ML20096E035

Rev 0 to North Atlantic Energy Svcs Co,Seabrook Station GL 89-10,Design Basis Closure

ML20096E035
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	01/12/1996
From:	Brown P NORTH ATLANTIC ENERGY SERVICE CORP. (NAESCO)
To:
Shared Package
ML20096E023	List: ML20096E014 ML20096E035 ML20096E048
References
GL-89-10, NUDOCS 9601190394
Download: ML20096E035 (80)

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NORTH ATLANTIC ENERGY SERVICES COMPANY SEABROOK STATION 1 I

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GENERIC LETTER 89-10 l DESIGN BASIS CLOSURE Revision 0 l

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/b/ff6 Preparer Date' aw 001A2 - / // V S l Independst ' ewer bate 1

w i Date Inde{eddent Reviewer 00 /

u S$S Engineering Supervisor udu

/Datl N W@ /bl/fd pchanical Enginosfing Manager ' Date i$ & //n// /

D ctor, Nuclear Engi6eering 'Date

' 9601190394 960115 3 DR ADOCK 0500

Table of Contents TABLE OF CONTENT 3 PAGE TABLES iv EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

I 1.0 PURPOSE -

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2.0 BACKGROUND

2 3.0 PROGRAM SCOPE 4 4.0 PROGRAM OBJECTIVE 4 5.0 PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 5 6.0 SEABROOK STATION PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT 5 6.I 1990 SSPSA 5 6.2 1993 SSPSA EVALUATION OF SEABROOK RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 89-10 6 7.0 MOV DESIGN BASIS REVIEW 21 7.1 VALVE DESIGN INFORMATION 21 7.2 MOTOR-OPERATOR DESIGN INFORMATION 21 7.3 ELECTRICAL REVIEW - 21 7.3.1 TOL SIZING 21 7.3.2 MOV REDUCED VOLTAGE -

22 t 7.4 VALVE OPERATION - 22  ;

7.5 VALVE CONFIGURATION 23 I 7.6 GENERIC LETTER APPLICABILITY CONCLUSION 23 8.0 MOV SIZING AND SWITCH SETTINGS -

26 8.1 MAXIMUM DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE DETERMINATION 26 El GATE AND GLOBE VALVE REQUIRED THRUST 26 8.3 VALVE EQUIVALENT VALVE FACTOR 26 8.4 STEM / STEM NUT FRICTION COEFFICIENT -

27 8.5 COEFFICIENT OF FRICTION BASED ON TEST DATA- -- 27 i

Table of Contents TABLE OF CONTENTS EAQFS 8.6 GATE AND GLOBE VALVE REQUIRED TORQUE 30 8.7 BUTTERFLY VALVE REQUIRED AND MAXIMUM TORQUE 30 8.8 VALVE WEAK LINE ANALYSIS 30 8.9 SELECTION OF MOV SWITCH SETTINGS 34 8.10 TORQUE SWITCH BYPASS METHODOLOGY- 38 8.11 MAINTENANCE OF CORRECT SWITCH SETTINGS 39 9.0 MOV DESIGN CHANGE / ENHANCEMENTS 39 9.1 DCR 86-0403 39 9.2 DCR 87-0071 39 9.3 MMOD 89-0517 -39 9.4 DCR 89-0024 39 9.5 MMOD 91-0569 - 40 9.6 MMOD 92-0521 40 i

9.7 DCR 93-0029 40 9.8 DCR 93-0086 -

- 41 9.9 MMOD 94-0561 41 10.0 STATUS OF GENERIC LETTER 89-10 PROGRAM MOV's 41 .

I 1.0 VALVE MISPOSITIONING 41 12.0 DIAGNOSTIC TEST EQUIPMENT AND ACCURACY VALIDATION 42 12.1 DIAGNOSTIC TEST EQUIPMENT 42 12.2 VALIDATION OF INSTEAD SYSTEM ACCURACY 43 12.3 OVERALL ACCURACY OF CONTROL SWITCH SETPOINTS 43 12.4 GENERIC LETTER 89-10 SUPPLEMENT 5, DIAGNOSTIC TEST SYSTEM ACCURACY- -

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Table of Contents l TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 13.0 DIAGNOSTIC TESTING TO VERIFY DESIGN BASIS CAPABILITY 43 i

13.1 DIAGNOSTIC TESTING- 43 13.2 EXTRAPOLATION OF PARTIAL DP THRUST MEASUREMENTS 49 i 13.3 MARGIN 53 -

13.4 LOAD SENSITIVE BEHAVIOR 56 14.0 DEMONSTRATE ADEQUACY of VALVE SET UP 58 15.0 MOV MAINTENANCE 61 15.1 ROUTINE MAINTENANCE 61 ,

15.2 POST MAINTENANCE TESTING 62 16.0 MOV TRAINING 64 17.0 PERIODIC VERIFICATION 65 18.0 TRENDING 66 18.1 MOV FAILURE ANALYSIS TRENDING 66 18.2 MOV PERFORMANCE TRENDING 67 19.0 LIMITORQUE 10 CFR PART 21, "HIGH TEMPERATURE EFFECTS

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ON AC MOTORS' - 67 20.0 PRESSURE LOCKING AND THERMAL BINDING -- 67 21.0 INDUSTRY INFORMATION 68 22.0 PROGRAM SCHEDULE - 68 23.0 NRC MOV INSPECTION /MOV SELF ASSESSMENT AUDIT- 69 23.1 NRC MOV INSPECTIONS 69 23.2 MOV SELF ASSESSMENT 69 REFERENCES 70 ATTACHMENTS 73

1. INSPECTION REPORT OPEN ITEMS iii

1 TABLES TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE I

Table 1: SSPSA Listing for all Seabrook MOVs 7 Table 2: SSPSA GL MOV Grouping 13  ;

Table 3: MOVs Evaluated for inclusion into Seabrook GL 89-10 Program 17 Table 4: Physical Characteristics of GL 89-10 MOVs 23 Table 5: Stem / Stem Nut Friction Coefficient Based on Testing 29 Table 6: Design Thrust Values - Rising Stem Valves 31 Table 7: Design Torque Values - Butterfly Valves 33 Table 8: Torque Switch Serpoints - 35 Table 9: Misposition MOVs 42 ,

Table 10: MOV Valve Grouping 33 Table i1: Dynamically Tested MOVs 48 Table 12: Dynamic Test Conditions 50 .

Table 13: Margin Based On Dynamic Testing 53 Table 14: Load Sensitive Behavior - 57 Table 15: Adequacy of Valve Set Up -

58 Table 16: Post Maintenance Test Guidelines 62 iv 1 1

CLOSURE OF SEABROOK STATION GL 89-10 PROGRAM Executive Summary This h=a=* describes the bases for Seabrook Stauon's closure of the design-basis verification phase of NRC Genenc Imter 89-10, " Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance." Seabrook's MOV Program has been designed as a living program. Acw.441y, informaton obtained through operatmg expenence and industry information will be evaluated and if determined applicable will be factored into the Seabrook Stahon Motor Operated Valve Program This report describes the approach that Seabrook Station used to address Genenc Letter 89-10 and docummis the results of the Motor Operated Valve Program unplemented at Seabrook Station This report documents actions taken to date, as well as a description of the longer-term program developed for the penodic verification testmg of safety-related motor-operated valves (MOVs). 'Ihis progmm verified and ensures MOV operability under design-basis differential pressure and flow conditions.

Seabrook Stahon committed to develop a detailed program to address the r-=amdati provided in NRC Generic 14:er 89-10. All safety-related MOV's and positionA agankle MOV's in safety-related piping systems were evaluated as part of the program *Ihis program includes determimng the system conditions for each indivulual safety related motor-operated valve including maximum system pressure, maximum differenhal pressure, flow conditions, maxunum ambamt temperatures and nunimum voltage at the motor leads. Based on the maxunum operating conditions required valve torque and thrusts were determmed Maxunum torque and/or thrust values were determined takmg into account the weak link of the g-T-;-:- =t.

Based on the above informahon, muumum and maximum torque switch setpoints were calculated. Finally, t

each indivulual motor operator was tested under static conditions to assure that the valve set up is acceptable. Additionally, dynamic testag was perfur..,cd on 60 of the valves. A combination of analysis, static testmg and dynamic testmg at design basis conditions demonstrated the operability of all safety related MOVs.

Seabrook Station Procedure ES1850.003, " Motor Operated Valve Performance Monitoring"is the controlling document for the i=ala==aatabon of Generic Letter 89-10. ESl850.003 assures that motor-operated valves are maintamed, in a condition such that they will be capable of perfonning their design funcuan throughout the life of the plant. This procedure provides a predictive maintenance capability so that adverse trends can be datectad and corrected in accordance with Scabrook Stauon's preventative maintenance activities.

MOV performance parameters provided in this report are correct and current at the time of the report preparabon. Actual MOV performance parameters are controlled as part of the North Atlantic Design Control Program.

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1.0 PURPOSE He purpose of this document is to summarize the actions taken to address the generic letter recommendations and to provide a basis for closure of the design-basis phase of Generic Letter 89-10. His document will also describe the actions taken to support MOV actisities. MOV design changes that have been incorporated as a result of Seabrook's MOV activities are summarized and results of MOV inspections are discussed.

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2.0 BACKGROUND

The NRC issued I.E. Bulletin 85-03, " Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings" on November 15,1985. This bulletin requested licensees to develop and implement a program to ensure that switch settings on certain safety-related motor-operated valves were selected, set and maintained correctly to accaiwiaiate the maxunum differential pressures ,

expected on these valves during both normal and abnormal events within the design basis. Motorgrated valves in the high pressure coolant injection / core spray and emergency feedwater systems that are required to be tested for operational readiness were included in the population of valves addressed for this bulletin.

Subsequently, on June 28,1989, the NRC staffissued Generic Letter 89-10, " Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance,". This generic letter expanded the scope of the aforementioned  !

I.E. Bulletin 85-03 to include all safety-related as well as all position changeable MOVs. Position changeable MOVs were defined as any motor-operated valve in a safety-related system that is not blocked from inadvertent operation from the control room, the motor control center or the valve itself. The NRC -

justified expansion of the safety-related MOV population to be considered based on NRC extrapolations of test results in response to I.E. Bulletm 85-03.

The generic letter provided recommendations to the licensees for the development of adequate programs to ensure operability of safety-related MOV's under all design basis conditions. The generic letter provided the following recommendations:

a) Each licensee review and document the design basis for each MOV. l b) Based on the results of the design basis review establish correct motor-operator switch settings.

c) The valve should be demonstrated to be operable by testing the valve under maximum design basis j differential pressure and/or flow conditions. Explanations should be documented for any cases where testing at the design basis differential pressure or flow conditions could not be performed. )

d) Prepare and revise procedures to assure that correct switch settings are determined and maintained for the life of the plant.

e) He design basis review should include an exammation of the pertinent design and installation criteria for each particular valve including effects of reduced voltage on the actuator capability.

f) Documentation of the test methods used to accomplish testing the valve under design basis differential pressure and flow conditions.

g) Provide a list for review of deficiencies, misadjustments and degraded conditions discovered by licensees as a result ofI.E. Bulletin 85-03 for review.

h) Each MOV failure and corrective action including repairs should be analyzed and docmnented. This data should be periodically exanuned as part of a trending program .

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i) Provides the recommended schedule to address the Generic Letter, j) A periodic MOV testmg program should be established. He periodic inspection frequency should be based on the licensee's evaluation and should consider the safety importance of each MOV as well as its maintenance and performance history. Post maintenance testing guidelines should be established to ensure MOV operability following maintenance The NRC requested that licensees complete all design basis reviews, analyses, verifications, tests and inspections that have been instituted within five years or three refueling outages, whichever is later, from the date ofissuance of the generic letter (June 28,1989).

He NRC staff held public workshops to discuss the generic letter and to answer questions regarding its implementation. Subsequently, the NRC naffissued additional guidance for generic letter implementation as Generic Letter supplements. He following generic letter supplements were issued:

• Supplement 1, "Results of the Public Workshop", was issued on June 13,1990. His supplement excluded all items located in duct work such as dampers, weir and sluice gates, MOVs that do not change position during any accident scenario and are inhibited from mispositioning and MOVs whose position have no bearing on any system operation were excluded from the generic letter program. The following exceptions to testing at design basis conditions with sufficient technicaljustification was provided: 1. if testing is damaging to the plant or specific MOV,2. if testing creates a siolation of technical specifications or other licensing conditions and 3. if data on similar valves with appropriate design-basis test data is available.'

. Supplement 2, " Availability of Program Descriptions", was issued on August 3,1990. This supplement delayed the commencement of MOV inspections by six months or until at least January 1,1991.

• Supplement 3, " Consideration of Results of NRC-Sponsored Tests of Motor-Operated Valves", was issued on October 25,1990. This supplement requested BWR licensees to assess the applicability of data from the NRC sponsored MOV tests to detennine the "as-is" capability of the HPCI, RCIC and RWCU motor-operated valves.

• Supplement 4, " Consideration of Valve Mispositioning in Boiling Water Reactors", was issued on February 12,1992. Supplement 4 deleted the recommendation for inadvertent mispositioning of MOVs from the control room from the scope of the generic letter for BWR licensees.

• Supplement 5, " inaccuracy of Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic Equipment", was issued on June 28, 1993. Supplement 5 addressed the inaccuracy of diagnostic test equipment inaccuracy as a result of industry sponsored testing.

• Supplement 6, "Information on Schedule and Grouping, and Staff Responses to Additional Public Questions", was issued on March 4,1994. This Supplement further clarified NRC positions on the schedule for completing MOV testing to verify design-basis capability. Supplement 6 provided detailed guidance for valve grouping including specifying a required minimum number of valves to be tested in each valve group. This supplement also provided staff responses to other general public questions.

Supplement 7 to be issued will address valve mispositioning for PWR units. Seabrook plans to reevaluate its position on inadvertent valve mispositioning of all program valves once the NRC issues their official position on valve mispositioning for PWR units. Seabrook plans to remove MOVs from the enhanced MOV Program for valves that have been included solely based on inadvertent mispositioning.

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3.0 PROGRAM SCOPE ,

All safety-related motor operated valves were evaluated for inclusion in the generic letter motor-operated valve program at Seabrook Station. Additionally, motor-operated valves that are installed in safety-related ,

systems that have no active safety function and only have a safety function to maintain pressure boundary -

integrity were also reviewed and considered for incorporation into the Program. The program developed to address the Generic Letter consisted of the following: ,

• ~ Performing an initial screenmg to determme the MOVs to be included in the Program. ,

= Rankmg all the MOVs based on their safety significance using the Seabrook Probabilistic Safety i Assessment results.

• Deternumng the operating conditions as well as the design basis conditions for valve operation.

• Calculating the worst case maximum differential pressure for valve operation and identifying the corresponding flow and temperature conditions.

• Calculating the required thrust / torque for valve operation.

• Deternunmg the manmum allowable thrusts of the weak link component of the valve and actuator combination. .

e Calculating the muumum v.xl mammum torque switch setpoints.

• Calculating the thrust / torque acceptance range as appropriate to support diagnostic testing of each valve. i e Performing the required diagnostic testing to verify that the valve is set within the acceptable range.

• Performing dynamic testing of the testable valves in accordance with the grouping criteria.

• Developing a periodic maintenance and verification program for the valves to ensure that valve operability is maintained throughout the life of the plant.

. Development of a trending prognm that addresses MOV degradations and corrective actions. ,

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4.0 PROGRAM OBJECTIVE The objective of the Seabrook Station MOV Program is to provide assurance that the MOVs in senice at Seabrook are capable of operating under all design basis differential pressure and flow conditions for the life of the plant.

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5.0 PROGRAM DESCRIPTION Seabrook's Motor-Operated Valve Program is described in station procedure ES 1850.003, " Motor Operated Valve Performance Monitoring". The objective of procedure ES1850.003 is to provide assurance that the MOVs at Seabrook are maintained in a condition so that they are capable of performing their design function throughout the life of the plant. A secondary objective is to provide a predictive maintenance capability so that adverse trends can be detected and corrected as part of the preventive maintenance program. All motor-operated valves in service at Seabrook Station are included in the MOV Program. For safety-related MOVs, the program requirements are based on the recommendations presented in NRC Generic Letter 89-10.

ES 1850.003 defines the preventative maintenance activities for each individual valve. It also defines the periodic testing requirements for the Generic Letter MOVs. Actual MOV work activities, both preventive maintenance and periodic testing, are scheduled and controlled by the Station Work Control Program 6.0 SEABROOK STATION MOV PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT Two discrete evaluations were performed to incorporate the Seabrook Station Probabilistic Safety Assessment (SSPSA) into the Generic Letter MOV Program. The second evaluation reviewed Seabrook's Generic Letter valve population. The two evaluations are described below.

6.1 1990 SSPSA Evaluation All MOVs that are in service at Seabrook Station are qualitatively categorized by priority based on the results of the Seabrook Station Probabilistic Safety Assessment. Table I provides the listing of all motor-operated valves identifying the SSPSA priority for each valve. Each valve was assigned one of the following prioritie: based on its safety significance:

. Priority 1: MOVs which are important to safety and are required for safe shutdown and have been identified by the SSPSA and whose failure mode is consistent with Generic Letter 89-10 concems.

There were 49 MOVs in this category.

• Priority 2: MOVs which are important to safety and are required for safe shutdown and have been quantified as " transfer over mission time" in the SSPSA but whose failure mode is not specifically addressed in the Generic Letter unless the valve is mispositioned. There were 49 MOVs in this category.

. Priority 3: The remaining MOVs which are important to safety and required for safe shutdown but whose safety significance has been evaluated as less critical than those valves designated priority I or 2.

There were 24 MOVs in this category.

Priority 4: All other MOVs that do not have safety significant functions but are important to power generation.

The valves categorized as priority 1,2 and 3 were initially included in the enhanced MOV Program based on the requirements of the generic letter. These valves and selected priority 4 valves that are installed in safety related systems were evaluated in accordance with the recommendations presented in the generic letter.

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6.2 SSPSA Evaluation of Seabrook's Response to Generic Letter 89-10 (1993 Evaluation)

In 1993, an evaluation was conducted to assess the safety significance of MOVs within the Generic Letter 89-10 program as well as other potentially safety significant MOVs. This evaluation was an update to the earlier evaluation conducted in 1990 and is performed as part of the Seabrook Station Probabilistic Risk .

Assessment Program which is a living program. The outcome of the review identified the three following categories of MOVs with respect to Generic Letter 89-10 concerns: i

1. MOVs that are only position changeable valves. These are valves that do not have to open/close to perform their safety function but may have to be operated if mispositioned.

2. MOVs that must open/close to perform their safety function and that experience high differential pressures when required to actuate. High differential pressure was defined as a differential pressure greater than 600 psid.

3. MOVs that must open/close to perform their safety function and experience low differential pressure when required to actuate. Low differential pressure was defined as differential pressure less than 600 psid.

I Engineering Evaluation 93-44 documented the review of Seabrook's Generic Letter 89-10 MOV Program.

This review assessed the risk significance and applicability of Generic Letter 89-10 related issues as they pertain to the Seabrook MOV Program and other plant programs. Each MOV in the Seabrook Generic Letter 89-10 Program was reviewed. The purpose of the review was to identify the valves that are potentially risk significant from an 89-10 perspective and to identify the MOVs that are clearly not risk significant from an 89-10 perspective.

This evaluation consisted of a functional and risk significance deternunation in light of Generic Letter 89-10 concerns. Attributes considered in this evaluation included design and PRA related functional requirements, failure rates (both pre and post Generic Letter 89-10 set-up), potential inter and intra-system common mode failures, valve margin, operating delta P, the knowledge gained by other non-Generic Letter 89-10 tests, surveillances or PMs as well as an explicit consideration of the potential for mispositioning of the MOV.

In addition, as part of this evaluation, a review of research underway within the industry and the NRC was l also conducted. This review consisted ofinvestigating the up to date information available on both PWR and l BWR mispositioning as well as safety significance. 1 The end product of this evaluation was a grouping of MOVs based upon safety significance. The metrics used to assign this significance consisted of the MOV's potential impact upon core damage frequency and containment performance. Future revisions to periodic verification testing will factor this information into the evaluation for extending test frequencies.

The original PRA priorities based on the 1990 SSPSA evaluation have been updated to reflect the 1993 evaluation. Priorities I through 5 are categorized as test groups. Priority 6 addresses valves that are position changeable. These test groups are defined in this report following Table 1. In Table I the test groups are used in the PRA priority column. Additionally Priority 7 was added to include valves that were not ranked in the 1993 SSPSA Evaluation. Table I documents the latest risk based categorization of all Generic Letter 89 10 MOVs, as well as all other MOVs in service at Seabrook.

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1 TABLE 1 SSPSA LISTING FOR ALL SEABROOK MOVs VALVEID 1990 1993 FUNCTION PRA PRA Priority Pdority AS-V-175 3 5 Train 'A' HELB lsolation - AUX Steam Supply to PAB And WPB AS-V-176 3 5 Train 'B' HELB Isolation - AUX Steam Supply to PAB And WPB '

CBS-V-2 1 5 RWST to RHR/CBS Pump Suction Isolation (Train ' A')

CBS V-5 1 5 RWST to RHPJCBS Pump Suction Isolation (Train 'B')

CBS-V-8 1 3 Isolation Valve for Containment Recire Sump Tank 101 A CBS-V-I l 1 4 Containment Spray Header Train ' A' Isolation Valve CBS-V-14 1 3 Isolation Valve for Containment Recire Sump Tank 101B CBS-V-17 1 4 Containment Spray Header Train 'B' Isolation Valve CBS-V-38 3 5 SAT Supply to RWST Isolation Train ' A' CBS-V-43 3 5 SAT Supply to RWST Isolation Train 'B' CBS-V-47 2 5 RWST to SI Pump 'A' Suction Isolation I CBS-V-49 2 6 RWST to SI Pump 'A' Suction Isolation l CBS-V-51 2 5 RWST to SI Pump 'B' Suction isolation l CBS-V-53 2 6 RWST to SI Pump 'B' Suction Isolation CC-V-137

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1 5 PCCW Isolation to CBS HX 'A' CC-V-145 1 3 PCCW Isolation to RHR HX 'A' CC-V-266 1 5 PCCW Isolation to CBS HX 'B' CC-V-272 1 3 PCCW Isolation to RHR HX 'B' CC-V-395 2 3 PCCW Isolation from RCP 'B' Thermal Bamer CC-V-428 2 3 PCCW Isolation from RCP ' A' Thermal Barrier CC-V-434 2 6 PCCW Isolation from Excess Letdown HX CC-V-438 2 3 PCCW Isolation from RCP 'C' Thermal Barrier CC-V-439 2 3 PCCW Isolation from RCP 'D' Thermal Barrier CC V-1092 2 6 PCCW Loop 'B' Isolation to Thermal Barrier HX 'B' CC-V-1095 2 6 PCCW Loop 'B' Isolation from Thermal Barrier HX 'B' CC-V-1101 2 6 PCCW Loop 'A' Isolation to Thermal Bamer HX ' A' CC-V-1109 2 6 PCCW Loop ' A' Isolation from Thermal Barrier HX ' A' CGC-V-14 3 6 Containment Purge Exhaust Isolation IRC CGC-V-28 3 6 Containment Purge Exhaust Isolation IRC CO-V-59 4 7 FW Heaters 21C and 22C Inlet CO-V-71 4 7 FW Heaters 21 A and 22A Inlet CO-V-73 4 7 FW Heaters 21B and 22B Inlet CO V-75 4 7 FW Heaters 21 and 22 ' A', 'B', and 'C' Bvpass CO-V-82 4 7 FW Heaters 21 A and 22A Outlet CO-V-84 4 7 FW Heaters 218 and 22B Outlet CO-V-86 4 7 FW Heaters 21C and 22C Outlet COP-V-7 4 7 COP Exhaust Throttle Valve (Fine Control)

COP V-8 4 7 COP Exhaust Throttle Valve (Coarse Control)

CS-LCV-112B 1 5 Charging Pump Suction from VCT - Train 'A' CS-LCV-I 12C 1 5 Charging Pump Suction from VCT - Train 'B' CS LCV-ll2D 1 5 Charging Pump Suction from RWST - Train ' A' CS-LCV Il2E 1 5 Charging Pump Suction from RWST - Train 'B' CS-V-142 3 3 Train 'A' Charging System to Regen HX Isolation 7

