ML20065G014

Response to NRC Generic Request for Addl Info Re NUREG-0612,Control of Heavy Loads

ML20065G014
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	09/30/1982
From:	PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
To:
Shared Package
ML20065F994	List: ML20065F990 ML20065G014
References
REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8210010470
Download: ML20065G014 (125)

Text

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DOCKET NOS.: 50-443 50-444

'O SEABROOK STATION RESPONSE TO NRC GENERIC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

! RELATING TO NUREG - 0612

" CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS" lO

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SEABROOK STATION PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SEABROOK, NEW HAMPSHIRE O

iN S$$$d OS$835 SEPTEMBER 1982

DOCKET NOS.: 50-443 '

50-444 O

SEABROOK STATION RESPONSE TO NRC GENERIC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATING TO i

NUREG - 0612

" CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS" O

=w SEABROOK STATION PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SEABROOK, NEW HAMPSHIRE O

SEPTEMBER 1982

TABLE OF_ CONTENTS TAB

1. INTRODUCTION

2. NRC LETTER OF REQUEST

3.

SUMMARY

4. RESPONSE TO SECTION 2.1 (ENCLOSURE 3)

General Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems

5. RESPONSE TO SECTION 2.2 (ENCLOSURE 3)

Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in the Vicinity of Fuel Storage Pools

6. RESPONSE TO SECTION 2.3 (ENCLOSURE 3)

Specific Requiiements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in the Containment

7. RESPONSE TO SECTION 2.4 (ENCLOSURE 3)

Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in Plant Areas Containing Equipment Required for Reactor Shutdown, Core Decay Heat Removal, or Spent Fuel Pool Cooling.

8. TABLES l

Table 4-1 Tabulation of Heavy Loads Table 7-1 Load / Impact Area Matrices, Sheets 1 through 10.

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4 O TABLE OF CONTENTS TAB 9 APPENDICES

' Appendix I Analysis of RV Head Lifting Rig

! and Internals Lifting Rig (Special Lifting Devices) l Appendix II Method of Analysis of Plant Structures i

Appendix III Analysis of Filter Cask Lifting Device 10 ATTACHMENTS-Attachment A Conduit and Cable Tray Review i

Attachment B Piping Review Attachment C Safety-Related Equipment Review Attachment D HVAC Review

! 11 LOAD PATH DRAWINGS l

9763-F-805272 9763-F-805273 j 9763-F-805274

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9763-F-805275 9763-F-805276

, 9763-F-805277

, 9763-F-805278

' 9763-F-805279

9763-F-805280 9763-F-805281 ,

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,th (j 1. INTRODUCTION This report is in response to the NRC request for a review of the control of heavy loads at nuclear power plants, as contained in their letter dated December 22, 1980, and included herein in Section 2 for ease of reference. The report documents the results of a comprehensive review of the load handling operations at Seabrook Station and specific-ally addresses Enclosure 3 to the above ' trer, " Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads."

The information is presented in a request / response format which follows the same general format of Enclosure 3.

The above NRC letter requested that the report be submitted in two p parts:

! I Part 1 - Response to Section 2.1 of Enclosure 3.

Part II - Response to Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 of Enclosure 3.

Since the Seabrook Station is not yet operational, all the information requested is being provided in this one combined report without any reference to Part I or Part II.

1 For the purposes of this evaluation, a heavy load is defined in accord-ance with NUREC-0612, as a load whose weight is greater than the com-bined weight of a single spent fuel assembly and its handling tool, i.e.,

a load greater than 2000 pounds.

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2. NRC LETTER OF REQUEST l

l The generic letter which follows was sent to all licensees of Operating Plants and Applicants for Operating Licenses and Holders of Construction <

Permits, i

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[p' KEgIo, UNITED STATES

, ) 4.. t n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I,T ~ . i wAsWNGTON. D. C. 20555 V M! l 31981

%% ,,,,. fl Decemoer 22, 1980 TO ALL LICE!: SEES OF OPERATING PLANTS AND APPLICANTS FOR OPERATING LICENSES Af!D HOLDERS OF CONSTRUCTION PERMITS

• Gentlemen:

Subiect: Control of Heavy Loads In January 1978, the NRC published NUREG-0410 entitled, "!!RC Program for the Resolution of Generic Issues Related to Nuclear Power -Plants -

Report to Congress." As part of this program, the Task Action Plan for Unresolved Safety Issue Task No. A-36 " Control of Heavy Loads Near Scent Fuel," was issued.

He have comoleted our review of load handling operations at auclear power plants. A recort describing the results of this review has been issued as NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants -

Resolution of TAP A-36." This report contains several recommendations to be implemented by all licensees and applicants to ensure the safe O

v handling of heavy loads.

The ourcose of this letter is to reauest that vou review vour controls for the nanclinc of heavv loaos to determine the extent to wnich the guicelines of Enclosure 1 are cresentiv satisfied at vour facility, and to_identifv ne cnances and modifications that would be recuired in orcer to fully satisfy these ouicelines.

To expedite your compliance with this request, we have enclosed the folicwing:

NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at '!uclear Power Plants" (Enclosure 1).

Staff Position - Interim Actions for Control of Heavy Loads (Enclosure 2).

Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads (Enclosure 3).

• N1tn tne excection of licensees for Indian Point 2 and 3, Zion 1 and 2 and Three Mile Island 1 (These were creviously sent a letter)

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December 22, 1980 O

You are recuested to imolement the interim actions described in Enclosure 2 as soon as cossible out no later than 90 davs from the date of this letter.

In order to enable the NRC to determine whether operating licenses should be modified (10 CFR 50.54(f)), operating reactor licensees are reauested to orovide the following:

1. Submit a recort documentine the results of vour review and the recuired chances anc modifications. This report should incluoe the information identified in Sections 2.1 threugh 2.4 of Enclosure 3, on how the guidelines of NUREG-0612 will be satisfied. This report should be submitted in two parts according to the following schedule:

Submit the Section 2.1 information within six 1

montns from the date of this letter.

Submit the Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.a information within nine months.

2. Furnish c nfirmation within six months that imolementation of those chances and modifications you find are necessary will

(. commence as soon as cossible without waiting on staff review, so that all sucn enanges, beyond the above interim actions, l will be comoleted within two years of submittal of Section 2.4 for the above recort.

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, 3. Furnish justification within six months for anv chances or modi'ications that would be recuired to fullv satisfy the ,

cuicelines of Enciosure 1 whicn you believe are not necessary.

-e :riteria in NUREG-0512 are also acclicable to a:plicants for ocerating i licenses. Such acclicants are exoected to provide the information I recuested by item 1 above and to meet the same schedule of implementation i as incicated in 2 above. Any item for which tne implementation date is orier . the excected date of issuance of an operating license will be consicered to be a prerequisite to obtaining that license.

.or any date that cannot be met, furnish a proposed revised date, justification for the delay, and any planned compensating safety actions during the interim.

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lO This reouest for information was approved by GAO under a blanket i

cler.rance number R0072 which expires November 30, 1983. Comments on burden and duplication may be directed to the U.S. General Accounting Office, Regulatory Reports Review, Room 5106, 441 G Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20548.

1 i Sincerely,

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T rrell G E'isenhut, Director

- Division o Licensing I

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Enclosures:

1. NUREG-0612

2. Staff Position

3. Request for Additional Information cc: w/o Enclosure (1)

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SUMMARY

A systematic evaluation of all load handling systems has been performed to determine the extent to which the guidelines of NUREG-0612 are satisfied for Seabrook Station. Since the princi-pal causes of load handling accidents reported in the past include operator errors, rigging failures, lack of adequate inspection and inadequate procedures, greater emphasis has been placed in these areas in assuring safe handling of the heavy loads. The crane operator training program and periodic inspection and'mainten- .

ance program for the cranes, monorail systems and lifting equip-ment will meet all applicable requirements outlined in NUREG-0612 and other standards such as ANSI B30.2, ANSI B30.9, ANSI B30.10, ANSI N14.6, ANSI B30.11, ANSI B30.16, 29 CFR Part 1910, and Occupa-

tional Safety and Health Administration standards. The load handling operations will be governed by approved procedures and safe load path drawings, as applicable.

A review of the plant general arrangement drawings indicates that, in general, either the cranes do not travel over spent fuel or s

j safety related equipment, or the reliability of the load handling system is enhanced by providing increased safety factors and increased inspection of the critical components. In some instances, redundancy and physical separation of the safety related equipment continues to maintain the safe shutdown and decay heat removal capabilities following a load drop.

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--lq s Analysis of the reactor vessel head lifting rig and the internals V

lifting rig to verify compliance with the applicable standards (ANSI N14.6-1978 and NUREG-0612) is being performed by Westinghouse.

'l The lifting devices for the spent fuel cask and the filter transfer cask have not yet been designed or selected. An evaluation of these special lifting devices will be provided at a later date, prior to any cask handling operations at the plant site.

Some floor slabs / plant structures, as identified in this report, are being analyzed for their load carrying capabilit des to ensure that.thay can withstand the postulated load drops without causing any damage to the safety related equipment. Pending the results of these analyses, it is considered that the intent of NUREG-0612 has been met in regard s- to assuring safe handling of the heavy loads at Seabrook Station.

1 (Once these analyses have been completed, overall conclusion of this evaluation will be reviewed again.)

Some exceptions have been taken to the requirements of NUREG 0612 and i

Enclosure 3 to the NRC letter; however, these exceptions do not re-duce the reliability of the load handling operations. Alternatives in lieu or literal compliance with these requirements are discussed to demonstrate their equivalene and/or adequacy.

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,, 4. RESPONSE TO SECTION 2.1 (ENCLOSURE 3)

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%) GENERAL REQUIREMEhTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS "NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.1, identifies several general guidelines related to the design and operation of overhead load-handling systems in the areas where the spent fuel is stored, in the vicinity of the reactor core, and in other areas of the plant where a load drop could result in damage to equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. Information provided in response to this section should identify the extent of potentially hazardous load-handling operations at a site and the extent of conformance to appropriate load-randling g tidance."

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,, REQUEST 2.1-1

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" Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to identify overhead handling systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks, technical specifications, operating procedures or detailed structural analysis)."

RESPONSE TO 2.1-1 The overhead load handling systems identified during our plant review are listed below along with their capacities and locations:

l TAG NO. HANDLING SYSTEM CAPACITY LOCATION MM-CR-3 Polar Gantry Crane 420 Ton Main Containment j}

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50 Ton Auxiliary P'l-RE-24

• Radial Arm Stud 2 Tons Containment Tensioner Hoists (3)

CS-CR-5 Filter Cask Monorail 4.5 Tons Primary Auxi-Holst liary Building CS-CR-6 Boric Acid Batching 4.5 Tons Primary Auxi-Monorail Hoist liary Building CS-CR-13 CVCS Heat Exchanger 3.5 Tons Primary Auxi-Service Monorail Hoist liary Building CS-CR-14A,14B & 14C* Charging Pump Service 2.5/2.5/6.0 Primary Auxi-Monorail Hoist T""" liary Building CC-CR-15A & ISB Component Cooling Water Pump 3 Tons Primary Auxi-Service Monorail Hoist liary Building CBS-CR-18A & 18B* Radioactive Pipe Tunnel 2 Tons Radioactive Service Monorail Hoist Pipe Tunnel MS-CR-25A & 25B* Main Steam and Feedwater 7.5 Tons MS and FW Pipe Pipe Chase Crane Chase A>

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RESPONSE 2.1-1 (Cont'd) 1 TAG No. Handling System CAPACITY LOCATION i

j W-CR-27 Emergency Feed Pump 4 Tons Emergency Feed-Monorail Hoist water Pump Building f DC-CR-28A & 28B* Diesel Generator 8 Tons Diesel Generator l Building i f . Service Crane i

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• These monorails and cranes are listed here for completeness only, and are not l 1,

j considered in detail'in this Section. The bases for their exclusion from  ;

! detailed evaluation are discussed in Section 7 of this report under  ;

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Response to Section 2.4 of Enclosure 3.

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V REQUEST 2.1-2

" Justify the exclusion of any overhead handling system from the above category by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation from any load-impact point and any safety related component to permit a deter-mination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal."

RESPONSE TO 2.1-2 The following load handling systems have been excluded from the abore category because no safety related systems or components required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal are located in the areas served by these overhead handling systems:

TAG NO. HANDLING SYSTEM CAPACITY LOCATION MM-CR-1 Turbine Building 210 Ton Main Turbine Crane 30 Ton Auxiliary Building MM-CR-2 Heater Bay Crane 100 Ton Main Turbine 15 Ton Auxiliary Building ES-CR-26 Generator Breaker 5.5 Tons Turbine Crane Puilding CO-CR-29A To 29X Condenser Water Box 4 Tons Turbine Monorail Hoist Building CW-CR-22 Circulating Water Stop 10 Tons Service apd Log Monorail Hoist CW Pump House CW-CR-23 Pump House Trash Removal 1 Ton Service and Basket Monorail Hoist CW Pump House PAH-CR-17 Ventilation Service 1 Ton Primary Auyl-Monorail Hoist liary Building WS-CR-7 Waste Process General 4 Tons Waste Processing Service 80 Monorail Hoist Building

[N/ ') WS-CR-8 Waste Process General Service 40 Monorail Hoist 4 Tons Waste Processing Building RS-CR- 12 Resin Sluice Service 2 Tons Waste Processing Monorail Hoist Building i

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TAG NO. HANDLING SYSTEM CAPACITY LOCATION WS-CR-4 Solid Waste Handling 30 Tons Waste Processing Crane Building FH-RE-1 Spent Fuel Cask 125 Ton Main Fuel Storage Handling Crane 2 Aux. Hooks Building 5 Ton each AAH-CR-20 Decontamination Service 5 Tons Administration Monorail Hoist and Service Building fbi-CR-30 RCA Shop Crane 5 Tons Administration &

Service Building In addition, the following systems are excluded from further consideration since they do not handle heavy loads. A " heavy load" is defined in accordance with Section 1.1 of NUREG-0612, i.e., a load whose weight is f)'s x_ greater than the combined weight of a single spent fuel assembly and its handling tool. (A load greater than 2000 pounds.)

