ML20237K263

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Transcript of Ofc of Investigations Investigative Interview of Wh Jens on 850723 in Glen Ellyn,Il Re 850702 Reactor Operator Error at Plant.Pp 1-21
ML20237K263
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Issue date: 07/23/1985
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l I-OR'GINAL l UN11ED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l l

l IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NO:  ;

0FFICE OF INVESTIGATION INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW i

CLOSED i

I 4

LOCATION: GLEN ELLYN, IL PAGES: 1 - 21 l

, 23, 1985 DATE:

. . . . (

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1 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

M a ters 444 rth Capitol Stztet Washington, D.C 20001 (202)347-3 7 9 {8-] j' y 8708270121 870819 NATIONWIDE COW i 1~~

PDR F01A f PUNTENN86-245 PDR ( ~'g. y }; ,

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1 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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-- 2

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1 3 l IN THE MATTER OF: Investigative Interview, l 4 Closed Meeting. ]

5 INTERVIEW OF: Wayne H. Jens. l 6  :

7 I 1

8 Report of proceedings taken at the interview in j l

9 the above-entitled cause on Tuesday, July 23, 1985, l 10 at 799 Roosevelt Road, Glen Ellyn, Illinois. I

)'

11 1

1 12 , i PRESENT: )

( 13 MR. JAMES N. KALKMAN, Investigator l 14 MR. TERRANCE LANG, Reactor Engineer  !

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l 15 Office of Investigations Field Office Region III 16 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137; 17 I' MR. PETER A. MARQUARDT, General Attorney 18 Detroit / Edison 200 Second Avenue 19 Detroit, Michigan 48226.

20 21 Glen Ellyn, Illinois 22 July 23, 1985 23

,- - 24 25 1

k 1 MR. KALKMAN: For the record, this is an i

- - 2 interview with Dr. Wayne'Jens, J-e-n-s, who is i

3 employed by Detroit Edison Company. The location 4 .of this interview is NRC Region III, Glen Ellyn, ,

5 Illinois. Present at the interview are Mr.'Jens; I i

6 Detroit Edison general attorney Mr. Marquardt; NRC f i

7 reactor engineer Terrance Lang; and NRC investigator ]

d 8 James Kalkman. As agreed, this interview is being 9 transcribed by agreement by court reporter Lisa l 10 Selepa. The subject matter of this interview 11 concerns a reactor operator error at the Fermi II 12 Power Station on July 2nd, 1985.

I 1 13 Mr. Jens, would you please stand and

)

l 14 raise your right hand.

15 (Witness sworn.)

16 WAYNE H JENS, 17 called as a witness herein, having been first duly 18 sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

19 EXAMINATION j 20 BY l

21 MR. KALKMAN:

22 Q. What is your capacity with Detroit Edison?

23 A. I'm vice president of nuclear operations.

-- 24 Q. And how long have you been employed in that 25 capacity?

2

1 A. Sinco.lato 1979._

e 2 O. 'Have you been employed or worked.at any 3 other nuclear facility?

4 A. Yes, at Fermi I.

5 O. So you've spent a few years with Detroit 6 Edison?

7 A. I'm a full time --

I was a full-time 8 Detroit Edison employee _since 1972; although I'was 9- on the payroll since 1964, but on loan to Atomic 10 Power Development Associates.

11 And prior to that, from 1957 to 1964, 12 I was an APB employee, Atomic Power Development. I 13 Q. Could you relate for us the --

your first

( .

14 recollection of the rod pull error, operator. error i 15 incident that occurred on July 1 s t' or 2nd of '857 l 16 A. As I recall, and again, I a:m not 100 17 percent certain, that on July 3rd Bob Lenart 18 mentioned it to me as I was leaving his office area.

