ML20202C795
| ML20202C795 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 07/07/1986 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8607110404 | |
| Download: ML20202C795 (110) | |
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UNITED a - SA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter of:
COMMISSION MEETING Discussion /Possible Vote on Fermi Restart Docket No.
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Location: Washington, D. C.
Date: Monday, July 7, 1986 Pages: 1 - 93 ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES Court Reporters 1625 I St., N.W.
Suite 921 06071104o Washington, D.C. 20006 07 (202) 293-3950 pff, 710CFR PDR l
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1 D 1 SCLA 1 MER 2
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5 6 This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the 7 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on e 7/07/86 . In the Commission's office at 1717 H Street, 9 N.W., Washington, D.C. The meeting was open to public 10 attendance and observation. This transcript has not been 11 reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain 12 inaccuracies.
18 The transcript is intended solely for general 14 informational purposes. As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is 15 not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the 16 matters discussed. Expressions of opinion in this transcript 17 do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs. No i
18 pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in 19 any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement 20 or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may
- 21 authorize.
22 23 24 25
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1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
, ' -s 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 DISCUSSION /POSSIBLE VOTE ON FERMI RESTART 4 (Public Meeting) 5 -
- 6 MONDAY, JULY 7, 1986 7 , Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8 1717 H Street, N.W.
9 Washington, D.C.
10 The Commission met, pursuant to Notice, at
! 11 2:05 p.m.
12 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
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13 LANDO W. ZECH, JR., Chairman of the Commission 14 JAMES K. ASSELSTINE, Commissioner 15 THOMAS M. ROBERTS, Commissioner 16 FREDERICK M. BERNTHAL, Commissioner i
17 STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT COMMISSION TABLE:
1 18 S. Chilk W. Parler 19 V. Stello J. Keppler
! 20 R. Vollmer J. Taylor 21 J. Calhoun W. McCarthy 22 R. Sylvia M. Keegan 23 R. Petticrew J. Eckert i 24 AUDIENCE SPEAKERS:
i 25 D. Lynch E. Greenman l
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1 PROCEEDINGS m
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Good afternoon, ladies and 3 gentlemen. The purpose of the meeting today is for the 4 Commission to be briefed on the status of the Detroit Edison 5 efforts to comply with actions required prior to an NRC 6 decision to permit the Licensee to proceed with testing 7 preparatory to power ascension and full power operation.
8 We will be briefed today by the NRC Staff and by 9 senior management from Detroit Edison and their Independent 10 Oversight Committee; a representative from the Safe Energy 11 Coalition of Michigan; and Monroe City-County officials.
12 The operating license for Fermi Unit 2, which 13 permitted fuel loading and low power testing, was issued on 14 March 20th, 1985. The Commission voted to issue a full power 15 license for Fermi Unit 2 on July 10th, 1985. The Commission 16 later learned that premature criticality due to a rod pull 17 incident occurred on July 2nd, 1985. Following this incident, 18 the plant has remained in a shutdown condition for maintenance 19 and for installation of NRC required safety equipment, 20 pursuant to an NRC confirmatory action letter of July 16th, 21 1985 in which Detroit Edison agreed not to operate above 5 22 percent power, and a 10 CFR 50.54 (F) letter of December 24th, 23 1985.
24 Authorization for higher or, in fact, any power 25 levels will be given only when and if the NRC is satisfied l
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3 1 that the utility has adequately dealt with the issues
,.m 2 contained in NRC's confirmatory action letter and the 10 CFR 3 50.54(F) letter.
4 During the briefing today, I ask that my fellow 5 Commissioners identify any additional concerns that they feel 6 need to be addressed by the Licensee or the staff. I believe 7 that the Commission should be kept fully informed on the 8 status of the NRC Staff's continuing evaluation of the Detroit 9 Edison's preparation for restart of the Fermi Unit 2 reactor.
10 At the conclusion of today's meeting, I will pose 11 the following question to my fellow commissioners: Based on 12 the conditions imposed in the recent enforcement action, the 13 staff's planned involvement in oversight and the Licensee's
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14 Performance Improvement Program, do you endorse a decision by 15 the staff to allow the restart of Fermi-2 when the staff 16 determines that they are satisfied that the Licensee and the 17 plant are ready for, restart?
18 It appears to me that we have a full agenda on this 19 important matter today. I would like to ask the presenters to 20 do their best to adhere to the prescribed times allotted for 21 their presentations. My review of the staff's presentation 22 leads me to believe that the latter part of the presentation 23 will answer many questions that the Commissioners may have. I 24 would respectfully request that we keep our interruptions to a 25 minimum.
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4 1 Having given that brief background, do any of my
,m c 2 fellow commissioners have any opening remarks?
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Just a couple of brief 4 points, Lando. I would like to ask the staff as they go 5 through particularly the major problem areas, if they could 6 start off by just highlighting -- both to refresh our memory 7 and to refresh the memories of those in the audience -- what 8 the problem is, how it came to our attention and relevant 9 ' background information. I think we touched on that on a few 10 of these back in March, but I think it would be useful to sort 11 of highlight that at the start of each one.
12 The second point I would make I think is a broader 13 question that perhaps we could turn to after the staff's 14 presentation, and that is: how did so many of these things 15 occur? And I'm thinking in particular of the management 16 problems without us being really aware of it or sensitive to 17 it before we issued.this plant a full power license last year.
18 I went back this morning and once again re-read some 19 of the things that I, among other commissioners, said about 20 this utility last year, and. apart from being a fairly humbling 21 experience the message that came through in my own mind was 22 that we sure missed the boat on a lot of these things. And I 23 would like to explore that issue a bit at the end of the 24 staff's presentation on why we failed to pick up some of these 25 things as well.
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5 1 Those are the only comments I have.
. 2 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Thank you. Anyone else?
3 (No response.]
4 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Mr. Stello, would you please 5 proceed?
f 6 MR. STELLO: Our intent today is to very quickly 7 review for you the history of the Fermi problems, the status 8 and then clearly identify those things that we need to finish 9 before we would be prepared to allow the plant to start up.
10 . I have heard the request of Commissioner i 11 Asselstine. We will do our best to attempt to respond to 12 those kinds of issues, but I do believe if we are going to ask 13 for an examination of the history and try to determine what it 14 is that we did and didn't do as well as we ought to, that that
. 15 perhaps ought to have more thoughtful consideration than we'd 16 be able to give it here at the table. And I'll listen 17 carefully and I'd like at least the opportunity at the 18 conclusion to decide if we really need to go back and review
- 19 that history -- maybe we ought to do that more deliberately 20 and carefully rather than try to do it in an ad hoc fashion.
l 21 I'll ask Mr. Keppler to lead us through the 22 presentation. You have copies of the viewgraphs that will be 23 used, and I assume there were in fact enough at the back of 24 the room so that everyone got a copy.
25 [ Slide.]
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6 1 MR. KEPPLER: Thank you, Mr. Stello. My briefing m
2 today will cover very briefly the history of what has 3 happened. I want to spend a fair amount of time on the 4 problems and corrective actions that have taken place, and 5 then I will summarize the status of other issues and identify 6 the major items remaining to be completed before the staff is 7 prepared to authorize restart of the reactor.
8 [ Slide.] ,
9 Very briefly, the low power license was issued on 10 March 20th, and as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the premature 11 criticality event took place just a little over a year ago.
12 The Commission met on July 10th, 1985 and a full power license 13 was granted by the staff following the Commission meeting; the 14 full power license granted on July 15th. At that time, I 15 learned of the premature criticality event and took action to 16 put a hold on plant operations above 5 percent power at that 17 time until the matter could be investigated by the Office of 18 Investigations.
19 After July 15th, the plant operated from zero power 20 up to five percent power, and during those following months, I 21 numerous operating errors occurred, and that led to a further 22 reluctance on the part of the staff to see the plant go above 23 5 percent power because we had felt the utility had not 24 demonstrated the capability to proceed.
25 That resulted in a plan of action by Detroit Edison
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7 1 Company aimed at improving plant performance, and that plan 1
s 2 was submitted to us in October of 1985. But before the plan 3 could be demonstrated how well it was working, the utility 4 went into a planned outage to complete work committed to 5 previously at the time of licensing in the area of fire 6 protection equipment qualification.
7 And that outage commenced on October 11, and during 8 that outage more problems were encountered that reflected 9 adversely on the hardware of the plant, it reflected adversely 10 on the management of the plant and on the plant security 11 capabilities.
12 As a result of'that, we issued a 50.54(F) letter in
/' 13 December. That 50.54(F) letter requested the Licensee to 4
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14 review its management, why the problems had occurred, to 15 ascertain what it would take to restart the reactor, and then 16 how they would, from there, operate the plant with fewer 17 problems than in the past.
18 The Licensee responded to that 50.54(F) letter in 19 January and was very close to being in a position to restart 20 the reactor in April of 1986, but at that point in time 21 because of the fact that the sources had almost depleted to 22 the point that they could not use them for startup, rather 23 than rush into operation the utility chose at that time to 24 extend the outage, replace the sources and also during the 25 outage to complete some testing that they would have to do in i
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8 1 the fall of this year had they started up earlier.
8
? 2 Right now, the plant is projected for startup in the 3 latter part of this mcnth, and I think that data is 4 achievable.
5 (Slide.)
6 I have listed very briefly the major problems and I 7 am going to dwell on each problem as we go through them, but 8 they focus on inadequate management, management controls, 9 administrative deficiencies related to plant operations 10 particularly in the control room, engineering design 11 deficiency problems, security problems which happen and 12 continue to be, and hardware problems.
13 ,
(Slide.)
14 We addressed -- I guess trying to follow your cue, 15 Commissioner Asselstine, you asked what the problem was. Even 16 though the utility was only able to run the plant for a short 17 period of time, there were numerous problems in the operation 18 of the plant in addition to the criticality event, where 19 numerous limiting conditions for operation were violated.
20 Those problems reflected adversely on both operations and 21 maintenance, and in addition, they had security problems and 22 problems that related to plant engineering.
23 And as a result of the diversity of the problems 24 that we found and the many functional areas that they fall 25 into, we chose at that time to issue the 50.54(F) , addressing l
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9 1 the broad issue of management because we felt that the ,
<g l 2 management control systems had not performed the jobs 3 intended, and we were concerned that if we didn't address it 4 in this kind of a timely manner that we might run into 5 problems further down the road. So it was a conscious staff 6 decision to issue that 50.54 (F) letter and involve the EDO and 7 the major program offices.
8 CCMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I take it from that that 9 your judgment was that as you looked at all of these operating 10 events and operating problems through the brief full power 11 program at the plant, your conclusion was that the root cause 12 of many of those deficiencies was a management weakness on the
- 13 part of the utility's nuclear organization; is that fair?
14 MR. KEPPLER: Yes.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: And I take it right after 16 the 50.54(F) letter was issued, the utility's own Independent 17 Overview Committee came out with its evaluation of the 18 management.
19 MR. KEPPLER: Well, let me make the point upfront 20 that the staff was behind the suggestion of bringing in an 21 overview committee. We felt that an outside team that was not 22 tied in with day-to-day operations, that had not blessed the 23 Fermi operation was the type of thing that was needed. We 24 didn't feel the staff could put the resources into that typo 25 of effort, and we sort of encouraged the concept of an 7 -; 3 _ --- ; ; -_ - ; 3 ___
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10 1 overview committee almost as an extension of the staff m
2 itself. And the utility was receptive to that suggestion and 3 I'll touch more on the overview committee in a moment.
4 When we decided to issue the 50.54(F) letter, we 5 held a meeting with the top management of the company and 6 talked about all of the issues associated with a 50.54(F) 7 letter, and then the utility received the letter initial 8 response later in January.
9 I think the key elements of this right away were 10 that -- and perhaps most importantly -- was that the Chief 11 Executive Officer of the company, who really had not been 12 involved in any major way, took it upon himself to place 13 himself in control of restart of the reactor. He had that
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14 plant basically reporting to him, whereas before it was 15 reporting up through the President of the company, and ha 16 became much more directly involved and has remained involved.
17 He has been at the plant, he has been in my office many times,
- , 18 and I viewed that change as very important and refreshing.
19 On a short term basis, they placed quality assurance 20 in the role of reporting to directly to the President, and 21 then they established this Independent Overview Committee.
22 This Independent Overview Committee is comprised of six 23 members who have very broad experience in the industry, and I 24 will leave that for Mr. Calhoun to talk to you more about.
25 That Overview Committee has spent over 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> in
11 1 the review of Fermi. They issued a report back at the end of 2 January. That report was made public; it's a very 3 hard-hitting report, very critical of the lack of experience 4 on the part of the company. It was critical of their 5 leadership, their posture on accountability and their 6 management control systems in general, and they made a number 7 of recommendations to strengthen the Fermi operation.
8 Those recommendations, which Mr. Calhoun will talk 9 about, have all been completed with the exception of one, and 10 that action is in the process right now. The most significant 11 recommendation by the overview Committee was to' bring in an 12 experienced senior vice president. That action has been s
13 done. The utility retained Mr. Sylvia, formerly with Virginia 14 ElectricPowerCompany,whohadexperiencewfthbothSurryand i
15 North Anna, and he had been retained subsequent to that by 16 Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company to bring'Zimmer into 17 operation. That didn't happen, but that's no't a reflection on 18 Mr. Sylvia, and we believe that the move to bring in an i
19 experienced person has been accomplished.
20 I might add also that the company has hired some 60 21 people for the plant since the beginning of the year and 15 l
22 of those have prior commercial nuclear experiehce, s'o they are
.i 23 doing something to strengthen that.
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! 24 The Overview Committee also suggested hiring a vice 25 president for engineering and strengthening that role within s
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1 the company. That effort is under active recruitment right )
s 2 now for that position.. They have made organizational i
3 modifications in the Engineering Department.
4 Security is another area that they addressed. This 5 has been a weak area and it is still not fixed, but they are 6 working at it and they have action underway to recruit a new 7 Director of Security.
8 And lastly, they have retained an experienced 9 advisor to Mr. Sylvia, an individual who formerly worked with 10 the NRC and presently works with the Management Analysis 11 Company.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Who is that individual?
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13 MR. KEPPLER: Carl Alderson; he used to be in 14 Region II.
15 [ Slide.]
16 The plant operations during the period of July 17 through October were plagued with numerous LER reports, LCO 18 violations, and they reflected adversely on the administrative 19 controls for plant operations.
