeenperformed onagenericbasisbytheWestinghouse OwnersGroup,ofwhichRG&Eisam'ember.

I~~l~pSection2.1.4-CONTAINMENT

'ISOLATION POSITION1.Allcontainment isolation systemdesignsshallcomplywiththerecommenda-tionsofSRP6.2.4;i.e.,thattherebediversity intheparameters sensedfortheinitiation ofcontainment isolation.

2.Allplantsshallgivecarefulreconsideration tothedefinition ofessential andnonessential systems,shallidentifyeachsystemdetermined tobeessential, shallidentifyeachsystemdetermined tobenonessential, shalldescribethebasisforselection ofeachessential system,'shall modifytheircontainment isolation designsaccordingly, andshallreporttheresultsofthere-evaluation totheNRC.3.Allnonessential systemsshallbeautomatically isolatedbythecontain-mentisolation signal.4.Thedesignofcontrolsystemsforautomatic containment isolation valvesshallbesuchthatresetting theisolation signalwillnotresultintheautomatic reopening ofcontainment isolation valves'eopening ofcontain-mentisolation valvesshallrequiredeliberate operatoraction.CLARIFICATION 1.Providediversecontainment isolation signalsthatsatisfysafety-grade requirements.

'.Identifyessential andnon-essential systemsandprovideresultstoNRC.3.Non-essential systemsshouldbeautomatically isolatedbycontainment isolation signals.4.Resetting ofcontainment isolation signalsshallnotresultintheauto-maticlossofcontainment isolation.

RG&EResonseTheexistingcontainment isolation systemattheGinnaNuclearPlantconformswiththediversity requirements oftheStaffposi-tion.SeeWestinghouse drawing882D612sheet.6submitted inalettertoD.L.ZiemannonNovember22,1978.Thisdrawingalsoshowswhichsensorsprovidecontainment isolation andcontainment ventilation isolation.

Thesystemautomatically isolatesallnonessential syst;emsnotalreadyisolated.

Essential andnon-essential systemsareidentified onTable2.1.4.Theeffectofresetting containment isolation andcontainment ventilati'on isolation wasdiscussed indetailinourresponses toitem9ofIEBulletin79-06AdatedApril28,1979andJune22,1979andinourletterstotheNRCdatedJanuary2,1979,February16,1979andMarch30,1979.Asidentified inthoseletters,therearecertainvalveswhichcouldreopenuponresetofthecontainment isolation orcontainment ventilation isolation iftheircontrollers weresetintheopenposition.

13Thereopening ofvalvesiscurrently precluded byseveralmeans.First,theoperatorisdirectedtoplaceallvalvepositioncon-trollersintheclosedpositionsothatno'valvewillopenoninitiation ofthereset.Theresetofcontainment ventilation isolation canbeactuatedonlythroughuseofakeyswitch.Thekeyisunderthecontroloftheshiftforeman.Therefore, nosingleoperatorerrorcanresultinimproperuseofthisresetfunction.

Theresetforcontainment isolation, originally areset.button,hasbeenreplacedwithakeyswitch.Tofurtherreducethelikelihood ofinadvertent reopening ofvalves,asystemmodification hasbeendesignedtoprovideforindividual resetting ofallisolation valvestoeliminate anypossibility ofaninadvertent opening.Equipment forthismodification wasrecentlyordered,following thenecessary phasesofpreliminary engineering, bidrequests, andbidevaluations andeveryeffortisbeingmadetoexpeditedelivery.

Thevendorestimates twenty-twoweeksfordelivery.

ItshouldbenotedthatinordernottodegradetheClass1Esystemofwhichitwillbeapart,thisequipment (including over1SOrelays)must,befullyqualified seismically andenvironmentally.

Theequipment beingprocuredishousedinfourlargecabinetswhichwillbelocatedintherelayroom.Installation alsoinvolveswiringbetweentherelayroomandthecontrolroom.

I f~I~~~r14-'Table2.1.4Essential andNonessential SystemContainment Penetrations PENT.NO.29100101102105106107108109110110112113120120121121121121123124IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION Fueltransfertubecharginglineto"B"loopSIPump1Bdischarge Alternate chargingto"A"coldlegContainment SprayPump1A"A"ReactorCoolantPump(RCP),seal waterinletSumpAdischarge toWasteHoldupTankRCPsealwaterout,andexcessletdowntoVCTContainment SprayPump1B"B"RCPsealwaterinletSItestlineRHRto"B"coldlegEssential letdowntoNon-regen.

Heatexchanger SIPump1Adischarge NitrogentoAccumulators Pressurizer ReliefTank(PRT)toGasAnalyzer(GA)NitrogentoPRTReactorMakeupwatertoPRTCont.Press.transmitter PT-945Cont.Press.transmitter PT-946ReactorCoolantDrainTank(RCDT)toGAExcessletdownsupplyandreturntoheat.exchanger ESSENTIAL VS.NONESSENTIAL Nonessential Nonessential Essential Nonessential Essential Essential Nonessential Nonessential Essential Essential Nonessential Nonessential Essential Nonessential Nonessential Essential Nonessential Essential Essential Nonessential Nonessential PENT.NO.125126127128129130131132140142143201202203203204205206206207207209210300Table2.1.4(continued)

IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION PostAccidentairsample"C"fanComponent CoolingWater(CCW)from1BRCPCCWfrom1ARCPCCWtolARCPCCWto1BRCPRCDT&PRTtoVentHeaderCCWtoreactorsupportcoolingCCWtoreactorsupportcoolingDepressurization atpowerRHRpumpsuctionfrom"A"HotlegRHR-51pumpsuctionfromSumpBRHR-52pumpsuctionfromSumpBRCDTpumpsuctionReactorCompart.coolingUnit-A&BHydrogenrecombiner pilot&main"B"Contain.Press.transmitter PT-947&948Postaccidentairsampleto"B"fanPurgeSupplyDuct,HotlegloopsamplePrzr.liquidspacesample"A"S/GsamplePrzr.SteamspacesampleBiiS/GsampleReactorCompart.coolingUnitA&BOxygenmakeuptoA&Brecombiners PurgeExhaustDuctESSENTIAL VS.NONESSENTIAL Nonessential Essential Essential Essential Essential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Essential Essential Essential Nonessential Essential Nonessential Essential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Essential Nonessential Nonessential lI~~r 16Table2.1.4(continued)

PENT.NO.301303304305IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION Aux.steamsupplytocontainment Aux.steamcondensate returnHydrogenrecombiner pilotandmainto"A"Radiation MonitorsR-ll,R-12&R-10AAutoInletIsol.ESSENTIAL VS.NONESSENTIAL Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential 305305308309310310311312313315317318319320321322323324332332R-ll,R-12&R-10AOutletPostAccidentairsample(containment)

ServiceWaterto"A"fancoolerleakagetest.depressurization ServiceAirtoContain.Instrument AirtoContain.ServiceWaterfrom"B"fancoolerServiceWaterto"D"fancoolerleakagetestdepressurization ServiceWaterfrom"C"fancoolerServiceWaterto"B"fancoolerleakagetestsupplyDeadweight.testerServiceWaterfrom"A"fancoolerServicewaterto"C"fancoolerAS/GBlowdownBS/GBlowdownServiceWaterfrom"D"fancoolerDemineralized watertoContainment, Cont.Press.Trans.PT-944,949&950Leakagetestinstrumentation lines.Nonessential Nonessential Essential Nonessential Nonessential Nonessential Essential Essential Nonessential Essential Essential Nonessential Nonessential Essential Essential Nonessential Nonessential Essential Nonessential Essential Nonessential 17PENT.NO.40140240340410002000Table2.1.4(continued)

IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION MainsteamfromAS/GMainsteamfromBS/GFeedwater linetoAS/GFeedwater linetoBS/GPersonnel HatchPEquipment HatchESSENTIAL VS.NONESSENTIAL Nonessential*

Nonessential*

Essential, usedforAuxiliary Feedwater Essential, usedforAuxiliary Feedwater Nonessential Nonessential

• Signalswhichcausemainsteamlineisolation areshownonWestinghouse drawing882D612sheet6.

18Section2.1.5.a-DEDICATED H2CONTROLPENETRATIONS POSITIONPlantsusingexternalrecombiners orpurgesystemsforpost-accident combustible gascontrolofthecontainment-atmosphere shouldprovidecontainment isolation systemsforexternalrecombiner orpurgesystemsthatarededicated tothatserviceonly,thatmeettheredundancy andsinglefailurerequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria54and56ofAppendixAto10CFRPart50,andthataresizedtosatisfytheflowrequirements ofthe,recombiner orpurgesystem.CLARIFICATION 1.Thisrequirement isonlyapplicable tothoseplantswhoselicensing basisincludesrequirements forexternalrecombiners orpurgesystemsforpost-accidentcombustible gascontrolofthecontainment atmosphere.

2.Anacceptable alternative tothededicated penetration isacombineddesignthatissingle-failure proofforcontainment isolation purposesandsingle-failureproofforoperation oftherecombiner orpurgesystem.3.Thededicated penetration orthecombinedsingle-failure proofalternative shouldbesizedsuchthattheflowrequirements fortheuseoftherecom-binerorpurgesystemaresatisfied.

4.Components necessitated bythisrequirement shouldbesafetygrade.5.Adescription ofrequireddesignchangesandascheduleforaccomplishing thesechangesshouldbeprovidedbyJanuary1,1980.Designchangesshouldbecompleted byJanuary1,1981.RGGEResonseGinnaStationhastwohydrogenrecombiners whicharelocatedinsidecontainment.

Therefore, dedicated penetrations arenot.required.

19Section2.1.5.c-CAPABILITY TOINSTALLHYDROGENRECOMBINER ATEACHLIGHTWATERNUCLEARPOWERPLANTPOSITIONTheprocedures andbasesuponwhichtherecombiners wouldbeusedonallplantsshouldbethesubjectofareviewbythelicensees inconsidering shielding requirements andpersonnel exposurelimitations asdemonstrated tobenecessary inthecaseofT>11-2.CLARIFICATION 1.Thisrequirement appliesonlytothoseplantsthatincludedHydrogenRecombiners asadesignbasisforlicensing.

2.Theshielding andassociated.

personnel exposurelimitations associated withrecombiner useshouldbeevaluated aspartoflicenseerespons'e torequirement 2.1.6.B,"DesignreviewforPlantShielding."

3.Eachlicenseeshouldreviewandupgrade,asnecessary, thosecriteriaandprocedures dealingwithrecombiner use.Actiontakenonthisrequirement shouldbesubmitted byJanuary1,1980.Thepresently available procedures whichgoverntheuseofhydrogenrecombiners havebeenreviewedandfoundtobeadequate.