19 He indicated he had several things to tell me, one 20 was this; and I can't recall what the other item was.

21 O. Do you remember the discussion?

22 A. It was very brief. He just mentioned that 23 the reactor operator had made a mistake in pulling

,-- 24 some rods, that was one item, and he felt there was 25 a fuss being made whether or not criticality had I 3 l M" er mnh e

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l' been achieved; and there was argument between the j

' 1

-- 2 operating group .and the reactor engineers.

j 3 O. How did you --

how did you come away from 1

4 that discussion,.what was your perception?

l 5- A. I guess I was -- he impressed upon me the l

l 6 arguments that were going on, and I think in my own 7 mind I was not impressed particularly with what he 8 said, that it was a major error that had been 9 committed. In other words --

I didn't recall the 10 number of rods that had been mispulled and how far 11 they had been notched out.

12 Q. Did you give any advice to Mr. Lenart? i i

[ 13 A. No.

14 O. Any direction?

15 A. No.

16 Q. So if you had been asked right after that 17 discussion whether the plant had gone critical 18 during the rod pull incident, what would you have

'l 19 responded? J l

20 A. Probably not, but that it wasn't 100 f

l 21 percent clear.

22 O. There was some review taking place?

23 A. Uh-huh.

c- 24 O. Did the incident trigger anything in,your 25 mind as far as a significant enough event or j i

4

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4 1 incident to report the incident to the NRC7  ;

i 2 A. No. Normally that's not a function that I l i 3 feel I have to take. Up to the present time the 1

4 plant has been doing that very capably. j 5 O. Is there --

I didn't ask anyone else this, 6 but is there a DECO procedure on who the responsible 7 corporate officer is for reporting deficiencies or 8 nonconformances to the NRC under Part 21, Part 21 9 Deportability?

10 A. There is a compilation of directives and 11 procedures that the licensing engineer put together 12 that identifies who is responsible for these type of ,

1 1

13 activities. '

14 0 Are you the responsible corporate officer? l l

15 A. Ultimately I would be, clearly; but it's 16 more or less delegated down to plant superintendent 17 and shift supervisor.

18 O. I understand.

19 A. In other words, if they are deficient, I

~~

20 feel I am responsible.

21 O. But normally there is a single responsible 22 corporate officer who is held --

who's responsible 23 for reporting a Part 21 issue.

,i- - 24 A. In Part 21 that would be me, according to 25 those procedures.

5

- i

7.

1 O. Not that this is a --

my curiousity --

2 A. Part 21 --

I was little confused. Part 21 1

3 ultimately comes to me.

4 0 Did you at any time prior to the Commission 5 meeting become aware of the fact that the plant had 6 indeed gone critical as a result of the --

the July 7 let or 2nd rod pull incident?

8 A. Not to my recollection.

9 o. When did in fact you become aware --

10 A. I was made partially aware of that in a i i

11 phone call from Leo Lessor on Saturday. Prior to  !

l l

12 the phone call from Ed Greenman, it was kind of a 13 key indicent --

that I had talked to Frank Agosti 14 prior to his going on vacation, that I planned to 15 call Leo to talk to him about general conditions in 16 the plant. And what I was mainly interested in 17 seeking was that --

I had talked to Leo occasionally, 18 and I don't like to do it very often because he's 19 actually a consultant to the superintendent.

20 But one of my conversations must have 21 been months ago. He mentioned he didn't feel 22 engineering was responsive enough to the problems in 23 the plant. And I thought that recently the 23 engineering people were really responding very well.

25 So I wanted to talk to him, and I felt 6

6 e met W

--mm_ ._____m__

1 I better talk to Frank about that before I did it; I

- - 2 and that I would also tell Bob Lenart that I was 3 going to do it. And so it was a key incident that 4 Leo called me on Saturday indicating that he'd like 5 to talk to me. And when he called, he indicated 6 that about, he said about a couple incidents in the 7 plant. And two of the incident that I was 8 particularly interested in speaking to him about, 9 which Bob had mentioned to me at the time, one was i

10 the rod pull. And he said, " Yeah, that was one of i 11 the them." And I said, "Well, that's an incident I l I

12 was concerned about because of operator error."

( 13 And he said, "What about criticality?"

14 And I said, "Well, it didn't go critical, did it?"

15 And he said, "Well, you better find out more about 16 that." So that was one of them, and the other one 17 was the incident that occurred just prior to the 18 Commission meeting, which was the water level trip.

