ML20237J920

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Transcript of Ofc of Investigation Investigative Interview (Closed Meeting) W/T Dong on 850730 in Newport,Mi
ML20237J920
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/30/1985
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI)
To:
Shared Package
ML20237J518 List:
References
FOIA-86-245 LB-85-214, NUDOCS 8708260369
Download: ML20237J920 (24)
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Text

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UN11EU STATES

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1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

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IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NO:

LB-85-214 '

0FFICE OF INVESTIGATION l 1

INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW I

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(CLOSED MEETING) l l

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LOCATION: NEWPORT, MICHIGAN PAGES: 128 i DATE: TUESDAY,-JULY.30, 1985 l i

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. ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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' MN #N JTEh 86-245 PDR 9wsMi

a 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

1 3 (

I

)-

d In the Matter of: )

) Case No. LB-85-214 l 5 OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION )

1 INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW )

6 )

7 The Deposition of TOM DONG, taken 8

pursuant to Notice before me, Elizabeth Diann Ferguson, Notary l I

9 Public in and for the County of Wayne, (Acting in Monroe County),

10

{

at 6400 Dixie Highway, Newport, Michigan, on Tuesday, July 30, l 11 I 1985, commencing at about 5:05 p.m.

  • 12 ,

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!l APPEARANCES:

J 14 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Field Office Region III 15 jj 799 Roosevelt Road )

f Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 i 16 (By: James N. Kalkman, Esq.)

1 3 1? Appearing on behlaf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission lI

.~. 18 JOHN H. FLYNN, ESO.

!! 2000 Second Avenue

19 Detroit, Michigan 48226 l 20 Appearing on behalf of Detroit Edison l ]

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.t 22 23 24 (continued) i I i 2s i I

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1 APPEARANCES: -(continued) 2 PETER A. MARQUARDT, ESQ, 2000 Second Avenue 3 Detroit, Michigan 48226 4 pr.. waring on behalf of Detroit Edison 5

1 6 ALSO PRESENT: 1 7 Terrence Lang and Thomas Randazzo  ;

8 9 '$

Elizabeth Diann Ferguson, CSR-1347 10 Court Reporter 11 12 13 14 15 16 E 17 l

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Page 2 Witness l 3 Tom Dong 5

4 Examination by Mr. Kalkman 1

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1 1 Newport, Michigan l 2 Tuesday, July 30, 1985  ;

i 3 at about 5:05 p.m. l 4 _ . -  !

5 MR. KALKMAN: For the record, this-6 is the interview with Tom Dong, D-o-n-g, who is employed I

7 by the Detroit Edison Company. The location of this i i

1 interview is the Fermi II Nuclear Power Station.

(

8 9 Present at this interview are Mr. Dong, 10 the Detroit Edison Counsels, Peter Marquardt and John Flynn; 11 Detroit Edison Director of Reactor Af fairs, Thomas Randazzo; 12 NRC Reactor Inspector, Terrence Lang; and NRC Investigator' 13 >

J unes KaIkman, I

'd As agreed, this interview is being 15 transcribed by Court Reporter Elizabeth Ferguson.

16 The subject matter of this interview 9

l 17 concerns the reactor operator error which occurred on g

18 July 1,1985, at the Fermi II Nuclear Power Station.

19 Mr. Dong, would you please stand and 20 raise your right hand?

l

  • l

.; 2, . . .

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22 TOM DONG, 23 after having first been duly sworn to tell the truth, 24 the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, testified 25 upon his oath as follows:

4

1

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1 2 EXAMINATION j

(

3 BY MR. KALKMAN:

1 4 Q Mr. Dong, how are you employed by Detroit Edison? )

5 A Do you want my title?

6 Q Yes, please.

7 A. I am a shift technical advisor.

I B Q And what are your responsibilities as a shift technical 9

}1 advisor?

10 A I provide technical advice to the operations' group on a 11 shift basis.

12 i 0 Could you give us an example of the type of technical t:

13 advice you may be asked to provide?

14 Well, it varies.

L ll A i

I

! 15 ' It could depend on the situation that i

16 is involved, 17 Well, give me one example of that.

I 0

I

  • 18 A Well, valve interlocks.

f i

19 O Could you explain? Could you expand on that?

! I

j. 70 A Well, if a valve does not open when it is required to,
21 f and they ask me to determine what the interlocks are, i

t 22 and advise them as to what to do to get them open.

23 0 Is that a licensed position?

24 3 .No, sir.

25 Q What qualifies you to be a shift technical advisor?

1 5  !