20 I mentioned that the company submitted a Reactor 21 Operations Improvement Plan in October just prior to shutting 22 down the plant, and that plan was aimed at improving the 23 controls within the control room area to assess and track 24 plant operations, specifically. As a result of the Overview 25 Committee's report and their findings, they came out with a I
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13 1 Huclear Operations Improvement Plan which was officially cs
[ 2 submitted in May of 1985, and that is a much broader-based 3 program --
4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: You mean 1986, right?
5 MR. KEPPLER: I'm sorry, 1986, yes. And that plan 6 addressed all of the operations, and specifically takes on the t
7 recommendations of the Overview Committee.
8 Steps were also taken to enhance training. They 9 moved more experienced people into the cbntrol room and the 10 Operations staff, pa ticularly the shift supervisor, is in 11 direct control of work activities planning.
12 [ Slide.]
13
{ '>) CHAIRMAN ZECH: Is the intention to have more 14 management directly involved in the control room activities 15 when and if restart takes place?
16 MR. KEPPLER: Yes. When I was here last week, 17 Mr. Chairman, you mentioned you were interestrid specifically 18 in what actions had been taken to prevent a reoccurrence of 19 what took place on July 1st of last year. And what I have 20 here on the next two slides is specifically addressing that 21 question that you raised.
22 [ Slide.]
23 I will just briefly run through it. They have made 24 'a number of improvements aimed at bringing more experience 25 into the control room; specifically, the Assistant Nuclear 6
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14 1 Shift Supervisor and the SOA. The shift supervisor is
,q 2 directly involved in work planning activities that affect what 3 goes on in the control room.
4 They have also made a number of improvements in the 5 training area, including workshops for managers and 6 supervisors to increase their sensitivity to safety and 7 regulatory issues.
i 8 They have made adjustment, made modifications to the 9 procedures and controls associated with rod pull. They have 10 put together a training film of the event and required that to 11 be viewed by all reactor operators, and they -- whatever 12 ' differences had existed at the time between the simulator and j, 13 the plant, they straightened that out.
14 [ Slide.]
15 They also have instituted a number of audits. They 16 have plant managers conducting surveillances of the control 17 room, the Superintendent of Operations is observing the 18 activities, and management is directly involved in plant 19 performance. And you might recall with the enforcement action 20 that was taken last week, we have tied in an audit requirement 21 that will provide further efforts in that area.
22 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Let me just say that these are good I
23 things to do but they are not all that different than what one 24 might expect'. This is what you should expect when you do 25 these kind of operations. This is the kind of supervision you t
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15 1 should have; I think it's very good. But I think it's -- you n.
know, it's something that should have taken place on the other 2
3 event, which showed a real lack of complete understanding as 4 far as I'm concerned as to the importance of the things that 5 were going on.
i 6 So this is good, and this is the kind of supervision 7 that one should have in these operations but it should 8 continue, it shouldn't just, you know, be there for a while.
9 It should certainly continue for a considerable period of 10 time. These are the kinds of supervision that you need during 11 these kind of startup operations, in my view.
12 MR. KEPPLER: I agree with you, and this is the
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, 13 reason -- if you go back, this is the reason the staff was so 14 appalled at the way they just reinserted the control rods and 15 started back up again.
I 16 I also listed some other activities that have been 17 instituted, including a management meeting with each shift 18 supervisor and assistant shift supervisor and SOA to press l 19 upon them the importance of their jobs. They have brought the 20 . reactor engineer more into the operating team, which was a 21 good move. And they have made some minor changes to the 22 procedures for rod pulling.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Before you leave that 24 slide, the impression I get from having read a lot of the 25 voluminous information tha.t was developed on the July 1st
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16 1 event last year was that it wasn't that the people on the 2 plant staff weren't getting correct advice; it's that they 3 weren't following some of that advice. There were experienced 4 people that were telling them what had gone on and there were 5 management people at the plant who were choosing not to 6 believe it, at least for some period of time.
7 Which of these changes is going to get at that 8 problem, and how are you confident or satisfied that that 9 problem has now been resolved as well?
10 CHAIRMAN ZECH: I'm not sure I would agree with that 11 assessment, but go ahead and address it if you want to.
12 MR. KEPPLER: I think there were several points; you
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13 have to look back at that event. First of all, there were 14 inexperienced people starting up the plant. And people really 15 didn't appreciate what their job was in that control room.
16 There were a number of people in the control room but they 17 weren't clear as to.what their role was.
18 In addition to that, the shift supervisor wasn't in 19 the control room. The assistant shift supervisor was in the t
20 control room part of the time but he was preoccupied with 21 something else. The SOA wasn't doing his job, and I'm not 22 sure he appreciated what his job was at that time.
23 I think it's more of taking a step back and 24 re-acquainting or re-familiarizing, re-stressing what 25 everybody's job is and making it clear that they have to work l .
17 1 as a team.
m 2 If you recall the report from the Overview 3 Committee, one of the things that came across very loud and 4 clear was this was not a team operation up there. This was a 5 bunch of individuals doing their various things.
, 6 CHAIRMAN ZECH: That was my impression. It was a 7 lack of experience. It was just very clearly evident that 8 they -- it wasn't so much -- and there was some confusion, 9 certainly. But to me it was clearly a lack of experience, 10 which is a concern because there should have been more 11 experience there.
12 But I think it was lack of management oversight as
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13 much as anything, but not so much any kind of a willful thing; 14 it was more or less just reading certain events one way or 15 reading them another and not having the experience to make a 16 good evaluation on the spot because they didn't have the 17 experience, the people in the control room.
18 This was kind of my assessment. So it was confusion 19 as well as lack of experience. But I think that's kind of how 20 I read it. Is this what you are telling us, too?
21 MR. KEPPLER: Yes. I've spent just a few minutes 22 here. This Nuclear Operations Improvement Plan is a very, 23 very broad-based plan. My staff has had a lot of input to the 24 utility. But this plan was put together with the hindsight of 25 what happened in that control room, the problems after that d h 8 4
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18 1 and was aimed at addressing the concerns of the Overview
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2 Committee. And there had been really almost a reshaping of 3 attitudes, a reshaping of what people need to do to work 4 together. There have been massive reorganizations in this 5 group, so that these various components within the utility 6 aren't competing; they are supporting.
7 [ Slide.]
8 For example, Engineering was totally out of the 9 picture before. This move here strengthens Engineering's role 10 and makes them a part of the operation.
11 The administration within the plant was almost a 12 detriment to the operation. People didn't know who was in 13 charge, and I think these moves are steps in the right 14 direction.
15 Now the proof of the pudding is going to be what 16 happens when the plant runs.
17 CHAIRMAN ZECH: But we've got to have a certain
,i j 18 amount of confidence that changes have taken place, and that's 19 what you're going to tell us, I presume, as we go through 20 here. You're starting to tell us that now?
21 MR. KEPPLER: Yes.
- 22 CHAIRMAN ZECH
- Okay, well let's go.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: But on training, that's 24 one of the things you just covered, it appears that most of
- 25 the training has really focused on rod pulling. What kind of
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..s 1 training has gone on, for example, in assuring that each of 2 these shifts functions as a team? Have they done team 3 training and have you been able to review that sufficiently so 4 that you are confident that this group will not perform as a 5 group of individuals but that they'll function as a team?
6 That the engineer will be listened to when he says something 7 like, " hey, fellows, I think you went~~ critical." When the 8 shift advisor, the experienced guy that they have hired 9
from other utilities tells them, " Hey, fellows, I think you ,
10 went critical here," that they will listen to that.
11 CHAIRMAN ZECH: I agree. That is the key point.
12 It's just as important. The team work and the listening to
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13 each other and working together and gaining from their own 14 knowledge than it is the individual thing. I agree with 15 that. That's a very important element of working together, 16 and I hope you're going to tell us what they have done in that 17 regard. .
18 MR. KEPPLER: Bob, could you put up the backup slide 19 I had en enhanced training?
20 (Slide.)
, 21 I don't know that these are in any particular order, 22 but the instrumentation and control technicians have received 23 additional training. Simulator training has been done for all 24 RO's who will --
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH: How about emphasizing the team 9
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1 training and the team work concept as you're going through 2 these two?
3 MR. KEPPLEP: If you take the next part, 4 requalification training to highlight routine operations, this 5 is changing modes, starting up, encountering LCO's, handling 6 Work requests, that type of thing. So this had been lacking 7 before in my judgment.
8 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: And they'll be trained as 9 a shift when they're doing it?
10 MR. KEPPLER: As a shift. Supplemental training on 11 rod manipulations, training to emphasize differences between
! 12 the plant and the simulator.
13 CHAIRMAN ZECH: The next to the last item looks like 14 it's what we're looking for.
l 15 MR. KEPPLER: Operations staff providing on-shift l
16 training on significant plant and procedure changes. And l
I 17 corrective actions.,
18 Do you want to add anything?
l 19 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Give your name for the reporter.
20 MR. GREENMAN: Ed Greenman, Region III, Deputy 21 Director of Projects. We've had a rather in-depth look at 22 training ever since the July 1st incident. One of the things 23 ve found from the staff's perspective was that the shift i
l 24 personnel handled themselves quite well in dealing with 25 transient situations. They did not, as you pointed out,
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21 1 Mr. Commissioner, have the clearcut understanding on how to 2 work together as a team.
3 The utility has done a number of things not only in 4 working them on the simulator -- what I'll call enhanced 5 simulator training -- they have brought the shift as a unit 6 and the supervisors into work planning meetings, work study 7 meetings; how to work not only within the Operations 8 Department, that facet of the operation that they deal with, 9 but in how to deal with all of the other departments that they 10 have to interface with in order to understand other people's 11 problems and how to work together more effectively.
12 Now we've reviewed some of the shifts, their 13 performance on the simulator training. That has not been 14 totally completed for all shifts yet but it will be prior to 15 startup of the plant.
16 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Thank you. Proceed.
17 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I would ask one question 18 here. Am I to understand from all of this that the shifts, 19 prior to this series of mis-steps, had never trained as shifts 20 on the simulator? They had always trained as individuals? In 21 other words, most plants -- I won't say all, but I think most 22 of our plants, the shifts train as a shift on the simulator.
23 At least at some point before they go into operation. Is that 24 not the case here?
25 MR. KEPPLER: I think they have trained as shifts O
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22 1 but I think the emphasis was on training for accidents or w
2 accident conditions, and there was little attention given to 3 the routine activities for normal operations. That's a 4 perception that I have not only with this plant but with some 5 other plants.
6 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Did somebody else want to back 7 that up? Go ahead.
8 MR. GREENMAN: Yes, sir. While they were training 9 as shifts, there was no real assurance at the time of that 10 event that each member worked the correct position in the 11 shift that he was assigned to, nor was the STA or the SOA or 12 the reactor engineer for that matter, although the reactor 13 engineer's involvement at very, very low power -- he becomes 14 much more important at different phases of power escalation.
15 But that had not been done at that time.
16 COMMIS3IONER BERNTHAL: How come we didn't pick that 17 up ahead of timo? That's something that I thought was 18 considered to be a fairly standard part of training; that you 19 get your people together in their spots training as a shift, 20 in the way that that shift is going to run the plant.
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Fred, you know I remember 22 at the INPO/CEO workshop last year there was a presentation on 23 team training, and I got the clear impression from that that 24 this was sort of an evolving concept. That in fact, by and 25 large, most utilities did not do team training where you bb
_._ . . , , _ -%w.. 4 e- - - * * - - * ~ + - - - - - " """ '
23 1 brought everybody tcgether and where you focused attention on 2 the individual roles of every element, including the more 3 support-oriented ones like advisors, engineers, STA's even in 4 some instances.
5 So I guess my icpression was a little different:
6 that perhaps this is more of an evolving thing rather than the 7 common practice. I think it's something that's very 8 important.
9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Well, I don't think we're 10 getting to the root of this. I have to say, I don't think 11 we'll live to see the day when we have a problem at a plant 12 that we can't walk away and say, that's a management problem.
13 That's easy to say. In fact, I can't remember a problem plant 14 where we've been able to walk away and say that was a hardware 15 problem, and I doubt that that will ever happen.
16 The one word that it seems to me runs throughout all 17 of this analysis is, inexperience. And I thought we might have 18 something here, team work, although I'm -- you're really 19 talking about how human beings interact, and when the day 20 comes that we get good at predicting that, I'll be very 21 pleased that we're all experts in management to an extent that 22 I doubt we'll ever be.
23 MR. STELLO: Let me make a point here addressing 24 what commissioner Asselstine raised in the beginning. I think 25 the utility spent a lot of time and energy building that
24 1 plant and dadn't really appreciate the enormous energy it a takes to operate it and nake that transition -- with the time 3 and care that he put into building the plant, he built it and 4 did a fine job of bui2 ding it. And I think perhaps that was a 5 result of much of what went behind the compliments of the 6 Commission; they did do a very good job and I don't think we 7 ought to hesitate to say so.
8 But there are a lot of plants that have not made 9 that transition from construction to operation. I think 10 that's part -- I don't know if it's all of the problem but 11 it's certainly a part of that problem and they're learning.
12 They're learning now and have so painfully.
13 But with respect to team training, I think that 14 there is routinely team training when you have teams. I think 15 when you're licensing operators you never know which operators 16 are going to get through the process and which ones won't, so i
17 there's an awful lot of individual training in preparation for 18 the examinations.
19 But when you get to the requalification issue where 20 the shifts then exist and are being requalified as shifts, 21 then you tend to concentrate -- and that's what was being 22 picked up in the CEO Workshops. That as the shifts now 23 go to requal training, as each plant has six shifts and -
24 rotates once every month or so, that they are emphasizing and 25 picking up on requal. But that's awful hard to do with new
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25 1 people coming in when you don't know which ones will or won't 2 be on the shift. And I think that explains a plant coming 3 through a process where it's something that we do have to give 4 more attention to because it's harder in fact to get the team 5 put together early enough to give them the training.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Evta there I think you 7 still have questions about support organizations like 8 engineering and STA, and there's wide variation even on requal 9 I think on the extent to which those people are involved in 10 the formal retraining program as opposed to licensed 11 operators.
12 MR. STELLO: But I think we're doing a fairly good job in that area now, and I'm sure we're going to do better.
^
13 14 But I'm pointing out it's much more difficult to do that with 15 respect to a plant going through an initial licensing process.