Inviewofthefact,thatourrecombiners areinsidecontainment, nofurtherreviewisrequiredtoconsidershielding requirements andpersonnel exposurelimitations resulting fromtherecombiners.

Accesstothecontrolpanelwillbeconsidered inresponsetoSection2.1.6.b.

1(20Section2.1.6.a-INTEGRITY OFSYSTEMSOUTSIDECONTAINMENT LIKELYTOCONTAINRADIOACTIVE MATERIALS FORPWRsANDBWRsPOSITIONApplicants andlicensees shallimmediately implement aprogramtoreduceleakagefromsystemsoutsidecontainment thatwouldorcouldcontainhighlyradioactive fluidsduringaserioustransient oraccidenttoas-low-as practical levels.Thisprogramshallincludethefollowing:

Immediate LeakReduction a.b.Implement allpractical leakreduction measuresforallsystemsthatcouldcarryradioactive fluidoutsideofcontainment.

Heasureactualleakagerateswithsysteminoperation andreportthemtotheNRC.2.Continuing LeakReduction Establish andimplement aprogramofpreventive maintenance toreduceleakagetoas-low-as practical levels.Thisprogramshallincludeperiodicintegrated leaktestsatafrequency nottoexceedrefueling cycleinter-vals.CLARIFICATION Licensees shall,byJanuary1,1980,provideasummarydescription oftheirpro-gramtoreduceleakagefromsystemsoutsidecontainment thatwouldorcouldcon-tainhighlyradioactive fluidsduringaserioustransient oraccident.

ExamplesofsuchsystemsaregivenonpageA-26ofNUREG-0578.

OtherexamplesincludetheReactorCoreIsolation CoolingandReactorMaterCleanup(Letdownfunction)

SystemsforBMRs.Includealistofsystemswhichareexcludedfromthisprogram.Testingofgaseoussystemsshouldincludeheliumleakdetection orequivalent testingmethods.Considerinyourprogramtoreduceleakagepotential releasepathsduetodesignandoperatordeficiencies asdiscussed inourlettertoyouregarding NorthAnnaandRelatedIncidents datedOctober17,1979,.RGSEResonseThescheduleforcompletion oftheNRCstaffrequirements isgiveninourresponseofOctober17,1979andisinagreement withstaffrequirements.

WewillconsiderinourprogramforreducingleakagetheNRClettertoRG&EdatedOctober17,1979regarding theNorthAnnaandrelatedincidents.

Wearereviewing anddiscussing withconsultants asatisfactory methodfordetermining theleakagerateforthe"'waste gassystem.WeintendtocomplyasrequiredbyJanuary1,1980.

(rI~~~~WewillprovidetotheNRCbyJanuary1,1980,asummarydescription ofourprogramtoreduceleakagefromsystemsoutsidecontainment thatcontainhighlyradioactive fluidsduringaserioustransient oraccident.

LII,~~gI ItjI~g'22Section2.1.6.b-DESIGNREVIEWOFPLANTSHIELDING ANDENVIRON-MENTALUALIFICATION OFEUIPMENTFORSPACESSYSTEMSWHICHMAYBE,USEDINPOST-ACCIDENT OPERATIONS POSITIONWiththeassumption ofapost-accident releaseofradioactivity equivalent tothatdescribed inRegulatory Guides1.3and1.4,eachlicenseeshallperformaradiation andshielding designreviewofthespacesaroundsystemsthatmay,asaresultofanaccident, containhighlyradioactive materials.

Thedesignreviewshouldidentifythelocationofvitalareasandequipment, suchasthecontrolroom,radwastecontrolstations, emergency powersupplies, motorcontrolcenters,andinstrument areas,inwhichpersonnel occupancy maybeundulylimitedorsafetyequipment maybeundulydegradedbytheradiation fieldsduringpost-accident operations ofthesesystems.Eachlicenseeshallprovideforadequateaccesstovitalareasandprotection ofsafetyequipment bydesignchanges,increased permanent ortemporary shield-ing,orpost-accident procedural controls.

Thedesignreviewshalldetermine whichtypesofcorrective actionsareneededforvitalareasthroughout thefacility.

CLARIFICATION Anyareawhichwillormayrequireoccupancy topermitanoperatortoaidinthemitigation oforrecoveryfromanaccidentisdesignated asavitalarea.Inordertoassurethatpersonnel canperformnecessary post-accident operations inthevitalareas,weareproviding thefollowing guidancetobeusedbylicensees toevaluatetheadequacyofradiation protection totheoperators:

SourceTermTheminimumradioactive sourcetermshouldbeequivalent tothesourcetermsrecommended, inRegulatory Guides1.3,1.4,1.7andStandardReviewPlant15.6.5withappropriate decaytimesbasedonplantdesign.a.LiquidContaining Systems:100%ofthecoreequilibrium noblegasinventory, 50~ofthecoreequilibrium halogeninventory and1',ofallothersareassumedtobemixedinthereactorcoolantandliquidsbyHPCIandLPCI.b.GasContaining Systems:100~ofthecoreequilibrium noblegasin-ventoryand25~ofthecoreequilibrium halogenactivityareassumedtobemixedinthecontainment atmosphere.

Forgascontaining linesconnected totheprimarysystem(e.g.,BWRsteamlines)theconcentra-tionofradioactivity shallbedetermined assumingtheactivityiscontained inthegasspaceintheprimarycoolantsystem.

)Il)~yl232.DoseRateCriteriaThedoserateforpersonnel inavitalareashouldbesuchthattheguide-linesofGDC19shouldnotbeexceededduringthecourseoftheaccident.

GDC19limitsthedosetoanoperatorto5Remwholebodyoritsequivalent toanypartofthebody.Whendetermining thedosetoanoperator, caremustbetakentodetermine thenecessary occupancy timeinaspecificarea.Forexample,areasrequiring continuous occupancy willrequiremuchlowerdoseratesthanareaswhereminimaloccupanyisrequired.

Therefore, allowable doserateswillbebaseduponexpectedoccupancy, aswellastheradioactive sourcetermsandshielding.

However,inordertoprovideageneraldesignobjective, weareproviding thefollowing doseratecriteriawithalternatives tobedocumented onacase-by-case basis.Therecommended doseratesareaverageratesinthearea.Localhotspotsmayexceedthedoserateguidelines providedoccupancy isnotrequiredatthelocationofthehotspot.Thesedosesaredesignobjectives andarenottobeusedtolimitaccessintheeventofanaccident.

a.AreasReuirinContinuous Occuanc:<15mr/hr.

Theseareaswillrequirefulltimeoccupancy duringthecourseoftheaccident.

TheControlRoomandonsitetechnical supportcenterareareaswherecon-tinuousoccupancy willberequired.

Thedoseratefortheseareasisbasedonthecontrolroomoccupancy factorscontained inSRP6.4.AreasReuirinInfreuentAccess:GDC19.Theseareasmayrequireaccessonaregularbasis,butnotcontinuous occupancy.

Shielding shouldbeprovidedtoallowaccessatafrequency anddurationestimated bythelicensee.

TheplantRadiochemical/Chemical AnalysisLaboratory, radwastepanel,motorcontrolcenter,instrumentation locations, andreactorcoolantandcontainment gassamplestationsareexampleswhereoccupancy maybeneededoftenbutnotcontinuously.

RG&EResonseAradiation andshielding designreviewwillbecompleted byJanuary1,1980whichidentifies thelocationofvitalareasandequipment inwhichpersonnel occupancy maybelimitedorsafetyequipment undulydegradedbyradiation fieldsduringpost,-accident conditions.

Thereviewwillusethesourcetermanddoseratecriteriaofthisposition.

Thedesignreviewwilldetermine thetypesofcorrective actionsneededfortheaffectedvitalareas.Weexpecttoimplement plantshielding modifications andprocedure changeswhichmayberequiredbyJanuary1,1981unlessmajormodifications whichareaffectedbySystematic Evaluation Program(SEP)topicsareidentified.

Theremaybeaselectednumberofmodifications whichwewillrecommend including intheintegrated assessment, oftheSEP.Thiswouldbeinthosecaseswherethemodification couldpotentially interactwithreviewsbeingcon-ductedunderSEPsuchastopicsIII-4.A,III-4.B,III-4.C,III-4.D(missiles),

III-5.B(pipebreakoutsidecontainment),

III-6(seismic),

andVI-8(controlroomhabitability).

Recommendations forinclusion inSEPwillbereachedonacase-by-case basisandwillbepresented totheNRCforconcurrence.

Section2.1.7.a-AUTONATIC INITIATION OFTHEAUXILIARY FEEDWATER POSITIONConsistent withsatisfying therequirements ofGeneralDesignCriterion 20ofAppendixAto10CFRPart50withrespecttothetimelyinitiation oftheauxiliary feedwater system,thefollowing requirements shallbeimplemented intheshortterm:1.Thedesignshallprovidefortheautomatic initiation oftheauxiliary feedwater system.2.Theautomatic initiation signalsandcircuitsshallbedesignedsothatasinglefailurewillnotresultinthelossofauxiliary feedwater systemfunction.

3.Testability oftheinitiating signalsandcircuitsshallbeafeatureofthedesign.4.Theinitiating signalsandcircuitsshallbepoweredfromtheemergency buses.5.Nanualcapability toinitiatetheauxiliary feedwater systemfrom,thecontrolroomshallberetainedandshallbeimplemented sothatasinglefailureinthemanualcircuitswillnotresultinthelossofsystemfunctions.

6.Thea-cmotor-driven pumpsandvalvesintheauxiliary feedwater systemshallbeincludedintheautomatic actuation (simultaneous and/orsequential) oftheloadstotheemergency buses.7.Theautomatic initiating signalsandcircuitsshallbedesignedsothattheirfailurewillnotresultinthelossofmanualcapability toinitiatetheAFWSfromthecontrolroom.IntheLongTerm,theautomatic initiation signalsandcircuitsshallbeupgradedinaccordance withsafetygraderequirement.

CLARIFICATION ControlGrade(Short-Term) 1.Provideautomatic/manual initiation ofAFWS.2.Testability oftheinitiating signals,and circuitsisrequired.

3~Initiating signalsandcircuitsshallbepoweredfromtheemergency buses.4.Necessary pumpsandvalvesshallbeincludedintheautomatic sequenceoftheloadstotheemergency buses'erify thattheadditionoftheseloadsdoesnotcompromise theemergency dieselgenerating capacity.

01Pg~

-255.Failureintheautomatic circuitsshallnotresultinthelossofmanualcapability toinitiatetheAFHSfromthecontrolroom.6.OtherConsiderations a.Forthosedesignswhereinstrument airisneededforoperation,'he electricpowersupplyrequirement shouldbecapableofbeingmanuallyconnected toemergency powersources.RG&EResonsesWemeettherequirements of'thisposition.

PleaseseeourresponseofOctober17,1979.