(~

l l

i e  :

1 A well, I have attended and am qualified through the liccnsing i 2 program.

3 0 What licensing program is that?

d. A One that they have here at Fermi II.  ;

5 0 Are you required to have an engineering degree?

6 A Yes.

7 Q What type of degree do you have? ]i 8 A I have a Bachelor's of Science, Engineering; my major is  !

9 thermo-mechanics.

! l 10 0 Where did you obtain that?

11 A The UniverJity of Illinois, Chicago.

12 Q Mr. Dong, how long have you been employed in the 13 Nuclear Industry?

I

'4 IA 1972, I was hired by Sergeant Alundy (phonetically), as h

15

'l mechanical draf tsman designer; and for the Byron Bragewood 16 (phonetically) project through 1974.

3 17 Okay. I began working at Detroit --

I g

18 well, as f ar as Nuclear experience, I picked it back up, 8 l

19 resumed that in 1980 at the Fermi Plant; but I was s

l 20 internally employed as a designer with a floor pioneer, l I i 21 j and I did some design work.

I 22 I worked on two fossile units.

23 Is Fermi II the first reactor experience, operating reactor Q

24 experience?

2s 6

I A Well, we took a short course while at Fermi at the l

. i

University of Michigan Test reactor; and I'took a reactor I l l l 2 operator short course, and I don't know the title of the 1 .

4 course.

5 0 Okay. q 6 A Then we participated and attended the reactor start-up 7 system; also I spent a week at the Brownsville simulator E in the STA program there.

9 COURT REPORTER: I am sorry, sir.

I l to you will-have to speak up.

11 A Oh, I am sorry.

i 12 I am involved in the licensed operator

(

l 13 ji recall program here at Fermi; and we conduct start-ups II 12  !! on the simulators there. i l

15 I have been in the recall program for 16 over a year and a half, I believe.

i 17 - - -

I 18 BY MR. KALKMAN:  !

I h 19 Q You were the shift technical advisor on the evening shift i  :

j 20 on July 1, is that correct?.

21 A Yes.

22 Q The shift that started at 11:00 p.m.?

23 A Yes.

24 0 What do you recall from that particular shif t relating to 25 the operator error that we are here discussing?

7

1 A Well, where do you want me to begin?-

2 Q From the time you came on the shif t.

Well, I took relief. I went down to the shift supervisor's 3 A 4 office and attended a relief.

5 Q Pardon me?

6 A They give a turnover also.

7 Q Is there a meeting or something?

8 A Yes, a turnover meeting.

9 I don't recall right now what was- 1 to discussed at the turnover meeting, but I attended that.

11 After that, I toured the control services in the -- I l

12 was aware that they were beginning a -- continuing a start- )

l l

13 i up.

14 Sometime during the night, I took a 15 position behind the reactor operator, approximately eight 16 feet, six or eight feet behind, next to the shift

! 17 operational advisor.

$8 18 0 Who was that?

19 A Ed Duda.

j 20 0 Is that D-u-d-a? .)

'! 21 A Yes

,i 22 O okay.

23 A When I was made aware of -- I don't know what happened  ;

24 between that and the time I was informed of the incident; 25 so I will just start with the incident:

8

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I was watching various Plant parameters when John Dewes informed me that the operator had -- I 2 don't know the exact words, but it was -- he may have been out of sequence or the reactor operator was out of sequence.

  • I asked him to explain, and he said j 8 that he had pulled some rods beyond position that was 7

required. Then he left.

8 Q Mr. Dewes left?

A Right.

Q Okay.

" I discussed that matter with Ed Duda the shift operational A

12 advisors and I believed we asked -- I think we looked over i

?3 to see what Group he was in or which rod Group he was in, l

u ! and Ed was familiar with the reduced notchworth procedure, l 15 i

and we discussed the matter -- well, let me back up.

I 16 I asked John if he was running rods 17 E

back to pattern, and be said yes. Then I went into a g

l discussion with Ed. We talked about t.he basis for the 19

" reduced notchworth procedure and if we had any problems with fuel damage or the possibility of any unusual safety

~

21 j concerns.

22 O okay.

A or the significance of the safety concerns, 2a Q Okay.

25 '

A And we concluded that it was none.

9 i

1 I was also surprised that I did not 2 notice any rod blocks were pulled;.and I went to look 3 for the reactor engineer to question him about that 4

situation. .

I 5 And who was-that, Barry Myers?

0 .)i 6 A 'Yes.