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Yes, true.
17 CHAIRMAN ZECH: I have two quick comments. First, 18 you're absolutely right that the transition from construction 19 to operation for any plant is a real challenge. And if I 20 recall, when I visited out there at Fermi, in my closing 21 remarks I emphasized that, and have in many, many other plants 22 throughout the country.
23 It is a challenge to go from construction to 24 operations, and it's a mentality, it's not easy. But the big 25 thing that helps there is experience, because people who have
- -. 7-- - - 3, __-----
o .
l 26 j 1 done it before can appreciate the difference. So when you 2 don't have experience it's even more of a challenge, but it 3 certainly is a challenge.
4 The second thing is about any procedural operation 5 -- startup -- if you can do it on the simulator, you take your 6 whole team out there and do it on the simulator first. Now 7 some of these things.you can't do on the simulator because 8 they don't lend themselves to -- all the instrumentation and 9 so forth. But if you could do it on a simulator, you should 10 practice these things with your team ahead of time. If you 11 can't do it on a simulator, you should get and have a skull 12 session with all of your people on your shift and go through 13 just -- you know, here's what we're going to do, we're going 14 to pull rods, we're going to do this when this happens, expect 15 this to happen.
16 So everybody knows so you talk it about ahead 17 of time. That's kind of the approach that I think should be 18 taken on most of these key operations when they're starting up 19 the plants, especially when you don't have a lot of 20 experience. It just makes kind of common sense to me that 21 that's the kind of a procedure you'd use.
22 So we are getting more emphasis on team training, 23 and I think that's the right approach to take. But until we 24 get there, certainly there are provisions that you can make 25 that can be very helpful. If you can't do it on a simulator
27 1 and practice these things, then you should get together and 2 talk it through for several hours so everybody knows what to 3 expect. And then perhaps you don't have as many surprises.
4 But anyway, it's just attention to detail, same old 5 thing. Discipline. Nothing complicated about it. It's just 6 really a hardnosed approach to knowing what you're doing, and 7 making sure you can anticipate the reactions of this 8 complicated technology. This is why training is so important, 9 in my view.
10 Well, we've interrupted you too much, 11 MR. KEPPLER: But could I add one more point, 12 though?
13 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Go ahead.
14 MR. KEPPLER: Again, getting back to the question 15 that was put on the table at the beginning of the meeting, 16 it's still very hard to predict that ahead of time. You wind 17 up -- this company had one of the best passing rates of all 18 the operator exams in the country.
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: That's right.
20 MR. KEPPLER: This company had a plant that looked 21 second to none in terms of cleanliness. This plant had a 22 management system that looked good to everybody.
23 CHAIRMAN ZECH: But they weren't experienced. That 24 makes a big difference.
25 MR. KEPPLER: I agree, but we've also had other
28 1 plants that weren't experienced. Callaway is a good example.
2 They started up and didn't fall flat on their pants.
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH: But we have had others who did have 4 trouble starting up. So the point is when you don't have 5 experience you try to compensate for it in some way.
6 Now, Callaway did do some things to compensate for 7 it. They got extra inspection teams in there and so forth.
8 And perhaps that helped a bit, I think it did.
9 But in any case, when you don't have experience, you 10 should do something to try to compensate for it; more than 11 just kind of hope for the best. And I think that that's a 12 very important lesson not only for all in the industry but for 13 all of us to learn, too. That when you don't have the 14 experience, then you should be especially vigilant. And I 15 think that's all we're really trying to say here.
16 And certainly, the company did a marvelous job in 17 construction, we all agreed on that. But operations is not 18 construction; it's a different ballgame, and that's very 19 difficult for an inexperienced organization, in my view, to 20 comprehend. But it's quite different when that plant comes to 21 life from when it's sitting there rather inert.
22 MR. KEPPLER: I'm not trying to be defensive with my 23 comment, but as we have other plants that will come along -- I 24 will be coming forth before the Commission on Perry, and we ,
25 are gqing to revisit the same thought with Perry.
i
29 1 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Well, but I hope we have learned 2 something.
3 MR. KEPPLER: I hope we have, too. But trying to be 4 able to see through it is very hard.
5 CHAIRMAN ZECH: But that's what we're going to try 6 to do.
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Well, I would just like --
8 without prolonging this too much -- I haven't heard anything 9 yet that anyone has said that they are willing to stand up and 10 say, we should have seen this a long time ago. I can think of 11 one or two little precursors. They were having security 12 problems way back when I visited that plant.' You might have 13 said, well, there seems to be an organization prcblem here,
{-
14 but I think -- Jim started out by asking the question, how 15 come we didn't see this coming down the track, 16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Yes.
17 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I haven't heard the answer 18 yet. I'm not sure I'll hear the answer.
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Well, we may not.
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I have a feeling we won't.
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: That's interesting in 22 itself.
23 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: We're talking about 24 something we're not very good at here.
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Well, if you can't foresee into the
30 1 future -- and we're not very good at that -- we're going to 2 try to do better by looking at the past. But this is not an 1
3 operational plant so you don't have any record to go on.
4 But the only thing you can do is be cautious about i 5 when you're inexperienced, and certainly vou can't predict a 6 lot of these things but you can say -- you know, if you have
! 7 an inexperienced group of people, even though they've done a a
8 commendable job building the plant, you've just got to say go 9 slow, be careful; this is a demanding technology by the 10 numbers. And I think those are the kind of attitudes that
, 11 will help. It won't necessarily cure the problem always, but i 12 will help in many cases.
13 So that's all you can say, I think.
~} You can't look i
14 into the future, you don't have a crystal ball, but you can i
15 try to say if you're inexperienced, you should be more 16 cautious and more careful. I think that's an important i
- 17 lesson, if we don't, learn anything more than that.
18 MR. KEPPLER: Well, when I come before the 19 Commission on Perry, you will see that we've tried to take 20 what we've learned from Fermi and apply it to Perry.
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Good. Well, let's move. We've 22 taken your 30 minutes already.
I 23 (Slide.]
24 MR. KEPPLER: Over the last several months, a number l
25 of issues surfaced at Fermi in terms of the adequacy of ,
I
31 1 reviews of design changes issued since 1984, and in 2 particular, the seismic and environmental verifications.
3 There were concerns about the adequacy and completeness of 4 engineering calculations to reflect as-built conditions.
l 5 Concerns about whether deviations that were made from the 6 small bore pipe design manual were done with sufficient 7 justification. There was potential overloading of embedment 8 plates, potential problems with the Nelson studies on 9 embedment plates, and incompleted engineering work that was 10 outstanding at the time of licensing.
11 In terms of what was done, a very extensive effort 12 was put in place over the last several months to review and 13 verify all modifications made during this time period. They
( '-
14 went through a few thousand document packages and they 15 identified only a very limited number of deficiencies; of the 16 order of half a dozen to a dozen deviation reports had to be 17 issued. And only three hardware problems were identified, and 18 these are in the process of being resolved.
19 The company did update all their design calculations 20 to make sure that the as-built configuration was in fact 21 covered.
22 .
In the case of embedments, some of those were not 23 safety qualified, and they had to look at those. They did 24 some sampling, UT testing, pull testing on a representative 25 sample and resolved that issue.
32 1 They brought in Stone & Webster to look at their ,
l 2 system of performing reviews and had Stone & Webster take one 3 complete system from start to finish, which was the core spray 4 system, to make sure there were no additional problems not 5 already known. The company upgraded their design controls 6 from here on to make sure that qualified people look at all 7 design changes and that the sign-offs are appropriate.
8 We had a meeting in our office I believe it was last 9 week, maybe the week before, to go through this in some 10 detail. I am not doing the amount of review justice by my 11 comments, but it's a fairly thorough effort. I took one of my 12 most experienced and critical design engineers to review this 13 effort; I brought Isa Yin into the picture, and Isa provided
{
1 14 some comments for the utility and Stone & Webster, but in 15 general is satisfied with the review and we have signed off 16 on this job.
17 (Slide.] ,
I 18 Security. Problems with security have ranged all 19 over the place. There have been a large number of allegations 20 about security problems. There have been problems with 21 falsified security documents. The security group has not been 22 successful at identifying problems. There seems to be a poor 23 working team relationship between the security organization 24 and the guard force, and our inspections have identified 25 numerous violations of security requirements.
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33 1 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: What was, broadly speaking, 2 the nature of these security problems? I have heard security 3 problems said a lot here, but what was the nature of those 4 problems?
5 MR. KEPPLER: Well, the security plan just is not 6 being implemented, and I think the problem is tied to the 7 relationship between the security organization within the 8 company and the guard force. They just have not been
- 9 successful in implementing the security plan. And, I would 10 say, in motivating the security guard staff.
11 I don't treat the problem as a major shortcoming in
) 12 the security of the plant, but at best, the security program i
13 is a SALP-3 rating. Despite the efforts to improve it, it is 14 still a*SALP-3, and they're going to have to work on it to 15 bring it up. And the company is committed to doing that.
- 16 They have -- the last I heard, they had advanced an offer to 17 an experienced security director. The company may able to
- 18 comment on that for you today.
19 We issued a civil penalty in this area. We have met 20 with the utility to require them to upgrade its security in 21 certain areas, and we have put additional inspection effort i
22 into this area.
l 23 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Let's move along.
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Well, before we leave 25 security, right now they don't have the experienced security 1 . . . . .
. . . - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . , - __ ___ _ ~_~ _~__ _ .---_ ... _ -_ _. __ _ .- ~~ ~ _ .~ .,--
34 l
1 director in place --
2 MR. KEPPLER: That's correct.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: -- that they are looking 4 for. You say despite all their efforts they are still a 3 on 5 security program. What's the basis for assurance that the 6 security program is going to function effectively over the 7 next few months if you let them start the plant?
8 MR. KEPPLER: I think you will find that they will 9 be moving a director in very soon. I think it's just a short 10 period of time.
11 The basis for continuing ahead, as far as I'm 12 concerned, is my staff has required upgraded measures in
~
13 security, the company submitted a Security Improvement Program 14 and we are verifying that that is being carried out, But 15 despite this -- I don't want to leave you with the wrong 16 impression -- there are still problems; they are just not to 17 the point that I would put that as a hold for startup, in my 18 judgment.
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Okay.
20 (Slide.)
21 MR. KEPPLER: Lastly, the hardware issues. Very 22 briefly, at the time that the plant was shut down in October 23 they had cracked turbine bypass piping. That has been 24 replaced with thicker-walled piping. I must tell you that 25 there is still some concern whether this fix will solve this
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35 1
i problem, and this piping is instrumented. They will monitor 2 the vibrations during startup and see where that gees.
I
! 3 The diesel generators -- you may recall from 1
4 previous meetings there were a number of problems with 5 bearings. The bearings have been replaced. There have been ;
i 6 demonstration tests done on two of the diesel generators to
! 7 the satisfaction of the staff. I believe an SER has been I
j 8 written or will be written or will be issued shortly, and that issue is closed as far as the staff is concerned.
9
- 10 The RHR pump motor problem was fixed. It was a
- 11 manufacturing problem. The second RHR pump was checked out by I
12 GE and that's okay.
1 13 They broke a handful of springs in the main steam 14 isolation valves. Those have been replaced and they tested ;
t 15 the others at in excess of operating stresses, and that issue I
16 has gone away. I 4 17 All of the.EQ and Appendix R modifications have been 18 completed with one exception, and that is that the backup i
19 power supply for the remote shutdown panel is still under l 20 review by the staff. Do we have a comment on that?
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Identify yourself, please.
i 22 MR. LYNCH: Dave Lynch, Project Manager for 23 Fermi-2. We think we have a resolution for those issues. The r
i 24 utility will be documenting those resolutions this week in a 1 25 letter. i l i
. . .....::: - :,2= - ~:2..,_ L. ::. L X L ~ T. ~LL. L . :L . L -_ .
36 1 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Thank you.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Will that be closed out 3 before startup?
4 MR. LYNCH: Yes, they will be.
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Are they requesting an 6 exemption?
7 MR. LYNCH: No.
8 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: So they will be in 9 compliance with the rule on remote shutdown?
10 MR. LYNCH: Yes. They will have a deviation request 11 on a minor matter.
12 CHAIRMAN ZE'CH: Thank you.
13 MR. KEPPLER: Okay. I mentioned that they completed 14 the source change-out during this last outage, and that went 15 smoothly. And there is one issue that I have listed as 16 unresolved at the time that relates to the degraded grid r
17 voltage problem that surfaced as a result of the engineering 18 reviews that were done by the company.
19 The setpoints on low voltage are -- in the tech 20 specs aru 89 percent, and the recalculations indicate the 1
21 value should not go below 95 percent to protect equipment. My 22 understanding is that the staff has some concerns with this 23 and they're reviewing it with the company, but it relates not 24' so much as a safety concern but more of -- there will be more 25 challenges to the equipment with these setpoints.
o .
37
- 1 Dick, do you want to add anything?
2 MR. VOLLMER: Well, this is for Division I. When it 3 reaches the under-voltage setpoint, then it would transfer 4 power from its normal sources into emergency sources, start l
5 the diesel generator and so on. They found that certain of 6 their equipment did not have the capability that they could 7 demonstrate that it would start at the 89 percent setpoint 8 rather than the 95 percent.
9 So it requires a tech spec change. They have given l
)
l'O the staff a submittal, and we're pretty well through our i
11 technical review of that. And restart would await a tech spec 4
12 change unless the staff finds additional technical problems.
13 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right. Thank you.
, 14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: One last quick question, i 15 Jim, on this. Particularly when you look at the first four i 16 items on that list -- are those typical or usual kinds of i
- 17 hardware problems that you'd expect to see in the startup of a 18 plant, or do you think they'ra unusual?
19 MR. KEPPLER: I would gay they're unusual.
i
- 20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE
- Is that indicative of what j 21 we all thought; that this is a well-constructed plant?
i I 22 MR. KEPPLER: No, I don't think it bears on that.
23 The problem with the pump motor and the MSIV springs were i
24 manufacturing defects. The problem with the turbine bypass l 25 piping, they have used an English generator. They've got a
(
j i
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38 l
1 system that's not used with any experience in this country,
! 2 and I can't -- I think that's more of a design problem than a i
3 fabrication or installation problem.
i i 4 And the diesel problem, I don't have a good answer 5 on, why those problems occurred.
i' 6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Refresh my memory --
i 7 MR. KEPPLER: The bearing problem, that's Colt t
8 Industries, Fairbanks-Morris.
i 9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Okay. But you've l '
10 typically not had widespread problems.
