ML20237K345

Partially Deleted Statement of Me Parker on 851003 Re 850702 Reactor Operator Error at Plant

ML20237K345
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	10/03/1985
From:	Parker M DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20237J518	List: IA-86-245, Discusses 850912 Interview of AB Davis Re 850702 Operator Error at Facility.Davis Would Have Recommended Postponement of NRC Vote for Full Power License If Known of Premature Criticality IR 05000341/1985007 ML20237J515 ML20237J542 ML20237J566 ML20237J587 ML20237J620 ML20237J639 ML20237J686 ML20237J708 ML20237J722 ML20237J726 ML20237J741 ML20237J781 ML20237J797 ML20237J810 ML20237J839 ML20237J848 ML20237J890 ML20237J911 ML20237J920 ML20237J948 ML20237J973 ML20237J979 ML20237J991 ML20237K175 ML20237K193 ML20237K199 ML20237K212 ML20237K218 ML20237K226 ML20237K238 ML20237K250 ML20237K263 ML20237K290 ML20237K304 ML20237K316 ML20237K345 ML20237K353 ML20237K370 ML20237K384
References
FOIA-86-245 NUDOCS 8708270148
Download: ML20237K345 (4)

Text

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Mtchael Parker, hereby make the following statement to Sharon Connely, I.

Uetth Logan, and Edward Campbell, who have ioentified themselves to me as Investigators with the Office of Inspector and Auditor, Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I make this statement with no promises of reward having been made to me. This statement is being provided to supplement my previous statement, dated August 14.1985, as requested by Sharon Connely. Director, Office of l

Inspector and Auditor.

I was first informed of a problem with a mismanipulation of control rods at l Fermi-2 when I received a call from Gregg Overback (Assistant Superintant-Operations) after lunch on July 3, 1985, at approximately 12:15 p.m.. He said he wanted to discuss an event that happened on July 1, i

regarding l

an operator error. I met him at about 12:30 p.m. in his office. Eugene Preston, Operating Engineer, was also present.

i Ovarbeck told me that, on the evening of July 1 and 2, there had been an operator error, in that il rods were pulled out of sequence. The correct rod i putI sequence should have been 00 to 04 and they pulled.the rods from 00 to

48. Overbeci stated that the ope ator subsequently reinserted the rods to the srrect position, repulled the rods in the correct sequence and proceeded back

( to 5"/. power. Overbeck discussed the proposed corrective action Detroit i

Edison was talings what action the operator took and that the error might have resulted from their training. In addition, Overbeck told me that Detroit Edison wes taling corrective action which consisted of requiring a second S nowl edgabl e member of the plant staff to oversee future rod pulls,for Groups 3 and 4 O ver bec t- said there was some discussion regarding criticality. He said that accordi ng to the Source Range Monitor (SRM) charts the reactor did not go critical but that. Reactor Engineering believed they might have gone critical based on the computer predictability moc l. He said that "we" have looked at the SRM charts, but he was not specific as to who "we" referred to. I had the impression that Overbeck had l ool'ed at the SRM charts and that he believed the reactor did not go critical based on his review of the SRM charts.

Overbeci indicated that he had little faith in the computer program. Overbeck said they were still evaluating the situation. Overbeck did not elaborate as to why he had so little faith in the computer program.

Overbect' said the Reactor Engineering. Operations and the Technical group were looting into the event. Preston gave me a copy of the Deviation / Event Report (DER). We discussed the information on it. Preston indicatpd that the items circled in red were corrections. The DER stated that the reactor did not go critical and was signed by the Nuclear Shift Supervisor. Overbeck asked me to touch base with him to get the full picture of what had happened. He said I could contact whomever I wanted; however, he preferred me to get back with him 4

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8708270148 870819 PDR FOIA ,-

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bo[ause hd had threo groups looking at the incident and he wanted me to get thn fvil story, j mrheck i operator error.

stated the event could be sensative to licensing because it involved I r e v i ew% applicable portions of 10 CFR to determine if the event was 1 reportable.  !

I called Reactor Engineering to see which reactor engineer was on dut_v at the time of the incident. and learned it was Barry Myers. Myers was {

nut available. so I spoke to Harry Arora, Myers' supervisor. This was a short i

conversation in which I asked where the reactor engineer (Myers) was during the incident and why he had not been f ollowing the instrumentation. Arora said Myers was in the control room but not at the control panel at the time:

he was at his desk in the control room. I then asked why he was not p.aying attention to the control s. The purpose of this conversation was to see why the Peactor Engineering wasn't following the rod pulls: it was not to discuss 1 the criticality as I did not believe Arora had any more information than I had .

Just received from Overbeck. However, I believe we discussed criticality and i Ar ora said his group had been assigned to look into it. I

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I had told Overbeck at the ._ vi w l uci on of the July 3 meeting with him that I apprecleted the contact, and as far as I c v..t i d see. this was a l evel IV or V vi ol at i on (minor significance) - a failure to follow procedures.

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Ms n e. t conversation regarding the event was wi th Frank Agosti (Manager He was not aware of the event.

i Nuclear Operations) on July 5.

I had .o casual conversation on July 5, with Harry Arora while leaving the I don't cofeteria. He told me they were having a meeting on the rod pull.

Mike, we're remember enactly what he said, but it was something like "Oh, going to have a meeting on the rod pull today".

I l I didn't consider this an invitation, and did not attend the meeting. I believe normall y don't attend the licensee's meetings on a routine basis.

Arora told ene at the meeting because he knew I was concerned over theal I was issue.

so I decided I would let the licensee reach their own conclusion.

tied up with the review of the SAFETEAM at that time.

The ne::t discussinn I had on this issue was when Page 3 of 4

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i l1 declare under penalty of purjury,that the foregoing statement is true to the m

, best of my 6nowledge, based on the fact that almost three I monthe have Subscribed and passed sworn to

' since the above conversations and events tp,~ck place, on the ;i dav of October, 1985 at 37..' _. . 'd._1_. _ .

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