TAG NO. HANDLING SYSTEM CAPACITY LOCATION FH-CR-33 Jib Crane 0.75 Tons Containment FH-RE-5 Manipulator Crane 1.5 Tons Containment Auxiliary Hoist Fil-RE-2 Spent Fuel Pool Bridge 2 Tons Fuel Storage and Hoist Building RH-CR-32 RHR, CS, SI Equipment 0.75 Tons Equipment Vault Vault Monorail Hoist (P.A.B.)

SW -CR-16 Service Water Strainer 1 Ton Outside Primary Monorail Holst Auxiliary Building o

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REQUEST 2.1-3

[O T "With respect to the design and operation of heavy-load-handling systems in the containment and the spent fuel pool area and those load-handling systems identified in 2.1-1, above, provide your evaluation concerning compliance with the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Section 5s1.1. The following specific information should be included in your reply:

(a) Drawings or sketches sufficient to clearly identify the location of safe load paths, spent fuel and safety-related equipment."

RESPONSE TO 2.1-3 (a)

The following drawings depict the safe travel paths for heavy loads which, if dropped, could impact the irradiated fuel or components 1n h)

J the systems required for shutdown or decay heat removal. .Also shown on these layout drawings are the locations of the safety related equip-ment and spent fuel, where applicable. To the maximum extent practic-able, handling of heavy loads over safety _ related equipment is avoided in identifying the safe load paths. Also, in defining these load paths consideration has been given to the safety related equipment located on lower elevations below the operating floor for the load handling system in question. Where safety related equipment is likely to be damaged by a load drop, adequacy of the intervening floor to sustain the load impact is being verified.

Drawing No. Title 9763-F-805272 Containment Building m Elev. 25'-0" t _

Safe Load Paths for Polar Crane (Sheet 1 of 6)

RESPONSE TO 2.1-3 (a) (Cont'd)

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Drawing No. Title 9763-F-805273 containment Building Elev. 25'-0" Safe Load Paths for Polar Crane (Sheet 2 of 6) 9763-F-805274 Containment Building Elev. 25'-0" Safe Load Paths for Polar Crane (Sheet 3 of 6) 9763-F -805275 Containment Building Elev. 25'-0" Safe Load Paths for Polar Crane (Sheet 4 of 6) 9763-F-805276 Containment Building Elev. 25'-0" Safe Load Paths for Polar Crane (Sheet 5 of 6)

/'~'N 9763-F-805277 Containment Building h Elev. 25'-0" Safe Load Paths for Polar Crane (Sheet 6 of 6) 9763-F-805279 Fuel Storage Building Elev. 25'-0" Safe Load raths for Cask Handling Crane 9763-F -605280 Primary Auxiliary Building Elev. 25'-Q" Safe Load Paths for Monorails 9763-F-805281 Primary Auxiliary Building Eley. 53'-0" Safe Load Paths for Monorails 9763-F-805278 Emergency Feedwater Pump Bldg.

Elev. 27'-0" Safe Load Paths for Monorails i

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I One of the requirements of Section 5.1.1 - (1) of NUREG 0612 is that- "These load paths should be c1carly marked on the floor in

, the area where the load is to be handled." PSNH, however, takes exception to this requirement due to the following considerations:

, The safe load. paths have been delineated on the drawings listed above. During the crane operator training program, emphasis

will be placed on the need to adhere to these safe load paths.

1 Again, these load paths will be thoroughly reviewed witF. the crane operators and other maintenance personnel prior to the commencement of any load handling operations. Heavy loads will be moved by the safest and shortest routes in accordance with the approved load handling procedures and the safe load path drawings.

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i Due to the number of paths and their configurations (particularly in the Containment), it is felt that marked load paths, in general, will not contribute to ensuring the safe handling of the heavy loads at Seabrook. Therefore, load paths will not be marked on the floor.

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REQUEST 2.1-3 (b)

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%d "A discussion of rneasures taken to ensure that load-handling operations remain within saf e load paths , including procedures , if any, for deviation from these paths."

RESPONSE TO 2.1-3 (b)

All heavy loads identified in response to Section 2.1-3 (c) (to follow) will be handled along the well defined safe load paths or within safe operating areas. The drawings showing safe load paths will be referenced

_n the applicable load handling procedures which form part of the over-all plant operation and maintenance procedures. Prior to starting any maintenance or refueling operations, the work crews will be instructed by the maintenance supervisor regarding tne procedure, and the travel (y

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) paths to be.followed by the heavy loads, and The load paths identified on the layout drawings follow the safest shortest routes with consideration given to maintaining safe distances from spent fuel and safe shutdown equipment. In general, a load will be moved as close to the floor as practical except to clear any equip-In addition, ment or other physical obstructions in the travel path.

appropriate notes of the precautionary nature are also included, as required, on the load path drawings. Any deviations from these safe load paths or written procedures governing the load handling operations will require the app oval of the Plant Operating Review Committee.

To summarize, loads will be handled along established safe load paths rx in accordance with the approved procedures by trained and experienced

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y udST 2.1-3 (c)

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V "A tabulation of heavy loads to be handled by each crane which includes the load identification, load weight, its designated lifting device and verification that the handling of such load is governed by a written procedure containing, as a minimum, the information identified in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 (2) ."

RESPONSE TO 2.1-3 (c)

Heavy loads that will be handled by the cranes end monorail-hoists identified in response to section 2.1-1, above, are listed in Table 4-1.

For each load handling system tabulated, the loads to be carried are included along with the estimated weight of the load, its designated lifting device, applicable load path drawing and the reference drawing /s.

v Also included for each load is the reference to the load handling procedure, i.e., whether a ' general' or ' specific' procedure will be prepared for a particular load. The procedures will be developed in accordance w';t Caction 5.1.1 (2) of NUREG-0612 and will be available prior to use of the load handling system. Finalized and approved procedures will be assigned identification numbers and the same will be incorporated in Table 4-1.

Each ' specific' procedure (See Table 4-1) will contain detailed step-by-step instructions for handling a particalar load including responsibility, identification of required equipment, safe rigging practices, safety precautions and reference to safe load paths. Wher2 a ' specific'

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procedure is not intended, a ' general' procedure (See Table 4-1) encompassing the above information will be developed to cover the handling of miscellaneous loads.

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i REQUEST 2.1-3 (d)

" Verification that lif ting devices identified in 2.1.3-C, ahnve, comply 1 with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978 or ANSI B 30.9-1971 as approp-riate. For lif ting devices where these standards, as supplemented by NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.1 (4) or 5.1.1 (5), are not met, describe any proposed alternatives and demonstrate their equivalency in terms of i ,

load-handling reliability."

t RESPONSE TO 2.1-3 (d)

The various lif ting devices employed in handling the heavy loads at Seabrook are identified in Table 4-1. Of these devices, the following are categorized as special lifting devices:

(i) Reactor. Vessel Head Lif ting Rig, Load Cell and Load Cell Linkage '

Assembly.

(ii) Internals Lif ting Rig, Load Cell and Load Cell Linkage Assembly.

(iii) Spent Fuel Cask Lifting Device (iV) Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Lif ting Slings i

(V) Filter Cask Lifting Device The head and internals lifting rigs and associated load cell and linkage assemblies are being evaluated by Westinghouse to verify compliance with the requirements of ANS1 N14.6 and NUREG 0612. Section 5.1.1 (4).

The results of this assessment will be included later in Appendix I.

The design of the spent fuel cask and lifting device has not yet been final-ized. A detailed review of the lif ting device will be performed to verify r

( ) RESPONSE TO 2.1-3 (d) (Cont'd) 8v compliance with ANSI N14.6-1978, once the cask design has been selected, and the results of the analysis will be provided to the NRC prior to any cask handling operations at the plant site.

The reactor coolant pump motor lifting slings will comply with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978 and NUREG-0612 Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.6. The design of the filter cask lifting device has not been finalized. An evaluation of this special 11fting device with regard to compliance with the above applicable standards will be appended to this report at a later date, and made available to the NRC prior to handling of the filter cask.

,_ All special lif ting devices will be subjected to periodic testing

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md inspection to verify continued compliance in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 of ANSI N14.6-1978 with the following clarifications / exceptions:

(a) The required tests or inspections will be performed prior to use of the lifting device if it is not used for a period exceeding one year.

(b) Where the usage frequency is more than once a year, the tests and inspections will be performed annually.

(c) Instead of the load test, dimensional testing, visual inspection and non-destructive examination will be performed as per Section 5.3.1 (2).

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(d) All special lifting devices will be visually inspected by maintenance personnel prior to each use instead of every three months (5.3.7) for indications of damage or deformation.

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The standard lifting devices (which are not specially designed)

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listed in Table 4-1, such as slings, shackles, etc. will meet the requirements of ANSI B30.9-1971 as supplemented by.Section i 5.1.1 (5), NUREG 0612. The standard lif ting devices used to carry i

heavy loads will maintain a minimum safety factor of five based l

l upon nominal breaking strength. Where the loads are handled over or near spent fuel and/or safety related equipment, a safety factor of 10 will be maintained as indicated on the load path drawings. In selecting the proper sling size, the rated load used will be the sum of the static and dynamic loads, the dynamic '

load being the greater of 15% of the static load or 0.5% of static load for each foot per minute of hook speed. PSNH takes bl

'\- no exceptions to the requirements of B30.9-1971 or Section 5.1.1(5).

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-REQUEST 2.'l-3 (e))

l " Verification that ANSI B30.2-1976 Chapter 2-2, has been invoked with I_ respect to crane inspection, testing and maintenance. Where any excep-1

! tion is taken to this standard, sufficient information should b'e provided i

to demonstrate the equivalency of proposed altarnatives."  :

RESPONSE TO 2.1-3 (e)

A crane inspection, testing and maintenan program will be developed and implemented in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 2-2

of ANSI B30.2-1976, as well as other applicable standards such as 4

Occupational Safety and Health Administration Standards, Section 179 of 29 CFR Part 1910, ANSI B30.9 (Slings) and ANSI B30.10 (Hooks).

Frequency of tests and inspections will be as per Section 5.1.1.(6) of NUREG 0612.

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.-y-g U REQUEST 2.1-3 (f)

" Verification that crane design complies with the guidelines of CMAA Specification 70 and Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, including the demonstration of equivalency of actual design requirements for instances where specific compliance with these standards is not pro-vided."

RESPONSE TO 2.1-3 (f)

Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge)

The polar gantry crane and the spent fuel cask handling crane have been designed in accordance with the guidelines of CMAA Specification

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No. 70 and ANSI B30.2-1967 Overhead and Gantry Cranes. At the time of

,- s. design and fabrication of both these cranes, ANSI standard B30.2-1976 was i  !

'-' not in existence. A comparison of design revisions of Chapter 2-1 from 1967 to 1976 edition and the review of United Engineers and Constructors crane specifications 9763.006-257-2 and 9763.006-257-3 indicates that the design of the cranes complies with the requirements of ANSI R10.2-1976.

Monorail Systems and Underhung Cranes The miscellaneous monorail-hoists and the two underhung cranes -- diesel generator service crane and main steam and feedwater pipe chase crane --

identified above in Table 4.1, are designed to the following applicable ANSI standards:

ANSI B30.ll Monorail Systems and Underhung Cranes

,-- ANSI B30.16 Overhead Hoists (Underhung)

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. i RESPONSE TO 2.1-3 (f) (Cont'd)

In addition, the design complies with the applicable specifications of Monorail Manuf acturers Association (MMA) and Hoist Manufacturers Institute (HMI). Since the applicable volumes of the overall general standard B30 for monorails and underhung cranes are B30.ll and B30.16, it is considered that the intent of the Request 2.1-3 (f) in regard to the design of these load handling systems has been met.

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REQUEST 2.1 (3) - (g) v

'txceptions , if any, taken to ANSI B30.2-1976 with respect to operator training, qualification and conduct."

RESPONSE TO 2.1-3 (g)

No exceptions are taken to the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976 in regard to qualification, training or conduct of crane operators.

The crane operators and signalmen will be trained in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 2-3 of B30.2-1976. A crane operator training and qualification program will be developed and implemented prior to fuel loading and start-up of the plant. This program will play an important role in assuring safe handling of the heavy loads at Seabrook.

O The crane operators .will be required to receive class-room instruction, and gain practical operating experience under the direction of other

, qualified operators, for each crane on which they are to become qualified.

In addition to a physical examination as per Section 2-3.1.2 (b) of B30.2-1976, .each operator trainee will be required to pass a written examination at the end of the formal instruction program. The practical training will continue until the trainee can demonstrate competent operation of the crane and pass the practical test. Proper training records doc-umenting this operator training will be kept at the plant site.

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() 5. Response to Section 2.2' (Enclosure 3)

Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in the Vicinity of Fuel Storace Pooln

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"NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.2, provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of stored, spent fuel. Information provided in response to this section should demon-l strate that adequate measures have been taken to insure that in this area, either the likelihood of a load drop uhich might damage spent

! fuel is extremely small, or that the estimated consequences of such a drop will not exceed the limits 4et by the evaluation criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, Criteria . thru III".

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REQUEST 2.2.1

" Identify by name, type, capacie' and equipment designator, any cranes physically capable (i.e. , ignoring interlocks, moveable mechanical stops, or operating procedures) of carrying loads which could, if dropped, land or fall into the spent fuel pool."

RESP 0NSE TO 2.2-1 There are no such cranes.

Both the spent fuel pool bridge and hoist, and the cask handling crane in the Fuel Storage Building are excluded, and the justification

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is provided below in Response 2.2-2.