11 MR. KEPPLER: Yes. But they have provided diesels 1
12 for other plants in the country, yes. So I don't have an !
l \
f '
13 answer on that.
I 14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Okay.
l 1
i 15 (Slide.)
{ 16 MR. KEPPLER: Major items before startup.
17 Obviously, the remaining engineering and technical issues that a
18 we have talked about here have to be cleaned up before
! 19 startup. The Independent overview Committee needs to make a
? -
i 1 i 20 recommendation to the CEO of the company. We will be I 21 interested in that.
- 22 I have met with the Independent Overview Committee 23 and have the benefit of their thinking. I have a meeting set ;
24 up on July 17th, next week, to brief the Monroe County Board .
25 of Commissioners up in Monroe, Michigan, which was a t
i
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39
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1 commitment I mada early in the game, and we will also have one 2 public meeting up at the plant to discuss the resolution of j 3 the remaining items.
4 The Chief Executive officer will make his i
1 5 authorization to restart, and the NRC. And I guess,-if I 6 could respectfully make a comment here, the Commission has
) 7 from time to time been concerned about the staff taking
- 8 decisive action before the plants get into serious problems, a
, 9 and I think we did that in this case. The plant has never 10 gone above 5 percent power. '
i i
11 So I would urge that the commission give strong i 12 consideration to keeping the restart issue with the staff.
13 (Slide.)
i 14 Just to touch on -- there are some other things to ,
, 15 close the story here. We are still carrying out -- the agency l .
16 is still carrying out some investigations at the~ plant'that i 17 relate to matters that I'm sure Mr. Hayes has talked to you 1 18 about so I won't go into them here.
l 19 The Department of Justice review on' the rod pull
, 20 error culminated last week, and they declined that. case.
l 21 On enforcement actions, we issued the o~nforcement 22 action for the rod pull error last week. The Commission 23 l should know that there will be at leasu on.e more encalated I
i t
24 enforcement action to be taken for problems'cubsequent to the l
25 rod pull error that we haven't gotten out yet. So when you
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1 see that coming, I don't want you to be caught offguard.
2 The staff still has under review the 2.206 petition i
3 that was submitted by the intervenor groups, and that is under 4 review. I put down also, Mr. Chairman, the INPO review 5 because I remember you had some very Wkrong points to make on
- 6 that. And INPO was at the site last week, so you might want
- 7 to talk to Mr. McCarthy today about that.
]
8 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Fine.
9 MR. KEPPLER: In tarms of plans, just very briefly,
.i 10 we are treating this plant like it's a new plant in terms of 11 inspection activities for restart. There will be an augmented 12 inspection coverage under the direction of Mr. Greenman, and i
- 13 we will be covering the plant extensively during startup. And i /
14 based upon performance, we will adjust our program 15 accordingly.
16 And the plans for startup call for a phased control 17 of startup, at which time a decision is made first to start i
18 the plant and progress to a certain plateau. Those results 2,
l 19 will be reviewed to make sure that they are satisfactory to
.I
] 20 the company. The CEO will authorize progression to the next j 21 step, and the NRC is in that chain as well.
1 22 So we plan to monitor the startup very closely when 23 we see the plant ready, and if problems develop I won't 24 hesitate to take the kind of action I took last time.
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Fine.
l
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41 1 MR. .STELLO: That concludes our presentation, 2 Mr. Chairman.
~
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Good. I'd like to move along unless 4 my fellow commissioners have any objection to that.
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: A quick question if I 6 could. On the question of management, I take it you have had 7 ample opportunity to look at the Independent Overview 8 Committee's report, and you basically agree with their 9 characterization, at least of the former management of the 10 plant and the problems that existed?
11 MR. KEPPLER: Yes. Yes. I think that I have some 12 further reservations, but -- and I think that the company is 13 aware of their inexperience, and I would expect that if 14 problems continue, you may see some more changes.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Okay. I guess one of the 16 questions I still have -- it's ths'ene I put on the table at 17 the outset, and that is, when I looked through this list of 18 management problems, I guess I wonder why we didn't pick up on 19 at least some of those; some of those that seem to me to be 20 the kinds of things that we might be looking for. Conflicts 21 between support organizations, failure to give subordinates --
22 tell them what their responsibilities are. Confusion about
'23 what people are supposed to be doing. Those kinds of things, 24 it strikes me, are not so esoteric, management considerations 25 that perhaps we shouldn't have tumbled to some of them.
42 1 I guess I just --
.~
2 MR. KEPPLER: Well, I can't give you a good answer, 3 commissioner. I am just as dismayed about this thing as 4 everybody else is. We sent up a team two weeks before the 5 plant was licensed to observe activities, to observe 6 communications,,the way people interfaced with each other, and 7 I can't tell you why w'e didn't pick it up.
8 MR. STELLO: I think we need more time to think it 9 through, as I said before. I don't know that there's an easy 10 answer. Our goal is to catch everything, but we are realists, 11 we know we're not going to.
12 I suggest that a plant that does as well in
('S ,
13 construction as they have -- and they have done well -- that
%.)
14 transition is a difficult one and not an easy one. And they 15 clearly didn't do what they needed to do to be ready. Now, 16 should we have really identified the key elements 17 retrospectively? Yes. But that's always the case.
18 I think we need to look further to find out is there 19 something in our inspection program or something that we ought 20 to be more sensitive to that we are not that would make a 21 difference in the future. I think that deserves much more 22 thought than we can give at this table.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I agree with you. I think 24 it's something that ought to be looked at a bit more 25 carefully.
I 43 1 Well, I think -- and I was one of the culprits. I 2 thought that I had some indicators, many of the same ones that 3 Jim mentioned earlier, about hou they would do in operations 4 that weren't tied so much to the construction program but were 5 the kinds of things that seemed to focus more on plant 6 operations. And I'll be the first to admit that I was fooled 7 as much as anybody.
8 And I guess what I'm wondering is if we weren't 9 looking at the right things. And what I want to make sure of 10 is that in the future that we are looking at the right things 11 so that if there are problems like this out there, hopefully 12 we can try and pick them up.
~
13 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Well I agree. I think it's 14 certainly a very thoughtful suggestion, and we all know how 15 difficult the answer is. But if there is a way we could learn 16 from this and how could we have done it better, I think we 17 should all think about just exactly that. I think that's what 18 Commissioner Asselstine is saying, and I support that effort.
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: As Jim says, we've had 20 inexperienced utilities before that have done pretty well.
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Right. Maybe we can look and see 22 perhaps why they did well and why the others didn't. But I 23 think it will certainly be valuable if we could learn from 24 this. And I think we should put some effort into doing so if 25 we possibly can.
44 1 MR. STELLO: We will.
i 2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: The same question on the 3 design problems. To what extent were these things surprises 4 to us after the plant got its license? To what extent were 5 they surprises to the Licensee? Did they know about these 6 things ahead of time and just dismiss them as not being 7 important, or did they not know about them ahead of time? And 8 what assurance do we have now that we really have identified 9 all the problems, that they don't exist in other systems of j 10 the plant, and that they have all been fixed?
11 MR. KEPPLER: Well, I think the last question we 12 have a good answer to, and that is we know that all the'
)
13 safety-related systems have been looked at for design changes 14 that took place when this issue came into question. What 15 contributed to this was the fact that there were more than one 16 AE at this plant, and in fact, there may have been four 17 different engineering groups involved overall through the life 18 of this. And when calculations or when areas were reviewed, 19 they were acceptable for what each AE did up to a point. But 20 one AE picking up on the changes of other brought into 21 question whether or not you had the final as-built 22 configuration thoroughly analyzed.
23 And in terms of why same of the design calculations 24 weren't done when in fact the Licensee portrayed to us a 25 completed project, is a matter that I've got OI looking at.
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j 45 1 I'd just as soon drop it right there.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Okay. All right.
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Any other questions?
4 [No response.)
5 All right, thank you very much.
6 Mr. Jack Calhoun is scheduled next, the Chairman of 7 the Independent Oversight Committee for Detroit Edison. Would 8 you come up, please?
9 Thank you very much for being with us today. You 10 may proceed.
11 Mn. CAIROUN: I intend to finish in 15 minutes.
12 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Thank you.
~~
13 MR. CALHOUN: I first want to point out a little bit
(". ,
14 about the committee and then I'll go through some o'f the 15 things that we found wrong with the plan. And then I will 16 give you our impression of what we think the status of the 17 plant is and the management.
18 The overview committee had,its first meeting in 19 January of this year and, as you know, we were asked to 20 provide guidance to the Chairman and the Board of Directors in 21 the areas of management related to training, operations, 22 engineering and security.
23 The Independent Oversight Committee consists of six 24 members with each having at least 25 years of experience in 25 nuclear plant operations or engineering. And much of this
46 1 experience has been in the area of management.
2 I am Jack Calhoun, Chairman of the Committee. I am ;
3 presently employed as a Senior Vice President for the General 4 Physics Corporation. I have had 26 years in nuclear 5 operations and maintenance at two utilities, TVA and 6 Pennsylvania Power and Light Company.
7 We also have Mr. Saul Levy, President of the Levy 8 Corporation. And he is an ex-General Electric employee with 9 over 30 years experience. He was one of the principal 10 engineers who developed the large Fermi type boiling water 11 reactors. Saul also has had extensive experience as a 12 consultant to the industry. For instance, he was a consultant 13 to the Kemeny Commission after the TMI accident.
14 Mr. Jim Green, private consultant, 30 years nuclear 15 operations and maintenance experience, 10 years with the 16 U.S. Navy and 20 years with the Tennessee Valley Authority.
17 We have Mr. Jim Neeley, President of Nuclear Power la Consultants Company, with over 25 years experience in nuclear 19 engineering and aanagement, relating to both water cooled and 20 gas cooled reactors.
21 Mr. Leo Lesser is presently an employee of the 22 Management Analysis Company. He has 30 years experience in 23 nuclear operations. He is an ex-superintendent of the Cooper 24 Nuclear Plant and he was a General Electric employee in
' 25 Richland, Washington, where he was an operations supervisor at
l k) 1 the Hanford reactors.
2 The last of the group of six is Mr. Murray Miles, 3 ex-Navy with over 25 years experience with Admiral Rickover.
4 And he was responsible to the Admiral for the development of 5 nuclear technology, especially the technology relating to 6 radiological p'rotection. Presently, Murray is a consultant to 7 the industry in radiological protection.
8 The oversight Committee gave its initial assessment 9 report to the Detroit Edison Chairman and the Board of 10 Directors in early February of this year. Our findings, which 11 were in considerable detail, pointed out a lack of management 12 effectiveness, which we believe to be caused by poor leadership, lack of teamwork, and the need to have more
{ 13 14 management with recent commercial nuclear plant operating 15 experience.
~
16 Our review of the management at Fermi was expedited 17 because four of our, members were already in key monitoring 18 positions to observe the company activities. Three are 19 regular members of the Fermi Safety Review Board and one 20 member is a full time advisor to the plant manager.
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: That is Leo Lesser?
22 MR. CALHOUN: That is Leo Lesser, yes, sir.
23 Briefly, the Committee findings were -- and most of 24 these have already been mentioned -- there was a lack of
'- 25 commercial operating experience. However, some of the
48 1 employees had had Naval operating experience and several of s
2 the supervisors had assignments for short periods of operating 3 plants. ,
4 Fermi-2 leadership seemed to be lacking. Management 5 or managers were reluctant to define goals. The l
l 6 accountability of managers and supervisors was missing in some l
7 cases. Managers failed to hold subordinates accountable.
8 There was management ineffectiveness, lack of effective 9 teamwork. Planning did not seem to be effective. There was 10 an excessive amount of time taken to implement important 11 management directives.
12 Also, regarding the organization at Fermi-2, the 13 division of responsibility was not well balanced in the 14 engineering group. The quality assurance organization did not 15 report to a level of management consistent with the emphasis 16 placed on quality. In the area of management systems, 17 administrative procedures and controls seemed excessively 18 rigid. There was no integrated system for planning and 19 schedule. We asked the company to make a written response to 20 each of the management deficiencies I just enumerated.
21 Also, we made six specific recommendations. Hire 22 one or more people with commercial operating experience to 23 head key positions. Provide an advisor to the Vice President 24 of Nuclear Operations with previous commercial experience.
25 Emphasize to all side organizations the need to fully support l
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49 1 the plant manager. Establish challenging performance goals at 2 all management levels with performance indicators to measure 3 progress in achieving these goals. Fifth, reorganize the 4 nuclear engineering department. And sixth, acquire an 5 experienced security professional to advise the security 6 organization.
7 The company has responded in a responsible and 8 effective way to our recommendations. Senior management has 9 developed an acceptable program to prepare for plant restart 10 and to carry out the testing required during the startup 11 program. This is reflected in the changes made in management 12 staffing and in the organizational reporting lines, as well as 13 the several improvement plans put in place since NRC issued 14 the 54(F) letter.
15 Progress has been made in implementing these plans 16 and there is a noticeable improvement in management 17 effectiveness since.we made our first report to the Chairman.
18 And more specifically, there is a maturing of plant 19 management, as evidence by a take charge attitude, the 20 attention given to detail and assuring of the sensitivity 21 necessary to satisfactorily carry out NRC safety regulations 22 and reporting requirements.
23 Improvement plans have been implemented that define 24 mission and goals and performance standards. There is 25 evidence that efforts are being made to communicate these l
50 1 plans downward through the plant and department 2 organizations. As Jim just mentioned, two important *. raining 3 programs have been implemented to improve plant operation.
4 Plant licensed operators and other shift members, such as the 5 nuclear engineers and the technical advisors, are being 6 trained to operate as an integrated shift team.
7 Plant operators are being given structured, formal 8 training in the elements and techniques of good plant watch 9 standing. Special emphasis is being given to this training 10 for the non-licensed operators. These two programs should 11 significantly reduce operator errors.
12 There is evidence the company is implementing plans 13 to hold individuals accountable for their actions. Better C]x 14 team performance is evident between the operating, 15 engineering, quality assurance and maintenance organizations.
16 In response to our recommendation to obtain outside 17 commercial operating experience, to fill key management 18 positions, and to improve the overa'll' management at Fermi, the 19 company has hired additional people with previous commercial 20 operating experience and has made several organizational 21 changes.
