ML20237J797
| ML20237J797 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 07/30/1985 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237J518 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-86-245 LB-85-214, NUDOCS 8708260321 | |
| Download: ML20237J797 (57) | |
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UNITED STATES q i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l i
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- I IN THE MATTER OF:
DOCKET NO: l LB-85-214 ,
0FFICE OF INVESTIGATION INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW (CLOSED MEETING)
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t . 1 LOCATION. NEWPORT,MICHIGdN PAGES: 128 l
DATE: TUESDAY, JULY 30, 1985 i
' information in this record was deleted in accordance with th I n{of Information Act,exegtionsE '
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UNITED STATES QF AMERICA 2 j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i 4
3 l d In the Matter of: } .
i
) Case No. LB-85-214 /
5 OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION )
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW ) -
6
______________)
7 <-
The Deposition of
] 1 taken pursuant to Notice before me, Elizabeth.Diann Ferguson, Notary l 9
Public, in and for the County of Wayne, (acting in Monroe . County) ,
to l
at 6400 Dixie Highway, Newport, Michigan, on Tuesday July 30, !
11 1985, commencing at about 2:05 p.m.
12 13 APPEARANCES:
I 14 l UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .
Pield Office Region III
' 15 l l 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137
('
16 (By: James N. Kal)anan, Esq,)
17 3
Appearing on behalf of Nuclear Regulatory Commission '
l
'. 18 JOHN H. FLYNN, ESQ.
! 2000 Second Avenue
- 19 Detroit, Michigan 48226 i
20 Appearing on behalf of Detroit Edison
\
3 21 }
l 22 (continued) 24 25
) /
l' s s
1 1 APPEARANCES: (continued) 2 PETER A.MARQUARDT, ESQ.
2000 Second Avenue ,
3 Detroit, Michigan 48226 i
4 Appearing on behalf of Detroit Edison s l 6 ALSO PRESENT:
7 Terrence Lang and ;
Thomas Randazzo B
9 Elizabeth Diann Ferguson, CSR-1347 to Court Reporter 11 12 1
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3 Newport, Michigan 2 Tuesday, July 30, 1985 3 at about 2:05 p.m.
l 4 -
t 5 MR. KALKMAN: For the record, this is 6 the interview with who is employed by the.
7 Detroit Edison Company; the location of this interview is 8 the Fermi II Nuclear Power Station.
p S 9 Present at .his interview areg l 10 Detroit Edison Counsels, Peter Marquardt, and John Flynn, 11 and the NRC inspector -- reactor inspector, Terrance Lang, 12 and NRC investigator, James Kalkman.
l 13 As agreed, this intereview is being 14 transcribed by the Court Reporter Elizabeth Ferguson.
15 MR. MARQUARDT: I think we ought to l
16 clear up one thing. 1
$ 17 Nobody has asked on this one, and we I
j 18 don't have a.ny objection to it being transcribed. There 3 i i
- 19 was no agreement to this as such.
20 MR. KALKMAN: Okay.
l j 21 This is a passive agreement?
i 22 MR. MARQUARDT: Yes. ?
23 MR. KALKMAN: Okay.
)
24 The subject matter of this interview l l
25 concerns the reactor operator error, on which occurred on j i
/
1 July 1, 1985, at the Fermi II Nuclear Power Station.
2 ould you please stand and f
3 riase your right hand?
4 . . -
5 1
6 after having first been duly sworn to tell the truth, l l
7 the whole truth and nothing but the truth, testified 8 upon his oath as follows:
i g . . .
10 EXAMINATION 11 BY MR. KALKMAN:
12 o what is your position with Detroit EdiPon? j j
13 A Nuclear supervising operator.
14 Q And what are your functions?
15 A I carry out the responsibilities as Control Room Operator, 1
16 and also I supervise personnel under me to carry out i 17 functions as PPO's and APPO's.
I l , 18 Q Could you, for the record, tell us what PPO and APPO stands l l l 19 for?
I j 20 A PPO is the Power Plant Operator, and APPO is Assistant
! 21 Power Plant Operator.
i*
22 Q Okay.
23 As a Control Room Operator, is your 24 function to perform the procedures and so on necessary to 25 control the reactor?
I
}
I, . ..
i A That's correct, sir.
2 Q Now, on the evening of July 1, would you recall for us the :
)
3 events that occurred from the time you came on shift, and l 4 up to the time that you started your normal functions as 5
a reactor operator? !
6 A Okay.
i 7
Sir, approximately -= I came in a g little bit earlier that night, approximately five or g 10 minutes earlier t hat night, so I would place it at 10 about 10 until 11:00.
ii I went behind the on-duty reactor 12 operator, watched him pull Group II rods through the 13 48-position, watching the nutron monitoring as he was 34 pulling. I looked at the pull sequence sheets.
I 35 I did that for approximately 10 or 16 15 minutes. At that time, I asked him if he was prepared
'l 37 to give me a turnover, and he said, "Yes, I am." So I
- c 8
3g asked him to show me where we are on the pull sheet. He j
! l 19 showed me where we are on the pull sheet, what step we j i
[
a 20 were on, s 21 I asked him had he had any talk with ir 22 the reactor engineer on what steps we might be critical at, 23 and he said yes, he had. They said approximately step 156, 24 and that was based on their last critical that they had 25 pulled, and they were at -- at this time, we were at 100 6
k 1 degress hotter, so I told him, I was talking to my 2 supervisor, and from that point, with the botter l 3 temperature, we would go critical with a few more rod 4 . pulls due to temperature deviation. He agreed with me.
5 I saw on duty the afternoon angineer. .
6 I asked him the same question that the critical would'be 7 at the -- approximately the 156 step.
8 Q Let me stop you one second.
9 What reactor engineer are you referring 10 to?
11 A The gentleman on the sheet there, Mr. ' Barry Myers. I think f 12 that is his last name'.
13 0 Mr. Myers, this all occurred before you actually started-14 your shift?