19 And so I set up a meeting on Monday 20 with him; but before I could have the meeting, Ed 21 Greenman called me and asked me personally to 4 22 investigate the rod withdrawal incident, which I 23 launched into at that time.

l ,--- 24 And in doing that I called Leo plus l 25 Bob over to the office, and so I had part of my k 7

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d 1 meeting with him.

2 O.

You weren't aware of the fact that Leo had

. - i 3 already or was in the process of conducting an 4 investigation?

i 5 A. Well, I was, after I called Bob and found 6 out that Leo was investigating. And that was one of 7

the reasons he probably talked to m? on Saturday.  !

8 But that was prior --

or after the Commission ' '

9  !

hearing. I've got to remember the actual --

see if 10 k I can get the date so you'll have that.

11 It would have been July 13 when he I 12 called me, and Ed Greenman called me on July 15. )

i 13 0 Did you know that --

before the Commission I 14 meeting, that one of the agenda items at the 15 Commission meeting was operator error?

16 A. Could you repeat the question, please.

17 Q. Did you know before the Commission meeting 18 that one of the agenda items at the Commission 19 hearing for licensing was going to be operator error  ;

j 20 at Fermi? l l

21 A. Well, about one hour before --

and it was a l 1

22 number of items that were discussed. What had 23 happened was that Burt Davis and -

let me think.  !

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24 Joe Youngblood was in the meeting. I 25 I'm just trying to remember who 1

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I replaced Harold Benton (phonetic).

- - 2 O. Jim Taylor?

3 A. No. I know him, I just can't remember his 4 name. He was in the meeting. And what they wanted 5 to do was go over a rough outline of what they were 6 proposing to say at the briefing one hour later to 7 see if we had any comments.

8 And operator error was one of those 9 that was discussed. Specifically, again, I can't 10 recall the number at the time. It didn't make much 11 of an impression on me at the time, but'it'was one 12 of the items.

[_ 13 O. Did you know that the NRC_was going to --

14 or that Mr. Davis was going to brief the Commission F i l 15 on the incident that occurred the night before the j l

i 16 Commission hearing, the water level. incident? l 17 A. Now, what you're talking about'is kind of --

18 I don't remember that that was a specific item. I 19 think it was more of how many operator errors were 20 encountered. I guess I can't recall that_they 21 discussed that. But I do remember once the briefing 22 started, that Commissioner Zeck brought that 23 particular item up. And again I'm trying to 24

--- remember how many operator errors they were talking 25 about. It was something like two.

9 T

____________________-O

1 O. It's a very small number, I think.

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-- 2 A. Right.

3 O. I think the NRC was fairly complimentary in 4 the --

5 A. Right.

1 6 0 -- operations of Fermi.

7 A. But again, how many were reported -- if you  ;

8 talk about how many operator errors there are, there i

9 are a lot of operator errors. As I-mentioned i

10 downstairs today, you know, to get operator errors 11 Giuch below one percent is very, very difficult. . )

12 You have to use other devices to do-I 13 that, and what you have to get is independent 14 verification, rod worth minimizer blocking, movements, 15 whatever. And so I think to take that out of 16 context, how many operator errore are there, is not 17 something easy to handle.

18 O. If you're talking about significant 19 operator errors --

I am wondering if you would 20 categorize the rod pull incident with -- is that any 21 more or less significant than what Commissioner Zeck 22 brought up, the water level incident?

23 A. Had I, I guess, fully understood the fact 24 that we pulled 11 rods, you know, to get to the 1

25 criticality point in error -- today that's

10.  ;
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I significant to me. I didn't know that at the time.

, -- 2 All I know was that the operator had .

3 got close to critical through a rod manipulation 4 that was incorrect. I am not even sure I would have 5 appreciated that rods were manipulating. It could 6 have been one4 So I don't know if that would be 7 significant to me with my bankground.

8 I think to -- my background came out 9 of Fermi I. It wouldn't have been significant 10 there. I think the water reactor experience makes 11 it much more significant main 3y because of the worth 12 of --

remember, you 't. a v e a lot of reactivity worth 13 in all of the rods, so you have to be careful.