22 For instance, through the expeditious efforts of the 23 Chairman of the Board and the President, the company has 24 implemented the overview Committee's recommendation to recruit 25 a top level manager with commercial nuclear operating
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51 1 experience. Mr. Ralph Sylvia, formerly with Virginia Electric 2 Power, has been hired to head the nuclear department. As the 3 Group Vice President Nuclear, Mr. Sylvia reports directly to 4 the Chairman of the Board an we feel that this was the 5 priority action necessary to improve the management 6 performance of the Fermi-2 organization.
7 Also, 14 other people with outside experience have 8 been hired since January. The company is presently searching 9 for a vice president for engineering services and a nuclear 10 security professional. There is evidence the search will soon 11 be successfully completed.
12 The reporting of the plant support organization has 13 been changed to have it report directly to the plant manager.
14 This strengthens the manager's control of activities for which 15 he is ultimately responsible. The Director of Nuclear 16 Engineering has been replaced.
17 And as Jim,said, the Quality Assurance organization 18 at one time reported to the President of the company and that 19 reporting organization has now been changed to report directly 20 to Mr. Sylvia.
21 A new Supervisor for Simulator Training has been 22 appointed and he reports directly to the Vice President of 23 operations, thereby putting additional emphasis on training.
24 The Radiation and Chemistry Supervisor now reports directly to 25 ,the plant manager.
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52 1 Thus, good progress is being made on implementing 2 the remainder of our recommendations and several other 1 3 beneficial improvements have been made that were not the 4 result of our findings. And there were several of these.
5 Before restarting Fermi-2, the Independent Overview 6 Committee requested that Detroit Edison provide the Committee 7 written justification for their readiness to restart the 8 plant. We asked that their justification address both 9 material conditions and performance and should clearly define 10 the criteria on which management bases its decision to 11 proceed. This justification, which provides more detail than 12 given in this report, has been written and made available to 13 the overview Committee. A copy has been or will be given to 14 Mr. Keppler of Region III.
15 This completes the Independent overview Committee 16 report. In summary, we believe the Fermi management team has 17 a satisfactory plan.in place, the necessary sensitivity to 18 good management practices, and the ability to successfully and 19 safety resume the operation of Fermi-2.
20 We will continue to advice management and monitor 21 their progress. That completes the report.
22 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Thank you very much. Questions from 23 my fellow Commissioners?
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I just have a few.
25 Six months is a pretty quick time to turn around the
. .-..-.;...-- ; y- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
53 1 range of management problems that you identified in your 2 report last January. Let me say, at the outset, that I 3 thought your report was an excellent one. It was a very 4 candid and open discussion of the situation. I found it very 5 helpful and very thoughtful.
6 I wonder if you could, though, give me a few 7 examples of how, over a six month period of time, things have 8 changed in some of these areas, like accountability. You said 9 that there is evidence of greater accountability, people are 10 being held accountable for their actions. Could you give me a 11 few examples of what's being done?
12 MR. CALHOUN: The company has gone to each one of
~} 13 the managers and specifically gave them -- stated their
.)
14 responsibilities and has established their annual work -- what 15 they're supposed to do for the year. And it's written and 16 they follow up on it. I think they will monitor every three 17 months.
18 One of the key things, I think, for Fermi is that 19 essentially they had a good crew. They had good bodies and it 20 was a matter of proper leadership welding them into a team.
21 And they are now having team building sessions, which I think 22 that you have to do for a new plant, for the people to work 23 together properly.
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: What evidence do you see, 25 in terms of day to day operations of the plant, of this new l l
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- 54 1 teamwork? They're all working together now instead of
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2 working as a group of individuals.
3 MR. CALHOUN: Well, for one thing, they've 4 reorganized so that the support group now reports to the plant 5 manager. At one time, the plant manager didn't feel that he 6 had the responsibility of running the plant. There were too 7 many people telling him what he should do.
8 And by reorganizing and putting the support group 9 under the plant manager, I think certainly his feelings about 10 the plant has changed av1 I detect that that's so.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Is he the guy in charge 12 now?
13 MR. CALHOUN: He is the fellow in charge.
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: And who is that now, in 15 the current position?
16 MR. CALHOUN: Mr. Leonard. He's the plant 17 superintendent, plant manager as he's called at Fermi.
18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: The same guy as at the 19 time of licensing?
20 MR. CALHOUN: Yes.
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: One of your other findings 22 was that there is a reluctance to face facts, identify l 23 problems, establish their sources or root causes. Could you I
24 give me a couple of examples of how that's changed? That 25 sounds almost like an attitude problem.
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55 1 MR. CALHOUN: It would be hard for me to give you a l 2 good example on that one. Now the plant has' addressed it in 3 the report that's just been issued. They address it -- well, 4 it really gets down to a sensitivity of the NRC requirements, 5 is the way I look at it. They now know that they have to --
6 when they run into a problem -- shut down and investigate it.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: And you feel that message 8 has gotten across?
9 MR. CALNOUN: I see that message has clearly gotten 10 across to the Fermi-2 pecple.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: One of your 12 recommendations was to provide an advisor for the Vice 13 President of Nuclear Operations, who is Leo Lesser. He was in 14 a different capacity at the time that the plant got its 15 license, at the time that the rod pull incident for example.
16 What made you decide that he should be given a -- well, how 17 does the role differ? And if it is a bigger role now, what 18 made you feel that that should be something that should be 19 done? And in particular, do you feel that he was listened to 20 before?
21 MR. CALHOUN: We had a sense that he didn't talk to 22 Vice President of Operations much, and Leo had the feeling 23 that he wasn't listened to properly.
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Just in the rod pull 4 \ 25 incident or in general?-
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56 1 MR. CALHOUN: Well at the time it was a general
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2 feeling that Leo had, and I think that situation has improved 3 considerably.
4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Okay, good.
5 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Fred?
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I have one question. You 7 have been candid in your assessment and evaluation. I'm going 8 to challenge you a little bit now. How many of these problems 9 do you think you would have picked up and how close to today's 10 report would a report have been if you had done it a year 11 befora you did it?
12 MR. CALHOUN: It really gets down to the thought 13 that we have got to create a team that works together and 14 somebody in charge that is sensitive to the NRC issues.
15 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Do you think you would have 16 picked up your --
i 17 MR. CALHOUN: I -- I'm not sure. Of course, I've 18 been through it several times, and of course if I had put that 19 priority and looked hard at it, I would have picked it up.
20 But I'm not sure that I would have zerced in on the priorities 21 problem.
22 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Sounds like a pretty honest answer f
23 to me.
24 (Laughter.]
25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I was hoping you would say,
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57 1 we sure would have, because --
. ~s 2 [ Laughter.]
3 MR. CALHOUN: If you point me in the right direction 4 I would have. Here was a plant in trouble, definitely in 5 trouble, and we went right to the heart of the matter.
6 But it's hard to see, as the Vice President in 7 charge of the operation, to always be able to see really all 8 such things.
9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Thank you.
10 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Well let me just thank you very 11 much. I think you have done a great service not only for 12 Detroit Edison Company but for all of us here, and a very
^
13 thoughtful and useful report. Thank you very much.
14 MR. CALHOUN: Thank you.
15 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Mr. McCarthy, Chairman of the Board 16 and Chief Executive Officer of Detroit Edison.
17 MR. MC CARTHY: Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, the 18 first thing I'd like to do is introduce a gentleman who has 19 been referred to at least twice today, Ralph Sylvia, who is 20 cur new Group Vice President for Nuclear Operations. And you 21 have heard his qualifications and his past background in the 22 nuclear business.
23 I'd like to say that Ralph Sylvia is not just a 24 person who was hired to come in and spend a year or so at 25 Detroit Edison and get us over what has been a very hard time;
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58 1 this is a career move, a career job. He is a senior officer m.
2 of our company and I expect him in the future -- and he has 3 many years in his future I hope -- to advance in our company, 4 not just solely limited to the nuclear business. And I say 5 that because I personally don't believe very much in getting 6 one-time shots in the arm and to look over and to do things 7 and then go. And that's one of the reasons that cur 8 recruiting took a while. I think we did the right thing, and 9 I'd like to ask Ralph to join me at this time if that's okay.
10 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Certainly.
11 MR. MC CARTHY: A number of you have raised the 12 central management question about how did you miss the 13 estimate of the performance of the nuclear operations crew at 14 Fermi, and I assure you that you aren't asking that question 15 anywhere near as hard as I have asked it, and how we have 16 asked it of ourselves. It's a very complex thing.
17 I think Mr. Stello in his characterization of an 18 organization that was a proficient professional doing a very 19 good job in building the plant, had experience in building a l 20 plant -- and after all, it took a long time to do -- didn't 21 make that transition to the operating mode.
22 I will say that right after we got our low power 23 license, Mr. Keppler and Mr. Davis from Region III visited the 24 plant and they told us that it was going to be a very hard 25 transition, and I was in that meeting, Chuck Heidel, our
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1 President, was in the meeting, Wayne Jens, Bob Leonard and 2 Frank Agosti were in the meeting and we all heard that and we 3 said yes, that's right, it's going to be a hard transition.
4 And it turned out, as you have seen and as we have seen, to be 5 more difficult and really very, very much harder than we 6 thought it was going to be.
7 Sitting here this afternoon, I couldn't help but 8 think that perhaps we as an organization that has been through 9 a hard time, I think successfully, could perhaps work with NRC 10 in the preparation of an analysis of what has gone on, what 11 one should look for from your standpoint and from our 12 standpoint, from the Licensee and from the regulator 13 standpoint; something perhaps to produce and put on at the 14 INPO/CEO meeting in the fall.
15 CHAIRMAN ZECH: I think it would be very useful.
16 And don't just give it to INPO, give it to us, too.
17 MR. MC CARTHY: Okay. I think it would be useful.
18 I think if we both were candid and introspective, I think we 19 could go a long way toward helping people in the future.
20 One of the things we're doing -- and there's been a 21 good deal of talk about the team operation -- we're trying 22 something, we're trying to get our shift operations to look as 23 much as possible like the quality circle idea that is used 24 very successfully in Japan and'has been used in some k 25 industries here. It struck us that the shift as a unit has
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1 all the characteristics of a quality circle; they're together, 2 they get to know each other, they have similar 3 responsibilities, they can be compared to the other shifts so 4 competition comes in, they have all the ideal 5 characterizations of that.
6 And we are beginning a program that I think in a 7 year or so will result really in a quality circle, a degree of 8 excellence; how well did we do on our last rotation of shifts, 9 what should we train for in our week of training that is 10 interspersed with these things. I think it's an idea that we 11 can develop, and I hope to be able to come back at some point 12 and tell you how well that is working.
^
13 I think from the standpoint of factual material, J 14 Mr. Keppler and Mr. Calhoun have presented basically 15 everything that I could present. I don't disagree with any of 16 it. There's a little confusion about who the advisor to the 17 Vice President of Nuclear Operations is, and perhaps a little
{ 18 confusion as to who Quality Assurance reports to now. Quality 4 19 Assurance now reports to Ralph Sylvia, the group Vice 20 President. For a while when I first took direct charge of the 21 plant operation back in I guess it was January, I asked our 22 President to assume that job to get the counter-balancing 23 effect that I think is valuable in QA.
24 Mr. Heidel is still doing a monthly audit on quality
. 25 assurance, again to bring an experienced engineering mind into
l l
61 l 1 what's going on in QA.
^
l 2 My own feeling has been over the past I guess really 3 three or four months one of tremendous improvement in morale 4 and the way thing are looking at the' plant and the way 5 training has been going in particular. The training operation 6 now on the simulator is being done as if that was the plant, 7 not just the reactor that was going on. And there is much to 8 be learned about using a simulator. Are there other 9 communications beside just the reactor; what's going on 10 outside the place.
11 So I think tremendous improvements have been made, 12 and I have a very, very high level of confidence, and in a 13 couple of weeks when the things that Mr. Keppler described to
{)
14 you that are ongoing are completed, they will be able to start 15 up and we'll be able to start up and restore what has been a 16 reputation that has been a good one all along and has been 17 tarnished in the last year or so.
18 Ralph may have some thoughts which -- if that's 19 okay.
20 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Certainly. Go ahead.
21 MR. SYLVIA: I don't have anything planned, but I 22 would like to say I do have a high degree of confidence that 23 we are ready to start up when we finish this current outage, 24 and that we will operate safely and within the regulations of 25 our license.
62 1 I think that the company has done an excellent job 2 in addressing the root cause problems identified by the 3 Independent Overview Committee. They have put in an entirely 4 new management system with well-defined goals and regiment 5 parameters and that addresses the accountability issue quite 6 well, which I think was one of the major problems.
7 We have made numerous organizational changes and we 8 have hired additional people with commercial oper'ating 9 experience, and I think these are the responses to the root 10 cause problem.
11 In addition, we have done specific things that 12 directly address the inexperience concern. I think our 13 training program, our simulator training program, covers 14 everything that was mentioned here today that.you gentlemen 15 thought should be covered. It's not just e program that 16 addresses the rod pull error and what went on in the control 17 room at that point in time; it addresses the overall plant 18 operations with the team concept.
19 We had a human factors expert investigate that 20 incident to determine what could be learned from a human point 21 of view. And this is where the team idea came from, with the 22 shift operations advisor and the shift technical advisor and 23 reactor engineer all participating in the simulator training 24 just as if they were working together in the control room.
l 25 Also, we identified a need to do some supervisory
. . l 63 1 and management training so that the supervision would 2 understand how to better utilize the people working for them 3 on shift.
4 We have also done operator training outside of the 5 control room. We have had quite an improvement in the 6 non-licensed operator training program and how they perform 7 their duties and associated log sheets that they use and the 8 standards for training them on how to do their rounds. And we 9 have posted information on equipment that's a little more 10 difficult to inspect, to give them directions locally on how 11 to do that. We have labeled equipment.
12 We have made many improvements that would help 13 offset the inexperience factor. We have given additional 14 instructions to the shift operations advisors who are people 15 with experience from the industry and licensed on our plant 16 there to advise us.
17 So I don't. agree with something that was said a 18 little earlier about we didn't pay attention. The shift 19 operations advisor wasn't watching the rod pull, he wasn't 20 anymore involved than the shift supervisor was, so I don't 21 agree with that characterization. I think we didn't have a 22 plan, a management plan, to get the advice from him properly.