7 Q Okay.

8 A .That Group programs -- their Group programs the rod-worth-l 9 minimizer, which I expected to pull the rod block in that  !

I

'O We discussed it with'him, it was determined situation. _ )

l 11 that it was not programmed in for that feature.

12 Q Let me stop you at this point then, and ask you some more )

'3 specific questions relating to that time frames i

.]

Apparently, you were not aware of is the rod pull error while it was occurring; is that correct?

j 18 A Well --  !

E 5 " Q You became aware of it abortly after?

18 A Yes, sir.

g 19 0 While they were re-inserting the Group III rods? j 20 l A I am not really sure of the time frame.

21 I Q It was shortly thereafter, though?

r 22 A Yes, sir, i 23 Okay, 0 j 24 And Mr. Dewes made you aware of that?

25 3 y,,,

10 I

l 3

MR, LANG: At any time durisg the 2 shif t, were you ordered or sent out of the Contr ol Room?

3 A No.

4 MR. LANG: Were you anywehre in the 5

Control Room on control area all evening?

l Not the whole evening. j 6 A 7

We went upstairs to make out my logs.

l 8 MR. LANG: Wehre is upstairs? l I

l 9 A That is where my office is above the research tagging {

i 10 center.

11 MR. LANG: During the evening after the 12 rods were re-inserted, was there any discussion at all 13 i between yourselves and the STA in training or the shif t 14 supervisor, of criticality?

15 A No, I did not discuss criticality with them.

16 MR. LANG: How about the SOA?

8 6 17 A No, I cannot say, because I don't know.

6'

. 18 MR. LANG: Would you say there was

19 any major discussions going on at all during the evening?

j zo A Concerning what?

21 MR. LANG: The rod pull and criticality

  • and the possibility of criticality.

22 23 A Well, can you be more specific?

24 MR. LANG: I mepn, any discussion 25 involving more than, say, two people?

11

)

' Well, there were some discussions -- we were in such A

2 close quarters, that some discussion overflowed into .

1 others.

1

' I I was standing next to Ed Duda 6

discussing the notchworth basis, and to my right, Ed Duda --

6 no,.not Ed Duda, but Ed Dewes was discussing with 7

Barry Myers.

8 i And that is when I posed the question 8 about the rod-worth-minimizer to Barry Myers.

'O You posed a question?

MR. LANG:

' What was the question?

' About the ennstriints of the program and why it did not A

block and things like that. I don't know.if you can say-1 14 '

that it was created through a discussion between the two 15 participants, we were in such close quarters, individuals-16 are discussing different things. J

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3 17 _

'g BY MR. KALKMAN:  !

19 Q Did you overhear a discussion between Mr. Dewes and i

i Mr. Myers relating to whether the Plant had gone critical?

21 l A No.

22 Q To your knowledge, that question did not come up during the shift?

24 A It did not come up.

25 Q Okay. ,

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i i

' Did you ever have any discussion with i

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l 2 the STA in training that evening? l 3 A Just about when he informed me that the rod pull was out 1

4 s equence.

of .. l 5

0 What individual -- who is the STA in training again?

6 A John Dewes.

i 7

O Did John Dewes relate that he thought the Plant had gone 8 critical? )

9 A Not to me.

l 10 MR. LANG: During the shift, did the l

'l RO or the NSO as you call them or the NSS, ever show you 12 the rod pull sheet and inform you of the error and the l

'3

number of rods -- .

i

" A I don't recall.

15 I remember glancing over. We were so 16 close, I remember glancing over and seeing it.

t

' '7 MR. LANG: So you say that you were

'8 aware of the number of rods that were pulled out of l

19 sequence?

20 A No.

t

21 MR. LANG: You were not?

r 22 A No.

23 MR. LANG: Okay.

24 Not the exact numbers, no.

> A 25 MR. LANG: All right.

13

I.

3 But you ware aware of same of them?

'2 A Yes.

3 MR. LANG: Okay.

4 Thank you.

5 6 BY MR. KALKMAN:

7 Q Were you asked for any technical advice that evening,  !

l B the evening of July 17 l

9 A By whom?

10 Q By anyone.

11 A That entire evening?

i 12 O Yes. j 13 A Well, we had a problem with the water level, and I went 14 to investigate that problem.

15 Q A problem with the water level, what was the problem with 16 the water level?

i 17 A Well, af ter the Start-up, we had some indication that the j lI .

18 water level was fluctuating greatly.

19 Well, we had some, I think 10-inch swings s

20 on the narrow edge, swings of level, fluctuations, and I l

21 went to investigate that.