CII~~'26Section2.1.7.b-AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FLOWINDICATION TOSTEANGENERATORS POSITIONConsistent withsatisfying therequirements setforthinGDC13toprovidethecapability inthecontrolroomtoascertain theactualperformance oftheAFllSwhenitiscalledtoperformitsintendedfunction, thefollowing requirements shallbeimplemented:

1.Safety-grade indication ofauxiliary feedwater flowtoeachsteamgenerator shallbeprovidedinthecontrolroom.2.Theauxiliary feedwater flowinstrument channelsshallbepoweredfromtheemergency busesconsistent withsatisfying theemergency powerdiversity requirements oftheauxiliary feedwater systemsetforthinAuxiliary SystemsBranchTechnical Position10-1oftheStandardReviewPlan,Section10.4.9.CLARIFICATION A.ControlGradeShort-Term 1.Auxiliary feedwater flowindication toeachsteamgenerator shallsatisfythesinglefailurecriterion.

2.Testability oftheauxiliary feedwater flowindication channelsshallbeafeatureofthedesign.3.Auxiliary feedwater flowinstrument channelsshallbepoweredfromthevitalinstrument buses.B.Safet-GradeLon-Term1.Auxiliary feedwater flowindication toeachsteamgenerator shallsatisfysafety-grade requirements.

C.Other1.FortheShort-Term theflowindication channelsshouldbythemselves satisfythesinglefailurecriterion foreachsteamgenerator.

Asafall-back

position, oneauxiliary feedwaterflowchannelmaybebackedupbyasteamgenerator levelchannel.2.Eachauxiliary feedwaterchannelshouldprovideanindication offeedflowwithanaccuracyontheorderof210~.RG&EResonseA.Theauxiliary feedwater flowindication toeachsteamgenerator doesnot,byitself,satisfythesinglefailurecriterion.

However,asallowedbyclarification C.l,redundant indication isprovidedbysteamgenerator level.

~~~27,2.Theauxiliary feedwater flowindication channelsaretestable.

3.Auxiliary feedwater flowinstrument channelsarepoweredbyvitalinstrument buses.B.1.I,ongtermauxiliary feedwater flowindication toeachsteamgenerator whichmeetssafetygradereguirements willbeinstalled byJanuary1,1981.

~~~1128Section2.1.8.a-INPROVEDPOST-ACCIDENT SAMPLINGCAPABILITY POSITIONAdesignandoperational reviewofthereactorcoolantandcontainment atmosphere samplingsystemsshallbeperformed todetermine thecapability ofpersonnel topromptlyobtain(lessthan1hour)asampleunderaccidentconditions withoutincurring aradiation exposuretoanyindividual inexcessof3and183/4Remstothewholebodyorextremities, respectively.

Accidentconditions shouldassumeaRegulatory Guide1'or1.4releaseoffissionproducts.

Ifthereviewindicates thatpersonnel couldnotpromptlyandsafelyobtainthesamples,addi-tionaldesignfeaturesorshielding shouldbeprovidedtomeetthecriteria.

Adesignandoperational reviewoftheradiological spectrumanalysisfacilities shallbeperformed todetermine thecapability topromptlyquantify(lessthan2hours)certainradioisotopes thatareindicators ofthedegreeofcoredamage.Suchradionuclides arenoblegases(whichindicatecladdingfailure),

iodinesandcesiums(whichindicatehighfueltemperatures),

andnon-volatile isotopes(whichindicatefuelmelting).

Theinitialreactorcoolantspectrumshouldcor-respondtoaRegulatory Guide1.3or1.4release.Thereviewshouldalsocon-sidertheeffectsofdirectradiation frompipingandcomponents intheauxiliary buildingandpossiblecontamination anddirect,radiation fromairborneeffluents.

Ifthereviewindicates thattheanalysesrequiredcannotbeper-formedinapromptmannerwithexistingequipment, thendesignmodifications orequipment procurement shallbeundertaken tomeetthecriteria.

Inadditiontotheradiological

analyses, certainchemicalanalysesarenecessary formonitoring reactorconditions.

Procedures shallbeprovidedtoperformboronandchloridechemicalanalysesassumingahighlyradioactive initialsample(Regulatory Guide1.3or1.4sourceterm).Bothanalysesshallbecapableofbeingperformed

promptly, i.e.,theboronanalysiswithinanhourandthechloridesampleanalysiswithinashift.DISCUSSION Theprimarypurposeofimplementing ImprovedPost-Accident SamplingCapability istoimproveeffortstoassessandcontrolthecourseofanaccidentby:1.Providing information relatedtotheextentofcoredamagethathasoccurredormaybeoccurring duringanaccident; 2.Determining thetypesandquantities offissionproductsreleasedtothecontainment intheliquidandgasphaseandwhichmaybereleasedtotheenvironment; 3.Providing information oncoolantchemistry (e.g.,dissolved gas,boronandpH)andcontainment hydrogen.

Theaboveinformation requiresacapability toperformthefollowing analyses:

1.Radiological andchemicalanalysesofpressurized andunpressurized reactorcoolantliquidsamples;

'I1g~

292.Radiological andhydrogenanalysesofcontainment atmosphere (air)samples.CLARIFICATION Thelicenseeshallhavethecapability topromptlyobtain(inlessthan1hour)pressurized andunpressurized reactorcoolantsamplesandacontainment atmos-phere(air)sample.Thelicenseeshallestablish aplanforanonsiteradiological andchemicalanalysisfacilitywiththecapability toprovide,within1hourofobtaining thesample,quantification ofthefollowing:

1.certainisotopesthatareindicators ofthedegreeofcoredamage(i.e.,noblegases,iodinesandcesiumsandnon-volatile isotopes),

2.hydrogenlevelsinthecontainment atmosphere intherange0to10volumepercent,3.dissolved gases(i.e.,H,0andboronconcentration ofliquids.orhavein-linemonitoring capabilities toperformtheaboveanalysis.

Plantprocedures forthehandlingandanalysisofsamples,minorplantmodifications fortakingsamplesandadesignreviewandprocedural modifications (ifnecessary) shallbecompleted byJanuary1,1981.Duringthereviewofthepostaccidentsamplingcapability consideration shouldbegiventothefollowing items:1.Provisions shallbemadetopermitcontainment atmosphere samplingunderbothpositiveandnegativecontainment pressure.

2.Thelicenseeshallconsiderprovisions forpurgingsampleslines,forreducingplateoutinsamplelines,forminimizing samplelossordistortion, forpreventing blockageofsamplelinesbyloosematerialintheRCSorcontainment, forappropriate disposalofthesamples,andforpassiveflowrestrictions tolimitreactorcoolantlossorcontainment airleakfromaruptureofthesampleline.3.Ifchangesormodifications totheexistingsamplingsystemarerequired, theseismicdesignandqualitygroupclassification orsamplinglinesandcomponents shallconformtotheclassification ofthesystemtowhicheachsamplinglineisconnected.

Components andpipingdownstream ofthesecondisolation valvecanbedesi'gned toqualityGroupDandnonseismic CategoryIrequirements.

Thelicensee's radiological sampleanalysiscapability shouldincludeprovisions to-a.Identifyandquantifytheisotopesofthenuclidecategories discussed abovetolevelscorresponding tothesourcetermsgiveninLessonsLearnedItem2.1.6.b.Hherenecessary, abilitytodilutesamples-toprovidecapability formeasurement andreduction ofpersonnel

exposure, shouldbeprovided.

Sensitivity ofonsiteanalysiscapability shouldbesuchastopermitmeasurement ofnuclideconcentration intherangefromapproximately 1pCi/gmtotheupperlevelsindicated here.

1fl~~V I~130'b.Restrictbackground levelsofradiation intheradiological andchemicalanalysisfacilityfromsourcessuchthatthesampleanalysiswillprovideresultswithanacceptably smallerror(approximately afactorof2).Thiscanbeaccomplished throughtheuseofsufficient shielding aroundsamplesandoutsidesources,andbytheuseofventilation systemdesignwhichwillcontrolthepresenceofairborneradioactivity.

c.Haintainplantprocedures whichidentifytheanalysisrequired, measurement techniques andprovisions forreducingbackground levels.Thelicensees chemicalanalysiscapability shallconsiderthepresenceoftheradiological sourcetermindicated fortheradiological analysis.

Inperforming thereviewofsamplingandanalysiscapability, consideration shallbegiventopersonnel occupational exposure.

Procedural changesand/orplantmodifications mustassurethatitshallbepossibletoobtainandanalyzeasamplewhileincurring aradiation dosetoanyindividual thatisaslowasreasonably achievable andnotinexcessofGDC19.Inassuringthattheselimitsaremet,thefollowing criteriawillbeusedbythestaff.1.Forshielding calculations, sourcetermsshallbeasgiveninLessonsLearnedItem2.1.6.b.2.Accesstothesamplestationandtheradiological andchemicalanalysisfacilities shallbethroughareaswhichareaccessible inpostaccidentsituations andwhichareprovidedwithsufficient shielding toassurethattheradiation dosecriteriaaremet.3.Operations inthesamplestation,handlingofhighlyradioactive samplesfromthesamplestationtotheanalysisfacilities, andhandlingwhileworkingwiththesamplesintheanalysisfacilities shallbesuchthattheradiation dosecriteriaaremet.Thismayinvolvesufficient shielding ofpersonnel fromthesamplesand/orthedilutionofsamplesforanalysis.

Iftheexistingfacilities donotsatisfythesecriteria, thenadditional designfeatures, e.g.,additional shielding, remotehandlingetc.shallbeprovided.

Theradioactive samplelinesinthesamplestation,thesamplesthemselves intheanalysisfacilities, andotherradioactive linesofthevicinityofthesamplingstationandanalysisfacilities shallbeincludedintheevaluation.

4.Highrangeportablesurveyinstruments andpersonnel dosimeters shouldbeprovidedtopermitrapidassessment ofhighexposureratesandaccumulated personnel exposure.

Thelicenseeshalldemonstrate theircapability toobtainandanalyzeasamplecontaining theisotopesdiscussed aboveaccording tothecriteriagiveninthissection.RG&EResonseWeareperforming anoperational anddesignreviewofthereactorcoolantandcontainment atmosphere samplingsystemstodetermine theimprovements necessary forpromptcollection, handlingand 01Iy~

analysisofrequiredpost-accident sampleswithoutincurring ex-cessivepersonnel exposure.

