ML20141P001
| ML20141P001 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/1986 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8603180407 | |
| Download: ML20141P001 (111) | |
Text
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- , UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -
' / NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter oft COMMISSION MEETING Status Briefing on -
FERMI ,
(Public Meeting)
Docket No.
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Location: Washington, D. C.
Date Wednesday, March 12, 1986 Pages: 1 74 0603180407 9603112 h[p,7 " PDH ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES ,
Court Reporters 1625 I St., N.W.
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Suite 921 !
Washington, D.C. 20006 d
(202) 293-3950
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6 This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the j i
7 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission helJ on l
) s 3/12/86 . In the Commissie.n's office at 1717 H street, !
L I
i 9 N.W., Washington, D.C. The meeting was open to public 4
, i I 10 attendance and observation. This transcript has not been !
! 11 reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain l l '
- l. 12 inaccuracles.
d 13 The transcript is intanded solely for general i f
14 Informational purposes. As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is f
15 not part of the formal or Informal record of decision of the 16 matters discussed. Expressions of cpinion in this transcript i
i 17 do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs. No r 18 pleading or other paper may be flied with the Commission in i
19 any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement ;
20 or argument contained herein, except as the Commisalon may '
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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA f
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i 3 ***
- i 4 STATUS BRIEFING ON FERMI 5 ***
i 6 PUBLIC MEETING 7 *** *
- i 8 Nuclear Regulatory Com
- nission 9 Roon 1130 I'
j 10 1717 M Street, Northwest
! 11 Washington, D.C.
12 i
13 Wednesday, March 12, 1986 14 '
1!, The Commission met in open session, pursuant to i 16 notice, at 2:05 o' clock, p.m., the Honorable NUHZIO ;
t 17 J. PALLADINO, Chairman of the Commission, presiding.
18 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT f 19 NUNZIO J. PALIADINO, Chairman of the Commission 20 THOMAS M. ROBERTS, Member of the Commission i i
21 JAMES X. ASSELSTINE, Member of the Commisnion I
- 22 FREDERICK M. BERNTHAL, Member of the Commission 23 1ANDO W. ZECH, JR., Hanbar of the Commission l 24 25
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) 1 STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT THE COMMISSION TABLE: l j i 2 ;
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3 S. CHILK, Secretary to the Commission '
a 4 N. PLAINE, General Counsel ,
j 5 H. DENTON, NRR !
4
, 6 V. STELI4, -
7 J. REPPLER, Region III ,
I a J. TAYLOR, IE
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{ 9 N. McCARTHY l 1
1 j 10 B. BACCI r j
) 11 J. PUNTENNEY -
q 1 12 B. HAVES f
13 AUDIENCE SPEAKER 8 I r
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! 14 !
1 i l 15 R. SERNER0, NRR
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. 3 1 PR0CEEDINGG 2 (2:05 p.m.]
3 CHAIRMAN PA W DINO: Ccod afternoen, ladies and 4 gentlemen.
5 Commissioner Barnthal has been detained, but hic ,
6 office advised that we should start without him. !!e will be !
7 here momentarily. ;
8 The subject of today's meeting in the Formi Nuclear 9 Power Plant. The meeting will be dividad into two parts, the 10 first of which is to be opaned and the second part c1ccod.
11 In the open portion of this afternoon's necting, the 12 Connission will receive a briefing on the status of the 13 Staff's activities regarding the Ferni Nucinar Power Plant, ,
14 Unit 2. At the completion of the Staff's presentation, tino 15 will be afforded to the three intornsted partiac who have 16 expressed an opportunity to speak at today's meeting. Five l 17 minutes will be afforded to each of these parties. !
10 This plant received a low-power liennan in March of :
19 1985 and a full-power license on July 15, 1985. However, dun 20 to significant technical issueu, as well as pending OI and ,
21 OIA investigations, Fermi Unit 2 shut down on Octobat 11, 22 1985.
I 23 During the open portion of today's meeting, tho {
24 Commission will hora about the open technical issucc.
25 In the closed portion of today's moeting, the
. 4 1 Conmission will be briefed on and discuss tho status of 2 pending investigations on the Fermi Nuclear Plant.
3 Let me ask my fellow Commissioners whether they have 4 any additional cpening remarks.
5 CCKMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: No.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINot All right, then. I will turn 7 the meeting over to Mr. Vic Stallo, the Acting Executive 8 Director for Operations.
9 MR. STELLos Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be very 10 brief.
11 We are here today to basically give you a status
, 12 report. We are not prepared today and we will not request of 13 the Commission that any decisions need to be made at the 14 meeting this afternoon. We are not finished with the work 15 that wo have to do in order for us to come to the commission
< 16 and may we recommend that we go forward.
17 It is our belief that it will require another 18 Commission meeting to bring all of the matters that are still 10 pending to resolution, and as econ an we have a way of 20 identifying when that will be, tie will ask the commission to 21 put it on its calendar for a meeting sometime in the future.
22 And with that, lot me have Mr. Keppler basically 23 give you the status of where we are and what needs to be dono.
24 Cl(AIPRAN PALLADINO: All right. Thank you.
25 MR. KEPPLEnt Good afternoon. Could I have the
i
. 5 1 first slide, please?
2 (Slide.)
3 Let me talk a little bit about the history of 4 Fermi. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the low-power license 5 was irsued in March, March 20, 1985, and the 0-to-5 percent 6 power operation revealed nothing unusual, and by the time of 7 the Commission meeting that took place on July loth to l
8 consider a full-power license, the Staff was confident that 9 Detroit Edison Company was ready for a full-power license.
10 on July 15th, the same day that the license was 11 actually issued, our Senior Resident Inspector at Termi-2 ,
i 12 learned from the utility that a premature criticality event '
13 had occurred on July 2, 1985 as a result of operator error.
i 14 (Commissioner 3ernthal enters the hearing room.)
! 15 MR. KEPPLER: Because of not knowing that i 16 information at the time of the Commission meeting, I 17 immediately initiated an OI investigation, and I issued a 18 Confirmation of Action letter to the utility holding power at I
19 5 percent until this investigation could be completed and '
i 20 until corrective actions for what caused that event.could be !
< l 21 taken.
4 22 Subsequently on August 9th, when information was '
23 made known to me that my staff may have known about this 4
24 avant, I also initiated an investigation by OIA.
4 1 25 The full-power license was issued on July 15th, as i
. 6 I 1 mentioned. During the following months up until october, 2 numerous operating areas were experienced with the plant 3 operating between 0 and 5 percent, and that led to a growing 4 concern on the part of the Staff that maybe the utility wasn't ,
5 ready to go above 5 percent power, even if the OI ,
6 investigation had been completed at that time. And in 7 September, we met with the utility to get them to initiate a
. 8 performance improvement plan to better their performance.
- 9 On October lith, the utility went into an outage to l 10 deal with EQ modifications and fire protection modifications 11 that they had committed to with the Staff, and the outage was ,
i 12 probably started a little bit earlier because of problems they 13 had with the turbine bypass piping. They had cracks in that 14 piping.
15 Despite the Licensee's efforts to improve 16 performance, additional plant and equipment problems and [
17 personnel errors were experienced during the outage, and i :
18 programmatic weaknesses were identified concerning engineering 19 and security. This led the Staff to issue a 50.54(f) letter I 20 to the utility on December 24, 1986.
21 The plant is still shut down. There is --
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINot What was that date again?
4 23 MR. KEPPLER: I'm sorry. December 24, 1985. I 24 apologize.
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADIHot okay. Thank you.
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. 7 1 MR. KEPPLER: The plant is still down. We do not 1
2 have a projected date from the utility for startup, and, in j
3 fact, the utility, I'm certain, will tel1~you today, the ,
4 utility CEO will tell you today that he doesn't have a date in i
5 mind yet for restart of the reactor.
6 Could I have the next slide, please?
l j 7 (Slide.) '
t
] 8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: In your 50.54 (f) letter, I -
1 j 9 presume you stated that you wouldn't allow them to start up 4
10 until corrective action had been taken.
I 11 MR. KEPPLER: We told the utility that we wanted 12 them to develop a plan by which they satisfied themselves that ,
!l 13 they were to start up, and that that would be discussed with I l
14 the Staff prior to startup. l 15 The next slide shows what I think will summarize r i 16 briefly the current issues before the Staff. As Mr. stello !
] 17 mentioned, the OI and CIA investigation issues will need to be l 18 discussed, and we will address those in closed session.
19 There have been a number of technical of issues, but I i
j 20 there are two currently outstanding technical issues, the i .
! 21 diesel generator problems and the problems associated with l '
22 design change reviews, which I'll address in a little more l 1
4 23 detail.
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Excuse me, Jim. Do we have 25 that slide'?
i I
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. 8 1 MR. KEPPLER: It's toward the back.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: The last one.
3 MR. KEPPLER: And I'll also talk about the 4 resolution of performance-related issues in a little more 5 detail.
6 The last point I would mention is, on February 15th 7 of this letter, the Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan 8 petitioned the Staff to issue a show cause Order and hold a 9 hearing on why the Fermi-2 license should not be revoked, and 10 that petition is under review by the Staff right now.
11 Could I have the next slide, please?
12 (Slide.)
13 This slide depicts the actions being taken by the 14 Licensee with respect to the technical issues and the 15 performance-related issues.
16 Let me address the diesel generator problem very 17 briefly. Prior to the plant receiving a low-power license 18 last year, the plant experience bearing failures with the 19 emergency diesel generators in January of 1985. The problem 20 was attributed to inadequate lubrication, and they instituted 21 a program to make sure that the bearings were pre-lubricated 22 before start, and they developed a surveillance program to 23 monitor the performance of the diesel generators, and the i 24 Staff was happy with that action at that time.
25 No further problems were encountered until November
' 9 1 when the plant shut down. They experienced additional bearing 2 failures and then had more in December.
3 The Staff and the utility -- the Staff has had 4 consultants on the' problem; the utility has had consultants.
5 The vendor has,been involved.
6 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: Who is the vendor?
7 MR. KEPPLER: Fairbanks-Morse-Holt. -
8 And they identified a number of issues associated 9 with preconditioning of the bearings during startups, fit-up 10 potent'ial problems, concerns with the oil. They changed oil, 11 and they weren't sure what the source of the -- the root cause 12 of the problem really was.
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Were they still associated with 14 bearings?
15 MR. KEPPLER: Yes. But they developed a program --
16 they met with the staff and developed a program to perform 17 reliability and; operability demonstrations on two of the four 13 emergency diesel generators. They submitted that proposal in 19 writing. The test program involved a large number of slow 20 starts and fast starts and endurance runs, and the Staff 21 approved that proposal. The testing was conducted during the 22 early part of,this year, and the testing has been completed, 23 and the Staff is reviewing the results of the tests, awaiting 24 a Licensee report on it. But it is my view that this problem 25 , will go away technically. The Staff is prepared to buy in on 5
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,1 the resolution, the demonstration runs.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Jim, has the -- and maybe l
3 this is an NRR question -- but have you looked at experience '
4 with similar diesels of this manufacturer that are in use at 5 other plants? Are there similar diesels, and have you seen i 6 bearing problems of this sort at other plants, or is this sort 7 of a first-of-a-kind problem area? -
8 MR. DENTON: If you remember, the diesel that we've 9 talked most about is the Delaval diesel that's gotten all of 10 the attention. But there have been numerous other diesel 11 problems.
12 Let me ask Bob Bernero if he knows the answer to 13 your specific question.
14 MR. BERNERO: Yes, we did. This type diesel 15 generator has been used in other plants, and I believe it was 16 Duane Arnold that had a similar sort of experience about three
- 17 years ago. And if anything, the pattern of behavior, failure
, 18 behavior, bearing-associated, seems to be a combination of the 19 care with which the diesel generator is reassembled and the 20 bearings align and the various subtle things like torques and 21 so forth.
i 1 22 And as Jim Keppler said, we're satisfied that with 23 the careful scrutiny by the vendor and the other participants, 24 that this reverification run on the two diesel generators that 25 were selected -- and that included post-run removal of l
1 11 1 bearing caps to examine the bearings to validate that they i
2 were not damaged -- that that is a solution to this, which we l
3 think is a specific problem to the site, rather than some 4 generic Colt-Fairbanks-Morse diesel generator problem.
5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Why is this specific to the 6 site?
7 MR. BERNERO: Well,.we think it was because of the -
l 8 mechanical assembly and disassembly that had taken place, that j l
9 in all cases the shafts may not have been properly aligned, 10 the bearing caps not properly torqued in some instances, a l 11 host of small factors rather than any one single thing.
i
. 12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: So in essence, you think 13 the root cause is not paying proper care and attention to ,
14 detail in the maintenance activities.
l 15 MR. BERNERO: Yes. That's my own personal opinion, i 16 and I think others share that opinion, too. But we think the t
17 problem has now been brought in hand.
18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Okay.
19 MR. KEPPLER: I'm told that there are twelve plants 20 in the country that use these types of diesels, and we have 21 three in Region III. In addition to Fermi and Duane Arnold, 22 there is Prairie Island.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I would assume that 24 Prairie Island's are considerably older than the others.
25 MR. KEPPLER: As would be Duane Arnold.
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12 1 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Okay. And did Prairie 2 Island have any of this kind of experience.
3 MR. KEPPLER: We know of no problems at Prairie 4 Island. As Bob mentioned, there were problems at Duane Arnold 5 that we didn't know about.
6 We have had our people out to Duane Arnold, as they 7 did checks on the bearings during this last outage that they -
8 had, and I'm not aware of any problems that were found.
9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Has the Staff, by the way, 10 put out an Information Notice or something on this particular I
11 problem to sort of get the word out'to other plants in terms 12 of these efforts?
13 MR. KEPPLER: We haven't yet, and we will. But part 14 of the problem is to make sure that we have all the 15 information available to pass on. We're not sure of what the 16 fix really was here.
17 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Okay.
18 MR. KEPPLER: And we may not.
19 MR. TAYLOR: And we've had the vendor group '
20 involved, too, with our Staff working with the Region and NRR 21 to try to answer the questions you're asking.
22 MR. KEPPLER: So in summary, I am saying I think the 23 diesel problems are going to evaporate.
24 The next three bullets, the seismic issue, the 25 embedment issue and the design change issue raise serious
, l
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, 13 1 questions in our' mind,over the adequacy of engineering 2 contrcls of Fermi. Let me talk a little bit about each of 3 these.
4 The seismic issue came to our attention through an 5 allegation that was made that required seismic reviews were 6 not performed on engineering change packages that had been 7 made by Detroit Engineering starting back in the fall of '84.
8 The Licensee and a consultant that they brought in reviewed 9 those design change documents for which there was no evidence 10 of any previous seismic qualification having been performed.
11 And they redid those calculations.
12 And we had our people, from the Regional office, 13 follow up on that as a result of that exercise, we concluded 14 that the design was adequate and no hardware modifications 15 were required.
16 A little bit later --
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Why had they not been done or 18 was it overlooked by them, overlooked by us?
19 MR. KEPPLER: We think it was done but there was no 1
20 physical evidence to show that a seismic engineer had reviewed 21 these things.
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I see.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Documentation problem.
24 MR. KEPPLER: I don't know that it was totally a 25 documentation problem. It may have been that other people i
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14 1 were signing off on it as well.
2 And I guess I -- I don't have the details of this, 3 Commissioner, but we found out, as we got into the review, 4 there was no requirement to have, per se, a seismic qualified 5 engineer do these reviews for all cases. But we found, in 6 some instances, that they were being done by perhaps 7 electrical people or others.
8 And it may have been valid to do it that way for 9 very simple cases, but without the paperwork to trace this 10 through, we felt we had to go back and pursue the issue. It 11 was done both by the Licensee and its consultants and our own 12 people and that issue evaporated.
13 But why this wasn't protected is a good question.
14 And then the second part of it --
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I take it you don't have 16 an answer to that, yes.
17 MR. KEPPLER: No. And that's why I'm lumping these 18 together for you?
19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: You don't have an answer to 20 what?
21 1
MR. KEPPLER: I don't have an answer as to why this 22 happened.