15 A Before actually I took the watch, yes,' sir, it did.
16 Approximately before my shift actually
- i 17 took the watch.
,1 is O So Mr. Myers was present?
g
. t.
- 19 A He was present at that time in the general area. He was is j 20 around. Yes, I had asked him.
l 21 Q Did this function, this is the reactor engineer?
ll '
22 A Yes, sir.
23 Q Okay. Please continue. -
24 A well, let me get my thoughts together here. Okay.
25 This is approximately a quarter'after, 7
I maybe about between a quarter and 20 minutes af ter 11:00 2 at that timer and I looked at the pull sheets again, I 3 looked where we were. I looked on the monitor to see what 4 the rod pattern was, where it was at at that times and I 5 maid, "Are you prepared to be relieved?" And be said yes, 6 he is prepared.
7 At that time, I relieved him at the 8 reactor operator's console at - the 603 panel.
9 Q Who was the reactor operator that you took over?
10 A It was Lynn Barker. .
11 Q Now, your shift started at 11:00?
12 A That is when $m come in to turn over, sir. Actually, our 13 shift turn over time is 11:30.
14 0 And you are saying that Mr. Barker stayed on, you had this 15 discussion with him?
16 A Yes, sir.
i 17 Q Between 11:00 and 11:20, there abouts?
18 A Approximate times, yes.
19 There is no clock'right there in front 20 of me to give me the exact times; and I don't have a l
e j 21 watch on me. I did net have 'a watch on me at the time, 22 and neither did he, so these are just approximations of 23 time.
24 Q At any time, either prior to your shift or during this 25 first 20 minutes or so after you came on the shift, did you l 8
i
1- have a meeting with the. shift supervisor?- I i
2 A LNo, sir. l l
3 Q When you relieved Mr. Barker, what step were you at or was 1
4 he at in the rod pull sequence?
5 A I would have to look at the rod pull sheet to tell you i 1'
6 exactly, because my initials are on there. I don't 7 remember at this time. j s Q Can you approximate?
9 A We were on -- somewhere between step 40 and 50.
10 Q And you, at that time, at that step or in that range, you ;
11 and Mr. Barker had discussed going critical at an sarlier 12 step because of the temperature that had been achievad. l 13 A Sir, I had asked Mr. Barker what step the reactor engineer 14 said we might go critical, knowing we might go critical 15 any timer and he said the last start up, they had one 16 critical on step -- approximately 150, something like that.
i- 17 I don't recall exactly; but since we were at a hotter 18 temperature, about 100 degrees hotter, we were going to
- 19 have to pull more rods to make up for that negative 20 reactivity due to temperature to get critical.
l 21 So I said, "Well, I know we are going i*
22 to go critical. " I assumed and calculated-in my mind 23 about 10 pulls more.
24 He said -- he agreed, and I saw the 25 reactor engineer and I asked him, and he said that the last 9
3 time they went critical was about step 150, and I told 2
him about the temperature deviation, and he also confirmed.
3 0 If you had gone to step 156, would that have been in the-4 third rod Group somewhere?
5 A Yes, sir.
6 0 would it have been much further beyond the step where you 7 actually did go to critical?
e A Well --
g Q I don't know what step.
10 Do you recall what step you actually 33 decided to re-insert the rods?
12 A Well, could you define critical for me, sir?
33 i0 Well, what step were you at when you decided to re-insert i
34 the rods?
! 15 A Well, if I looked at the pull sheet, I could tell you is exactly which one it was.
l 37 (Discubsion held off the record.)
gg MR. KALKMAN: For the record, this 39 is a copy of the pull rod sheet sequence B-1. -
! 20 A Step 56 was when I realized that an error had been made.
a j 21 At no time had I ever called the reactor critical and at i
22 no time was the reactor critical.
~ ~ ~
23 24 BY MR. KALKHAN:
25 Q So at step 56, you discovered that there was an error?
l 10
l 1 A Yes, sir.
2 O Why don't we go back to the chronology of time that 3 Mr. Barker turned over the rod pull to you and why don't 4 you go through kind of a step-by-step process to pull us 5 through the events of that time period up until the time 6 that you discovered that there was an error.
1 7 A All right, sir. l
. 8 As you see here on step 38, the first 9 rod 1423 was the first one I withdrew to position 48, as l
10 called by the rod sequence check-off sheet.
l l 11 I continued doing that for the next --
12 to step 45; at that time, we changed sequence from B-1-2, 13 il to B-3-4.
14 J oh, I forgot to mention something here:
i 15 That is the last step on step 44. I 16 got a rod-worth minimiser blocking. I run a Od-7 option I: two to verify my rod positions.
,l 17
!! I re-initialized the rod-worth minimizer ,
- 18
- 19 and the rod block. The reactor engineer was there at that t
j 20 time and he also ran an od-7 option two.
21 You are talking about Mr. Myers?
l O r
22 A Yes, sir.
23 At that time, I recommenced to the 24 0-2 position. I commenced withdrawing the rod to the 48 25 position on step 44.
11
e i Then I pulled the last rod in this ,
2 Group, step 45, rod 3023, to the 48 position, and I _
3 changed my sequence to the B-3-4.
4 Ckay.
O 5 A Okay.
6 .
The next step 46, I took Rod 02, but 7 not noticing that it was at the 0-4 position, I saw 48, 8 sir, and I withdrew that rod to 48. At all times that I 9 am pulling my rod, I am watching my nutron instrumentation, l
l 10 since we are down in the source range, you have the source l
l 11 range monitor and the period meters, I am observing them.
! 12 Also, I am observing your CRD systems 13 .i parameters, my full corp display, and my rod position i
I, I 14 indication, the full rod display at this time.
l 15 As I get out to the position 48, I do i 16 my company checks as prescribed by the procedure; I go W !