23 We didn't tell him when to advise us and how to advise us.
24 CHAIRMAN ZECH: And now you have the plan and now 25 you're going to execute it.
64 1 MR. SYLVIA: Yes, sir. And these are some of the 2 specific things we have done to address the inexperience 3 factor. And that, along with addressing the root cause 4 management concerns, gives me the assurance I have that we can
. 5 start up and operate in accordance with our license in a safe 6 manner.
7 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Thank you. Questions?
8 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Two brief ones. One I'd 3
9 like to go back to briefly, Mr. McCarthy, one you addresshd, 10 sort of a soul-searching question a little bit. I appreciate
, 11 the comment about the transition from construction to 12 operation, and I accept that as part of the difficulty. But 13 it also seemed to me certainly when I was out at the plant at 14 the time we issued the full power license about a year ago, i
15 that there were an awful lot of indicators that focused on the 16 operations side. We have talked about a few of them earlier 17 today. ,
18 But the training program -- you really had done a 19 lot on training your operators. You had an outstanding 20 pass / fail rate for your operating staff, you had a good 21 Fitness for Duty program. And one of the things that I guess
! 22 impressed me at the time was the extensive management 23 invo'lvement. You had two corporate managers at the site. You 24 went with me on the tour; it was obvious you were familiar 25 with the plant. You were making notes to yourself as we went
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65 1 on the tour, so it was clear that you had been fairly heavily 7,
2 involved in the project.
3 And yet, things went wrong apart from the transition 4 from construction to operation. You have obviously thought 5 about this a lot over the past six months or probably longer,
! 6 going back a year. What else do you think went wrong? What 7 contributed to the direction that things took over the past j 8 year?
4 9 MR. MC CARTHY: I think probably the single weakest 10 point is the point that all of you, or many of you, have made 1
11 this afternoon, that the individual in charge of that 12 transition was mu'h c more construction oriented than operation 13 oriented. And that that is where the two cultures didn't 14 meet, exactly. That's the only thing I can say.
2 15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Well, you had an advisor 16 at the plant who was a plant superintendent at another plant.
17 MR. MC CARTHY: Of course. All kinds of advisors.
- 18 And as you said, we had a 40 out of 41 pass rate. The 19 individuals went off to other plants and trained and did fine 20 and all that sort of thing. It's one of those things. It's a l
21 very hard human equation to try and balance. And I think now 22 we have come a long way. We have seen something wrong and we 23 have fixed it.
24 The hard thing is to see what's wrong, and I think 25 Jack Calhoun, when you asked him the question that you did, l
1
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66 1 Commissioner Bernthal, -- once you know something is wrong, m
2 you can fix it sometimes. But unless it has been shown to be 3 wrong it's often very hard to say it won't work. And that's 4' true in lots of other fields of human endeavor, too.
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: The second question I have 6 has to do with I guess what I would characterize as the 4
7 attitude problem, and it's been talked about briefly by 8 others today.
9 Your Overview Committee said, " reluctance to face 10 facts, identify problems, establish their sources and root 11 causes, and then work towards timely and effective 12 solutions." I think Jack Calhoun mentioned insensitivity to 13
}
J our requirements and concerns. Our recent enforcement action
/
j 14 talked about the lack of forthrightness and candor with the 15 NRC. Quite frankly, I would have gone a step beyond that.
16 And I think Jack Calhoun said earlier, the lack of a cautious i
17 approach; if in doubt, stop and sort things out.
18 I'd be interested in your perception of the problem, ,
l 19 if it is a problem; and if so, why it occurred. And second, i
j 20 what you've done about it to make sure that if the plant 21 starts up again, that part of the problem, the attitude 22 problem, really is gone once and for all.
23 MR. MC CARTHY: Well in the first place, in my role
! 24 a year and a half or a year ago, I didn't spend three mornings j 25 a week at the plant as I have been for the last six months, l
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67 1 and I guess I'd have to say that many of the characterizations
/,
2 that you just made I would have doubted back then.
3 I think the things that have happened in the last 4 six months and the pointing out of concerns by the Independent s
5 Overview Committee have had a tremendous reaction on the 6 people down there. I think the joining of our forces by Ralph 7 Sylvia with his background has had an equally strong impact on 8 people. ,
! 9 We had, I guess it was in January, a series of 10 meetings put on by a consultant, essentially a seminar on what
~
11 the NRC is all about and what the Licensees are all about, and 12 how do you mesh the personal and human viewpoints of both of
^
13 those grouped organizations so that you can have an effective 14 communication between them. And I think you would be
~
15 absolutely amazed at the viewpoints of some of the individuals 16 on the staff, on our staff not your staff, as to what the role 17 of the NRC was. I don't think they really knew. And that may 18 be true in other places, too. You know, it's hard. I can be 19 very specific about us but I can't be very specific about lots 20 of other people.
21 We tried to impress the need for candor. My 22 absolute belief is that that's the only way to get along with 23 people, no matter what the corporate relationships are; to be 24 candid and try to always develop from them what they know and 25 tell them what you know. And I think that course has had a l
___--_-~~_^ 3 _ _ , XT ';_^ ^ ~~
. . l 68 l
1 big effect.
l l
2 We, I think -- and I think if you ask the Region III 3 people I think they would respond the same,way -- that our 4 relationship has been a great deal different in the past eight 5 or nine months than it was before.
6 That's not to say that during construction our 7 relationship wasn't very good because if you'll remember we ,
8 never had a fine during the nine or ten years of construction 9 of Fermi. And that's because we decided that we were going to 10 do it right. And I think they did do it right.
11 So I don't know if that answers your question. It's 12 a very hard question.
(~N 13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Yes, I realize it's not an L}
14 easy one. Thank you.
15 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Fred?
16 (No response.]
17 CHAIRMAN ZECH: It's always easier in hindsight to 18 look back and perhaps believe that you would take different 19 courses of action. But I think it's important, in your 20 particular case, that you recognize that a lot of these things 21 that we are talking about now, we did talk about before your 22 incident. And although most of us who visited your facility l 23 were very impressed with the construction and the plant l
24 itself, and the management team, the operators -- I think '
25 there still was a very important element to consider. And
69 1 that was shifting from construction to operation.
2 And I think when I was out there we talked about 3 that very point. And also, attention to detail and discipline 4 and the management involvement and all those things. Those 5 are more than words, I think. And it seems to me that perhaps 6 the organization has learned that the hard way. It's hard to 7 describe, I think, what you even mean by management 8 involvement, perhaps, sometimes.
9 But it really is the key when yo't are transitioning 10 from construction to operation. And so perhaps others can 11 learn from your difficulty and I think if you could look back 12 and make such a contribution because it was difficult, you had 13 done a good job. And everyone had every right to believe that 14 things were working together. The only thing was you hadn't 15 transiti'oned yet to the operational phase.
16 And other than that, there was nothing to -- and 17 management involvement, of course, is a big key in that. And 18 you didn't have the experience. So those are things -- and I 19 think your Independent Oversight Committee has done an 20 excellent job, as far as I can tell, in looking into the 21 things. And I think you have been very candid and honest with 22 them, and I think they have, too. But let's learn from this 23 experience. That's the important thing.
24 This is a very important way to learn because it's l
25 so difficult, looking into that crystal ball, when you've done
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70 1 such a good job in construction. So maybe the biggest l 2 contribution you can make is to analyze this very carefully 3 and see -- look at yourself and say what could we have done 4 and how could we have recognized some of the teamwork that was 5 missing and the attitudes.
6- Those are very subjective, very difficult, for 7 anybody to judge. But you were there, you were in the midst 8 of it all, and your people. And perhaps you can make a 9 contribution that might be more useful to us at the NRC, as 10 well as to the other utilities.
11 So I think that's a commendable effort and I hope ,
12 that you will be able to put a fair amount of attention into 13
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that.
14 MR. MC CARTHY: I will.
15 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Thank you very much.
16 Michael Keegan, the Safe Energy Coalition of 17 Michigan. And there's Monroe City County. Do you want to 18 come together, or separately? Is Monroe City County here?
19 Separately? Okay, fine. This is Mr. Michael 20 Keegan, Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan. Proceed, please.
21 MR. KEEGAN: Gentleman, thank you for allowing me to 22 present this afternoon. My name is Michael J. Keegan. I am 23 the Acting Director of the Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan.
24 I am currently a Doctoral Fellow in the Department 25 of Sociology at Bowling Green State University, specializing
._ . _ _ _ _ _ . . m _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ ._ __.
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71 ;
1 in environmental sociology.
l 2 I'm here today representing a constituency of over 3 1,000 concerned citizens of Southeastern Michigan. We are 4 here to demand that licensing hearings for Detroit Edison's 5 Fermi-2 Nuclear Reactor be reopened. Since the original 6 hearings ended in March 1982, several new construction and 7 safety concerns have been uncovered.
8 On February 18, 1986, our organization filed a 10 9 CFR 2.202 and 2.206 petition with the NRC's Office of Nuclear 10 Reactor Regulation, the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, 11 and Region III. The NRC has not yet responded to our ,
12 petition. The NRC must address our allegations and request 13 for revocation of Detroit Edison's operating license before a 14 decision is reached as to restart of Fermi-2.
15 Additional inadequacies have arisen since we filed 16 the petition. One, Detroit Edison's non-disclosure of the 17 lack of documentation for 20 engineering systems. Two, i
18 inadequate capacity of emergency equipment cooling water 19 system, to cool both safety and non-safety systems. Three, 20 degraded grid voltage, which will result in the failure of 21 electrical equipment and engines when there is a brown-out.
22 Four, cracks, scratches, indications, corrosions, pitting, 23 scuffing, minor imperfections on the reactor dome and on the 24 flanges of the reactor vessel.
25 Five, Office of Investigation investigation of Safe
?
72 1 Team. Six, a 1973 fire in which several trailers of 2 documentation were destroyed, perhaps purposefully. Seven, 3 the dropping of the reactor dome onto the reactor vessel when 4 one of four straps snapped. This occurrence made a loud noise 5 which reverberated throughout the building. And eight, 15 6 items which remain open under the multi-plant action document.
7 In a recent statement to the press ~ Region III 8 administrator James Keppler stated that h'ad he known all the 9 loose ends at Fermi-2 15 months ago, he would not have 10 recommended the issuance of an operating license.
11 Unfortunately, there are as many unresolved issues today as .
II2 there were in March of 1985.
13 In addition, Harold Denton, Director of NRC's Office 14 of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, told utility officials in June, 15 "I don't have the same warm feeling about GE containment that 16 I do about the larger, dry containments." There has been a 17 lot of work done on.those containments, but Mark I 18 containments -- especially being smaller with lower design 19 pressure and in spite of suppression pool. If you look at 20 the WASH-1400 Reg Safety Study, you'll find that something 21 like 90 percent probability of that containment failing.
22 Fermi-2 is'the highest powered reactor with a Mark I 23 containment in the nation. SECOM has filed six FOIAs since
- 24 March 1986, all of which have gone unanswered. All of these 25 are beyond the legally mandated ten day response limit. It
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1 appears to us that this has been done purposefully. The 2 consequences of these inactions has been to hamper us in the
- 3. receipt of vital information.
4 Today we have filed an FOIA requesting all 5 documentation between the NRC and Detroit Edison -- including 6 General Electric and all suppliers and consultants --
7 concerning the cracks, scratches, pitting, corrosion, and 8 anomalies on the reactor dome and the flange of the reactor 9 vessel.
10 We fully expect to have that documentation within 11 ten days. If the alleged cracks in the Fermi-2 dome do, in 12 fact, exist, as reported to SECOM, the operation and startup 13 of the reactor could result in another Chernobyl type
. 14 accident. '
9 15 The NRC analysis of restart has fundamental 16 methodological flaws. The NRC will be utilizing information 17 generated by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations and 18 Detroit Edison's Independent Overview Committee to help make 19 decisions on restart. This information is exempt from public 20 disclosure. The ties of these bodies to Detroit Edison 21 Company negate independence.
22 In a related matter, the NRC has relied on Edison's 23 Safe Team analysis of nuclear safety, management, industrial 24 matters, and miscellaneous. It appears to us that the intent 25 of Safe Team is to circumvent information from being addressed
. _ _ _ _ ._.. _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ . _ _ --- - -
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74
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1 by the NRC. Of the 747 nuclear safety concerns presented by 2 the workers to Safe Team, 90 percent have gone unreviewed by 3 the NRC.
4 There are 368 management concerns, 178 industrial 5 matters, and 180 miscellaneous concerns which are reviewed in 6 similar fashion by the NRC. We regard acceptance by the NRC 7 o,f conclusions based upon this methodology to be fatally 8 flawed and totally unacceptable.
9 Recently, this Commission issued a $300,000 fine to 10 Detroit Edison for a July 2, 1985 premature criticality. We 11 consider this fine to be merely tokenism. It serves to 12 reinforce negligent operation and mismanagement of Fermi-2.
13 We consider an unrecognized chain reaction to be a severe i 14 danger to the public. .
15 Because of accumulation of Fermi-2 specific related 16 issues and the unresolved General Electric containment 17 inadequacies, we will ask Congressman John Dingell to hold 18 congressional hearings on the General Electric boiling water 19 reactors.
20 In a statement to the New York Times, NRC officials 21 said " Proceedings on any reactor can be reopened if sufficient 22 new information warrants it." In light of what has been 23 presented to the NRC in our February 1986 petition and that 24 which has been presented today, SECOM demands that the Atomic 25 Safety and Licensing Board reconvene and hold adjudicatory
._n + - - --men- - - m-- ~ ^
75 1 hearings on Fermi-2 license.
2 The NRC has the right, under the Atomic Energy Act, 3 to revoke a license under certain circumstances, willful or 4 careless disregard for requirements, failure to construct and I
5 operate a facility in accordance with the license or technical 6 specifications, or failure to observa NRC regulations.
l 7 These conditions do, in fact, exist with Detroit 8 Edison Company's Fermi-2. This plant represents 16 years of 9 failure and has placed the utility on the brink of 10 bankruptcy. Detroit Edison cannot afford the safe operation
~
11 of this plant. Allowing Edison to operate this plant could -
12 result in a cataclysmic accident.
13 The license must be revoked to protect the health C,]s ,
14 and well being of the residents of Michigan, Ohio, and 15 Ontario. Fermi-2 has the worst start up record of any nuclear 16 power plant ever. It has been rated as one of the nation's 17 worst. To allow this plant to continue with a track record of I
18 16 years of failure is unconscionable.