TABLE 1 SSPSA LISTING FOR ALL SEABROOK MOVs VALVEID 1990 1993 FUNCTION PRA PRA Priority Priority CS-V-143 3 3 Train 'B' Charging System to Regen HX Isolation CS V-149 3 3 Regen HX Outlet to Letdown HX CS-V-154 3 6 'D' RCP SealInjection Isolation CS V-158 3 6 'C' RCP Seal Injection Isolation j CS-V-162 3 6 'B' RCP Seal Injection Isolation

] CS-V-166 3 6 'A' RCP Seal Injection Isolation CS-V-167 1 5 RCP Seals to Seal Water HX l CS-V-168 1 5 RCP Seals to Seal Water HX CS-HCV-189 4 7 Letdown Flow Control j j CS-HCV-190 4 7 Letdown Flow Control

! CS-V-196 3 4 Charging Pump 'A' Min Flow Isolation l

i CS-V-197 3 4 Charging Pump 'B' Min Flow Isolation I CS-V-205 4 7 PDP Min Flow Recire j CS V-426 3 5 Emergency Boration to Charging Pump Suction Header CS-V 460 1 5 SI And Charging Pump Suction X-Connect from RH Pump Disch CS-V-461 1 5 SI And Charging Pump Suction X-Connect from RH Pump Disch CS-V-475 2 6 SI And Charging Punip Suction X-Connect from RH Pump Disch CS-V-625 4 7 L/D System to PDT Iso from LCV-ll2A 1 1 CS-V-633 4 7 Letdown Degasifier Supply i CW V-1 4 7 Intake Structure to Unit 1 Flume

CW V-2 4 7 Intake Structure to Unit 1 Flume l CW-V-4 4 7 CW-P-39A Discharge CW-V-8 4 7 CW-P-39B Discharge

CW-V-11 4 7 CW-P-39C Discharge 5

CW-V-15 4 7 CW.E-27C CW Inlet Isolation CW-V-16 4 7 Condenser 'B' CW Inlet Isolation CW-V-17 4 7 Condenser 'A' CW Inlet Isolation j CW-V-29 4 7 CW-E-27C CW Outlet Isolation CW-V-31 4 7 Condenser 'B' CW Outlet Isolation CW-V-33 4 7 Condenser 'A' CW Outlet Isolation CW-V-38 4 7 Unit I CW Outlet to Discharge Structure CW-V-39 4 7 Unit I CW Outlet to Intake Structure CW-V-40 4 7 Flume Supply Valve for Heat Treatment CW-V-66 4 7 Intake Structure to Unit 2 Flume CW V-67 4 7 Intake Structure to Unit 2 Flume l CW-V-68 4 7 Unit 2 CW Outlet to Discharge Structure CW-V 69 4 7 Unit 2 CW Outlet to Intake Structure CW-V 70 4 7 Flume Supply Valve for Heat Treatment EX-V-1 4 7 FW E-26A Hi/Hi Heater Isolation EX-V-4 4 7 FW E-26B Hi/Hi Heater Isolation EX-V-13 4 7 24C Hi/Hi Heater Isolation EX-V-16 4 7 23C Hi/Hi Heater Isolation EX-V-19 4 7 24B Hi/Hi Heater Level isolation EX-V-22 4 7 23B Hi/Hi Heater Isolation EX V 25 4 7 24A Hi/Hi Heater Isolation 8

TABLEI SSPSA LISTING FOR ALL SEABROOK MOVs VALVE ID 1990 1993 FUNCTION PRA PRA Priority Priority EX-V-28 4 7 23 A Hi/Hi Heater Isolation FP-V-127 4 7 Fire Protection Tank 'B' Auto Fill FP-V-132 4 7 Fire Protection Tank 'A' Auto Fill FW V-2 4 7 Feed Pump 'A' Discharge Isolation FW-V 13 4 7 Feed Pump 'B' Discharge Isolation FW-V-23 4 7 26A Heater Outlet Isolation FW-V-25 4 7 26B Heater Outlet Isolation FW-V-28 4 7 Feedwater Regulating Block Valve ' A' FW-V-37 4 7 Feedwater Regulating Block Valve 'B' FW-V-46 4 7 Feedwater Regulating Block Valve 'C' FW-V-55 4 7 Feedwater Regulating Block Valve 'D' FW-V-156 2 4 EFW X-Connect Isolation from SUFP FW-V-163 2 1 SUFP X-Connect to EFW Header FW-V-346 2 3 EFW Pump 37-A Min Flow Recire to CST FW-V-347 2 3 EFW Pump 37-B Min Flow Recirc to CST FW-FV-4214A 2 5 S/G 'A' EFW Train ' A' Flow Control FW-FV-4214B 2 5 S/G ' A' EFW Train 'B' Flow Control FW-FV-4224A 2 5 S/G *B' EFW Train 'A' Flow Control FW-FV-4224B 2 5 S/G 'B' EFW Train 'B' Flow Control FW-FV-4234A 2 5 S/G 'C' EFW Train ' A' Flow Control FW-FV 4234B 2 5 S/G 'C' EFW Train 'B' Flow Control FW-FV-4244A 2 5 S/G 'D' EFW Train ' A' Flow Control FW-FV-4244B 2 5 S/G 'D' EFW Train 'B' Flow Control HD-V-240 4 7 Heater Drain Tank Vent MS-V-100 4 7 Reheater Steam Supply for MSR 'A' MS-V-101 4 7 Reheater Steam Supply for MSR 'A' MS-V-150 4 7 Reheater Steam Supply for MSR 'D' MS-V-158 4 7 Reheater Steam Supply for MSR 'C' MS-V-204 3 6 SG ' A' MSIV Bypass MS-V-205 3 6 SG 'B' MSIV Bypass MS-V-206 3 6 SG 'C' MSIV Bypass MS-V-207 3 6 SG 'D' MSIV Bypass MSD-V-1 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V 2 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-3 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-4 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V 5 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD V-6 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-7 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-8 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V 9 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V 10 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V 12 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-14 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-15 4 7 MSR ' A' Reheat Steam Control Valve Drain 9

TABLE 1 SSPSA LISTING FOR ALL SEABROOK MOVs VALVEID 1990 1993 FUNCTION PRA PRA Priority Priority MSD-V-16 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-17 4 7 MSR 'B' Reheat Steam Control Valve Drain MSD-V-18 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-19 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-20 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-21 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-22 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-23 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-24 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-25 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V 26 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-27 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-28 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-29 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-30 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-31 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-32 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-33 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-34 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-35 4 7 FW-E-26B Extraction Steam Supply Drain MSD-V-36 4 7 MSR 'A' Drain B3 pass MSD-V-37 4 7 MSR ' A' Drain Bypass MSD-V-38 4 7 MSR *B' Drain Bypass MSD-V-39 4 7 MSR 'B' Drain Bypass MSD V-40 4 7 MSR 'C' Drain Bypass MSD V-41 4 7 MSR 'C' Drain Bypass MSD-V-42 4 7 MSR 'D' Drain Bypass MSD-V-43 4 7 MSR 'D' Drain B3 pass MSD-V-44 3 3 MS Drain Isolation Valve Upstream of MS-V-86 MSD-V-45 3 3 MS Drain Isolation Valve Upstream of MS V-85 MSD V-46 3 3 MS Drain Isolation Valve Upstream of MS-V-90 MSD-V-47 3 3 MS Drain Isolation Valve Upstream of MS-V 92 MSD-V-48 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-49 4 7 MSR 'C' Reheat Steam Control Valve Drain MSD-V-50 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V 51 4 7 MSR 'D' Reheat Steam Control Valve Drain MSD-V 53 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-55 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V 57 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-59 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-67 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD V-69 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-71 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-73 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MSD-V-75 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve 10

_. _- ~ . _ _ - _ __ _ _ _ _

TABLE 1 SSPSA LISTING FOR ALL SEABROOK MOVs VALVE ID 1990 1993 FUNCTION PRA PRA Priority Priority MSD-V-77 4 7 Main Steam Drain Valve MVD-V-142 4 7 Misc Vent and Drain Valve MVD-V 143 4 7 Misc Vent and Drain Valve MVD-V-144 4 7 Misc Vent and Drain Valve MVD-V-145 4 7 Misc Vent and Drain Valve MVD-V-146 4 7 Misc Vent and Drain Valve MVD-V 147 4 7 Misc Vent and Drain Valve MVD-V-148 4 7 Misc Vent and Drain Valve MVD-V-149 4 7 Misc Vent and Drain Valve MVD-V-150 4 7 Misc Vent and Drain Valve MVD-V-151 4 7 Misc Vent and Drain Valve RC-V-22 1 4 RHR Pump 'A' Suction Isolation from Loop i Hot Leg RC-V-23 1 4 RHR Pump 'A' Suction Isolation from Loop i Hot Leg RC-V-81 4 7 Regenerative Heat Exchanger Letdown isolation from Loop 3 RC-V-87 1 4 RHR Pump 'B' Suction Isolation from Loop 4 Hot Leg RC-V-88 1 4 RHR Pump 'B' Suction Isolation from Loop 4 Hot Leg RC-V-122 1 2 PORV 456A Block RC-V-124 1 2 PORV 456B Block RC-V-323 2 3 Reactor Head Vent Isolation RH-V-14 2 4 RHR Train 'A' to Cold Legs 1 And 2 RH-V-21 2 6 RHR Train 'B' Discharge X-Connect RH-V 22 2 6 RHR Train 'A' Discharge X-Connect  ;

RH-V-26 2 4 RHR Train 'B' to Cold Legs 3 And 4 RH-V-32 1 5 RHR Train 'B' Common Supply to Hot Leg Recire RH-V-35 1 5 RHR Pump ' A' Discharge Isolation to SI/ Charging Pumps RH-V-36 1 5 RHR Pump *B' Discharge Isolation to SI/ Charging Pumps RH V-70 1 5 RHR Train ' A' Common Supply to Hot Leg Recirc ,

RH-FCV-610 1 5 RHR Pump 'A' Min Flow Control RH-FCV-611 1 5 RHR Pump 'B' Min Flow Control SB-V-80 4 7 Blowdown Flashtank Steam Line Drain SB-V-189 4 7 SG 'A' Blowdown Isolation SB V-191 4 7 SG 'B' Blowdown isolation SB V-193 4 7 SG 'C' Slowdown Isolation SB-V-195 4 7 SG 'D' Blowdown Isolation SI V-3 2 5 Accumulator ' A' Discharge Isolation SI V-17 2 5 Accumulator 'B' Discharge Isolation SI V-32 2 5 Accumulator 'C' Discharge Isolation SI-V-47 2 5 Accumulator 'D' Discharge Isolation SI-V-77 2 5 SI Train 'B' Discharge Isolation to Hot Legs 1/4 SI V-89 1 1 S1 Pump 'B' Min Flow Isolation to RWST SI-V-90 1 1 S1 Pump 'A' Min Flow Isolation to RWST SI V-93 1 1 S1 Pumps ' A'/'B' Combined Min Flow Isolation SI-V-102 2 5 SI Train ' A' Discharge Isolation to Hot Legs 1/4 SI-V-111 2 5 SI Train 'B' Discharge X-Connect SI-V-112 2 5 Si Train ' A' Discharge X-Connect i1

TABLE 1 SSPSA LISTING FOR ALL SEABROOK MOVs VALVEID 1990 1993 FUNCTION PRA PRA Priority Priority SI-V-114 2 6 SI Pumps Common Isolation to Cold Legs SI-V-138 1 1 Charging Pumps Supply to RCS Cold Legs SI V-139 1 1 Charging Pumps Supply to RCS Cold Legs SSS-V-18 4 7 Steam Seal Header Bypass to Condenser SSS-V-19 4 7 Steam Seal Main Steam Supply B3 pass SSS-V-20 4 7 Steam Seal Feed Valve Isolation SSS-V-22 4 7 Steam Seal Auxiliary Steam Isolation SW-V-2 1 3 SW Pump 'A' Discharge Isolation SW-V-4 1 3 SW Train ' A' Isolation to Secondary Loads SW-V-5 1 3 SW Train 'B' Isolation to Secondary Loads SW-V-15 2 6 PCCW HX 'A' SW Isolation SW-V-17 2 6 PCCW HX 'B' SW Isolation SW-V-19 1 4 SW Train 'B' to Discharge Structure SW-V-20 1 4 SW Train 'A' Discharge Structure SW-V-22 1 3 SW Pump 'C' Discharge Isolation SW-V-23 1 4 SW Train 'B' Return to Cooling tower SW-V-25 1 4 Cooling Tower Pump 'B' Discharge Isolation SW-V-26 2 6 Cooling Tower Pump *B' Recire >

SW-V-27 2 4 Cooling Tower Train 'B' Spray Header B3 pass SW-V-29 1 3 SW Pump 'B' Discharge Isolation SW-V-31 1 3 SW Pump 'D' Discharge Isolation i SW-V-34 1 4 SW Train 'A' Return to Cooling tower SW-V-44 2 6 SW Isolation from Intake Structure SW-V-46 4 7 SW Isolation from Discharge Structure SW-V-54 1 4 Cooling Tower Pump ' A' Discharge Isolation SW-V-55 2 6 Cooling Tower Pump 'A' Recire SW-V-56 2 4 Cooling Tower Train 'A' Spray Header B3 pass SW V-63 4 4 SW Isolation to Discharge Structure SW-V-64 4 4 SW Isolation to intake Structure SW-V-74 2 6 Turbine Bldg SW X-Connect to PAB SW-V-75 4 4 Turbine Bldg SW Discharge to CW System Discharge SW-V-76 2 6 Turbine Bldg SW X-Connect to PAB SW V-139 1 6 SW Cooling Tower Train 'A' Spray Bypass Recirc SW-V-140 1 6 SW Cooling Tower Train 'B' Spray Bypass Recirc WL-V 222 4 7 Waste Distillate Discharge to Intake Structure WL-V-223 4 7 Waste Distillate Discharge to Discharge Structure 12

Table 2 provides the listing of all generic letter motor-operated valves identifying the current (1993) SSPS A Evaluation valve grouping for each valve based on Engineering Evaluation 93-44 criteria. Each valve was assigned into one of the following valve groups based on its safety significance and based on operating requirements:

Group 1: MOVs whose risk significance is high and are required to operate under high differential pressure conditions. There are 6 valves in this group.

Group 2: MOVs whose risk significance is medium and are required to operate under high differential pressure conditions. There are 2 valves in this group.

Group 3: MOVs whose risk significance is low and are required to operate under high differential pressure conditions or whose risk significance is high and the valves are required to operate under low differential pressure conditions. There are 24 valves in this group.

Group 4: MOVs whose risk significance is medium and are required to operate under low differential pressure conditions. There are 19 valves in this group.

Group 5: MOVs whose risk significance is low and are required to operate under low differential pressure conditions. There are 41 valves in this group.

Group 6: MOVs that are only position changeable valves. These are valves that do not have to open/close to perform their safety function but may have to be operated ifmispositioned. There are 30 MOVs in this group.

TABLE 2 SSPSA GL MOV GROUPING VALVE ID SSPSA VALVE FUNCTION RANK AS-V-175 5 Train 'A' HELB Isolation - Aux Steam Supply to PAB And WPB AS-V-176 5 Train 'B' HELB Isolation - Aux Steam Supply to PAB And WPB CBS-V-11 4 Contamment Spray Header Train 'A' Isolation Valve CBS-V-14 3 Isolation Valve for Containment Recire Sump Tank 101B CBS-V-17 4 Contamment Spray Header Train 'B' Isolation Valve i CBS-V-2 5 RWST to Train 'A' RHR/CBS Pump Suction Isolation  !

CBS-V-38 5 SAT Supply to RWST Isolation Train 'A' CBS-V-43 5 SAT Supply to RWST Isolation Train 'B' CBS-V-47 5 RWST to SI Pump 'A' Suction Isolation CBS-V-49 6 RWST to SI Pump 'A' Suction Isolation CBS-V-5 5 RWST to 'B' Train RHR/CBS Pump Suction Isolation CBS-V Sl 5 RWST to SI Pump 'B' Suction Isolation CBS-V-53 6 RWST to Si Pump 'B' Suction Isolation  !

CBS-V-8 3 Isolation Valve for Containment Recire Sump Tank 101 A l CC-V-1092 6 PCCW Loop 'B' Isolation to Hermal Barrier HX 'B' CC-V-1095 6 PCCW Loop 'B' Isolation from Thermal Barrier HX 'B' CC-V-1101 6 PCCW Loop 'A' Isolation to Thermal Barrier HX 'A' CC-V-1109 6 PCCW Loop 'A' Isolation from Thermal Barrier HX 'A' CC-V-137 5 PCCW isolation to CBS HX 'A' CC-V-145 3 PCCW Isolation to RHR HX 'A' 13

-- . . . -. . - - . . - - - . . . ~-- - . _ - - . _ - - _ ~ - - . .

TABLE 2 SSPSA GL MOV GROUPING VALVE ID SSPSA VALVE FUNCTION i RANK CC-V-266 5 PCCW Isolation to CBS HX 'B' CC-V-272 3 PCCW lsolation to RHR HX 'B' CC-V-395 3 PCCW Isolation from RCP 'B' Thermal Barrier CC-V-428 3 PCCW Isolation from RCP 'A' Hermal Barrier CC-V-434 6 PCCW Isolation from Excess Letdown HX CC-V-438 3 PCCW Isolation from RCP 'C' Hermal Barrier CC-V-439 3 PCCW Isolation from RCP 'D' Thermal Barrier CGC-V-14 6 Contamment Purge Exhaust Isolation IRC CGC-V-28 6 Contamment Purge Exhaust Isolation IRC CS-LCV-112B 5 Charging Pump Suction from VCT - Train 'A' CS-LCV-112C 5 Charging Pump Suction from VCT - Train 'B' CS-LCV-Il2D 5 Charging Pump Suction from RWST - Train 'A' CS-LCV-112E 5 Charging Pump Suction from RWST - Train 'B' CS-V-142 3 Train 'A' Charging System to Regen HX Isolation CS-V-143 3 Train 'B' Charging System to Regen HX Isolation CS-V-149 3 Regen HX Outlet to Letdown HX CS-V-154 6 'D' RCP Seal Injection isolation CS-V-158 6 'C' RCP Seal injection Isolation CS-V-162 6 'B' RCP Seal Injection Isolation CS-V-166 6 'A' RCP Seal Injection Isolation CS-V-167 5 RCP Seals to Seal Water HX CS-V-168 5 RCP Seals to Seal Water HX CS-V-196 4 Charging Pump 'A' Min Flow Isolation CS-V-197 4 Charging Pump 'B' Min Flow Isolation CS-V-426 5 Emergency Boration to Charging Pump Suction Header CS-V-460 5 SI And Charging Pump Suction X-Connect from RH Pump Disch CS-V-461 5 SI And Charging Pump Suction X-Connect from RH Pump Disch CS-V-475 6 SI And Charging Pump Suction X-Connect from RH Pump Disch FW-FV-4214A 5 S/G 'A' EFW Train 'A' Flow Control FW-FV-4214B 5 S/G 'A' EFW Train 'B' Flow Control FW-FV-4224A 5 S/G 'B' EFW Train 'A' Flow Control FW-FV-4224B 5 S/G 'B' EFW Train 'B' Flow Control FW-FV-4234A 5 S/G 'C' EFW Train 'A' Flow Control FW-FV-4234B 5 S/G 'C' EFW Train 'B' Flow Control FW-FV-4244A 5 S/G 'D' EFW Train 'A' Flow Control FW-FV-4244B 5 S/G 'D' EFW Train 'B' Flow Control FW-V-156 4 EFW X-Connect Isolation from SUFP FW-V-163 1 SUFP X-Connect to EFW Header FW-V-346 3 EFW Pump 37-A Min Flow Recire to CST FW-V-347 3 EFW Pump 37-B Min Flow Recire to CST MS-V-204 6 SG 'A' MSIV Bypass MS V-205 6 SG 'B' MSIV Bvpass 14

. -. - .- - . . . - .- - -. ~ _ - - --~ - . . ,

i TABLE 2 l SSPSA GL MOV GROUPING VALVE ID SSPSA VALVE FUNCTION ]

RANK <

MS-V-206 6 SG 'C' MSIV Bypass MS-V-207 6 SG 'D' MSIV Bypass MSD-V-44 3 MS Drain Isolation Valve Upstream of MS-V-86 MSD-V-45 3 MS Drain Isolation Valve Upstream of MS V-85 MSD-V-46 3 MS Drain Isolation Valve Upstream of MS-V-90 i MSD-V-47 3 MS Drain Isolation Valve Upstream of MS-V-92 RC-V-122 2 PORV 456A Block RC-V-124 2 PORV 456B Block RC-V-22 4 RHR Pump 'A' Suction Isolation from Loop i Hot Leg i RC-V-23 4 RHR Pump 'A' Suction Isolation from Loop i Hot Leg I RC-V-323 3 Reactor Head Vent Isolation RC V-87 4 RHR Pump 'B' Suction Isolation from Loop 4 Hot Leg RC V-88 4 RHR Pump 'B' Suction Isolation from Loop 4 Hot Leg RH-FCV-610 5 RHR Pump 'A' Min Flow Control RH-FCV-611 5 RHR Pump 'B' Min Flow Control I RH-V-14 4 RHR Train 'A' to Cold Legs 1 And 2 l

RH-V-21 6 RHR Train 'B' Discharge X-Connect  !

RH-V-22 6 RHR Train 'A' Discharge X-Connect RH-V-26 4 RHR Train 'B' to Cold Legs 3 And 4 RH-V-32 5 RHR Train 'B' Common Supply to Hot Leg Recire RH.V-35 5 RHR Pump A Discharge Isolation to SI/ Charging Pumps RH-V-36 5 RHR Pump B Discharge Isolation to SI/ Charging Pumps  !

RH-V-70 5 RHR Train 'A' Common Supply to Hot Leg Recire SI-V-102 5 St Train 'A' Discharge Isolation to Hot Legs 1/4 SI-V-111 5 SI Train 'B' Discharge X-Connect SI-V-112 5 SI Train 'A' Discharge X-Connect SI-V-114 6 SI Pumps Common Isolation to Cold Legs SI-V-138 1 Charging Pumps Supply to RCS Cold Legs SI-V-139 1 Charging Pumps Supply to RCS Cold Legs SI-V-17 5 Accumulator 'B' Discharge Isolation SI-V-3 5 Accumulator 'A' Discharge Isolation SI-V-32 5 Accumulator 'C' Discharge Isolation SI-V-47 5 Accumulator 'D' Discharge Isolation SI-V-77 5 SI Train 'B' Discharge Isolation to Hot Legs 1/4 SI-V-89 i SI Pump 'B' Min Flow Isolation to RWST SI-V-90 1 SI Pump 'A' Min Flow Isolation to RWST  !

SI-V-93 1 SI Pumps A/B Combined Min Flow Isolation I SW-V-139 6 SW Cooling Tower Train 'A' Spray Bvpass Recire SW-V-140 6 SW Cooling Tower Train 'B' Spray Bvpass Recire SW-V-15 6 PCCW HX 'A' SW Isolation SW-V-17 6 PCCW HX 'B' SW Isolation SW-V-19 4 SW Train 'B' to Discharge Structure 15

l TABLE 2  !

SSPSA GL MOV GROUPING VALVE ID SSPSA VALVE FUNCTION RANK  !

SW-V-2 3 SW Pump A Discharge Isolation SW-V-20 4 SW Train 'A' Discharge Structure SW-V-22 3 SW Pump C Discharge Isolation SW-V-23 4 SW Train 'B' Return to Cooling Tower SW-V-25 4 Cooling Tower Pump B Discharge Isolation  ;

SW-V-26 6 Cooling Tower Pump B Recire SW-V-27 4 Cooling Tower Train 'B' Spray Header Bypass SW-V-29 3 SW Pump B Discharge Isolation SW-V-31 3 SW Pump D Discharge Isolation SW-V-34 4 SW Train 'A' Return to Cooling Tower SW-V-4 3 SW Train 'A' Isolation to Secondary Loads SW-V-5 3 SW Train 'B' Isolation to Secondary Loads SW-V-54 4 Cooling Tower Pump A Discharge Isolation SW-V-55 6 Cooling Tower Pump A Recire SW-V-56 4 Cooling Tower Train 'A' Spray Header Bypass SW-V-74 6 Turbine Bldg SW X-Connect to PAB SW-V-76 6 Turbine Bldg SW X-Connect to PAB l 16

Table 3 identifies the safety-related valves as well as selected non-safety related MOVs that were evaluated as part of Seabrook's enhanced MOV Program. Valves that are included in the generic letter program are  !

identified in Table 3. All MOVs are in the MOV Program. MOVs that meet the criteria of the generic letter are in the enhanced program which has additional testing and surveillance requirements. If an evaluated valve did not meet the generic letter criteria for inclusion in the enhanced program it was not included as part of the Generic Letter MOV Program. Originally there were 122 MOVs in Seabrook's Generic Letter MOV l Program. After all valves were evaluated the following valves were found not to meet the generic letter j inclusion criteria: '

e CC-V-434 l e SW-V-26

• SW-V-44 l

• SW-V-55 l

1 Currently, there are i18 MOVs in the enhanced MOV Program, twenty-six MOVs are included solely due to  :

the mispositioning case described by the original Generic Letter. Section i1.0 of this report discusses the misposition issue with respect to the proposed 89-10 Supplement 7.