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14 But take something like Fermi I, there j 15 was less in the dollar in the two operating rods --

16 manipulating that rod in error is not as significant.

17 So it's a matter of context, the background of the i

18 person that's evaluating it, how much information he 1 19 has.

20 O. Well, do you think that if the Commission 21 had the information, the commissioners had the 22 information about the inadvertent criticality 23 incident, that it would have affected their r- 24 licensing decision --

25 A. I don't know.

11

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at the time? <

l. - 2 A. I don't know how to answer that because 3 it's a subjective kind of a question.

4 O. Sure it is. .

5 A. In view of the way people have put the 6 importance on it today in today's environment, yeah.

l l

7 Today it would have have had an effect.

8 I never expected the kind of' reaction 'I 9 we're getting to the incident.

10 0 Let me ask you a more direct question. ,

11 Was there a co ris cio u's effort on anyone's '

12 part that you're aware <of to keep the NRC or the

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l 13 commissioners from becoming, fully. aware of the 1 :,

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14 inadvertent criticality prior'to li enbing at Fermi, f

15 full power libensing? <

,} , 5'l J g 16 A. No, not in the way you' phrase the question..  ;

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i 17 O. Was there in some other way that I d i d ri ',t /

. 1 18 phrase? J' 1 19 A. Well, again, I mean I d$n't knoM o,f any.

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20 '0.,, You're not. ja ware of --

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t at l3 21 A' . 4 No, I ' m nc,t t 'awa r e of anybo'dy s9ppressing

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c- 24 was asked'tt.o compile some statistics for th'e

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25 commissiori briefing relating tAi operator -4 relating

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I to operator error.

- - 2 .

Are you aware of that?

3 A. I don't believe I am. I can't recall it.

4 O. At any time during the Commission hearing, 5 in any of the discussions about operator error or.

6 the the incident, the water level incident that j 7 occurred the day before the hearing, did this other 4 i

1

! 8 matter come to your mind? i j

l 9 '

A. No, it didn't come to my mind or did t

10 anybody indicate to me that it came to their mind. l 11 O. What was your understanding or what is your i I

12 understanding of the rod worth minimizer system in j

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13 relation to this rod pull incident?

14 Was it your understanding --

do you l!

il 15 know the system well enough to know it would have or {

16 should have prevented this incident?

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17 A. Are you --

are you asking whether I know it i i

18 now or I knew it some time ago?

19 O. In either case.

f 20 A. Well, I didn't know much about the e 21 limitations of it until the last week; 's o in that 22 sense it didn't have much significance to me. I 23 guess at the present time in the sense of what it's

-- 24 intended to be used for fundamentally, I don't think 25 it is a significant item.

13 6

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t 1 In view of the apparent sensitivity

- - 2 that this particular. situation has, it's unfortunate 3 that it wasn't programmed to protect the operators J

l 4 from getting into this kind of difficulty. I I

5 And if people knew of the sensitivity 1 i

6 of this at the time, they should have done something I 7 to account for the fact that it wasn't protecting l l

8 against this and employed independent verification, 9 which is a directive that I have out to all the 10 people.

11 Q. Speaking of the sensitivity of this issue 12 at the present time, wouldn't you think that if the 13 NRC had --

if the resident inrpectors had been fully 14 aware of this incident when it occurred, that they 15 may have had some involvement or some contact with 16 yourself relating to this incident?

17 A. Yeah, I guess --

state the question over 18 again.

19 Q. Based on your working relationship with Mr.

20 Byron and Mr. Parker --

21 A. Okay. l 22 O. --

and what you know now of how the NRC

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l 23 perceives this incident, wouldn't it seem reasonable 24 that if --

assuming Mr. Byron and Mr. Parker did not l l

25 understand the issue when it occurred for whatever j 14 1 1

i a

. i 1 reason, miscommunicati'on, if they had understood the

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-- 2 significance of the problem, don't you think they 3 would have been more -- there would have been more 4 involvement on their part with yourself or with'the 5 corrective actions -- which would lead one -- lead '

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6 me to believe that the NRC was not fully aware of i

7 the incident.

