ML20043B762

Employee Allegation Resolution Program Radio Communication Transcript Review.

ML20043B762
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	05/24/1990
From:	PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
To:
Shared Package
ML20043B730	List: ML20043B729 ML20043B762
References
NUDOCS 9005310253
Download: ML20043B762 (11)

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-a New Hampshire Yankee May.24, 1990

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Enclosure 1 NYN-90116 n.

i M ovee Allegation Resolution Pronram i

Ladio Communication I Transcriot Review-l I

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4 9005310253 DR 900524 1 ADOCK 05000442, PDC

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i TABLE OF CONTENTS

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-1 1-SECTION~ J,lT]& f.AEK 1.0 . Executive Summary + 1 2.0 Background 2 3.0- ' Review Process 5 l

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=- 4.0 4 Corrective Action -7 1 5.0 conclusion- 9  !

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s, 1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARX, ,

Thi?reportprovidestheresultsoftheNewHampshkre' Yankee (NHY) s e evaluation of control room radio transatissions recorded by' Mr. Fred

• s f)'t Anderson,-Jr., between January 1, 1989, and January 13, 1990. ,

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In its February 22, 1990, letter to NHY, the Nuclear Regulatory. '

% t c Commission (NRC)' requested that NHY review the transcript of'the radio i transmissions, conduct an evaluation with epecific emphasis on nuclkar.  !

4 safety and security..and submit'the results of the NHY' evaluation ,

within 90' days of the rece'pt of the letter. o

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NHY, through its L.ployee Allegation Resolution (EAR) program, conducted an extensive review of the entire :6,692 page ' transcript. The-review team established a process whereby any issues potentially s ,

involving nuclear safety and/or security significance were; identified and subsequently evaluated. The review process consisted of . reading .- ,

and categorizing all 6,692 transcript pages, and subsequently. 4 l- .e

l. conducting detailed analyses of 608 communicattions that warranted b l

further review.

l El l~ The EAR team concluded that the transcripen do nottcontain .or imply, any

issues that.are of detrimental safety significance to the public or

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j. plant personnel, impair security or affect.the safe operation and-1 .;

' mainter ance .of Seabrook Station - Further

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e 4 there was no indication.of intentional, wrongdoing. . 3 i

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• there wac no indication of fitness for duty inadequacies..

xi there was no unauthorided transainsion of safeguards infors.ation.i t e

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1  ;- w u i-On January 9, 1990, Mr.-Fred Anderson, Jr. Leent a letter-to NRC Regional!Administratdr Mr. William' Russell; 'This 2etter standd'that N

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'Sincu January l',1989,1xhave been motutcring and taping broadcasts by x

the control room operators at Seabrook Station.'~- Mt. Anders$ntslett.er

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' stated the following as beliefs: .

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+ That the samples demonstrate that significane sa'fisty'cotherns s s; i still'need to be resolved before'._scfull power IIcense is grantede ,,

, w -t s' That.the plant will have many unplanned shutdowns,?which could x \-

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affect public safety. , ,

1 , s 1 p That the areas for concern involvo both plant personnel land' i

hardware, N e

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,. t t lOn ' Januarf 15, 1990 Mr. Fred Anderson, Jr.,1sent a second1 letter to .t

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NRC Regional Administrrxme, Mr. William RusseII, that enclosed n' page .

excerpting additional taped trannmishions,i which Mr. Anderson  ;

. . considered to be cause for concern about employee attitude 'and' '

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complacency, and plant hardware. t V

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I The NHY EAR pro, gram conducted twol separate evaluations of the 1

allegationt raised' by the January '9 and 15 Anderson let!ters to the NRC. ,;

T Yhene evaluations concluded that NHY't conduct of operations t and

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, maintenance were,'and continue to be, appropriate'and that there wert. i u ,

no areas of concern that were 'of 'detrimentaEsafety significance;to r the public, p1 int personnel or the operation and tr.alntenance of thei -

plant -(see New Hampshire Yankee Letters NYll-900202 dated January"24, t 1990 and m W 90026, det.ed January'26, 1990). 1' ,. ,

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In addition to' evaluating:the coauxtnications in the January:0*and 15: ,

i letters, NHY conducted'un extensive'Self Assessment Tens (SAT) analysis:

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i of the Seabrook StatAon= radio communications system,. applicable

• programmatic and procedure contrc h and system operating practices. As L .