!i 17 through and I initial. I do my check-ups as required on l!
g 18 the steel rods, and still only observed it to go to the s
- 19 0-4.
j 20 Q Did you notice that at step 46, which was the first step i9
'j 21 in Group III?
h .
22 A Yes, sir. l I
23 0 Did you notice any fluctuation in the SRM monitor?
24 A Could you explain fluctuation in the SRM?
25 0 Well, did you read any indication on the graph other than i
12
.l
1 a straight line?
2 A I see your prompt jump as you withdraw the rod; and I see 3 a slight increase in the nutron population as you are 4 withdrawing the rod.
5 0 Which is normal?
6 A Yes, sir. ;
7 The sub-critical --
8 0 Okay.
9 A Also around this time, the STA in training has come into 10 the room right around this period of time, and he is 11 walking back and forth watching the level and other 12 indications in the Control Room.
13 Q And that was whom?
14 A John Dewes.
15 Q Is that D-e-w-e-s?
i 16 A Yes.
i 17 I select my neXt rod, which is step 47, y
18 of the 0-2-19 rod, and I pull that one to 48, watching 19 .
my nutron instrumentation, especially my source range and
- l l 20 my period meters, my CRD system indication; and as I said )
1 21 before, my full force display and rod position, and I do 22 my company checks when it gets to the 48 position.
23 I am continuing doing this, and when 24 I get to the step, I do all of these rods the same way.
25 I watch my instrumentation at all times. As I get to step I i i
13
1 56 here, or rod 18-51, I notice on my two upper SRM charts, 2
. there are A & B that my nutron population is too high for 3
where I should be.
4 My period meters are not reacting to 5
what is expected; and I look over here and I notice at the 6
same time that the reactor engineer ~~ excuse me, the 7
STA, John Dewes says, " Hey, I think you might be 8
going critical," and at that time, I realized that something 9
was wrong, and I started putting 1851 back to its proper 10 position.
1 11 j I told him, " John Dewes, go get the 12 shift supervisor. I just made a mistake." He went and 4
'3
[ . gottheshiftsupervisorandtheshiftsupervisorgot{out l there and I was selecting rod 4259 and was commencing to
'I
S l put that back to the 0-4 position.
I
'6 h
- i All of this time, he comes over, he looks at the SRM, takes a look at it.
i 1 I am watching my 18
- nutron monitoring equipment as I put the rods back in; he
,a l ; 18 i 1 looks at it, he goes back behind me. When I get done j 20 putting the rods back'in, I am told to re-commence the j 21 start-up.
22 MR. LANG: Now, the NSS which is 23 Dave Aniol, did he at that time roll back the charts?
24 A No, sir, he did not, because what you could see was still 25 on the chart, what you could physically ses --
14
1 MR. LANG: How much of that chart was 2 actually shown when you looked at it?
3 A Sir, this has been over four weeks. I have a hard time 4 remembering.
5 It would be maybe this much right here 6 if we put it back on the chart.
7 MR. LANG: Would you put a line on a there for me?
9 A Yes.
10 MR. LANG: Those are just approximations?
11 A Yes, just approximations.
12 You also have to remember at this time, l l
l 13 see, right here, I am withdrawing rods.
l 14 ,
MR. LANG: Okay.
15 A I want to point that out, that this period in here between 16 here and here, I am withdrawing rods.
. 1 l3 17 MR. MARQUARDT I think the record I ll
',, is ought to reflect that the two lines he drew are j; 19 approximately eight or nine inches apart?
20 MR. LANG: Yes.
ll
!; 21 I just wanted to know what is on the i !
l' 22 chart at that time. !
23 A Well, that is a close approximation. If we could actually 1 i
24 go and put it on the chart, maybe I could see. J 25 MR. LANG: You are saying at that point, 15 i
r .0
- 1 the humps meaning the part you were going back on where -- 1 i
2 I did not see that. i l
3 A Yes, sir.
4 He did see where I was putting rods 5 back in.
6 If you look at the other SRN charts, 7 the A & B chart, it is much more representative of what 8 is going on.
9 MR. LANG: For the record, you ought i i
10 to tell them what chart this is.
11 A Yes.
12 MR. LANG: This is the SRM chart, j i i 13 A&B.
14 A I think that is the C & D chart.
15 MR. LANG: Oh, the SRM chart is C & D.
1 16 sorry.
i 17 - - -
I
. 18 BY MR. KALKMAN:
'I
- 19 Q Okay.
20 A Can I continue on, sir? ;
- 21 O Yes, s
22 A I had talked to Mr. Lang approximately, I think it was about 23 two weeks ago, the 15th or the 16th; when I talked to him, i 24 he asked me the same questions basically about the critical:
25 and I told him at that time, " Sir, I was not there long i
16 i
, )
l 1
1 1 enough to make a determination as to whether I.was critical l 2 or not'.- I saw that an error was made, and I took l 1
3 corrective action on that."
4 Later on, approximately a week ago, ;
5 I' had had a chance to look at the charts again. They {
6 were being reviewed by the other people besides myself; 7 and I sat down and I have looked at them with nobody -
. e asking me questions and nobody has been -- and I have --
9 that reactor is not critical.
10 Q Are you stating now that based on your review of the 11 graphs, the SRM's --
12 A Yes, sir, I am stating that two days ago when I had a 13 chance to take a look at them again, that reactor is not i
14 critical.
15 I told Mr. Lang on the second, when 16 I talked to him on the 15th when I -- that I had not 3 17 stayed there long enough to make a determination.
I 18 I had saw an error and I took corrective l 19 action on it.
20 Q So you are stating that at the time of the event, the
- 21 evening of July 1 --
! Yes, sir.
22 A 23 Q You did not make the determination?
24 A I had not called the reactor critical because I had not 25 stayed there long enough to make that determination. '
17 l
1
)
, i 1 After getting a chance to take a look . ;
l i 2 at the charts again and without people asking me questions 1 3 and without saying -- without their opinion, I took a -(
1 d
look at that reactor, and it was not critical.