19 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Thank you. Questions?
i 20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I have one question for 21 the Staff, if I could. When does the Staff intend to respond 22 to the 2.206 petition and will it be before restart?
23 MR. TAYLOR: Yes, we're working on it now and expect 24 a response any time.
( 25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Do you have a specific
. . . .- - - - . . - . . - . - . . ~ . . - - - - - . - - - - - - . . . - . .- . . . . -
76 1 time period? Well, it'll be this month then?
2 MR. TAYLOR: Yes.
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Jim, did you have another question?
4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: No, I think that's it.
5 Yes.
6 MR. BERNTHAL: Well, you know there's a lot of heat 7 in this statement, but I'd like to get some sense of how much 8 light there is. I should think the Staff would want to 9 respond to some of these allegations.
10 For example, do you want to tell us about what the 11 consequence was of this alleged dropping of the reactor dome 12 and the sound that reverberated throughout the building?
13 Anybody want to speak to that?
)
14 MR. KEPPLER: I don't have any information on this, 15 at all.
16 MR. BERNTHAL: Does anybody have any information?
17 Was that a real event or not?
18 MR. KEEGAN: Yes.
19 MR. BERNTHAL: Well, presumably, the utility should 20 know if it was.
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Does anybody want to attempt to make 22 a response to that?
- 23 MR. MC CARTHY
- When was this supposed to be?
24 MR. KEEGAN: Late '78 or '79. '
i 25 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Late '78 and '797 i
I
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77 '
1 MR. KEEGAN: Yes.
- c. -
2 MR. BERNTHAL: This is eight years ago?
3 MR. KEEGAN: This was reported by a whistle blower 4 to us.
5 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Well, has it been officially 6 reported before to the NRC or is this the first time, today?
7 MR. KEEGAN: To my knowledge -- I don't know what 8 has come of it. This is the first I have brought it up.
9 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Thank you. Mr. Keppler?
.' 10 MR. KEPPLER: This has not been reported before and 11 I would suggest that perhaps this gentleman could provids us
. 12 information in regard to that whistle blower.
13 MR. KEEGAN: I will be in contact with GAP to see 14 how to go about this.
15 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Fine.
16 MR. BERNTHAL: I notice that there are one or two 17 other allegations that you make here, that seem to refer to 18 your source. I think you probably ought to, in some way 19 that's appropriate for that source -- if that individual or 20 individuals wish to maintain anonymity, they certainly have 21 the right to do that. But you ought to probably make that 22 information available to the NRC.
23 I would make the comment that, when you commented on 24 the 90 percent probability of containment failing, I'm sure
'-- 25 you understand that that's in the event of a severe core melt
']
7 _
78 1 accident. That's not sort of failing in routine operations
.P 2 and that is not in your statement. That does refer to a 3 severe core melt incident, as I'm sure you are aware.
4 MR. KEEGAN: Yes, that's Mr. Denton's statement.
5 MR. BERNTHAL: That's right, in relation to a core 6 melt accident.
7 What's the story on all of these FOIAs that are 8 supposedly beyond the ten day response limit? Does someone 9 want to comment on that?
10 MR. PARLER: I don't have any information about 11 that, Commissioner. I'll be glad to look into it. I'm just 12 not familiar with anything that's pending on appeal. Perhaps 13 the matters are still being reviewed by the Staff, but I don't 14 know.
15 MR. LYNCH: In the normal course of events, we 16 process those very quickly. Again, as your general counsel 17 has pointed out, as,it works its way through the system, much 18 of the documentation we provide is reviewed very carefully to 19 determine whether it's pre-decisicnal or not. Some of the 20 information is sensitive and I think it takes some time to 21 review whether that information is releasable.
22 Normally, though, we provide it very, very quickly, ,
23 within a very short period of time. But as you recognize, 24 some of these documents have been very, very sensitive.
' 25 MR. BERNTHAL: I'm not sure that's an answer to the i _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . - . - -~ -- - - --"~
-- _ - - . . . - - . - . - - - . - , - - - - ----~~----
79 1 question of whether we are within the legally mandated 2 response time, here.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I think the answer is we 4 are rarely within the ten day limit on Freedom of Information 5 Act requests, for a variety of reasons.
6 MR. BERNTHAL: I guess that means that you don't 7 need to feel alone in not getting your response in ten days, 8 if that's any consolation.
9 MR. KEEGAN: Some of these are over 100 days old, 10 stemming from March. And how can we take part in this 11 political process if we are kept in the dark. And here we are 12 talking about a restart decision. We're talking about the
, 13 disposition of the 2.202 and 2.206 will be established before 14 restart. That's assuming there's going to be a restart.
15 So it sounds as though a determination has already 16 been made on that.
17 MR. BERNTHAL: Well, if there isn't going to be a 18 restart, I guess there is not much need to evaluate them.
19 Let me ask about the 747 nuclear safety concerns 20 presented by the workers of Safe Team, 90 percent of which l
21 have gone unreviewed by the NRC. Does somebody want to clue 22 me in on what happened to those 90 percent? Mr. Keppler?
23 MR. KEPPLER: When we came before the Commission for 24 a full power licensing, we talked about the Fermi Safe Team at 25 great length. The Fermi Safe Team had a number of
. , . , _ . - . - . . . . , . - - . - - - ~~ ~ ' " ' ' ~ ~ ~ ' ' ~ ~ ~~
80 1 shortcomings to it and you will recall, in fact, that the 2 staff took no credits for that effort, in recommending its 3 issuance of the license.
4 The Safe Team concept has been an evolving concept.
5 The Fermi Safe Team was not one that we would hold up to use 6 as a model for othar programs, but we did look at all of the 7 issues that were identified that had any potential safety 8 significance at all and were satisfied that they were 9 resolved.
10 MR. BERNTHAL: So what you're saying is that you 11 have gone through those files and reviewed those documents and you have considered any of those issues that you felt had 12 s 13 safety significance?
Cs) 14 MR. KEPPLER: Th's ones that were developed to the 15 extent that they could be reviewed. The process itself was 16 not a very good process and I tried to explain to the 17 Commission that, in, recommending issuance of the license, we 18 really took no credit for that program.
19 MR. BERNTHAL: Okay.
- 20 MR. KEPPLER
- If I could, I would just say it's hard 21 to react to issues that are dumped on us with this time 22 frame. But I think there are some of these we know the answer 23 to. There are some that we don't know. And to those that we 24 don't have information, we will have to pursue it.
5 25 ,
CHAIRMAN ZECH: Fine, okay.
81 1 Yes, Mr. McCarthy?
2 MR. MC CARTHY: I would just like to comment on 3 Safe Team. Our Safe Team was the first Safe Team. It is used 4 now as a generic name. I believe we had the first safe Team.
5 And the purpose of Safe Team was to allow individuals who 6 worked at the plant, who were associated with the plant in 7 some way -- including construction people who were there for a 8 short time -- to tell us, in complete anonymity, what they 9 thought was going on at the plant and if they had any 10 questions, they would be exposed, they would be involved, they 11 would be written down, they would be investigated, and th,ey 12 would be completely available to the Nuclear Regulatory 13 Commission.
14 The purpose of it was to prevent a person coming in 15 eight years later and alleging that the reactor dome, as he 16 calls it, fell with a loud clang. The purpose was to find out 17 about things so that things could be done about them, so that 18 we could proceed in an orderly and safe way.
19 That was the purpose of Safe Team and I think it 20 succeeded better than has been mentioned here today.
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Thank you very much, Mr. McCarthy.
22 I appreciate it.
23 MR. KEEGAN: May I respond to that?
24 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Yes, you may.
'. 25 MR. KEEGAN: As you know, we have hired the
- m - m- v - , - - - - w, ,,, -,
82 1 Government Accountability Project to take whistle blower 2 allegations. We have a number of people who reported to the 3 Safe Team who were fired and who are currently involved in 4 legal suit against Detroit Edison. And I believe that a couple 5 of them have won. I believe I have a lawyer here from GAP who 6 may be able to speak to that better.
! 7 CHAIRMAN ZECH: That's fine. I think that you have 8 told us what you wanted to tell us.
9 I would only say that I would like the Staff to look 10 at the allegations that have been made responsibly. And if 11 there's anything that we should look at, I would hope that 12 you'd do so. I expect you to do so.
13 I just wanted to say, though, this is a serious 14 business we are all about, Mr. Keegan and we really do have a 15 great responsibility to the American people, to our country.
16 We want to do what's right. It doesn't help us too much to 17 have things brought,to us at the last minute, that hasn't been 18 officially brought to the Staff or to the Commission, that 19 sound very serious.
20 We will look into what you've told us here, but if 21 you are really serious about getting something done, it would 22 be most helpful if it happened in 1978 or '79, to have brought 23 it to us long before 1986.
24 Mr. Bernthal?
25 MR. BERNTHAL: Yes, I was just going to ask -- as I i
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83 1 gather Jim, Mr. Keppler you scanned through some of this.
, 2 You've indicated that you're not aware of this reactor dome 3 incident. Are there any others that, in your judgment, you'd 4 point to as matters that you're going to have to take a look 5 at quickly and check out?
6 MR. KEPPLER: I don't know what Item 8 is.
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I was wondering about that 8 myself. Does anybody know about the 15 items under 9 multi-plant action document? It's a long number, I won't read 10 the number. What does that mean? Anybody know?
11 MR. KEPPLER: I don't know uhat Number 6 is.
12 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Maybe the Project Manager can help 13 us out.
14 MR. LYNCH: Recently, the staff sent out a letter to 15 all utilities requesting them to respond on the record for us 16 to implement our GIM system, Generic Items Methodology I think 17 it is. Basically we probably knew the answer, but what we 18 wanted to do was have the utilities respond as to where they 19 stand with respect to many of the multiple plant actions.
20 Now, many of them are anticipated not to be resolved 21 until 1988, '88 or '90. That is not news to the Commission or 22 the staff. Some of them basically are awaiting generic 23 resolution of problems that have been a long time coming.
24 Basically, I think what Mr. Keegan is referring to 25 is that since some of the generic items have not been closed v --a-
.a --
e D 84 1 or will not be resolved, for example, for NUREG-0737 Rev. 1 7
j 2 until sometime in the future, I think he's referring to those 3 items. I have not discussed this with him but that's the way 4 I interpret it.
5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: So what you're saying is 6 that those items are not unique to this plant.
7 MR. LYNCH: They're not unique to Fermi. They are 8 standard throughout tha industry, and basically it's the 9 implementation of 0737 and Rev. 1 to 0737.
10 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: This 1973 fire is 13 years 11 ago. How long have you known'about that one?
12 MR. KEEGAN: That is common knowledge in Monroe.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Mr. Keppler, I thought you 14 said you didn't know about that.
15 MR. KEPPLER: I'm not aware of that issue.
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: It's common knowledge in 17 Monroe. .
18 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Any other questions?
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: One quick comment. First 20 on the FOIA requests, I would agree that three months is 21 getting pretty long. We don't usually make the 10-day 22 requirement, quite frankly, but we can do a lot better than 23 100 days. I think your point is well taken on the FOIA's.
24 It's not always easy to respond to those things, particularly 25 if there's a lot of pre-decisional information that has to be
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85 1 reviewed, but I think that's a fair comment.
.) 2 Second, with my question on the 2.206 Petition, I 3 didn't mean to imply that the decision had been made on 4 restart. My question was a bit to short-handed, and what I 5 was really trying to ask was whether the staff intended to 6 respond to the 2.206 petition before the staff believed that 7 it would be in a position to make a decision on restart. And 8 you are quite correct to point that out, and that would have 9 been a much better way to phrase the question.
10 And the third item I think I would mention is the 11 Mark I containment question. I think that that is a serious 12 question. It's one that we have talked about among ourselves 13 a bit and it's something that I think we do have to look at in 14 greater detail. I think it's a concern not just for this 15 plant; it's a generic issue for all of the Mark I 16 containments. And I think notwithstanding Fred's comment 17 earlier, it's one that we should pay attention to.
18 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Anything else?
19 (No response.)
20 All right, thank you very much.
21 MR. KEEGAN: Thank you very much.
22 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Monroe City-County, Richard 23 Petticrew and Jon Eckert. Please proceed, gentlemen.
24 MR. PETTICREW: Mr. Chairman and members of the 25 Commission, I'd like to take this opportunity on behalf of the
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86 1 Monroe County Board of Commissioners to thank you for allowing 2 us on the agenda. I'd also like to extend my appreciation to 7
3 Mr. Keppler and Mr. Greenman for the information and keeping 4 the County Board informed of the status of Fermi-2.
5 My next comment is with regard to the meeting we
- 6 attended here on March 12th when Sister Bocce referred to the 7 letter from Governor Blanchard, the Governor of the state of 8 Michigan, on the unmet needs in regard to ambulances in case
- 9 of an accident at Fermi-2, which the Governor's letter is 10 still in effect. And we forwarded you in the last week or so 11 a list of the availability of the ambulances. And of course 12 in that meeting we didn't have a chance to -- but we were not 13 on the agenda, and we forwarded the letters to you immediately 14 after that.
15 Also then there was some discussion on the common 16 care centers which I would like to have Mr. Eckert, our j 17 Director of Civil Defense, elaborate on.
18 CEAIRMAN ZECH: Thank you.
19 MR. ECKERT: I believe at the March 12th meeting, 20 Commissioner Zech, you indicated to Sister Bocca that that had i
21 been litigated, as far as the special care facilities and the 22 transportation issue. She brought that up at that meeting.
- 23 It was indicated that the County had made no attempt 24 to take any steps forward in regard to those issues, and I 25 forwarded you on June lith --
2
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I 2 statement, but perhaps I did.
3 MR. ECKERT: I think you did.
4 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All I do remember is that I did 5 remember to say something to the effect that I had hoped that 6 the utility could work with the good sisters to resolve their 7 problem. I remember that very well. Go ahead.
8 MR. ECKERT: As indicated in our letter to you, 3
9 there was a task force which was assigned that particular 10 project and has been working diligently on it over the past 11 year. We awaited for a long period of time a report from the
] 12 Michigan Depart'ent m of Public Health on the number of vehicles i
i 13 for transportation. We have that report, we have forwarded it 14 to you. We do have an adequate number of ambulances available 15 to Monroe County for movement of homebound individuals and 16 special care needs.