8 MR. MARQUARDT: I guess'I only have a problem --

~l 9 there's about three different questions strung .q 1

10 together with a couple of assumptions.

11 THE WITNESS: I still have trouble with the l

1 12 question. Can you simplify it into single items?

l( 13 MR. KALKMAN: O. Let me break it down. I 14 MR. LANG: Maybe I can help you out.

l 15 How did you perceive the NRC, meaning 16 like Paul Byron and Mike --

17 MR. KALKMAN: Parker.

18 MR. LANG: --

Parker.

19 How did you perceive them to be aware 20 of the situation? In other words, did you think l

21 they took it seriously?

22 THE WITNESS: Well, until the last week, I was 23 unaware of the fact that Gregg had discussed it with r-- 24 them. I mean until I --

until today I was unaware 25 of the details of that conversation which came out 15

___________._____m_________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _

1 today in the presentation when Gregg indicated that

(

-- 2 he expressed --

made the kind of statement he did to 3 Mike Parker about the seriousness that-he viewed the 4 situation. That was news to me.

5 And I guess under those circumstances l

6 I would have expected No. 1, that'they wou.1d have 7 had made a greater issue of it with me; and No. 2, 8 that either of the residents would have made an 9 issue of it with me. If that's --

and if'that --

10 they probably would have --

t i

l 11 MR. KALKMAN: O. The way I understand it, I'm '

i l

12 assuming that had Mike Parker or Paul Byron been

( 13 fully aware of this incident, they would have 14 brought it to your attention, which leads me to 15 believe that they were not notified --

I 16 A. I wouldn't --

I don't come to that 17 conclusion. There are several other options there-18 that, you know, that you would have to be thoroughly 19 familiar with. No. 1, were they so occupied with 1

20 other activities that they were not fully impressed 1 21 with what Gregg told them; and No. 2, were they 22 under some pressure to not bring up matters of this 23 kind. So I'm not --

I'm not prepared to'say that ,

.-- 24 you-know, they're going to react certain ways.

25 There could be other --

other options there.

16

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l 1 O. What type of pressure would they

- 2 experiencing not to bring up a plant problem? -

I 3 A. Well, I just don't know what kind of j 4 pressures they're put under --

5 O. Well, licensing of Fermi should not be the 6 resident inspector's interest. It should be safe 1

7 operation of the plant. I i 8 A. I agree. I mean I'm not implying anything 9 by my inference. On the other hand, I don't think l

10 that you could infer what you did either, you know. )

l l 11 There's too many possibilities out there I think 12 under normal circumstances. -

13 I would have expected out of -- now, I i

14 don't have too much to do with Mike Parker; I mean Ji 15 he very seldom would bring anything to my office.

16 Paul Byron, on the other hand, does on many.

17 occasions. So under normal circumstances, yes, I 18 would think that they would have brought that to my 19 attention, asked me what am I doing about that, j 20 That would be the way it.would come 21 into me from Paul; that did not happen, but there 22 could be circumstances that would have prevented  ;

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23 that.

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~- 24 Q. Well, just f p o,m our discussion here today,  ;

25 I don't get the impression that you felt this was a 17

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_______.__________J

1 very significant incident, not from the way it was

.- 2 related to you.

3 A. That's right. That's certainly correct.

4 No one expressed the level of concern about it that 5 I now think they should have. I mentioned 6 downstairs, however, that there was tremendous 7 pressure put on us and the residents to investigate 8 Save Team activities, not necessarily from you, you 9 know, from your office, but in general.

10 And I had to -- it was a decision I 11 made, but I was asked to do whatever I could to get 12 that investigated. And so I took the best man I h a d ,'

13

( Mr. Agosti, and said, "You're going to spend full 14 time doing that until it's done."

15 And he did that and --

I don't know --

16 that had no effect, I don't think, on this 17 particular event. But I also know that Mike Parker 18 was spending full time on that activity and under 19 pressure to get it done by a certain time, which we 20 did. And Paul was not on the site very much during 21 this period of time.