TABLE 3 MOVS EVALUATED FOR INCLUSION INTO SEABROOK'S GENERIC LETTER 89-10 MOV l PROGRAM VALVE ID VALVE FUNCTION IN GL MOV PROGRAM  ;

AS-V-175 Train 'A' HELB Isolation - Aux Steam Supply to PAB And WPB Yes AS-V-176 Train 'B' HELB Isolation - Aux Steam Supply to PAB And WPB Yes CBS-V-I l Containment Spray Header Train 'A' isolation Valve Yes CBS-V-14 Isolation Valve for Contamment Recirc Sump Tank 101B Yes l

CBS-V-17 Containment Spray Header Train 'B' Isolation Valve Yes CBS-V-2 RWST to Train 'A' RHR/CBS Pump Suction Isolation Yes CBS-V-38 SAT Supply to RWST Isolation Train 'A' Yes CBS-V-43 SAT Supply to RWST Isolation Train 'B' Yes CBS-V-47 RWST to SI Pump 'A' Suction Isolation Yes CBS-V-49 RWST to SI Pump 'A' Suction Isolation Yes CBS-V-5 RWST to 'B' Train RHR/CBS Pump Suction Isolation Yes CBS-V-51 RWST to SI Pump 'B' Suction Isolation Yes CBS V-53 RWST to S1 Pump 'B' Suction Isolation Yes CBS-V-8 Isolation Valve for Containment Recire Sump Tank 101 A Yes CC-V-1092 PCCW Loop 'B' Isolation to Thermal Barrier HX 'B' Yes CC-V-1095 PCCW Loop 'B' Isolation from Thermal Barrier HX 'B' Yes CC-V-1101 PCCW Loop 'A' Isolation to Thermal Barrier HX 'A' Yes l

CC-V-1109 PCCW Loop 'A' Isolation from Thermal Barrier HX 'A' Yes  !

CC-V-137 PCCW Isolation to CBS HX 'A' Yes j CC-V-145 PCCW isolation to RHR HX 'A' Yes I CC-V-266 PCCW Isolation to CBS HX 'B' Yes CC-V-272 PCCW isolation to RHR HX 'B' Yes CC-V-395 PCCW Isolation from RCP 'B' Thermal Barrier Yes CC-V-428 PCCW lsolation from RCP 'A' Thermal Barrier Yes CC-V-434 PCCW Isolation from Excess Letdown HX No 17

TABLE 3 MOVS EVALUATED FOR INCLUSION INTO SEABROOK'S GENERIC LETTER 89-10 MOV '

PROGRAM VALVEID VALVE FUNCTION IN GL MOV PROGRAM CC-V-438 PCCW Isolation from RCP 'C"Ihermal Barrier Yes CC-V-439 PCCW Isolation from RCP 'D' Thermal Barrier Yes CGC-V-14 Containment Purge Exhaust Isolation IRC Yes CGC-V-28 Containment Purge Exhaust Isolation IRC Yes CS-LCV-112B Charging Pump Suction from VCT - Train 'A' Yes CS-LCV-112C Charging Pump Suction from VCT - Train 'B' Yes CS-LCV-112D Charging Pump Suction from RWST - Train 'A' Yes CS-LCV-ll2E Charging Pump Suction from RWST - Train 'B' Yes CS-V-142 Train 'A' Charging System to Regen HX Isolation Yes CS-V-143 Train 'B' Charging System to Regen HX isolation Yes CS-V-149 Regen HX Outlet to Letdown HX Yes CS-V-154 'D' RCP Seal Injection Isolation Yes CS-V-158 'C' RCP Seal Injection Isolation Yes CS-V-162 'B' RCP Seal Injection Isolation Yes CS-V-166 'A' RCP Seal Injection Isolation Yes CS-V-167 RCP Seals to Seal Water HX Yes CS-V-168 RCP Seals to Seal Water HX Yes CS-HCV189 Letdown Flow Control No CS-HCVl90 Letdown Flow Control No CS-V-196 Charging Pump 'A' Min Flow Isolation Yes CS-V-197 Charging Pump 'B' Min Flow Isolation Yes CS-V-426 Emergency Boration to Charging Pump Suction Header Yes l

CS-V-460 SI And Charging Pump Suction X-Connect from RH Pump Disch Yes  !

CS-V-461 SI And Charging Pump Suction X-Connect from RH Pump Disch Yes  !

CS-V-475 SI And Charging Pump Suction X-Connect from RH Pump Disch Yes j FW-FV-4214A S/G 'A' EFW Train 'A' Flow Control Yes FW-FV-4214B S/G 'A' EFW Train 'B' Flow Control Yes FW-FV-4224A S/G 'B' EFW Train 'A' Flow Control Yes FW-FV-4224B S/G 'B' EFW Train 'B' Flow Control Yes FW-FV-4234A S/G 'C' EFW Train 'A' Flow Control Yes FW-FV-4234B S/G 'C' EFW Train 'B' Flow Control Yes FW-FV-4244A S/G 'D' EFW Train 'A' Flow Control Yes FW-FV-4244B S/G 'D' EFW Train 'B' Flow Control Yes

)

FW-V-156 EFW X-Connect Isolation from SUFP Yes FW-V-163 SUFP X-Connect to EFW Header Yes FW V-346 EFW Pump 37-A Min Flow Recire to CST Yes FW-V-347 EFW Pump 37-B Min Flow Recire to CST Yes MS-V-204 SG 'A' MSIV Bypass Yes MS-V-205 SG 'B' MSIV Bypass Yes MS-V-206 SG 'C' MSIV Bypass Yes MS-V-207 SG 'D' MSIV Bypass Yes 18

- ..- - . - . . -~ . - . - - . - . - . - . - - - . - . - - - . . . - - . - - . . - -

i TABLE 3 MOVS EVALUATED FOR INCLUSION INTO SEABROOK'S GENERIC LETTER 89-10 MOV 4

PROGRAM VALVE ID VALVE FUNCTION IN GL MOV PROGRAM MSD-V-44 MS Drain Isolation Valve Upstream OF MS-V-86 Yes MSD-V-45 MS Drain Isolation Valve Upstream OF MS V-85 Yes MSD-V-46 MS Drain Isolation Valve Upstream OF MS-V-90 Yes MSD-V-47 MS Drain Isolation Valve Upstream OF MS-V-92 Yes RC-V-122 PORV 456A Block Yes RC-V-124 PORV 456B Block Yes RC-V-22 RHR Pump 'A' Suction Isolation from Loop 1 Hot Leg Yes RC-V-23 RHR Pump 'A' Suction Isolation from Loop 1 Hot Leg Yes RC-V-323 Reactor Head Vent isolation Yes RC-V81 Regenerative Heat Exchanger Letdown isolation from Loop 3 No i RC-V-87 RHR Pump 'B' Suction Isolation from Loop 4 Hot Leg Yes RC-V-88 RHR Pump 'B' Suction Isolation from Loop 4 Hot Leg Yes RH-FCV-610 RHR Pump 'A' Min Flow Control Yes RH-FCV-611 RHR Pump 'B' Min Flow Control Yes RH-V-14 RHR Train 'A' to Cold Legs 1 And 2 Yes RH-V-21 RHR Train 'B' Discharge X-Connect Yes ,

RH-V-22 RHR Train 'A' Discharge X-Connect Yes RH-V-26 RHR Train 'B'to Cold Legs 3 And 4 Yes RH-V-32 RHR Train 'B' Common Supply to Hot Leg Recire Yes f RH-V-35 RHR Pump A Discharge Isolation to SI/ Charging Pumps Yes l RH-V-36 RHR Pump B Discharg:: Isolation to SI/ Charging Pumps Yes RH-V-70 RHR Train 'A' Common Supply to Hot Leg Recire Yes )

SI-V-102 SI Train 'A' Discharge Isolation to Hot Legs 1/4 Yes I SI-V-111 Si Train 'B' Discharge X-Connect Yes  !

SI-V-112 SI Train 'A' Discharge X-Connect Yes SI-V-114 S1 Pumps Common Isolation to Cold Legs Yes SI-V-138 Charging Pumps Supply to RCS Cold Legs Yes SI-V-139 Charging Pumps Supply to RCS Cold Legs Yes SI-V-17 Accumulator 'B' Discharge Isolation Yes SI-V-3 Accumulator 'A' Discharge Isolation Yes SI-V-32 Accumulator 'C' Discharge Isolation Yes SI-V-47 Accumulator 'D' Discharge Isolation Yes SI-V-77 SI Train 'B' Discharge Isolation to Hot Legs 1/4 Yes SI-V-89 SI Pump 'B' Min Flow Isolation to RWST Yes SI-V-90 SI Pump 'A' Min Flow Isolation to RWST Yes SI-V-93 SI Pumps A/B Combined Min Flow Isolation Yes SW-V-139 SW Cooling Tower Train 'A' Spray Bypass Recire Yes SW-V-140 SW Cooling Tower Train 'B' Spray Bypass Recire Yes SW-V-15 PCCW HX 'A' SW Isolation Yes SW-V-17 PCCW HX 'B' SW Isolation Yes SW-V-19 SW Train 'B' to Discharge Structure Yes 19

P l 1 TABLE 3 MOVS EVALUATED FOR INCLUSION INTO SEABROOK'S GENERIC LETTER 89-10 MOV PROGRAM VALVE ID VALVE FUNCTION IN GL MOV PROGRAM l SW-V-2 SW Pump A Discharge Isolation Yes SW-V-20 SW Train 'A' Discharge Structure Yes SW-V-22 SW Pump C Discharge Isolation Yes  ;

SW-V-23 SW Train 'B' Return to Cooling Tower Yes SW-V-25 Cooling Tower Pump B Discharge Isolation Yes SW-V-26 Cooling Tower Pump B Recirc No I SW-V-27 Cooling Tower Train 'B' Spray Header Bypass Yes l SW-V-29 SW Pump B Discharge Isolation Yes SW-V-31 SW Pump D Discharge Isolation Yes I SW-V-34 SW Train 'A' Return to Cooling Tower Yes l SW-V-4 SW Train 'A' Isolation to Secondary Loads Yes SW-V44 Service Water Isolation from Intake Structure No SW-V-5 SW Train 'B' Isolation to Secondary Loads Yes l

SW-V-54 Cooling Tower Pump A Discharge Isolation Yes SW-V-55 Cooling Tower Pump A Recire No SW-V-56 Cooling Tower Train 'A' Spray Header Bvpass Yes l SW-V-74 Turbine Bldg SW X-Connect to PAB Yes SW-V-76 Turbine Bldg SW X-Connect to PAB Yes l

20

.. - - - - . . . .- -- . - - - - - .-----~ _ . -

N 7.0 DESIGN BASIS REVIEW Generic Letter 89-10, recommendation (a) requested that licensees review and document the design basis of each MOV that meets the scope of the generic letter. The Design Basis Review consisted of the following:

7.1 Valve Design Information Valve design information was reviewed to document specific valve design parameters for each individual valve. Valve specifications, Piping and Instrument Drawings (P&lDs), shop order data sheets, foreign prints

(vendor drawings), the Valve List, vendor instruction manuals, and valve data cards were reviewed as necessary to obtain valve design information. Change documents that affect MOVs were also reviewed. The valve vendors were contracted to provide additional design information and to provide weak link information for each MOV. The design differential pressure of each valve was identified as part of this review.

7.2 Motor-Operator Design Information Motor-operator design information was reviewed for each valve. Foreign prints, Actuator Manufacturer shop order data sheets, valve specifications, engineering change documents and valve data cards were reviewed as necessary to obtain the desired information. This portion of the review identified and documented motor-operator parameters such as operator size, type, overall gear ratios, stem diameter, pitch, lead, torque switch setpoints, spring pack part number, motor size, design minimum voltage and motor service factor.

7.3 Electrical Resiew In response to Oeneric Letter 89-10, the following actions were taken by Electrical Engineering:

7.3.1 TOL Sizing Motor Control Circuit Protection Calculation (Calc. No. 9763-3-ED-00-28-F) sizes the protective desices for MOV motor circuits. The sizing criteria was revised to use the larger of 110% of nameplate current or 110% of actual measured current in the selection of the circuit protective devices. This criteria ensures that the maximum running current is conservatively used in the sizing of the protective devices. This maximum running current value was subsequently labeled "TOL Basis Value" and added to Drawing 1-NHY-250000.

The Seabrook MOV testing program compares actual measured currents with the TOL Basis Value to ensure that the selected protective devices are acceptable.

21

7.3.2 MOV Reduced Voltage Generic Letter 89-10 recommendation (e) requests that the design basis review include pertinent design and installation criteria including the effects of reduced voltage on the actuator capability. The Voltage  !

Regulation Study (Calc. No. 9763-3 ED-00-02-F) uses a computer program to calculate the various bus and motor termmal voltages. Starting motors are modeled as a constant impedance within the program. MOV locked rotor current, starting power factor, cable impedance, and TOL heater coil impedance are considered i in the program to calculate the voltage drop from the supply bus to the MOV motor termmals.

The Voltage Regulation Study was revised to determme the voltage available at the MOV motor termmals for all safety-related MOVs during motor starting. Plant bus loading and supply bus voltages were ,

determined based on the conditions during which the MOVs are required to operate. These conditions include operation during sequencing ofloads on emergency diesel generators, during simultaneous start of safeguards loads via offsite power at nummum anticipated grid voltage, and during full load running sia offsite power.

The Voltage Regulation Study was revised to consider the impedance of the MOV thermal overload (TOL) j relay heater coils when calculating MOV termmal voltages. His results in increased voltage drop at the MOV motor terminals.

The Voltage Regulation Study was also revised to consider the effects of high ambient temperatures on cable impedances for MOVs located in harsh emironments (containment). He MOV feeder cable impedances for selected MOVs were adjusted based on the higher ambient temperature. This results in increased voltage drop at the MOV motor termmals.

The reduced voltage values obtained from the voltage regulation study were factored into the calculations to determine motor-operator capability. Also the effects of high ambient environmental temperatures were l evaluated to assure that adequate motor capability exists, see Sections 8.9 and 19 of this report for additional information.

7.4 Valve Operation Each MOV that is in a safety related flow path has been evaluated for incorporation into the generic letter )

MOV program. The safety function for each valve was reviewed and identified for each of the UFSAR i Chapter 15 accidents using the Safety Class Equipment List. Applicable Technical Specifications, UFSAR Sections, IST records, system descriptions, training manuals and Station Operations Procedures including normal, abnormal, emergency and surveillance procedures were reviewed as necessary to determine maximum operating conditions for each MOV. The flow paths for each valve were reviewed using the applicable Piping and Instrument Drawings. A determmation of the effect of valve mispositioning has been completed for all normal and emergency operating conditions for valves that are capable of being mispositioned from the main control room. Mispositioning was not considered for valves that are normally de-energized or that have automatic interlocks that prevent valve mispositioning. Maximum flow and fluid i process temperatures have been determined for each valve using the UFSAR, procedures and/or training l manuals. A determmation as to whether each individual valve is required to operate during the loading sequence of the emergency diesel generator has been made. Applicable normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures as well as surveillance procedures, Technical Specifications and UFSAR sections have been identified. A prelimmary test configuration and mode of operation to support testing have been identified.

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I i

i 7.5 Valve Configuration l

i Applicable P& ids have been reviewed to identify the installation isometric drawings for each program valve. 1

The T/P (Temperature / Pressure) sheets for each line were identified using the Line List. The T/P sheets identify the maximum pressures and temperatures expected during normal, upset, emergency, and faulted 1 - operating conditions. The isometric drawings have been reviewed to determine valve elevation and the

, existence of upstream and downstream disturbances.

( 1 j 7.6 Generic Letter Applicability Conclusion e

Following completion of the applicable component and system reviews, a determmation is made to ascertain j if the individual valves should be included in the Generic Letter program. Non-safety related MOVs that are in portions of safety related systems were also evaluated to assure that they were not required to be included

in the generic letter portion of the MOV Program Presently, there are one hundred and eighteen (118) j motor-operated valves included in the Seabrook Station Generic Letter MOV Program scope. Table 3 i identifies the valves that were evaluated for inclusion into the Generic Letter MOV Program and identifies l whether they were or were not included in the program. Table 4 identifies some of the physical characteristics of the valve and actuator for the generic letter MOVs.

l TABLE 4

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF GL 89-10 MOVs Valve ID Description

{ AS-V-175 12" Velan Gate SB-1 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 40 filb

! AS-V-176 12" Velan Gate SB-1 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 40 filb l CBS V-2 12" West Gate SB-1 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 60 filb Motor l CBS-V-5 12" West Gate SB-1 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 60 filb Motor I CBS-V-8 16" Velan Gate SMB-0 Limitocque Heavy Spring Pack - 15 filb l CBS-V-11 8" Aloyco Gate SB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 25 filb Motor  !

]~

CBS-V-14 16" Velan Gate SMB-0 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 15 filb l CBS-V-17 8" Aloyco Gate SB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 25 filb Motor l CBS-V-38 6" Aloyco Gate SMB-000 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 5 filb Motor CBS-V-43 6" Aloyco Gate SMB-000 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 5 filb Motor i CBS-V-47 8" West Gate SMB-00 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor l CBS-V-49 6" West Gate SMB-000 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 5 filb Motor l CBS-V-51 8" West Gate SMB-00 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor l CBS-V-53 6" West Gate SMB-000 Limitorque Extra Heavy Spring Pack - 10 filb Motor

CC-V-137 14" Posi Seal Butterfly SMB-000 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 5 filb Motor i CC-V-145 16" Posi Seal Butterfly SMB-000 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 5 filb Motor

CC-V-266 14" Posi Seal Butterfly SMB-000 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 5 filb Motor

. CC-V-272 16" Posi Seal Butterfly SMB-000 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 5 fttb Motor l CC-V-395 3" Velan Gate SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb j CC-V-428 3" Velan Gate SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb

} CC-V-438 3" Velan Gate SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb CC-V-439 3" Velan Gate SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb i

CC-V-1092 6" Posi Seal Butterfly SMB-000 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 2 filb Motor

] CC-V-1095 6" Posi Seal Butterfly SMB-000 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 2 filb Motor 4

CC-V-1101 6" Posi Seal Butterfly SMB-000 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 2 filb Motor CC-V-1109 6" Posi Seal Butterfly SMB-000 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 2 filb Motor

. 23

TABLE 4 PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF GL 89-10 MOVs Valve ID Description C'3C-V-14 2" Velan Globe SMB-000 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 5 filb Motor CGC-V-28 2" Velan Globe SMB-000 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 5 filb Motor CS-LCV-1128 4" West Gate SB-00 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor CS-LCV-112C 4" West Gate SB-00 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor CS-LCV-Il2D 8" West Gate SMB-00 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor CS-LCV-112E 8" West Gate SMB-00 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor CS-V-142 3" West Gate SB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor CS-V-143 3" West Gate SB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor l

CS-V-149 3" West Gate SMB-000 Limitorque Extra Heavy Spring Pack - 10 filb Motor CS-V-154 2" Velan/ West Globe SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 10 filb Motor

,CS-V- 158 2" Velan/ West Globe SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 10 filb Motor CS-V-162 2" Velan/ West Globe SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 10 filb Motor '

CS-V-166 2" VelanAVest Globe SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 10 filb Motor CS-V-167 2" Velan/ West Globe SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 10 filb Motor l

CS-V-168 2" Velan/ West Globe SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 10 filb Motor l CS-V-196 2" VelanAVest Globe SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 10 filb Motor CS-V-197 2" VelanAVest Globe SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 10 fllb Motor i CS-V-426 2" Velan/ West Globe SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 10 alb Motor l

CS-V-460 6" West Gate SMB-000 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 5 filb Motor CS-V-461 6" West Gate SMB-000 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 5 ftib Motor CS-V-475 6" West Gate SMB-000 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 5 filb Motor FW-V-156 6" Velan Gate SMB-0 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 25 filb Motor FW-V-163 6" Velan Gate SMB-0 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 25 filb Motor FW-V-346 4" Velan Globe SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 10 filb Motor FW-V-347 4" Velan Globe SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 10 filb Motor FW-FV-4214A 4" Masoneilon Globe NAl Rotork 11 Spring Pack - 50 filb Motor FW-FV-4214B 4" Masoneilon Globe NAl Rotork 11 Spring Pack - 50 filb Motor FW-FV-4224A 4" Masoneilon Globe NAl Rotork Ii Spring Pack - 50 ftib Motor FW-FV-4224A 4" Masoneilon Globe NAl Rotork Ii Spring Pack - 50 filb Motor FW-FV-4234A 4" Masoneilon Globe NAl Rotork Ii Spring Pack - 50 filb Motor FW-FV-4234B 4" Masoneilon Globe NAl Rotork i1 Spring Pack - 50 filb Motor FW-FV-4244A 4" Masoneilon Globe NAl Rotork 11 Spring Pack - 50 ftlb Motor FW-FV-4244B 4" Masoneilon Globe NA1 Rotork l1 Spring Pack - 50 filb Motor MS-V-204 4" Rockwell Globe SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 10 filb Motor MS-V-205 4" Rockwell Globe SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 10 fttb Motor MS-V-206 4" Rockwell Globe SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 10 filb Motor MS-V-207 4" Rockwell Globe SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 10 filb Motor MSD-V-44 1" Yarway Globe SMB-000 Limitorque Extra Heavy Spring Pack - 5 filb Motor MS D-V-45 I" Yanvay Globe SMB-000 Limitorque Extra Heavy Spring Pack - 5 fttb Motor MSD-V-46 1" Yarway Globe SMB-000 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 5 fttb Motor MS D-V-47 1" Yarway Globe SMB-000 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 5 flib Motor RC-V-22 12" West Gate SMB-1 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 40 flib Motor RC-V-23 12" West Gate SMB-1 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 40 filb Motor 24

TABLE 4 PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF GL 89-10 MOVs -

Valve ID Description RC-V-87 12" West Gate SMB-1 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 40 filb Motor RC-V-88 12" West Gate SMB-1 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 40 filb Motor RC-V-122 3" West Gate SB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor RC-V-124 3" West Gate SB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor RC-V-323 3/4" Velan Globe SMB-000 Limitorque Extra Light Spring Pack - 2 filb Motor RH-V-14 8" West Gate SB-1 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 60 filb Motor RH-V-21 8" West Gate SMB-00 Limitorque Medium Spring Pack - 25 fllb Motor RH-V-22 8" West Gate SMB-00 Limitorque Medium Spring Pack - 25 filb Motor RH-V-26 8" West Gate SB-1 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 60 filb Motor RH-V-32 8" West Gate SMB-0 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 25 alb Motor RH-V-35 8" West Gate SMB-00 Limitorque Medium Spring Pack - 25 filb Motor RH-V-36 8" West Gate SMB-00 Limitorque Medium Spring Pack - 25 filb Motor RH-V-70 8" West Gate SMB-0 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 25 filb Motor RH-FCV-610 3" Velan Globe SMB-00 Limitorque Extra Light Spring Pack - 10 filb Motor RH-FCV-611 3" Velan Globe SMB-00 Limitorque Extra Light Spring Pack - 10 filb Motor SI-V-3 10" West Gate SBD-3 Limitorque Light / Heavy Spring Pack - 150 filb Motor SI-V-17 10" West Gate SBD-3 Limitorque Light / Heavy Spring Pack - 150 filb Motor SI-V-32 10" West Gate SBD-3 Limitorque Light / Heavy Spring Pack - 150 filb Motor l SI-V-47 10" West Gate SBD-3 Limitorque Light / Heavy Spring Pack - 150 filb Motor SI-V-77 4" West Gate SB/SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor SI-V-89 1.5" Velen/ West Globe SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 10 alb Motor SI-V-90 1.5" Ve!an/ West Globe SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 10 filb Motor SI-V-93 1.5" Velan/ West Globe SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 10 filb Motor SI-V-102 4" West Gate SB/SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor I SI-V-111 4" West Gate SB/SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor SI V-112 4" West Gate SB/SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor SI-V-I l4 4" West Gate SB/SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 15 ftib Motor SI-V-138 4" West Gate SB/SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor SI-V-139 4" West Gate SB/SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor SW-V-2 24" Fisher Butterfly SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor SW-V-4 12" Fisher Butterfly SMB-00 Limitorque Extra Light Spring Pack - 5 filb Motor SW-V-5 12" Fisher Butterfly SMB-00 Limitorque Extra Light Spring Pack - 5 filb Motor SW-V-15 24" Fisher Butterfly SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor SW-V-17 24" Fisher Butterfly SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor SW-V-19 24" Fisher Butterfly SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor SW-V-20 24" Fisher Butterfly SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor SW-V-22 24" Fisher Butterfly SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor SW-V-23 24" Fisher Butterfly SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor SW-V-25 24" Fisher Butterfly SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor SW-V-27 24" Fisher Butterfly SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor SW-V-29 24" Fisher Butterfly SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor SW-V-31 24" Fisher Butterfly SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor SW-V-34 24" Fisher Butterfly SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 ftlb Motor 25

TABLE 4 PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF GL 89-10 MOVs Valve ID Description SW-V-54 24" Fisher Butterfly SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor j SW-V-56 24" Fisher Butterfly SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 ftib Motor SW-V-74 24" Fisher Butterfly SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor SW-V-76 24" Fisher Butterfly SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor SW-V-139 24" Fisher Butterfly SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor SW-V-140 24" Fisher Butterfly SMB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack - 15 filb Motor 8.0 MOV SIZING AND SWITCH SETTINGS Generic Letter 89-10 recommendation (b) states that the correct motor-operator switch settings should be established based on the design basis review. Seabrook performed the'following to establish correct switch settings:  !

l 8.1 Maximum Differential Pressure Deternunation The maximum differential pressure for each generic letter 89-10 valve was calculated using the guidance provided in the Motor-Operated Valve Program Maximum Differential Pressure Guideline which is included in the differential pressure calculations. Design basis accident conditions and both normal and abnormal operating conditions were considered in determining the maximum differential pressure and line pressure conditions. The potential for valve mispositioning and recovery from valve mispositioning were also factored -

into the calculations. The intent of the differential pressure calculations was to obtain a conservative maximum differential pressure for valve operation.