17 So we wanted to, once and for all, lay that to rest, 18 that the County is moving forward on this as we are the 19 planning process, very diligently. That's all I had.
20 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Have you satisfied the sisters' 21 concerns?
22 MR. ECKERT: Sister Paula Maria sits on that task 23 force and on the special care facilities, and she was in 24 agreement that this plan should be sent out to the rest homes 1
! l 25 and so forth for their approval.
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88 1 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Fine. Thank you very much. Is a
2 there anything else, gentlemen?
3 MR. ECKERT: I believe there was also mentioned at 4 the last meeting if I recall something about adequate siren 5 coverage. During that period from March until now, Detroit 6 Edison agreed to install an additional 21 sirens in Monroe 7 County, bringing the total to 51. And I addressed the County 8 Board with this, and as I did them I will tell you that I feel 9 that number is adequate. I'm not a siren expert, but I do 10 believe that number will be adequate for warning the general 11 public. And up until this time I don't believe it was.
12 So I think the County -- or at least I'm satisfied 13 at the present time with that type of warning system.
14 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right, thank you very much.
15 Before you leave, any questions?
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Just one quick followup on 17 the trans.)ortation arrangements. I take it from what you are 18 saying that that still isn't completely closed out yet? What 19 you have done is you have developed your plan including the 20 identification of vehicles that would be available; you are 21 sending that out now for comment to the local folks, including 22 the sisters?
23 MR. ECKERT: What we did is ask the -- we had 24 approximately the need for 170 ambulances. By getting the 25 total number of ambulances from the Michigan Department of ,
O b 89 1 Health, which are licensed not only in Michigan but in Ohio, 2 and that's the surrounding counties, it gives us a total of 3 470 ambulances available in that area, in the tri-county 4 area. So that's more than adequate to move our homebound and 5 our rest home people that need ambulance transportation.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Good. It would be good, 7 the next time we hear from Sister Bocce, to hear that this 8 problem has now, once and for all, been resolved rather than 9 her coming back time and again saying it still isn't fixed.
10 CHAIRMAN ZECH: I would agree with that.
11 MR. ECKERT: As we move forward with this we'll be 12 happy to send you people the signed plans and so forth that
/N 13 will be signed by all the individuals.
y/
14 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Thank you very much.
15 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Are we to understand th,en 16 that the concerns of the sisters there are resolved now? I 17 mean, I realize you, don't want to speak for them, but --
18 MR. ECKERT: I can't speak for ther..
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: They're a step short of 20 that.
21 MR. ECKERT: We have worked very hard with them 22 diligently, and hopefully -- at least I feel that with their 23 participation in the planning process and now knowing what has 24 been the big question for a number of years, how many 25 ambulances are available, I feel that question should be
90 1 resolved.
) 2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Okay. But what's the step 3 short then that you're referring to?
4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I gather what they've done 5 is identified the number of ambulances available and the plan 6 for how they would be used; they've sent that out now to 7 everybody to ask if that's satisfactory. So the one step o 8 short is they haven't heard back yet from them, I think, 9 saying we're satisfied now.
10 MR. ECKERT: I would hope they'd be satisfied.
11 ' COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: We hope they're satisfied 12 with you; we hope that you've solved the problem.
13 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Anything else? All right, thank you 14 very much.
15 The Commission has been briefed today by the NRC 16 Staff and by others on the status of Detroit Edison's efforts 17 to comply with the NRC requirements preparatory to an NRC 18 decision to lift the confirmatory action letter and permit 19 operation above five percent power.
20 At this time I'd like to pose the question that I 21 posed earlier in the meeting to my fellow commissioners:
22 Based on the Commission's imposed on the recent enforcement 23 action, the staff's planned involvement in oversight and the 24 Licensee's performance improvement program, do you endorse a 25 decision by the staff to allow the restart of Fermi-2 when the i
I
a 6 91 1 staff determines that they are satisfied that the Licensee and
,) 2 the plant are ready for restart?
3 All those in favor say Aye please.
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Let me make a comment before 5 we vote on that, if I may.
6 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Certainly.
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: The one thing that I would
- 8 like the staff to do, obviously, based on the discussion here 9 today -- and I think the public deserves to have this, and I 10 would suggest it be made public -- is to provide me and the 11 Commission with a point-by-point response to these issues that 12 have been raised by the Safe Energy Coalition here so we 13 understand and the public understands exactly how those have C.)s 14 been dealt with.
15 Beyond that, I'm prepared to --
16 CHAIRMAN ZECH: I agree. I certainly assumed I had 17 that kind of a commitment from the staff ahead of time to look 18 into those allegations, all of them, and satisfy yourselves 19 and ourselves that they can be resolved if there is problems '
20 there, prior to restart. Is that a commitment I have from the 21 staff to do that?
22 MR. STELLO: I don't want to use the word resolved 23 because if we have to have a discussion with the --
24 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Well you pick another word then. I 25 just want it --
4
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. o 92 1 MR. STELLO: We will make every effort to give you 2 the status on where we stand. If it involves pursuing 3 allegations, it's taken us many more than months to even have 4 a --
5 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Certainly. We don't want any safety 6 items that we're concerned about.
7 MR. STELLO: We won't have any of those. Those will 8 all be resolved.
9 CHAIRMAN ZECH: That's what I mean as far as 10 resolved is concerned. Any other allegations to be looked 11 into as appropriate.
12 Anything else?
13 (No response.)
(~N
\si 14 Then I won't repeat the question, but do you endorse 15 the decision by the staff, when they are ready to make the 16 decision, for restart? All those in favor say aya.
17 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Aye.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Aye.
19 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: Aye.
20 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All those opposed?
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I'm going to say no at the 22 moment because I want to reserve judgment a bit on this case.
23 And quite frankly, I'd like to see the 2.206 petition from the 24 staff before I make a judgment on whether I'm comfortable with 25 the staff's position on this case.
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1 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right. Do you want to reserve l p '
i 2 decision completely or do you want to vote against.it for now?
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I'd say I'd vote against 4 right now giving the staff the absolute authority to go ahead.
5 , CHAIRMAN ZECH: So the vote is three to one.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Right.
7 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right, fine. The meeting is 8 adjourned.
9 (Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the Commission meetihg was 10 adjourned.]
11 12 13 C.S )
14 15 16 17 ,
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 l
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^
.) 2 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 3
4 This is to certify that the attached events of a 5 meeting of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission entitled:
6 7
TITLE OF MEETING: Discussion /Possible Vote on Fermi Restart (Public Meeting) 8 PLACE OF MEETING: Washington, D.C.
9 DATE OF MEETING: Monday, July 7, 1986 10 11 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 12 transcript thereof for the file of the commission taken
{~'N 13 stenographically by me, thereafter reduced to typewriting by 14 se or under the direction of the court reporting company, and 15 that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the 16 foregoing events.
17 '
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MAJOR PROBLEMS
- 1. INADEQJATE MANAGEN NT
- 2. ADMINISTPAT!vE DEFICIENCIES - PLNIT OPERATIONS a
- 3. ENGINEERING DESIGN DEFICIENCIES
- 4. SECURITY PROBLEMS -
- 5. HARDWARE PROBLEMS e
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PROBLEM: INADEQUATE MANAGEMENT ACTION: -
INCREASED INVOLVEMENT OF CED QA REPORTING TO PRESIDENT ESTABLISffENT OF IOC NEW SENIOR VP HIRED (EXPERIENCED)
VP ENGINEERING - ACTIVE FECRUITMENT SECURITY DIRECTOR - ACTINE RECRUITENT EXPERIENCED ADVISOR TO VF i
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--- -- ~ ' ~ ' ~ ' ' ' ~ ' ~ ' " ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ' "
PROBLEM: ADMINISTRATIVE DEFICIENCIES - PLANT OPERATIONS ACTION: REACTOR OPERATIONS IMPROVEMENr PLAN RJCLEAR OPERATIONS INRONDENT PLAN ENHANCED TRAINING NASS AND SOA PRESENCE IN CONTROL IDOM OPERATIONS STAFF CONTROLLING WORK e
Y e
. - ~ . - - , - - . - - - _ . . - - - - - . . . . . , --.-.-
'd 2 MAJOR DETROIT EDISON COPPANY CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO PRECLUDE REPETITION OF EVENTS OF JULY 1, 1985 ikNAGEENT IMPROVEMENTS PtWED ltJCLEAR ASSISTANT SHIFT SUPERVISOR FROM SS OFFICE TO
" HORSESHOE" AREA 0F CONTROL ROOM
. DUTY STATION OF SOA M0vED TO CCNTROL ROOM
. PUT NSS IN CONTROL OF WORK IN PLANT DURING HIS SHIFT; PARTICIPATES IN WORK PLANNIfKi EETINGS
. ROLE OF NUCLEAR SUPERVISING OPERATOR CLARIFIED TRAINING
. CONDUCTED 2-DAY WORKSHOPS FOR MANAGERS / SUPERVISORS TO INCREASE SENSITIVITY AND RESPONSIVE TO SAFETY / REGULATORY ISSUES CONDUCTED TRAINING TO ASSURE THAT ROD PULL SHEETS ARE UNDERSTOOD BY USERS PROVIDED SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO OPERATING SHIFTS CONCERNING CONTROL R0D MOVEMENT l . DEVELOPED A SPECIAL TRAINING FILM ON THE EVENTJ REQUIRED VIEWING BY F S
. PhDE SIMJLATOR TRAINING CONSISTENT WITH REACTOR
, OPERATIONS l
MAJOR DETROIT EDISON COPPANY CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO PRECLUDE REPETITION OF EVENTS OF JULY 1, 1985 (CONTINUED)
INCREASED AUDITS
. INCREASED INVOLVEN NT OF OPERATIONS ENGINEER BY REVIEWING ACTIVITIES AGAINST PLANS
. UNANNOUNCED OBSERVATION OF SHIFT OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES BY SUPERINTENDENT OF OPERATICNS ADVISOR TO PLANT MANAGER C0hEUCTS SURVEILLANCES OF CONTROL ROOM
. MANAGEENT TO MONITOR PLANT FERFORMANCE OTHERS
'~~~
. PLANT P% NAGER OR SUPERINTENCENT OF OPERATIONS MET INDIVIDUALLY WITH EACH NSS, NASS, AND SOA
. INCREASED PARTICIPATION IN REACTOR OPERATIONS BY REACTOR ENGINEER PROVIDED A COVE'1 SHEET / INSTRUCTIONS TO ROD PULL SHEETS; REQUIRES INITIALING Bf USERS REVISED FORMAT OF RCD PULL SHEETS FOR HLP%N FACTORS CONSIDERATION O M M -
. - . - . . . , . ,. . . . . _ -.w., .-w.. .-w,.-.
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PROBLEM: ENGINEERING DESIGN DEFICIENCIES I
- ACTION: REVIEWED AND VERIFIED MODIFICATIONS IDENTIFIED DEFICIENCIES BEING RESOLVED UPDATED DESIGN CALCULATIONS ENGINEERING TESTING THIRD PARTY EVALUATION (ONE SYSTEM)
UPGRADED DESIGN CONTROLS NRCINSPECTIONS 9
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~~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ - "
o o PROBLEM: SECURITY PROBLEMS ACTION:
EXPERIENCED SECURITY DIRECTOR - ACTIVE RECRUITMENT REGULATORY IMPROVEMENT PecoR m INCREASED NRC SURVEIMMCE 9
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. . 1 MAJOR HARDWARE ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS REPLACED TURBINE SYPAss PIPING ENHANCED DIESEL GENERATOR RELIABILITY REPLACED RHR Ptre MOTOR REPLACED BROKEN MSIV SPRINGS; TESTED ALL OTHERS
. COMPLETED EQ AND APPENDIX R MODIFICATIONS COMPLETED SOURCE CHANGEOUT DEGRADED GRID VOLTAGE (UNRESOLVED) 0
__ _ _ _ __ . . . _ - - - - - ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ' '~
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. o MAJOR ITEMS REMAINING BEFORE STARTUP RE50WTION OF REMAINING ENGINEERlhG/ TECHNICAL ISSUES REcomENDATION FROM IOC BRIEFING OF MONROE COUNTY BOARD (PUBLIC)
CED AumoRIZATION NRC AUTHORIZATION 4
-.,. -..... __.--, .,.- ~ . , _ . _ _ _ _ . . . . _ . . . _ , _ , . . . _ . - _ .
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a OTHER REMAINING ISSUES AND PLANS
. 1. ISSUES
- INVESTIGATIONS
- D0J REVIEW ,
-NRCENFORCEMENT
- 2.206 PETITION
- INP0 REVIEW
- 2. E8tgi
- NRC AUGMENTED INSPECTIONS
- MANAGEMENT CONTROL OF FhASED STARTUP m m e 0
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7/3/86 SC'ECULING NOTES 4h TITLE: DISCUSSICN/POSSIBLE VOTE ON FERMI RESTART SCHE:cLE:: 2:00 P.M., MCn AY, JULY 7, 1986 (CPEN)
CupATICn: AppR0x 1-1/2 HPS SPEAKE:S: NEC start 30 MINS *
- JAMES G. KEPPLER, REGICN 111 ADMINISTRATOR
- RICHAPD VOLLMEP, NRR LICENSEE'S INCEDENCENT CVE:StGWT COMMITTEE 13 MINS
- 1 JACK CALHOUN, CHAIRMAN l!CENSEE 15 MINS
- WALTER J. MCCARTHY, CHAIRMAN OF THE 3CAPD AND CHIE: EXECUTIVE OFFICER DETROIT EDISCN l
l SAFE ENEOGY COALITION OF MICHIGAN 3 MINS MICHAEL KEEGAN, ATTORNEY PoNPOE CITv-COUNTV 5 MINS l
- RICHARD PETTICREW, CHAIRMAN MONROE CITY-COUNTY OFFICE OF CIVIL PREPAREDNESS
- JON R. ECKERT, DIRECTOR l MONROE CITY-CCUNTY CFFICE CF CIVIL PREPARECNESS I
SPEAKING TIMES ShCWN AE0VE APE APPRCXIMATE.
I CCCUPENTS: - VIEWGFAFHS g
- 6/26/86 LETTER FROM SAFE COALITION OF MICHIGAN, MCNROE, I MICHIGAN
-g
- 6/11/86 LETTER F:CM MCNRCE CITv-CCUNTV, CF ICE OF CIVIL
?AEPAREMESS, MCNRCE, MICHIGAN i
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