Samplingprocedure'changes andminorsamplecollection modifications willbecompleted byJanuary1,1980.Theongoingdesignreviewwillconsiderthoseitemsidentified intheCommission's October30,1979clarification letterandwillimplement byJanuary1,1981thenecessary majorplantmodi-fications withthepossibleexception ofselectedmodifications thatmaybeaffectedbySEPreview.Thesemaybeincorporated intotheSystematic Evaluation Program.(seeresponseto2.1.6.b) iI~~~32Section2.1.8.b-INCREASED RANGEOFRADIATION MONITORSPOSITIONvTherequirements associated withthisrecommendation shouldbeconsidered asadvancedimplementation ofcertainrequirements tobeincludedinarevisiontoRegulatory Guide1.97,"Instrumentation toFollowtheCourseofanAccident,"

whichhasalreadybeeninitiated, andinotherRegulatory Guides,whichwillbepromulgated inthenear-term.

Noblegaseffluentmonitorsshallbeinstalled withanextendedrangedesignedtofunctionduringaccidentconditions aswellasduringnormaloperating conditions; multiplemonitorsareconsidered tobene'cessary tocovertherangesofinterest.

a.Noblegaseffluentmonitorswithanupperrangecapacityof105uCi/cc(Ze-133)areconsidered tobepractical andshouldbeinstalled inalloperating plants.b.Noblegaseffluentmonitoring shallbeprovidedforthetotalrangeofconcentration extending fromnormalcondition (ALARA)concentra-tionstoamaximumof10uCi/cc(Ze-133).

1Iultiple monitorsareconsidered tobenecessary tocovertherangesofinterest.

Therangecapacityofindividual monitorsshalloverlapbyafactoroften.2.Sinceiodinegaseouseffluentmonitorsfortheaccidentconditions arenotconsidered tobepractical atthistime,capability foreffluentmonitoring ofradioiodines fortheaccidentcondition shallbeprovidedwithsamplingconducted byabsorption oncharcoalorothermedia,followedbyon-sitelaboratory analysis.

3.In-containment radiation levelmonitorswithamaximumrangeof108rad/hr[totalor10rad/hrphoton]shallbeinstalled.

Aminimumoftwosuchmonitorsthatarephysically separated shallbeprovided.

Honitorsshallbedesignedandqualified tofunctioninanaccidentenvironment.

DISCUSSION TheJanuary1,1980requirement, werespecifically addedbytheCommission andwerenotincludedinNUREG-0578.

ThepurposeoftheinterimJanuary1,1980requirement istoassurethatlicensees havemethodsofquantifying radioactivity releasesshouldtheexistingeffluentinstrumentation gooffscale~CLARIFICATION Radiological NobleGasEffluentNonitorsA.January1,1980Requirements Untilfinalimplementation inJanuary1,1981,'alloperating reactorsmustprovide,byJanuary1,1980,aninterimmethodforquantifying highlevelreleaseswhichmeetstherequirements ofTable2.1.8.b.l.

Thismethodistoserveonlyasaprovisional fixwiththemorede-33tailed,exactmethodstofollow.Hethodsaretobedeveloped toquantifyreleaseratesofupto10,000Ci/secfornoblegasesfromallpotential releasepoints,(e.g.,auxiliary

building, radwastebuilding, fuelhandlingbuilding, reactorbuilding, wastegasdecaytankreleases, maincondenser airejector,BWRmaincondenser vacuumpumpexhaust,PWRsteamsafetyvalvesandatmosphere steamdumpvalvesandBWRturbinebuildings) andanyotherareasthatcommunicate directlywithsystemswhichmaycontainprimarycoolantorcontainment gases,(.e.g,letdownandemergency corecoolingsystemsandexternalrecom-biners).Heasurements/analysis capabilities oftheeffluents atthefinalreleasepoint(e.g.,stack)shouldbesuchthatmeasurements ofindividual sourceswhichcontribute toacommonreleasepointmaynotbenecessary.

Forassessing radioiodine andparticulate

releases, specialprocedures mustbedeveloped fortheremovalandanalysisoftheradioiodine/particulate samplingmedia(i.e.,charcoalcanister/

filterpaper).Existingsamplinglocations areexpectedtobeade-quate;however,specialprocedures forretrieval andanalysisofthesamplingmediaunderaccidentconditions (e.g.,highairandsurfacecontamination anddirectradiation levels)areneeded.Itisintended, thatthemonitoring capabilities calledforintheinterimcanbeaccomplished withexistinginstrumentation orreadilyavailable instrumentation.

Fornoblegases,modifications toexistingmonitoring systems,suchastheuseofportablehighrangesurveyinstruments, setinshieldedcollimators sothatthey"see"smallsectionsofsamplinglinesisanacceptable methodformeetingthein-tentofthisrequirement.

Conversion ofthemeasureddoserate(mR/hr)intoconcentration (pCi/cc)canbeperformed usingstandardvolumesourcecalculations.

Amethodmustbedeveloped withsufficient accuracytoquantifytheiodinereleasesinthepresenceofhighback-groundradiation fromnoblegasescollected oncharcoalfilters.Seismically qualified equipment andequipment meetingIEEE-279isnotrequired.

Thelicenseeshallprovidethefollowing information onhismethodstoquantifygaseousreleasesofradioactivity fromtheplantduringanaccident.

NobleGasEffluents a.System/Hethod description including:

i)Instrumentation tobeusedincluding rangeorsen-sitivity, energydependence, andcalibration frequency andtechnique, ii)Honitoring/sampling locations, including methodstoassurerepresentative measurements andbackground radia-tioncorrection, s>~~34iii)Adescription ofmethodtobeemployedtofacilitate accesstoradiation readings.

ForJanuary1,1980,Controlroomread-outispreferred; however,ifim-practical, in-situreadingsbyan,individual withverbalcommunication withtheControlRoomisacceptable basedon(iv)below.iv)Capability toobtainradiation readingsatleastevery15minutesduringanaccident.

v)Sourceofpowertobeused.IfnormalACpowerisused,analternate back-uppowersupplyshouldbepro-vided.IfDCpowerisused,thesourceshouldbecapableofproviding continuous readoutfor7consecutive days.b.Procedures forconducting allaspectsofthemeasurement/

analysisincluding:

i)Procedures forminimizing occupational exposures ii)Calculational methodsforconverting instrument read-ingstoreleaseratesbasedonexhaustairflowandtakingintoconsideration radionuclide spectrumdistri-butionasfunctionoftimeaftershutdown.

iii)Procedures fordissemination ofinformation.

iv)'rocedures forcalibration.

B.January1,1981Requirements ByJanuary1,1981,thelicenseeshallprovidehighrangenoblegaseffluentmonitorsforeachreleasepath.Thenoblegaseffluentmonitorshouldmeettherequirements ofTable2.1.8.b.2.

Thelicenseeshallalsoprovidetheinformation giveninSections1.A.l.a.i, 1.A.l.a.ii, 1.A.l.b.ii, 1.A.l.B.iii, and1.A.l.b.iv aboveforthenoblegaseffluentmonitors.'.

Radioiodine andParticulate Effluents A.ForJanuary1,1980thelicenseeshouldprovidethefollowing:

System/Method description including:

a)Instrumentation tobeusedforanalysisofthesamplingmediawithdiscussion onmethodsusedtocorrectforpotentially interfering background levelsofradioactivity.

b)Monitoring/sampling location.

\c)Methodtobeusedforretrieval andhandlingofsamplingmediatominimizeoccupational exposure.

~~35d)Methodtobeusedfordataanalysisofindividual radio-nuclidesinthepresenceofhighlevelsofradioactive noblegases.e)IfnormalACpowerisusedforsamplecollection andanalysisequipment, analternate back-uppowersupplyshouldbepro-vided.IfDCpowerisused,thesourceshouldbecapableofproviding continuous read-outfor7consecutive days.2.Procedures forconducting allaspectsofthemeasurement analysisincluding:

a)Minimizing occupational exposureb)Calculational methodsfordetermining releaseratesc)Procedures fordissemination ofinformation d)Calibration frequency andtechnique B.ForJanuary1,1981,thelicenseeshouldhavethecapability tocontinuously sampleandprovideonsiteanalysisofthesamplingmedia.Thelicenseeshouldalsoprovidetheinformation requiredin1.Aabove.Containment Radiation MonitorsProvidebyJanuary1,1981,tworadiation monitorsystemsincontainment whicharedocumented tomeettherequirements ofTable2.1.8.b.2.

Itispossiblethatfutureregulatory requirements foremergency planninginter-facesmaynecessitate identification ofdifferent typesofradionuclides inthecontainment air,e.g.,noblegases(indication ofcoredamage)andnon-volatiles (indication ofcoremelt).Consequently, consideration shouldbegiventothepossibleinstallation orfutureconversion ofthesemonitorstoperformthisfunction.

I's~'~~1 lf~~~TABLE2.1.8.b.1 INTERIHPROCEDURES FORUANTIFYING HIGHLEVELACCIDENTAL RADIOACTIVITY RELEASESLicensees aretoimplement procedures forestimating noblegasandradio-iodinereleaseratesiftheexistingeffluentinstrumentation goesoffscale.Examplesofmajorelementsofahighlyradioactive effluentreleasespecialprocedures (noblegas).Preselected locationtomeasureradiation fromthe'exhaustair,e.g.,exhaustductorsampleline.Provideshielding tominimizebackground interference.

Useofaninstalled monitor(preferable) ordedicated portablemonitor(acceptable) tomeasuretheradiation.

Predetermined calculational methodtoconverttheradiation leveltoradioactive effluentreleaserate.

37TABLE2.1.8.b.2 HIGHRANGEEFFLUENTMONITORNOBLEGASESONLYRANGE:(OverlapwithNormalEffluentInstrument UNDILUTED CONTAINMENT EXHAUSTDILUTED(>10:1)CONTAINMENT EXHAUSTMARKIBWRREACTORBUILDINGEXHAUSTPWRSECONDARY CONTAINMENT EXHAUSTBUILDINGS WITHSYSTEMSCONTAINING PRIMARYCOOLANTORGASESOTHERBUILDINGS (E.G.,RADWASTE)

Range)10pCi/CC10pCi/CC10pCi/CC10pCi/CC10pCi/CC10pci/CCNOTREDUNDANT

-1PERNORI1ALRELEASEPOINTSEISMIC-NOPOWER-VITALINSTRUMENT BUSSPECIFICATIONS

-PER.R.G.1.97ANDANSIN320"1979

.DISPLAY*:

CONTINUOUS ANDRECORDING WITHREADOUTSINTHETECHNICAL SUPPORTCENTER(TSC)ANDEMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER(EOC)QUALIFICATIONS

-NO+Although notapresentrequirement, itislikelythatthisinformation mayhavetobetransmitted totheNRC.Consequently, consideration shouldbegiventothispossiblefuturerequirement whendesigning thedisplayinterfaces.