-..n il a result of- perforclingithis evaltiation.f the NIN SAT I provided ;several e '

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l reconmoudations, which focused -on' enhancing progrannatic cor,trols. - ,

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system operation, and communic.ation(protocol. A1numbersof those d

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, recommendat$onoihuve already been ; implemented .and. the balance of the -O J s 1 . .. ,. - . 1 enhancements have been ass Qned and-are beingitrached on the NHY' M g g ,

l- Integratnd cetsititment Tracking System. ) ,

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In January, 1990, NHY contacted Mr.; Anderson.in an effort to obtain.

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, , i-copies of the radio transmissions in order to conduct a complete j u <

.t si review of the manuhf. cations in response to his concerns'. JIndependent i, , ,

of theus efforts, the NRC also contacted Mr. Anderas,n for coplasaof the s

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i recorded radio transmissions. The NRC subsequently obtained copies of the tape recordings and prepared six thousand six hundred ninety-two (6.692) transcribed pages.

On February 23, 1990, New Hampahire Yankee (NHY) received 4,492 pages of t.ranscript from the NRC. On March 23, 1990, NHY received an additional 2,200 pages of transcript for a total of 6,692 pages. The NRC requested that NHY review the transcript and cubatit an analysis of any nuclear safety and security implications.

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The transcript was made from tapes recorded at various cimes from January 1, 1989. to January 13, 1990. Three types of Seabrcok Station related transmissions were recorded. The'., transmissions were by:

Operations, Security, and Siren Maintenance personnel. The majority of the recorded Seabrook Station related countunications were by plant control room operators and, in most cases, only the Main Control Room half of the communication was remotely received by Mr. Anderson ans.

then subsequently transcribed.

The transcript identified the dates on which tne tapes were recorded.

A number of tapes contained a time ' reference, typically every fifteen minur.e s . In most cases, the date and time references, coupleil wi@

complete and accurate plant logs, allowed the cor:rnunications to be  !

tied to a specific plant condition and/or avolution in progress.

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$ 3.0 R,gyIEW PROCf,,S.J.

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{ The review procean consisted of twa yk.ases to classify, analyte. and.

_ then evaluate for nucJ eer safety or security implicatioas. The '.irst j phase consisted of reading and cla ss.lfying, the 6,E92 transcrir. pages .

and identifying those cotemications t'. tat required a second-phs.se n 1 analysis. The second phase consinted of a detailed analysin of 608 .. l connunications which required further review in order to determ.ine the exact nature of the event or evolut. ion that wa s in pro.; esa at the m t itrie . The cowaunication was evaluator) fot any nucleat unfety and/or -

security implications. '!

F The first p'aase involved the initl.a1 review and classificat. ton of 6,692 ..

~q communication /tra.nucript pagus int.o one or tuore of the following ..

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l. Intentional Wrnogloi'.ag

2. Fitness for Duty (F7f,) Implicatloas j

3. 1't reass.in sion of Sadegun dn Informat.3 an (transmi tted .inforc.rention I rever.ls exploi?.able eleinents of the security pinn or equirmenu. )

4. Indicatiert of Program of Proced' tral Deviations

5. Courr.taication 'desknes voy (1.3., uttw:ofessioaril, venceeptable ,

inadeqvnto or undesicabio corumnicatloc.S protocol).

fi .. Ro.itlne 7 unar.11ss!.txin of an Accuptable Natu;e (May l'4clude er.traneous trannmi9siorin nr>t. related to operation that do not interfarte with ceperational informat/.on. )