5 on the reactor operator sitting at l 6 the panel I never called the reactor critical.
7 And at this time, you don't think --
! O 8 A No, sir, that reactor was not critical.
9 MR. LANG: When'the NSS came out, did 10 he immediately tell you to resume your power extention 11 towards criticality?
12 A No, sir, he did not.
13 0 I was putting rods -- it would be rods -- l 14 step 56 to step 46 back at this time; and he said continue 15 ! on.
16 MR. IANG : Continue on?
9 3 17 A Inserting rods back to the 0-4 position, which I was doing.
l.
18 I think at that time, Mike was making sure that the rod g
a
- 19 pattern was getting back. I had missed one on two rods i
j 20 that I had taken into the 0-2 position.
j 21 I went back around and I checked each 22 rod and I got it back to the 0-4 position. I run an Od-7 23 option to verify rods at..the proper position.
24 At this time, the NSS was taking a look 25 He goes behind me, at the SRM's while this is going on.
18 I
l
1 and the next thing I know, he said he had made a call to '
i 2 Mr. Preston. He has a DER in his hand, and he has taken 3
some data down, and at this time, I finish up with my !
4 insertion of the rods.
5 At this time frame, I am not exactly i
6 sure, because like I said, I did not have a watch ont so 7
af ter I get the rods inserted, he says -- well, we ccamenced 8 the reactor start-up. ]
l 9 MR. LANG: Well, let me phrase something !
10 here:
11 You are saying he came back and he said i
12 he had called Mr. Preston, and for you td re-start-up 13 j before you finished inserting all of the rods?
14 I A No, sir, l
15 9 All of the rods were already back in.
16 The rods had already been inserted to the 0-4 position.
5 17 I
He came back in, and like I say, he had a DER in his hand, 18 I.
and he had talked to Mr. Preston.
- 19 Since he is behind me, I don't know who '
f j 20 else he is talking to, because I am monitoring my
'; 21 instrumentation that is going on, and I cannot give you 5
22 times, because like I said, there was no watch, and be 23 says -- well, we commenced the start-up.
24 MR. LANG: At any time during this 25 discussion, did he ever pull out the charts?
l 19
1 i A No, sir, because like I said before, because -- i 2 MR. LANG: Well, that is okay.
3 A Okay.
i 1
5 BY MR. KALKMAN: {
l 6 Q How much of a time period are we talking between the time I
7 you asked the STA in training to notify the shift !
8 supervisor to come out? )
9 A Sir, it was immediate, as soon as I realized that I had .
1 10 made the error, I told him to get the shift supervisor.
11 He came out there, I had finished my second rod and I 1
12 started on my third rod, with a few rod speeds of 13 approximately 50-plus or minus 10 seconds.
14 If you take the slowest time, it i
15 would have been two minutes before he got out there.
16 The slowest rod speed time. !
?
3 17 Q And between the time he came out, the shift supervisor ,
18 came out, and the time that you completed inserting the
- 19 rods in Group III --
I j 20 A By the time everything -- approximately 15 minutes, sir.
21 0
- When, during the 15-minute time period did the shif t t -
r 22 supervisor call Mr. Preston? -
23 A Well, I cannot determine that, sir. I have no idea.
24 Q Was it during that time period or was it --
25 A well, I --
^
20 \
I 1
Q Af ter you re-inserted Group III rods, were you on a 2 standby?
3 A Sir, I was on waiting for him to tell me what to do.
4 How long was that waiting before --
0 5 A I don't know, sir. I . cannot give you an accurate time.
6 Q Was it an hour?
7 A No, sir.
e Q Was it a half an hour?
9 A No, sir.
to Q Was it less than 30 minutes?
11 A Yes. sir. ,
12 O It was less than 30 minutes before you started pulling 13 towards criticality?
l 14 A Yes, sir.
15 o Do you recall more srncifically the discussion between 1C yourself and the shif t supervisor?
ll 17 A The shift supervisor had asked me -- came over to my
- 18 right-hand side where the pull sheet was and he' looked at
- 19 the pull sheet.
'I 20 I said, " Sir, I made an error.
[ I pulled
- 21 these rods from the 48 position. I have re-commenced r
r 22 putting the rods back in to the 0-4 position." He said 23 continue on with inserting rods to the 0-4 position. I 24 said, "Okay, sir "
25 He went over and he took a look at the i
21
1 SRM chart; and the next thing I know,- he . goes - around my 1
2 back. .After that, I do not see him anymore because I 3 have to watch the reactor that is going on. I cannot 4 tell you what he did after that.
1 5 0 Well, I am not asking you what he did. All I want to ;
6 know is was there any discussion that you and the shift-7 supervisor had? ;
I B A Like I said before, I told him I had made an error and 9 the rod pull, I had pulled 48 instead of 0-4, as the rod l l
1D sheet said; and he told me to continue on putting them 11 back to the 0-4 position. And I said, "Okay, sir."
12 MR. LANG: At that time, where was the 1
~3 !' reactor engineer? l n
'4 l! A Sir, I would have to say the reactor engineer was behind me.
il ib ! That is all I can say.
16 MR. LANG: Did he make any comments l
l:
!s 17 at this time?
18 A If he made any to the shif t supervisor, I .did not know is
- '9 because I did not see him.
$ 20 MR. LANG: I mean to you.
a
- 21 A He made nothing to me.
r r
22 - - -
23 BY MR. KALKMAN: .
24 O Did anyone make any comments to you?
25 a What do you mean by comments?
22
1 Q Any discussion relating to the rod pull error, anyone in 2 the Control Room period.
3 A At this time period or --
d From the time you noticed that you had an error, to the Q
5 time you have got the Group III rods re-inserted, was 6 there any discussion with anyone in .the Control Room other 7 that the shift supervisor?
. 8 A Not that I recall, sir.