TABLE2.1.8.b.3 HIGHRANGECONTAINMENT RADIATION NONITORRADIATION:

TOTALRADIATION (ALTERNATE:

PHOTONONLY)RANGE:UPTO10RAD/HR(TOTALRADIATION)

ALTERNATE:

10R/HR(PHOTONRADIATION ONLY)7SENSITIVE DOWNTO60KEVPHOTONS*REDUNDANT:

TWOPHYSICALLY SEPARATED UNITSSEISHIC:PERR.G.1.97POWER:VITALINSTRUNENT BUSSPECIFICATIONS:

PER.R.G.1.97REV.2andANSIN320-1978 DISPLAY:CONTINUOUS ANDRECORDING CALIBRATION:

LABORATORY CALIBRATION ACCEPTABLE

• Honitors mustnotprovidemisleading information totheoperators assumingdelayedcoredamagewhenthe80KEVphotonZe-133isthemajornoblegaspresent.

JiI]eS39RGSEResonses2.1.8.b1Noblegaseffluentmonitorwithanupperrangecapacityof10pCi/cc(Xe-133)isbei'ngprocuredtobeinstalled ontheplantventbyJanuary1,1981.InordertomeetthisdatestaffapprovalofourdesignisrequiredbyMarch1,1980.Theadditional informa-tionrequiredbythestaffpositionconcerning ourinterimmethodsforquantifying highlevelreleaseswillbesubmitted byJanuary1,1980.2.1.8.b.2 RGGEcurrently hasthecapability tomonitoriodinegaseous"releases.

Thisequipment isinplaceandusedforroutineanalysis.

PriortoJanuary1,1980wewillprovidetheinformation requiredbyparagraph 2.A.oftheclarifications above.2.1.8.b.3 Twohighrangecontainment radiation monitorshavebeenorderedforinstallation inthecontainment priortoJanuary1,1981.Inordertomeetthisdatestaffapprovalofourdesignisrequired'yMarch1,1980.Thesemonitorswillmeet7therequirements ofTable2.1.8.b.3 andwillhavearangeof10R/hr(photononly).

Section2.1.8.c-IMPROVEDIN-PLANTIODINEINSTRUMENTATION UNDERACCIDENTCONDITIONS POSITIONEachlicenseeshallprovideequipment andassociated trainingandprocedures foraccurately determing theairborneiodineconcentration inareaswithinthefacilitywhereplantpersonnel maybepresentduringanaccident.

CLARIFICATION UseofPortableversusStationar Honitorin EuimentEffective monitoring ofincreasing iodinelevelsinthebuildings underaccidentconditions mustincludetheuseofportableinstruments forthefollowing reasons:a.Thephysicalsizeoftheauxiliary/fuel handlingbuildingprecludes locatingstationary monitoring instrumentation atallareaswhereairborneiodineconcentration datamightberequired.

b.Unanticipated isolated"hotspots"mayoccurinlocations wherenosta-tionarymonitoring instrumentation islocated.c.Unexpectedly highbackground radiation levelsnearstationary monitoring instrumentation afteranaccidentmayinterfere withfilterradiation read-ings.d.Thetimerequiredtoretrievesamplesafteranaccidentmayresultinhighpersonnel exposures ifthesefiltersarelocatedinhighdoserateareas.IodineFiltersandHeasurement Techniues,A.Thefollowing areshort-term recommendations andshallbeimplemented bythelicenseebyJanaury1,1980.Thelicenseeshallhavethecapability toaccurately detectthepresenceofiodineintheregionofinterestfol-lowinganaccident.

Thiscanbeaccomplished byusingaportableorcart-mountediodinesamplerwithattachedsinglechanne$3~nalyzer (SCA).TheSCAwindowshouldbecalibrated tothe36SkeVyf1I.Arepresentative airsampleshallbetakenandthencountedforIusingtheSCA.Thiswillgiveaninitialconservative estimateofpresenceofiodineendcanbeusedtodetermine ifrespiratory protection isrequired.

Caremustbetakentoassurethatthecountingsystemisnotsaturated asaresultoftoomuchactivitycollected onthesamplingcartridges B.ByJanuary1,1981:Thelicenseeshallhavethecapability toremovethesamplingcartridge toalowbackground, lowcontamination areaforfurtheranalysis.

Thisareashouldbeventilated withcleanaircontaining noairborneradionuclides whichmaycontribute toinaccuracies inanalyzing thesample.Here,thesampleshouldfirstbepurgedofanyentrapped noble'ases

'usingnitrogengasorcleanairfreeofnoblegases.The.licensee shallhavethecapa-bilitytomeasureaccurately theiodineconcentrations presentonthesesamplesandeffluentcharcoalsamplesunderaccidentconditions.

RGSEResonseWehavemobileinstrumentation locatedinvariousareasthroughout theplanttomonitorairborneiodineconcentrations.

Portableairsamplersareavailable intheHealthPhysicsofficeandattheEmergency SurveyCenterforuseincollecting iodinesamples.Bothcharcoalandsilverzeoliteareavailable asiodinecollectors.

Wehavethecapability toaccurately detectthepresenceofiodineusingmobileairmonitorswhichhaveasinglechannelanalyzercalibrated totheI131energy.Wealsohavealowbackground, lowcontamination countingfacilitywhereasamplecanbepurgedofnoblegasestoassureaccurateiodinemeasurements.

Procedures areinuseandHealthPhysicstechnicians aretrainedtousetheGeLidetectorinisotopicanalysis.

Thisprocedure isusedroutinely todetermine MPChoursofexposure.

Section2.1.9-TRANSIENT ANDACCIDENTANALYSISPOSITIONSeeNUREG-0578, pageA-44.DISCUSSION Thescopeoftherequiredtransient andaccidentanalysisisdiscussed inNUREG-0578.TheschedulefortheseanalysesisincludedinNUREG-0578 andisrepro-ducedintheImplementation Scheduleattachment tothisletter.TheBulletins andOrdersTaskForcehasbeenimplementing theserequiredanalysesonthatschedule.

Theanalysisof.thesmallbreaklossofcoolantaccidenthasbeensubmitted byeachoftheownersgroups.Theseanalysesarepresently underreviewbytheBMTaskForce.Thescopeandschedulefortheanalysisofinadequate corecoolinghavebeen"discussed andagreeduponinmeetingsbetweentheownersgroupsandtheB&0TaskForce,andaredocumented intheminutestothosemeetings.

Theanalysisoftransients andaccidents forthepurposeofupgrading emergency procedures isdueinearly1980andthedetailedscopeandscheduleofthisanalysisisthesubjectofcontinuing discussions betweentheownersgroupsandtheB&PTaskForce.Analysesofsmallbreaklossofcoolantaccidents werereportedtotheNRCinWCAP-9600, submitted bytheWestinghouse OwnersgrouponJune29,1979.Thesensitivity toreactorcoolantpumptripwasaddressed inWCAP-9584 whichwassubmitted onAugust31,1979.NRCapprovaloftheprocedure guidelines contained inthesetworeports,asamended,wastransmitted byletterdatedNovember5,1979fromMr.D.F.Ross,Jr.Analysesofinadequate corecoolingwassubmitted bytheOwnersgrouponOctober30,1979.Asidentified inaletterfromCordellReed,Chairman, Westinghouse OwnersGroup,toMr.D.F.Ross,Jr.,datedOctober29,1979,weexpecttosubmittheanalysisoftransients andaccidents byJanuary1,1980.

Section2.1.9-CONTAINMENT PRESSUREINDICATION POSITIONAcontinuous indication ofcontainment pressureshouldbeprovidedinthecontrolroom.Heasurement andindication.

capability shallincludethreetimesthedesignpressureofthecontainment forconcrete, fourtimesthedesignpressureforsteel,andminusfivepsigforallcontainments.

CLARIFICATION 1.Thecontainment pressureindication shallmeetthedesignprovisions ofRegulatory Guide1.97including qualification, redundancy, andtestability.

2.Thecontainment pressuremonitorshallbeinstalled byJanuary1,1981.RG&Ewillinstallcontainment, pressureindication inconformance withtheStaffposition.

~l4 Section2.1.9-CONTAINNENT WATERLEVELINDICATION POSITIONAcontinuous indication of'containment waterlevelshallbeprovidedinthecontrolroomforallplants.Anarrowrangeinstrument shallbeprovidedforPHRsandcovertherangefromthebottomtothetopofthecontainment sump.Awiderangeinstrument shallalsobeprovidedforPHRsandshallcovertherangefromthebottomofthecontainment totheelevation equivalent toa600,000galloncapacity.

ForBHRs,awiderangeinstrument shallbeprovidedandcovertherangefromthebottomto5feetabovethenormalwaterlevelofthesuppression pool.CLARIFICATION 1.Thenarrowrangesumplevelinstrument shallmonitorthenormalcontainment sumplevelvicethecontainment emergency sumplevel.2.Thewiderangecontainment waterlevelinstruments shallmeettherequire-mentsoftheproposedrevisiontoRegulatory Guide1.97(Instrumentation forLight-Hater CooledNuclearPowerPlanttoAssessPlantConditions DuringandFollowing anAccident).

3.Thenarrowrangecontainment waterlevelinstruments shallmeettherequire-mentsofRegulatory Guide1.89(Qualification ofClassIEEquipment ofNuclearPowerPlants).4.Theequivalent capacityofthewiderangePHRlevelinstrument hasbeenchangedfrom500,000gallonsto600,000gallonstoensureconsistency withtheproposedrevisiontoRegulatory Guide1.97.Itshouldbenotedthatthismeasurement capability isbasedonrecentplantdesigns.Forolderplantswithsmallerwatercapacities, licensees mayproposedeviations fromthisrequirement basedontheavailable watersupplycapability attheirplant.5.Thecontainment waterlevelindication shallbeinstalled byJanuary1,1981.RGSEResonsesRGSEwillinstallcontainment, waterlevelindication inconformance withtheStaffposition, except,that.thedepthmaynotbegreaterthanthatequivalent to500,000gallons.Themaximumcapacityoftherefueling waterstoragetank(338,000gal.)plusthereactorcoolantsystem(approximately 50,000gal.)plustheaccumulators (lessthan10,000gal.each)isconsiderably lessthan500,000gallons.

Section2.1.9-CONTAINNENT HYDROGENINDICATION POSITIONAcontinuous indication ofhydrogenconcentration inthecontainment atmosphere shallbeprovidedinthecontrolroom.measurement capability shallbeprovidedovertherangeof0to10~hydrogenconcentration underbothpositiveandnegativeambientpressure.

CLARIFICATION 1.Thecontainment hydrogenindication shallmeetthedesignprovisions ofRegulatory Guide1.97including qualification, redundancy, andtestability.

2.Thecontainment hydrogenindication shallbeinstalled byJanuary1,1981.RG&Eintendstoinstallcontainment hydrogenindication instrumenta-tioninconformance withtheStaffposition.