23 As a separate issue, but still related, during the 24 design review that was performed by -- I believe it was
)
J 25 Sargent & Lundy, they identified better than 100 concrete l
I
, 15 1 embedmonts in which the applied loads were greater than the -
2 loads assumed in the original design calculations. This 3 additional load that needed to be addressed was from required 4 seismic load cases.
5 So they had to go back through and redo those 6 calculations with the correct loads. They evaluated those 7 embedments against the safe shutdown margin and the operating 8 basis earthquake criteria and again found they did not have to 9 make any hardware changes. They had adequate margin in their 10 analysis. But this had not been picked up.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Jim, I take it in both of 12 those, either the Licensee or the Licensee's contractor 13 identified the problem?
14 MR. KEPPLER: Well, one of them came to us by way of 15 an allegation, but it also came through their own internal 16 allegation review source.
1 17 I think perhaps the more critical one -- and it ties :
\
18 it together a little bit -- is that on the last day of 19 January -- January 31st -- the Licensee came to us and 20 informed us that since September 1, 1984 design changes had 21 been made to some 20 systems without the stress reports or 22 hanger designs having been evaluated or reviewed by 23 appropriate personnel.
24 And in fact, I'm told there are several thousand 25 man-hours of calculations that either have not been done or l l
l l
, 16 1 there is not a record for it. ,
2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: What had they done? They had 3 -- what did they find?
4 MR. KEPPLER: They found that since September 1984, 5 design changes made to a number of safety related systems, 6 over 20, that they didn't have che stress reports, stress i
7 calculations, or the hanger design calculations to support the 8 conclusion that the system met design requirements.
9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Does that mean the 10 calculations weren't done or they were missing or a f
11 combination of both?
12 MR. KEPPLER: It could be all of the above.
1 13 What has happened here is that Detroit Edison has 14 brought in Stone & Webster to review the situation and, in i
3 15 addition to this, as a result of the seismic problem, the 16 embedment problem and this, we've asked the utility what about ,
17 the next problem, that we don't know about and to take a
- 18 detailed look at this whole area of engineering analysis.
i 19 I have talked to Mr. McCarthy, the Chief Executive 4
20 Officer of the company, and he is concerned about this issue.
21 He has told me that he, personally, wants to understand why 22 this came to be. And they are not going to come to the NRC to ;
j 23 pursue resolutien of this issue until he is satisfied with it.
24 In fact, he has been quoted in the papers as saying 25 he is now in the critical path for this project. And I think 1
' 17 1 that is an appropriate statement. !
l 2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Was there any kind of an !
3 independent design review or verification done for this plant, 4 prior to licensing?
5 MR. KEPPLER: The Staff required an independent 6 design review done by a third party organization that I 7 believe, Harold, dates back three years maybe. It was -
8 performed by Cygna Corporation and it was a sampling type of 9 review. And I am not aware of any significant problems that 10 were developed by that review.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Has anybody gone back to i 12 look to see whether that review cut across any of the systems 13 work or areas where these problems have now cropped up?
14 MR. KEPPLER: I have not, but we will.
15 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Are we sure that all the design 16 changes that there have been problems with -- or there is some 17 doubt about -- that we have discovered them all? How about 22 18 systems? Are there other systems that are being looked at?
19 How do we know we've got to the root causes and how do we know 20 we've looked at the whole problem?
21 MR. KEPPLER: We don't, Commissioner. And that's 22 the issue that I made with the Company.
23 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Who is doing that?
1 24 MR. KEPPLER: The utility has brought in Stone &
25 Webster to do that.
i
. 18 1 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Stone & Webster is going beyond, 2 then, just the looking at what's happened? They're looking at 3 other things to see what else happened? j 4 MR. KEPPLER: They are looking at the potential for 5 other problems. And then, once that's done, I will have my 6 own staff follow up and do an independent -- do an additional 7 check on what they've done.
8 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Good. We want to make sure 9 we've got them all?
10 MR. KEPPLER: That's right.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Has Stone & Webster 12 developed their plan -- or the Licensee developed a plan on 13 how they're going to do this? What kind of a cut they're 14 going to use?
15 MR. KEPPLER: They came in for a meeting with us 16 back in mid-February and the meeting abruptly ended due to 17 miscommunications between the Licensee and their consultant.
18 They said they didn't have their act in order. They wanted to 19 go back and review it. And the fact that they have not come 20 forth since, I think, is suggesting that they appreciate the 21 significance of the issue right now.
22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I think it would be useful 23 for the Staff to at least have some detailed meetings and 24 understand the direction that they're going in, rather than 25 simply waiting until they've finished this review and then
- o 19 1 telling them whether they think it's adequate or not.
l'
- 2 MR. KEPPLER
- No, no. They are going to discuss the 3 methodology with us and we also will have NRR involved in
- 4 this.
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Good.
6 MR. KEPPLER: One point to leave jou with, on this '
7 -- and this, in my view, could be the pacing item in terms of -
l 8 the technical resolution or performance resolution of issues.
9 Let me address the 50.54 (f) response and the actions 4 10 that the utility has taken to make sure they're ready to go 11 back into operation. We have received the response. I had 12 thought it was a good response, somewhat general at first, but 13 a good start.
14 The number one thing that impressed me the most is 15 that the CEO of the company is taking, personally, the role of I
16 assuring himself that the plant will be ready before he l
l 17 recommends restart. And I think, in the past, he has not been 4
l 18 closely involved with what's going on. It 's very clear to
, 19 me, from the response, that he intends to.make firsthand 20 decisions here.
21 At the urging of the Staff, Mr. McCarthy brought in 22 an overview committee, which I'd like to consider to be almost l 23 an extension of the NRC in this area. We can't get in and do
- 24 everything for them. We asked them to bring in an independent 25 group. They have six key members in this group and I'll just l
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. 20 1 run through them briefly.
2 CHAIRMAN PALIADINO: How many?
3 MR. KEPPLER: Six.
4 It's headed up by Jack Calhoun from General Physics 5 Corporation. He formerly was a Executive Vice President, I 6 believe, at Susquehanna.
7 They have Leo Lusser, from the Management Analysis 8 Company. And he formerly was a plant superintendent at 9 Cooper.
10 Harry Green, Sol Levy from GE -- ex-GE. Marie Miles j
11 is now with Beta. And Jim Neeley, who I do not know but is 12 with the NPC organization.
j ;' 13 This overview committee is reviewing the Licensee's 14 history to date, the actions that it's taken to improve its 15 performance. It has issued one report so far. I thought it 16 was a very candid report, supercritical in a number of areas.
17 And it's the plan that this oversight group will make 18 recommendations to Mr. McCarthy, relative to start-up.
19 And I might say to you that I plan to meet with the
, 1 20 overview committee myself, when they reach that point in time.
l
! 21 The plan also calls for a phased start-up, in which i
~
22 they will not only declare themselves ready for initial l 23 startup, but then will proceed to some escalated -- some i
24 plateau for testing and operation and review that level of I
25 performance up to that point, before moving on to the next --
, . 21 1 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Does the overview committee have 2 a broad charter to look into all aspects of the operations, 3 such as training and maintenance and other things, too, or are 4 they just looking at start-up itself? l t
5 MR. KEPPLER: No, no. I think they're looking at i
6 the total operation up there. I don't think there are any L
7 bounds on this group.
8 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Experience level and all those f'
9 aspects? !
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Actually, they touched on
- 11 that --
l 12 MR. KEPPLER: You might want to ask the utility, I
13 when they come on today, that question. But my understanding 14 is there is no bounds to this. And I can tell you that the 15 report, the one report that was issued, was fairly critical in ,
16 terms of adequacy of management talent there.
i 17 COMMISSIONER ZECH: I just want to make sure they i
18 get a broad charter to look at all areas. That's important, I
, 1 19 think. Looking at this, we should look at everything, {
20 especially training and operations experience and things like l 21 that.
22 MR. KEPPLER: I agree.
- 23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO
- Are they looking at training
- 24 procedures?
25 MR. KEPPLER: I believe so, but I'd have to look 4
9 I
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, 22 1 into that more. I believe the answer is yes.
2 The last point that's on the chart, that I would 3 mention, at the urging of this overview committee, the utility 4 is actively seeking a new Senior Vice President with nuclear 5, experience to bring into the plant.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Jim, we've received at 7 least a summary of this, of the management overview, review of
, 8 the management evaluation. That was dated January 30th. And 9 I noticed on the status list that you provided to us, the f
- 10' company's response to the 50.54 letter was the day before.
11 Did the response reflect the outcome of the 12 oversight or overview committee's review on the management 13 question?
14 MR. KEPPLER: The overview committee reviewed the 15 response to the 50.54 (f) .
l
. 16 COMMISSIOliER ASSELSTINE: So in essence, this is l 17 part of that, as well?
! 18 MR. KEPPLER: Yes. They were asked to review the 19 response before it was submitted.
i 20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: It would be interesting to 21 hear from the company on the scope of the overview committee's i
22 authority. But I would have to say, based upon that first 23 report, it sure looks like they're going to be very forthright l
i 24 and candid and hard-hitting. That was a very tough evaluation l 25 of some of the management problems they've got, very L__ - - . - _ - _ . - _ _ _ . . , . . - . - _ . . - _ . - - - - - _ - . . - - - - - - - - - . - . - . . . - . _
. l
. 23 1 forthright, I thought.
2 MR. KEPPLER: I think the overview committee feels 3 that their reputation is on the line in this, too.
4 COMMISSIONER ZECH: I agree, and I hope the charter 5 is broad enough to give them other avenues to look into, if 6 they feel appropriate.
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Jim, if this new VP, is he to -
S be in addition to their other VPs or is he replacing --
9 MR. KEPPLER: He's going to be -- depending upon who 10 they get -- he will either be an Executive VP or a Senior VP.
11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: But it's an additional 12 position? We can ask the CEO.
13 MR. KEPPLER: I think a lot depends upon who they 14 get, to answer that question.
15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: But they're not -- are they 16 going to have to replace some lead VP to add --
l 17 MR. KEPPLER: Mr. Jens, who was the VP of Nuclear is 18 retiring. In fact, he has actually left the site now. And I 19 believe he's still on the company's roster in the corporate 20 office. t 21 But I think they're actually even looking for a more 22 senior person with adequate experience.
i 23 Could I have the next slide, please?
l l
24 (Slide.]
l 25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: The lack of previous
m 24 1 nuclear experience is one of the concerns that was highlighted 2 in the overview committee report.
3 MR. KEPPLER: This really is -- I skipped through 4 this. This really is just a brief summary of what I said, in 5 accordance with the Staff actions, as a result of the l 6 premature criticality event and the operator error. We did <
k 7 issue a confirmatory action letter. We instituted the !
8 investigations and I might add that there has been a lot of ;
- 9 local interest in the project up there. The Monroe County i
10 Board of Commissioners has been very active and we have tried
- 11 to keep them abreast through briefings.
12 And in fact,.I have committed to them that we will j
13 brief them before the plant goes back into operation.
l 14 As a result of further problems, we required the
- 15 Licensee to institute a performance improvement program in l
16 September. And then, as a result of further problems we 17 issued the 50.54 (f) letter. The 2.206 petition has come in
- 18 and that's currently under review.
4 19 And I would just say that although this is not a i
20 meeting to seek Commission approval for restart, it would be t i
21 my intent, before the plant is ready for restart, that we meet '
i l
22 with the overview committee and, in fact , it might even be of l 23 some interest to the Commission at that final meeting, to
- 24 consider meeting maybe with the chairman of that group.
25 And I certainly intend that we would do a fairly
_ _ _ . _ . _ . __.____y_,_-,,.my- _
._...,m. , _ _ . y ,.,..,.,,__.,.,,,_% ,.._.,_.ymym.y..yv_,_ .,,,r%,, _,g,,._.,wy,..ym,., y_
. 25 1 augmented inspection effort on restart, until we were 2 satisfied that --
3 COMMISSIONER ZECH: I think it might be a good idea 4 to ask him -- or to invite him to come in, with the Detroit 5 Edison management prior to restart.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I agree with that. That's 7 a good idea. '
8 Jim, on the 50.54 (f) letter, you issued the letter.
9 You received the company's response. Then the company 10 receiv3d the management evaluation which, in essence, was a 11 review of the company's response as I understand it.
12 Are we going to get something else, now?
13 MR. KEPPLER: We will get all additional 14 correspondence by that group of the reports.
15 ' COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I guess what I was 16 wondering is the Staff satisfied with the response that 17 they've received on the 50.54 (f) letter in light of what we've ,
18 now seen on the management questions, or are you looking for 19 something else from the Licensee now that reflects the current 20 state of affairs and provides -- I don't know if you think you 21 need a more complete plan than what you've already got.
22 (Chairman Palladino left the room at 2:45 p.m.]
23 MR. KEPPLER: I have responded to the 50.54 (f) 24 letter just this last week. And we may have had one or two 25 minor points in there. But at this point in time, I am
,- - - - - - - - - - , - - , . - - - = - - - - - - - - , - - - , -
o 26 1 satisfied with the actions being taken. I think we have to
-2 see how this overview committee comes out and have to see how 3 the utility comes out because I think we can't draw many 4 conclusions until we see more information from them.
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Okay.
6 It's sort of an interim situation at the present 7 time?
8 MR. KEPPLER: Yes.
9 MR. STELLO: We're through, unless there are more 10 questions.
11 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: (Presiding.) Questions?
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Do we know -- maybe this 13 is something I need to ask the company when they come up -- if 1
14 INPO has done an evaluation of the plant since they received 15 the low power license and to what extent their evaluation, if 16 at all, tracks some of the concerns that we've surfaced, or 17 that their overview committee has surfaced?
18 COMMISSIONER ZECH: I submit that's an excellent J 19 suggestion. I would concur that INPO should be involved. And 20 if they haven't been, I would highly recommend that they do 21 so. Maybe the utility can ask INPO for their assistance, 22 also. That's what they're especially good at and it might be 23 useful. I think that's an excellent suggestion.
24 (Chairman Palladino entered the room at 2:47 p.m.]
25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I was under the impression
l l
, 27 i i
1 that INPO had -- I'm trying to recall. I know that there was l 2 an independent evaluation of plant engineering and readiness, 3 or whatever it all involved, by Duke Power way back two or 4 three years age, I guess.
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Oh, yes, that's right.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: And I also thought INPO had I
7 done at least one trip or two.
8 MR. KEPPLER: INPO did a pre-start-up, t
9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Maybe we can get the
- 10 company to address that when the come up.
11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I guess I have one question 12 that probably, won't be easy to answer, Jim. I guess I should ,
13 be asking it of myself, as well. I won't embarrass myself and 14 the Commission by reading the comments of Commissioners when 15 this utility was in here to get its license.
16 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: That's the worst for not i
17 making any comments, my friend.
18 (Laughter.]
19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: But the Staff, as well, we 20 had pretty good SALP ratings that we were looking at there. I 21 think there was only one 3 in the SALP ratings for fire 22 protection.
23 And I and -- I think it's fair to say -- other l 24 members of the Commission had a very good impression of 25 this management team. Why don't we catch these things :
7..-- . -. .__, , , . _ _ , , , . _ _ . , , _ - , _ . . _ , , , _ _ , , , . . - . , . ~ . _ -
- 28 1 earlier? Why is it that here we are now, nearly a year later, 2 all of us -- Commission included -- only now being able to 3 identify a lot of these problems. And in fairness, I guess, 4 at least in respect to one or two engineering matters, the 5 review done by a highly capable and competent outside group 6 failed to pick up some things.
7 Have you got any thoughts on that?
8 MR. KEPPLER: I've got a couple of comments.
9 I feel very bad about the situation, not only for 10 the agency, but I feel bad for the industry an a whole. There 1 11 is no question we felt that this utility was ready to operate ,
12 and they were going to be a top performer. We all felt that 13 way. And I don't know that there are good answers to that 14 right now.
15 One thing -- we have some views that may cr may not 16 contribute to the problem. One view is that while we felt the i 17 utility had done a goed job, in terms of training and 18 preparing itself for emergency situations, they really didn't ;
19 know how to handle dealing with all the conditions of an ;
20 operating license en a normal basis. The issues one runs into 21 when the change modes of operation. The surveillances.