9 It has been four weeks, and I don't 10 recall.
11 MR. LANG: Do you keep a log?
12 A Do I keep a log?
13 MR. LANG: Yes.
1d A No, the Control Room Operator, the NSO on duty in the 15 Control Room keeps the log, sir.
16 MR. LANG: After you made the error,
=
3 17 did you inform him of it?
I.
18 A No, sir, I did not.
g s
- 18 KR. LANG
- Why didn't you?
20 A well, my major concern at that time was to put the rods
- 21 back in their proper position; and that is what I was I
22 thinking about, sir.
23 It just slipped my mind. I did not.
24 MR. LANG: Af ter you got all of the 25 rods back in that 0-4, go on from there.
23
1 What happened then?
2 A Well, the 0-4 position, like I said, the time frame is 3 hard to say. I got the order from the shift supervisor 8
to re-commence the start-up.
5 At this time, there were various people 6 around, and as you can see, I did -- just to -- because 7
I was a little nervous, I went through, and as I did each 8 rod, I checked them to make sure 'that I did put the rod i 8 back into the proper position; and I took it all up to l
10 the -- the reactor was critical, and I took it on up to 11 the heat-up range, and I took it up to the reactor pressure, 12 and it was approximately 140 lbs temperature, corresponding
'3 j to that pressure.
'd MR. LANG: So you don't keep any kind of
'S : log at allt is that correct?
I 16 A No, sir. I 3 17
, MR. LANG: Dverything in your 18 g possession would be recorded --
a
- 18 A Yes, sir.
g i j 28 '
The way it was run, I work for the 21 f NSO in the Control Room.
22 MR. LANG: Do you remember at this 23 period of time or up until any point in tLae where he was?
24 y,,,
3 25 There was a multitude of things going 24
e 1 on, the various alarms associated with other panels on this He had his midnight 2 system that' he was taking care of.
3 readings, the midnight things that he had to do as 4 prescribed by our procedures as per se, marking charts.
5 I was talking to people on the radio, 6 other operators, getting things done.
7 He wRs up and about all over the Control Room.
e 1
I 9 MR. LANG: Did you inform him at all 10 of the error?
11 A Sir, do you mean at that time period or a day later or 12 two days later or what?
13 MR. LANG: On the shift.
14 A Yes, sir, two days later on, we were on the same shift, 1
15 I was the relief shift, I took him up and I showed him, 1
16 I said, "Do you realize I made this error?" And he said, i
l 17 no, sir, he did not, and I showed it to him.
18 MR. LANG: It was two days after you
- 19 got --
r 20 A No, no. Not the next midnight,.but the midnight.after l
t 2I that.
3 I 22 MR. LANG: But on the July 1 --
23 A No, sir, I did not.
24 MR. LANG: Not on July 17 25 A No, sir, I did not.
25 O
___-..__.______-_..____m__m_-
1 . . .
1 2 BY MR. KALKMAN:
3 Q Now, on the evening of July 1, who knew that the error l
4 occurred? I 5 A Myself, the reactor engineer, the STA, and the SOA, the 6 STA in training, the operations engineers that is all I l 7 know of, sir.
8 MR. LANG: Why do you say they are i
9 all you know? The only one you told us so far is the 10 NNS.
11 A Because after the fact, it was later on in the evening and 12 , it was right there in black and white. I showed them I 13 exactly what I had done.
h 14 l There is no doubt in my mind that they ,
15 k
1 knew. It was af ter the fact, maybe not exact.ly right 16 af ter the time, but within the shif t period by 0730 that 5 17 morning, they all knew about it.
l 18 MR. LANG: Okay.
- 19 - _ _
i j 20 BY MR. KALKMAN:
21 O Now, when you asked the STA in training to notify the shif t 22 supervisor, I believe you stated that he was there at the 23 panel with you and he also noticed the SRM monitor --
24 A Sir, All I can say is he was looking at them, he was not ,
25 watching those instrumentations for me; I was watching my 26
l l
1 nutron instrumentation. I l
2 He was watching other things. He 1
3 came over there and happened to take a look at them and j 4 said, t think they are going critical." At 5 that time, I had already determined something was wrong, 6' and, boom, put the rods back in. That is when I noticed 7 that I was at 48 instead of 0-4 position.
8 Q Were those his exact words, I think you are. going 9 critical."? 1 10 A Yes, sir.
l 11 0 Did you at that point suspect he was correct?
12 A Like I told Mr. Lang, I had not stayed there long enough 13 to make a determination.
14 My training is not that way. I had 15 not stayed there long enough.
16 Q What about your gut instinct?
3 17 A At that time, yes, sir, I thought it was; but looking at l$ .
- 18 the SRM charts again, no, sir.
- 19 It is not critical.
- i ll 20 My main concern at that time was ll 21 t
putting the rods back in the proper position. It was not l
? 22 5 until a week or so later until the information came up and 23 they said the reactor engineer had determined it was critical, 24 Q I undertand that, but I understand you were busy re-insert'ing f 25 rods and when the shif t supervisor came out to see what the
[ @ /2 )
i situation was, did you mention to him that that gut 2 instinct that we may have gone critical?
l 3 A No, sir, I did not.
4 Q Did you overhear any discussion in the Conrtol Room with 5 the shift supervisor, the STA, the reactor engineer, or 6 anyone else, a discussion concerning whether the reactor 7 went critical?
e A No, sir, I did not hear any discussion at all, because 9 I am up to the 603 panel, it is a little bit of a distance 10 away.
11 I did not hear anything. My whole l
12 concentration was on this reactor.
l 13 MR. LANG: At the tbne you had -- or l
14 j after the event, okay, after the error occurred, a little 15 while back, you gave a list of an operating engineer, an 16 SOA, an STA, and they all knew about the event by the end s 17 of the shift?
I 18 A Yes, sir.
l 19 MR. IJdE3: How did they get this l 20 information?