8.2 Gate and Globe Valve Required Thrust The required thrust for gate and globe valves was calculated in accordance with the Motor-Operated Valve Sizing and Calculation Guideline. The approach taken was to calculate the maxunum thrust required for valve operation. In most cases, the required thrust was calculated using the differential pressure (DP) that the valve was originally designed to operate under. In some cases, where the design differential pressure was substantially greater than the calculated DP value, a less conservative value was used in the calculation.

Generally the value selected was greater than the calculated maximum differential pressure value calculated using the approach described above. If the calculated differential pressure was greater than the design differential pressure value, then the calculated DP value was used to determme the required valve thrust for operation. Valve vendors were contacted to obtain valve sizing equations. Valve required thrust for operation was calculated using the vendor supplied calculations.

8.3 Equivalent Valve Factor An equivalent valve factor was calculated using the calculated required thrust value for open and close operation and the maximum calculated differential pressure for open and close operation. Using these values an equivalent valve factor is calculated. It should be noted that the nummum required thrust value for open i operation was used to calculate the equivalent valve factor even though the torque switch is b> passed for a minimum of 25% of the open stroke. The results of this calculation show that the equivalent valve factor is a minimum of 0.5 with the exception of five valves which have open equivalent valve factors greater or equal to 0.398. If the derated output capability of the actuator is used instead of the minimum required thrust all valve factors are greater than 0.5.

I l

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8.4 Stem / Stem Nut Friction Coefficient Seabrook calculations use a stem factor based on a friction coefficient of 0.15. The stem factor is determined by stem geometry and the coefficient of friction between the stem and the stem-nut. Since the geometry of a given stem is fixed, any change in coefficient of friction will change the stem factor. The 0.15 friction coefficient has beenjustified as appropriate, based on vendor data, and submitted to the NRC in NYN-92058 (Reference 17) in response to an NRC Phase 1 MOV Inspection 91-81 (Reference 14), request for additional information. The 0.15 assumption is based on information and experience from the following sources:

• Industry experience

. Vendor experience e Testing performed at Seabrook  !

l e Limitorque sizing procedures l

e EPRI Stem / Stem-Nut Lubrication Test Report, TR-102135

• NMAC Application Guide for Motor Operated Valves in Nuclear Power Plants, NP-6660-D e NHY Letter NYN-92058

. EPRI PPP test data at flow cutoff 8.5 Coefficient of Friction Based on Test Data Seabrook has installed stem mounted strain gauges on selected valves to measure the stem torque and thrust during valve testing. Seabrook performed both dynamic and static testing to quantify the stem / stem nut friction coefficient under both operating conditions. Currently, there is test data available for sixteen  :

different valves. The friction coefficient was determmed during the highly loaded portions of the valve stroke.

The calculated friction coefficients for the required design basis strokes are presented in Table 5. The majority of the friction coefficients are less than 0.15, however, some of the testing showed friction coefficients greater than this value. The test data that reflected stem / stem nut coefficients of friction higher than 0.15 was reviewed to assure that the valve is setup so that the higher than assumed friction coefficient can be accommodated. Valve control switch trip thrusts were reviewed for valves that have similar stem geometries to assure that a higher stem factor would not affect valve operation. The dynamic test results were reviewed to assure that adequate margin is available for valves that have been dynamically tested. It should be noted that FW-V-163 is installed horizontally and that fact could have played a role in obtaining higher than assumed friction coefficient. The remammg valves in the dynamic test group, that have not been monitored to obtain a friction coefficient, were reviewed to assure that they could accommodate a higher friction coefficient and perform their design basis function. The following summarizes the resiew of the higher than assumed friction coefficients for each of the affected valves.

27

FW-V-156/V-163: These valves must open to perform their safety function. FW-V-163 was tested under dynamic conditions. Test results show that significant margin is available to open these valve. FW-V-156 was set up based on the same differential pressure conditions as FW-V-163. However, FW-V-156 is required to open under low differential pressure conditions. In both cases, the actuator reduced voltage capability is sufficient to open these valves under design basis conditions. There were no other safety related MOVs that have this same stem geometry.

RC V-122/V-124: These valves are required to close to isolate a stuck open PORV. These valves close under limit switch control. Accordingly, the full output capability of the actuator is available to close these valves. Dese valves are identical to CS-V-142 and CS-V-143 which were dynamically tested at nearly 100% of maximum differential pressure. Both valves had substantial margin. For both valves, the actuator reduced voltage capability is sufficient to close these valves under design basis conditions. RH FCV-610/611 were the only other safety related MOVs that have this same stem geometry. Both of these valves were tested under dynamic conditions and exhibited significant margin.

RH-V-14/V-26: These valves are normally open to perform their safety function. These valves must be capable of closure during the switchover sequence to ECCS Recirculation. Both valves were tested under dynamic conditions at nearly 100% DP and have sufficient margin for valve operation. For both valves, the actuator reduced voltage capability is sufficient to close these valves under design basis conditions. Other safety related valves that have the same stem geometry as these valves are: AS-V-175/V-176, CBS-V-2/V-5, and RH-V-32/V-70. All of these additional valves are in separate test groups. Valve set up for these valves has been shown to be acceptable based on dynamic testing.

Seabrook plans to continue monitoring stem / stem nut friction coefficients during subsequent valve testing.  !

Table 5 identifies the stem / stem nut coefficients of friction based on diagnostic testing data.

1 l

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TABLES STEM / STEM NUT FRICTION COEFFICIENT BASED ON DIAGNOSTIC TFSTING VALVEID UNSEATING CST STEM FACTOR STEM STEM FACTOR STEM ASSUMED PITCH LEAD FRICTION FRICTION TIME (SEC) TIME (SEC) AT THE ATTHE AT CST AT CST STEM FACTOR ,

RAW RAW UNSEATING UNSEATING CBS-V-5 (stat i c) 15.729 42.149 0.0089 0.027 0.012 0.067 0.019 0.25 0.5 CBS-V-5 (dp) 0.77 12.88 0.0038 -0.0346 0.0053 -0.01668 0.019 0.25 0.5 CS-V-460 (static) 10.584 8.7I (1) (I) 0.014 0.1 0.0163 0.333 0.666 CS-V-475 (static) 0.853 19.829 0.0146 0.I16 0.0156 0.137 0.0163 0.333 0.666

' FW-V-163 (static) -' ~ 39.982 : ' 36.3491 / 0.017 + .O.183^ (2) (2) 0.014 0.25 0.25 FW-V-163 (50% dp) 2.194: 069.11: 'O.915{ >L0.167A (2) (2) 0.014 0.25 0.25 1FW-V-163 (dp) E :21.877 L N/Ar: 0.015" 0.165" (2) (2) 0.014 0.25 0.25 FW-V-347 (static) 40.341 28.66 << 012 . << 15

. 0.01 0.128 0.012 0.25 0.25 FW-V-347 (dp) 43.236 23.975 0.011 0.15 0.011 0.138 0.012 0.25 0.25 RC-V-88 (static) 2.282 118.743 << 0242 . <<.15 0.017 0.08 0.0242 0.333 0.666

~ RC-V-122(static)' r 13.04 (  : 9.476" 0.0116 0.138 10.01274 0.164 0.0122 0.2 0.4 RC-V-124 (static) " 79.855 - 68.1: << 0122 . <<15

. :c 0.0:323 *0.1720 0.0122 0.2 0.4 RH-V-26 (static) 1.155 16.395 0.008 0.017 0.011 0.051 0.019 c.2s o.5

> RH-V-26 (dp) ' 3.523i n 25.575 > 0.012 0.07I u0.022:1 3 0.185? 0.019 0.25 0.5 RH-V-36 (static) 0.972 N/A 0.013 0.089 (1) (1) 0.0163 0.333 0.666 RH-FCV-610 (dp) 31.732 12.94 0.007 0.052 0.00 % 0.091 0.0122 0.2 0.4 SI-V-77 (dp) 4.322 N/A << 0163 . <<15 (1) (1) 0.0163 0.333 0.666 SI-V-102 (dp) J3.804 V32.348 g << 0163 . << 15 (2) (2) 0.0163 0.333 0.666 SI-V-111 (static) 21.236 18.262 0.009 0.003 0.0118 0.061 0.0163 0.333 0.666 SI-V-111 (dp) 4.065 31.962 << 0163 . <<.15 0.013 0.093 0.0163 0.333 0.666 SI-V-114 (dp) 5.704 32.665 <<.0163 << I 5

. 0.0119 0.061 0.0163 0.333 0.666 SI-V-138 (static) 23.3 % 18.864 0.0126 0.077 0.0143 0.108 0.0163 0.333 0.666 SI-V-138 (dp) 18.359 35.045 0.011 0.047 0.0121 0.0653 0.0163 0.333 0 666 (1) Measurement could not be determined.

(2) Not required to close under DP condition.

29

_ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . - _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _____..___._______________m_ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ m_ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ .

L 8.6 Gate and Globe Valve Required Torque 4

The required thrust for valve operation was converted to required torque using a stem factor based on a 0.15 l friction coefficient. The 0.15 friction coefficient has been found to be appropriate based on various industry test data. Seabrook has been monitoring stem / stem nut friction over the past two cycles and has found that 1 the majority of valves monitored have stem / stem nut friction coefficients less than 0.15. Further discussion J

. of friction coefficients can be found in Section 8.5 of this document.

8.7 Butterfly Valve Required and Maximum Torque j

\

! The safety related butterfly valves were manufactured by Posi-Seal, (currently a subsidiary of Fisher

Controls), and Fisher Controls. Valve required torque was determmed based on maxunum differential pressure values.

l The safety related Service Water butterfly valves were procured from Fisher Controls. During system and plant startup problems were experienced with the rubber seat liners. Multiple design modifications were performed on the Senice Water butterfly valves. He seat liners were replaced with a Belzona D&A material in accordance with Engineering Change Authorization (ECA) 19/1120078. He liner was further modified in accordance with Design Coordination Report (DCR)87-249 to preclude the chaffing of the liner material in the valve stem area. Minor Design Modification (MMOD)89-517 provided guidance for close l limit switch settings based on seating and unseating loads. Valve torque requirements were determmed based i on an extensive testing program He maxunum torque values for these valves was based on the weak link of 4

the valve and motor-operator combination.

J

, 8.8 Valve Weak Link Analysis

] Valve weak link analysis were provided by the individual valve manufacturers. The weak link analyses have determmed the thrust or torque structural capacity of each component involved in supponing the MOV

opening and closing strokes. These analyses evaluated the structural components of each MOV which typically included the valve body, bonnet, yoke, stem, disk and appropriate flanges including bolted interfaces as appropriate. He allowable thrust or torque capacity of each MOV was developed using the valve vendor's weak link analysis which have been independently reviewed by site Mechanical Engineering.

The weak link values are used in the torque switch setting calculations and are identified as a maximum 4

thrust value in NHY Drawing 250000, as appropriate. In many cases the maxunum allowable thrust or j torque is based on the allowable limits of the motor-operator. Identifying the weak link provides controls to assure that the valve torque or thrust does not exceed the weak link of the valve or motor operator. -

l Seabrook participated in the Limitorque Phase I and II Overload Testing Program conducted by Kalsi

Engineering, Inc. The Phase i portion of this program provided the necessary testing and analysis that was j the basis for increasing the published thrust ratings for Limitorque operator sizes SMB-000 through I. As a 4

result of this work, Limitorque Corporation issued Limitorque Technical Update 92-01 which allowed for the i use of 140% of nommal thrust rating. Seabrook uses the information provided in Limitorque Technical i

Update 92-01 on a case basis to justify over-thrust conditions. Seabrook does not routinely use the increased ratings to set up the actuators.

d Table 6 identifies the design thrust values for rising stem valves that were used to set up the generic letter

! valves.

1 l

d

] 30 i

l l

TABLE 6: 1 DESIGN THRUST TABLE RISING STEM VALVES Valve ID Design Min Design Max Design Min Design Max Open (Ib6 Open (Ib0 Close (ib0 Close (Ib0 AS-V-175 6550 45000 12050 45000  !

AS-V-176 6400 45000 11950 45000 CBS-V-11 8512 15000 6000 26400 CBS-V-14 9593 26400 10504 26400 CBS-V-17 8512 15000 6000 26400 CBS-V-2 22200 45000 12000 45000 CBS-V-38 1590 8800 1615 8800 CBS V-43 1590 8800 1615 8800 CBS-V-47 6310 16000 7300 16000 CBS-V-49 4020 8800 3900 8800 CBS-V-5 22200 45000 12000 45000 CBS-V-S I 6310 16000 7300 16000 CBS-V-53 4020 8800 3900 8800 CBS-V-8 9593 26400 10504 26400 CC-V-395 3000 11779 10900 14560 CC-V-428 3000 11779 10900 14560 CC-V-438 3000 11779 10900 14560 CC-V-439 3000 11779 10900 14560 CGC-V-14 2769 8800 2779 8800 CGC-V-28 2769 8800 2779 8800 CS-LCV-Il2B 3900 16000 3800 16000 CS-LCV-ll2C 3900 16000 3800 16000 CS-LCV-112D 6310 16000 7450 16000 CS-LCV-ll2E 6300 16000 7450 16000 '

CS-V-142 8400 16000 8000 16000 CS-V-143 8400 16000 8000 16000 CS-V-149 4300 8800 5900 8800 CS-V-154 10900 15400 10900 15400 CS-V-158 10900 15400 10900 15400 CS-V-162 10900 15400 10900 15400 CS-V-166 10900 15400 10900 15400 CS-V-167 3500 15400 3500 15400 CS-V-168 3500 15400 3500 15400 CS-V-196 10900 15400 10900 15400 CS-V-197 10900 15400 10900 15400 CS-V-426 3500 15400 3500 15400 CS-V-460 3850 8800 2250 8800 CS-V-461 3850 8800 2250 8800 CS-V-475 3850 8800 2250 8800 FW-FV-4214A 4730 10000 4730 10000 31

TABLE 6:

DESIGN THRUST TABLE RISING STEM VALVES Valve ID Design Min Design Max Design Min Design Max Open (Ib6 Open (Ib0 Close (Ib0 Close (Ib0 FW-FV-4214B 4730 10000 4730 10000 FW-FV-4224A 4730 10000 4730 10000 FW-FV-4224B 4730 10000 4730 10000 FW-FV-4234A 4730 10000 4730 10000 FW-FV-4234B 4730 10000 4730 10000 FW-FV-4244A 4730 10000 4730 10000 FW-FV-4244B 4730 10000 4730 10000 FW-V-156 14950 26400 14550 26400 FW-V-163 14250 26400 13900 26400 FW-V-346 11250 15400 12150 15400 FW-V-347 11250 15400 12150 15400 MS-V-204 8723 33900 11100 21000 MS-V-205 872- 33900 11100 21000 MS-V-206 8723 33900 11100 21000 MS-V-207 8723 33900 11100 21000 MSD-V-44 3800 8800 6810 8800 MSD-V-45 3800 8800 6810 8800 MSD-V-46 3800 8800 6810 8800 MSD-V-47 3800 8800 6810 8800 RC-V-122 - 8650 16000 8000 16000 RC-V-124 8650 16000 8000 16000 RC-V-22 26850 45000 27950 45000 RC-V-23 26850 45000 27950 45000 RC-V-323 1525 5000 1604 5000 RC-V-87 26850 45000 27950 45000 RC-V-88 26850 45000 27950 45000 RH-FCV-610 4150 10572 4750 12737 RH-FCV-611 4150 10572 4750 12737 RH-V-14 13000 45000 10500 45000 RH-V-21 9050 16000 9850 16000 RH-V-22 9050 16000 9850 16000 RH-V-26 13000 45000 10500 45000 RH-V-32 8850 26400 10650 26400 RH-V-35 8000 16000 8800 16000 RH-V-36 8000 16000 8800 16000 RH-V-70 8850 26400 10650 26400 SI-V-102 10200 16000 6100 16000 SI-V-111 9820 16000 7820 16000 SI-V-112 9820 16000 7820 16000 SI-V-114 4750 16000 6600 16000 SI-V-138 12550 16000 8000 16000 32

TABLE 6:

DESIGN THRUST TABLE RISING STEM VALVES Valve ID Design Min Design Max Design Min Design Max Open (Ib0 Open (Ib0 close (Ib0 close (ibo SI-V-139 12550 16000 8000 16000 SI-V-17 56700 112000 17300 116900 SI-V-3 56700 112000 17300 116900 SI-V-32 56700 112000 17300 116900 SI-V-47 56700 112000 17300 116900 SI-V-77 10200 16000 6100 16000 i SI-V-89 8050 15400 8050 15400 SI-V-90 8050 15400 8050 15400 SI-V-93 8050 15400 8050 15400

! Table 7 identifies the design torque values for butterfly valves. The values included in Table 7 were used to I

set up the butterfly valves. All of the butterfly valves at Seabrook Station open close operation are controlled by limit switch.

TABLE 7:

DESIGN TORQUE TABLE BUTTERFLY VALVES TAG ID MAXIMUM PEAK MAXIMUM PEAK MAXIMUM SHAFT l SEATING TORQUE UNSEATING TORQUE (ft-Ib)

(ft-Ib) TORQUE (ft-lb)

CC-V-137 N/A N/A 1075 l

CC-V-145 N/A N/A 1300 CC-V-266 N/A N/A 1075 CC-V-272 N/A N/A 1300 CC-V-1092 N/A N/A 447 CC-V-1095 N/A N/A 447 CC-V-1101 N/A N/A 447 CC-V-1109 N/A N/A 447 SW-V-2 1800 to 2400 < 2400 4681 SW-V-4 300 to 750 N/A 1011 SW-V-5 300 to 750 N/A 1011 SW-V-15 1800 to 2400 < 2400 4681 SW-V-17 1800 to 2400 < 2400 4681 SW-V-19 1800 to 2400 < 2400 4681 SW-V-20 1800 to 2400 < 2400 4681 SYi-V-22 1800 to 2400 < 2400 4681 SW-V-23 1800 to 2400 < 2400 4681 SW-V-25 1800 to 2400 < 2400 4681 SW-V-27 1800 to 2400 < 2400 4681 SW-V-29 1800 to 2400 < 2400 468i SW-V-31 1800 to 2400 < 2400 4681 l SW-V-34 1800 to 2400 < 2400 4681 4

, 33 l

1 TABLE 7:

DESIGN TORQUE TABLE BUTTERFLY VALVES TAGID MAXIMUM PEAK MAXIMUM PEAK MAXIMUM SHAFT SEATING TORQUE UNSEATING TORQUE (ft-Ib)

(R-lb) TORQUE (R Ib)

SW-V-46 1800 to 2400 < 2400 4681 SW-V-54 1800 to 2400 < 2400 468i SW-V-56 1800 to 2400 < 2400 4681 SW-V-63 1800 to 2400 < 2400 4681 SW-V-64 1800 to 2400 < 2400 4681 SW-V-74 1800 to 2400 < 2400 4681 SW-V-75 1800 to 2400 < 2400 4681 SW-V-76 1800 to 2400 < 2400 4681 ,

SW-V-139 1800 to 2400 < 2400 4681 >

SW-V-140 1800 to 2400 < 2400 4681 8.9 Selection of MOV Switch Settings MOV torque switch setting calculations deternune the nummum and maximum torque switch setpoints.

Minimum torque switch setpoints were calculated using the calculated required thrusts and torques for open and close operation. Torque switch settings for rising stem gate and globe valves were determined in accordance with the Motor-Operated Valve Sizing and Calculation Guideline. Torque switch setpoints were 4 deternuned using the Limitorque methodology. Appropriate factors were included in the calculation for reduced voltage at the motor. Either a generic 80% reduced voltage factor was used or a valve specific reduced voltage factor based on the Voltage Regulation Study was used in the calculations. Motor nameplate rated torque, an appropriate application factor and the pullout efficiency were used to determine the mimmum and manmum torque switch setpoints. The mammum torque switch settings are based on the l muumum of the actuator nommal torque rating, the maximum range of the applicable spring pack, the motor l pullout torque at reduced voltage conditions and the valve weak link. He motor-operator capability is based '

on the motor pullout torque which is calculated using the motor rated torque, appropriate application factor j and the pullout efficiency. '

Butterfly valves, at Seabrook Station, close and open under limit switch control. The torque switch setpoints are determined for component protection. The open and close torque switches are in the control circuitry to provide backup component protection.

In July of 1987, the service water butterfly valve seat / lining was redesigned, and all critical SW valves were reworked using an improved seat design. Seabrook performed a major study as a result of periodic failures of Service Water butterfly valves. The study is documented in NHY Report entitled " Report on Service Water System Motor Operated Valves". The failures were attributed to torque switch trip of the butterfly valves and necessitated the development of a program to investigate and correct the problems. Among the conclusions reached in the report were:

e that tests conducted on SW-V29 have demonstrated that actual valve seating torque can be reduced significantly by resetting the closed limit switch while maintammg a leak tight seat.

The test results of this report were used to establish new close position limit switch setpoints which maintain reasonable margin between actual torque values and torque switch setpoints. The new limit switch position is set using diagnostic test equipment to set the seating torque in an acceptable torque range.

34

. . - - . . . - - . . - . . . - . - - . - - - . _ ~ . _ . - . ~ . . . . . _ . _ -

Minimum and maximum allowable torque switch setpoints are controlled in NHY Drawing 250000. This drawing also provides the nummum and mammum thrust and torque values as appropriate to support valve testing. Station Procedure ES1850.003 provides guidance for the control of torque and limit switch settings.

Thrust requirements for settmg of actuator torque switches are adjusted to account for diagnostic equipment inaccuracy and torque switch repeatability. Further discussion of diagnostic test equipment inaccuracy and i torque switch repeatability will be discussed later in this report.

Four-rotor limit switches are installed on all actuators in the Seabrook Station Generic Letter 89-10 MOV Program. Actual limit switch settings are depicted on the applicable MOV schematic drawings.

ES 1850.003 provides guidance for setting the limit switches. Limit Switch settings are performed in accordance with the applicable electrical schematics using approved procedures. For the open limit switch for rising stem valves Seabrook has a policy not to backseat the valve. Accordingly, the open limit switch is set so that the valve is not routinely backseated Intermediate limits are set in accordance with the electrical '

schematics to provide the required control functions as appropriate.

Control of motor-operated gate and globe valves in the closing direction is normally by the torque switch.