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- 7 .' Routine Transmissions Where Speaking in Jest is Involved 11 . Indeterminant (The transcript does not contain suffic'ient

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$., information to classify.)

t 9.. Require,n Clarification and Comparison with the Original Recording

10.  !!ousekeeping Implications i i

- 11.- Industrial Safety Implications

12. Personnel Injuries s 8- ,

13.- Potential Nuclear Safety, Plant Reliability or Security Significance i

14. Requires Phase 2 Analysis' Pages that clearly did not contain safety or security signiricance or

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did not contain any potentially adverse implications were ' eliminated:

from,further review (6,07'4 pages). 'During this phase, the EAR team, identified a significant number of~ communications'that clearly did not- j originate from Seabrook Station or from Seabrook Station employees.

l Ernples of these communications can be found ,on: ,

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l . Tape 202/203, side B, page 21, line-2 i!

f . -Tape 606/607, side A..page 7, line 7 i

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• Tape'606/607, cide A, page 21, line 14 l . Tape 606/607, side A, page 21, line 22 ~!

. -Tr.pa'610/6i'1, sf.de h, page 23~, line 8' i 4

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The second' phase consiste.1 of conducting a detailed analysis of 608 communications identified in the first phase. Each communication was analyzed-to determine its substantive _ nature and impact on plant safety and operation. The review process consisted of one or more of the following, as appropriates e determining the context of surrounding-communications o conducting-interviews with operators, technicians, mechanics. .

engineers, fire fighters, security and/or management

. reviewing logs, procedures, drawings and calculations v . conducting physical plant walkdowns-

. reviewing work requests, tagging orders and/or maintenance

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records.

i 4.0 CORRECTIVE ACTION j ,

The review team determined that'two areas required corrective action.

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.The first resulted from the review of the communication on tape 1

804/805, side A, transcript page 19, line 9: "The' CST heater inlet temp high, 104 degrees." t J

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.. o-x During the Phase 2 review, the Engineering calculation for the temperature alarm was one of the documents reviewed. This calculation was revised on March 20. 1986, but not subsequently reflected in a-revision to the Standard Instrument Schedule (SIS). An Engineering

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evaluation of the acceptability of the'104'F Condensate Storage-Tank (CST) Heater Idlet Temperature High Alarm concluded there were no detrimental effects and no safety significance. -The corrective action entails a revision to the SIS to incorporate-the' appropriate-setpoint.

To verify that this was an isolated occurrence, Engineering has-reviewed the safety-related systems-setpoint calculations (over 20 calculations which identify over 600 setpoints). This review' verified that the setpoints in this SIS agree with or are conservative with-respect to the setpoints in these calculations.

The second area identified in the transcript requiring corrective action is the practice of tapping instruments and plant equipment, without impairing operational characteristics, to check for: gauge or meter movement freedom or to seat check valves. New Hampshire Yankee Engineering has evaluated =this application and has concluded that there is no detrimental impact on safe plant operations if conducted conservatively and within reason The transcript does support the conclu. ion that when equipment is defective, station personnel consistently initiate and follow through on work requests for corrective maintenance.

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The Operations Group is developing a policy that will specifically ,

address the NHY limits of any percussivr type treatment deemed l acceptable for use on various types of plant equipment. The Operations Management Manual will be-revised to include this policy by.

August 22, 1990. A uniform and conservative cet of guidance will be- {

included'in the continuing operator requalification training.- The 1 initial training'is expected to be completed by November 30, 1990.- I l

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5.0 CONCLUSI0,E The two-phase review of the 6,692 page transcript provided the basis i for determining that: '

there was no indication of intentional wrongdoing. i there was no indication of fitness'for duty inadequadies.

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there war no unauthorised' transmission of safeguards information, j there were no adverse nuclear safety and security implications. l l

l The review team has concluded that the transcribed communications do l not represent any unresolved significant issues related to security or safety.

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'i The extensive page-by-page and issue-by-issue transcript review file is '

available in the EAR prcgram office for further NRC inspection and  ;

review. i i

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