- 21 A Well, they had talked to either me or indirectly by some r
22 other people.
23 I know I had -- people had come and 24 looked at the pull sheet, and I had said, " Hey, I made a 25 mistake here."
. 28
V .
4 i MR. LANG: Was the other NSO part of l
2 this discussion?
3 A No, sir, I don't think he was. I don't recall that he was.
i 4 MR. LANG: 'Okay. Thank you. I 5
6 BY MR. KALKMAN:
7 Q Did-the STA in training come back with'the shift su'pervisor?
. 8 A He is the one who went and got the shift supervisor. l 9 That is basically the last -- I.saw him on the rest of the
-]
to night, but that is all I know, h'e went to get the shift 11 supervisor.
I 12 What he said, I have no idea.
13 Q Did he come back with the shift supervisor to your station? ,
I 14 A He could have, sir, because I am looking at 603. He could 15 have been standing right behind me and I would not have 16 known it.
ls 17 0 Now, throughout the remainder of the shift, and subsequent I
l 18 to the re-insertion of the rods in Group III, did you have
- - 19 any discussions with any of the Control Room people regarding 20 the error or the criticality of the reactor?
l i 21 A No, sir. ;
- r l 22 Q Now, you said that as .a result of this error, you wore a 23 little nervous, apprehensive?
24 A Yes.
25 Q What was the reaction of the shift supervisor when he came out?
29
1 A Well, could you define reaction for me?
2 o Well, what did he seem? Excited? Was he passive?
3 You know, you just -- well, did he say, d
"Just insert the rods."?
5 A No, he came over and said, " Continue inserting the rods 6 with the positive action," Continue inserting rods to 7
the proper position.
8 As he watched me insert one of the rods, 9 he went over there and took a look at the SRM; then he-10 went behind me and until I got done, that is basically the last interaction I had with him.
12 0 What discussion'did you have later on in the shift with 1
'3 him, the shif t supervisor?
'd 'I went up and I said, " Sir, i A Well, basically what happened.
15 I don't know why I saw 48 there instead of 0-4. I feel 16 real bad about it." f 17 I thanked him for letting me stay in j
'8 the 603 panel, and I think it took a lot of -- I cannot l i
- think of a word for it, but he had maintained his trust i
[
o 20 in me, I had made an error, I corrected the error, and 21 he made a decision and we commenced the start-up and I I 1 i 22 thanked him for it.
23 It showed a lot of trust in me.
24 Q Did he make the decision to re-start or --
25 Sir, I don't know.
A i
30 .
1 He is the one who gave me the order 2 to re-commence the start-up.
3 We are already in a start-up. We 4 .had just corrected the problem.
5 I don't think we were in the in between 6 position; he just told me to re-commence work from wh'ere 7 we should have been. I don't think there was a decision a made to start-up. We were already in that mode.
i 9 I think he just made a decision to l 10 continue on from where we were.
11 0 So he was not excited?
1 12 A Do you mean -- was he' excited -- could you explain l
13 excited to me? .
14 ! Do ym mean vas he flapping is arms 1
15 or anything like that? Whs.t do you mean?
16 0 Yes, was he doing any of that?
i 17 A No, sir. He was very calm, cool, and he went over there, I
' '. 18 and like I said, he observed me driving the rods back in
'i
- 19 the proper position.
If I 20 He looked at the SRM chart, he went
\t l 21 behind me, and the next thing I know, af ter I get the s
22 rods back in, he comes up and says, "Re-commence."
23 That is what I did. I took the 1
24 reactor critical, and I took it on up to the heat-up range, 25 and took it up to 150-140 lbs.
l l
l 31
R y
1 O At sometine during the evening, he came back to you and i I
2 he had a DER in his hand? l l
3 A Close approximation of the time right around here, pretty i l
4 close to when we got the rods on. I know he got the DER 5 in his hand. When he come out with the SRM.. Whether he s has written on it or not, I do not know.
7 I know he has a DER in his hand, but s whether it had been written on, I do not know, I could i J
9 not tell you, because I know what a DER form looks like.
10 Q so that was when you were still inserting the rods?
is A Yes, sir, in that time period.
12 O He came out? .
13 {A Yes.
34 Did he come out of the office originally with the DER?
[Q ts liA I cannot answer that because, like I say, I am selecting i l
16 rods and driving them in; and when I noticed the DER', is
- i i
i 17 When he is looking at the SRM's. i I i
- Is He could have had it in his hand when
- 19 he first came out, I don't know, s ,
1
! 20 d I am saying that I saw him with a i 8
. Il 21 DER in his hands.
i*
22 0 .,o you are not sure if that was right away when you first 23 asked him to come out?
24 A No, sir, I am not.
25 0 Was there any meeting, shift staff meeting with the shift 32
I supervisor, the Control Room staff with the shift 2 supervisor?
3 A Do you mean at a later date or --
j 4 Q Even on July 1.
5 A July 1, no, because it was -- you are talking maybe a 6 half an hour period here. Not on July 1,. no .
7 Q Okay.
8 After midnight, did you have a 9 shift meeting?
Io A I talked with the reactor engineer on July 2, yes, sir.
11 Not Barry Myers, but another' reactor 12 engineer who asked me about the charts, something like that. l 13 0 I. am referring to a meeting held by the shift supervisor.
14 Have you talked to -- briefed the 15 people that were on his shift, either prior to your taking 16 ' control or sometime during your eight-hour shif t?
17 A Well, there was a meeting, but I did not attend that 18 seesting because I had already taken the watch from the
- 19 603 panel.
1 20 I had already taken the watch. There l
was a , meeting at approximately 11:20 that night, with the j 21 I 22 rest of the shift; but I had already taken the watch at 23 603, and I did not attend.
24 Our shif t supervisor on the night had 25 already spent eight hours there already. One of our shift 33
l 1
1' supervisors is on vacation, and he had already been there i
2 either eight or four hours, so he was still the shif t I
3 supervisor on duty at the time.