However, certain Motor Operated gate valves, which are equipped with compensated spring packs, have their close stroke operation controlled by the close limit switch. Here are 6 gate valves tha: have SB-00 actuators that use this limit closure logic. NHY Drawing 250000 and applicable station procedures provide the controls for limit closure of the gate valves.

l Open and close operation of all generic letter butterfly valves is controlled by the open and close limit i switches. The torque switch is in the circuit for these valves to provide component protection. Station ,

procedures provide instructions for adequately setting the open and close limit switches.

]

Table 8 identifies the torque switch setpoints.

l TABLE 8:

TORQUE SWITCH SETTINGS Valve ID Min TS TS Open Max TS Min TS TS Close Max TS Open Open Close Close AS-V-175 1.50 3.25 3.25 2.25 3.25 3.25 AS-V-176 1.50 3.00 3.25 2.25 2.50 3.25 CBS-V-11 3.00 3.25 4.00 2.25 3.25 4.00 CBS-V-14 2.75 2.75 3.00 3.00 2.50

• 3.00 CBS-V-17 3.00 4.00 4.00 2.25 4.00 4.00 CBS-V-2 2.25 1.75

• 2.25 1.50 1.50- 2.25 CBS-V-38 1.50 2.00 2.25 1.50 2.00 2.25 CBS-V-43 1.50 2.00 2.25 1.50 2.00 2.25 CBS-V-47 2.25 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 1 CBS V-49 1.75 1.50

• 2.00 1.75 2.50 2.00 I CBS-V-5 2.25 2.00

• 2.25 1.50 1.75 2.25 >

CBS-V-51 2.25 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 CBS-V-53 1.50 1.50 2.00 1.50 1.50 2.00 CBS-V-8 2.00 2.25 2.25 2.00 2.25 2.25 CC-V-1092 1.00 2.75 2.75 1.00 2.75 2.75 35

TABLE 8:

TORQUE SWITCH SETTINGS Valve ID Min TS TS Open Max TS Min TS TS Close Max TS Open Open Close Close CC-V-1095 1.00 2.75 2.75 1.00 2.75 2.75 CC-V-Il01 1.00 1.50 2.75 1.00 1.50 2.75 CC-V-1109 1.00 1.50 2.75 1.00 1.50 2.75 CC-V-137 1.50 2.50 2.75 1.00 2.50 2.75 CC-V-145 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.75 3.00 3.00 CC-V-266 1.50 2.50 2.75 1.00 2.50 2.75 CC-V-272 2.25 3.00 3.00 1.50 3.00 3.00 CC-V-395 1.00 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 2.00 CC-V-428 1.00 1.50 1.75 1.75 1.75 2.00 CC-V-434 1.00 1.50 2.75 1.00 1.50 2.75 CC-V-438 1.00 1.50 1.75 1.75 2.00 2.00 CC-V-439 1.00 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 2.00 CGC-V-14 1.25 1.25 3.50 1.25 1.25 3.50 CGC-V-28 1.25 1.25 3.50 1.25 2.00 3.50 CS-LCV-112B 1.75 1.75 2.25 1.75 2.00 2.25 CS LCV-112C 1.75 2.00 2.25 1.75 1.25

• 2.25 CS-LCV-112D 1.00 1.75 3.00 1.50 2.00 3.00 CS-LCV-Il2E 1.00 1.50 3.00 1.50 2.00 3.00 CS-V-142 1.00 1.00 1.00 LIMIT LIMIT LIMIT CS-V-143 1.00 1.00 1.00 LIMIT LIMIT LIMIT CS-V-149 1.50 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.25

• 2.00 CS-V-154 2.25 2.00

• 2.75 2.25 1.50

• 2.75 CS-V-158 2.25 2.00

• 2.75 2.25 1.75

• 2.75 CS-V-162 2.25 1.50

• 2.75 2.25 1.50

• 2.75  !

CS-V-166 2.25 1.75

• 2.75 2.25 1.50

• 2.75 i CS-V-167 1.00 1.50 2.75 1.00 1.50 2.75 CS-V-168 1.00 1.00 2.75 1.00 1.00 2.75 CS-V-196 2.25 2.00

• 3.00 2.25 1.50

• 3.00 CS-V-197 2.25 2.00

• 3.00 2.25 1.50

• 3.00 CS-V-426 1.00 1.75 2.75 1.00 1.50 2.75 CS-V-460 1.00 1.00

• 1.50 1.50 1.50 CS-V-461 2.00 2.00

• 1.50 1.50 1.50 CS-V-475 2.00 2.00

• 1.50 1.50 1.50 FW-FV-4214A 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 FW-FV-4214B 4.00 4.50 5.00 4.00 4.50 5.00 FW-FV-4224A 4.00 3.00

• 5.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 FW-FV-42248 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 FW-FV-4234A 4.00 4.50 5.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 FW-FV-4234B 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 FW-FV-4244A 4.00 3.00

• 5.00 4.00 3.50

• 5.00 FW-FV-4244B 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 3.50

• 5.00 FW-V-156 2.00 2.50 2.50 1.75 2.50 2.50 36

TABLE 8:

TORQUE SWITCH SETTINGS Valve ID Min TS TS Open Max TS Min TS TS Close Max TS Open Open Close Close FW-V-163 1.50 2.25 2.50 1.50 2.50 2.50 FW-V-346 2.00 3.00 3.00- 2.50 2.75 3.00 FW-V-347 2.00 2.75 3.00 2.50 2.50 3.00 MS-V-204 1.00 1.75 2.50 1.00 1.50 2.50 MS-V-205 1.00 2.00 2.50 1.00 1.50 2.50 MS-V-206 1.00 2.00 2.50 1.00 1.50 2.50 MS-V-207 1.00 2.00 2.50 1.00 2.00 2.50 MSD-V-44 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 MSD-V-45 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 MSD-V-46 1.50 2.00 2.00 1.50 2.00 2.00 MSD-V-47 1.50 1.50 2.00 1.50 2.00 2.00 RC-V-122 1.00 1.25 1.25 LIMIT LIMIT LIMIT RC-V-124 1.00 1.00 1.25 LIMIT LIMIT LIMIT RC-V-22 3.00 2.50

• 3.75 3.25 2.75

• 3.75 RC-V-23 3.00 2.75

• 3.75 3.25 2.75

• 3.75 RC-V-323 1.00 2.00 2.75 1.00 2.00 2.75 RC-V-87 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.25 3.00

• 4.00 RC-V-88 3.00 3.00 3.50 3.25 3.00

• 3.50 RH FCV-610 2.50 3.00 3.00 2.75 3.00 3.00 ,

RH-FCV-611 2.50 3.00 3.00 2.75 3.00 3.00  ;

RH-V-14 1.50 1.50 2.50 1.50 1.50 2.50  ;

RH-V-21 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.50 3.00 3.00 RH-V-22 2.00 2.75 3.00 2.50 2.75 3.00 RH-V-26 1.75 1.50

• 2.25 1.50 1.50 2.25 l RH-V-32 2.00 2.50 2.50 2.25 2.50 2.50 )

RH-V-35 1.75 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 RH-V-36 1.75 2.50 3.00 2.00 2.50 3.00 RH-V-70 2.00 2.25 2.50 2.25 1.50

• 2.50 SI-V-102 1.00 1.00 1.50 1.00 1.00 1.50 SI-V-111 1.00 1.50 1.50 1.00 1.25 1.50 SI-V-112 1.00 1.25 1.25 1.00 1.25 1.25 SI-V-114 1.00 1.00 1.25 1.00 1.00 1.25 SI-V-138 1.50 1.75 1.75 LIMIT LIMIT LIMIT SI-V-139 1.50 1.50 1.75 LIMIT LIMIT LIMIT l SI-V-17 1.75 1.75 2.25 1.00 1.75 2.25 SI-V-3 3.00 2.00

• 4.00 1.50 2.00 4.00 SI-V-32 3.00 1.75

• 4.00 1.50 1.50 4.00 SI-V-47 1.75 1.75 2.25 1.00 1.75 2.25 SI-V-77 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.00 1.25 1.50 SI-V-89 1.75 2.00 2.75 1.75 1.75 2.75 4 SI-V-90 1.75 1.75 2.50 1.75 1.75 2.50 SI-V-93 1.75 1.75 3.00 1.75 1.75 3.00 37

l TABLE 8: j TORQUE SWITCH SETTINGS )

Valve ID Min TS TS Open Max TS Min TS TS Close Max TS i Open Open Close Close SW-V-139 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 l SW-V-140 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 SW V-15 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 SW-V-17 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 SW-V 19 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 SW-V-2 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 SW-V-20 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 SW-V-22 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 SW-V-23 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 SW-V-25 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 l

SW-V-27 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 l SW-V-29 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 SW-V-31 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 j SW-V-34 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 l SW-V-4 LIMIT 2.25 2.25 LIMIT 2.25 2.25 l

SW-V-5 LIMIT 2.25 2.25 LIMIT 2.25 2.25 SW-V-54 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 L1MIT 4.00 4.00 SW-V-56 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 SW-V-74 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 SW-V-76 LIMIT 4.00 4.00 LIMIT 4.00 4.00

• PER DIAGNOSTIC TEST RESULTS 8.10 Torque Switch Bypass Methodology The open torque switch bypass is set between 25% and 80% of the open stroke. In-situ testing has shown i that the 25% nummum value is acceptable because peak unseating loads occurs prior to 25% of the open stroke. This allows for up to the full actuator output capability to be available to unseat the valve. 4 Diagnostic testing provides assurance that the torque bypass switch is set within this range. The acceptable I bypass switch settings are included in station procedure ES 1850.003, " Motor-Operated Valve Performance Monitoring" "Ihe Open-to-Close Torque Switch Bypass setting is set consistent with the operation of the green indicating light. The limit switch rotor for this indicating light is set in accordance with Station Maintenance Procedures. Typically this light illununates within the first 10 % of the close stroke operation; the Open-to-Close Bypass switch actuates at the same time. Accordingly, the close torque switch is in the close circuit for nearly the complete stroke.

l 38

8.11 Maintenance of Correct Switch Settings Recommendation (d) of Generic Letter 89-10 requires licensees to prepare or revise procedures to ensure that correct switch settings are deternuned and maintained throughout the life of the plant. ES1850.003 in conjunction with NHY Drawing 250000 provide the controls for selecting and maintsmng correct switch settings for the life of the plant. Correct switch settings have been calculated in response to Generic Letter 89-10 recommendation (b) and have been set based on static and dynamic testing in response to recommendation (c). Periodic testing will verify that acceptable switch settings are maintained.

9.0 MOV DESIGN CHANGES / ENHANCEMENTS A number of motor-operated valve design changes have been completed to increase the reliability for valve operation or to increase the motor-operator capability A number of design changes have been made to motor-operated valves since the issuance ofI.E. Bulletin 85-03. An over view of some of the changes follows:

9.1 DCR 86-403:

This DCR revised the control circuits for MOVs to 1) provide Control Room indication for motor thermal overload actuation and 2) rewire operator limit switches as necessary to dedicate a rotor for proper open j torque switch bypass. This DCR addressed MOVs in the Service Water, Chemical and Volume Control, 1 Safety Injection, Residual Heat Removal Systems and some of the valves in the Circulating Water System. l United Engineers and Constructors DCN 63-0082A dedicated a limit switch rotor for open torque bypass i switch setting for the Westinghouse valves during plant construction.

9.2 DCR 87-071:

His DCR revised the control circuits for MOVs to rewire operator limit switches as necessary to dedicate a rotor for proper open torque switch bypass. The MOVs addressed in this DCR were the balance of the I. E.

Bulletin 85-03 valves that did not already have a dedicated rotor for torque switch bypass control.

9.3 MMOD 89-517:

This MMOD determmed an acceptable methodology to set the close limit switch for butterfly valves. This change corrected a negative trend in the performance of Service Water System motor-operated valves. A method of valve closure control was instituted that based the close limit switch setpoint on strain gauge torque values.

9.4 DCR 89-024:

This DCR implemented the four rotor limit switch design for the remaining plant MOVs that had not been modified previously. His provided a separate rotor for the open torque switch bypass switch. This design change also provided control room indication for identifying MOVs which are inoperable due to tripped TOLs, Thermal Overload Devices.

39

1 I

9.5 MMOD 9l-569:

This MMOD was issued to address the Generic Letter 89-10 concems for the valves that were scheduled to be tested during the first Refueling Outage. This MMOD did the following:

• Provided the thmst and torque values and nummum and maximum torque switch setpoints for the OR01 valve scope.

• Replaced the torque switch limiter plates for CBS-V8N14, Containment Recirculation Sump Isolation Valves.

. Increased the torque switch limiter plate setting for CBS-Vi lN17, Contamment Spray Discharge Isolation Valves.

• Allowed for a reduction of the torque switch settings for the Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass Valves.

• Approved use of a stronger motor pinion key material AISI 4140 for Limitorque valves.

• Increased the overall gear ratio for RH-V35N36, the RHR Recirculation Discharge Cross Connect Valves to CS and St.

• Provided additional guidance to support MOV diagnostic testing.

9.6 MMOD 92-521:

This MMOD was issued to address the Generic Letter 89-10 concerns for the valves that were scheduled to be tested during the second Refueling Outage. This MMOD did the following:

• Provided the thrust and torque values and nummum and maximum torque switch setpoints for the OR02 valve scope.  ;

e Increased the overall gear ratio for CBS-V47N49N51, RWST to SI Pump Suction Isolation Valves.

• Increased the overall gear ratio for SI-VI1INI12, SI Pump Discharge Cross Connect Valves.

• Increased the overall gear ratio for SI-VI 14, SI Pump Cold Leg Isolation Valve.

• Increased the overall gear ratio for SI-V138N139, High Head Injection isolation Valves.

• Increased the overall gear ratio for MSD-V46N47, Main Steam Drain Valves.

• Provided additional guidance to support MOV diagnostic testing.

9.7 DCR 93-029:

This DCR was issued to address the Generic Letter 89-10 concerns for the valves that were scheduled to be tested during the third Refueling Outage. This DCR did the following:

• Provided the thrust and torque values and minimum and maximum torque switch setpoints for the OR03 valve scope.

. Replaced the motor operators for CS-LCV-112D/l12E, RWST to CS Pump Suction Isolation Valves.  ;

e Increased the overall gear ratio for CS-V460N461N475, CS to SI Pump Suction Cross Connect '

Isolation Valves.

. Provided additional guidance to support MOV diagnostic testing.

40

9.8 DRR 93-086:

Replaced the ductile iron packing followers for the Service Water Butterfly Valves with stainless steel ,

followers. This change was the result of an evaluation of the failure to fully stroke of SW-V54 reference LER 93-006, SIR 93-021 and 93-025 He root cause of the failure to stroke was found to be corrosion product buildup between the valve shaft and the gland follower A contributing secondary cause was found to be excessive packing gland loading during installation. Diagnostic testing was used to troubleshoot, trend and evaluate the cause of this failure mechanism. He gland followers on all safety related service water butterfly valves were replaced during OR03. Follow-up testing was conducted on SW-V54, during Fuel Cycle Four, the test results confirmed that this action adequately addressed the root cause.

9.9 MMOD 94-561:

1 This MMOD was issued to support Generic Letter 89-10 MOV testing during the fourth refueling outage. l This MMOD did the following:

• Increased the overall gear ratio for RC-V122/V124, PORV Block Isolation Valves. j e Allowed for higher torque switch setpoints for SI-V77/V102, SI Hot Leg Discharge Isolation Valves. l 10.0 - STATUS OF GENERIC LETTER 89-10 PROGRAM MOV's As of August 1994, all design basis reviews, valve set-up and static tests of the 118 valves in the Seabrook Station Generic Letter 89-10 MOV Program were completed. Of the 118 MOV's in the program, all MOVs were set up under static conditions using diagnostic test equipment. Additionally,51 valves were tested under dynamic conditions. his testing met the commitments based on Seabrook Station Grouping Methodology which was submitted to the NRC in NAESCO Letter NYN-92024. As a result of the NRC MOV Inspection 94-11 performed in May 1994, which questioned Seabrook Station's testing of valve groups, an additional 9 valves were committed to be tested under dynamic conditions from the end of OR03 to the end of OR04 (see Reference 37, NYN 94106). Additionally approximately 1/3 of the program valves j were tested using diagnostics as part of Seabrook's periodic MOV testing program.

I 1.0 VALVE MISPOSITIONING q Seabrook has evaluated each Generic Letter MOV for inadvertent valve mispositioning. The conditions that the valve must be capable of operating under to recover from mispositioning have been calculated.

Supplement 7 to Generic Letter 89-10, to be issued, will address valve mispositioning for PWR units.. It is anticipated that Supplement 7 will provide guidance for the removal of valves that have been incorporated into the program based solely on valve mispositioning . Following issuance of Supplement 7, Seabrook plans to remove MOVs from the enhanced MOV Program that have been included in the Program solely based on inadvertent mispositioning. Table 9 identifies the valves that are in the Seabrook Generic Letter 89-10 Program solely based on mispositioning.

41

l

)

TABLE 9 MISPOSITION VALVES i VALVE ID FUNCTION - I CBS V-49 RWST to SI Pump 'A' Suction Isolation CBS-V-53 RWST to St Pump 'B' Suction Isolation CC-V 1092 PCCW Loop 'B' Isolation to Thermal Barrier HX 'B' CC-V-1095 - PCCW Loop 'B' Isolation from Thermal Barrier HX 'B' CC-V-1101 PCCW Loop 'A' Isolation to Thermal Barrier HX 'A' 'I CC-V-1109 PCCW Loop 'A' Isolation from Thermal Barrier HX 'A' CGC-V-14 Contamment Purge Exhaust Isolation IRC -

CGC-V-28 Contamment Purge Exhaust Isolation IRC CS-V-154 'D' RCP Seal Injection Isolation CS-V-158 'C' RCP Seal Injection Isolation ,

CS-V-162 'B' RCP Seal Injection Isolation l CS-V-166 'A' RCP Seal Injection Isolation l

CS-V-475 SI And Charging Pump Suction X-Connect from RH Pump Discharge MS-V-204 SG 'A' MSIV Bypass MS-V-205 SG 'B' MSIV Bypass j MS-V-206 SG 'C' MSIV Bypass )

MS-V-207 SG 'D' MSIV Bypass

{

RH-V-21 RHR Train 'B' Discharge X-Connect l RH-V-22 RHR Train 'A' Discharge X-Connect '

SI-V-114 SI Pumps Common Isolation to Cold Legs SW-V-15 PCCW HX 'A' SW Isolation i SW-V-17 PCCW HX 'B' SW Isolation SW-V-74 Turbine Bldg SW X-Connect to PAB SW-V-76 Turbine Bida SW X-Connect to PAB SW-V-139 SW Cooling Tower Train 'A' Spray Bypass Recirc SW-V-140 SW Cooling Tower Train 'B' Spray Bypass Recire 12.0 DIAGNOSTIC TEST EOUIPMENT AND ACCURACY VALIDATION 12.1 Diagnostic Test Equipment Seabrook developed its own Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic Test System to be used to address the recommendations provided in Generic Letter 89-10. The MOV Test System, INSTEAD, was designed to j diagnose the performance of MOVs either on a preventive basis or to support corrective maintenance INSTEAD uses a variety of MOV actuator sensors to monitor the conditions and state changes associated with an MOV actuation. The system has a great deal of flexibility in that it can be adapted to a wide variety of valve styles, manufacturers, and environmental conditions. INSTEAD employs strain gauge methods to deternune valve stem / shaft torque and/or thrust, along with other traditional diagnostic sensors. Data acquisition hardware interfaces with a personal computer and is capable of monitoring up to 12 parameters with high sample rates during a single valve stroke. The computer based portion of the diagnostic test system has been independently verified and validated by Yankee Atomic Electric Corporation.

42

1 l

l l

l 12.2 Validation ofINSTEAD System Accuracy l The INSTEAD diagnostic test system underwent a rigorous accuracy validation program performed at Idaho National Engineering Laboratories, INEL, in December of 1990. This validation testing took place prior to Seabrook's first refueling outage. The validation testing consisted of simultaneous measurements and comparisons ,

between INEL's load cell system and Seabrook's strain gauge system on MOV test stands. INSTEAD system I inaccuracies are based on the INEL test data. l l

12.3 Overall Accuracy of Control Switch Setpoints NHY Letter NYN 92058 (Reference 17) transmitted NHY's response for additional information pertaining to MOV control switch setpoint error analysis as a result of the Phase 1 NRC lt spection of the Seabrook MOV Program (Reference 14). Technical Support Group Calculation,92-CALC-0003 was developed to determine the combined accuracy associated with torque switch repeatability, data acquisition and data processing accuracy's. The combined accuracy value is then used to reduce the design range specified in NHY Drawing 250000 to a more restrictive set of values called the " target range", The accuracy factor for torque switch repeatability is based on the actuator vendor recommendations. The data acquisition and data processing accuracies take into account the accuracies associated with:

o measuring and test equipment (M&TE) e physical constants for conversion of strain measurement to thrust or torque and/or i e comparison techniques that associate load cell measurements on the valve open stroke to spring pack displacement on the close stroke.

12.4 Generic Letter 89-10 Supplement 5, Diagnostic Test System Accuracy The NRC issued Supplement 5 to inform licensees of a generic concern regarding the accuracy of MOV diagnostic test equipment. The Supplement requested that the licensee evaluate this new information and any other information reasonably available to them and provide a written response to two requests for additional infonnation. Seabrook responded to Supplement 5 in NAESCO Letter NYN-93139 (Reference 30). Seabrook's response was based on the aforementioned validation testing of the INSTEAD diagnostic test system performed at INEL and on a previous response to an NRC request for additional information that was submitted in NYN-92058.

13.0 DIAGNOSTIC TESTING TO VERIFY DESIGN BASIS CAPABILITY 13.1 Diagnostic Testing Generic Letter 89-10, Recommendation (c) requires that each MOV be tested in-situ at design-basis conditions, if practicable, to demonstrate that it is capable of performing its intended function. In addition, Recommendation (c) requires that each MOV be stroke tested at no-pressure or no-flow conditions (static testing) to verify that the MOV is operable even if testing with a differential pressure or flow cannot be performed. Seabrook set up the generic letter MOVs using a combination of static diagnostic testing and dpamic diagnostic testing. As a minimum, all of the Seabrook Generic Letter MOVs were subjected to static diagnostic testing. Seabrook developed a dynamic testing grouping methodology and submitted it to the NRC in NYN-92024 in response to a request for additional information as a result of the Phase 1 NRC Inspection of the MOV Program (Inspection 91-81). The 118 valves were broken down into 32 difTerent test groups. There are a total of 33 test groups, however, test group #27 consist of one of the valves that was excluded from Seabrook's enhanced MOV Program. The grouping was based on the physical attributes of the valve, motor-operator and system operating conditions. NYN-92024 identified the individual valve groups, the planned dynamic testing to be performed to validate the acceptability of a group and the valves that were excluded from testing based on non-testability. A reason for valve exclusion was also prosided.

Station Procedure ES1850.003 identifies the attributes used to develop the valve groups and provides a table of the individual valve groups. Seabrook developed a test plan to meet the commitments for valve testing identified in NYN-92024. Table 10 identifies the valve grouping used at Seabrook.