22 Q. Did you ever relate this incident to Mr.

23 Heidel or anyone in the management chain above you?

24 A. Yes, but I can't recall exactly when. I 25 know I related the call from Mr. Greenman. Whether 18

___--_..m_ _ _ - . _ . - - . . - . . .

1 I indicated anything to him about Bob Lenart's

-- 2 comment to me on the 3rd, I don't remember.

3 And I probably didn't because I wasn't 4 really --

I didn't feel it was that important at i

S that time. j 6 O. When you talke.d to Mr. Lenart on or about l

j l

7 July 3rd about relate --

relating to this issue, did 8 he indicate that there may be a public concern about 9 this issue or you may be contacted if the 10 information were to get out of the --

out of Detroit 11 Edison to the newspaper or intervener group, that 12 you may be -- you should be prepared to -- prepared 13 to comment on the issue?

(

14 A. No, I don't think he would have --

I don't 15 think he would have indicated that, although he may 16 have expressed some concern about whether 17 criticality had occurred or not; and that's why he 18 wanted to make sure that whatever the arguments were 19 between the two, that the matter was settled, 20 because that --

and I don't recall it, but it could 21 have entered his conversation that -- whether it's 22 critical or not col 1d be a public affairs issue.

23 Again, I have a vague recollection

-- 24 that something like that may have occurred.

25 O. Based on that comment, did you ever see --

19

- - - a

4 1 feel the necessity to get back with Mr. Lenart to 2 find out how the problem resolved, was resolved?

3 A. No. What I did do, I talked to the head of 1

4 our nuclear engineering department and I asked him ,

l 5 to see if he could get the matter resolved because I l

6 the reactor engineer reported to him.

7 I asked him to make sure that the 1

'i 8 people weren't talking about an issue like the j 9 angels dancing on a head of a pin, whether it was a l

10 trivial issue or whether it was significant.

l 11 But I never heard back on that either, 12 and in retrospect I probably should have followed up i 13 more on the matter.

14 O. Who was tha nuclear engineering person? j 15 A. Bill Colbert.

1 16 O. Colbert? '

17 A. Colbert.

l 18 MR. LANG: How does he connect or interface with 19 Hari Arora?

20 THE WITNESS: The way we were organized at that 21 time, that's before we received the full power 22 license, we made on organizational change. But the 23 reactor engineers reported to nuclear engineering.

.- -- 24 And then on a day do day basis --

it.was very 25 similar to the STA's. STA's report to nuclear 20 u_______.__________ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _

l I

1 engineering and are assigned to the shift.

(

. - 2 MR. LANG: Okay.

3 THE WITNESS: So that it's the responsibility of 4 nuclear engineering to train the reactor engineers, l 5 to make sure that they're qualified for what their.

I 6 job is, then assign them to'the shift. .l l

Then they take day to day directives

_7 8 from the shift supervisor.

! 9 MR. KALKMAN: Do you have anything else?

l 10 MR. LANG: No.

11 MR. KALKMAN: Mr. Jens, have I or any other NRC.

. 12 representative here threatened you in any way or I 13 l (_ offered you any reward in return for this s t a t em erit ?

14 THE WITNESS: No.

s 1 15 MR. KALKMAN: Have you given- this statement-1 16 freely an voluntarily? i 17 THE WITNESS: Yes, I have.

18 MR. KALKMAN: Is there anything further you care 19 to add for the record?

20 THE WITNESS: No, I don't.

21 MR. KALKMAN: Okay. Thank you very much.

22 l

23 iq 24

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L____._.______________.--- _ . - . _ _ _ _ _

i NO PAGE NUMBER l

CERTIFICATE OF' OFFICIAL' REPORTER I i

i l j

I>

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the matter of: ,

NAME OF PROCEEDING: OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW CLOSED 1

i DOCKET NO.:

1 I

1 1 1

l PLACE: GLEN ELLYN, IL l i

K DATE: . Tuesday, July 23, 1985 * '

) \

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear d Regulatory Commission.

1 (siet) s - / ,Wa (TYPED)

Lisa Jo.Selepa  !

Official Reporter Sullivan Reporting' Company Reporter's Affiliation l

l 4

,4 m.

_ _ _ _____ ____ _ - - - - - - - - - - -

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