22 O What did you find out?

23 A Are you asking me if I discovered the root cause?

24 0 Yes.

25 A No, I did not discover the root cause.

14

t I made a best guess.

2 Q What was your best guess? ,

3 A Control problems with the. start-up of the control valve, 4 control problems with a level control valve, possible 5 piping, which was, I think --

6 Q Did you report this in your log?

7 A Yes.

B Q Is this similar to the problems that occurred the water 9 level problem that occurred a week or so later, where 10 they had a reportable event?

11 A I don't believe so.

12 Q Are you aware of that later event that I am referring to?

13 A No.-

l 14 I don't know the specific date, but I think it was --

l 0 15 A I don't believe it was the some. It was not the same 16 sechanism.

3 17 0 Who asked your advice regarding the water level fluctuation?

- 18 A I don't recall.

19 Q Did you have any discussion with shift supervisor, i

j 20 David Aniol, on the evening of July 1, or the early morning

21 of July 27 r

22 ' A I had a brief discussion with him about -- just to make 23 sure that he was aware that the out-of-sequence problem 24 did occur as I understood it.

75 Q And what did he say?

. 15

1 A He said that he waa aware of it.

2 O That was it, the conversation was that brief or that to 3 the point? .,

1 4 A Yes.

5 0 Did you ask him if he knew of the rod pull sequence error 6 as you understood it?

7 A Yes, 8 0 How did you understand it?

I 9 A I asked him if he was aware that some rods were pulled l 10 out of sequence, and ha said yes.

11 0 Is there some reason,-- do you feel reluctant to be 12 candid with us at this interview?

13 ,A I don't understand.

14 0 I get the impression that you are reluctant to be open i 15 in this discussion. I feel like I am prying answers out 16 of you.

a 17 A Well, can you be more specific?

I' 18 Q No, but if I do come up with something specific, I will

- 19 let you know.

20 Okay.

21 A Okay.

i 22 Q So you checked out a water level fluctuation that evening.

23 Did you know anything else during that 24 shift that you might want to tell us about?

25 Why don't you just summarize the events 16

1 that -- your actions that evening, just briefly summarize 2 what you did during that shift.

3 A well, I observed the start-up, the Plant start-up.

d Q Could you speak up a little bit? We are having a hard l

5 time hearing you.

j 6 A Okay.

J 7 I observed the Plant start-up. I 8 think also that night the instrument man had some problems f 9 with a cable problem, and the water level problem. i 10 That is all I recall. l I

11 O Okay. ]

l 12 Let me make sure that I understand )

13 what you said from our discussion. 1 14 You first became aware of the rod 15 sequence pull error, that was when Mr. Dewes advised you l

16 of the error? )

3 17 A Yes.

1 18 Q And this was sometime af ter the error occurred? j

19 A Yes.

l 20 0 Sometime af ter the re-insertion of the Group III rods or i 21 during the re-insertion of the Group III rods?

! 22 A Yes.

23 Q And you had a brief discussion with Mr. Duda relating to i 24 the rod pull sequence arror?

25 A Yes.

I 17

1 O And that was -- ,

2 Just tell me about those conversations 3

that you had with Mr. Dewes and Mr. Duda, i

A Well, Mr. Dewes, he informed me -- I asked him if he was l 5

getting rods back into the pattern and he said yes, or 6

he nodded. I got an affirmative.

7 Then he left. In the. discussion with 1

8 Mr . D ewes , it was concerning the basis with the notchworth 8

procedure and his experience over at Nine Mile Point.

10 MR. LANG: At any time during the evening M

did you or anybody else that you know of, ' Pull back the 12 charts and take a look at the charts?

13 A I did not.

14 MR. LANG: Do you know of anyone else 15 that did?

16 A No, I don't. I don't know.

5 17 MR. LANG: Did you or the SOA, Mr. Duda, I

18 g discuss criticality?

19 g yo, t

20

{' MR. LANG: Okay. Thank you.

2, '

l . . .

s r

22 BY MR. KALKKAN:

23 O Did the issue of whether the Plant went critical, did that 24 cross your mind at all because of the rod pull error?

25 A No, it was never --

18

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ]

I i

1 Q And in your discussion with the shift supervisor, 2

Mr. Aniol, it was merely to find out if he knew of the- ]

)

3 rod pull error? l l

l 4 A Yes. 4 l 5 Q And there was no discussion at that point of criticality? l l

6 A Right. i 1

l 7 Q Was anyone else surprised that the rod-worth-minimizer a did not block this rod pull error, other than yourself? l l 9 A Ed Duda -- well, I don't know.

l l

io o Well, why did you think that t.he rod-worth-minimizer should 11 i have blocked -- are you familiar with rod-worth-minimizers 12 from other plants, or did you just think that --

13 !A From my training.