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(x/ I Request 2.2-2

" Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads or are permanently prevented from movement of the hook centerline closer than 15 feet to the pool boundary, or by providing a suitable analysis demonstrating that for any failure mode, no heavy load can fall into the fuel - storage pool."

Response To 2.2-2 The following cranes are excluded from our response to 2.2-1, above:

EQUIPMENT NO. CRANE MANUFACTURER CAPACITY

_.s FH-RE- 2 Spent Fuel Pool Dwight Foote Inc. 2 Tons 1 Bridge and Hoist (Hoist by P&H)

[Q FH-RE-1 Spent Fuel Cask Whiting Corp. 125 Ton Main Handling Crane (5 Ton Hoists by P&H) 2 @ 5 Ton Aux.

1. Spent Fuel Pool Bridge and Hoist The spent fuel pool bridge and hoist does not handle heavy loads. The only loads carried by the hoist over the spent fuel pool are the fuel assemblies with or without control elements, and their associated handling tools. Therefore, this load handling system has not been included.

2. Spent Fuel Cask Handling Crane a

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() The cask handling crane is excluded because of its location in the Fuel Stortge Building relative to the spent fuel storage pool. The design of the layout of the cask loading pool, spent fuel storage area and cask storage and decontamination area eliminates the need to move the cask and other heavy loads over'the spent fuel. Since both the cask handling crane rails are outside the boundaries of the spent fuel storage pool--both i

rails are on the north side--it is physically impossible for any of the three hooks to travel over the spent fuel storage pool.

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. The cask loading pool is separated from the spent fuel storage area by a six foot thick reinforced concrete wall with a stainless steel liner on each side. An isolation gate is provided in the wall, with the lowest point of the gate opening being above the top of the fuel in the storage racks.

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( The steel gate is in the closed position whenever the spent fuel cask or other heavy loads are handled over the cask loading pool. Figure 5-1 shows approximate locations of the above areas and limits of travel of the l main and auxiliary hooks.

J In the extreme position of the trolley, the centerline of the 125 ton main

] hook is 10 feet away from the spent fuel storage pool boundary. The cask i

i design has not yet been finalized; however, use of the preliminary dimensions in the load drop analysis indicates that in the unlikely event of a cask 3

drop in the loading pool, integrity of the storage pool will not be breached nor would any damage occur to the stored spent fuel. A loss of spent fuel j storage pool water will be prevented by the isolation gate in the l wall.

D k,s) The centerline of the two 5 ton auxiliary hooks, in the extreme position of i

the halsts, cannot move closer than 8'-8" to the storage pool boundary.

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v The auxiliary hook number 1 is normally used to handle single fuel elements.

The new fuel containers, each weighing about 6,700 pounds, are normally handled by auxiliary hook number 2. The area in the Fuel Storage Building

. allocated to storage and handling of the new fuel containers eliminates the need to carry the containers near the spent fuel storage area or the cask loading pool. In the unlikely event of inadvertent carrying of~the new fuel containers near the spent fuel storage area and coincident failure of the load handling system, the container will fall in the cask loading pool only since the center of gravity of the load falls approximately 2'-8" from the outer edge (or 8'-8" from the inner edge) of the spent fuel storage pool wall.

PSNil takes exception, on the basis of plant specific design, to the 15 feet requirement for minimum distance of the hook centerline from the spent fuel pool boundary. The ten (10) feet separation presently allowed in the Seabrook Station design is more than sufficient, due to the physical layout, to ensure that the casic, if dropped, does not fall into the spent fuel storage pool or compromise its integrity. The limits imposed on the hook travel will again be reviewed, when the cask dimensions are finalized; and, if necessary, feasibility of moving the fixed mechanical stops to increase this distance will be examined.

4 The cask handling crane is not a seismic Category 1 component; however, in compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.29 the crane design parameters are specified to provide adequate quality control of fabrication and design so that in the event of an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) or Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE), the crane will not fail in such a manner as to impair the functioning of any plant feature designated as seismic Category I.

The crane is prevented from being dislodged off its rails during the SSE 4

by mechanical anti-derailing devices.

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J In addition, the cask handling crane includes the following safety features which contribute to the reliability of the load handling operations:

a) Dual Itmit switches, each of different design, are provided in series to stop the main and auxiliary hooks in their highest safe positions and prevent a "twc-blocking" incident. Limit switches are also provided to restrict the downward travel of the hooks.

b) Low or no voltage for any motion automatically stops the motion and sets brakes.

c) The drives for the bridge, trolleys and hoists are variable speed with an inching control on the main hoist. Controls for all motions

(~' are full magnetic, 5 step timed acceleration type. In addition, V} main hoist control includes magnet operated electric shoe type brakes to provide positive controlled speed regulation in both hoisting and lowering.

d) The hoist motor shaft is provided with two electrically released, spring actuated double shoe type DC load holding brakes each rated at 150 percent of motor full load torque, e) The crane is designed for a minimum safety factor of 5 in accordance j with CMAA Specification No. 70 and ANSI B30.2-1967. However, taking i into consideration the actual weight of the heaviest anticipated load handled, the factor of safety provided is expected to be more than

'~'\ five.

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• -- Furthermore, the spent fuel shipping cask or other heavy loads cannot travel over any safety related equipment. The spent fuel pool cooling equipment is located in a separate area in the Fuel Storage Building beyond the operating area of the cask handling crane. Although no credit is taken in the above discussion for safe load paths, load handling procedures and other technical specifications; it is, however, pointed out that the administrative controls, proper operator training, load paths and procedures will help ensure the safe handling of the heavy loads, with loads being maintained as far away from the spent fuel pool boundary and as close to the floor as practical.

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1 REQUEST 2.2-3 i

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" Identify any cranes listed in 2.2-1, above, which you have evaluated

. as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e. , complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Sectirn 5.1.6 l or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-j handling-system (i.e. , crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1."

i RESPONSE TO 2.2-3 j ,

! Refer to Response 2.2-1.

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() REQUEST 2.2-4 "For cranes identified in 2.2-1, above, not categorized according to 2.2-3, demonstrate that the criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied. Compliance with criterion IV will be demonstrated in res-ponse to Section 2.4 of this request. With respect to criteria I through III, provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane opera-tion in the spent fuel area and your determination of compliance. This response should include the following information for each crane."

RESPONSE TO 2.2-4 defer to Response 2.2-1. No cranes fall in this category.

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RESPONSE TO SECTION 2.3 (ENCLOSURE 3)

Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in the Containment "NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.3 provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-tundling systems in the vicinity of the reactor core. Information provided in response to this section should be sufficient to demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that in this area, either the likelihood of a load drop which might damage spent fuel is extremely small, or that the estimated consequences of such a drop will not exceed the limits set by the evaluation criteria of NUREG 0612, section 5.1, Criteria I through III."

[} REQUEST 2.3-1

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" Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any crancs physically capable (i.e., taking no credit for any interlocks or operating procedures) of carrying heavy loads over the reactor vessel."

RESPONSE TO 2.3-1 The following cranes and monorail-hoists can carry heavy loads over the reactor vessel:

EQUIPMENT NO. CRANE TYPE CAPACITY MM-CR-3 Polar Gantry Crane Revolving 420 Ton Main Overhead Bridge 50 Ton Aux.

FH-RE-24 Radial Arm Stud Monorail 2 Ton each Tensioner Hoists (3)

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m REQUEST 2.3-2

' " Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads, or are permanently prevented from the movement of any load either directly over the reactor vessel or to such a location where in the event of any load-handling system failure, the load may land in or on the reactor vessel."'

RESPONSE TO 2.3-2 4

The following load hand ling systems are not listed above in Response 2.3-1. The justification for their exclusion is provided below:

EQUIPMENT NO. CRANE TYPE CAPACITY -

FH-CR-33 Jib Crane Jib 0.75 tons FH-RE-5 Manipulator Crane Traveling 1.5 tons

- Auxiliary lloist Bridge and

, Hoist The jib crane is not capable of carrying heavy loads. It is used primarily to handle studs, and tools required to unbolt and remove the reactor vessel i

i head during refueling operations.

The manipulator crane auxiliary hoist handles only light loads such as control rod drive shaft, drive shaft unlatching tool, guide tube cover i

and cover handling tool. (The main hoist system is supplied with redundaat i

paths of load support such that failure of any one component will not result l in a drop of the fuel assembly).

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() REQdEST 2.3-3

" Identify any cranes listed in 2.3-1,above,which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load I

drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this

, evaluation (i.e, complete compliance with NUREG 0612, .Section 5.1.6, or ,

partial compliance supplemented'by suitable alternative or additional i

1 design features).. For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e.,' crane-load-combination) Information specifiedlIn Attachment I.

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RESPONSE TO 2.3-3

. The polar gantry crane has been evaluated as having sufficient design j

{ features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely.small. The

( basis selected for this evaluation is essential compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, supplemented by additional design f eatures.

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1. Rated Capacity Manufacturer Whiting Corporation Design Rated Load (DRL) 420 ton Main 50 ton Auxiliary Maximum Critical Load (MCL) 160 tons

2. Point-By-Point Comparison with NUREG 0554 The following evaluation is a point-by-point comparison of the design, fabrication, inspection, testing, and maintenance of the polar crane to the requirements delineated in NUREG 0554. Where the design features differ from those of NUREG 0554, they are presented along with an explanation to demonstrate their equivalency and/or ade~tacy.

Section 1. Introduction

[\s) Section 2. Specification and Design Criteria 2.1 Construction and Operating Periods _

Req uirenen t_: The allovable design stress limits for the crane intended for plant operation should be those indicated in Table

3. 3. 3.1. 3- 1 of CMAA specification No. 70 reflecting the appropriate duty cycle.

Actual: This requirement is met. The allowable stresses used in the design of the polar crane are as per CMAA Specification No. 70 for Class Al (Standby Service).

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- () 2.2 Maximum Critical Load (MCL)

Requirement: The Design Rated Load (DRL) should be at least 15%

greater than the Maximum Critical Load (MCL).

j Actual: The requirement is met. The DRL is 263% greater than the MCL, and is considered to be an important l

factor in proving the adequacy of the polar gantry crane.

I 2.3 Operating Environment Reauirement: The operating environment including minimum and maximum pressure, maximum rate of pressure increase, temperature, humidity and emergency corrosive or hazardous conditions should be specified as well as proper venting and drainage requirements to avoid collapse and standing water.

Actual: The crane design complies with this section of NUREG 0554.

\m / The following service conditions are specified in the Polar Crane Specification 9763-006-257-2:

Design Temperature, Minimum -200F Design Temperature, Maximum +1200F Temperature (accident conditions) 2960F Wind Loading 35 mph (while in operation) 110 mph (while not in use)

Pressure (normal operation) Atmospheric to 15.7 psia Pressure (accident conditions) 52 psig Pressure (pressure test) 60 psig Pressure Change 4 psi /sec Relative Humidity 30-100%

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V Radiation Dose 50 mR/ Hour Aqueous Spray

• pH 8.0-10.5 Boron (calculated as beric 4 w%

acid)

Sodium Hydroxide 1.75 w%

All enclosed portions of the crane equipment have positive openings to the environment.

2.4 Material Propertica Requirement: Materials for structural members essential to structural integrity should be tested for brittle fracture per ASTM E-208 (Drop Weight Test) or ASTM A-370 (Cherpy Test).

Minimum operating temperatures based on drop weight test should be obtained from paragraph NC 2300 of Section III O)

's or for Charpy test from paragraph ND 2300 of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

OR Cold-proof load test should be performed.

Actual: Material testing for brittle fracture was in accordance with the above requirements. Load bearing members of cranes including weld metal and bolting whose failure could damage components were impact tested in conformance with United Engineers Specification No. 9763-MPS-2 including the following:

Impact testing shall be performed in accordance with ASME Section VIII Division II, Article M-2 (including exemptions) as modified below:

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(a) Testing is not required for material thickness of P

5/8" or less.-

(b)- Testing is not required.for all thicknesses of material for pipe, tube, fittings, pumps and valves with a nominal pipe size of 6" diameter or less.

(c) Testing of support and crane welds when required shall be performed as required by Article T-2 as specified for Category B joints.

(d) Impact testing of materials for cranes shall be conducted at 30 F below the lowest service tempera-ture.

(e) The lateral expansion value in Table AM 211.1 shall be 0.025" in lieu of 0.015".

2. 5 Seismic Design Requirement: Grane should be designed to retain load during an SSE; and the bridge and trolley should remain on their respective runways with wheels prevented from leaving the tracks.

Design should also be in accordance with regulatory position 2 of Reg. Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification.

Actual: Although the polar crane is not classified as Seismic Category I equipment, the design does include consideration of Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE). The dynamic forces resulting from SSE and OBE accelerations corresponding to the response spectra for the containment operating floor were considered in the modal seismic analysis of the crane load bearing D

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J elements. The dynamic analysis was performed in

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\- accordance with the procedures stipulated in United ,

Engineers Specification-9763-SD-257-2. .The analysis assumed that the crane and trolley were both in the parked position and that the crane was unloaded. Due to

, the infrequent use anticipated for this crane, the combined probability of-the event involving a heavy load lift and the occurrence of an SSE is expected to be extremely low. Therefore, this assumption is considered to be valid.

The crane design and construction is in accordance with regulatory position C2 of Reg. Guide 1.29, i.e., the crane will not fail in such.a manner as to damage safety i

\.~~/ related equipment or in any way prevent the performance of their safety function in the event of a seismic event equal to SSE. The bridge and trolley are equipped with earthquake restraints (up-kick lugs) which are deafgned to prevent the crane from overturning and leaving the rails during an SSE.

! 2.6 Lamellar Tearing i

Requirement: All weld joints whose failure could result in the drop of a critical load, and the base metal at the joints susceptible to lamellar tearing should be non-destructively examined.