22 COMMISSIONER BERNTRAL: But that sounds like 23 training and procedures there. Are you able to --
i 24 MR. KEPPLER: I'm saying they were well prepared for 25 emergencies. They were not well prepared for day-to-day ;
, )
, 29 1 operations. I think a second factor that comes in my judgment 2 is that this plant took an enormously long time to build.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: An enormous what?
4 MR. KEPPLER: Long time to build, to complete. This 5 plant was under construction for 15 years, literally. And one 6 of the problems that I see tied to this engineering issue is 7 that the utility had, I believe, either three or four 8 different architect engineers. They had Parsons, they had 9 Daniel construction company. I believe Bechtel may have been 10 in there.
11 They had -- and I'm not sure there was any 12 continuity, any good changeover on some of this. And then ,
13 they got their own engineering department involved. *
, 14 And then, I think, a third point, I think the
{ 15 utility was lacking in experience and -- in terms of f 16 cperation. The plant manager was inexperienced. The --
! 17 Dr. Jens, the Vice President -- well, he had a lot of '
18 experience, dating back to Termi i days. I think in terms of '
19 a commercial nuclear power plant, he wasn't experienced.
1 20 And I don't think the utility did. a good job of t
21 listening to their advisors. That cones through to me, that 22 they did not pay attention to the advice they were getting.
23 And I don't know whether that's a problem of arrogance or 24 whether it's a problem of -- whatever.
25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Well, I have to say that the
- - - . . - - .- . , - - - - . . - , . - - , . , , - . , , . - , . . , , . . - . , . , , , - . , , , . , , , , , . . . ,.,.,.,.,-.,,,-..n_ . , , , . - , _ . , --
o 31 ,
i 1 experienced utilities. i i
2 MR. KEPPLER: They set an excellent first cycle of i
3 operations for that plant.
4 COMt!ISSIONER BERNTHALt How much had to do with the ,
5 plant? It was quite a different plant.
9 6 MR. KEPPLER: Well, it is , I grant ycc. And that 7 was done through the SNUPPS concept. And maybe that helps. I 8 don't know. I think we've got to revisit your questien at 9 some point. ;
10 The issues that ccme up with engineering centrols, I f
11 think Jim Taylor's been briefing you on scue of the findings l 12 that he's having at plants in the engineering areas. And I ,
13 think this problem may be not a problem unique to Fermi. !
14 MR. STELLO: Let ne suggest that it's not unusual to ;
15 see a situation where a plant does do a Occd job in getting it :
16 built and they deserve praise. They've done a good job. (
17 But building a plant is not the same thing as ;
4 15 operating it. And they pay an awful let of attention. If 19 they don't really recognize the significant difference in ,
20 moving from building and constructing it into the operation.
21 And I think we've since seen this kind of thing 22 happen before. Tne kind of attention and the kind of people, 23 the kind of experience and the kind of training that's 24 necessary to move from a plant, after you've constructed it, ;
25 into the pre-op, that operations phase, is a different kind of
(
[
1 e ,- - --, --...w- , -,ge-.-,. +--+,-n., - - - - . - e,- _ - - .--m -.,, ,- -- ~n,e.--e,,.,,. - ,-n,.--w--.gn-,v,w --,-m- - - - ..
l
. 30 .
r 1 one' thing that I recall from -- it's been two years or so, I 4 ,
- 2 guess -- not quite two years sir.ca I was there. The one 3 precursor that I think I was briefed on before I went there
! 4 and it was evident when I was there, was the apparent 1
5 inability to tie up lots of loose ends. And you will probably
- l 6- recall terms like that being used in some of the materials l
l 7 that you and your people presented. There were many seemingly
} 8 little things that -- the list wasn't getting any shorter. l f 9 And it sort of went en longer than it appeared it ,
10 should have. The management attitude appeared to be, then,
)
11 and I assume today, is still excellent. And yet, there was an i
12 inability to tie up the loose ends. i
\
13 Is that something we missed and we should have '
l 14 noticed at the time? Was that a valid indicator or -- that f
- 15 was really the only indication, I must say, that ve.had at the
(
4 16 time that might have led us to suspect that things Vouldn't go !
t i t 17 well. !
18 MR. KEPPLER: I don't know.
i I can tell you that (
l 19 when we licensed Callaway, which was before Fermi, I saw a lot l l i 20 of the same symptoms there, in terms of the inexperience and (
l 21 in terms of use of advisors. ,
6 l 22 I remember some of the Commissioners down there, l . >
23 they expressed those same concerns. But yet, Callaway came I
- 24 off very good. In fact, they set an -- j 25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE
- Better than some -
I i
i
.-_ _ . _ . _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ . . ~ . _ _ - _ - - - , _ . - . - _ _i
32 1 l
1 a problem than constructing it. )
2 And it appears that the credit that everyone '
- 3 suggested that they deserved, maybe it was deserved and is 4 deserved. But that still has nothing to do with the fact that l l 5 they have this difficulty when they went into operation. They 4 6 didn't do nearly as gcod a job.
7 And I can remember one other plant where that was 8 evident and we started to raise the prcblem. And it's .an issue 9 that's not an unimportant one. That was at Palo Verde, who f i'
10 also did a fairly good job in constructing it. But the i d ;
11 concern was raised as, are you now ready to make that same 12 kind of commitment in cperations? '
i 13 It's the need to recognize. That needs to be done.
14 In my view, that's a problem that one has to be careful, that ,
15 you really recognize that you're doing something significantly '
16 different, in operating that facility versus building, t
17 CHAIRKAN PALLADINO: Have we learned anything from 18 this situation, that should cause us to re-examine the way we I 19 approach these plants? Here was a situation where during a l r
20 meeting we all felt, from the information we got, this plant i 21 was ready. It turns out it wasn't. And 1 think we need to i f
22 look carefully at what signals we might get frcm this, that !
23 could be useful in other situations. And we're going to face i
I 24 other plants coming up for opetating licenses. And we -
25 shouldn't get caught in this bind if we can avoid it.
i l
_ I
~ . _- - - . _ _ _ . _ . -- . _ _ _
e 33 1 MR. STELLO: I agree. And what I think -- and we
! 2 have started to look harder at the signs that you can start to l 3 see during the pre-op testing of a facility to make sure that i
4 they have paid attention to the kinds of things they need to l
5 -- as they're moving over into operations. :
! 6 It is something we are paying more attention to.
7 Whether we are doing enough yet is obviously an interesting -
8 question. But it is an area we're sensitive to.
- 9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE
- Vic, your point is well i
10 taken about the success of a construction program and yet, 11 differentiating between going into operation.
i l 12 What I had recalled -- like Fred, I was one of those 13 that re-read my comments and it's a humbling experience to ;
14 read some of the things that I said at that meeting, too, l 15 in light of the way things have gone.
l 4 16 But some of them were really on the operational i
- 17 side, it seemed to me, too. The training program had a very 4 18 successful pass / fail rate for reactor operators. That was 1 I 19 part of what led me to feel that, gee, here was an outfit that
{
20 was going to repeat the performance of Union Electric and
{
21 callaway and have a very successful startup program.
) 22 It seems to me, maybe I and others were looking at 1
23 some of the wrong indicators. Maybe what we need is some
! 24 additional --
25 MR. STELLO: If you went back and looked at the
- t
. . 34 e
1 experience level throughout the organization, I think you j 2 would have found --
I.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: No question about that.
4 MR. STELLO: And maybe there's a -- having some 7
5 spara spots on the top of your head and a lot of gray hair and 6 a lot of experience in'how to do this, sometimes it helps.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Or listening to those that -
8 have that, yes.
9 MR. STELLO: Either one.
! 10 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Well, I'd sure agree, you know, l
11 I've visited all the near-term operating licensed plants that i 12 I've had to participate in making a decision since being a 4 .
{ 13 Commissioner, and I'd say almost every single one of them has l ,
14 some -- has a challenge to shift from construction to l
j 15 operation. There's not a plant that I've visited that didn't i
~
16 have some kind of a challenge. Some seem to do it better than i .
i 17 others, but I agree that it's a barrier that has to be gone
?
- 18 through, and operations is quite different. You've really got i to force that, and experience is really perhaps the single 19 1
1 20 most important area that helps in going through that. So when j 21 a plant does not have all the experience, perhaps that's j 22 certainly one lesson that we should look at to see if we can't j 23 do something to strengthen up that shifting from construction i
l 24 to operation for those plants that don't have as much
{
! 25 experience.
l 1 . l
. 1 l
' 35 1 , But it's a good valid point, I think, and something )
2 we ought to look at and certainly ought to be one of the 3 lessons learned from this experience, because it's a syndrome, 4 a different thinking. Constructing and operation are quite 5 different, and you simply need to have that shift of I
6 mentality, in my view. And some plants seem to do it easier l 7 than others. -
1 8 It's been my experience, though, that those plants 4
9 that do have the experience, you almost have to go through it 10 to understand it and feel it. But experience is important, so 11 perhaps that is something that we should keep in mind as we i 12 continue to evaluate and learn from this event.
1 13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I tend to agree, I think, i
14 with the point that you've seconded, Lando, that Vic has 15 made. We didn't look at that experience thing very carefully.
16 It also, however, points out that the thing that we l
17 really are in short suit on here is this problem of 18 identifying management capability. I think it's difficult for 19 anybody to do that. That is not the NRC's strong suit, at 20 least in my experience here. It reminds of our problems down 21 at the Tennessee Valley Authority, which are much more massive 22 problems than this particular problem, in my judgment.
23 In this case, I maintain today that the visit I made 24 to that plant revealed the management, whose openness and l
25 attitude was one of the best I've ever seen. They knew their
j .
o 36 l 1 staff people. They appeared to have the kind of exchange when i
l 2 they disagreed with our own Staff people on certain things 3 that you really think you like to see. And yet we have this 4 outside review group come in and lambast the organizational l 5 aspects of management in particular. And maybe the missing 6 ingredient really comes down to this experience thing.+ It's 7 about the only one I can come up with here that sort of gummed -
1 j 8 up the works as they tried to prepare for operation.
9 But it's something that we haven't found the answer l 10 yet to in the commission. We are not strong, I would say, in 11 management assessment, and somehow we've got to figure out how ,
I i 12 to do that better.
) -
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Can we use INPO to help us in 4
14 any way, both to get the utility's attention to their i
i 15 management problem and to help identify management problems?
j 16 Presumably they have some expertise in this area.
) 17 COMMISSIONER ZECH: They can help. I know they l
l j 18 can. They have a good capability in that regard, and they can
{
19 also call in others from the utilities to assist them, if they 20 feel it necessary. I think that's something that we ought to 21 look into.
- 22 But in this particular situation here, I do think !
i j 23 INPO should be called in, and I think the utility should want 24 to do that, and I strongly recommend that they do it.
i
! 25 MR. TAYLOR: INPO has started corporate
o 37 1 evaluations. They've been doing them. I can't tell. I don't 2 know personally whether they did one for Detroit Edison or 3 not, but they have started that some time ago.
4 COMMISSIONER ZECH: That's right. They're into 5 that.
6 MR. TAYLOR: And that is an attempt to assess --
7 COMMISSIONER ZECH: And they have a capability 8 there, and it's something that I think we should call upon.
9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: We can ask Mr. McCarthy that 10 question.
11 Other questions, comments?
12 COMMISSIONER ZECH: No.
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: No.
14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, we chank you, gentlemen.
15 In scheduling this meeting we had requests.from 16 three individuals to speak today, w e 've allotted five minutes 17 to each of them: Jennifer Puntahnt , Michigan State Energy 18 Coalition; Sister Barbara Baer.a,'resvants of the Immaculate 19 Heart of Mary; Walter McCarthy, Chief Executive Office, 20 Detroit Edison.
21 I'm going to call on each of them in this order, 22 starting with Jennifer Puntenney, Michigan State Energy 23 Coalition.
24 Ms. Puntenney? We've allotted five minutes for your 25 presentation.
o 38 1 MS. PUNTENNEY: Good afternoon, Commissioners. I l
2 have handed out copies of my prepared statement to you.
3 My name is Jennifer Puntenney. Today I am here 4 representing the Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan. I have 5 worked for SECOM for seven years as a researcher and organizer 6 in every aspect of the nuclear debate. Presently I am 7 employed at the University of Michigan's Natural History 8 Museum and am nearing completion of a Master's of Science 9 degree at the University. In addition, I hold a Bachelor's 10 Degree in Elementary Education and Sociology and an additional 11 degree in teaching Montessori education.
4 12 Our organization has had a longstanding involvement 13 in the issues and problems of the Fermi-2 Nuclear Power 14 Plant. It is our strong commitment to the communities and the 15 environment that surround this plant that brings me before 16 you, as we think it is imperative, and we appreciate your 17 letting us speak to you, and we feel that your positions as 18 Commissioners warrant this.
.: 19 On February 18, 1986, our organization filed a 10 20 CFR 2.202 and 2.206 petition with the NRC's Office of NRR, the 21 Office of Inspection and Enforcement, and with Region III. We 22 are here today to demand that the NRC address our allegations 23 and the request for revocation of Detroit Edison's operating i
24 license before a decision is reached as to restart of Fermi-2.
25 The ineffective and incompetently managed and t
t o 39 1 operated Licensee program and the degraded and fault equipment f i
2 and construction at the Fermi-2 Nuclear Power Plant warrant l
4 3 NRC's immediate actions, as requested in our petition.
j j 4 We are asking that you issue an order to institute 5 immediate proceedings to revoke the Fermi-2 license and to 6 issue a Show Cause Order and demand hearings, so that Detroit 7 Edison, in full public disclosure, would have to present facts "
8 and the laws to respond to our allegations, and I have listed
- 9 our allegations, the first one being that the U.S. NRC has not 10 elevate the enforcement actions against the Licensee to the 1 11 necessary levels mandated and provided for in the Acts and
(
12 regulations as a result of the events that have transpired at 13' this power plant. '
] ,
14 continuing lack of management controls at levels 4
15 required to meet NRC regulations and requirements, the result 16 has been ineffective programs and incompetence in operations, i 17 maintenance, security, and engineering. Twenty-six violations 18 were issued in January, and we allege that they were willful, 19 and that they showed careless disregard for requirements. The
! 20 Licensee has been unable to comply with certain NRC i 1 21 requirements.
j 22 The recently released Operations Improvement Plan by 23 the company will not provide the substantive changes needed to ;
4 i 24 correct the serious breakdown of operations at the Fermi-2 25 Nuclear Plant.
I a
- - - . - . - , - - --e - ,. , - =r,- <-e,- - --
or:r--- m-p-.s,c-,- . - - - - - - -,-w--e,--r - --m%----ec-..-------v%,-- w--, .,,m--r'
. 40 f
1 I would just like to add at this point, which is not 2 included in my prepared statement, but because of the recent 3 source release from the NRC of the OI report conclusions, I 4 will be sending an additional allegation to include 5 conclusions from that OI report in determination of this 6 petition. l 7 The NRC has the authority in the law for prompt and -
8 vigorous action. Your regulations state that this action will
\
9 be taken when dealing with Licensees who do not achieve the l
10 necessary meticulous attention to detail and the high 11 standards of compliance which the NRC expects. The i
12 regulations further state that in no case will Licensees, like 13 the Detroit Edison Company, who cannot achieve and maintain 14 adequate levels of protection be permitted to conduct licensed 15 activities.
{
16 The Atomic Energy Act authorizes you to revoke l 17 licenses under certain circumstances for material false l 18 statements, wi11 fulness or careless disregard of requirements, i
j 19 for failure to construct and operate a facility in accordance 20 with the license and technical specifications, or failure to i
21 observe NRC regulations. And indeed, the Detroit Edison 4
22 Company has failed to operate the Fermi-2 facility in I
i 23 accordance with the terms of the license by not following l 24 technical specifications for violations for failure to observe 25 the laws and regulations of this Commission.
(
r
.-_-.-,-,..,..~._.m.-----____._,-_.,.._ m ., , _._ _ _ m ,_ _ _ _____,,...__,-.m------ -
I
, 41 1 Your own Staff has stated that the violations at ,
2 Fermi-2 have demonstrated a major breakdown in controls to 3 safely operate Fermi-2. The Licenses has admitted that there 4 has been inattention to detail at every level of the 5 organization.