IC~~

Section2.1.9-REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMVENTINGPOSITIONEachapplicant andlicenseeshallinstallreactorcoolantsystemandreactorvesselheadhighpointventsremotelyoperatedfromthecontrolroom.Sincetheseventsformapartofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary, thedesignoftheventsshallconformtotherequirements ofAppendixAto10CFRPart50GeneralDesignCriteria.

Inparticular, theseventsshallbe.safetygrade,andshallsatisfythesinglefailurecriterion andtherequirements ofIEEE-279inordertoensurealowprobability ofinadvertent actuation.

Eachapplication andlicenseeshallprovidethefollowing information concerning thedesignandoperation ofthesehighpointvents:Adescription oftheconstruction,

location, size,andpowersupplyfortheventsalongwithresultsofanalysesofloss-of-coolant accidents initiated byabreakintheventpipe.Theresultsoftheanalysesshouldbedemon-stratedtobeacceptable inaccordance withtheacceptance criteriaof10CFR50.46.2.Analysesdemonstrating thatthedirectventingofnoncondensable gaseswithperhapshighhydrogenconcentrations doesnotresultinviolation ofcom-bustiblegasconcentration limitsincontainment asdescribed in10CFRPart50.44,Regulatory Guide1.7(Rev.1),andStandardReviewPlanSection'.2.5.3.Procedural guidelines fortheoperators'se ofthevents.Theinformation available totheoperatorforinitiating orterminating ventusageshallbediscussed.

CLARIFICATION A.GeneralThetwoimportant safetyfunctions enhancedbythisventingcapability're corecoolingandcontainment integrity.

Foreventswithinthepresentdesignbasisfornuclearpowerplants,thecapability toventnon-condensible gaseswillprovideadditional assurance ofmeetingtherequirements of10CFR50.46 (LOCAcriteria) and10CFR50.44 (containment criteriaforhydrogengeneration).

Foreventsbeyondthepresentdesignbasis,thisventingcapability willsubstantially increasetheplant'sability-todealwithlargequantities ofnoncondensible gaswithoutthelossofcorecoolingorcontainment integrity.

2.Procedures addressing theuseoftheRCSventsarerequiredbyJanuary1,1981.Theprocedures shoulddefinetheconditions underwhichtheventsshouldbeusedaswellastheconditions underwhichtheventsshouldnotbeused.Theprocedures shouldbebasedonthefollowing criteria:

(1)assurance thattheplantcanmeettherequirements of10CFR50.46 and10CFR50.44 forDesignBasisAccidents; and(2)asub'stantial increaseintheplant'abilitytomaintaincorecoolingandcontainment integrity foreventsbeyondtheDesignBasis.

Jl~~

B.BWRDesignConsiderations 1.SincetheBWRownersgrouphassuggested thatthepresentBWRdesignsinherentcapability ofventing,thisquestionrelatestothecapa-bilityofexistingsystems.TheabilityofthesesystemstoventtheRCSofnoncondensible gasmustbedemonstrated.

Inadditiontheabilityofthesesystemstomeetthesamerequirements asthePWRventsystemsmustbedocumented.

Sincethereareimportant dif-ferencesamongBWR's,eachlicenseeshouldaddressthespecificdesignfeaturesofhisplant.2.Inadditiontoreactor.coolantsystemventing,eachBWRlicenseeshouldaddresstheabilitytoventothersystemssuchastheisola-tioncondenser, whichmayberequiredtomaintainadequatecorecool-ing.Iftheproduction ofalargeamountofnoncondensible gaswouldcausethelossoffunctionofsuchasystem,remoteventingofthatsystemisrequired.

Thequalifications ofsuchaventingsystemshouldbethesameasthatrequiredforPWRventingsystems'.

PWRVentDesignConsiderations Thelocations forPWRVentsareasfollows:a.EachPWRlicenseeshouldprovidethecapability toventthereactorvesselhead.b.Thereactorvesselheadventshouldbecapableofventingnon-condensible gasfromthereactorvesselhotlegs(totheeleva-tionofthetopoftheoutletnozzle)andcoldlegs(throughheadjetsandotherleakagepaths).Additional ventingcapability isrequiredforthoseportionsofeachhotlegwhichcannotbeventedthroughthereactorvesselheadvent.TheNRCrecognizes thatitisimpractical toventeachofthemanythousands oftubesinaU-tubesteamgenerator.

However,webelievethataprocedure canbedeveloped whichassuresthatsufficient liquidorsteamcanentertheU-tuberegionsothatdecayheatcanbeeffectively removedfromthereactorcoolantsystem.Suchaprocedure isrequiredbyJanuary1981.c.Ventingofthepressurizer isrequiredtoassureitsavailability forsystempressureandvolumecontrol.Theseareimportant considerations especially duringnaturalcirculation.

2.Thesizeofthereactorcoolantventsisnotacriticalissue.Thedesiredventingcapability canbeachievedwithventsinafairlylargerangeofsizes.Thecriteriaforsizingaventcanbedeveloped inseveralways.Oneapproach, whichweconsiderreasonable, istospecifyavolumeofnoncondensible gastobeventedandaventingtimei.e.,aventcapableofventingagasvolumeof1/2theRCSinonehour.Othercriteriaandengineering approaches should,becon-sideredifdesired.

>)r~~~tP~

3.Wherepractical theRCSventsshouldbekeptsmallerthanthesizecorresponding tothedefinition ofaLOCA(10CFR50AppendixA).Thiswillminimizethechallenges totheECCSsincetheinadvertent open-ingofaventsmallerthantheLOCAdefinition wouldnotrequireECCSactuation althoughitmayresultinleakagebeyondTechnical Speci-ficationLimits.OnPWRstheuseofneworexistingvalveswhicharelargerthantheLOCAdefinition willrequiretheadditionofablockvalvewhichcanbeclosedremotelytoterminate theLOCAresulting fromtheinadvertent openingofthevent.4.Anindication ofvalvepositionshouldbeprovidedinthecontrolroom.5.Eachventshouldberemotelyoperablefromthecontrolroom.6.Eachventshouldbeseismically qualified.

7.Therequirements forasafetygradesystemisthesameasthesafetygraderequirement onotherShortTermLessonsLearneditems,thatis,itshouldhavethesamequalifications aswereacceptedforthereactorprotection systemwhentheplantwaslicensed.

Theexception tothisrequirement isthatwedonotrequireredundant valvesateachventinglocation.

Eachventmusthaveitspowersuppliedfromanemergency bus.Adegreeofredundancy shouldbeprovidedbypoweringdifferent ventsfromdifferent emergency buses.8.Forsystemswhereablockvalveisrequired, theblockvalveshouldhavethesamequalifications asthevent.9.SincetheRCSventsystemwillbepartofthereactorcoolantsystemsboundary, effortsshouldbemadetominimizetheprobability ofaninadvertent actuation ofthesystem.Removingpowerfromtheventsisonestepinthedirection.

Otherstepsarealsoencouraged.

10.Sincethegeneration oflargequantities ofnoncondensible gascouldbeassociated withsubstantial coredamage,ventingtoatmosphere isunacceptable becauseoftheassociated releasedradioactivity.

Ventingintocontainment istheonlypresently available alternative..

Withincontainment thoseareaswhichprovidegoodmixingwithcontainment airarepreferred.

Inaddition, areaswhichprovideformaximumcoolingoftheventedgasarepreferred.

Therefore theselection ofalocationforventingshouldtakeadvantage ofexistingventilation andheatremovalsystemsll.Theinadvertent openingofanRCSventmustbeaddressed.

ForventssmallerthantheLOCAdefinition, leakagedetection mustbesufficient toidentifytheleaka'ge.

ForventslargerthantheLOCAdefinition, ananalysisisrequiredtodemonstrate compliance with10CFR50.46.

RG&EResonseWeareplanningtoinstallreactorcoolantsystemandreactorvesselheadhighpoint,ventsinaccordance withthestaff'srequirements.

WeintendtosubmitthedesigndetailsbyJanuary1,1980;andhavetheventingsysteminstalled byJanuary1,1981asrequired.

Inordertomeettheinstallation datestaffapprovalofourdesignwillberequiredbyMarch1,1980.

~~4,)Section2.2.l.a-SHIFTSUPERVISOR RESPONSIBILITIES POSITIONS Thehighestlevelofcorporate management ofeachlicenseeshallissueandperiodically reissueamanagement directive thatemphasizes theprimarymanagement responsibility oftheShiftSupervisor forsafeopera-tionoftheplantunderallconditions onhisshiftandthatclearlyestablishes hiscommandduties.2.Plantprocedures shallbereviewedtoassurethattheduties,responsi-

bilities, andauthority oftheShiftSupervisor andcontrolroomoperators areproperlydefinedtoeffecttheestablishment ofadefinitelineofcommandandcleardelineation ofthecommanddecisionauthority oftheshiftsupervisor inthecontrolroomrelativetootherplantmanagement personnel.

Particular emphasisshallbeplacedonthefollowing:

a.Theresponsibility andauthority oftheShiftSupervisor shallbetomaintainthebroadestperspective ofoperational conditions affecting thesafetyoftheplantasamatterofhighestpriorityatalltimeswhenondutyinthecontrolroom.Theideashallbereinforced thattheShiftSupervisor shouldnotbecometotallyinvolvedinanysingleoperation intimesofemergency whenmultipleoperations arerequiredinthecontrolroom.b.TheShiftSupervisor, untilproperlyrelieved, shallremaininthecontrolroomatalltimesduringaccidentsituations todirecttheactivities ofcontrolroomoperators.

Personsauthorized torelievetheShiftSupervisor shallbespecified.

C.IftheShiftSupervisor istemporarily absentfromthecontrolroomduringroutineoperations, aleadcontrolroomoperatorshallbedesignated toassumethecontrolroomcommandfunction.

Thesetemporary duties,responsibilities, andauthority shallbeclearlyspecified.

3.TrainingprogramsforShiftSupervisors shallemphasize andreinforce theresponsibility forsafeoperation andthemanagement functiontheshiftsupervisor istoprovideforassuringsafety.4.Theadministrative dutiesoftheShiftSupervisor shallbereviewedbytheseniorofficerofeachutilityresponsiblie forplantoperations.

Administrative functions thatdetractfromoraresubordinate tothemanagement responsibility forassuringthesafeoperation oftheplantshallbedelegated tootheroperations personnel notondutyinthecontrolroom.CLARIFICATION Theattachment providesclarification totheaboveposition.