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Actual: These requirements are met. The polar crane _ specification 9763-006-257-2 required the crane supplier to perform radiographic examination on the cover plate splice welds in the tension members of the bridge girders in accordance 1

with the United Engineers Standard 9763-WS-3. All other welds were required to be examined by magnetic particle technique as per 9763-WS-3. All load bearing welds were specified to be full penetration type.

2.7 Structural Fatigue i

Requirement: Fatigue atalysis for the critical load bearing structures and components should be performed. The cumulative fatigue' usage factors should reflect effects of the cyclic loading from both the construction and operating periods.

Actual: Construction usage was ident).fied in the crane specification-9763-006-257- 4 and therefore was considered by the crane manuf acturer in. order to assure placement of the crane into the proper classification. The polar crane was designed in accordance with CMAA Specification No~. 70.

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The allowable stress range values for the polar crane are

, in accordance with Table 3.3.3.1.3-1 which takes into l

I consideration the number of loading cycles. The polar i

crane is classified as Al and meets the intent of Section j 2.7.

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]A) 2.8 Welding Procedures 1 Requirement: Preheat and postweld' heat treatment temperatures should be specified for all welds. Welds whose failure could result

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in the drop of a critical load should be postweld heat 4

treated per Subarticle 3.9 of AWS Dl.1, Structural Welding Code..

Actual: This requirement-is met. Welding was performed la accordance with United Engineers Specificat .on 9763-WS-3 which further makes reference to AWS Dl.1 a i the applicable standard for welding, welding procedure qualifications and welder per-formance qualifications. All welding procedures and, ..

qualifications were approved by United Engineers.

1 Section 3.0 Safety Features

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3.1 General 3.2_ Aurilicry Systems ,

Requirement: 1. Auxiliary hoisting systems cmployed to lift or assist in handling critical loads should be single-failure-proof.

2. The main hoisting mechanism should be provided with I

! redundant or dual components.

l Actual _: 1 & 2. The main and auxiliary hoists are not single-l failure proof; however, they have sufficient design features to guard against a load drop.

The hoists are equipped with dual upper limit j switches to prevent two-blocking. The heavy i

( loads identified in Table 4-1 do not exceed I

'~'i 50% of the rated capacity of the hoists, (Q

thereb y increasing the available safety factors to 10 or greater. The Preventive Maintenance and Inspection Program to be implemented for all cranes will reveal any deterioration of the lifting equipment and allow for repairs prior to component failure.

3.3 Electric Control Systems Requirement: Provide fail safe controls and lbmiting devices such that when dieorders due to inadvertent operator action, component malfunction or disarrangement of subsystem ,

control functions occur singly or in. combination during load handling, disorders will not prevent the handling system from stopping and holding the load. An emergency stop button sbould be added at the control station.

Actual: The cranc design complies with this requirement. The polar crane is controlled from either the cab or from-the operating floor by a push button pendant station. All push buttons and master switches are of the momentary contact or spring-return type. Release of the push button or switch automatically stops the motion and sets brakes and thus a positive operator action is required to initiate and sus-tain any crane motion. The controllers are equipped with start and stop buttons. The stop button may be used

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during an emergency to stop the crane, should it become necessary. In addition, an electrically operated main line circuit breaker is mounted within easy reach of the operator 3.4 Emergency-Repairs

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Requirement: Means should be provided for repairing, adjusting or

. replacing'the failed component or subsystem, when i

failure of an active component or subsystem has occurred and the load h supported and retained in the safe (temporary) position. Alternatively,'a means should be provided for safely transferring the immobilized hoisting

, system with its load to a safe laydawn area.

1 Actual: This requirement is met. Depending upon the failure',

t repairs can be unde in place while load is safely sus-pended in a temporary position, or load may be manually transferred to a safe laydown area that will accept the load while repairs are being made.

-- Section 4 Hoisting Machinery 4.1 Reeving System

. Requirement: 1. Dual reeving system each providing separate load balance on the head and load blocks through a configura-tion of ropes and rope equalizers, is required.

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2. Rope sizing should include effects of impact loads,

acceleration and emergency stops. Maximum loads (including static and inertia forces) on each individual wire rope in the dual reeving system with MCL attached, should not exceed 10% of the manuf acturer's published breaking strength.

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3 q 3. Maximun fleet angle from drum to lead sheave in the-

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load block or between individual sheaves should not '

er.ceed 3 1/2 at any one point during hoisting,ex-

! cept that for the last 3 feet of maximum. lift I i

elevation, the fleet angle may increase slightly. '

, The use of reverse bends should be limited.

4. The pitch diameter of running sheaves should be selected in accordance with CMAA Specification 70.

Actual: 1. The main hoist reeving system is a 2-rope system using dual drums and two separate ropes, each

<- reeved through upper and lower sheaves to an equalizer sheave and anchored to one drum. The reeving con-figuration consists of 32 parts (2 ropes x 16) of 1 1/4" diameter 6 x 37 IWRC extra improved plow m) steel wire rope.

l 2. The ropes have been sized to include effects of impact l

$ loading, acceleration and emergency stops. The maximum j i

load on each of the individual wire ropes in the

! reeving system, with the MCL attached, does not exceed

! 7% of the published breaking strength.

3. The reeving is designed such that the fleet angle 1

l relative to the drum or sheaves does not exeed 4.75 during any operating condition. As per Appendix C to NJREG 0612, Modification of Existing Cranes, larger v

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than recommended fleet angles have been accepted for

.; similar applications. The crane inspection and pre-

'ventive maintenance program to be implemented at Seabrook will assure the continued integrity of the wire ropes.

4. The polar crane has been designed in accordance with CMAA Specification 70. The pitch diameter of all

> running sheaves is 24 times the rope diameter.

The auxiliary hook is equipped with a single rope reeving system em ploying a single drum and 12 parts of 5/8" diameter 6 x 37 regular lay wire center rope. The i anticipated loads to be handled by this hook during i

1 plant operation are expected to provide' design safety i

factors of greater than 10.

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4.2 Drum Support i

j Rcquirement: The load hoisting drum should be provided with structural j and mechanical safety devices to limit the drop or the drum and thereby prevent it from disengaging from its holding brake system if the drum shaft or bearings were to fail or fracture.

Actual: Each of the two load hoisting drums is supported at each end by a roller bearing mounted in a pedestal, and is driven through a gear and pinion at one end. The crane design does not include any special retaining features to limit the excessive drop of the drum in the event of a shaf t or bearing failure. Therefore, depending upon the failure, the drum might disengage from the driving

(% pinion, or alternatively in the case of a small drop it may still remain partially engaged. However, this failure is not credible because of increased safety margins allowed in the design of the polar crane. By considering an MCL of 160 tons, the safety factor provided is 13.1 (or 11.4 if 15% allowance for the impact loading is added to the MCL).

4.3 Head and Load Blocks Requirement: 1. The load block assembly should be provided with two load-attaching points, each designed to support a load of three times the load being handled without permanent deformation.

2. The individual component parts of the hoisting system should each be designed for a static load of 200% of the MCL.

3. Each load-attaching point should be load tested at 200% of the MCL. Dimensional measurements of the hook configuration should be made, and NDE should be perfort.ed both before and after the test.

4. The load blocks should be non-destructively examined by surface and volumetric techniques, and the results shculd be documented.

Actual: 1. The crane is equipped with a single attachment sister hook (main) with a pin hole and safety latches. As j per Appendix C to NUREG 0612, a safety factor in excess of 10 (approximately 11.4 by allowing 15% for

the impact loading) is provided to compensate for loss of the single-failure-proof feature.

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2. The individual components of the vertical hoisting system are designed for a static load of 263% of the MCL.

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3. The main hook including pin hole was load tested in the shop at 150% of the design rating or about 395%

of the MCL. A longitudinal magnetic particle test and ultrasonic inspection were performed as per ,

above requirements. The load-attaching points were also subjected to a load test in the field in accordance with ANS1 B30.2 at about 328% of the McL.

4. The load blocks were examined by magnetic particle and ultrasonic inspection techniques during manufacture, in accordance with the polar crane specification and I',,T

's / other applicable standards. The results of the NDE have been documanted.

ine 50 ton auxiliary hook is of the single prong grpe and is equipped with a eafety latch. The increased safety fcctors provided for the auxiliary hoisting system enhance the reliability of the load hoisting system. The above load tests and NDE were also perform d on the auxiliary hook.

4.4 Hoisting Speed Requirement: Maximum hoisting speed for the critical load should be limited b that given in the ' slow' column of Figure 70-6 of CMAA Specification No. 70.

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1 Actual: The polar crane hoist speeds comply with the above 4 iN-requirement.

4.5 Design Against Two-Blocking

-Requirement: 1. Provide means within the reeving system located on the head or load block combinations to absorb or control the kinetic energy of 'rotsting machinery during a two-blocking incident. Ojt Provide two independent travel limit devices of different design and activ.ced by separate mechanical  :

means.

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2. The protective control system for load hang-up should consist of load cell systems in the drive train or motor current sensing devices or mechanical load t

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) limiting devices.

3. The auxiliary hoist, if supplied, should be equipped with two independent travel limit switches.

Actual

These requirements are met.

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1. The main hoist is equir, ped with dual upper limit switches to prevent two-blocking. One of the two load hoisting drums contain's a screw type limit j switch (which also limits the downward travel) in ,

! addition to a weight type limit switch which is l

directly actuated by the traveling load block.

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p__ 2. A load cell on the main hoist provides load

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\~ 'i indication in the cab and is equipped with an adjustment feature. The power supply to the hoist motor is interrupted at a preset load value.

3. The auxiliary hoist is provided with two independent travel limit swtiches.

4.6 Lifting Devices Requirement: The lifting devices that are attached to the load block should be conservatively designed with a dual or auxiliary device or combinations thereof. Each device should be designed to support a load of three times the load (static and dynamic) being handled without permanent deformation.

("'N, Actual: Refer to item 4 in this section un polar crane for a N -]

detailed evaluation of the lifting devices.

4.7 Wire Rope Protection Requirement: If side loads cannot be avoided, the reeving system should be equipped with a guard that would keep the wire rope properly located in the grooves on the drum.

Actual: The proper operator training and load handling procedures will assure that the significant side pulls are avoided under all circumstances.

4.8 Machinery Alignment Requirement: Where gear trains are interposed between the holding brakes and the hoisting drum, these gear trains should be of single failure proof design.

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Actual: The hoisting machinery is not equipped with single j failure proof or redundant gear trains. Depending l' _

l upon the failure, a single active component failure in the gear train between the holding brakes and the hoisting drum could render the train ineffective in transmitting power or holding the drum with the brakes-

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activated, liowever, increased factors of safety, of the order of 11.4 (based'upon MCL of 160 tons plus 15%

for dynamic loading) employed in the design of the gear.

case and other components will make such failures incredible.

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~~ 4.9 Hoist Braking System

( ,,/ Requirement: 1. The minimum hoist braking system should include one power control braking system and two holding brakes. Each holding brake should have a minimum capacity of 125% of the torque developed during the hoisting operation at the point of brake application.

2. The holding brake system should be single failure proof.

3. Provision for manual ~ operation of the hoisting brakes _ '

during emergency conditions should be included in the crane design.

Actual 1. Both the main and the auxiliary hoist are each equipped with a separate braking system which is comprised of an eddy current brake and two DC load holding brakes. Each holding brake is rated at 150% of the f motor full load torque.

2. One of the two holding brakes is directly applied to the motor shaft and the other with a time delay is (s.- designed to apply to an intermediate shaft in the gear train. Following a malfunction or failure of one brake, 4

the other independant brake is capable of holding the hoisting drums to eliminate the possibility of an accidental load drop. The interposing gear trains are discussed in 4.8, above. The brakes are automatically applied upon power interruption or in the event of an overspeed or overload condition.

3. The load can be manually lowered under emergency conditions.

Section 5 Bridge and Trolley 4

5.1 Braking Capacity Requirement: 1. The maximum torque capability of the driving motor and gear reducer for trolicy and bridge should not exceed the capability of the gear train and brakes i to stop the trolley or bridge from maximum speed

(

V with DRL attached.

2. Mechanical drag-type brakes should not be used to control movements of the bridge and trolley. Control and holding brakes should each be rated at 100% of maximum drive torque.

3. Brakes should be activated in the event of a power shut-off, malfunction in the power supply or an over-speed condition.

4. Opposite-drive wheels on bridge or trolley should be matched and have identical diameters.

5. Trolley and bridge speeds should be limited as per CMAA Specification No. 70.

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Actual: The braking system is generally in accordance with the above requirements; and also complies with the require-ments of CMAA Specification No. 70. Each bridge drive motor is equipped with a Whiting 6" solenoid brake type "SESA" '(Covered), designed for a minimum torque of 100% of the rated full load torque. The trolley brake provides_a minimum torque of 50% of the rated full load torque of the drive motor as per CMAA Spec. # 70.

Both the bridge and trolley brakes automatically apply torque and act as parking, fail-safe brakes upon loss of power or full release of the controller button.

Controls for all motions are specified to be full mag-netic,5 step, timed acceleration type, b 5.2 Safety Stops Requirements: Mechanical and/or electrical limiting devices shculd be provided to prevent over-travel or overspeed of the trolley and bridge.

Actual: The crane design complies with this requirement. Four (4) fixed mechanical stops are provided at the end of the trolley rails, and prevent overtravel of the trolley by coming in contact with spring bumpers attached to the trolley trucks. No stops are required for the revolving bridge.

Section 6 Drivers and Controls 6,1 Driver Selection Requirement: The maximum torque capability of the electric motor drive for hoisting should not exceed the rating or capability i (j of the individual components required to hoist the MCL at maximum design speed.

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() Actual: The electric drive motors were selected in accordance i

with the requirements established in CMAA Specification No. 70, and meet'the intent of this Section.

6.2 Driver Control Systems Requirement: If the crane is used to lift spent fuel assemblies,the 1 .

control system should be adaptable to include inter-4 locks that will prevent trolley and bridge movements while the load is being hoisted free of the reactor vessel or storage rack.