6 Further, your Staff has determined that problems at 7 Detroit Edison's plant, that the management has failed to find 8 the root causes of their problems. They have not properly I
9 corrected these causes. They have not followed the i 10 procedures. Weak training of personnel an.d lack of knowledge i
11 and status of equipment and systems -- there has been lack of 12 control of operations, and the safety evaluations in many 13 cases were less than adequate. And, in your agency's views, 14 these did not even constitute safety evaluations.
15 Your mandate by law is to issue revocation orders 16 when a Licensee is unable to comply with NRC requirements.
17 Furthermore, the past history of problems and the 18 recommended implemented changes to the operations and i
19 management at Fermi-2 have shed light on the overall j 20 continuing ineffectiveness of the Licensee, that the Licensee i 21 is plagued with. If 16 years of experience, with numerous l 22 reviews, have not helped the past problems, we find it hard to 23 believe that the Licensee today, with its so-called new '
24 management structure, can try to correct the similar and 25 identical problems that just keep recurring.
J - a o
42
. 1 The Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan firmly 2 believes that there has been little done to assure the NRC and i 3 the public that the Detroit Edison Company can change.
! 4 The Fermi-2 license should be revoked. It is ,
'I 5 imperative that the U.S. NRC implement the Safe Energy 6 Coalition's request for action by instituting proceedings for 7 revocation of the Fermi-2 license and that the issuance of a -
8 Show Cause Order be issued demanding hearings.
9 We feel that the pattern of oversight and neglect is
, lo so deep and pervasive that only federal action can protect the j 11 health and safety of the citizens in the environment of 12 Michigan, in which we live and care for. Only the action of 13 your agency stands between the citizens of Michigan and a
- 14 catastrophic accident.
15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, thank you, Ms. Puntenney.
1 16 MS. PUNTENNEY: Thank you. I included a copy of my l
17 petition that I wrote for the Safe Energy Coalition in your 18 packets.
19 CIIAIRMAN PALLADINO: As you heard today, the plant i
I 20 is shut down.
(
l 21 MS. PUNTENNEY: That is correct.
I l 22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: And our intent is to make sure l I
I 23 that we're satisfied before consideration will be given to f 24 startup and when.
25 Let me see if other Commissioners have questions or f i
! l 4
43 0
1 comments.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Just two quick ones.
3 On one of the concerns you raised on page 2, 4 Jennifer, you mentioned that you felt that we had not elevated 5 some enforcement actions up to the levels that are appropriate 6 under the regulations.
7 Do you have some specifics, or are those spelled out 8 in your petition, some specific ones where you have concerns?
9 MS. PUNTENNEY: Yes. I did comment the NRC Region 10 III for the actions that they have taken to this level. But 11 reading the Code of Federal Regulations and comparing that to 12 what has occurred at this plant, we felt that your -- the 13 Staff had not gone to the highest level that was needed to 14 protect the citizens of Michigan. And I do spell that out in 15 my petition in great detail, if you would like to go through 16 that.
17 I go through your purpose of elevated enforcement, 18 what those steps are, and how Detroit Edison's problems and 19 violations fit into our arguments for elevated enforcement.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Second, I guess, is the 21 crux of your argument in terms of saying that what you really 22 need here is a revocation proceeding, as opposed to the course 23 that the Staff has proposed.
24 The crux of that argument is that you've reached the 25 conclusion that the company just can't change, that the
! 44 l 1 pattern has been such that you just don't have confidence that
- 2 they can change and develop an effective improvement program.
i f
3 MS. PUNTENNEY: That's correct. I guess I take ;
i i
4 issue with some of the comments that were made by some of the ;
5 Staff. Our Public Service Commission did an in-depth i I
[
i 6 investigation, and they had varying -- the similar criticisms l 7 from the very beginning of the construction of this plant, the - i l . !
s 8 same criticisms that your Staff has reached in the last eight l 9 months. So that's why we are drawing those conclusion.
i !
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Okay. Thank you.
t
( 11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: And other comments or !
{ 12 questions. [
1 i i 13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Let me -- I think what I'm i j 14 asking is the flip side of what Jim has just asked, perhaps. !
15 Let me ask it anyway.
l I ,
16 I gather, based on at least the vast majority of l
{
17 what you have written in your statement here, except for those ,
l 18 issues -- and there are one or two issues of construction and ;
4 l l
19 especially documentation, as you know - but I gather that :
4
! 20 except for that, your quarrel is not with the plant itself so j 21 much as it is with the management and the operation of that j 22 plant.
23 Is that a fair statement? I j 24 MS. PUNTENNEY: No, that's not. We would take issue i 25 with the management. We take issue with the design.
1 i
i
. _ - - .. . - . . .--. -- - _- =- -- - --. . - .
0 45 1 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Well, that's what I'm 2 asking.
l 3 MS. PUNTENNEY: Also the design of the plant and i I a 4 the faulty equipment and the degraded equipment. It's a ;
i 5 brand-new old plant, is tne way it has been described in 6 Monroe County. And we really feel that this plant can never 7 operate safely. -
! 8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I see.
i 9 MS. PUNTENNEY: Because of those issues. !
j 10 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: So your concerns go beyond j 11 primarily management concerns.
12 MS. PUNTENNEY: Management. Yes, that's correct. i 13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: So you're saying you object i I
i 14 to the plant itself.
I 15 MS. PUNTENNEY: We object to the technology being i.
16 used to generate electricity.
i 17 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Okay. Thank you.
i 18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Any other comments? I 1
l 19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: No.
1 j 20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, thank you very much. l 4
l 21 MS. PUNTENNEY: Thank you.
[t 22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Now I wonder if Sister Barbara 1
i i 23 Bacci, Servants of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, would join I
i 24 us?
]
l 25 SISTER BACCI Mr. Chairman and members of the
o 46 4
1 Commission, my name is Sister Barbara Bacci, IHM. I am a 2 member of the Sisters Servanto of the Immaculate Heart of 3 Mary, a religious community of women whose headquarters are f
4 located within a ten-mile radius of the Enrico Fermi-2 nuclear
.i
- 5 facility in Monroe, Michigan.
i 6 I thank the Commission for the opportunity to i
7 address 'ssues that concern many residents of Monroe, as well -
8 as the congregation.
9 The issues of concern include, first, the inadequate
! 10 evacuation plan for the residents of Monroe County, Michigan ,
11 and secondly, the harmful effects of onsite storage and/or 12 transport of radioactive wastes on the environment and health j 13 of Monroe residents. I cite these two issues for the
.f 14 following reasons: i 15 First, the NRC has been charged with the 16 responsibility to assure and maintain the public health and i.
17 safety of all persons who reside near a reactor site. (
18 Secondly, since July of 1985, a series of equipment
- 19 failures and human errors have increased concern. The most ;
20 critical of these events were the following {
21 One, premature criticality; two, a license violation l 1
22 which shut off cooling water fer an entire ECCS division; i
23 three, six technical specifications limiting the condition of 1 24 operation violations; fourth, January 1986, the NRC released a 25 list of 26 violations of safety and operational procedures i
-.--.,,-,,._,.---._,.--.,----.--m--,--m,-- --,-mm.-y-.-,..-m--e---m-,e-.m.gy--,,- .,csm-.~we-..--% --
47 !
a o
1 that occurred between July and October of 1985.
2 March 9, 1986, Mr. Walter McCarthy, Chairman of the 3 utility, said that Detroit Edison will not ask the NRC to 4 allow the plant to produce power again until he is convinced l
5 that human errors and equipment failures that have plagued it l
4 6 since last July of '85 are cleared up.
i 7 For these reasons, there is justified concern for 8 the health and safety of the surrounding population.
- 9 Our first concern is that the emergency preparedness 10 plan at present is inadequate. One aspect of the plan in i
11 particular is the problem of evacuating of residents and i
12 several congregate care facilities, which include the IHM i 13 Mother House, home for over 300 of our retired and infirm i 14 sisters. It is important to note that all of the congregate 5
i 15 care facilities are located within the same evacuation 16 sector. Thus, if a PA-390 was implemented, all of these 17 facilities -- and I believe there are six, plus a hospital,
) 18 which I didn't include in here, because I don't know the i
1 19 status of them at this point -- would need to be promptly f
3 20 evacuated.
iu l 21 The Michigan Department of Public Health has not i
22 identified to date the appropriate transportation resources
- 23 for the over 470 wheelchair-bcund residents. A safe 24 evacuation of all residents at this time appearn virtually l
25 impossible for two reasons. First, because of an inadequate
i I
- o 48 -
1 number of appropriate conveyances to accommodate the special l 2 needs of many residents, and second, because it is impossible l l 3 to predict or promise that human error will not occur in the f i
^
! 4 midst of an actual PA-390. !
i !
j 5 For example, the NRC cited that the personnel in the i l
} 6 emergency operations facility overlooked a forecast wind l l 7 shift, resulting in evacuating the wrong areas in the October -
i 8 2, 1985 nock emergency drill. The Office of Civil j
- 9 Preparedness intends to implement a plan which will meet the j 10 needs of a worst-case disaster.
I '
j 11 The Department of Energy, conducted by Sandia Labs i f
I 12 in 1982, of the worst-case estimates revealed that for the five million people within 50 miles of Fermi-2, the following 1
- 13 j
l 1 14 events would occur:
1
(
1 j 15 There would be 8000 early radiation-induced deaths, !
}
! 16 13,000 cancer deaths, 340,000 injuries, and $135 billion in f
17 property damage.
i L
{
18 In the midst of such staggering statistics, it seems !
j 19 impossible for the present evacuation plan to meet the serious i
j 20 effects of a worst-case accident. 1 i
l 21 The second area of concern is tr.e potentially lethal 1
{
22 dangers of onsite storage and/or transport of radioactive 4
23 materials. A lot of money has been spent by the Department of I
24 Energy, $1 million annually, researching permanent waste [
{
1 25 disposal sites. Although the NRC is confident that permanent
- t
o 49 1 sites will be ready between 2006 and 2009, in the interim, 2 nuclear waste will stay where it is produced, or it will be 3 transported to another facility. The temporary storage of 4 low-level waste will be viewed as a solution, rather than an 5 interim measure.
6 Given the difficulty in determining precisely when 7 disposal facilities will be available, there is no assurance -
8 as to when stored wastes will be removed to permanent sites.
9 The environmental and social implications of the 10 nuclear waste problem are tremendous. Fermi-2 will generate 11 30 metric tons of high-level radioactive waste each year. One 12 of the most products is plutonium, which is lethally toxic for 13 250,000 years. The transporting of such lethal toxins 14 seriously threatens the lives of virtually every American 15 citizen.
16 The nuclear waste problem is faced with many 17 technical, political, and institutional concerns which must be 18 addressed. Dumping nuclear waste in the backyards of 19 communities like Monroe is not the solution.
20 We bring these issues before the commission because 21 of our continued concern about the protection of human life 22 and about the growing stockpiles of radioactive waste which 23 will become our legacy. Therefore, for the reasons already 24 stated, it would be socially irresponsible for the NRC to 25 license at this time nuclear power plants while issues such as
50 1 emergency preparedness and nuclear waste remain unresolved.
2 The commission will be doing the whole nation a 3 favor. What the country owes communities such as Monroe, 4 Michigan is to carry out the disposal program correctly. The 5 best technology must be employed. Safety must not be 6 compromised. Candid information must be shared, and posterity
, 7 must be protected.
8 Thank you.
9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Thank you, Sister Bacci.
10 Let me ask the General Counsel -- I'm not sure --
11 was the emergency planning not litigated in this case?
12 MR. PLAINE: I thought it was.
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I believe it was, but I just 14 want to make sure. Is there a member of the Staff that knows 15 for sure?
16 Well, we'll check that.
~
Let me see if other commissioners have questions.
17 18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I have one other question 19 on the same subject, Joe.
20 As I recall, the last time you met with us, you 21 raised the transportation question.
22 SISTER BACCI: Yes. '
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: And at the time, as I l
24 recall, we got a commitment out of the company, as well as, I !
l 25 think, our Staff, to work to try and resolve this
51 1 transportation question.
2 I take it, little has been accomplished since the 3 last time we talked about this, in terms of making available 4 the kinds of vehicles that you need to move your people.
5 SISTER BACCI: As I understand it, it is the Offico 6 of Civil Preparedness, the OCP office, which is looking into 7 this matter with Michigan, with the state.
8 So I had spoken with an official from that office on 9 this issue, and he claims, at this point, it is very difficult 10 for them to figure out how they are going to bodily remove 11 individuals who are physically and, in some cases, mentally 12 incapable of just being put in a bus or, you know, in a 13 regular car, that they need special equipment. And at 14 present, the state hasn't identified where those sources are 15 going to come from.
16 And since it is an area where there are many 17 congregate care facilities which fall within the same sector, 18 it is a serious situation, and I don't want it to be 19 overlooked.
20 So the point is that I know there are many issues 21 related to emergency preparedness, but I am basically bringing 22 up one that we ere very concerned about.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Yes, I think you're right, 24 and it's a perfectly legitimate issue to be concerned about.
25 While it is a state responsibility, at the same time, I think
1 o 52 1 there's an awful lot that perhaps we can do to help encourage j 2 a solution and that the Licensee can do to help ensure that i l
3 there is a solution. ,
i I
- 4 I guess that I'm a little disturbed that more hasn't l 1
! 5 been done to resolve the issue. Maybe we can take it up with l l
6 the Licensee and hear a little bit on what progress has been
] l 1
- 7 made.
1 8 My understanding was, I thought something was going l i j i 9 to be done to help ease this problem.
I
] 10 SISTER BACCI Well, my understanding from spesking !
! I j 11 with the OCP is that they have been awaiting a response from i
1 12 the state, and haven't received yet. l l
l 13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Well, that's the point that i
) 14 I think is missing here. I'm sitting here with a transcript i
15 of the last meeting that we had, and, in fact, Mr. Pettigrew, i ,
! 16 who at that time, at least, was Chairman of the Monroe County l i '
f 17 Board of Commissioners, told us, and I'm quoting here, that l la "the Governor of the state, Governor Blanchard, in regard to (
j 19 responding to the Mother House of St. Mary's, we have a letter f i
t 20 on file committing the state of Michigan" -- I presume from l 21 the Governor - "to the unset needs," which he says he'll .
l l 22 refer back to Mr. Eckert. And Mr. Eckert responds that that -
r 1 23 was the Governor's statement -- I'm paraphrasing now -- that l I l 4 24 was sent to the Board of Commissior. ara last year in December. i
- 1 25 And I'm quoting here: "I believe it was the f' i
i I.
9 53 1 Governor who pledged all the necessary resources to the County <
2 of Monroe."
3 What's going on? Why are --
4 SISTER BACCIt The county can't meet those needs by 5 themselves, and so it's going to need additional conveyances 6 from outside of the county. So that's, you know, the big i i 7 point. And even though the state promises to take care of the communities' needs, we're only one group within that area, 8 '
9 where there are many -- you're talking close to 500 10 individuals who, at this point, don't have -- they don't have 11 a legitimate way to remove them. They need special type of 12 equipment to remove them.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: But has anything happened 14 since a year ago -- or it's nearly a year ago, I guess --
15 since the time that the Governor committed to provide that 16 equipment for your facility? Has anything at all happened?
17 SISTER BACCIt Well, as I understand from speaking 18 with the OCP, that movement has been made in terms of locating l 19 ambulances which will be needed for those that are, you know,
! 20 in a bad situation. For the people that can board a bus, that i 21 can be done. But individuals with extreme physical and mental 1
t 22 problems, which is the case in some of these facilities, it is t 23 virtually impossible right now for them to figure out how to 24 do that.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINEt Because they don't have l
54 1 the equipment, the vehicles or --
2 SISTER BACCI: They don't have the equipment, or 3 they haven't figured out how they're going to do that yet.
4 I do understand that there are meetings going on, 5 you know, with these various care facilities. But at present, 6 I'm bringing it out, because I don't want it to become 7 overlooked.
C COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Okay. It certainly 9 shouldn't be. It seems to me, that's a solvable problem.
10 COMMISSIONER BERNTHALt Yes. I don't understand Why 11 so little seems to have happened, and perhaps our people, 12 along witn the utility, can once again seek to make sure that ,
13 those stato resources are made available.