~4~SOAttachment Section2.2.1.A-SHIFTSUPERVISOR RESPONSIBILITY NUREG-0578 POSITIONPOSITIONNO.HighestLevelofCorporate Management (1.)Periodically Reissue(1.)Management Direction (1.)ProperlyDefined(2.0)UntilProperlyRelieved(2.B)Temporarily Absent(2.C)ControlRoomDefined(2.C)CLARIFICATION V.P.ForOperations AnnualReinforcement ofCompanyPolicyFormalDocumentation ofShiftPersonnel, AllPlantManagement, CopytoIERegion7DefinedinWritingin..aPlantProcedure FormalTransferofAuthority, ValidSROLicense,RecordedinPlantLogAnyAbsenceIncludesShiftSupervisor OfficeAdjacenttotheControlRoomDesignated (2.C)InAdministrative Procedures ClearlySpecified SROTrainingAdministrative Duties(4.)Administrative DutiesReviewed(4.)DefinedinAdministra-tiveProcedures Specified inANS3.1(Draft)Section5.2.1.8NotAffecting PlantSafetyOnSameIntervalasReinforcement:

i.e.,AnnualbyV.P.forOperations 51RGSEResonsesWewillcomplywiththestaffpositionandclarifications.

SeeourresponseofOctober17,1979.

52Section2.2.l.b-SHIFTTECHNICAL ADVISORPOSITIONEachlicenseeshallprovideanon-shifttechnical advisortotheshiftsuper-visor.Theshifttechnical advisormayservemorethanoneunitatamulti-unit siteifqualified toperformtheadvisorfunctionforthevariousunits.TheShiftTechnical Advisorshallhaveabachelor's degreeorequivalent inascientific orengineering discipline andhavereceivedspecifictrainingintheresponseandanalysisoftheplantfortransients andaccidents.

Theshifttechnical advisorshallalsoreceivetraininginplantdesignandlayout,including thecapabilities ofinstrumentation andcontrolsinthecontrolroom.Thelicenseeshallassignnormaldutiestotheshifttechnical advisorsthatpertaintotheengineering aspectsofassuringsafeoperations oftheplant,including thereviewandevaluation ofoperating experience.

DISCUSSION TheNRCLessonsLearnedTaskForcehasrecommended theuseofShiftTechnical Advisors(STA)asamethodofimmediately improving theplantoperation staff'scapabilities forresponsetooff-normal conditions andforevaluating operating experience.

Indefiningthecharacteristics oftheSTA,wehaveusedthetwoessential functions tobeprovidedbytheSTA.Theseareaccidentassessment andoperat-ingexperience assement.

AccidentAssessment TheSTAservingtheaccidentassessment functionmustbededicated tocon-cernforthesafetyoftheplant.TheSTA'sdutieswillbetodiagnoseoff-normaleventsandadvisetheshiftsupervisor.

ThedutiesoftheSTAshouldnotincludethemanipulation ofcontrolsorsupervision ofoperators.

TheSTAmustbeavailable, inthecontrolroom,within10minutesofbeingsum-moned.Thequalifications oftheSTAshouldincludecollegeleveleducation inengineering andsciencesubjectsaswellastraininginreactoroperations bothnormalandoff-normal.

Detailsregarding thesequalifications areprovidedinparagraphs A.l,2and3ofEnclosure 2toourSeptember 13,1979letter.Inaddition, theSTAservingtheaccidentassessment functionmustbecognizant oftheevaluations performed aspartoftheoperating experience assessment function.

0eratinEerienceAssessment Thepersonsservingtheoperating experience assessment functionmustbededicated toconcernforthesafetyoftheplant.Theirfunctionwillbetoevaluateplantoperations fromasafetypointofviewandshouldin-cludesuchassignments aslistedonpagesA-50andA-51ofNUREG-0578.

Theirqualifications areidentical tothosedescribed previously underaccidentassessment andcollectively thisgroupshouldprovidecompetence inalltechnical areasimportant tosafety.Itisdesirable thatthisfunctionbeperformed byonsitepersonnel.

CLARIFICATION Duetothesimilarity intherequirements fordedication tosafety,train-ingandonsitelocationandthedesirethattheaccidentassessment func-tionbeperformed bysomeonewhosenormaldutiesinvolvereviewofoperat-ingexperiences, ourpreferred positionisthatthesamepeopleperformtheaccidentandoperating experience assessment functions.

Theperformance ofthesetwofunctions maybesplitifitcanbedemonstrated thepersonsassignedtheaccidentassessment roleareaware,onacurrentbasis,oftheworkbeingdonebythosereviewing operating experience.

2.Toprovideassurance thattheSTAwillbededicated toconcernforthesafetyoftheplant,ourpositionhasbeenthatSTA'smusthaveaclearmeasureofindependence fromdutiesassociated withthecommercial opera-tionoftheplant.Thiswouldminimizepossibledistractions fromsafetyjudgments bythedemandsofcommercial operations.

Wehavedetermined that,whiledesirable, independence fromtheoperations staffoftheplantisnotnecessary toprovidethisassurance.

Itisnecessary, however,toclearlyemphasize thededication tosafetyassociated withtheSTApositionbothintheSTAjobdescription andinthepersonnel fillingthisposition.

Itisnotacceptable toassignaperson,whoisnormallytheimmediate supervisor oftheshiftsupervisor toSTAdutiesasdefinedherein.3.ItisourpositionthattheSTAshouldbeavailable within10minutesofbeingsummonedandtherefore shouldbeonsite.TheonsiteSTAmaybeinadutystatusforperiodsoftimelongerthanoneshift,andtherefore asleepatsometimes,ifthetenminuteavailability isassured.Itispreferable tolocatethosedoingtheoperating experience assessment on-site.Thedesiredexposuretotheoperating plantandcontactwiththeSTA(ifthesefunctions aretobesplit)maybeabletobeaccomplished byagroup,normallystationed offsite,withfrequentonsitepresence.

Wedonotintend,atthistime,tospecifyoradvocateaminimumtimeon-site.Theimplementation schedulefortheSTArequirements istohavetheSTAondutybyJanuary1,1980,andtohaveSTAs,whohaveallcompleted train-ingrequirements, ondutybyJanuary1,1981.Whileminimumtrainingrequirements havenotbeenspecified forJanuary1,1980,theSTAsondutybythattimeshouldenhancetheaccidentandoperating experience assess-mentfunctionattheplant.ResonseSeeourresponseofOctober17,1979.Additional information con-cerningourtrainingprogramwillbeprovidedbyJanuary1,1980.

Section2.2.1.c-SHIFTANDRELIEFTURNOVERPROCEDURES POSITIONThelicenseeshallreviewandreviseasnecessary theplantprocedure forshiftandreliefturnovertoassurethefollowing:

Achecklist shallbeprovidedfortheoncomingandoffgoingcontrolroomoperators andtheoncomingshiftsupervisor tocompleteandsign.Thefollowing items,asaminimum,shallbeincludedinthechecklist:

a.Assurance that,criticalplantparameters arewithinallowable limits(parameters andallowable limitsshallbelistedonthechecklist)

.b.Assurance oftheavailability andproperalignment ofallsystemsessential totheprevention andmitigation ofoperational transients andaccidents byacheckofthecontrolconsole(whattocheckandcriteriaforacceptance statusshallbeincludedonthechecklist).

2.c.Identification ofsystemsandcomponents thatareinadegradedmodeofoperation permitted bytheTechnical Specifications.

Forsuchsystemsandcomponents, thelengthoftimeinthedegradedmodeshallbecomparedwiththeTechnical Specifi-cationsactionstatement (thisshallberecordedasaseparateentryonthechecklist).

Checklist orlogsshallbeprovidedforcompletion bytheoffgoingandoncomingauxiliary operators andtechnicians.

Suchchecklists orlogsshallincludeanyequipment undermaintenance ortestthatbythemselves coulddegradeasystemcriticaltotheprevention andmitigation ofoperational transients andaccidents orinitiateoperational transients (whattocheckandcriteriaforacceptable statuswillbeincludedonthechecklist.

)3.Asystemshallbeestablished toevaluatetheeffectiveness oftheshiftandreliefturnoverprocedures (forexample,periodicindependent verification ofsystemalignments).

CLARIFICATION Noclarification provided.

RG&EResonsesWewillcomplywiththestaffpositionasdescribed inourresponseofOctober17,1979.

55Section2.2.2.a-CONTROLROONACCESSPOSITIONThelicenseeshallmakeprovisions forlimitingaccesstothecontrolroomtothoseindividuals responsible forthedirectoperation ofthenuclearpowerplant(e.g.,operations supervisor, shiftsupervisor, andcontrolroomoperators),

totechnical advisorswhomayberequested orrequiredtosupporttheoperation, andtopredesignated NRCpersonnel.

Provisions shallincludethefollowing:

1.Developandimplement anadministrative procedure thatestablishes theauthority andresponsibility ofthepersoninchargeofthecontrolroomtolimitaccess.Developandimplement procedures thatestablish aclearlineofauthority andresponsibility inthecontrolroomintheeventofanyemergency.

Thelineofsuccession forthepersoninchargeofthecontrolroomshallbeestablished andlimitedtopersonspossessing acurrentseniorreactoroperator's license.Theplanshallclearlydefinethelinesofcommunica-tionandauthority forplantmanagement personnel notindirectcommandofoperations, including thosewhoreporttostationsoutsideofthecontrolroom.CLARIFICATION Noclarification provided.

Wewillcomplywiththestaffpositionasdescribed inourresponseofOctober17,1979.

56Section2.2.2.b-ONSITETECHNICAL SUPPORTCENTERPOSITIONEachoperating nuclearpowerplantshallmaintainanonsitetechnical supportcenterseparatefromandincloseproximity tothecontrolroomthathasthecapability todisplayandtransmitplantstatustothoseindividuals whoareknowledgeable ofandresponsible forengineering andmanagement supportofreactoroperations intheeventofanaccident.

Thecentershallbehabitable tothesamedegreeasthecontrolroomforpostulated accidentconditions.

Thelicenseeshallrevisehisemergency plansasnecessary toincorporate theroleandlocationofthetechnical supportcenter.Recordsthatpertaintotheas-builtconditions andlayoutofstructures, systemsandcomponents shallbereadilyavailable topersonnel intheTSC.CLARIFICATION ByJanuary1,1980,eachlicenseeshouldmeetitemsA-Gthatfollow.Eachlicenseeisencouraged toprovideadditional upgrading oftheTSC(items2-10)assoonaspractical, butnolaterthanJanuary1,1981.A.Establish aTSCandprovideacompletedescription, B.Provideplansandprocedures forengineering/management supportandstaffingoftheTSC,C.Installdedicated communications betweentheTSCandthecontrolroom,nearsiteemergency operations center,andtheNRC,D.Providemonitoring (eitherportableorpermanent) forbothdirectradiation andairborneradioactive contaminants.

Themonitorsshouldprovidewarningiftheradiation levelsinthesupportcenterarereachingpotentially dangerous levels.Thelicenseeshoulddesignate actionlevelstodefinewhenprotective measuresshouldbetaken(suchasusingbreathing apparatus andpotassium iodidetablets,orevacua-tiontothecontrolroom),E.Assimulate orensureaccesstoTechnical Data,including thelicensee's bestefforttohavedirectdisplayofplantparameters, necessary forassessment intheTSC,F.Developprocedures forperforming thisaccidentassessment functionfromthecontrolroomshouldtheTSCbecomeuninhabitable, andSubmittotheNRCalongerrangeplanforupgrading theTSCtomeetallrequirements.