Actual: The polar gantry crane does not handle spent fuel assemblies.

6.3 Malfunction Protection

>0 4 \~ / Requirement: Means should be provided in the motor control circuits i

l to sense and respond to excessive current, excessive temperature, cverspeed,l overload and over-travel. Controls i should be provided to absorb the kinetic energy of the rotating machinery and stop the hoisting movement if one rope or one of the dual reeving systems should fail or

if an overloading or overspeed condition should occur.

Actual: The design of the motor control circuitry is in compliance with the above requirements; and includes necessary pro-tection features such as overload relays, overspeed switch, load sensing devices and under voltage protection.

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6.4 Slow Speed Drives Requirement: If jogging or plugging is to be used, the control cir-cuit should include features to prevent abrupt change in motion.

Actual: This requirement is met. Precision or inching drives are provided to reduce the main hoist speed to 2.4 inches per minute and the auxiliary hoist speed to 22.8 inches per minute. The normal or slow speed for either hoist can be selected from the " NORMAL-INCHING" sw itch located on the control panel in the cab or from a similar switch on the pendant station. The control system is considered-to be adequate to protect against an abrupt change in l motion. Also, the proper training program will stress the need to avoid any abrupt change in motio n which could cause. load swings.

6.5 ' Safety Devices

Requirement

l Safety devices such as limit switches provided for malfunction, fnadvertent operator action or failure should'be in addition to and separate from the limiting means or control devices provided for operation.

! Actual: The design of the polar crane complies with this require-ment. The travel limit switches as discussed in the preceding sections are separate from normal control functions provided for operation.

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/~'N o6. 6 Control Stations

} Requirement: The controls.for normal operation, and provisions for j emergency controls should preferably be located in a i

j. cab on the bridge. Additional operator stations, when provided, should have control systems similar to the

, main station. Electrical interlocks should be included so as to permit the crane operation from only one control' station at any one time.

4 Actual: The requirement is met.

The polar crane is equipped with two control stations, a j cab mounted on the underside of the bridge and a push-3 button pendant station. Both these stations have similar control functions with proper electrical interlocks c.

1 l per above re.quirements. Emergency operation is possible by manual controls for lowering and traversing the load.

Section 7 Installation Instructions 7.1 General Requirement: Installation instructions should be provided by the manu-facturer.

', Actual: The requirement is met. Complete instructions for unloading, extended storaga, erection and. testing of

'the polar crane were provided by the manufacturer.

i i- 7.2 Construction and Operating Periods Requirement: 1. The construction operating requirements should be defined separately. "

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[ .. - . - , . . . . . . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ - _ - . . - . - - . . . . . _ - . _ - . . .. - - .- - . _ - - - .

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2. At the end 'of the construction period, the crane

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should be modified as needed for the performance requirements of the plant operating service.

3. After construction use, the crane should be thoroughly inspected by NDE and load tested ~for the operating phase.

4.--NDE extent and acceptance criteria should be defined in the design specification.

5. If allowable stress limits are to be exceeded during construction, added inspection supplementing that described in Section 2.6 should be specified ant developed.

6. Durine and after installation of the crane, the proper assembly of electrical and structural com-ponents should be verified.

7. The integrity of control, operating and safety j systems should be verified.

i Actual: .The above requirements are met.

i 1. The operating requirements for the construction phase

!- were defined in'the polar crane spedification.

2. Modification of the polar crane is not required.

3. The polar crane will be thoroughly inspected, and j refurbished,1f necessary,to restore the crane to its t original new condition. The crane will be re-load t sted if major modification or repairs are required.

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4.. NDE extent and acceptance criteria were not defined in the crane specification for removal from con-struction phase to plant operation phase. These will be defined in a written procedure prior to use of the crane in the operation phase.

5. Allowable stress limits will not.be exceeded during the construction phase.

6. Proper assembly of electrical, structural and mechanical components was verified.

7. Integrity of control, operating, and safety systems j was verified during crane checkout and load test.

Section 8 Testing and Preventive Maintenance i 8.1 General l Requirem st: 1. Make a complete check of all mechanical and electrical systems of the crane before the tests.

2. Information concerning shop testing should be available at the plant site.

Actual: These requirements are met.

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1. All mechanical and electrical systems were thoroughly inspected and checked out prior to the field acceptance tests.

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2. In addition to required tests and inspection as per technical specifications, all hooks were load tested in the shop to 1.5 times the design rating. A longi-l tudinal magnetic particle test and ultrasonic inspection were performed on the hooks both before and after the load test. A no-load running test of all motors was conducted. The necessary documentation concerning

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these tes'ts is available in.QA files at the plant.

8.2 Static and Dynamic Load Tests

i. Requirement: A static load test at 125% of the maximum critical load (McL) should be performed. Full performance test with

-100% of the MCL including verification of the proper I functioning of all limiting and safety control devices should be conducted.

Actual: The polar crane complies with this requireneht A no-load and loaded running test for all crane motions using a test load equal'to 125% of the design rated load (DRL) was performed in accordance with ANSI B30.2.

8.3 Two- Block Test Requirement: 1. When equipped with an energy-controlling device between the load block and the head block, the com-

).. . plete hoisting machinery should be allowed to two-block. The test should be conducted at slow speed without load.

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2. Crane should be tested for load hangup.

) Actual: 1. Appendix C to NUREG 0612, allows the crane to be i

furnished with two independent travel limit switches in lieu of a design to withstand a two-blocking j incident. This alternative is selected for the polar I

l crane; and the proper functioning of the dual upper limit switches was verified during rated load test and operational tests.

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2. Interlock alternative as outlined in Appendix C

'is selected in lieu of load hang-up protection.

An overload sensing system is provided on the main hoist with read-out and adjustment in the control cab. In the event, the hoist load exceeds the set-point of the load sensing device, power supply to the hoist motor is interrupted, thus preventing over-loading of the hoisting machinery.

8.4 Operational Tests Requirement: Operational tests should be performed to verify the proper functioning of limit switches and other safety devices.

Actual: The requirement-is met. Inspection and operational V tests were performed in accordance with ANSI B30.2.

8.5 Maintenance Requirement: The critical load handling cranes should be continuously maintained above MCL capacity. The MCL should be clearly marked for each hoisting unit.

Actual: The polar crane as well as other crancs and monorails are subject to a periodic inspection and maintenance program as outlined in this report. The crane inspection, testing and maintenance program is considered an extremely important component in the overall safe load handling operations at Seabrook. The DRL is marked on the crane instead of MCL.

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Section 9 Operating Manual t,

) Requirement: Manufacturer should provide an operating manual for the Crane.

Actual: This requirement is met. Whiting Corporation provided a crane manual which contains information on checking, operating, and maintaining the polar crane.

Section 10 Quality Assurance Requirement: A quality assurance program should be established to the extent necessary to include recommendations of NUREG 0554 for the design, fabrication, installation, testing, and operation of the cranes. The applicable procurement documents should specify a quality assurance program consistent with the pertinent provisions of Regulatory r, - si Guide 1.28, " Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Design and Construction)".

Actual: A quality assurance program in accordance with the requirements of United Engineers Standard 9763-QAS-2, which applies to non-nuclear safety (NNS) class items, was specified for the polar crane. A quality assurance manual and written procedures such as welding procedures; welding procedure qualifications; heat treatment, NDE, test, inspection and cleaning procedures is a requirement of this standard. Under this program, material certifications or material test reports are required to satisfy code or speci-fication requirements. The procedures and documents contain appropriate quantitative or qualitative criteria for determining

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4 compliance with the applicable standards or specifications.

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Sufficient records are prepared as work is performed to furnish documentary evidence of the quality of item.

All fabrication, inspection, and test operations per-formed by Contractors and their %bcantra. n n.<t subject to surveillance by the Engineer and the owner.

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, . . . . - . . _ - . ~ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . ~ . . . _ _ - . . . _ . _ _ . . _ _ . , _ _ __. ._._._.____._. _ _ , , _ . _ _ _ _, . . - . _ - _ _ _ _ , . . . . _ , _ _ . . ~ . _ _ , ,

, 3. Seismic Analysis lI}-

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The crane is designed to remain in place during and after the seismic event. As described above under point-by-point comparison, both the bridge and trolley wheel trucks are equipped with anti-deratling devices which prevent the bridge and trolley from dis-engaging from their respective runway rails when the crane is subjected to seismic excitations. A general purpose computer program, ANSYS, was used to perform the modal dynamic analysis of the crane. A detailed description of the method of analysis and assumptions are given in Section RAI 220.23 (3.7(B).3) of the FSAR.

The mathematical model assumed the crane to be in a parked position at the tima of the seisuic event equivalent to SSE. Also, no I

s_ / lifted load was considered in the seismic analysis. This assumption is based upon the fact that the crane will not be in use for a great majority of the time during plant operation phase. The seismic occurrence at the time the crane is in use and carrying a heavy load, is considered to be a low probability event.

4. Lifting Devices An evaluation of the lifting devices for the polar crane with respect to the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6 is provided below:

(a) Standard Lifting Slings The standard lifting slings and associated fittings will meet the requirements of ANSI B30.9-1971. An allowance for dynamic p

d

, loading will be added to the static load as per Section V) 5.1.l(5) of NUREG 0612. Furthermore, in selecting the proper sling size, the load used will be twice the sum of the static and dynamic loads so derived; i.e., a safety factor of 10 or greater will be maintained in accordance with the requirements of Section 5.1.6.

(b) RV Head Lifting Rig, Load Cell and Load Cell Linkage Assembly Refer to Appendix I (Westinghouse Analysis).

(c) Spreader Assembly The spreader assembly is part of the RV head lifting rig and is used to handle reactor missile shield during refueling 7 operations. Analysis of the spreader assembly is included in Appendix I.

(d) Internals Lifting Rig, Load Cell and Load Cell Linkage Assembly Refer to Appendix I (Westinghouse Analysis).

(c) RC Pump Motor Lifting Slings The reactor coolant pump motor lifting slings will meet the requirements of applicable standards, ANSI N14.6-1978 as supplemented by NUREG-0612, Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.6.

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.. 5. Interfacing Lift Points k/ An evaluation of the attachment points for heavy loads with respect to the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6 follows:

(a) Reactor Vessel Head, Upper Internals and Lower Internals Refer to Appendix I, Analysis of Special Lifting Devices.

(b) RC Pump Motor Lifting Lugs The four lif ting lugs for the reactor coolant pump motor are designed with a safety factor of 6, based upon ultimate strer.;th.

In the event of a failure of a single lif t point, the load will be transferred to the other two points with the safety factor reduced to 3. Because of a four lift point system, the load is expected to be retained under these conditions..

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U (c) Neutron Shield Panels Each shield panel is provided with three lif ting lugs wi di a design safety factor of about 8 based upon ultimate strength. Failure of a single attachment point would result in an uncontrolled movement of the panel, but not necessarily a load drop. The safety factor is considered to be adequate since the load would be immediately set down and not moved until repairs are made to the failed lift point.

(d) Reactor Cavity Seal Ring The seal ring is equipped with twelve (12) 3/4" shoulder eye bolts for lif ting purposes which are equi-spaced along the circumference, with two bolts provided at each of the six locations. Failure of a

, -w, single eye bolt is not expected to disturb the static balance or result in a load drop.

(c) Reactor Missile Shield The three lifting lugs are designed with a safety factor of five (5) which is considered to be adequate to provide sufficient safety margin-against a load drop.

(f) Stud Tensioner The two stud tensioner lifting eyes have a safety factor of greater than 10.

(g) Equipnent Hatch Cover The equipment hatch cover is equipped with four lifting luga with a safety factor of about seven (7). Failure of a single lift point would result in transfer of the-load to two points with a reduction

. in safety factor by 50%. A load drop is, however, not expected to occur.

The above evaluation indicates that the polar crane is substantially in compliance with the guidelines of NUREG 0554, although some design features required by 0554 may not be present. This is further supplemented by the fact that the heavy loads anticipated during plant operation phase do not exceed half the hoist design capacities. The increased safaty factors, as a result, will contribute significantly to the overall reliability of the load handling systems in the Containment. In addition, the periodic-inspection and maintenance program to be developed and implemented in accordance with the applicable standards, coupled with a comprehensive operator training program, proper load handling procedures and load path (3

g j drawings will help assure the safe handling of the loads in this area.

6.

O h REQUEST 2.3-4 "For crenes identified in 2.3-1 above, not categorized according to 2.3-3,

'! demonstrate that the evaluation criteria of NUREG 0612 Section 5.1 are 4

satisfied. Compliance with Criterion IV will be domonstrated in your response l

to Section 2.4 of this report, With respect to Criteria I through Ill provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane operation in the contain-ment and your determination of compliance. This response should include the following information for each crane:

i

a. Where reliance is placed on the installation and use of. electrical interlocks or mechanical stops, indicate the circumstances under which these protective devices can be removed or bypassed and the administrative procedures invoked to ensure proper authorization of

() such action. Discuss any related or proposed technical specification concerning the bypassing of such interlocks,

b. Where reliance is placed on other site-specific considerations (e.g., refueling sequencing) provide present or proposed technical specifications and discuss administrative or physical controls provided to ensure the continued validity of such considerations,

c. Analyses performed to demonstrate compliance with Criteria I through III should conform with the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Appendix A.

Justify any exception taken to these guidelines, and provide the specific information requested in Attachment 2,3, or 4, as appropriate for each analysis performed.

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' RESPONSE TO 2.3-4 The only other crane which is not categorized according to 2.3-3 above, is the radial arm stud tensioner hoist. These three (3) stud tensioner hoists of 2 ton capacity each are, however, not evaluated as per this subsection.

These hoists are excluded because of the following reasons:

The stud tensioner hoists are used for removal and replacement of the reactor vessel head studs during refueling operations.