43

l TABLE 10 DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TEST GROUP STATUS DP DESCRIPTION NO PER. STATUS TAG ids

TEST TESTED / CENT GROUP NO IN GROUP 5 1 3" Westmghouse Gate 1/1 100 % COMPLETE CS-V-149 SMB-000 Limitorque Extra Heavy Spring Pack 10 f1-lb Motor 2 3" Westinghouse Gate 2/4 50 % COMPLETE CS-V 143 CS V-142 SB-00 Limitorque RC-V-124 RC-V-122 Heavy Spring Pack 15 ft-lb Motor 3 3" Velan Gate 0/4 0% EXCLUDED CC-V-395 CC V-428 SMB-0 Limitorque CC V-438 CC-V-439

Light Spring Pack 15 ft-lb Motor 4 4" Westmghouse Gate 0/2 0% EXCLUDED CS-LCV-112B CS-LCV-112C 4

SB-00 Limitorque Light Spring Pack 15 fl-lb Motor 5 4" Westinghouse Gate 60 85.7 % COMPLETE SI-V 77 SI-V 102 SB/SMB-00 Limitorque SI-V-111 SI-V-112 SI-V-114 Heavy Spring Pack SI-V-138 SI-V-139 15 ft-lb Motor 6 6" Westmghouse Gate 0/4 0% EXCLUDED CBS-V-49 SMB-000 Limitorque CS-V-461 CS V-460 Light Spring Pack CS-V-475 5 ft-lb Motor 7 6" Velan Gate 1/2 50 % COMPLETE FW-V-156 FW-V-163 SMB-0 Limitorque lleavy Spring Pack 25 fi-lb Motor 8 6" Westinghouse Gate 1/1 100 % COMPLETE CBS-V-53 SMB-000 Limitorque Extra Heavy Spring Pack 10 f1-Ib Motor 9 8" Westinghouse Gate 3/4 75 % COMPLETE IUI-V-21 RH-V 22 SMB-00 Limitorque RH-V-35 RH-V-36 Medium Spring Pack 25 ft-lb Motor 10 8" Westinghouse Gate 0/4 0% EXCLUDED CBS-V-51 CBS-V 47 SMB-00 Limitorque CS-LCV-112D CS-LCV 112E Light Sprmg Pack 15 fl-lb Motor I1 8" Westinghouse Gate 2/2 100 % COMPLElli RH-V-32 RH-V-70 SMB-0 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack 25 fi-lb Motor 12 8" Westinghuse Gate 2/2 100 % COMPLETE RH-V-14 RH-V-26 SB-1 Limitorque Heavy Sprmg Pack 60 ft-lb Motor 44

1 l

i TABLE 10 DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TEST GROUP STATUS DP DESCRIPTION NO PER- STATUS TAG ids TEST TESTED / CENT GROUP NO IN j GROUP i 13 8" Aloyco Gate 0/2 0% EXCLUDED CBS-V-11 CBS-V-17 SB-0 Limitorque Light Spring Pack 25 ft-lb Motor 14 10" Westinghouse Gate . 0/4 0% EXCLUDED SI-V-3 SI-V 17 I SBD-3 Limitorque SI-V-32 SI-V-47 ,

Light / Heavy Spring Pack 150 ft-lb Motor 15 12" Westinghouse Gate 2/2 100 % COMPLETE CBS-V-2 CBS-V 5 4 SB-1 Limitorque l

Heavy Sprmg Pack I 60 ft-lb Motor l 16 12" Westmghouse Gate 0/4 0% EXCLUDED RC-V-22 RC-V-23 l SMB-1 Limitorque RC V-87 RC-V-88 )

Heavy Spring Pack 40 ft-lb Motor ]

17 12" Velan Gate 1/2 50 % COMPLETE AS-V-175 AS-V-176 i SB-1 Limitorque l Light Spring Pack 40 ft-Ib 18 16" Velan Gate 0/2 0% EXCLUDED CBS-V-8 CBS-V-14 SMB-0 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack 15 ft-lb 19 3/4" Velan Globe 1/1 100 % COMPLEE RC-V-323 SMB400 Limitorque Extra Light Spring Pack 2 ft-lb Motor 20 1" Yarway Angled Globe 3/4 75 % COMPLETE MSD-V-44 MSD-V-45 SMB-000 Limitorque MSD-V-46 MSD-V-47 Heavy / Extra Heavy Sprmg Pack ,

I 5 ft-lb Motor 21 2" Velan Globe 0/2 0% EXCLUDED CGC-V-14 CGC-V-28 SMB-000 Limitorque Light Spring Pack 5 ft-lb Motor 22 1.5" & 2" Velan/ 4/5 80 % COMPLEE CS-V-196 CS-V-197 Westinghouse Globe SI V-89 SI-V-90 SI-V 93 SMB40 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack 10 ft-lb Motor 23 2" Velan/Westmghouse 0/7 0% EXCLUDED CS-V-154 CS-V-158 Globe CS-V-162 CS-V-166 SMB-00 Limitorque CS-V-167 CS-V-168 Heavy Spring Pack CS-V-426 10 ft-lb Motor 24 3" Velan Globe 2/2 100 % COMPLETE RH-FCV-610 RH-FCV-611 SMB-00 Limitorque Extra Light Spring Pack 10 ft-lb Motor 45

_ _ . ~. _ _._. _ . _ _ . - . __ _ . . _ _ . . _ . . . - . . . _ . .

TABLE 10 DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TEST GROUP STATUS DP DESCRIPTION NO PER- STATUS TAG ids TEST TESTED / CENT GROUP NO IN GROUP 25 4" Rockwell Globe 2/4 50 % COMPLETE MS-V-204 MS-V 205 SMB4)0 Limitorque MS-V-206 MS-V-207 Heavy Spring Pack 10 fi-lb Motor 26 4" Masoneilon Globe 3/8 37.5 % COMPLETE FW-FV-4214A FW FV-4214B NAl Rotork FW-FV-4224A FW-FV-4224B 11 Spring Pack FW-FV-4234A FW-FV-4234B 50 fl-Ib Motor FW-FV-4244A FW-FV-4244B 27 4" Velan Globe 0/1 0% EXCLUDED CC-V 434 SMB-00 Limitorque Extra Light Spring Pack 10 ti-lb Motor 28 4" Velan Globe 2/2 100 % COMPLETE FW-V-346 FW V-347 SMB-00 Limitorque Heavy Spring Pack 10 ft-lb Motor 29 6" Posi Seal Buttertly 4/4 100 % COMPLETE CC-V-1092 CC-V-1095 SMB-000 Limitorque CC-V-1101 CC-V-Il09 Light Spring Pack 2 ft-lb Motor 30 12" Fisher Butterfly 2/2 100 % COMPLETE SW V-4 SW-V-5 SMB-00 Limitorque Extra Light Spring Pack 5 ft-Ib Motor 31 14" A16" Posi Seal 3/4 75 % COMPLETE CC-V-137 CC-V-145 Butterfly CC-V-266 CC-V-272 ,

SMB-000 Limitorque Light Spring Pack 5 fi-lb Motor 32 24" Fisher Buttertly 13/20 65 % COMPLETE SW V-2 SW-V-15 SW-V-17 .

SMB-0 Limitorque SW V 19 SW-V-20 SW-V-22 I Light Spring Pack SW-V-23 SW V-25 SW-V-27 15 ft-lb Motor SW-V-29 SW-V-31 SW-V-34 SW V-54 SW V-56 SW-V-74 SW-V-76SW-V-139 SW-V-140 33 6" Aloyco Gate 0/2 0% EXCLUDED CBS-V 38 CBS-V-43 SMB-000 Limitorque Light Spring Pack 5 ft-lb Motor l

46 l

_ _ . _ . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ . . _ . . . . . _ _ . _ . _ _ .

l The Seabrook grouping methodology's objective was to create numercus succinct test groups based on I stringent valve and motor-operator physical attributes. Accordingly, r.umy discrete groups were established so that each group, for the most part, consisted of valves and motor-operators that had identical characteristics. This approach has been beneficial when evaluating the dynamic testing data and when extrapolating that data to design basis conditions. Many discrete groups of valves have also been beneficial in evaluating the effects ofload sensitive behavior.

As stated previously, based on the results of the subsequent NRC Motor-Operated Inspection 94-11 a concem was raised by the NRC that the Seabrook dynamic testing in accordance with the Seabrook grouping  ;

philosophy did not meet the intent of Generic Letter Supplement 6 criteria. Following subsequent i discussions with the NRC, Seabrook committed to dynamically test additional valves to meet the intent of  !

Generic Letter 89-10 Supplement 6. The additional testing was planned to be completed by the end of Srabrook's fourth refueling outage. The commitment to perform additional MOV testing was identified to the NRC in NAESCO letter NYN-94106. At the completion of Refueling Outage 04 dynamic testing had been performed on at least two MOV's from each group or 30% of the group (round up to the next high number of valves when taking percentages), whichever is greater with the exception of Groups 7 and 17 which are discussed below. Dynamic testing need not be performed on the remaining MOV's in the group for GL 89-10 closure. Exceptions were taken to the criteria iflow differential pressure existed and meaningful test data would not be obtained from dynamic testing. Exceptions were also taken if the valves in the group could not be tested under dynamic conditions due to the plant configuration. Justifications for excluding valves from testing are included in the MOV Data Base.

Seabrook performed dynamic testing on 60 valves. Table 11 identifies the MOVs that were dynamically tested. Following OR01, as the result of an NRC inspection comment, all dynamic testmg was performed in accordance with site approved dynamic testing procedures with the exception of one test. The one exception 1 was tested in accordance with a work request. Table 12 identifies the valves that were dynamically tested, the maxunum calculated differential pressure for valve operation, the as tested differential pressure, the muumum calculated thrust, the extrapolated as tested thrust and the amount of margin for open/close operation. As can be seen the calculated required thrust exceeded the as tested thrust in all cases and adequate margin exists to provide reliable operation of the MOVs. The test data was reviewed and evaluated to assure that each tested valve was set up adequately and to assure that the remaining valves in the test group, that were not dynamically tested, were also set up acceptably.

AS-V-175 and AS-V-176 (Test Group 17) have a safety function to close to isolate an auxiliary steam line break in the Primary Auxiliary Building. It should be noted that for dynamic testing of AS-V-175, a test configuration was produced to simulate the line break condition. During the line break simulation the auxiliary steam flow from the auxiliary boiler exceeded the predicted flow for the line break. Valve differential pressure during the isolation stroke was negligible due to the large volume in the 12 inch auxiliary steam line compared to the size of the simulated line break (~3 inch). The valve was closed before any appreciable decrease in downstream pressure was experienced. Close thrust for the as tested condition were low and no meaningful test data with the exception that there was no appreciable DP during the closure stroke was obtained. For this reason the isolation valve in series, AS-V-176, was not tested under dynamic conditions.

FW-V-156 (Test Group 7) was not tested under dynamic conditions since the differential pressure for valve opening and closing is O psig. For open operation FW-V-156 is opened following start up of the start up feedwater pump and prior to opening the upstream gate valve (FW-V-163).

Static and dynamic testing records are maintained in the individual test files for each specific MOV. This meets the intent of recommendation (f) of the Generic Letter.

47

TABLEII i VALVES DYNAMICALLY TESTED Valve ID Name Type  ;

AS-V-175 Train 'A' HELB Isolation - AUX Stm Supply to Dynamic Baselme PAB/WPB CBS-V-2 RWST to Train 'A' RHR/CBS Pump Suction Isolation Dynamic Baseline CBS-V-5 RWST to Train 'A' RHR/CBS Pump Suction Isolation Dynamic Baseline ,

CBS-V-53 RWST to SI Pump 'B' Suction Isolation Dynamic Baseline l CC-V-137 PCCW Isolation to CBS HX 'A' Dynamic Baseline CC-V-145 PCCW Isolation to RHR HX 'A' Dynamic Baseline j CC-V-272 PCCW Isolation to RHR HX 'B' Dynamic Baseline CC-V-1092 PCCW Loop 'B' Isol to Thermal Barrier HX 'B' Dynamic Baseline I CC-V-1095 PCCW Loop 'B' Isol from Thermal Barrier HX 'B' D3namic Baseline CC-V-1101 PCCW Loop 'A' Isol to Dermal Barrier HX 'A' - D3namic Baseline

)

CC-V-1109 PCCW Loop ' A' Isol from Thermal Barrier HX ' A' Dynamic Baseline

)

CS-V-142 Train 'A' Charging System to Regen HX Isolation Dynamic Baseline l CS-V-143 Train 'B' Charging System to Regen HX Isolation Dynamic Baseline I CS-V-149 Regen HX Outlet to Letdown HX Dynamic Baseline CS-V-196 Charging Pump 'A' Min Flow Isolation Dynamic Baseline l CS-V-197 Charging Pump 'B' Min Flow Isolation D5mamic Baseline FW-V-163 SUFP X-Connect to EFW Header D5mamic Baseline l FW-V-346 EFW Pump 37A Min Flow Recirc to CST Dynamic Baseline FW-V-347 EFW Pump 37B Min Flow Recirc to CST Dynamic Baseline FW-FV-4224A S/G 'B' EFW Train 'A' Flow Control Dynamic Baseline FW-FV-4234B S/G 'C' EFW Train 'B' Flow Control Dynamic Baseline FW-FV-4244B S/G 'D' EFW Train 'B' Flow Control Dynamic Baseline MS-V-205 SG 'B' MSIV Bvpass Dynamic Baseline MS-V-206 SG 'C' MSIV Bypass Dynamic Baseline MSD-V-44 MS Drain Isolation Valve Upstream OF MS-V-86 Dynamic Baseline MSD-V-45 MS Drain Isolation Valve Upstream OF MS V-85 Dynamic Baseline MSD-V-46 MS Drain Isolation Valve Upstream OF MS-V-90 Dynamic Baseline RC-V-323 - Reactor Head Vent Isolation Dynamic Baseline RH-V-14 RHR Train 'A' to Cold Legs 1 And 2 Dynamic Baseline RH-V-21 RHR Train 'B' Discharge X-Connect D5namic Baseline RH-V-22 RHR Train 'A' Discharge X-Connect D3namic Baseline RH-V-26 RHR Train 'B' to Cold Legs 3 And 4 Dynamic Baseline RH-V-32 RHR Train 'B' Common Supply to Hot Leg Recirc Dynamic Baseline RH-V-36 RHR Pump B Disch Isolation to SI/ Charging Pumps Dynamic Baseline RH-V-70 RHR Train 'A' Common Supply to Hot Leg Recire Dinamic Baseline RH-FCV-610 RHR Pump 'A' Min Flow Control Dynamic Baseline RH-FCV-611 RHR Pump 'B' Min Flow Control Dynamic Baseline SI V-77 SI Train 'B' Discharge Isolation to Hot Legs 1/4 Dynamic Baseline SI-V-89 SI Pump 'B' Min Flow Isolation to RWST Dynamic Baseline SI-V-93 SI Pumps A/B Combined Min Flow Isolation D3namic Baseline SI-V-102 SI Train 'A' Discharge Isolation to Hot Legs 1/4 Dynamic Baseline 48

TABLE 11 VALVES DYNAMICALLY TESTED Valve ID Name Type SI-V-111 SI Train 'B' Discharge X-Connect Dynamic Baseline SI-V-l l2 SI Train 'A' Discharge X-Connect Dynamic Baseline SI-V-114 SI Pumps Common Isolation to Cold Legs Dynamic Baseline SI-V-138 Charging Pumps Supply to RCS Cold Legs Dynamic Baseline SW-V-2 SW Pump A Discharge Isolation Dynamic Baseline SW-V-4 SW Train ' A' Isolation to Secondary Loads Dynamic Baseline SW-V-5 SW Train 'B' Isolation to Secondary Loads Dynamic Baseline SW-V-19 SW Train 'B' to Discharge Structure Dynamic Baseline SW V-20 SW Train 'A' Discharge Structure Dynamic Baseline SW-V-22 SW Pump C Discharge Isolation Dynamic Baseline SW-V-23 SW Train 'B' Return to Cooling Tower Dynamic Baseline SW-V-25 Cooling Tower Pump B Discharge Isolation Dynamic Baseline SW-V-27 Cooling Tower Train 'B' Spray Header Bypass Dynamic Baseline SW-V-29 SW Pump B Discharge Isolation Dynamic Baseline SW-V-31 SW Pump D Discharge Isolation Dynamic Baseline -

SW-V-34 SW Train 'A' Return to Cooling Tower Dynamic Baseline SW-V-54 Cooling Tower Pump A Discharge Isolation Dynamic Baseline SW-V-56 Cooling Tower Train 'A' Spray H_eader Bypass Dynamic Baseline SW-V-139 SW Cooling Tower Train 'A' Spray bypass Recire Dynamic Baseline SI-V-77 SI Train 'B' Discharge Isolation to Hot Legs 1/4 Periodic Verif SI-V-102 SI Train 'A' Discharge Isolation to Hot Legs 1/4 Periodic Verif 13.2 Extrapolation of Partial DP Thrust Measurements Seabrook attempted to dynamically test the generic letter valves at as high as practicable differential pressure conditions. Table 12 identifies when the valve was dynamically tested, the design differential pressure for close and open operation, the as tested close and open differential pressure and the as tested percent of maximum differential pressure for both close and open. In some cases the tested DP was greater than the differential pressure that the valve would be required to operate against. Linear extrapolation has been used to determine the thrust at maximum calculated differential pressure based on the as-tested differential pressure. The EPRI test results for gate and globe valves has validated linear extrapolation. Published EPRI PPP results demonstrate that the friction coefficient for stellite-on-stellite decreases with increasing disc-to-seat contact pressure, i.e., increasing d/p. Thus, extrapolation from low d/p has been demonstrated to be conservative.

49

-._ . _- - --. - . -- - .- - ~. .. .

TABLE 12 DYNAMIC TEST CONDITIONS VALVE ID DATE DSGN TEST  % DSGN TEST  %

DP DP DSGN DP DP DSGN l CLOSE CLOSE DP OPEN OPEN DP )

AS-V-175 10/27/92 125 Note i Note I l CBS-V-2 10/9/92 40 22.34 55.85 310 22.34 7.21 l

Note 2 CBS-V-5 10/9/92 40 22.54 55.85 310 22.54 7.27 Note 2 )

CBS-V-53 10/9/92 Note 3 65 125.9 125.9 l I

CC-V-1092 4/14/94 140 85.6 61.14 140 85.6 61.14 CC-V-1095 4/15/94 140 86.2 61.57 140 86.2 61.57 CC-V-1101 4/17/94 135 85.7 63.48 135 85.7 63.48 CC-V-1109 4/17/94 135 85.9 63.62 135 85.9 63.62 CC-V-137 6/30/94 129 92.2 71.47 129 92.2 71.47 CC-V-145 6/30/94 131 93.1 71.07 131 93.1 71.07 CC-V-272 9/9/91 131 92.7 70.76 131 92.7 70.76 I CS-V-142 10/31/92 2731 2686 98.35 2731 2686 98.35 CS-V-143 10/31/92 2731 2686 98.35 2731 2686 98.35 CS-V-149 12/6/95 600 529.7 88.28 600 529.7 88.28 CS-V-196 12/3/95 2670 2492.9 90.8 2745 2572.9 96.4 I CS-V-197 12/3/95 2670 2559.9 93.2 2745 2589.9 97.0 FW-FV-4224A i1/2/93 1550 1510 97.42 1550 1510 97.42 FW-FV-4234B 11/2/92 1550 1510 97.42 1550 1510 97.42 FW-FV-4244B 7/28/94 1550 435 28.06 1550 435 28.06 FW-V-163 7/22/94 Note 4 1560 1429 91.60 FW-V-346 6/l1/89 1500 1360 90.67 1500 1460 97.33 FW-V-347 7/22/94 1500 1514.5 101.0 1500 1514.5 101.0 MS-V-205 10/9/91 1236 1015 82.12 1236 Note 5 MS-V-206 6/23/95 1236 1030 83.33 1236 Note 5 MSD-V-44 10/5/93 1125 1052 93.51 1106 1052 95.12 MSD-V-45 10/5/93 1125 1052 93.51 1106 1052 95.12 MSD-V-46 7/26/94 1125 1050 93.33 1106 1050 94.94 RC-V-323 12/4/95 350 313.5 89.57 2595 313.5 12.08 Note 6 RH-FCV-610 11/21/95 183.3 193.4 105.5 202.7 193.4 95.41 RH-FCV-611 6/10/94 183.3 108.3 59.10 202.7 108.25 53.40 RH-V-14 10/9/92 190 175 92.11 625 175 28.00 RH-V-21 6/10/94 253.4 185.3 73.13 360.3 185.3 51.43 RH-V-22 11/21/95 253.4 193.4 76.32 360.3 193.4 53.68 RH-V-26 11/21/95 190 193.4 101.8 625 193.4 30.94 RH-V-32 9/4/91 194 188.0 96.91 221 188.0 85.07 RH-V-36 11/21/95 207 193.4 93.43 254 193.4 76.14 RH-V-70 9/4/91 194 188.0 96.91 221 188.0 85.07 50

d TABLE 12 DYNAMIC TEST CONDITIONS VALVE ID DATE DSGN TEST  % DSGN TEST  %

DP DP DSGN DP DP DSGN CLOSE CLOSE DP OPEN OPEN DP

~

SI-V-102 11/20/95 Note 7 1731 1558.1 88.50 SI-V-111 11/20/95 Note 7 m 1705 1643.4 96.39 SI-V-112 10/9/92 Note 7 1705 1549 90.85

, SI-V-114 11/20/95 70 1632.6 326.5 70 1632.6 326.5 SI-V-138 10/9/92 Note 8 2731 2733.8 100.1 SI-V-77 11/20/95 Note 7 ^

1731 1539 88.90 SI-V-89 11/20/95 1415 1480.6 104.6 1560 1480.6 94.90 SI-V-93 11/20/95 1415 1480.6 104.6 0 1480.6 Note 6 SW-V-139 4/28/89 145.4 52.5 36.11 145.4 52.5 36.11 SW-V-19 1/7/90 148.7 54.0 36.31 148.7 54.0 36.31 SW-V-2 7/7/94 60 Note 9 >

106- 85.I 80.30 SW-V-20 1/4/90 148.7 53.5 35.98 148.7 Note 10 SW-V-22 7/7/94 60 Note 9 106 84.1 79.30 SW-V-23 1/4/90 149.5 53.5 35.98 149.5 Note 1I SW-V-25 7/1/94 140.8 29.55 21.0 140.8 29.55 21.0 SW-V-27 7/1/94 140.8 145.43 103.28 140.8 145.43 103.28 SW-V-29 6/14/94 60 Note 9 106 82.8 78.1 SW-V-31 7/2/94 60 Note 9 106 78.9 74.4 SW-V-34 1/4/90 149.5 53.5 35.98 149.5 Note 11 SW-V-4 7/8/94 132.6 57.3 43.20 132.6 57.3 43.2 SW-V-5 11/28/95 132.6 48.1 36.27 132.6 48.1 36.27 SW-V-54 7/7/94 140.8 137.92 97.9 140.8 137.92 97.9 SW-V-56 7/7/94 140.8 144.16 102.4 140.8 144.16 102.4 NOTES FOR TABLE 12:

1. The closing stroke for AS-V-175 was performed with 2 auxiliary boilers on-line supplying steam.

The valve was stroked with steam flow at approximately 60,000 lbm/hr. With a warm steam header and no heating loads, virtually all of the steam mass was flowing through AS-V-175 and out to atmosphere by way of the simulated line break, (orifice), installed downstream. The measured dP based on the local pressure gauge located near the release point indicated very little pressure drop due to the expansion of the steam in the AS header downstrem of V-175. Subsequent analysis indicated that the dP was approximately 26 psid. Ahhough the dP was lower than expected and only a fraction of the conservative design dP, the valve successfully stopped approximately 60,000 lbm/hr. Analysis of the open stroke and the close stroke indicates that there is large margin in the thrust capability for this valve. AS-V-175 is never fully opened with design differential pressure.

For the test, the valve was cracked off the open seat to warm the downstream header. The signature captured the unseating force and flow initiation against 150 psid.

51

2 The open maximum DP for CBS-V-2 and CBS-V-5 is based on back leakage through 2 check valves. These valves were tested using the static head of the refueling water storage tank, RWST, as the upstream pressure source. The RWST gravity drained to the refueling cavity when the valve was opened. Fuel was removed from the reactor vessel and water level was slightly above the vessel flange. It was not feasible to test these valves by simulating check valve leakage or relief valve lifting. These are unlikely events ar.d would require highly abnormal system lineups that would involve risk to other equipment.

3. CBS-V-53 is not required to close under differential pressure conditions.

4. FW-V-163 closes after the startup feed pump is shutdown. This valve was not dynamically tested in the close direction.

5. MS-V-205 and MS-V-206, MSIV bypass valves, were not tested in the open direction. These valves are throttled open during main steam header warmup in hot standby, Mode 3, conditions. He safety function of these valves is to be capable of closure.

6. RC-V-323 is a globe valve with pressure under the seat. The valve was tested in cold shutdown, Mode 5, with approximatly 325 psig in the pressurizer. Since pressure assists the open stroke, it is not considered necessary to challenge the downstream piping at full DP conditions since that would require normal operating temperatures in the reactor coolant system.

7. SI-V-111/V-112 and SI-V-77/V-102 are not required to close under differential pressure conditions.

8. SI-V-138 is not required to close under differential pressure conditions.

9. SW-V-2, SW-V-22, SW-V-29, and SW-V-31, ocean service water pump discharge valves, are interlocked with the pumps and automatically open with pump start and automatically close on pump shut down. A check valve downstream of each of these valves prevents dynamic testing in the close direction.

10. SW-V-20 safety function is to automatically close on receipt of a tower actuation, TA, signal. This valve is normally open. It was not tested in the open direction under dynamic conditions.

I 1. SW-V-23 and SW-V-34 were not dynamically tested in the open direction.