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: In fact, maybe there's 15 something we can do to help encourage that.
16 SISTER BACCI: Or expedite the process would be 17 marvelous.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Let mo ask one other 19 question. I have to say I'm concerned also about your 20 comments on the problems and implications of radioactive 1
21 wastes, because again, that's a matter that you brought up i
22 last time you were here.
23 I believe that this agency connitted to send you and i 24 your associates materials explaining the passage of the 25 Nuc1 car Waste Policy Act, which Congress passed in December of {
l
59 1 1982, that there indeed was a schedule, a fairly specific ,
2 schedule with milestones laid out for the solution of this 3 problem of storage of radioactive wastas.
4 And I have to tell you that that is a solution that !
5 is well within the range of technology today. It's a mattor 6 of getting it done in this country, and I'll grant you, we are 7 proceeding very, very carefully and very, very slowly in 8 reaching that solution.
9 My first question is, did you get the materials that 10 we committed, and I think I personally committed that they 11 would be sent to you?
12 SISTER BACCI: Yes, I did receive them, and I did 13 read them. -
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: But that made no impact on 15 your concerns?
16 SISTER BACCI It actually encourages me to bring 17 the issue up again, only in the sense that if you live within 18 seven miles of a nuclear power plant, and it will be the place 19 where nuclear wastes will be stored, plus the fact that you 20 live in an area that is surrounded by railways and interstate 21 highways where nuclear waste will definitely end up being 22 transported, it hits home a whole lot more closer. So that we 23 could sit around until 2006 or 2009 waiting for this waste 24 problem to be solved by the Federal Government, but we're the 25 ones in the meanwhile who are being affected by the materials. l
56 1 And the point is that I think that much can be done 2 perhaps by the NRC to help expedite this process at the 3 federal level or whatever it would take, and so I bring that 4 issue up before you in hopes that you could do something to 5 expedite this more quickly.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Well, we certainly will. I 7 have to point out, as I did last year, though, that we are, on ,
8 the one hand, being urged to expedite, and on the other hand, 9 it really is the task of this agency to make sure that Ve rake 10 hasta very slowly on this matter, and that the licensing he ,
11 done very carefully. So there is a natural tension here 12 between those who want to expedite -- and I agree with you, we ,
13 should expedite to try and remove the storage of waste from 14 plant sites. That's not the most desirable solution. He 15 believe it's a safe interim solution, and Congress believed it 16 was a safe interim solution. But our responsibility is here 17 is to make sure that we expedite carefully and slowly and, 18 most importantly, safely.
19 So I had hoped that we had allayed some of your 20 concerns last year when we addressed that problem. I can 21 assure you that the technology is there, and this Commission 22 is charged with making sure now that that technology is 23 carried out in a safe and responsible tanner when we license 24 the nuclear waste repository.
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Any other comments or
57
,1 questions?
2 CCMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I would just add on the s 3 same point that Fred was just addressing, I think your 4 statement was a very good one on the vaste issue. As your 5 staterent itself points out, there are some challenging 6 institutional and environmental questions that have to be 7 dealt with, and it is a question of naking sure that the waste 8 disposal program is done correctly, that the best technology 9 is used, and it's dono preparly, no that the community that 10 will have the repository and the ccmmunities through which the 11 wasto will travel will be adequately protected. And I think 12 what we're about is to make sure that the decision is made on 13 a timely basis, but also that it's done properly the firct 14 time.
15 SISTER DACCI: I have two points I'd like to make.
16 The first one is that recently, I understand that i i 17 Toledo Edison had requested the NRC to give them permissicn to 18 bury radioactive wastes in a trench situation that they have 19 around their plant. And if that becones a precedent for other 20 utilities -- Toledo is our nextdoor neighbor, besides tho .
21 fact that, you know, we hava ar.other one -- so it's like being 22 surrounded by a nuclear waste dump, and that's our first 23 concern.
24 So I'm bringing it up because we're heightened by 25 the fact of Toledo Edison's plant, Davis-Besse.
58 J 1 The second is a question that I havn. can you bo ,
2 more specific in terms of how the NRC is trying to expedite 3 the political process in terms of the nucicar waste issue?
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I think that most people 5 would argue that we're not trying to expedite it. Most peopic 6 consider us obstructionists in the process, or et least some 7 people do, because we are trying to be careful and responsible 8 in the licensing process.
9 I'm not sure it's 50-50, but you will find pecple en 10 the one hand saying that the NRC is going to be the problem 1 11 because we're too slow, and on the otner hand, you'll find i 12 some people saying that the URC ought to be going moro olowly 13 and more carefully than it is. >
14 I would hopa maybe that criticism, in balance on 15 both sides, means that we're hitting a happy medium around 16 here. I'm not sure you'll even find completo agreement on the 17 Commission on that point.
18 Lst me make one comment, though, and I'll stop soon 19 here.
20 The nuclear waste issue is a very important one, and 21 I want to make sure that it's understood. The case that you 22 mention now at Tcledo Edison, I believe involves low-level '
23 nuclear vaste and the storage onsite of low-level waste ao 24 opposed to the actual spent fuel from the generating facility, ;
25 and I would only point out that the icw-level vastes
59 O
1 predominantly in this country is generated in the civilian 7 sector, is generated by many other users, including hospitals 3 and radio-pharmacoutical production people and users, people 4 in th nodical area in particular.
5 so that is a problem that extends far beyond the G utilities themselves. It is indeed an important problem.
7 That also is a problem that was recently -- again, I should 6 may -- addressed by the Congress in the amendmento that were i 9 passed this December to make nure, we hope, that the states in 10 this ccuntry now all develop a unified and responsible 11 low-level radioactive dicposal plant.
12 The concern that you have is legitimate and in 13 shared. It goes far beyond nucloar power plants. It extendo 14 to the many, mar.y applications that we hava in this country of 15 radioisotopen, many other arons.
IC CCMMISCICli3P. ASSELSTINZ: I would just add also in 17 responco to your question, what are we doing te help orpedito, la I'd say our focus is to make the process go as cmoothly as we 19 can. tie 'J1timatuly have to 11conse the rapository, j ust like ;
20 wc licenso reactors for operation.
21 Two of the things that I think wo're doing that are 22 positive steps are to try and bring home to the Department of 23 Energy, who will be our Licensee, tha ir.portance of quality ,
24 assurance, making sure thst their research prograr,s and 25 developnent programs are dena with a high degren of attontion
60 !
1 to quality early on, se that later en when we get involved in ;
2 a licensing proceeding, the licensing procons vill work .
3 l smoothly. There won't be surprices or new issues that wo 4 haven't identified in the past. t 5 Also, we're trying to identify the significant {
6 technical questions that need to bs answered early on, so that
- 7 we can achieve a consensus within the scientific cocnu.,ity, a 8 consensus with the local governments and the state governments 9 that will be very interested and involved, ao that when va get 10 to that licensing proceeding again, we've resolved and settled 11 to everyone's satisfaction as much as possible the key 12 technical issues that will be involved. i 13 Those are a couple of examples of positive things 14 that I see in our program to try and make it work nora 15 smoothly and achieve both a goed and early decision on 1
16 removing the wastes from the reactoro and placing them in a 17 nafe, permanent repository. c 10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Sister Dacci, thank you very l 19 much. We appreciate your remarks and appreciate your being I 20 here to present them to us.
21 We will next call on Mr. Waltor McCarthy, Chief [
22 Executive Officer of Detroit Edison Company.
23 MR. MC CARTHY: Good afternoon, gentlemen. The lact 24 time I sat in this seat has been referred to a nunber of tinen 25 this afternoon. And that time was a very happy one for the 1
1
- 61 4
4 1 Detroit Edison Company. We had just finished up an 2 exceptionally good, I think, termination of construction. We i
3 had had an exceptional training program with almost 100 i
4 percent success of our applicants on the first try for reactor l 5 licensing.
1 6 We had received the low power license in March of !
l 1
7 last year and loaded and did all of our low power testing in -
f 8 an extremely good way. And we felt pretty good on July 10th, l j 9 and I think you did, too.
I 10 And we let you down and I'm very, very sorry about f l ;
- 11 that. The incident, I think, that has caused the greatest i
12 concern in my professional life was the rod pull incident of I
! 13 July 12. I have carefully examined the incident itself. It .
l' '
i 14 was a very dumb thing for the Detroit Edison Company people I
j 15 not to have realized the sensitivity of that, whether or not '
l \
! 16 it was a reportable incident or not. It should have been !
i i
j 17 brought much higher than it was. l
! 18 I, myself, didn't learn shout it until nearly a week i 19 after the coating that we had here, and that was the wrong i 20 thing. That has poisoned the relationship between the NRC and l 21 the Detrot*. Edison Company ever since then and we are fighting
! 22 cur way to get out of that situation. And we will succeed.
23 A comment on the 202.6 petition, we will be filing a l !
{ 24 reply to that in the near future, p
4 l
25 We are doing lots of things. You have heard from ;
t i
I 62 1 Mr. I; oppler about our reply to the 50.54(f) letter. We have, 2 I think, focused the entire attention of the company upon the 3 Fermi plant. And that starts with me.
4 I, the Chief Executive Officer of the company, am 5 now the person to whom the Vice President of Nuclear 6 Operations reports. I spend, personally, three mornings a 7 week at the Fermi plant and lots and lots of afternoons not at 8 the Fermi plant but working on the Fermi plant.
9 I do that because it is absolutely essential to the 10 company that we get back to the standard that we had when I 11 appeared before you last. We are going to do that. We have 12 the people to do it. It's the same people, virtually, who 13 were there. They're the people who got the plant done, who 14 did the low power testing, and they can perform excellently 15 again.
16 I think many of the questions that have been 17 discussed here this afternoon about the transition from 18 construction to operations are very, very pertinent 19 questions. And in our discussionc with the Region III people, 20 upon receiving the low power license, they told us very fairly 21 and very frankly that it would be a difficult transition. We 22 heard them. We said gee, that's interesting stuff.
23 And I guess we didn't hear it loud enough or wo 24 didn't hear it or think about it long enough, or our people 25 didn't really interpret it properly
63 1 So we are going through, now, a period of 2 re-evaluation. We have, under the terms of that 50.54 (f) 3 letter reply, asked a group of independent consultants, who 4 you have heard about before here today, to tell us what's 5 wrong. And their report, their first report, didn't list lots 6 and lots of things that are good. They listed the things that 7 were wrong, because that's what we asked them to do.
8 And Commissioner Zech, their scope is universal.
9 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Good.
10 MR. MC CARTHY: They have no limitations whatever, 11 as far as the Fermi plant goes they can tell me anything they 12 want. And believe me, they have. And if you have read their 13 report, that's the kind of report you don't really lika very 14 much to send to the newspapers, but we did.
15 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Good. Well, I've seen the 16 report, but I also wanted to make sure that it was not limited 17 in any way, at all, and I appreciate that.
18 MR. MC CARTHY: As far as I'm concerned, and they 19 know it and that committee reports to me,. they have no scope 20 limitations whatsoever.
21 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Very good.
22 MR. MC CARTHY: And if they don't like the color of 23 the building, we'll paint it.
24 Lots and lots of things -- Commissioner Roberts your 25 question on why didn't we catch it earlier is a very, very
64 0
1 interesting one. We did have an INPO evaluation, Commissioner 2 Zech, and that INPO evaluation said we were average.
3 And they had lots of specific comments which we 4 factored into our reactor operations improvement plan.
S COMMISSIONER ZECH: But you haven't had one 6 recently, I don't think.
7 MR. MC CARTHY: In October.
8 COMMISSIONER ZECH: This past October?
9 MR. MC CARTHY: This past October.
f 10 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Are you going to have another 11 one before you go up? I'd recommend it.
12 MR. MC CARTHY: I think that will probably, before 13 we get any significant power level, we will do that.
14 COMMISSIONER ZECH: I think it would be helpful.
15 MR. MC CARTHY: I think so, too, and as you may 16 remember, I have a close relationship with INPO. I'm on the 17 Board of Directors of INPO, and I consider it my most 18 important, outside of the company, activity, as a matter of 19 fact.
20 COMMISSIONER ZECH: I think they'd be helpful.
21 MR. MC CARTHY: Yes, I think they would, too, and 22 of course I know the people there very, very well.
23 One of the comments that was made earlier, 24 interestingly enough, the comments on the Michigan Public 25 Service Commission's criticism of the Fermi project. I
i 65 1 couldn't pass up the remembrance that the comment in the 2 Michigan Public Service Commission report was that Detroit 3 Edison Company had a paranoia concern for safety and the 4 environment. And they felt that we spent too much money on 5 safety and the environment.
6 So the bringing up of that as a question about 7 insufficiency in the plant, I thought, had a particularly -
8 bitter twist.
9 The time to build a plant is undoubtedly, in my 10 mind, is a very important problem and especially tying up the 11 engineering on it. Because when engineering starts in 1968
< 12 and finishes in 1985, there are entirely different views as to 13 standards, as to Quality Assurance, as to what constitutes the 14 completion of engineering. And the completion of engineering, 15 in our company now, means not when the calculations are done 16 and not when the particular design change or modification is 17 made in the field. It means when all of the paper is closed.
18 And you have a place where it's written down that a check was 19 made on this or that. .
20 That wasn't the case in 1968 and that transition 21 took place over the last 17 years. It's one that I think 22 plants that took a long time to build have a particular 23 problem with. I l
24 I think that would be my particular statement, and 25 I'll just summarize it all by saying that the attention of
_ . .j _ _ . _ . _ _ ..______l...-___. _ _ . _ _ _
66 1 this company is directed toward the safe operation of Fermi.
2 We have no schedule, at the present time, for startup because 3 the most important thing, I think, from our standpoint and 4 also from the plant standpoint, is that when that start takes 5 place that we do it right.
6 I'm not in any hurry. I have said that publicly, a 7 number of times. I've got to be convinced before we call up 8 Region III and say we want to start up again.
9 There are reasons to go to five percent power that 10 are important in the long term. We had been at five percent 11 power. We got there and operated reasonably well at five 12 percent power. The source -- the neutron sources in the 13 reactor need rejuvenation and that is one way of doing that.
14 You will recall that the steam dump line was 15 replaced, the turbine bypass line was replaced, during the 16 outage that started in October. And we want to test that by 17 passing steam through it. So there are good reasons for going 18 to five percent.
19 They will also allow our operators and our operating 20 staff to demonstrate their facility and the things that we 21 have been teaching them.
22 We have been carrying out a large number of teamwork 23 development operations in the company, in the plant staff, so ;
l 24 that these teamwork things and the response to procedures and l 25 I all that are improved. 1 l
1
67 1 So I will stop there. I think my five minutes is up 2 and you might have some specific questions.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Walt, how do you plan to 4 convince yourself that you're ready when you think you're 5 ready?
6 MR. MC CARTHY: Commissioner Palladino, my 7 convictions are going to depend on lots of things, my own -
8 observations and, of course, no individual can look over a 9 whole list of specific disciplines in a plant and say every 10 one of those is all right.
11 One of the things that obviously I will lean on very 12 heavily is the feelings of the independent overview committee, 13 a committee that has a wide range of specific experiences on 14 it, including operations, including engineering, including 15 health physics, and including the whole thing.
16 And I will lean very heavily on their judgments as 17 well as my own. My own particular area of concern now is the 18 engineering aucit that's being done by Stone & Webster. I l l
19 have to see some good signs coming out of that before I'm 20 !
going to start feeling better about that.
)
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: How about the adequacy of your 22 operating crews and what they're doing with the plant? Do you 23 have some vehicles for getting feedback on that?
24 MR. MC CARTHY: Yes, well one of the ways is the old 25 management by walking around and seeing what they're doing and
l 68 '
1 seeing them and getting to know them in a closer way than I 2 have in the past. That's one way of doing that.
3 The records of operations during the shutdown are 4 important as well. And there are significant signs of 5 improvement in that area now.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: We were fooled once, you were 7 fooled once, so we both have the same problem. How do we make 8 sure, when we think we're convinced, that we have a sound 9 basis for it? You might want to think about that some more, 10 as we must think about it some more.