In normal operation, these hoists are not stored on the mono-rails attached to the underside of the head lifting device, and therefore do not pose any safety hazard. During refueling shutdowns, the hoists are suspended from the monorails and handle studs and stud tensioners. The heaviest load is the stud tensioner weighing about 2,500 pounds. Since these components are handled only when the head is.still covering the reactor vessel, no damage can be caused to the irradiated '

fuel or safety related equipment. When the head is removed'to its storage location, the stud tensioner hoists are also removed along with the head lifting device.

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7. RESPONSE TO SECT 10N'2.4 $NCLOSURE 3)'

Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in I Plant Areas Containing Equipment Required for Reactor Shutdown, Core Decay Heat Removal, or Spent Fuel Pool Cooling.

"NUREG 0612, Section 5'.'1.5, provides guidelines concerning the design-and operation of load-handling systems'in the vicinity of equipment or components required for safe reactor shutdown and decay heat removal.

Information provided in response to this section should be sufficient to demonstrate that adequate neasures have been taken to ensure that in these areas, either the likelihood of a load drop which might prevent safe reactor shutdown or prohibit continued decay heat removal is extremely small, or that damage to such equipment from load drops will be limited in order not to result in the loss of these safety related

. s (b m ,/ functions. Cranes which must be evaluated in this section have'been previously identified in your response to 2.1-1, and their loads in your response to 2.1 C" REQUEST 2.4-1

" Identify any cranes listed in 2.1-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carris, and the basis for this  ;

evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitabic alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling system (i.e. , crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1."

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() RESPONSE TO 2.4-1 The polar gantry crane las sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small. A detailed evaluation of the design,~ fabrication, installation, inspection, etc. of the polar crane appears in our response to Section 2.3. The cask handling crane and the stud tensioner hoists have been excluded for reasons l

given in the preceding sections. A comprehensive hazard evaluation of the remainder of the cranes listed in 2.1-1 is provided in this section. '

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REQUEST 2.4-2 "For any cranes identified in 2.1-1 not designated as single-failure proof in 2.4-1, a comprehensive hazard evaluation should be provided which includes the following information:

a. The presentation in a matrix format of all heavy loads and potential impact areas where damage might occur to safety-related equipment. Heavy loads identification should include designation and weight or cross-

reference to information provided in 2.1-3-C. Impact areas should be identified by construction zones and elevations or by some other method such that the impact area can be located on the plant general arrangement drawings. Figure 1 provides a typical matrix." i RESPONSE TO 2.4-2-a P

.The load / impact area matrices showing loads that will be handled by the crane or monorail-hoist and the potential impact areas are included a

in Table 7-1, Sheets 1 through 10.

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7s REQUEST 2.4-2-b

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For each interaction identified, indicate which of the load and impact area combinations can be eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment, nechanical stops and/or electrical inter-locks, or other site-specific considerations. EliminaCJon on the basis of the aforementioned considerations should be supplemented by the following specific inforn aulon:

(1) For load / target combinations eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment, discuss the basis for determining that load drops will not affect continued system operation (i.e., the ability of the system to perform its safety-related function).

(2) Where mechanical stops or electrical interlocks are to be

(._-) provided, present details showing the areas where crane travel will be prohibited. Additionally, provide a discussion con-cerning the procedures that are to be used for authorizing the bypassing of interlocks or removable stops, for verifying that interlocks are functional prior to crane use, and for verifying that interlocks are restored to operability after operations which require bypassing have been completed.

(3) Where load / target combinations are eliminated on the basis of other, site-specific considerations (e.g., maintenance sequencing), provide present and/or proposed technical specifi-catiens and discuss administrative procedures or physical con-straints invoked to ensure the continued validity of such 7-'S considerations.

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RESPONSE TO 2.4-2-b All load and impact area combinations for the following cranes have been eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment and other site specific considerations such as maintenance sequencing.

(i) Charging Pump Service Monorail Hoists (CS-CR-14A, 14B & 14C)

Three service hoists, each located in a separate room, are provided for maintenance of the charging pumps. A load drop can damage only a single pump which has already been taken out of service for repair or maintenance. Since normal plant shutdown can be accomplished with any one of the three charging pumps, a load drop in the event of a handling system failure cannot prevent the chemical and volume control system from performing its safety-related functions.

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(ii) Radioactive Pipe Tunnel Service Monorail Hoists (CBS-CR-18A & 18B)

A separate monorail-hoist is provided to service the sump isolation valve and associated encapsulation vessel in each of the two independent and fully redundant trains of the containment spray system. The two trains and monorail-hoists are separated by a 24-inch thick reinforced concrete wall.

In the unlikely event of a load drop in one area, the redundant system would remain functional. Therefore, a load drop will not result in the loss of safety functions of the containment spray system.

(iii) Main Steam and Feeduater Pipe Chase Cranes (MS-CR-25A & 25B)

These crancs, 25A located in West Chase and 25B in East Chase, service the main steam and feedwater containment isolation valves and are used only after the reactor coolant system has been cooled down,with the

(i ii) Main Steam and Feedwater Pipe Chase Cranes (MS-CR-25A & 25B) (Cont'd)

(

residual heat removal system removing decay heat. Therefore, any potential damage to the main steam and feedwater systems resulting from a load drop cannot affect the decay heat removal process.

(iv) Diesel Generator Service Cranes (DG-CR-28A & 28B)

The two redundant diesel generator units and their associated auxiliaries are located in separate and independent enclosures within a seismic Category I building. One service crane is provided in each enclosure for repair and maintenance of the diesel generator. Since only one diesel generator will be removed from service at any one time, a load drop could result in damage to only this one unit and/or its auxiliary systems. The redundancy of the other generator will allow for plant operations for 7 d

days, with no loss of safety-related functions. However, as specified in the Seabrook technical specifications, if.the damaged unit cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, the plant will be brought to at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to COLD SHUTDOWN within the follow-ing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

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REQUEST 2.4-2-C For interactions not eliminated by the analysis of 2.4-2-b, above, identify any handling systems for specific loads which you have evaluated as having sufficient design' features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely.

small and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with l

NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e. , crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1.

RESPONSE TO 2.4-2-C The boric acid batching monorail hoist and the emergency feed pump monorail hoist have sufficient design featuree to make the likelihood of a load drop O. small.

BORIC ACID BATCHING MONORAIL HOIST (CS-CR-6)

The boric acid batching monorail hoist is designed for a capacity of 4.5 tons using a safety factor of 5. However, the normal loads anticipated for this hoist do not exceed half the capacity, thus providing a large safety margin and consequently increasing the reliability of the load handling system.

In addition, the standard lifting apparatus will have a safety factor of 10 or greater, or will be of redundant design.

The load carrying capability of the reinforced concrete slab at 53'-0" elevation is being verified for impact loading to preclude any damage to the boric acid tank CS-TK-4B, located below at floor elevation 25'-0",

in the unlikely event of a load drop in this area. In the event of any damage

(}

occurring to this boric acid storage tank, which is located directly below

s RESPONSE TO 2.4-2-C (Cont'd)

(' ,/)

s the batching tank, the other storage tank will provide a source of horic acid. With the complete boric acid storage system unavailable, two boration paths from the refueling water storage tank can be relied upon for safe shutdown of the plant. If the boric acid storage system cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, the plant will be put in at least HOT STANDBY mode within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> in accordance with the technical specifications.

EMERGENCY FEED PUMP MONORAIL HOIST (FW-CR-27)

This is a 4 ton monorail hoist normally used to handle individual pump components during maintenance or repair of the two emergency feed pumps.

All these loads are not expected to weigh more than 4000 pounds each, which will ensure a safety factor of at least 10 for each load handling cystem

(

combination. Even if there is a need to lift the entire pump, motor or turbine unit, the only loads heavier than 4000 pounds are feed pump and motor which will still provide safety factors of 7 and 8.3 respectively.

Considering these increased hoist safety factors for individual loads together with a safety factor of 10 or greater for the standard lif ting devices, the likelihood of a load drop is extremely small.

Furthermore, the maximum time allowed by the technical specifications for

, any emergency feed pump to be out of service for repair or maintenance is 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. If during this period, the other pump is rendered inoperable because of a load drop,the plant will be brought to HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> as per operational x_,) limits specified in the technical specifications. Any potential damage to the system piping or valves resulting from a load drop will not impair the L

. -. . . - . - . _ _ . -. . . .. .. .. - . _ _ _ . _ , _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ ~ _ . . . . .-

Response to 2.4-2-C (Cont'd) main feedwater system including the 5% startup feed pump, since the check valves in the individual steam generator feed lines are located in the l Main Steam and Feedwater Pipe Chase.

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REOUEST 2.4-2-d For interactions not eliminated in 2.4-2-b or 2.4-2-c, above, demonstrate using appropriate analysis that damage would not preclude operation of sufficient equipment to allow the system to perform its safety function following a load drop (NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, Criterion IV). For each analysis so conducted, the following information should be provided:

(1) An indication o'f whether or not, for the specific load being investi-gated, the overhead crane-handling system is designed and constructed such that the hoisting system will retain its load in the event of seismic accelerations equivalent to those of a safe shutdown earth-quake (SSE).

(2) The basis for any exceptions taken to the analytical guidelines of NUREG 0612, Appendix A.

O O (3) The information requested in Attachment 4.

RESPONSE TO 2.4-2-d All load-impact area combinations for the filter cask monorail, heat ex-changer service monorail and the component cooling water pump service mono-railshave~ been evaluated in detail. The analysis demonstrates that either the load does not impact the safety related equipment or damage is limited so as not to result in loss of the safety functions of the systems under consideration. A detailed discussion for these monorail systems is provided below:

FILTER CASK MONORAIL HOIST (CS-CR-5)

The reactor coolant filter, seal water return and injection filters, demineral-izer pre-filter, and spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup filters served by this 4.5 ton monorail are located in their individual compartments / cubicles RESPONSE TO 2.4-2-d

(,_ \

\s / below 3 foot thick reinforced concrete slab. Only one filter will be taken out of service at any one time for removal and replacement of the filter element. Since all other compartments will be covered with floor plugs during cask handling operations, damage in the event of a l load drop could occur only to this one filter which has already been valved out.

In addition, the maximum height of the filter transfer cask will be limited to about 12" above the operating floor due to headroom restrictions. A confirmatory structural analysis is being performed for the floor slab at 25'-0" elevation to verify that the slab will sustain anticipated load drops in the event of a handling system failure. Therefore, integrity of the CVCS piping, valves and the remaining filters located below this level

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is not expected to be compromised. The system will continue to perform its safety functions.

CVCS IIEAT EXCHANGER SERVICE MONORAIL II0IST (CS-CR-13)

The letdown, letdown reheat, Ictdown chiller, moderating and seal water heat exchangers in the chemical and volume control system are all installed in l separate cubicles below 25'-0" floor level. As in the case of filters, only one heat exchanger cubicle will be opened at any one time for inspection, or to have access to the particular heat exchanger. Thus any potential damage would be limited to only that heat exchanger which has been removed from service.

Also, the adequacy of the reinforced concrete slab and other structures is being checked to ensure that following a load drop safe shutdown cnd decay (n I

( heat removal capabilities are retained.

u)

RESPONSE TO 2.4-2-d (Cont'd)

(sm-)

In addition, with the exception of the removable floor plugs, the safety factors for other loads such as tube bundles are much greater than 10 which will enhance the reliability of the load handling system. The concrete plugs are not expected to be lif ted more than 12 inches from the floor.

COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP SERVICE MONORAIL HOISTS (CC-CR-15A & 15B)

The monorail CC-CR-15A services primary component cooling water pumps CC-P-11A and IIB, and monorail CC-CR-15B is used during maintenance of pumps 11C and 11D. An interchangeable chainfall hoist of 3 ton capacity is provided for the two monorails. The pumps in the two independant loops are separated by a 6 foot high metal partition (provided for fire protection purposes) which runs across the two parallel monorails.

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The metal partition as well as the safe load paths will restrict the move-ment of a heavy load over a pump in the redundant loop. However, in the unlikely event of a load being carried over the partition and coincident failure of the handling system, one pump in the redundant loop could be rendered inoperable. Since for normal full power operation only one pump is required in each loop, the remaining pump will continue to supply cooling water to the various users, if the affected loop must be shut down following a load drop, and it cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, cooldown will be initiated with one loop to bring the plant to HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

In addition, a structural analysis is being performed to demonstrate that a load drop in this area will not damage any safety related equipment or damage to such equipment will be limited so as not to result in loss of the required RESPONSE TO 2.4-2-d (Cont'dI safe shutdown or decay heat removal functions. i The.above three monorails are not designed to retain a load in the event r

r of seismic accelerations equivalent to an SSE. An outline of the ' method h I

of analysis' used to demonstrate the adequacy of the structures following I

a load drop is given in Appendix II.  !