4 Q So you had obtained all of the information about the rod 5 pull that was started on the shif t prior to you from the !
6 reactor operator, Mr. Barker?
l 7 A Yes, sir.
8 He told me about some rods we needed 9 .to by-pass due to the ' proper. indication, and some other 10 things, indications we had; and the normal conversation 11 you would have with the reactor' operator.
~
12 I asked him where we were sitting when 13 l we first started pulling rods, what was our initial count I!
14 rate on the SRM. I looked at whare we were at now, I Jj 15 looked over at the 603 panel, resert flows, the CRD flows, 16 and also observed him pulling rods for that time period.
Ji 17 0 were you asked to attend the meeting subsequent to your lI
' shift with the shift supervisor and any management personnel?
- 18
- 19 A Do you mean like a pre-shift brief meeting like before we j 70 come on shift like they normally have?
~
21 Q Well, adter the event when the shift. ended or any time s
22 -during the remainder of the shift, did you attend --
23 A Yes, sir, I came in the next night, the same time, 2300, >
24 on the 2nd; there was Mr. Thorpe, or reactor engineer, and 25 his immediate supervisor. I have a hard time remembering his 34 !
)
1 name, sir.
2 They came in and asked me about the 3 incident; and I explained to thern what happened. They 4 looked at the SRM charts. Some more questions they wanted l 1
5 to clarify some things. I 6 I clarified it for them. They asked 7 me about some indications on the SRM charts when they were
. e not sure about it, and I was looking at them and Mr. Duda 1
9 and Mr. Tom Dong explained to them that was the .lriving l l
10 of your SRM in after our last scram, that it would look 11 like you would have a' period like that.
12 They said okay, and they understood 13 ll that; and basically, that is at a meetin,, it lasted for i l' !
j 14 f about a half an hour with them.
- i
' 15 The next morning, I had to see Mr. Preston ll 1 16 ' and Mr. Lesser, and they basically asked me the same
! 17 questions, you know, why did I do this, and I said, "I i
, 18 saw 48, sir." They asked some questions about how we
- 19 could prevent this from happenisg again, and I gave them 20 my recommendations on that.
l l 21 MR. MARQUARDT: To be clear, ,w ith
~ v 22 this meeting with Mr. Preston and Mr. Lesser, was this on 23 the morning of July 3?
24 A Yes, sir, the third.
25 - ~ ~
}
i
-e e s .
1 BY MR. KALKMAN: .
2 o Wait a minute. ,
3 Prior to your shif t --
' A It was in the morning after my shift. I had to stay and !
5 see him in the morning. -l 6 Q Oh, okay.
7 A I talked to them, I gave them my recommendation that these 8 be X-ed out if you.are not going to the 48, putting these 9 numbers in red so that they can be clearly visible to you.
l 10 The next thing I hear about it, I had 11 to see Mr. Lang about us going cr.itical.
12 O Well, let me see if I have this clear in my minds 13 On the shift tbst you had the operator i
14 i error, the only people you had a discussion with regarding )
l 15 l
this operator error, were the shift supervisor, and the 1 16 STA in training; is that correct?
I i 17 A Yes, sir, that I only had a discussion with at that time 18 when the actual event occurred.
l 19 The STA in training, I am not even s
20 sure that he knew that I had pulled the rod wrong when I l
e
- 21 told him to go to get the shift supervisor.
r
- 22 I told him I had made an error, now, 23 whether he assumed that to be a rod pull error or not, I 24 cannot answer that.
25 You would have to ask him that, but the 36
o I. ..
L 1 only one who would be -- it would be the shift supervisor.
l 2 A And that is Mr. Aniol?
3 A Yes, sir.
l 4 Q However, do you know for a fact that these other Control 5 Room personnel that you indicated earlier knew by the end 6 of- the shif t that they were -- that there- had been an . error?
7 A There is no doubt in my mind.
r 8 Q They did not get any information from yourself?
9 A They had to , because we were sitting there all night..
10 I was downhearted about talking about it, and they said, 11 "You made an error, you took the correct steps to correct 12 it."
13 They had to know how bad I felt about it.
14 MR. LANG: Who said that?
15 A There were a multitude of people. You know, it was just 1E like a conversation between you and me, sir, i
'i 17 - - - )
16 BY MR. KALKMAN:
la 19 Q Was their discussion -- were there any opinions off ered as t
j 2c to whether the plant went critical?
~
21 A Well, in fact, I want~to point out again that I was sitting ;
ir 22 in 603. I never called the reactor critical.
i 23 The way we have been trained, sir, if ,
24 the reactor operator does not call it critical, the 25 reactor never went critical.
i 37]
._____.______.___.___________j
.~ .
1 I did not call it critical; the shift
~
2 supervisor said I did not tell him. He took a look at it 3 and said it was not critical; then, the reactor was not 4
4 critical.
s And now, we have a week later, 10 days i
6 later, we have somebbdy coming along saying, " Hey, the 7 reactor was Critical." That is after the fact. That is 8 something I was not involved with.
9 Q Well, I did not ask you if you declared the reactor operator --
10 I asked you if there were any opinions offered by other 11 Control Room personnel.
12 A As f ar as I know, sir, I do not know if they told the shif t 13 supervisor that.
h 14 I did not say, "The reactor was
[
' 15 critical," I did not say that to the shift supervisor.
16 Q Well, you heard the STA in training state that -- l
$ 17 A He said, "I think the reactor is critical, I.
18 Now, whether he said anything to the g
- 19 shif t supervisor, you would have to ask him, sir.
I So none of the other shif t personnel made any statements j 20 0
- 21 similar to that of the STA in training?
r No, not that I heard, sir.