I 14 00 The simulator training here? 3 i

h 15 A Well, no, not simulator training, but the systems training.

16 Q Should it have been programmed to stop that error, block

i I E 17 k that error?

l I

18 A I don't know.

.h

  • I
19 0 Okay, I MR. LANG
During the evening, the j 20 21 discussions about the out-of-sequence pull, did you feel l

' i

  1. that it was a fairly significant error?

22 l 23 A Not at that time, no.

24 MR LANG: Not at that time?

25 A No.

19 l

l j

1 MR. LANG: Did you feel like it was 2 something that you should have logged?

J 3 A No, not at that time.

4 MR. LANG: Okay. Thank you.

3 l

Y 6 BY MR. KALKMAN:

7 Q Does your 109 reflect the rod pull error? j 8 A P' No, it does not.

9 Q Did .you have any input to the DER that was initiated? s i

10 A No.

11 O You did not have any input? j 12 A No.

13 I would like to add that our logs, 14 the type of material that we put in our logs are not 15 necessarily the type of material that -- sometimes it is 16 not the type of situation that NSS would place in its 109 i 17 We used it as a turnover mechanism. l I

18 We have some specificity with the operational issue, some i  !

19 other things that might be used for the future.

I Were you present when the rod-worth-minimizer alarm went off?

j 20 Q f 21 A No.

i r

. 22 Q Did you become aware of that occurring?

23 A Yes.

24 O Do you;know why that alarm want off?

25 A No.

20

1 1

q

'i

[

l

, f0 That was at the end of the Group II, the rod group?

2 A I don t know.

i 3

O Who made you aware of the alarm? l d

A I saw the alarm.

5 You were.present then?

0 6 A No, I walked into the room and saw the alarm, it was still on .

7 Q It was still there?

8 g y,,,

9 0 Did you investigate that problem?

10 A Well, I asked the operator'if he was out of sequence, if

'I he was giving the rods out of sequence, and he said no.

12 O Is that normally what would have sounded that alarm?

13 A Yes, if you pull a rod out of sequence.

14 He was pulling from 0 to 48 in Group II, Q

i 15 Is there any reason why the rod-worth-f d

16 minimizer would block that pull?

17 I don't know.

l ;A g

18 0 Well, if he pulled the rods too fast or something like that,

19 would that cause the rod-worth-minimizer to block it?

I  !

j 20 ]A Can you repeat that question again? I l 21 g yes,

! 22 l The Group II rods that the operator 23 was pulling from 0 to 48 continuous, if he was pulling 24 the rods too fast, would that activiate the rod-worth-25 minimizer?

I 21

1 A No.

2 Q And that has nothing to do with it? i 3 A That is correct.

4 0 Did anyone else in the Control Room investigate the reason 5 for the rod-worth-minimizar alarm?

6 A I don't know.

7 0 Do you know if the rod-worth-minimizer was de-activated 8 after the alarm?

9 A Af ter the alarm, I don't know.

10 0 who is responsible for investigating a problem or an 11 indication of a rod-worthmsinimizer block?

12 A The Control Room operator.

I  !

l 13 I And if a Control Room operator needs some technical advice, lQ 14 6 would he go to you or the reactor engineer?

l U

1 15 A well, it would depend on his choice, 16 Q His choice?

s i 17 A Well, what he decides to ask.

'! 18 He may ask me, he may ask the reactor 19 engineer, I don't know.

l 20 Q So you were not present when it occurred, so do you know

21 if the operator asked someone else about it?

22 A No, I don't.

23 MR. KALKMAN: I don't have anything 24 else for you at the mament, but we may want to talk to 25 you again, based on information we obtain from your 22 w________-_________

---,=m a. n I co-workers.

2 But I will close with, Mr. Dong, have l

l 3 I or any other NRC representative either threatened you l-4 in any mEnner Of Offered you any reward iD return for your l

5- statement?

l 6 A No.

7 MR. KALKMAN: Have you given the jl 8 statement freely and voluntarily?. i i

9 A Yes.

I 10 MR. KALKMAN: Is there anything further l

11 you care to add for the record? l I

l 12 A No. j 13 MR. KALKMAN: Thank you.

14 (Deposition concluded at 5:45 p.m.)

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