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i Sheet 1 of 6 TABI.E 4-1 SEABROOK STATION - 1%ITS 1 & 2 TABl*LATION OF HEAVY LOADS CRANE / MONORAIL - HOIST LOAD IDENTIFICATION WEICHT LIFTING DEVICE LOAD PATH LOAD HANDLING REFERENCE (Ibs) DRAWING PROCEDURE DRX4ING SPECIFIC / GENERAL CONTAINMEST Polar Cantry Crane MM-CR-3 420 Ton Main 50 Ton Auxiliary Neutron Shield Panel (8) 10,000 each Main / Aux. Hook & 805276 General 815542 Whiting Corporation Slings (See Note 2)

Reactor Cavity Seal Ring 18,625 Main / Aux. Hook & 805273 Specific 805556

. Slings (See Note 1)

Reactor Missile Shield 40,000 Main Hook and 805273 gp,cggge gogg33 and Support (plus CRDH (with spread-Spreader Assembly cooling fans) er assembly)

CRDM Cooling Air Duct See Note 4 Auxiliary Hook and 805276 General 609605 and Supports Slings 609608 Heaviest Section 609609 Reactor Veasel Head and 320,000 Main Ho:k. RV 805275 Specific F.P. #50234 Attach:ents (with lifting Head Lifting Rig. F.P. 9502_46 rig) Load Cell, and Linkage Assembly Internals Lifting 18,350 Main Hook, Load Cell 805275 Specific F.P. f53998 Rig and Linkage Assembly

. - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ . . . . ~ . , . _ . _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ . ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . . _ ._- _ _ _ _ _ . . . - _ _ _ _ _

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I Sheet 2 of 6 TABLE 4-1 SEABROOK STATION - IINITS 1&2 TABLUTION OF HEAW LOADS CRANE / MONORAIL - HOIST LOAD IDENIIFICATION WE:CHT LIFTING DEVICE LOAD PATH IAAD HANDLINC. REFERENCE (lbs) DRAWING PROCEDURE DRAWING SPECIFIC /CENERAL Upper Internals 152,000 Main Hook, Internals 805272 Specific F.P. #50209 (with lift- Lif ting Rig, load ing rig) Cell and Linkage Assembly Lower Internals 340,000 Main Hook, Internals Not Required Specific / General (with lift- Lifting Rig, load Cell ing rig) and Linkage Assembly Jib Crane (including 3.000 Auxiliary Hook and 805272 Ceneral F.P. #54824 hoist and trolley) Slings Stud Tensioners 2,500 Aux. Hook & Slings 805274 Ceneral F.P. #50215 R.V. Head Stud, Nut 700 Aux. Hook & Slingc 805274 General l

and Washer Assembly RC Pump Motor 100,260 Main Hook & Motor 803277 Specific F.P. #50218 Lifting Slings RC Pump Meter Support 9.300 Main / Aux. Hook & 805277 Ceneral F.P. #50218 Slings RC Pump Internals 44,900 Skin Hook & Slings 805277 Specific F.P. #50218 RC Pump Asse-bly 94.400 Main Hook & Slings 805277 Specific F.P. #50218 (including casing)-

RC Pump Re=ovable 37,000 Main Hook & Slings 805277 Specific /Ceneral 101445 Concrete Plugs (2 sections) (Heavies t)

O G G Sheet 3 of 6 I

i-l TABLE 4-1 I

SEABROOK STATION - LNITS 1 & 2 TABULATION OF HEAVY 1.OADS CRANE / MONORAIL - HOIST LOAD IDENTIFICATION WEIQlT LIFTING DEVICE LOAD PATH LOAD HANDLINC REFERENCE DRAWING PROCEDURE DRAWING i SPECIFIC /CENERAL RC Pump Handling 10.000 Aux. Hook & Slings Frame 805277 General 1168 E 98 Plug for In-Core 10,00U Aux. Hook & Slings Not Required '

General 101445 Detector Drive 420 Ton Holst Load 30,000 N/A N/A Block F.P. #52461

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50 Ton Hoist Load 2,000 N/A N/A B lock F.P. #52461 In-Service Inspection (See Note 3)

Tool 1 I

Miscellaneous Equipment Auxiliary Hook and i 805275 General -

in Containment Annulus Slings Area Pressurizer Missile 5,000 Not req'd Aux. Hook & Slings General / Specific 101939 i Shield See Note 5 I

Equipment Hatch 85.150 Aux./ Main Hook and 805273 i .

Specit ic /Ceneral F.P. #10552 Cover (including air 1cck) Slings 1

F.P. J10556 I

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- -- - ~ - - , ,- .. - - - ,-.,,-. - - - _._ _ ,,_.-..m -..- - . _ - , . . - - - - - - . . - . - - - - --- . - -

l Sheet 4 of 6 TABLE 4-1 SEABROOK STATION - L31TS 1 & 2 TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS f

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i, LDAD IDENTIFICATION WEIGHT LIFTING DEVICE IDAD PATH LOAD HANDLING REFERENCE CRANE / MONORAIL - HOIST d (lbs) DRAWING PROCEDUFE DRAWING I SPECIFIC /CENERAL l

l _FQL STORACE BUILDING Spent Fuel Cask (Cask design not yet finalized) 805279 Specific i Spent Fuel Cask l Handling Crane l FH-RE-1 New Fuel Shipping 6,700 Main / Aux. Hook #2 and 805279 Specific / General 125 Ton tuin Container Four-Leg Sling 5 Ton Aux. (2) Assembly Whiting Corporation New Fuel Assembly 1,700 Auxiliary Hook #1 805279 Specific / General FIC. 4.2-2 l and New Fuel (with hand- (FSAR) l ling tool) Assembly Handling Tool '

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l Crane Load Block 5,900 N/A N/A - F.P. #55593 l

j (125 Ton) 1rradiated Specimen (See Note 3)

Cask Failed Fuel Container (See Note 3) f 1

PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING Filter Cask Filter Cask (CVCS 7,000 Filter Cask Lifting 805280 General F.P. #

Monorail Holst system) Device CS-CR-5 l 4.5 Ton Capacity Concrete Floor Plug 3,000 Slings 805280 General 805869 l

Boric Acid Hatch Cover (2 sections) 1,300 each Slings 805281 General 101598 Batching Monorail Holst Pallets of Boric 8,910/10 Slings 805281 Ceneral -

CS-CH-6 4.5 Ton Capacity Acid pallets

O O O Sheet 5 of 6 TABLE 4-1 SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 TABUTATION OF HEAVY IAADS CRANE / MONORAIL-HOIST LOAD IDENTIFICATION PEICHT LIFTING DEVICE IDAD PATH 14AD ILUDLINC ' REFERENCE (1bs) DRAWING PROCEDURE DRAWING SPECIFIC /CENERAL CVCS Heat Renovable Concrete Floor 6.600 each Slings 805280 Ceneral 101528 l Exchanger Service Plug (2 sections )

l Monorail Holst CS-CR-13 Heat Exchanger Tube 2.150 Slings 805280 General -F.P. 850163 3.5 Ton Capacity Bundle (Heaviest)

(Unit #1 only) -

Component Cooling Primary Corponent Cooling 3,600 Slings 805280 General F.P.8564th Water Pump Wat.r Pump Service Monorail Holst PCCW Pump Motor 5,270- Slings 805280 General F.P. #50(26 CC-CR-15A & 158 F.P. #51153 3 Ton Capacity each M ATER I"M OUILO!NC FME P.O C. FEt" Emergency Feed Emergency Feedwater 5,700 Slings 805278 Ceneral F P. #22432 Pump Monorail Pump F P. #22433 Hoist W-CR-27 Emergency Feedwater 4,800 Slings 805278 Ceneral F.P. # 22435 4 Ton Capacity Pump Motor Emergency Feedvater 3.900 Slings 805278 ceneral F.P. 8 22431 Pump Turbine 6'-0" x 4'-6" Removable 4,000 Slings 805278 General W 660 Concrete Floor Plug

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~Shert 6'of 6 TABLE 4-1 N_ r SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS 4

NOTES:

1. Specific Procedure: A specific procedure governs critical load handling operations requiring unique procedures, and provides

. detailed instructions for the movement and handling of such loads, or performance of complex tasks requiring greater detail to ensure safe handling of loads.

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2. Geheral Procedure: A general procedure governs all crane and load handling operations not requiring a specific procedure, and serves as a reference document for specific procedures. The ' Crane Safety Mannal' may be used as a general procedure.

3. Load path and attachment method 1. to be determined prior to use, and approved by the Plant ' Operating Review Committee. Details are not j available at this time.

4. The design of the ductwork/ supports for the CRDM has not been finalized. The weights of these components will be added at a later date.

5. The pressurizer missile shield will be stored on top of the pressurizer compartment itself.

2 f

TABLE 7-1 Shnet 1 of 10 CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX

(-)

HEAVY LOADS NUREG 0612 SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 CRANE: FILTER CASK MONORAIL HOIST (CS-CR-5)

IDCATION BUILDING: PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING Column Line 3-5 Column Line A-B Elev. 25'-0" l

LOADS Elevation Safety Related Hazard Elimination Equipment Category

• Filter Cask (7000 1bs) Floor Elev. 25' Seal Water Heet Ex- C and E Removable Floor Plugs (3000 lbs each -0" (Monorail changer, seal Water Elev. 40'-6") injection Filter, Sea:.

Water return Filter, i g-- Reactor Coolant Filter -

( ,j)

Demineralizer Pre-filter, all located in individual compart-ments below 3' thick reinforced concrete slab. CVCS piping and valves below 25' elev--

ation. (Valve oper-ators i.e. extensions for some drain valves and isolating valves for the above equip-mert are above 25' el :v. )

f%

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• Sheet 10 of 10 t 1

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TABLE 7-1 Sheet 2 of 10 CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX

( , HEAVY IDADS NUREG 0612 SEABE00K STATION UNITS 1 & 2 CRANE: IDRIC ACID BATCHING MONORAIL HOIST (CS-CR-6)

IDCATION BUILDING: PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING IMPACT Zone: Column Line 5-6 AREA Column Line B-D Elev. 53'-0" l

LOADS Elevation Safety Related Hazard Elimination Equipment Category i

Hatch Cover in 2 sections Eloor Elev. Boric acid tank CS-TK- B, D & E (1000 lbs each) 53'-0" 4B located at floor (Monorail elev. elev. 25'-0", below 67'-0") boric acid batching O' Pallets of boric acid

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tank.

(1000 lbs approximately in one --

lift) j O

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• Sheet 10 of 10-i l

_ _ 7_  ;- ~ - - -. _ .___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ,_

TABLE 7-1 Shest 3 of 10 1

CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX HEAVY LOADS NUREG 0612 SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 CRANE: CVCS HEAT EXCHANGER SERVICE MONORAIL HOIST (CS-CR-13)

LOCATION BUILDING: PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING Column Line 2-4 IMPACT Zee: Column Line A-B AREA Elev. 25'-0" l

LOADS Elevation **Y *** ***# " '"

Equipment Catego ry ,"

Concrete Floor Plug in 2 sections Letdown Heat Exchanger ,

(6600 lbs. each) Floor(Monorail

-0" Elev. 25'; Letdown Reheat HX, Let I -

C,E Elev. 45'-6") down Chiller HX, 7- g Moderating HX and

(_,) Seal Water HX, all located in individual compartments below 3' thick reinforced concrete slab. CVCS Piping and Valves located below 25' elev (Valve operators i.e.,

extensions for isola-t!.ng valves for above equipment are located above 25'-0" ele-vation)

Heat Exchanger ' lube Bundle same as above same as above C, D & E (2150 lbs. - Heaviest Tube Bundle) i f3

\_ /

• See Sheet 10 of 10 6

TABLE 7-1 Shist 4 of 10 CONTROL OF LOAD /IMPACI AREA MATRIX 9 HEAVY LOADS NUREG 0612 SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 CRANE: CIIARGING PUMP SERVICE MONORAIL HOISTS, (CS-CR-14A, 14B, & 14C)

I4 CATION BUILDING: PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING IMPACT Zone: Column Line 3-5 AREA Column Line C-D Elev. 7'-0" aey e ated Hazard El M nation LOADS Elevation Equipment Category

• Charging Pump Components Floor Elev. Charging Pump, B

_ 7'-0" (Rail Associated CVCS

/ < Elev. 18'-7") Piping x/ .

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• Sheet 10 of 10 l

TABLE 7-1 Shtst 5 of 10

% CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX k HEAVY LOADS NUREG 0612 SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 CRANE: COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP SERVICE MONORAIL HOISTS (CC-CR-15A & 15B)

IDCATION BUILDING: PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING j

IMPACT Zone: Column Line 2-4 AREA Column Line A-C Elev. 25'-0" I

LOADS . Elevation *'" Y *** ***# '"'""'"

Equipment Category i

Primary Component Cooling Floor El.25'-0" PCCW pumps and PCCW B&E Water Pump (3600 lbs) (Monorail El. System piping. CVCS 35'-0") Piping and valves be-low 2 to 4' thick Cs ,

, PCCW Pamp Motor (5270 lbs) reinforced concrete

' slab (El. 25'-0").

Valve' operators i.e.,

extensions, located above 25'-0" elev.,

for isolating valves for:

- Letdown Reheat HX

- Letdown Chiller HX

- Letdown Flow Control i

Valve PCV 131

- Seal Water Return Filter l Regenerative Deminqralizer

- Seal Water Injectidn Filters (drain valves)

- Cation Bed Deminer: 1-izers

- 3" line from Moderating HX to RC Filter

- 3" line from RC Filter to RHR Pump

• See Sheet 10 of 10 t I

-n- .,E- ,n . .,, . , -, , , - - a , - , -

TABLE 7-1 Sh::t 6 of 10 0 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS NUREG 0612 LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 CRANE: RADIOACTIVE PIPE TUNNEL SERVICE MONORAIL HOISTS (CBS-CR-18A & 18B)

IDCATION BUILDING. RADIOACTIVE PIPE TUNNEL IMPACT Zone: Piping Zone 28A AREA Pipe Tunnel Elev. (-) 34'-6" aey e a ed Hazard Elimigation LOADS Elevation Equipment Catego ry Encapsulation Vessel Head EL.(-) 34'-6" Valves 16" CBS-V8, B (1000 lbs) V14 & Piping i

x _- Encapsulation Vessel Skirt EL. (-) 34 '-6" Valves 16" CBS-V8, B (1200 lbs) V14 and Piping Sump Isolation Valve Topworks EL.(-) 34'-6" Valves 16" CBS-V8, B (Less than 2500 lbs) V14 & Piping 4

v,

• See Sheet 10 of 10 l

TABLE 7-1 Sh::st 7 of 10 5

O CONTROL OF LOAD /INPACT AREA MATRIX

- ) HEAVY LOADS NUREG 0612 -

SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 CPANE:

MIN STEAM AND FEEDWATER PIPE CIIASE CRANES (MS-CR-25A & 25B7 IDCATION BUILDING: MS AND FW PIPE CHASE IMPACT Zone: East Chase Floor Elev. 3'-0" AREA West Chase Floor Elev. 3'-0" LOADS Elevation * *7 * ** **** " "

Equipment Category ,"

MS Isolation Valve Operator EL. 20'-0" Safety Valve and C main steam and feedwater piping b

's ,/ MS Isolation Valve Topworks EL. 20'-0" Safety Valve and C main steam and feedwater piping FW Isolation Valve Operator EL. 20'-0" Safety Valve and C main steam end feedwater piping FW Isolation Valve Topworks EL. 20'-0" Safety Valve and C main steam and feedwater piping

• See Sheet 10 of 10

- - - - ,.-,g. -p ~_,y-.m _

,_- _ - - , , -_ -+ _ m _ m--- - , =rW ** h--

TABLE 7-1 Sheet 8 of.10

.S CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX HEAVY LOADS NUREG 0612 SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 CRANE: EMERGENCY FEED PUMP MONORAIL HOIST (FW-CR-27)

IDCATION BUILDING: EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP BUILDING IMPACT Zone: Area around monorail in entire building AREA Elev. 27'-0"'

l LOADS Elevation *'" Y ** **** " " ' "

Equipment Category

• Emergency Feedwater Pump Floor El.27'-0" Emergency FW turbine, C (5700 lbs) pump, motor, and feedwater piping.