52

___m _ _ . _ . . . . _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . - _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . ~ _ _ . _ . . _ _ . _ _

I-1

. 13.3 Margin i

d The available margm for valve operation is determmed for each valve that has been dynamically tested The close margin for gate and globe valves is the difference between the extrapolated hard seat contact thmst and the dynamic thrust at either the torque switch or limit switch trip point. For gate valves that close on limit, 4 the close thrust at hard seat contact is extrapolated to design bases condition and compared to the mimmum j required thrust value. Close margin is deternuned by taking the difference between these two values. The

open margin is determmed using the thrust at flow initiation and using linear extrapolation to determme the j, thrust at design basis conditions. The extrapolated flow initiation thrust is then compared to the thrust at j torque switch trip under static conditions. The difference between the two identified values is the open

! margin. On an as needed basis, the extrapolated thrust value based on flow initiation is compared to the actuator derated output capability and open margin is calculated as the difference between the two values.

i For valves that have been tested under dynamic conditions Table 13 identifies the adjusted margin for close

and open operation and the percent of margin available. Seabrook routinely performs a detailed case basis

( review of the available margin for eah dynamic test prior to determuung that the valve is operable.

Available margin for butterfly valves is determmed by takmg the peak dynamic torque and subtracting that value from the accuracy comp-M maximum torque value.

TABLE 13 MARGIN BASED ON DYNAMIC TESTING VALVE ID MARGIN CLOSE MARGIN OPEN

CLOSE MARGIN OPEN MARGIN AS-V-175 Note 1 ,

Note 1 'm f CBS-V-2 7426 lbf 96 08 Note 2 - WM l

CBS-V-5 26170 lbf 338.6- Note 2 '

4 4233lbf

^

l CBS-V-53 Note 3 4' 105.3 CC-V-1092 309.1 ft-lb 77.86 357.3 ft-lb 89.98 CC-V-1095 332.4 ft-lb 83.74 349.5 ft-lb 88.04 CC-V-1101 324.0 ft-lb 81.61 329.9 ft-lb 83.10 CC-V-1109 312.1 ft-lb 78.60 340.4 ft-lb 85.74 CC-V-137 425.0 ft-lb 44.18 451.2 ft-lb 46.90 CC-V-145 297.4 ft-lb 25.70 307.4 ft-lb 26.57 CC-V-272 95 ft-lb 8.21 404.7 ft-lb 34.98 CS-V-142 6622 lbf 45.92 1921lbf 22.99 CS-V-143 7172 lbf 49.74 4255 lbf 50.93 j CS-V-149 1828lbf 31.13 3363lbf 78.83 CS-V-196 4041 lbf 37.13 12553 lbf 117.8 CS-V-197 3365 lbf 30.92 10942 lbf 102.7 FW-FV-4224A 1568lbf 42.14 Note 4 FW-FV-4234B 1079lbf 30.00 Note 4 >

l FW-FV-4244B 1630 lbf 43.81 Note 4 l FW-V-163 Note 5 3635 lbf 25.52 FW-V-346 2175 lbf 17.90 2626lbf 23.34 l

FW-V-347 2374lbf 19.58 11020 lbf 98. I I )

m l MS-V-205 2971 lbf 34.06 Note 6 l MS-V-206 5039 lbf 57.77 Note 6 -

53 i

l l L. . . .. . _ . - - . - .

TABLE 13 MARGIN BASED ON DYNAMIC TESTING VALVE ID MARGIN CLOSE MARGIN OPEN CLOSE MARGIN OPEN MARGIN

^

^"

MSD-V-44 Note 7 Note 7 MS D-V-45 Note 7 oe Note 7 MSD-V-46 Note 7 Note 7 RC-V-323 Note 8 -

Note 8 RH-FCV-610 3302 lbf 69.77 4035lbf 96.83 RH-FCV-611 4017lbf 84.87 5415 lbf 129.9 RH-V-14 22760 lbf 248.8 24670 lbf 190.5 RH-V-21 2589 lbf 29.30 2250 lbf 28.47 RH-V-22 2106 lbf 21.40 2293 lbf 25.60 RH-V-26 9222lbf 101.2 4742lbf 36.61 RH-V-32 Il8721bf 113.0 130651bf 167.2 RH-V-36 5536lbf 74.59 6461lbf ^ 89.72 RH-V-70 18173 lbf 172.9 13085 lbf 167.4 SI-V-102 Note 9 3507lbf 35.41 SI-V-111 Note 9 3060 lbf 31.22 SI-V-112 Note 9 3180 lbf 32.44 SI-V-114 6318lbf 95.73 8807 lbf I85.4 SI-V-138 Note 10 2651 lbf 21.24 SI-V-77 Note 9 6122 lbf 61.8i SI-V-89 6944 lbf 101.5 11913lbf 163.6 SI-V-93 6033lbf 88.16 12477 lbf 171.3 SW-V-139 1514 ft-lb 34.76 1810 ft-lb 41.55 SW-V-19 2199 ft lb 50.48 2568 ft-Ib 58.95 SW-V-2 Note 11 797 ft-lb 18.30 SW-V-20 2275 ft-lb 52.23 Note 12 SW-V-22 Note 11 799 ft-lb 18.34 SW-V-23 2020 ft-Ib 46.37 Note 13 SW-V-25 985 ft-lb 22.61 1532 ft-lb 35.17 SW-V-27 2035 ft-lb 46.72 1559 ft-Ib 35.79 SW-V-29 Note 11 1441 ft-lb 33.08 SW-V-31 Note 1I 1491 ft-lb 34.23

_SW-V-34 1632 ft-lb 37.47 Note 13 SW-V-4 347 ft-lb 36.72 380 ft-lb 40.21 SW-V-5 533 ft-lb 56.40 180 ft-lb 19.05 SW-V-54 1349 ft-lb 30.97 1488 ft-lb 34.16 SW-V-56 1784 ft-lb 40.96 1603 ft-lb 36.80 54

l l NOTES FOR TABLE 13:

]

l l l 1. See Table 12, Dynamic Test Conditions, Note 1. 'Ihe test DP was lower than expected and only a fraction of the conservative design dP. However, the valve successfully stopped approximately 60,000 lbm/hr steam flovf. Analysis of the open stroke and the close stroke indicates that there is l large margin in the thrust capability for this valve and a case basis evaluation was performed. j l 2 See Table 12, Dynamic Test Conditions, Note 2. The low test DP compared to the conservatively high design DP did not permit extrapolation to design conditions. l j-l

3. CBS-V-53 is not required to close under differential pressure conditions.

l l 4. FW-FV-4224A,4234B, and 4244B were tested in the open direction. These valves are globe valves l with pressure under the seat. This results in a very large margin and it is not mamaingful to l extrapolate to design conditions.

5. FW-V-163 closes after the startup feed pump is shutdown. This valve was not dynamically tested in 1 the close direction,

6. MS-V-205 and MS-V-206, MSIV bypass valves, were not tested in the open direction. These valves are throttled open during main steam header warmup in hot standby, Mode 3, conditions. The safety function of these valves is to be capable of closure.

l 7. MSD-V-44,45, and 46 are rotating rising stem valves. The valves were tested in the open and l closed directions at hot standby, Mode 3, conditions at near design DP conditions. A special case l

basis evaluation was performed to demonstrate that these valves have adequate margin to perform their design function.  !

l

8. RC-V-323 is a globe valve with pressure under the seat. The valve was tested in cold shutdown, Mode 5, with approximatly 325 psig in the pressurizer. Since pressure assists the open stroke, it is not considered necessary to challenge the downstream piping at full DP conditions since that would require normal operating temperatures in the reactor coolant system.

9. SI-V-111/V-112 and SI-V-77/V-102 are not required to close under differential pressure conditions.

10. SI-V-138 is not required to close under differential pressure conditions.

l

11. SW-V-2, SW-V-22, SW-V-29, and SW-V-31, ocean service water pump discharge valves, are interlocked with the pumps and automatically open with pump start and automatically close on pump shut down. A check valve downstream of each of these valves prevents dynamic testing in the close direction.

12. SW-V-20 safety function is to automatically close on receipt of a tower actuation, TA, signal. This valve is normally open. It was not tested in the open direction under dynamic conditions.  ;

13. SW-V-23 and SW-V-34 were not dynamically tested in the open direction.

55

13.4 Load Sensitive Behavior Load-sensitive behavior is the condition where the delivered thrust at torque switch trip differs under dynamic conditions as compared to static conditions for the same torque switch settmg Seabrook testing has shown that load sensitive behavior is not experienced on every valve. Some valves have shown not to be affected by load sensitive behavior, whereas, on other valves load sensitive behavior has been shown to exist.

The output dynamic thrust at the same torque switch setpoint may either be greater or less than the thrust determmed under static conditions. Seabrook does not incorporate a generic load sensitive behavior factor in the required thrust calculations. Seabrook reviews the applicable dynamic test results and quantifies load sensitive behavior. By using the dynamic control switch trip in the margin analysis, ROL is inherently accounted for. In addition, on a case basis, additional corrections are made to the margin calculation to account for ROL uncertainty. Seabrook uses this approach since there is no industry acceptable rate of loading factor that applies to every valve and since the overall approach used at Seabrook is based on conservative differential pressure values. Table 14 shows load sensitive behavior test results. As discussed in Section 13.1, the dynamic testing grouping methodology created a significant number of groups. This allowed load sensitive behavior to be factored into the test group more easily since fewer valves would be required to be evaluated for specific rate ofloading cases.

Current setup practices are sufficient to provide assurance of the ability of the Seabrook valves to operate under all design basis conditions and would bound the thrust requirements based on load sensitive behavior.

Conservatisms are already included in the calculation of mmimum required thrusts. These include conservative diagnostic system inaccuracy, torque switch repeatability values, worst case differential pressure, derated motor torque, theoretical packing loads, actuator application factors, worst case undervoltage factors, and stem-to-stem nut coefficient of friction.

56

TABLE 14 LOAD SENSITIVE BEHAVIOR Tag ID Valve Group Close Thrust LVDT Thrust LVDT 'Ihrust LVDT Number  % of Type # TS Static Static Dynamic Dynami Dtfrerence Differe MOV's Group Setting CST CST CST CST nce Group Tested GATEJ VALVES + +

CS-V-149 gate I 1.25 7,464 0.098 5,777 N/R 1,687.00 1 100 CS-LCV-112C gate 4 1.50 11,635 0.159 9,540 0.146 2,095.00 0.013 2 50 SI V 102 gate 5 1.00 11,012 0.029 7,210 0.030 3,802.00 -0.000 7 71 SI V 11I gate 5 1.25 11,927 0.113 9,684 0.100 2,243.00 0.013 7 71 SI-V-112 gate 5 1.25 11,193 0.104 11,528 0.160 -335.00 -0.056 7 7i SI.V-114 gate 5 1.00 14,716 0.072 11,379 0.072 3,337.00 0.000 7 "' I SI-V-138 gate 5 tim 9,579 0.05 18,570 0.231 -8,991.00 -0.181 7 71 SI-V-77 gate 5 1.25 12,301 0.086 13,963 0.094 -1,662.00 -0.008 7 71 FW V-163 gate 7 2.50 16,102 -0.220 22,118 -0.216 -6,016.00 -0.004 2 50 CBS-V-53 gate 8 2.00 8,798 0.193 8,960 0.183 -162.00 0.010 1 100 RH-V-21 gate 9 3.00 11022 0.314 12,579 0.347 -1,557.00 -0.033 4 75 RH-V-22 gate 9 2.75 11,748 0.251 10,232 0.288 1,516.00 -0.037 4 75 RH-V-36 gate 9 2.25 11,194 0.329 10,908 0.342 286.00 -0.013 4 75 RH-V-32 gate 11 2.50 21,177 0.245 21,258 N/R -81.00 2 100 RH.V-70 gate II 2.25 22,997 0.259 26,710 N/R -3,713.00 2 100 RH-V-14 gate 12 1.75 38,615 0.135 44.,623 0.137 -6,008.00 -0.002 2 100 RH-V-26 gate 12 1.50 24,828 0.100 18,158 0.105 6,670.00 -0.005 2 100 CBS-V-2 gate 15 1.50 19,522 0.100 16,267 0.107 3,255.00 -0.007 2 100 CBS V-5 gate 15 1,75 36,943 0.132 32,824 0.137 4,119.00 -0.005 2 100 AS-V 175 gate 17 3 25 14,498 0.338 16,358 0.344 -1,860.00 -0.006 2 50 CS-V-142 globe 2 lim 9,386 0.029 9,363 0.035 23.00 -0.006 4 50 CS-V-143 globe 2 lim 9,743 0.024 9,557 0.030 186.00 -0.006 4 50 GLOBE:'

VALVES:

FW V-346 gate 28 2.75 13,618 0.261 13,115 0.188 503.00 0.073 2 100 FW V-347 gate 28 2.50 14,007 0.284 14,149 0.287 -142.00 -0.003 2 100 RC-V-323 globe 19 2.00 2,905 0.138 2,710 0.140 195.00 -0.002 1 100 MSD-V-44 globe 20 2.50 4 75 MSD-V-45 globe 20 2.50 4 75 MSD-V-46 globe 20 1.50 7,659 0.I36 7,777 0.139 -118.00 -0.003 4 75 CS-V 196 globe 22 1.50 13,334 0.I59 13,650 0.I72 -316.00 -0.013 5 80 CS-V-197 globe 22 1.25 12,785 0.169 12,811 N/R -26.00 5 80 SI-V-89 globe 22 1.75 13,057 0.114 13,461 0.127 -404.00 -0.013 5 80 SI-V-93 globe 22 1.75 12,172 0.126 12,077 0.127 95.00 -0.001 5 80 Ril-FCV-610 globe 24 3.00 8,469 0.299 7,184 0.294 1,285.00 0.005 2 100 RH-FCV-61 I globe 24 3.00 8,561 0.298 7,873 0.30"' 688.00 -0.009 2 100 MS-V-205 globe 25 1.50 11,206 0.116 4 50 MS-V-206 globe 25 1.50 15015 0.165 15,116 0.145 -101.00 0.020 4 50 FW-FV-4224A globe 26 4.00 5636 0.102 5,959 0.095 -323.00 0 007 8 37.5 FW-FV-4234B globe 26 4.00 7409 0 086 5,422 0.079 1,987.00 0.007 8 37.5 FW-FV-4244B globe 26 3.50 7,558 0.090 6,127 0 085 1,431.00 0.005 8 37.5 57

14.0 DEMONSTRATE ADEOUACY OF VALVE SET UP Each of the Generic Letter 89-10 motor-operated valve control switch settings were based on diagnostic test results. The adequacy of the switch settings for valves that are capable of being dynamically tested has been demonstrated by dynamic testing in accordance with the Seabrook Station valve grouping methodology. For valves that can not be dynamically tested the adequacy of valve set up is accomplished by evaluation. As part of the evaluation, if valves are made from the same valve manufacturer and are similar to valves that have been dynamically tested, although they may be in a different dynamic test group, the static test results of the valve not tested dynamically is compared to the dynamic test results of similar valves. EPRI Performance Prediction Program test results may also be used as part of the evaluation as appropriate.

Some of the basis for acceptable valve set up used in the evaluation are:

e Valve not required to operate e Globe valve that must open and flow is under the seat

. Excessive margin

. For valves required to open or are required to close, and closure is controlled by limit switch, excessive actuator capability

. Actuator capability at design basis conditions The adequacy of each Generic Letter 89-10 valve set up is summarized in the following Table 15.

TABLE 15 ADEQUACY of VALVE SET UP VALVE ID BASIS FOR ACCEPTANCE  ;

AS-V-175 Dynamically Tested AS-V-176 Based on Dynamic Test Results of AS-V175, Excessive Margin CBS-V-I l Actuator Capability CBS-V-14 Actuator Capability CBS-V-17 Actuator Capability CBS-V-2 Dynamically Tested i CBS-V-38 Low DP - Actuator Capability CBS-V-43 Low DP - Actuator Capability l CBS-V-47 Actuator Capability CBS-V-49 Actuator Capability CBS-V-5 Dynamically Tested CBS-V-51 Actuator Capability CBS-V-53 Actuator Capability CBS-V-8 Actuator Capability CC-V-1092 Dynamically Tested CC-V-1095 Dynamically Tested CC-V-1101 Dynamically Tested 58

l l TABLE 15 l ADEQUACY of VALVE SET UP l VALVE ID BASIS FOR ACCEPTANCE l.

CC-V-1109 Dynamically Tested CC-V-137 Dynamically Tested CC-V-145 Dynamically Tested l CC-V-266 Based on Dynamic Testing of Similar Valves ,

l CC-V-272 Dynamically Tested CC-V-395 Actuator Capability CC-V-428 Actuator Capability CC-V-438 Actuator Capability CC-V-439 Actuator Capability CGC-V-14 Actuator Capability - Flow Under Seat, Low DP CGC-V-28 Actuator Capability - Flow Under Seat, Low DP CS-LCV-ll2B Actuator Capability - Excessive Margin CS-LCV-112C Actuator Capability - Excessive Margin CS-LCV-112D Actuator Capability - Excessive Margin CS-LCV-112E Actuator Capability - Excessive Margin CS-V-142 Dynamically Tested CS-V-143 Dynamically Tested CS-V-149 Dynamically Tested CS-V-154 Excessive Margin - Flow is Under Seat CS-V-158 Excessive Margin - Flow is Under Seat CS-V-162 Excessive Margin - Flow is Under Seat CS-V-166 Excessive Margin - Flow is Under Seat CS-V-167 Excessive Margin CS-V-168 Excessive Margin CS-V-196 Dynamically Tested CS-V-197 Dynamically Tested CS-V-426 Excessive Margin CS-V-460 Actuator Capability CS-V-461 Actuator Capability CS-V-475 Actuator Capability FW-FV-4214A Based on Dynamic Testing of Similar Valve FW-FV-4214B Based on Dynamic Testing of Similar Valve FW-FV-4224A Dynamically Tested FW-FV-4224B Based on Dynamic Testing of Similar Valve FW-FV-4234A Based on Dynamic Testing of Similar Valve FW-FV-4234B Dynamically Tested FW-FV-4244A Based on Dynamic Testing of Similar Valve FW-FV-4244B Dynamically Tested FW-V-156 Based on Dynamic Testing of Similar Valve FW-V-163 Dynamically Tested FW-V-346 Dynamically Tested FW-V-347 Dynamically Tested 59

TABLE 15 ADEQUACY of VALVE SET UP VALVE ID BASIS FOR ACCEPTANCE MS-V-204 Based on Dynamic Testing of Similar Valve MS-V-205 Dynamically Tested MS-V-206 Dynamically Tested ,

MS-V-207 Based on Dynamic Testing of Similar Valve MSD-V-44 Dynamically Tested MSD-V-45 Dynamically Tested MSD-V-46 Dynamically Tested  ;

MSD-V-47 Based on Dynamic Testing of Similar Valve j RC-V-122 Based on Dynamic Testing of Similar Valve

]

RC-V-124 Based on Dynamic Testing of Similar Valve l RC-V-22 Actuator Capability 1 RC-V-23 Actuator Capability RC-V-323 Dynamically Tested  :

l RC-V-87 Actuator Capability RC-V-88 Actuator Capability RH-FCV-610 Dynamically Tested RH-FCV-611 Dynamically Tested RH-V-14 Dynamically Tested RH-V-21 Dynamically Tested RH-V-22 Dynamically Tested l

RH-V-26 Dynamically Tested j RH-V-32 Dynamically Tested RH-V-35 Based on Dynamic Testing of Similar Valve

)

RH-V-36 Dynamically Tested RH-V-70 Dynamically Tested SI-V-102 Dynamically Tested SI-V-111 Dynamically Tested SI-V-112 Dynamically Tested SI-V-114 Dynamically Tested SI-V-138 Dynamically Tested SI-V-139 Based on Dynamic Testing of Similar Valve SI-V-17 Actuator Capability SI-V-3 Actuator Capability SI-V-32 Actuator Capability i

SI-V-47 Actuator Capability SI-V-77 Dynamically Tested SI-V-89 Dynamically Tested SI-V-90 Based on Dynamic Testing of Similar Valve SI-V-93 Dynamically Tested SW-V-139 Dynamically Tested SW-V-140 Based on Dynamic Testing of Similar Valve SW-V-15 Based on Dynamic Testing of Similar Valve _

60

TABLE 15 ADEQUACY of VALVE SET UP VALVE ID BASIS FOR ACCEPTANCE SW-V-17 Based on Dynamic Testing of Similar Valve SW-V-19 Dynamically Tested SW-V-2 Dynamically Tested SW-V-20 Dynamically Tested SW-V-22 Dynamically Tested SW-V-23 Dynamically Tested SW-V-25 Dynamically Tested SW-V-27 Dynamically Tested SW-V-29 Dynamically Tested SW-V-31 Dynamically Tested SW-V-34 Dynamically Tested SW-V-4 Dynamically Tested SW-V-5 Dynamically Tested SW-V-54 Dynamically Tested SW-V-56 Dynamically Tested SW-V-74 Based on Dynamic Testing of Similar Valve  !

l SW-V-76 Based on Dynamic Testing of Similar Valve 15.0 MOV MAINTENANCE 15.1 Routine Maintenance j Routine MOV preventive maintenance is performed in accordance with either a Work Request or a l Repetitive Task Sheet. Corrective Maintenance is performed in accordance with a Work Request. Station  !

Procedure ESI850.003 defines the required preventive maintenance activities and PM frequencies for each motor-operated valve. ES1850.003 describes how the following is performed:

MOV motor overload protection devices are tested and verified and identifies the applicable maintenance procedure for doing same, e describes the MOV preventive maintenance activities and frequencies, e specifies the required MOV electrical inspections and identifies the applicable inspection procedure, e specifies the MOV actuator inspections and identifies the applicable maintenance procedures how corrective maintenance is performed and identifies the applicable procedures The MOV Program assumes little or no degradation of stem lubricant will occur between maintenance intervals. This is based on an effective preventive maintenance program which includes valve stem cleaning and re-lubrication at regular intervals. To validate the effectiveness of this maintenance attribute, "as-found" MOV diagnostic tests have been performed as a means of monitoring stem lubrication deterioration . As found diagnostic testing indicates that there has been minimal lubrication degradation. Seabrook will continue to monitor the acceptability of MOV stem lubrication.

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15.2 Post-MaintenanceTesting Generic Letter 89-10 recommendation (j) requires that Post Maintenance Test Guidelines be established to ensure MOV operability following maintenance. Station Procedure ES1850.003 Figure 10.3 prosides guidelines for post maintenance MOV testing activities. Post maintenance testing is performed in accordance with Station Procedure MA 3.5, "Seabrook Station Maintenance Manual (SSMA), Chapter 3, Work ,

Control". Table 16 of this report shows ES1850.003 Figure 10.3. This table identifies whether the l performed maintenance is considered routine minor maintenance or is considered major maintenance. Major  ;

maintenance that impacts on the ability of an MOV to perform its design-basis function is followed by a l new baseline static test in accordance with Generic Letter 89-10 requirements. Procedure MA3.5 identifies i the required testing necessary for minor and major maintenance classifications. The MOV Program ]

Manager may revise the testing requirements provided that adequate justification is available to demonstrate the activity does not affect the ability of the MOV to perform it's design basis function. Thejustification would be documented on the applicable work control document.

TABLE 16 POST MAINTENANCE TEST GUIDELINES MAINTENANCE AEE EXAMPLE FOLLOW UP REQUIREMENTS ACTIVITY CAMRY MINOR MAJOR actuator preventive maintenance X Per SSMA 3.5, Figure 5.4, Activities I,3,4 and 5.

I actuator electncal power circuit X Per SSMA 3.5, Figure 5.4, Activities I,3,4 and 5.

2 disconnect / reconnect MOV control circuit maintenance X Per SSMA 3.5, Figure 5.4, Activities 1,3,4 and 5.

3 4 actuator limit switch relacement or X Per SSMA 3.5, Figure 5.4, Activities I,3,4 and 5.

• See Note adjustment 1.

5 manual operation of MOV X Per SSMA 3.5, Figure 5.4, Activities I and 5.

6 valve stem packing adjustment or X Per SSMA 3.5, Figure 5.4, activities as applicable plus replacement quantify packing load using motor current or strain measurements.

• See Note 2.

7 actuator removal and installation X Per SSMA 3.5, Figure 5.4, activities as applicable plus motor current or strain measurement.

8 actuator rebuild X Per SSMA 3.5, Figure 5.4, activities as applicable plus new diagnostic base line test.

9 torque switch replacement X Per SSMA 3.5, Figure 5.4, activities as applicable plus venfy torque switch set point (diagnostics or 'P test).