2.LocationItisrecommended thattheTSCbelocatedinclosep'roximity tothecontrolroomtoeasecommunications andaccesstotechnical information duringanemergency.

Thecentershouldbelocatedonsite,i.e.,withintheplantsecurityboundary.

ThegreaterthedistancefromtheCR,themoresophisticated andcompleteshouldbethecommunications andavailability oftechnical information.

Consideration shouldbegiventoproviding keyTSCpersonnel withameansforgainingaccesstothecontrolroom.

57Phsical'Size6StaffinTheTSCshouldbelargeenoughtohouse25persons,necessary engineering dataandinformation displays(TVmonitors, recorders, etc.).Eachlicenseeshouldspecifystaffinglevelsanddisciplines reporting totheTSCforemergencies ofvaryingseverity.

Activation Thecentershouldbeactivated inaccordance withthe"Alert"levelasdefinedintheNRCdocument"DraftEmergency ActionLevelGuidelines, NUREG-0610" datedSeptember, 1979,andcurrently outforpubliccomment.Instrumentation intheTSCshouldbecapableofproviding displaysofvitalplantparameters fromthetimetheaccidentbegan(t=0definedaseitherreactororturbinetrip).TheShiftTechnical Advisorshouldbeconsulted onthe"Notification ofUnusualEvent"however,theactivation oftheTSCisdiscretionary forthatclassofevent.Instrumentation Theinstrumentation tobelocatedintheTSCneednotmeetsafety-grade requirements butshouldbequalitatively comparable (asregardsaccuracyandreliability) tothatinthecontrolroom.TheTSCshouldhavethecapability toaccessanddisplayplantparameters independent fromactionsinthecontrolroom.Carefulconsideration shouldbegiventothedesignoftheinterface oftheTSCinstrumentation toassurethatadditionoftheTSCwillnotresultinanydegradation ofthecontrolroomorotherplantfunctions.

Instrumentation PowerSulThepowersupplytotheTSCinstrumentation neednotmeetsafety-grade requirements, butshouldbereliableandofaqualitycompatible withtheTSCinstrumentation requirements.

Toinsurecontinuity ofinformation attheTSC,thepowersupplyprovidedshouldbecontinuous oncetheTSCisactivated.

Consideration shouldbegiventoavoidlossofstoreddata(e.g.,plantcomputer) duetomomentary lossofpowerorswitching transients.

Ifthepowersupplyisprovidedfromaplantsafety-related powersource,carefulattention shouldbegiventoassurethatthecapa-bilityandreliability ofthesafety-related powersourceisnotdegradedasaresultofthismodification.

Technical DataEachlicenseeshouldestablish thetechnical datarequirements fortheTSC,keepinginmindtheaccidentassessment functionthathasbeenestablished forthosepersonsreporting totheTSCduringanemergency.

Asaminimum,data(historical inadditiontocurrentstatus)shouldbeavailable toper-mittheassessment of:

58PlantSafetySystemsParameters for:ReactorCoolantSystemSecondary System(PHRs)ECCSSystemsFeedwater

&MakeupSystemsContainment In-PlantRadiological Parameters for:ReactorCoolantSystemrContainment EffluentTreatment ReleasePathsOffsiteRadiological Meteorology OffsiteRadiation LevelsDataTransmission Inadditiontoproviding adatatransmission linkbetweentheTSCandthecontrolroom,eachlicenseeshouldreviewcurrenttechnology asregardstransmission ofthoseparameters identified forTSCdisplay.Althoughthereisnotarequirement atthepresenttime,eachlicenseeshouldinvestigate thecapability totransmitplantdataoffsitetotheEmergency Operations Center,theNRC,thereactorvendor,etc.Structural InteritA.TheTSCneednotbedesignedtoseismicCategoryIrequirements.

Thecentershouldbewellbuiltinaccordance withsoundengineering practicewithdueconsideration totheeffectsofnaturalphenomena thatmayoccuratthesite.B.Sincethecenterneednotbedesignedtothesamestringent require-mentsastheControlRoom,eachlicenseeshouldprepareabackupplanforresponding toanemergency fromthecontrolroom.

59Thelicenseeshouldprovideprotection forthetechnical supportcenterpersonnel fromradiological hazardsincluding directradiation andairbornecontaminants asperGeneralDesignCriterion 19andSRP6.4.A.Licenseeshouldassurethatpersonnel insidethetechnical supportcenter(TSC)willnotreceivedosesinexcessofthosespecified inGDC19andSRP6.4(i.e.,5Remwholebodyand30Remtothethyroidforthedurationoftheaccident).

Hajorsourcesofradiation shouldbeconsidered.

/B.Permanent monitoring systemsshouldbeprovidedtocontinuously indicateradiation doseratesandairborneradioactivity concentrations insidetheTSC.Themonitoring systemsshouldincludelocalalarmstowarnpersonnel ofadverseconditions.

Procedures mustbeprovidedwhichwillspecifyappropriate protective actionstobetakenintheeventthathighdoseratesorairborneradioactive concentrations exist.C.Permanent ventilation systemswhichincludeparticulate andcharcoalfiltersshouldbeprovided.

Theventilation systemsneednotbequalified asESFsystems.ThedesignandtestingguidanceofRegulatory Guide1.52shouldbefollowedexceptthatthesystemsdonothavetoberedundant, seismic,instrumented inthecontrolroomorautomatically activated.

Inaddition, theHEPAfiltersneednotbetestedasspecified inRegulatory Guide1.52andtheHEPA'sdonothavetomeettheQArequirements ofAppendixBto10CFR50.However,sparepartsshouldbereadilyavailable andprocedures inplaceforreplacing failedcomponents duringanaccident.

Thesystemsshouldbedesignedtooperatefromtheemergency powersupply.D.Dosereduction measuressuchasbreathing apparatus andpotassium iodidetabletscannotbeusedasadesignbasisfortheTSCinlieuofventilation systemswithcharcoalfilters.However,potassium iodideandbreathing apparatus shouldbeavailable.

RG&EResonseThefollowing taskswillbeaccomplished byJanuary1,1980.Thoseitemsdescribing designofthefacilityapplytotheinterimTSC.Ourintentistoprovidetheequipment asdescribed, althoughchangesindesignmayberequiredasthedesignisfinalized.

A.AninterimTSCwillbeestablished andadescription provided.

B.C.Plansandprocedures forsupportandstaffingoftheTSCwillbecomplete.

TheTSCwillbemannedbydesignated-personnel.

Communications betweentheTSCandthecontrolroom,siteemergency operations centerandtheNRCwillbeestablished.

AtietotheTSCwiththeexistingdirectlinefromthecontrolroomtotheNRCwillbeinstalled.

Ahardwired D.intercomsystemwithamasterunitintheTSCandslaveunitsinthecontrolroom,emergency center,alternate emergency centerandtheoperations centerwillbein-stalled.TheTSCwillalsohavephonecommunications andportableradios.Aradiation monitorwillbeprovidedintheTSC.Inadditionportableairbornemonitorsarealreadyavail-ableintheplant.Guidelines willbeestablished asanaidforqualified personnel todecidewhenprotective measuresshouldbetaken.E.Tomeettheshort.termrequirements plantdatawillbemadeavailable intheTSCbymeansofadatalinkterminal.

Avideosystemcapableofscanningthecontrolboardisbeinginvestigated.

F.Procedures tousethecontrolroomasabackupTSCwillbedeveloped.

G.Plansforourpermanent TSCwillbeprovided.

Designdetailsgiveninitems2through10applytothepermanent TSC.Ourintent,istoprovideafacilitywiththefeaturesdescribed belowalthoughchangesmaybemadeasthedesignprogresses.

Asnotedin1.Gabove,adescription ofourlongerrangeplanswillbesubmitted byJanuary1,1980.2.TheTSCwillbeonsitewithameansforgainingaccesstothecontrolroom.Procedures arebeingpreparedtodirectstafftotheTSCforemergencies ofvaryingseverity.

Thedesignofthepermanent, TSCisnot,completebutit,willbecapableofhousingapproxi-mately25peopleandtheequipment.

necessary toassesstheemergency situation.

Guidelines foractivation oftheTSCarebeingpreparedwhicharebaseduponspecificplantconditions.

Theguidelines arenotinconsistent withthe"Alert"levelasdefinedinNUREG-0610.

Vitalplantparameters fortheperiodfromthebeginning oftheeventuntilactivation oftheTSCwillberecoverable intheTSC.5.6.Instrumentation tobelocatedintheTSCwillbeofgoodqualityandwillbecapableofdisplaying information independent fromactionsinthecontrolroom.Thecontrolroomandotherplant.functions willnotbedegradedbytheTSC.Anuninterruptable powersupplywillbeprovidedforTSCinstru-mentation whichisindependent fromexistingemergency powersupplies.

(~~~5.-i~a<.

617.Technical datareguirements fortheTSCwillbeestablished whichpermitassessment.

oftheplantsafety.systemsandin-plantandoffsiteradiological conditions listedabove.8.Thetechnology best,suitedtomeetthereguirements fortheTSCwillbeimplemented, however,RGSEalwaystriestoremainflexibletomeeteverchangingrequirements.

9.TheTSCwillbedesignedandbuiltinaccordance withsoundengineering practice.

10.A.Wewillprovideappropriate radiological protection forthetechnical supportcenterpersonnel sothat.doselimitations

.sp'ecified inGDC19andSRP6.4willnot,beexceeded.

Weexpecttofulfillthisobjective utilizing acombination ofaninstalled HVACsystem,radiation shielding andadministrative dosecontrolmeasures.

je62Permanent monitoring systemsandprocedures willbepro-videdtomeetthisrequirement.

Aventilation systemwhichmeetsthisrequirement willbeinstalled.

Breathing apparatus andpotassium iodidewillbeavail-ablebutitwillnotbeusedasadesignbasisfortheTSC.

~4/~63Section2.2.2.c-ONSITEOPERATIONAL SUPPORTCENTERPOSITIONAnareatobedesignated astheonsiteoperational supportcentershallbeestablished.

Itshallbeseparatefromthecontrolroomandshallbetheplacetowhichtheoperations supportpersonnel willreportinanemergency situation.

Communications withthecontrolroomshallbeprovided.

Theemergency planshallberevisedtoreflecttheexistence ofthecenterandtoestablish themethodsandlinesofcommunication andmanagement.

CLARIFICATION Noclarification provided.

Wewillcomplywiththestaffposition.

SeeourresponseofOctober17,1979.

C~V'I