O Emergency FW Pump Motor Floor El.27'-0" Emergency FW turbine, C,D

\/ (4800 lbs) pump, ana feedwater I P iping.

Emergency FW Pump Turbine Floor E1.27'-0" Emergency FW pump, C,D (3900 lbs) motor, and feedwater piping.

Concrete Floor Plug Floor El.27'-0" Emergency FW pump, C,D (4000 lbs) motor, turbine, and feedwater piping.

S 1

• See Sheet 13 of 10 i l

TABLE 7-1 Sheet 9 of 10 CONTROL OF LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX C'. HEAVY LOADS NUREG 0612 SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 CRANE: DIESEL GENERATOR SERVICE CRANES, (DG-CR-28A & 28B)

LOCATION BUILDING: DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING IMPACT Zone: Column Line 5-9 AREA Column Line A-E Elev. 21'-6" LOADS Elevation afe y eae azard Elidnation Equipment Category

• Diesel Generator Components EL.21'-6" Diesel Generator, B Diesel Auxiliary Systems -

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• See Sheet 10 of 10

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,r.. ,,.- , ,-r-..,y n. - - - - - - --.,.-.r , . . - - y -~i,, --.e- , . - . . -

-m. - - - -,; ,,y--,-,m--y.~e-.,--

Sheet 10 of 10 LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 O

TABLE 7-1 Hazard Elimination Categories A. Crane travel for this area / load combination prohibited by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops.

B. System redundancy and separation precludes loss of capability of system to perform its safety-related function following this load drop in this area.

C. Site-specific considerations eliminate the need to consider load / equipment combination.

D. Likelihood of handling system failure for this load is extremely small (i.e.

section 5.1.6 NUREG 0612 satisfied).

E. Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop will not damage safety-related equipment.

]

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APPENDIX I O

ANALYSIS OF RV HEAD LIFTING RIG AND INTERNALS LIFTING RIG (SPECIAL LIFTING DEVICES) i l

I O (Later)

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APPENDIX II 1

1

METHOD OF ANALYSIS OF PLANT STRUCTURES 4

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. - - - - - - - - - - - -. - - _ . - _ , . -n...,_ . , - - - . . , , , , , - _ , _ _ _ _ , --... _ ,-..,,.., ,,.- .-- , ,_-- . ,-n, n, , .- -, - - . , ,,- , ---.

a _ m. 4a.-. -- -w,m----aan -am-ma s -a m. o n,, s,,,.

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APPENDIX III ANALYSIS OF FILTER CASK LIFTING DEVICE 1

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O O- Sheet 1 of 2 LO.

ATTACHMENT A NUREG 612: CONDUIT & CABLE TRAY REVIEW I

AREA REFERENCE ITEM EQUIPMENT REMARKS EQUIPMENT NAME CONSIDERED DRAWINGS.

No. NUMBER Polar Gantry Crane' CTMr 805052 Not Examined

1. MM-CR-3 Excluded by Design 805053 805055 805056 Radial Arm Stud CTMr 805054 Not Examined

2. FH-RE-24 Excluded by Design Tensioner Hoists Spent Fuel' Cask' Fuel Storage 805058 See Note -1

3. FH-RE-1

-Handling Crane Bldg. 805059 805084 Filter Cask Mono- PAB 805215 See Note 'l

4. CS-CR-5 rail Hoist 805062 l

CVCS HX Service PAB 805062 See Note 1

5. CS-CR-13 Monorail Hoist Boric Acid Batch- PAB 805062 See Note 1

6. CS-CR-6 ing Monorail Hoist 805066 Charging Pump PAB 805061 See Note 1

7. CS-CR-14A

-148 Service Monorail 805065

-14C Hoist Component Cooling PAB 805062 See Note 1

'8. CC-CR-15A

-15B Water Pump Service 805064 Monorail Hoist 805066 Radioactive Pipe Radioactive 805540 See Note 1

9. CBS-CR-18A

-18B Tunnel Service Pipe Tunnel Monorail Hoist (EL-34'-0")

10. MS-CR-25A Main Steam & W MS & W 202063 See Note 2

-25B Pipe Chase Crane Pipe Chase 202064

O O O Sheet 2 of 2 ATTACHMENT A (CONT'D)

NUREG 612: CONDUIT & CABLE TRAY REVIEW AREA REFERENCE ITEM EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT NAME CONSIDERED DRAWINGS REMARKS No. NUMBER W-CR-27 Emergency Feed Emergency 310453 See Note 3 11.

Pump Monorail W Pump Hoist Bldg.

DG-CR-28A Diesel Generator Diesel Gen. 202068 See Note 1 12.

-28B Service Crane Bldg. 202069 202070 t

i NOTE 1: Safety-related cable trays and/or conduits do not exist below this crane.

NOTE 2: These cranes are excluded from detailed evaluation because of site specific considerations.

NOTE 3: The cable trays located below in the electrical tunnel'are not expected to be affected by a-load drop. A confirmatory strugtural analysis of the intervening floor is being performed.

Sheet 1 of 2 ATTACHMENT ^B NUREG 612 : PIPING REVIEW ITEM NO. EOUIPMENT NO. EQUIPMENT NAME AREA CONSIDERED REFERENCE DRAWINGS REMARKS 1 MM-CR-3 Polar Gantry Crane CTMT 805051 805052 Not Examined -

805053 excluded by design 2 FH-RE-24 Radial Arm Stud CTMT 805055 Not Examined - '

Tensioner Hoists excluded by design 3 FH-RE-1 Spent Fuel Cask Fuel Storage Bldg. 805058 No piping Handling Crane 805059 below this 805084 crane 805088 4 CS-CR-5 Filter Cask PAB 805215 No piping Monorail Hoist below this crane 5 CS-CR-13 CVCS HX Service PAB 805215 No piping Monorail Hoist 805235 below this 805236 crane 6 CS-CR-6 Boric Acid Batching PAB 805066 No other sys-Monorail Hoist 805062 tem piping in 805063 this area 7 CS-CR-14A Charging Pump Service PAB 805213 No piping

-14B Monorail Holst 805214 below this crane

-14C except suction and discharge piping for the individual pump served.

8 CC-CR-15A Component Cooling Water PAB 805215 No piping below

-15B Pump Service Monorail 805216 this monorail Holst 805213 except CC Water pump connections and check valves in the discharge lines.

O O Sheet 2 of 2 O

ATTACHMENT'E (CONT'D)

NUREG 612 : PIPING REVIEW ITEM N0? EQUIPMENT NUMBER EQUIPMENT NAME AREA CONSIDERED REFERENCE DRAWINGS REFARKS 9 CBS-CR-18A Radioactive Pipe Radioactive 805540 No other system 18B Tunnel Service Pipe Tunnel piping below this Monorail Holst (El . -34 '-0" ) crane-10 MS-CR-25A Main Steam & MS & FW 202063 See Note 1

-25B FW Pipe Chase Pipe chase 202064 crane 11 FW-CR-27 Emergency Feed Emergency 202296 FW-4613-01-1506-8"'

Pump Monorail FW Pump Bldg. .FW-4610-04-02-3" Hoist 12 DG-CR-28A Diesel Generator Diesel Generator 202070 No piping below 28B Service Crane Bldg. 202068 this crane NOTE 1: These cranes are excluded from detailed evaluation because of site specific considerations.

O O O ATTACHMENT C NUREG 612: SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT REVIEW ITEM EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT AREA REFERENCE No. NUMBER NAME CONSIDERED DRAWINGS REMARKS

1. MM-CR-3 Polar Gantry Crane CIMT 805054 Steam Generators, 805051 Reactor Coolant 805052 Pumps, pressurizer 805053 805055 805056

2. FH-RE-24 Radial Arm Stud CTMr Not examined -

Tensioner Hoists excluded by design FH-RE-1 Spent Fuel Cask Fuel Storage 805058 No safety-related 3.

Handling Crane Bldg. 805059 equipment in this area

4. CS-CR-5 Filter Cask Mono- PAB 805064 CS-E-5 Seal Water HX rail Holst 805062 Valve Operators, CC-P-11C CC Pumps and piping.

5. CS-CR-13 CVCS HX Service PAB 805062 CS-E-5 HX CC-P-11A, Monorail Hoist 805011 Valve Operators, CS-E-3 HX CS-E-4 HX CS-E-7 HX CS-E-8 HX and' piping

6. CS-CR-6 Boric Acid Batching PAB 805062 CS-TK-4B, Boric Acid Monorail Hoist 805066 Tanks

7. CS-CR-14A Charging Pump Ser- PAB 805061 See Note 1

-14B vice Monorail Hoist 805065

-14C

8. CC-CR-15A Component Cooling PAB 805062 Valve Operators,

-15B Water Pump Service CS-E-5 Seal Water HX Monorail Holst

. . . _ . . __ _ ..-. .- -._ ... . . _ _ . . - __ _ ._ ... ._ .- . . - . _ . ._. _ .. _ _ . ~ . _ . .. . _ . - _.....__ _ . ~ .._._ _ .-. _

o o o ATTACHMEN"' C (CONT'D)

NUREG 612: SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT REVIEW i ITEM EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT AREA REFERENCE No. NUMBER NAME CONSIDERED DRAWINGS REMARKS i 9. CBS-CR-18A Radioactive Radioactive 805540 Motor operated. valves '

-18B Pipe Tunnel Pipe Tunnel 16" CBS-V14, V8 ,

Service Mono- (Elev. .34'-0")  !

rail Hoist ,

10. MS-CR-25A Main Steam MS & W 202063 See. Note 2 4

-25B & W Pipe Chase Pipe Chase 202064 i Crane i

l

, 'l l . W-CR-27 Emergency Feed Emergency 202296 W-V67, V68 Valves, ~

! Pump Monorail W Pump IR-50 Instrumentation la Hoist Bldg. Rack i

t j 12. DG-CR-28A Diesel Generator Diesel Generator 202070 Fuel Oil Storage Tank i

-28B Service Crane Bldg. 202068 26A & 26B, valves Air Compressor.

I i

NOTE 1: These monorails are not evaluated in detail because of separation and redundancy of the safety related equipment.

t

] NOTE 2: These cranes are excluded from detailed evaluation because of the site specific considerations.  ;

I 9

l .

t i

O O O-ATTACHMENT D

- NUREG 612:HVAC REVIEW __

ITEM N E - EOUIPMENT NUMBJA EJUlDfENT ' NAMF ARFA CONSIDERED REFERENCE DRAWINGS REMARKS 1 MM-CR-3 Polar Gantry Crane CTMr 604128 Not examined--

604129 Excluded by design 604130 604131 2 FH-RE-24 Radial Arm Stud CTMI Not examined -

Tensioner Hoists ' excluded by design 3 FH-RE-1 Spent Fuel Cask Fuel Storage 604136 See Note 1 Handling Crane Building 604137 604143 4 CS-CR-5 Filter Cask PAB 604110 See Note 1 Monorail Hoist 604111 5 CS-CR-6 Boric Acid Batching. PAB 604109 See Note 1 Monorail Hoist 6 CS-CR-13 CVCS: Heat Exchanger PAB 604110 See Note 1 Service Monorail 604111-Holst 604113 7 CS-CR-14A Charging Pump Service PAB 604111. See Note 1

-14B . Monorail Hoist

-14C 8 CC-CR-15A Component Cooling PAB 604110 See Note 1

-15B Water Pump Service .604111 Monorail Hoist 604114 604115

. _ . . . _ . . - _ . _ . _ . . . _ . _ - . - _ _ . - . . _ . . - ......m . _ _ . . _ . . . ._...-m... _ - _. .;_......

iI O O O

~; ATTACHMENT D (CONT'D)

]

ITEM nom E_QU.IPMENT NUMBER E_QUIJMENT NAME AREA CONSIDERED REFERENCE DRAWING,S REMARKS i '

'9 CBS-CR-18A Radioactive Pipe Radioactive See Note 1 4

-18B Tunnel Service Pipe Tunnel Monorail Holst 10 MS-CR-25A Main Stea::: & MS & W Pipe 604165

' See Note 1

.-253 Feedwater Pipe Chase 604168 Chase Crane 604171 11 W-CR-27 Emergency W Pump Emergency W 604141

See Note 1

! Monorail Hoist Pump Bldg. 604142 i

12 DG-CR-28A Diesel Generator Diesel Generator 604097 See Note 1

-28B Service Crane Bldg. 604098 1 604123 i

i i

4 1

i Note 1: No safety-related HVAC equipment or ducts below this crane.

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