A 11 MR. MC CARTHY: Exactly. And that's one of the 12 things that we have to factor into whatever the overview 13 committee has to say to us. There are six more experienced 14 pairs of eyes and ears looking and brains to evaluate what 15 they see.
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Let me see if there are other 17 questions?
18 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Just a comment. It seems to me 19 that -- well, first of all we've talked about the shift from 20 construction operations -- which we think wa all agree is a 21 very important tiue and merits very special care and attention 22 and supervision, especially by senior management.
23 As I recall, the startup on Fermi was supported or 24 almost directed by a rather experienced startup engineering 25 group that it seems to me, if I recall properly, was of some
69 1 considerable assistance. And then they left and turned it 2 over to operations people.
3 Is that the way it worked out or were they still 4 during this criticality incident.
5 MR. MC CARTHY: The advisors were all still there.
6 COMMISSIONER ZECH: So there wasn't any startup 7 group that left, so that the same people are still there now. -
8 MR. MC CARTHY: The same advisors basically are 9 still there as well.
10 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Could you review for me just a 11 little bit, then? Are these advisors that are going to stay 12 with you or are these advisors that belong to Detroit Edison?
13 How does that work out?
14 MR. MC CARTHY: Some of them employees and some of 15 them are contractors.
16 COMMISSIONER ZECH: But the contractors are still 17 there?
18 MR. MC CARTHY: They are licensed on the plant 19 there. You will remember that we licensed our --
20 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Right, I remember you licensed 21 those people, but I just wanted to make sure that you didn't 22 move them out.
23 MR. MC CARTHY: No.
24 COMMISSIONER ZECH: How long do you plan to keep
- 25 them there?
3
-_ , , , _ . - - - - _ ,,___-m .
yy..-- ~ ~ . _ . - - - -_.-_______..----__,_,.,--.-_.-_____w -
_--_.__,,-.mm ~ _ . ---,___..m.- .y.
l 70 1 MR. MC CARTHY: Until we get our own people 2 developed to the point where they can go into those jobs.
3 COMMISSIONER ZECH: So they will additionally --
4 they will be additional people, really, to your shift. Is 5 that how it amounts?
6 MR. MC CARTHY: Well, the shift is now composed of 7 STAS and SOAs and then the normal shift supervisor. -
8 COMMISSIONER ZECH: But you'll have your own people 9 -- your permanent people and in addition you'll have the 10 startup people? Is that the way it works?
11 MR. MC CARTHY: And eventually, the intention is to 12 phase out the temporary people.
13 COMMISSIONER ZECH: But you tend to keep these 14 experienced people with you for a year, or something like 15 that?
16 MR. MC CARTHY: I'd say until we get to full power 17 operation.
18 COMMISSIONER ZECH: And well beyond that, I'd 19 think. I really would. Beyond that, to the point where 20 you're completely confident that those experienced people --
21 because, as you recognize, experience is a problem and it's ,
22 something that you know you don't gain except by doing it.
l 23 And it takes time. So it's necessary to keep those contractor l l
24 people with you until your own people have enough time on the 25 plant and operational experience to give you the confidence i
71 1 they can operate'it reliably and safely.
2 MR. MC CARTHY: No, I think that's right. And what 3 I have told the independent overview committee is that -- and 4 this is sort of a real exposure that people questioned it when 5 I made the decision. They're going to stay until they tell me 6 that we don't need them.
7 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Fine.
8 MR. MC CARTHY: Not at a certain date or not at a 9 certain power level.
10 COMMISSIONER ZECH: And you feel that you don't need 11 them, too.
12 MR. MC CARTHY: Well, yes.
13 COMMISSIONER ZECH: No matter what they say, if you 14 feel you need them longer, I'd suggest you keep them longer.
15 MR. MC CARTHY: Absolutely. Oh, not this has to be 16 a mutual operation. I wante- .. make sure that it didn't look 17 as if at some date, okay.
18 COMMISSIONER ZECH: You shouldn't pick an arbitrary 19 date. It takes time and your people are -inexperienced. It 20 might take little longer. Fine. Thank you.
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Let me just make or ask a 22 question, I guess, and make a comment here. I'm still 23 . puzzling over this less than flattering, shall we say, report 24 by your independent management review team. I have to say 25 that the upside -- the good part of this story is that as you
l
, I 72 s
1 go through this list, almost everything that they fault l 2 Detroit Edison on seems to be a textbook kind of problem. In 3 other words, things that can be learned.
4 Now this commission has seen cases of management 5 problems that involve attitudes and people and perhaps even 6 plain abilities that can't be learned, can't be taught.
7 Almost all of these look like things that are going to be a - ,
8 lot of works, perhaps, but are correctable. They're textbook
, 9 errors of one kind or another.
10 Is that a correct assessment, in your judgment, or 11 can you add to that thought? Where are we now on addressing l
12 this laundry list of difficulties?
13 MR. MC CARTHY: The laundry list consists of six 14 specified recommendations. But really all of the other i
15 comments are recommendations also. The final list of six 16 recommendations are specific things to do and we are 17 undertaking to do all of those things and are well advanced in I 18 most of them.
I 19 The previous, about 13 or 14 line items, which are 20 criticisms and are sometimes criticisms I don't completely 21 agree with because they go a little further than it's easy to 22 agree. We are undertaking programs and have undertaken 23 programs for all of those things. Most of those things are '
) 24 organizational or motivation or teamwork building things, as 1
25 you say, textbook management things.
73 1 My belief is yes, we can do that. We run a pretty 2 good electric company, as a matter of fact, and those things 3 don't exist in the rest of the company. And I think, so some 4 degree, they don't exist at Fermi. But through the eyes of 1 1
5 other people they did, and we took them on good faith, and 6 we're doing something about them.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: My question is much along -
8 the same lines. Have you collected those set of initiatives 9 to respond to the management report and are you going to 4
10 provide -- I guess it's a supplement to your response to the l
i 11 50. 54 (f) letter? l 12 MR. MC CARTHY: Yes, we will.
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Great. Maybe just one --
, 14 MR. MC CARTHY: Now wait a minute, now. We have i
15 responded to the 50.54 (f) letter.
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Right.
17 MR. MC CARTHY: What we have to do now is carry out 18 and bring to Region III and the Commission the report on the 19 achievement of those things.
i 20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: So it's encompassed within 21 the response you've already provided, just further detail of 22 how you're going to carry those things out?
i 23 MR. MC CARTHY: That's right.
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Maybe just one last 25 comment. I think the attitudes and the views that you
74 1 expressed are exactly the right ones. I think we both share a 2 common objective, and that's to make sure that when the plant 3 goes forward, at that point, the kinds of optimistic and 4 positive statements that we all made at the last meeting 5 really do come true. And I compliment you in terms of the 6 attitude that you expressed in your statement.
7 I think what we need to do now is work very 8 carefully at the specifics, as you obtain the technical 9 results from the Stone & Webster review, as the overview l 10 committee looks at technical issues, as well as the management 11 question, and see the specific elements to make sure that, in 12 fact, we're on the right track.
i .
1 13 MR. MC CARTHY: That's right.
4 14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, thank you very much, 15 Mr. McCarthy. We appreciate the commeats of you and the 16 other people that testified before us today.
17 I'm going to suggest a ten minute break while the 18 Secretary arranges for the room to be prepared for a closed 19 meetings.
I 20 (Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the meeting was 21 adjourned.) i 22 23 24 25 i
l
- . ~ , - - - - - . , _ - ,, .. . , , . . . - - - _ . . , . _ - . . ~ , , . . , - - . . , . . ~ , - - , - . _ , . - - - , , - - , - . - . . - . , ,-._, _ - ,.,-,
t 1 CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER 2
3 4
5 This is to certify that the attached proceedings 6 before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the
.7 matter of: COMMISSION MEETING e
9 Name of proceeding: Status Briefing on FERMI (Public Meeting) 10 11 Occket No.
12 place: Washington, D. C.
13 Date: Wednesday, March 12, 1986 14 15 were held as herein appears and that this is the original 16 t r a n s c r 'i p t thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear 17 Regulatory Commission.
19 (Signature)
[4 ttt\-
19 F"'
(Typed Name of Reporter) Ann Rildy 20 21 22 l 23 Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.
24 l .
3/12/86
- SCHEDULING NOTES TITLE: STATUS BRIEFING ON FERMI SCHEDULED: 2:00 P.M., WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 1986 (OPEN/ PORTION WILL BE CLOSED)
AGENDA: 1. OPEN PORTION REGION III 50 MINS JENNIFER PUNTENNEY 5 MINS MICHIGAN SAFE ENERGY C0ALITION SISTER BARBARA BACCI 5 MINS SISTERS, SERVANTS OF THE i
l IMMACULATE HEART OF MARY .,
WALTER MCCARTHY, CEO 5 MINS DETROIT EDISON COMPANY
- 11. CLOSED PORTION 1 HOUR
~
COMMISSION BRIEFING ON FERMI 2 STATUS (MARCH 12, 1986) e W
9
l -
FERMI HISTORY 3/20/85 LOW POWER LICENSE 7/02/85
- PREMATURE CRITICALITY EVENT 7/10/85 COMISSION MEETING
' 7/15/85 FULL POWER LICENSE 10/11/85 l UNIT SHUTDOWN 9
PROJECTED
~
l O
i l
i
1 e LICENSEE ACTIONS
- 1. OPEN TECilNICAL ISSUES
. DIESEL GENERATORS
- MEETING WITil STAFF :
- FORMAL LICENSEE EVALUATION i - ADDITIONAL TESTING
. SEISMIC ISSUE
- . EMBEDMENT ISSUE
. DESIGN CliANGE REVIEWS
- - DESIGN CHANGES FOR 22 SYSTEMS IN QUESTION
- S8W REVIEWING NEEDED ACTIJN
- 2. 50.54(F) RESPONSE
. INCREASED INVOLVEMENT BY CE3
. ESTABLISilMENT OF DVERVIEW C3MM11 TEE
- - REVIEW LICENSEE ACTIONS
- MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS RE STARTUP
. PHASED STARTUP
. NEW VP i
PERFORMANCE ISSUES AND NRC ACTIONS NRC ACTION ISSUE
~
CAL LIMITING POWER ,
- 1. PRENATURE CRITICALITY EVENT ..
(7/85) .
Of INVESTIGATION 4
- OlA INVESTIGATION BRIEFED LOCAL OFFICIALS
- REDUIRED PERFORM 4NCE
- 2. EXCESSIVE PERSONNEL ERRORS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
- (9/85)
- 50.54(r) LETTER
- 3. FAILURE TO DISPOSITION KNOWN PROBLEMS:
CONTINUED PERSONNEL ERRORS; SECURITY
~!
PROBLEMS: DESIGN CHANGE DEFICIENCIES
- - CURRENTLY UNDER REVIEW
- 4, 2.206 PETITION ,,
i G
l I
l i
CURRENT ISSUES
- 1. Of AND OfA INVESTIGATION ISSUES j .
1 2. TECHNICAL ISSUES
~
. DIESEL GENERATORS
. DESIGN CilANGE REVIEWS
- 3. RESOLUTION OF PERFORMANCE RELATED ISSUES I
j I I. 2.206 PETITION 10 ISSUE Sil0W CAUSE ORDER j
i j
D Y
4
SAFI INERGY COAL.]T;ON OF M]CE GAN P.O. SCX 331 MOITROE, !*ICHIGAN 48161 February 18, 1986 FOR IMELIATE RELEASE CONTACT:
JENNIFER PUNTENNEY 313-477-3441 MARY JOHNSTON 313-477-1670 MICHIGAN ENVIRONNINTAL GROUP REQUESTS NRC (NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION) -----REVOKE FERMI 2 LICENSE
' Monroe. . . .Today, 'the Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan (SECOM) filed a petition with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission requesting imme-diate proceedings to reveke the Detroit Edison Company's operating license for the $ 3. <5 billion Fermi 2 nuclear power plant located thirty miles southeast of Detroit.
SECOM's petition to the NRC requests elevated enforcement actions to address the " incompetently managed and operated licensee program at Fermi 2."
"Because of the history of problems at Fermi 2 and the serious breakdown in Detroit Edison's ability to safely operate this nuclear plant ina:cordance with the law, we are asking for immediate elevated enforcement, revocation of their license " explained Jennifer Puntenney, spokesperson for SECOM. "We also have requested an' order be issued by the NRC that would demand hearings in which Detroit Edison would have to present facts and respond to the five allegations in our petition."
--more--
_ . - - -. . __ - = _ . - - - . - -- - -.-.--- - -- _ - _
e r -
i i
The SECOM allegations in the petition include:
1.) NRC has not elevated the enforcement actions against the licensee to the necessary levels mandated and provided for in the Acts and regulations, as a result of the events that have occurred at i Fermi 2 2.) Continuing lack of mamagement controls at levels required to meet i NRC regulations and requirements: the result has been ineffective programs and incompetence at critical levels of the organization j
, including operations, maintenance, security, and engineering j
- i 3.) The twenty-six violations issued recently were willfull, in other ;
words, showed careless disregard for requirements 4.) The licenses has been unable to comply with certain NRC requirements 5.) The recently released operations improvement plan will not provide the substantive changes needed to correct the serious breakdown of operations at the Fermi 2 nuclear plant i
! Says SECOM spokesperson, Jennifer Puntenney "The law provides for prompt and vigorous action and if the utility does not operate a ;
nuclear plant in accordance with the terms of their license or achieve the necessary meticulous attention to detail and compliance, then revo-l cation is an action the NRC can take." {
l The SECOM petition presents twenty pages of. documentation ,
1 t
- for revocation of the Fermi 2 license. The Coalition bases its requests on many problem areas such as lack of knowledge or status of equipment and systems, lack of control of operations and safety evaluations, fail- -
ure to follow required procedures, inadequate and weak training of per- l sonnel, failure to restore equipment to service.
I SECOM spokeswoman, kary Johnston expressed concern, "There has not j been enough done by Detroit Edison to assure the NRC and the public l l the situation has changed in the sixteen years of construction and six months of operation. Our analysis of available documentation starkly I reveals a pattern of oversight and neglict so deep and pervasive that only '
an order to revoke the Fermi 2 license by federal action can protect the health and safety of citizens and the environment of Michigan!" -
i
---30---
SA7E ENERGY COA 1.]?]ON 07 M]CM]GAN -
F.C. Box 331 MonRCI. :.IT.i:GA:t 48161 February 15, 1986 Mr. Harold Denton Director Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. James Keppler Administrator Regjon III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Chicago, Il 60137 Mr. James Taylor Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ,
Dear Messers. Denton,
Keppler and Taylor:
The Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan (SECOM) , pursuant to ,
the code of Federal Regulations for Energy (10) under Section 2.206, " Requests for Action," and Section 2.202, " Order to Show I
Cause," petitions the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, j including the Offices of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Inspection and Enforcement, and Region III, requesting that these offices institute immediate proceedings regarding the ineffective and incompetently managed and operated licensee program at the Fermi 2 nuclear power plant.
l l l
_ _ , _ _ . _ _ . _ - _ _ _ . . , , . _ _ , . - _ _ _ _ . _ , , . - ,. _ _ _ , . . . . _ - . . _ _ , . - __ _._ , , .- .__________m _ _ . _ _ . . . .
Tha immedicto ccticn3 rCg:Octcd in th3 SECOM petiticn ;
t include the followingr (1) Elevated enforcement that would issue an order to -
institute an immediate proceeding to revoke the Fermi 2 license (NPF-4 3 ) .
(2) Serve on the licensee, the Detroit Edison Com pa ny , a show cause order and demand hearings to set forth the facts and law on which the licensee relies to respond to the forthcoming allegations presented in this petition as to why the NRC should not revoke the Fermi 2 license.
The Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan contends that the following five allegations and the supportive facts and documentation in this petition request, warrant your immediate actions so that prevention of any further degradation of management and equipment will not occur. Because of the history at the Fermi 2 nuclear power plant and the present situation Detroit Edison is emboiled in, the public's health and safety, the protection of the environment and above all the interest of the communities surrounding the Fermi 2 nuclear facility, are the basis for mandated action by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as provided in the Atomic Energy Act and the Energy Reorganization Act, ac well as the accompanying regulations.