10 valve disassembly X Per SSMA 3.5, Figure 5.4, activities as applicable plus new diagnostic base line test.

1I stem or stem nut replacement X Per SSMA 3.5, Figure 5.4, activities as applicable plus new diagnostic base line test.

12 actuator sprmg pack replacement or X Per SSMA 3.5, Figure 5.4, activities as applicable plus new adjustment diagnostic base line test.

13 Linutorque upper housmg cover bolt X Per SSMA 3.5, Figure 5.4, activities as apphcable plus new tightening or gasket replacement diagnostic base line test.

14 loosemng or tightenmg Linutorque X Per SSMA 3.5, Figure 5.4, activities as applicable plus venfy size 000 torque switch termmal torque switch set point (diagnostics or 'P test).

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TABLE 16 POST MAINTENANCE TEST GUIDELINES  :

ANCE MAINIENANCE EXAMPLE FOLLOW UP REQUIREMENTS CA M ORY ACTIVITY MINOR MAJOR 15 replacement of gaskets and seals X Per SSMA 3.5, Figure 5.4, activities as applicable plus new diagnostic base line test.

16 miscellaneous replacement and X Per SSMA 3.5, Figure 5.4, activities as applicable.

adjustment (handwheel, tripper fingers, engagement lever, etc.)  ;

17 motor replacement (Rotork) X Per SSMA 3.5, Figure 5.4, activities as apphcable plus new l diagnostic base line test. ,

18 motor replacement (Lmutorque) X Per SSMA 3.5, Figure 5.4, activities as applicable plus new l diagnostic baseline test. j X

19 adjustment gear box stops Per SSMA 3.5, Figure 5.4, activities as applicable plus new electrical trending baseline. 1 NOTE 1: For MOVs which utilize limit switch settings for the control of valve closure, diagnostic verification of the seating thrust or torque shall be performed, after limit switch replacements or adjustments, which affect valve closure, are made.

NOTE 2: Post maintenance testing after valve packing adjustments should verify valve stem thrust or torque whenever practical. If these measurements can not be acquired (example: technical specification limitations, seismic or EQ concerns) then motor current diagnostics should be acquired at the MCC.

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16.0 MOV TRAINING Seabrook Station provides training to its employees in order to develop in-house expertise in the area of -

MOV Maintenance and Testing. Trauung for MOV technicians is delivered in steps, with each step building on the previous ones. From initial trauung on preventive rnaintenance ofoperators and their controllers, the trauung program continues on through overhauls of several types of valve operators, culminating in diagnostics and analysis. A fully trained MOV tech will have received over two hundred I

hours ofinitial trauung. In addition to the initial programs, technicians are regularly scheduled for practice sessions, refresher trauung, and events update training, in order to keep their knowledge and skills current.

The following lesson plans are part of the MOV training program:

Initial Training consists of:

EL41.0ll Limitorque PM EL41021 Overhaul of Limitorque SMB 000 EL41031 Overhaul of Limitorque SB 00 EL41041 Overhaul of Limitorque SMB 0-4 EL41051 Maintenance of HBC Units EL41061 Rotork Inspection & PM EL41071 Rotork Overhaul EL22001 EIM Operators EL43201 Strain Gauge Installation ,

EL43101 Introduction to INSTEAD MOV Testing EL43111 Data Acquisition Using INSTEAD EL43121 MOV Diagnostic Analysis EL43151' Rotork MOV Testing Nine Job Performance Measures are used to evaluate trainees skill levels on these initial training topics.

Continuing Training (in addition to quarterly Industry Events training) consists of:

EL494iC MOV Refresher Training EL4312C INSTEAD Signature Analysis Information sources used to enhance and update both initial and continuing training lesson plans include, but are not limited to the following:

Feedback from technicians, supervisors, and Technical Support personnel NRC Generic Letters, I.E. Notices, Bulletins, etc INPO notices and reports EPRI guidelines Vendor notices, maintenance updates, Part 21 notifications Industry events and experiences, as applicable 64

1 17.0 PERIODIC VERIFICATION I l

Recommendation (j) of Generic Letter 89-10 requires that a program be established to verify that correct j switch settings as well as other tests or surveillances that are used to identify potential MOV degradations or J

misadjustments should be implemented aAer maintenance or packing adjustment of each MOV and 1 periodically thereafter. The surveillance interval should be based on the licensee's evaluation of the safety  !

importance of each MOV as well as the maintenance and performance history. The surveillance interval  ;

should not exceed 5 years or three refueling outages, whichever is longer unless a longer interval can be l justified. l Seabrook has performed periodic verification testing of the safety-related MOVs on a three refueling cycle frequency. However, Seabrook plans to modify the periodic verification frequency using a deterministic j 4

approach factoring in specific valve setup or valve operating parameters and including the results of the PRA analysis of the valve's safety significance, as discussed in Section 6 of this report. NAESCO Procedure ES 1850.003 describes the criteria that will be used to determine the new periodic testing frequency of each valve. He Post Maintenance testing requirements recommended in Itemj are discussed in the above section on Post Maintenance Testing, (Section 15.2).

Diagnostic testing frequencies are currently scheduled to be performed on a three refueling cycle frequency as specified in the work control database. This is consistent with the reconunendations of the NRC Generic Letter 89-10. As provided by recommendation (j) of the generic letter, "The surveillance interval should not exceed five years or three refueling outages, whichever is longer, unless a longer interval can bejustified (see item h.) for any particular MOV." It is anticipated that the periodic diagnostic testing surveillance frequencies will change as the results of the baseline diagnostic test program are realized. Changes which extend existing test frequencies will be done on a case basis which will be documented arxi approved by the MOV System Engineer prior to extending the frequency. Evaluations for the frequency extensions will utilize a deterministic methodology which includes the following considerations:

. The revised SSPSA performed by Reference 2.69 of ES1850.003, " Engineering Evaluation 93-44, Evaluation of the Seabrook Station Response to Generic Letter 89-10"

• Frequency requirements of the station equipment qualification program.

. Recommendations made by the results of the MOV design basis review process.

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. Station operating experience. l

• Industry guidelines. I

= Changes in NRC requirements.

. ALARA considerations.

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NAESCO is evaluating the need to perform periodic dynamic verifications on its MOV's. Industry and NRC guidence is insufficient, at this time, for NAESCO to make a firm committment regarding this issue. While -

NAESCO realizes that specific situations will require that a Post Maintenance D>namic Test be performed, NAESCO is concerned that the long term effects of scheduled, repeated Dynamic Testing have not been ,

sufficiently explored in the industry. NAESCO plans to evaluate industry data and will reassess its position on this issue after the NRC guidance on periodic verification is available.

Changes which decrease the diagnostic testing surveillance interval can be made whenever the MOV system -

engineer determines that it is necessary, A recent example where this was done was Service Water System valve SW-V-54. In 1993, this MOV had high runmng loads which were eventually tied to packing follower i corrosion and dimensional tolerances affecting clearances between the follower, the valve shaft and packing  ;

gland. When the problem was first discovered, the surveillance interval was decreased to quarterly to monitor the mnmng load trend. The quarterly frequency was continued with successful results until the third refueling outage when a new design packing follower was installed.

18.0 TRENDING Generic Letter 89-10, recommendation (h) requires that each MOV failure and corrective action taken including repair, alteration, analysis, test and surveillance should be analyzed orjustified and documented.

The documentation should include the results and history of each as found deteriorated condition, malfunction, test, inspection, analysis, repair or alteration. The Seabrook trending program is described in Station Procedure ES1850.003.

18.1 MOV Failure Analysis Trending MOV failures which result in declaring the component inoperable are evaluated and documented in  ;

accordance with the Station Operating Experience Manual (SSOE). The provisions of Procedure OE 4.2 i documentation contains the following information associated with the failure:

. As found deteriorated condition.

• Cause and Failure Analysis of the failure .

. Repair and/or modifications performed '

• Retest performed to demonstrate restored operability Failures are trended on an annual basis by the System Support Department and the results are published in the MOV annual performance report.

Minor degradations which have no impact on MOV operability are documented in accordance with the Seabrook Station Maintenance Manual (SSMA) Work Control Program. These degradations are reviewed by the system engineers during the close out process of completed SSMA 3.1 Work Requests. Significant trends are reported in the system annual performance reports.

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18.2 MOV Performance Trending MOV performance trending is performed in accordance with Station Procedure ES 1850.003. Performance trending is based on MOV diagnostic testing. Both static and dynamic testing may be utilized to ascertain and trend MOV performance. For example MOV trending was used to evaluate the degradation associated with SW-V54. As discussed above, MOV Performance Trending found that the root cause of the failure of SW-V54 to stroke was found to be corrosion product buildup between the valve shaft and the gland follower.

A contributing secondary cause was found to be excessive packing gland loading during installation. As a result of this adverse trend, DRR 93-086 was issued which replaced the ductile iron packing followers for the service water butterfly valves with stainless steel followers. The gland followers on all safety related service water butterfly valves were replaced during OR03. Follow-up testing was conducted on SW-V54, during fuel cycle four. The test results coafirmed that this action adequately addressed the root cause.

19.0 LIMITOROUE 10CFR PART 21. "HIGH TEMPERATURE EFFECTS ON AC MOTORS" i Limitorque identified a potential 10 CFR Part 21 condition related to high ambient temperature effects on the AC motor output torque capability. The Limitorque potential Part 21 condition was evaluated and it was concluded that all safety-related Limitorque motor-operators are sized adequately so that each safety related MOV can perform its required function under derated motor torque conditions as a result of high ambient environmental temperatures. Station Information Report 93-046 documents the evaluation of this 10 CFR Part 2I Condition.

20.0 PRESSURE LOCKING AND THERMAL BINDING Supplement 6 to Generic Letter 89-10 provided information on the consideration of pressure locking and thermal binding of safety related motor-operated gate valves. Seabrook had performed previous evaluations for pressure locking and thermal binding of gate valves. ISEG Memo 8801-004, " Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Gate Valves" was performed to address INPO SOER 84-7. Additionally, Engineering Evaluation 93-33, " Thermal Binding and Pressure Locking of Safety Related Gate Valves" was prepared to address NRC I.E. Notice 92-26, " Pressure Locking of Motor Operated Flexible Wedge Gate Valves" Subsequently, Seabrook re-evaluated the conclusions reached in Engineering Evaluation 93-33. This re-evaluation was documented in Engineering Evaluation 95-07, " Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Gate Valves". The reevaluation was warranted based on questions regarding the potential for liquid entrapment pressure locking that have been raised at other plants. This engineering evaluation documents the screening evaluation and operability determination requirements for NRC Generic Letter 95-07, Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves.

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i The safety-related motor operated gate valves in the NRC Generic Letter 89-10 program were reviewed to determme their susceptibility to pressure locking and/or thermal binding. The results of the evaluation was that 10 motor-operated gate valves were deternuned to be potentially susceptible to pressure locking. The basis for operability for the 10 potentially susceptible valves was determmed in Engineering Evaluation 95-07 Revision 1 and the conclusions are included in ACR-95-34. Design changes were prepared and implemented in OR04 to elimmate the potential for pressure locking of the 10 valves. The following changes were implemented:

. DCR 95-023, modified the packing configuration and rerouted the packing leakoff connection to the RCS side of the valves. 'Ihe following valves were modified:

e RC-V22N23N87N88 : RHR Hot Leg Suction Isolation Valves e RH-V32N70: Low Head Hot Leg Recirculation Valves e SI-V77N102: Intermediate Head Hot Leg Recirculation Valves a MMOD 95-509 modified the Containment Sump Isolation Valves, CBS-V8N14 by adding a bypass from the between seat drain valve and the upstream piping (contamment sump side).

21.0 INDUSTRY INFORMATION NRC information notices, industry technical and maintenance updates, and 10 CFR Part 21 notices are 1 entered into the Seabrook Station commitment tracking program. The information is assigned to a cognizant I engineer for review and evaluation to deternune if the information is applicable to Seabrook. The assignments, due dates, required response, and resultant action can be reviewed by any individual with  ;

access to a computer. 1 22.0 PROGRAM SCHED_ULE Generic Letter 89 10 Recommendation (i) provided information for the generic letter schedule. l Recommendation (i) specified that all design basis reviews, analyses, verifications, tests and inspections that l have been implemented should be completed within 5 years or three refueling outages whichever is later. l Seabrook committed to the generic letter recommendations in NYN-90003 and committed to the initial periodic verification testing frequency in the Phase 1 MOV Inspection. Seabrook was working on a schedule j to complete the generic letter at the end of OR03. Seabrook's schedule was predicated on the MOV dynamic testing grouping that was submitted to the NRC in the Spring of 1992. As a result of the NRC MOV Inspection 94-11 performed in May 1994, discrepancies between the Seabrook grouping methodology and NRC Supplement 6 were identified. to resolve the discrepancy Seabrook committed to meeting the NRC grouping methodology presented in Supplement 6 and to complete the recommendations of the generic letter by the end of OR04. This commitment was made in NAESCO Memo NYN-94106. Seabrook's fourth refueling outage ended on December 11,1995. By the end of OR04, Seabrook had completed the required .

additional dynamic testing to meet Supplement 6 recommendations and completed the periodic testing of approximately one-third of the Generic Letter MOV scope.

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23.0 NRC MOV INSPECTIONS /MOV SELF ASSESSMENT AUDIT 23.1 NRC MOV Inspections ne USNRC performed a team inspection of the Seabrook Motor-Operated Valve Program on December 2

.through December 6,1991. De inspection reviewed Seabrook programs that were developed in response to

- NRC Generic Letter 89-10. USNRC Inspection Report 50-443/91-81 documents the results of this Inspection. Seabrook responded to the NRC requests for additional information made in the inspection in the following letters:

• NYN-92024 provided additional information on MOV Grouping, Group Selection, and Exclusion Criteria for Differential Pressure Testing.

• NYN-92058 provided additional information related to switch setpoint error analysis and stem friction coefficients.

The NRC performed a second team inspection of the Seabrook Motor-Operated Valve Program on May 23 i through May 27,1994 during Seabrook's third refueling outage. USNRC Inspection Report 94-11 documents the results of this inspection. This inspection identified that approximately 15 of the 25 items identified in the first inspection were satisfactorily resolved. His inspection identified the differences in the Seabrook grouping methodology and the Supplement 6 grouping criteria. Seabrook has since committed to Supplement 6 criteria in NYN-94106. A listing of the items that were not resolved is presented in Attachment I to this report.

i 23.2 MOV Self Assessment  !

An internal self assessment of Seabrook's MOV Program was conducted between June 12 through June 16, 1995. The team was composed of NAESCO, Yankee Atomic, Vermont Yankee personnel and a Contractor from Vectra Technologies. The MOV Self Assessment Report documents the results of the assessment. Ten recommendations for program enhancements were made as a result of this self assessment. The recommendations made in the self assessment have been reviewed and are being implemented as appropriate.

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t REFERENCES

1) . USNRC Generic Letter 89-10, " Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance" dated June 28,1989.

2) USNRC Supplement I to Generic Letter 89-10: "Results of the Public Workshops", dated June 13, 1990.

3) USNRC Supplement 2 to Generic Letter 89-10: " Availability of Program Descriptions", dated ,

August 3,1990.

4) USNRC Supplement 3 to Generic Letter 89-10, " Consideration of the Results of NRC-Sponsored Tests of Motor-Operated Valves", dated October 25,1990.

5) USNRC Supplement 4 to Generic Letter 89-10, " Consideration of Valve Mispositioning in Boiling Water Reactors," dated February 12,1992.

6) USNRC Supplement 5 to Generic Letter 89- 10, " Inaccuracy of Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic ,

Equipment," dated June 28,1993. )

7) Supplement 6 to Generic Letter 89-10, "Information on Schedule and Grouping, and Staff Responses to Additional Public Questions", dated March 8,1994.

8) NHY Memo SS# 49944, M. E. Kenney to Distribution, "NRC Generic Letter 89-10, Valve j Diagnostic Test Program Meeting Minutes for September 1,1989". j

9) NHY Letter NYN-90003 to USNRC, " Response to Generic Letter 89-10", dated January 2,1990. l

10) Yankee Atomic Memo, SA-90-79, from J. F. Bretti/P. J. O'Regan to P. E. Brown, "MOV  !

Prioritization to Support Generic Letter 89-10 Response", dated May 10,1990. I l

11) USNRC I. E. Bulletin 85-03," Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings", dated November 15,1985.

12) USNRC letter Docket 50-443, E. J. Leeds to E. A. Brown, " Response to Generic Letter 89-10,  ;

Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve (MOV) Testing and Surveillance"(TAC NO. 75715) dated l August 10,1990.

13) NHY Letter NYN-92024 to NRC, "" Motor-Operated Valve Grouping, Selection and Exclusion Criteria for Differential Pressure Testing" dated March 2,1992.

14) USNRC Inspection Report 50-443/91-81, " Motor-Operated Valve Inspection at Seabrook Station Inspection Report". January 29,1992.

15) NRC Inspection Manual Temporary Instruction 2515/109

16) J. E. Richardson to NRC Regional Directors memo, " Guidance for Inspections of Programs in Response to Generic Letter 89-10," April 30,1993.

17) NHY Letter NYN-92058, to NRC, " Response to a Request for Additional Information", April 30, 1992.

18) NRC Inspection Manual Temporary Instruction 2515/109

19) NRC Information Notice 93-88, " Status of Motor-Operated Valve Performance Prediction Program by the Electric Power Research Institute," November 30,1993. ,

20) DCR 86-403.

21) DCR 87-071.

22) MMOD 89-517.

23) DCR 89-024.

24) MMOD 91-569.

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REFERENCES

25) MMOD 92-521.

26) DCR 93-029,

27) . DRR 93-086.

28) MMOD 94-561. '!

29) Technical Support Group Calculation No 92-CALC-0003.

30) NAESCO Letter NYN-93139 to NRC, Response to Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 5 dated October 15,1993.

3I) Engineering Evaluation 93-44, "SSPSA Evaluation of Seabrook's Response to Generic Letter 89-10." l

32) Calc 9763-3-ED-00-28-F, " Motor Control Circuit Protection Calculation."

33) Calc No. 9763-3-ED-00-02-F, " Voltage Regulation Study".

34) NHY Repon on Service Water System Motor-Operated Valves. l

35) Station Procedure ES1850.003, " Motor-Operated Valve Performance Monitoring".

36) NHY Drawing 250000, " Data Sheets for Motor and Air Operated Valves and Dampers"

37) NAESCO Letter NYN-94106 to NRC, " Motor-Operated Valve Testing During Cycle 4 and ORO4"

38) Engineering Evaluation 95-07, " Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding"

39) Station Procedure MA3.5, "Seabrook Station Maintenance Manual"

40) Station Information Report 93-046.

41) DCR 95-023

42) MMOD 95-509

43) 1. E. Notice 92-26, " Pressure Locking of Motor-Operated Flexible Wedge Gate Valves"

44) Engineering Evaluation 93-33, " Thermal Binding and Pressure Locking of Safety Related Gate Valves",

45) INPO SOER 84-7, " Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Gate Valves".

46) ACR 95-034.

47) USNRC Inspection Report 94-11

48) Assessment of the Nonh Atlantic NRC GL 89-10 MOV Program Assessment Report. i i'

49) EPRI MOV Performance Prediction Program, " Performance Prediction Methodology Implementation Guide," November 1994.

50) EPRI Letter, "EPRI MOV PPP Update of Results and Specifications and Drawings for Flow Loop Test Valves," December 14,1993.

51) Brian W. Sheron to NRC Regional Directors memo, " Guidance on Closure of Staff Review of l Generic Letter 89-10 Programs," July 12,1994.

52) Engineering Evaluation 91-07, " Motor-Operated Valve Design Basis Review"(OROI Generic Letter Valves)

53) Engineering Evaluation 92-41, " Refueling Outage 02 Motor-Operated Valve Design Basis Review"

54) Engineering Evaluation 94-26, " Motor-Operated Valve Design Basis Review for RF03 Valves" 71

REFERENCES

55) Calculation SBC-428, " Maximum Differential Pressure Calc for Motor-Operated Valves"(OROI Valves)

56) Calculation SBC-432, " Motor-Operated Valve Thrust Calculation"(OROI Valves)

57) Calculation SBC-472, "RFOl MOV Equivalent Valve Factor and Thrust Margin Cale"

58) Calculation SBC-477, " Refueling Outage 1 MOV Min / Max Torque Switch Settings"  ;

59) Calculation SBC-499, " Maximum Differential Pressure Calculation for Motor-Operated Valves for Refueling Outage 02"

60) Calculation SBC-500, " Maximum MOV Differential Pressure" l

61) Calculation SBC-501, " Motor-Operated Valve Thrust Calc - RF02 Valves"

62) Calculation SBC-511, " Refueling Outage 2 MOV Min / Max Torque Switch Settings"

63) Calculation SBC-542, " Equivalent Valve Factor for Refueling Outage 02 Motor-Operated Valves"

64) Calculation SBC-590, " Maximum Differential Pressure Calculation for Motor-Operated Valves for Refueling Outage 03"

65) Calculation SBC-610, " Motor-Operated Valve Thrust Calc -RF03 Valves"

66) Calculation SBC-611,"RF03 Motor-Operated Valve Min / Max Tque Switch Settings" l

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1 ATTACHMENT 1 INSPECTION REPORT OPEN ITEMS i

USNRC MOV Inspection Report 94-11 identified the items from the Phase 1 Inspection Report that have been closed and are left unresolved. Additionally an open item for pressure locking and thermal binding has been added as a result of the 1994 MOV Inspection. A listing of the unresolved /open items to the NRC

Inspection Report 94-11 with a NAESCO response to each item follows:

j Item: Continue seismic analysis of GL 89-10' MOVs Response This item was completed following a review of Westinghouse calculations in Monroeville during September 1994.

Item: Validate the assumed friction coefficients using the design basis test results and justify use of 0.15 as the assumed friction coefficient.

Response: Refer to section 8.5 " Coefficient of Friction Based on Test Data". l Item: Ensure that the design basis test results are applied to MOVs that cannot be tested at the design basis differential pressure or flow conditions.

Response. See section 14.0 " Demonstrate Adequacy of Valve Set Up".

Item: Identify the commitment regarding full differential pressure testing.

l Response: Refer to NAESCO Letter NYN-94-106 and section 13.0 " Diagnostic Testing to Verify J Design Basis Capability" of this report. .

I Item: Develop clear guidance and acceptance criteria for evaluating MOV capability usmg j diagnostic data to ensure operability under all conditions including degraded voltage.

Response: The applicable dynamic testing procedures have incorporated well defined acceptance criteria to address this concern. See the discussion in Section 13.0, " Diagnostic Testing to  !

Verify Design Basis Capability" for a description on how Seabrook performs dynamic testing extrapolation.

Item: Review the priority 2 and 3 MOVs tojustify frequency of periodic verification testing.

Response: As discussed above, Seabrook plans to extend the periodic testing frequencies. See the section 17.0 " Periodic Verification" and 6.2, "1993 SSPSA Evaluation of Seabrook Response to Generic Letter 89-10".

Item: Revise the MOV Program and periodic justification for extension of the preventive maintenance and Inspection period beyond vendor recommendations.

Response: This requirement has been documented in ESI850.003, item: Revise the procedure for adjustment of Rotork operators and the training module as appropriate to caution against inadvertently changing limit switch setpoints.

Response: Station Procedure LS0569.27," Inspection /PM of Rotork Valve Actuators" and the training module, "Rotork MOV Testing", have been revised to address this concern.

Item: Review and Resolve Concerns identified in Limitorque Maintenance Updates 88-2 and 90-1.  !

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ATTACHMENT I INSPECTION REPORT OPEN ITEMS Response: This item is documented in Technical Support Engineering Evaluation 94 TSEV 0003.

Report which addresses these items has been issued.

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item: Review Maintenance and Operation Procedures to ensure adequate control for switch l positioning to preclude short stroking.

Response: This item has been completed and the appropriate Operations and Maintenance Procedures I or OPS Instructions been revised to address this concern.

Item: Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding Response: Engineering Evaluation 95-07 documents the Seabrook Station evaluation for Pressure Locking and Thermal Bindmg DCR 95-023 and MMOD 95-509 modified the Generic Letter 89-10 valves that were identified to be potentially susceptible to pressure locking.

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l January ,1996 l NYN-l GENERIC LETTER 89-10. DESIGN BASIS CLOSURE REPORT l Cuoco, L. NU Main, E200 j f Garfield, G. DB&H-N O Kacich, R. M. MP Bldg. 475,5th Floor Executive Offices cc: Mail 1 Licensing Offices cc: Mail (File 0001 01-48 ,

P UWD 02-06 l