The SECOM allegations set forth in this petition are as follows:
(1) The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has not elevated i the enforcement actions against the licensee to the necessary levels mandated and provided for in the Acts and Code of Federal Regulations, as a result of the events that have occurred at the Fermi 2 nuclear power plant (2) Continuing lack of management controls at levels required to meet NRC regulations and requirements; the result has been ineffective programs and incom pe tence at ,
critical levels of the organization including operations, maintenance, security, and engineering 2
(3) The twenty-six violations issued recently were willful in other words, showed careless disregard for requirements (4) The licensee has been unable to comply with certain NRC requirements.
(5) The recently released operations improvement plan will the not provide the substantive changes needed to correct serious creakdown of operations at the rerm,i 2 nuclear plant.
Supportive Facts As To Allegations In regard to the SECOM Allegations, (specifically no. 1& 2 but not exclusively), the purpose of the NRC enforcement actions l
is to "promoto and protect the radiological health and safety of l
the public including employees' health and safety, the common defense and security and the environment (10 CFR Part 2 Appendix C). The regulations for enforcement procedures also are for the purpose of
!
- ensuring compliance with NRC regulations and license conditions
- obtaining prompt correction of non-compliance i
- deterring future noncompliance, and
- encouraging improvement of licensee performance, and by e xa mple , that of industry, including the prompt identification and reporting of potential safety problems '
(19 CFR Appendix C Pg 128)
It is important to note that the Detroit Edison Company has been at fault in every one of the areas at the Fermi 2 nuclear plant which will be discussed throughout this petition, In addition, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has the authority for
" pr ompt and vigorous enforcement action", that "will be taken dealing with licensees who do not achieve _ the necessary when meticulous attention to detail _ and the high standard of 3
l
a.
the expects of its licensees," The compliance which NRC (19 CFR Part 2 Appendix C Pg 128) state that "In no regulations however, will licensees who cannot achieve and maintain case, levels of protection be permitted to conduct licensed adequate activities" (10 CFR Part 2 Appendix C Pg 128)
The procedural framework of the Nuclear Regulatory the agency ato make orders immediately Commission authorizes if the public health, safety or interest so requires, effective case of an order t,o show cause, if the alleged !
or in the violation is willful," (16 CFR Part 2 Appendix C Pg 128) - rhe one of SECOM's allegations and will be 1atter of which Is discussed later.
Furthermore, general policy for elevated NRC enforcernent include " civil penalties, orders modifying, or actions suspending, or revoking licenses, or orders to cease and desist i
from designated activities" (if CFR Part 2 Appendix C IV Pg 128-29), The SECOM petition request for revocation of the Fermi 2 license is supported in other sections of the law. Section 186 (a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P . L. 783) authorizes the NRC to revoke licenses under certain circumstances Any license may be revoked for any material false statement Fn the appTication or any statement of fact required under Section 182, or because of conditions revealed by such application or statenent of fact or any report, record or ,
inspection or other means which would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license on any original application, or f or failure to construct or operate a facility in accordance the
~
with the terms of the construction permit or license or ,
technical specifications _ in the application, or for violation or, or failure to observe, any terms and '
provisions ~~of this Act_ or-~ of any regula tio~n of the i icommis sion . (Pg 955) j l
4 l
Indeed, the licensee, The Detroit Edison company, has been involved in failure to operate their facility in accordance with r
the terms of the license by not following the technical specifications, and for violations and the failure to observe the law and regulations of the commission. The ramifications for these failures are provided for in the issuance of enforcement (Director, Division actions, some of which have been mentioned. ;
of Reactor Projects, NRC Region III to Wayne Jens, Detroit Edison The Atomic Conpany former Vice-President Nuclear Operations) .
Energy Act of 1954, (Section 234), the Energy Reorganization Act 206), and the code of rederal Requistions of 1974, (Section (19 ) (Pa r t 2, Appendix C) (B) under " Civil Penalty" describes the provisions for violations by stating that:
Ineffective licensee programs for problem identification involving or correction are unacceptable. In cases willfullness, flagrant NRC - identified violations or in management controls, the Nuclear serious breakdown Eegu1~atory Comassion intends to appiy its full enforcement ,
authority where such action is warranted, including issuing penalties fo-a ppr opr iat e orders and assessing civil continuing viotations...
fact, this part of the regulations describes .
In circumstances at the Detroit Edison Company's Farmi 2 nuclear power plant very accurately. This is why the Safe Energy of Michigan has asked that elevated enforcement Coalition authority be taken by the NRC. The facts, reported in letters, investigative documents between the NRC and Detroit and other Edison company, we believe, warrant such elevated actions.
for actions and the allegations set forth in The request 5
thic petitica cro cuppor k:d by th] crimmary of tha pr:bicco ot Fermi 2 in a December 24, 1985 letter from James Keppler, Region III Admir a strator to Wayne Jens, former Vice-President of Nuclear Edison Caompany. In this NRC letter Mr.
Operatioas , Detroit Eepplec states that the Fermi 2 nuclear power plant: ;
has experienced numerous events involving operational errors and degraded plant equipment. Furthermore, programmatic weaknesses have been identified by the NRC concerning engineering and security. A number of events occurred despite the efforts of your compa ny to improve the regulatory perf ormance o[the Fermi 2 station.
The events of concern have been attributed to four functional areas which are the: operations group, maintenance group, engineering staff, and security organization. Mr.
I:eppler continued in the letter that the diversity of problems and functional areas involved with these problems indicate to the NRC that the present management systems have been ineffective. If left uncorrected, and current trends continue, signifficant saf ety, problems mgy, develop at the Fermi 2 facility. .
Further the safety significance was mitigated only by the operating history (Inspection report 50-34118 564 0 (DRP) ) , because of the length of time and the low power levels.
In addition to the situation described in Mr. Keppler's letter of December 24 th, the results of a special NRC safety inspection conducted during the period of July 1 through October 15, 1985, of activities at Formi 2 (Inspection Report No. 52-341/85040 (DRP)) identified twenty-six violations of NRC requirements. The report summary states:
The majority of these fall into the category of failure to follow procedures. This represents a breakdown tee licensee's ability to operate the plant in accordance in- with 6
n
, prescribed procedure 3 co rcquircd by tho tcchnical specifications (pg 15)
The licensee reviewed monthly surveillances from Jan - June 1985 of the problems the operations section had in following .
procedures. "The licensee had suf ficient knowledge of procedural compliance problems to inititate corrective actions rather than for a larger data base." (Pg 15) The breakdown occurred wait despite this. Many of the violations identified in the report and the NRC stated "they demonstrated a major were repetitive, to safely breakdown in the licensee's administrative controls operate the plant." (Pg 16)
The decision regarding NRC proposed enforcement action based on the findings of this inspection report are to be issued in sepa: ate correspondence to the licensee when a decision is reached by Region III. (January 7, 1986 letter, from Charles Norelius, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, NRC Region III to Wayne Jens, Detroit Edison Company.) SECOM has been told in several telephone conversations in January 1986 with Region III :
of the t1RC that civil penalties would be forthcoming. ,
In addition to the twenty-six (26) violations incurred to date by the licensee, at least eighty_ (89)_ Licensee Event Reports been filed since fuel-loading in March, 1985. Review of have from these safety events has also raised considerable criticism At a September le, 1985 review meeting at Region III the NRC.
headquarters in Chicago between the NBC staff and Detroit Edison management, Detroit Edison's Bob Lenart, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Production, admitted that the company's perf ormance was 7
- . l
. . l e xpected" and the " problems are greater than l
"less than i
Lenart also stated, e x pected" . The company representative Mr.
numerous problems; the structure (of the "We have had at Fermi 2) is not finely tuned or well put organization Region III administrator, told the together". Mr. Keppler, Edison Company that they have had a " lousy performance" Detroit Mr. Keppler went on to say and that the " errors were excessive."
does not that "our confidence is shaken" and "today's climate permit an expensive learning process."
Furthermore, a licensee event follow up (Inspection Report 50-341/85042 (DRP) event) conducted on October 1 through November 30, 1985 also was critical of the Detroit Edison Company: ,
the inspectors' review of the LERs have revealed several Discussion areas of weakness in the licensee's program.
have an with tee licensee demonstrated that they do status LERs.
not effective tracking system and are unable to (Pg 3) (SECOM Allegation 44)
?
ins pectors Also in this inspection report section (94700) the "to be criticized the licensee's safety evaluations of events referring to LER No.85-060 " Primary less than adequate, ,.
Lef t open" (October 11, 1985). Thi's event I Containment Valve constituted a breach of containment and the condition existed for 2 1/2 months undetected by the licensee. (Three violations have been issued on this event.) The inspectors considered the safety this evaluation staten nt filed with the NRC and concluded that "dces not constitute a safety evaluation" and that statement Finally, the inspectors "this is not an isolated case". (Pg 4) that they consider the licensee's "LER program to be less state 8
than cd;quoto cnd tha lic;n000 cu3t toko tha nec0000ry otOp2 to strengthen their program". (Pg 4)
On January 9, 1986 Mr. Keppler, Regional Administrator NRC, sent Mr. Walter McCarthy, Chief Executive Of ficer, Detroit Edison Company an internal NRC Region III memorandum dated January 3, 1986. The memorandum was written by Stevie DuPont, Reactor Inspector, Test Programs Section, Engineering Branch, Division of Reactor Safety, with the subject being "LER Review of 1985 Fermi 2 LERs". DuPont performed the review "as a result of my own (Stevie DuPont's) personal concerns with the quality of Fermi's LERs". (Pg 4)
The purpose of DuPont's review was "to determine whether the licensee adequately evaluated the events for root causes and properly corrected for root causes". (Pg 1) The review identified three areas of concern:
- 1) Lack of knowledge or status of equipment and systems
- 2) Lack of control of operations and evaluations
- 3) Failure to follow procedures.
In response to this major breakdown in controls at the Fermni 2 plant and the licensee's inability to meet NRC requirements and regulations, the NRC has taken 2 major steps in l the progression of possible actions that the regulations stipulate. In Table 2, " Examples of Progression of Escalated Enforcement Actions for Similar Violations in the Same Activity Area under the Same License" of 10 CFR, Part 2 Appendix C are the following actions the NRC can issue:
9
c) Civil Penalty b) suspension of affected operations until the office Director is satisified that there is compliance reasonable assurance in with the that the licensee can opera te applicable requirements, or modifications of the license, as appropriate the c) Show cause order for modification or revocation of license, as appropriate d) Further action, as appropriate date, as mentioned previously, the Nuclear Regulatory
. To Commission has issued twenty-six (26) violations and SECOM has verbally been assured by Region III that civil penalties will be forthcoming. This is the first level of action (a). The second enforcement action the NRC has taken, as relates to step (b) in Table 2, was the issuance of a Confirmatory Action Letter on July 16, 1985 restricting the licensee to 5% of full operating power at Fermi 2. The letter was issued by Region III due to the July 2 inadvertent criticality incident when control rods were pulled out-of-sequence. Nine examples of violations of technical s peci f ica tions were identified in the evaluation of this event.
(Inspection Report No. 50-341/85040 (DRP) ) . The Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan commends the NRC for these warranted enforcement actions because of the history of serious problems at Fermi 2.
However, the Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan believes that because of the licensee wrongdoings and because of the ineffective and incompetently managed and operated licensee program, that the NRC must elevate the enforcement to the next level, a show cause order to revoke the license as requested in 10
, thic petitiGn undar 19 CFR 2.296 cnd 2.292.
The twenty-six (26) violations issued stand alone as enough evidence on whether elevated enforcement shool'd be instituted.
"Section 161 of the Atomic Energy Act authorizes the NRC to conduct inspections and investigations and to issue orders as may be necessary or desirable to promote the common defense and security or to protect health or to minimize danger to life or prope r ty" (10 CFR Part 2 Appendix C) .
The NRC actions to date have not provided the necessary assurance to the communities surrounding Fermi 2 that the problems at Fermi 2 have been fully resolved or will be. The licensee must be penalized to the next level of enforcement.
There should never be recurrence of such a major breakdown in licensee control to safely operate the plant. Indeed Fermi 2 should never be allowed to start up. Appendix C of 10 CFR
" Purposes of Enforcement", has clearly stated your mandate to take " prompt and vigorous enf orcement action" and that it "will be taken when dealing with licensees", as the Detroit Edison Company, "who do not achieve the necessary meticulous attention to detail and the high standard of compliance which the NRC expects of its licensees." (Pg 128)
The regulations further allow the NRC to issue orders in 4
addition to civil penalties (Pg 132) 10 CFR --- and revocation orders may be used when a licensee is unable to comply with NRC requirements, as has been the case with the licensee and as alledged in the SECOM Allegation #4. The operating history of 11
the licensea procontcd in part in thic petition hoo clocrly chewn that the licensee, the Detroit Edison Company, has been unable to comply with NRC requirements. In addition to the operational errors and poor regulatory performance mentioned in the petition, "the security organization has been unable to properly implemen t the provisions of the security plan as evidenced by the numerous violations identified by both Detroit Edison and the NRC" (December 24, 1985 Letter, Keppler to Jens) This gives additional support for revocation of the license.
The regulations also state that:
Orders are made effective immediately without prior opportunity for hearing whenever it is determined that the public health, interest, or safety so requires, or when the order is responding to a violation involving willfulness.
The term willfulness as used here embraces a spectrum of violations ranging from deliberate intent to violate or falsify to and including careless disregard for requirements. (10 CFR Pg 133 SECOM Allegation 93)
In addition, the licensee "will ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to show cause why the order should not be issued in the proposed manner." (10 CFR Pg 133) the latter is also included in 10 CFR Section 2.202, " Order to Show Cause," and which allows the NRC to:
institute proceedings to modify, suspend, or revoke a license or for such other action as may be proper by serving on the licensee an order to show cause which will (1) allege the violations with which the licensee is charged, or the potentially hazardous conditions or other facts deemed to be sufficient ground for the proposed action (10 CFR 2.202)
These regulations provide for the Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan's two requests set forth in this petition: proceedings to revoke the license and an order to show cause. The 12
- - - - - - , - - - . . , , . - - - . . - - - . 4- - ..,-----..,-.,,--n--- - - - -
.-----.-.-.-m.
, substantial safety issues raised by the NRC in its documento oc to the licensee history once again supports the requests as l
allowed in the aforementioned regulations. !
The SECOM Allegation 43 should be discussed in terms of the regulations. SECOM alleges that the twenty-six violations issued recently were willful, or showed careless disregard for requirements. As stated before the regulations allow for orders to be issued when a violation involves willfullness. When the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, " finds that the public health, safety, or interest so requires, or that the violation is willfull the notice of violation may be omitted and an order to show cause issued.' (10 CFR Section 2.202(c)) The public's interest in the alleged willful violations should be an additional impetus for the NRC to fulfill the SECOM requests for action.
Allegation #3 of wi11 fulness has its support detailed in the NRC Inspection Report mentioned prior to this and issued November 14, 1985 (Report No. 50-341/8 504 0 (DRP) ) which involved inspections on July 1 through October 15, 1985 and Management Meetings on July 23 and September 10, 1985. Further support is found in the January 3, 1986 Stevie DuPont, Region III memorandum on "LER Review of 1985 Fermi 2 LER's", also previously raised.
Some examples of the alleged willful violations and events at Fermi 2 include the following:
- 1) Out of Sequence Rod Pull / Inadvertent Criticality, (July 1, IY8TT - Licensee failed to adhere to the provisions of technical specification 6.8.la covering the startup of the r e.a c t o r . The Nuclear Production Organization did not pfovide the appropriate ~ supervision of activities nor was 13
the Nuclear Shift Supervicor cuc0Cofully dicchorging hic or Shif t Operations Advisor failed to duties. The SAO become involved in the resolution of short period alarms.
- 2) Control Room HVAC (July 1985) - The supply fan switch even was out-of-specTTTeation position for 27 shift turnovers, though a CRIS " dot" had been placed on the switch and the event entered into the equipment status file. These latter Subsequent two went unnoticed for 27 shift turnovers.
- reviews of the log either failed to note the entry 15 or failed NASS recognize significance (6 NSS turnovers, to turnovers, 27 NSO turnovers). The licensee also failed to evaluate the consequences of removing components from service.
Spray Room Cooler (July 1985) - The High
- 3) RCIC/ Core Pressure Core Injection (HPCI) had been inoperable from July RCIC and 11 - July 24 so that for sixteen hours the HPCI, Division I core spray systems were inoperable while the reactor was in the startup condition. The licensee violated Technical Specification 6.8.1.a - failed to review past log entries, failed to write a work order (PN-21) to de-energize the feeder breaker, the failure to observe for two cooler shift turnovers the out-of-position RCIC/ Core Spray room switch, and the licensee failed to evaluate the fan consequences of removing components from service (Limiting Conditions for Operations)
- 4) Cooling Tower Bypass Valve (July 26, 1985) NPF-43 License condition 2.c. (9) (d) wIs apparently violated. This valve. was closed and de-energized but the license requires it to be open and de-energized.. This affected the Division
. I Emergency Diesel GeneratorP, and all Division I emergency core cooling systems were inoperable including the core spray and residual heat removal systems. By chance the licensee complied with the Limiting Condition for Opera tion (LCO) as a' result of the failure of the South Reactor Feed Pump on July 23, 1985.
Hydrogen Recombiner - Work Order PN-21 269327, was 5) completed on June 20, 1985, by completing maintenance on the Division II hydrogen recombiner. The work order stated that post maintenance testing was required but the Nuclear Shift Supervisor signed the order of f withouth the leakage test having been done. The licensee did not take action as required in technical specification 3.0.3, exceeded the 30 day LCO limit, and did not place the plant in hot shutdown within six hours. The leakage rate was in excess of f allowable containment leakage.
- 6) Breach of Primary Containment Integrity - On September 2, 1985 a prTmary containment boundary valve (containment monitoring system) was discovered open and uncapped and had been so since June 20, 1985. The Nuclear Shift Supervisor was not informed for 39 hours4.513889e-4 days <br />0.0108 hours <br />6.448413e-5 weeks <br />1.48395e-5 months <br /> after the discovery. The 14
, licanaco foiled to maintain c:ntoinment intGgrity and did not follow the required technical specifications. The procedural documents for implementation failed to identify the required documents.
These are just a few examples supporting SECOM's Allegations, especially 3 and 4. Besides these violations, the eighty (80) Licensee Event Reports are filled with the licensee's willfullness and inability to follow NRC requirement. These include missed surveillances such as Rad / Chem unaware of out-of-service equipment, unavailabvle statusing to verify operability of equipment, inability to control operations such as controlling equipment and testing, inadequate understanding of duties such that the operations Staf f failed to perform required functions, failure to follow procedures, weakness in training of personnel, lack of restoration of equipment to service, extreme weakness in general knowledge of Instrument and Control personnel of their jobs and functions. (January 3, 1986 DuPont, Region III memorandum) These very serious examples of safety violations should prompt the immediate attention to the SECOM requests. The prevention of a serious accident must be guaranteed by the NRC taking elevated enforcement action.
The final SECOM Allegation 45, regarding the recently released operations improvement plan states that this plan will not provide the substantive changes needed to correct the serious breakdown of operations at the Fermi 2 nuclear plant. Indeed, it is our contention that the breakdown of operations has been an ongoing problem from the early 1970's as documented in the Michigan Public Service Commission Staff Report of February, 15
.. j
. 1984, Staff Investigatien of Enrica Forni 2 Nucl^9r Prw7r Project.
I On October 19, 1985 the Detroit Edison bompany issued its Reactor Opera tions Improvement Plan in a letter to Mr. James Keppler, Region III (VP-8 5-919 8 ) . Additional information regarding the plan was submitted on November 27, 1985 in letter VP-85-0219 and on January 29, 1986 the licensee issued its
" Response to Request for Information Pursuant to 19 CFR 59.54 (f)"
VP-86-9998. This is the licensee response to the December 24, 1985 Keppler letter asking for more information to allow the NRC to determine whether or not the Fermi 2 license should be modified, suspended, or revoked.
Detroit Edison claims in VP-85-9198 that the root causes of the Fermi 2 problems were due to " inefficient and administratively burdensome procedures". The licensee claims a commitment to excellence and that the corrective actions that are to be implemented will assure that operational events are behind them and will not recur. The licensee claims their analysis has identified the problem areas that needed to be resolved before performance could improve. The licensee states, "On the strength of this plan and our people, I firmly believe that our performance has already improved and will get even better".
It is unclear to SECOM how more management with the same people in charge, except for the recent replacement of Wayne Jens, Vice-President of Nuclear Operations, will improve the i
serious situation to the level of perfection that is needed to l l
16
. operate and maintain a safe nuclear plant. SECOM is not convinced that these changes which the Detroit Edison Company proposes can give the level of confidence necessary to operate this plant.
The assumption is made by the licensee that management can evaluste the situation and the problems accurately, that they know what they are doing. The record of operations at Fermi 2 clearly shows the opposite to be true. Even with their enthusiastic optimism for objective monitoring criteria, independent monitoring, reviews, and verification, the same ineffective organization will be providing the proposed changes.
The most recent plan VP-86-0008 of January 29, 1986 calls for the Development of a Nuclear Operations Improvement Plan to be reviewed by 'he c Independent Overview Committee of outside ex per ts and ultimately the Detroit Edison Board Nuclear Review Committee and Walter McCarthy, Chairman of the licensee board.
In addition, a Security Improvement Plan will be implemented. #
These plans are to address planning, accountability, attitude, communications, teamwork, follow-up, and training in the entire organization to " assure improved regulatory, operating, engineering, maintenance, and security procedures". The plan is to be initiated no later than May 1, 1986 and full implementation is to occur by July 1, 1986.
Walter McCarthy claims that new management, the plant o pe ra to rs , and support staff will provide for " demonstrated satisfactory pe r f o rma nce " . The plan contains few substantive changes and plant history supports SECOM's claim that this 17
. l:
company cOnnDt Operato cnd man g3 FcrCi 2 Cnd guarcntco thDt NRC laws and regulations will be followed in the future and that the public health and safety and the protection of the environment will not be jeopardized. This has not been the case since fuel loading March 20, 1985 and our allegation stands that the situation will not be substantively changed in the future.
The licensee has hired consultants since 1974 including the ,
Institute of Nuclear Power Operation, (1982-83), the Management Analysis Company (1979), Bechtel Power Corporation (1978),
Commonwealth Edison (1978), Daniel Construction Company (1974),
University of Texas / Department of Energy Study (1979), Stone &
Webster Engineering Consultants (1979), Cygna (1982-83), Duke Power Company (1984). In addition the Detroit Edison Company has formed its own internal audit programs and review committees, to make changes in operations and management (1978, 1979, 1980).
(Michigan Public Service commission Staff Report, 1984).
i According to the (MPSC) staff report of 1984, Edison's Project Management Organization was adopted early in the Fermi 2 project and its concept is widely used in the industry. The Staff report states that there has been a long history of problems at Fermi 2 and that the methods of operation have been problematic from the early stages of design and construction.
"The construction and planning activities needed strong and dynamic management" and "the project was stagnating due to weak and relaxed controls". (Pg 124) Especially significant from the history of th'.s plant, is that Detroit Edison's problems continue with " lack of attention to detail at all levels of the 18
organization" (Wayne Jens February 13, 1985 meeting with the NRC at Fermi 2). As early as 1974, the Daniel Construction Company Review found that Project Controls were found inadequate due to inadequate document control, a poor materials management system and overall lack of control in the reporting system. Under Quality Assurance major weaknesses were found in the organization make-up, inadequacy of QA - document control (Pg 121)
The Management Analysis Corporation's review in 1979 of the !
Fermi 2 project revealed that there was " inadequate planning and lack of communication". The Fermi 2 project was reorganized as a result of this review. Another review by INPO in 1982-83 criticized the licensee's " serious defects in the operator ;
training program, major weaknesses in radiation protection areas, inadequate staffing, and sloppy procedures and inefficient ;
testing". (Pg 263) This past history of problems, the i recommended and implemented changes of the opera tions and l management at Fermi 2 has shed light on the overall continuing ;
ineffectiveness the licensee is plagued with. If sixteen years of experience with numerous reviews have not helped the past problems how can the licensee today with its so-called "new i
, management structures" try to correct the similar and identical
! problems that just keep recurring?
1 SECOM firmly believes that there has been little done to assure the NRC and the public that the Detroit ' Edison Company can The Fermi 2 license should be revoked. It is imperative chhnge.
l Nuclear Regulatory Commission implement the SECOM that the U.S.
requests for action by instituting proceedings for revocation of l
19
and the issuance of a show cause order the Fermi 2 license demanding hearings.
This SECOM request for action is based on an analysis of documentation that starkly reveals a pattern of available oversight and neglect so deep and pervasive that only federal the health and safety of the citizens of action can protect Michigan.
Respectfully submitted,
&h Jennifer Puntenney 24229 Locust Farmington Hills, MI 48018 313/477-3441 b
i i
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29 l
I ;
l SAFE ENERGY COALITION OF MICHIGAN
) P.O. BCX 331 MOUROE, MICHIGAN 48161 FOR I!DfEDI ATE RELEASE j CONTACT: MARY J0!!NSTON 313-477-1670 )
1 JENNIFER PUNTENNEY l 313-477-3441 l 1 1
!!IC111CAN ENVIRON!! ENTAL GROUP ASKS NRC TO REVOKE FERMI 2 LICENSE IFD!EDI ATELY 1
!!0NROE, MICHICAN-March 12---Today, the Saf e Energy Coalition of Michigan (SECOM) appeared before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Washington, D.C. status review meeting of the Detroit Edison Company's Termi 2 nuclear power plant. The Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan demanded immediate action by the NRC on its request for revocation of the utility's operating license.
The SECO?! representative, Jennif er Puntenney, explained, "It is imperative that t he' l NRC take immediate action because the Fermi 2 nucicar power plant is a major 1
environmental disaster waiting to happen."
l Numerous safety events involving operational errors and degraded plant equipment
! have occurred at Termi 2 since Detroit Edison loaded nuclear fuel in March,1985.
The NRC's Region III issued twenty-six violatijns in January. According to the NRC, the events have been excessive and the violations identified demonstrated a major breakdown in the licensee's administrative controls to saf ely operate the plant.
The problems included failure to follow NRC requirements and procedures, f ailure to find the cause of safety events, failure to correct problems, weak training, and lack of knowledge and status of equipment and systems at the Fermi 2 nucicar i plant. According to the Detroit News, !! arch 11, 1986, a preliminary federal a
l 1 --more-- '
) l l
i report concluded that Detroit Edicen made folca statsminto in July to the NRC about an incident in which a control room operator improperly removed conrol rods from the reactor which lead to a premature chain reaction.
The SECOM spokeswoman, Jennifer Puntenney stated, "The recent tragedy of the space shuttle Challenger forces us to face Fermi 2's problems before it is too late.
Only the action of the NRC stands between the citizens of Michigan and a catastrophic accid en t ."
Construction of Fermi 2 began in 1969, thirty-five miles southeast of Detroit, Michigan. The original cost estimate was $229 million with commercial operation scheduled for 1974. The costs have risen to $3.75 billion with interest costing Detroit Edison $40 million a month. The eleven years of delays have been a result of problems ranging from: ineffective and incompetent management, faulty equip-ment, lack of skilled labor, poor quality control, design defects, financial diffics 'as. The nuclear plant has been shutdewn since October 10th for maintenance and equipment repairs.
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5 l
. e SISTERS. SERVANTS or THE IM M ACUI. ATE HE ART OF M ARY eso WEST Et.se AVENUE ,
MONRCE. MICHIG AN dtlet Testimony Before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 12, 1986 Chairmn and members of the Commissien, 3:y name is Sister Barbara Bacci, IH}l. I am a member of the Ccagregation of the Sisters, Servants of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, a religous community of women whose headquarters are located within the ten-mile radius of the Enrico Fermi II Nuclear Power Facility in Monroe, Michigan. I thank the Commission for the opportunity to address issues that concern many residents of Monroe as well as the Congregation. The issues of concern include:
(1) tne inadequate evacuation plan for the residents of Monroe County.
- ichigan; and (2) the harmful effects of on-site storage and/or transport of radioactive vastes on the environment and health of Monroe residents.
I cite these two issues for the folicwing reasons:
(1) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been charged with the responsibilit:- to assure and maintain the public health and safety of all persons who reside near a reacter site; (2) since July, 1985, a series of equipnent failures and human errors have increased concern. The most critical of these events were the following:
(1) premature criticality; (2) a license violation which shut off cooling water for an entire ECCS Division; (3) six tcchnical specifications limitin; condition of operation violations; (4) January. 1986. the NRC released a list of of twenty-six violations of safety and operational u _ _ _ _ __ _
._ e_
8 Testimony Before the NRC March 12, 1986 Page Two procedures that occurred between July and October, 1986; (5) March 9,1966, Mr. k' alter McCarthy, Chairman of the utility, said Detroit Edison will not ask the NRC to allow the plant to produce power again until he is convinced that human errors and equipment failures that have plagued it since last July, 1985 are cleared up.
For these reasons, there is justified concern for the health and safety of the surrounding population. ,
Our first concerr. is that the emergency preparedness plan at present is inadequate. One aspect of the plan,in particular,is the problem of evacuating residents in several congregate care f acilities which includes the IK31 Motherhouse, home for over three hundred retired and infirm Sisters. It is important to note that all of the congregate care facilities are located within the same evacuation sector. Thus, if a p.A. 390 was implemented, all of these facilities (six) would need to be promptly evacuated. The Michigan Department of Public Health has not identified to date the appropriate transportation resources for the many (over 470) wheel-chair bound residents. A safe evacuation of all residents at this time appears virtually impossibla for two reasons: ,
first, because of an inadequate number of appropriate conveyances to accomodate the special needs of the em.y residents; and second, because it is impossible to predict or promise that human error will not occur in the midst of an actual P. A. 390.
For example, the NRC cited that the personnel in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) overlooked a forecast wind shift e
m J
. Te.stimony Before the NRC March 12, 1986 Page Three resulting in evacuating the wrong areas in the October 2, 1985 mock emergency drill. The Office of Civil Preparedness (OCP )
intends to implement a plan which will meet the needs of d
" worst case" disaster.
The Department of Energy conducted by Sandia Labs in 1982 of the " worst case" estimates, revealed that for the five million people within fifty miles of Fermi II, the following events would occur (1) 8,000 early radiation induced deaths (2) 13,000 cancer deaths (3) 340,000 injuries:
(4) $135 billion in property damage.
In the midst of such staggering statistics, it seems impossible for the present evacuation plan to meet the serious effects of a
" worst case" accident.
The second area of concern is the potentially lethal dangers of on-site storage and/or transport of radioactive materials.
A lot of money has been spent by the Department of Energy ($1 million annually) rescarching permanent waste disposal sites. Although the NRC is confident that permanent sites will be ready between 2,006-2,009, in the interim nuclear waste will stay where it is produced or it will be transported to another facility. The temporary storage of low-level waste will be viewed as a " solution" rather than an interim measure. Given the difficulty-in determining precisely when new disposal facilities will be available, there is no assurance as to when stored waste will be removed to permanent sites. The environmental and social implications of the nucicar waste problem are tremendous: Fermi II will generato thirty metric tons of high-level radioactive vastes each year. One of the most dangerous by-products is plutonium, which is letha11y toxic-for 250,000 years. The transporting of such lethal toxins seriously threatens the lives of virtually every American citizen. The nuclear waste problem is faced with many technical, political, and institutional concerns which must be addressed. Dumping nuclear waste in the backyards of communities like Monroe is not the solution.
We bring these issues before the Commission because of our continued concern about the protection of human life and about the growing stockpiles of radioactive waste which will become our legacy.
The re fo re , for the reaaons already stated, it would be socially irresponsible for the NRC to license,at this time, nuclear power plants whlie issues such as emergency preparedness and nuclea r waste remain unresolved. The Commission will be doing the whole nation a favor. What the country owes communities such as Monroe, Michigan, is to carry out the disposal procram correctly. The best technology must be employed. Safety must not be compromised. Candid information must be sha red. Posterity must be protected.
Respectfully submitted,
))yk, ha,d<tscG L<*d5 AU Sister Barbara Bacci, IHM
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