22 A 23 Q Okay.
24 Do you recall any discussions with 25 Mr. Barry Myers during that shif t?
(n16
t, m 1
1 A Yes, sir, one time we discussed the rod-worth minimizer, l 2 but initializing and -- about the way it is programmed. j l
3 That is basically -- and the one time, i
4 I talked to him about my step going critical, and that is 5 the only time -- what steps in our. start-up that l
6 determined that it was about -to go critical. ' That is 7 just a guestimation, that is not an. aid in operating. It 8 can go critical at any time. l l
9 That is the only time I had any; and i 10 after the fact, I talked to him, I said, "I don't know why l 11 I made the error." I was discussing the problem with him, 1
12 and he said, "I can understand, with your training," and 13 that is basically what we talked about.
1 14 ! MR. LANG: You just made a statement 15 that you discussed the rod-worth minimizer program --
16 well, you just made a statement saying that you discussed-i 17 the rod-worth minimizer program with the reactor engineer? l I
18 A Yes.
{s
- 19 MR. LANG
- What was discussed?
I j 20 A Well, I discusscd some of the -- basically, the program 21 behind it, the perception here, and how it works and the
{
22 function of the rod-worth minimizer, and that is basically 23 all we talked about.
24 MR. LANG: Was that before or after the a 75 error?
39
1 A Afttry sir.
2 s 3 BY MR. KALKMAN:
4 Q Was it your perception that the rod-worth minimizer would 5 have prevented the reactor error that occurred?
6 A I was under the impression that, yes, it would have; but 7 after being talked to about it, I understand that I was s in error-in thinking that way.
9 Q Why did you perceive that?
Io A- Because you are still on the rod-worth Group III; and if 11 you go to -- it is just an administrative flow, .and t} i 12 way it is programmed in the computer, it sees the final 13 step as being 48.
14 These intermediate steps are not l 15 programmed in the computer. Just seeing rod Group III, 16 and if we had the pull sheet here, you would see that it i 17 is finally getting the 48 position on all of those rods.
! You would check the course pattern, and that is what you
. 18 j 19 see in the final-outcome at least, 48.
'1 20 0 Okay.
l
!N 21 A I was under the misconception of that.
i 22 O Do you work the same shift with the same people?
23 A N.o .
24 I was on the relief whift that week.
25 Normally, I work the relief shift as Mr. Anio1's shift 40
i 1 because I like working with him. It is a midnight shift.
2 A lot of people don't like working the 3 midnight shift, so instead of having people complain about 4 it, I work it, and I had just come off training, sir.
5 o Well, I may have missed something, but you do not work 6 with the same people?
7 A No, sir.
. 8 0 You normally work the 11:00 shift?
9 A I normally work the shif t number four most of the time, 10 was my shift. I am shift five. That is my normal shift.
11 But right after our training, we have 12 a relief week; and during that time period, you can be
~
13 assigned to different shif ts to help them. Normally, the 14 midnight shift needs help; and I normally work the midnight 15 shift to help them.
16 That is usually the day shift, and I E 17 do that because I like working with that shift.
I 18 Q Okay. ,
- 19 You say people do not like to work that i ,
l 20 shift, you'said the people that were there on the evening a
- - 21 of July 1 --
- 22 A All of the people who were normally on the shift, except 23 for me, when I was an extra to help theaf that is a normal 24 shift. Their shift is there.
25 Dave, Mr. Flint, Mr. Powell, Steve Burt, 41
B i
1 and athers assigned to the shif t. 'I was just an extra body 2 to help them.
3 Q who are the people that normally are'on the shift that 4
you work?
5 A My shift normally has Mr. Jerry Clark as shift supervisor, ;
6 Mr. Olstroms, who is the assistant shift supervisor, 3
7 Mr. Mike Goriouski, the reactor operator, Mr. Jim Hammond, l 8 the reactor operator, myself,; we have Mr. Kevin Kelly, 8 we have -- I gave you all of the PPO and the APPO.
10 Do you want anybody else?
' No, I am trying to get~at this:
Q 12 ONce you start working a shift, with 13 a certain group of people, do you normally stay with that --
A Yes, sir, I do, except for that one week when we are on
'6 the relief week and we can be assigned to another shift.
16 where it is as needed. l E
" Q Did you notice when you were pulling the Group III rods, 18 that one of the SRM monitors was not indicating -- was not i:
I 18 recording any --
20 A It was either A or B.
21 I was looking at my meters and other l
i 22 instrumentation; and at one period of time, no, I did not 23 notice anything. I did not see it was inking. I did not-24 know it was inking until later on when, I think,-
25 I did not~ notice it was inking.
approximately two minutes.
42
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ = _ _ _ _ - _ . .
, /
i o so you were monitoring these?
1 2 A Yes. p .
3 Q These charts?
4 A Yes.
5 Q But you did not know that one of them was not inking?
e A Well, when the monitor charts -- well, the. monitor charts -
7 that you haVe, the indicators on your pen recorders, and l 8 as you pull the -- as you sit in the 603 panel, you take g' a look over there, and this is -- being sometimes so close 10 together, it is tough to see whether they are inking or 11 2no t .
12 Your period meters are also quicker 13 because they are there too. Also -- no, I did not see it 14 inkin'g , sir.
' Is Q The Nuclear Engineering Staff, did they review the rod 16 pull incident and several days later determine that the ,
I 17 plant, in fact, had gone critical?
I
- is Do you understand that to be a fact?
- 19 A What I heard, okay.
T j 20 The incident happened. I went to a 21 four-day-off period. I came back in, and I am not exactly l
2 8
22 sure what day it was, you can figure it out on a calender 23 if you take a look at it. Mr. Thorpe stopped.by me, saw 24 me and he said,
~ _<
)wanttotalktoyouforaminute.
2s This is a report that I have written, and I would like you 43
/ /
, 1 1
to read it." 'I said, " Fine."
2 I looked at it, and I said, "Well, 3 you are the engineer. I guess." ]
- )
d I read it, and I.was busy, I was doing. l I
5 work. I had to get done.- I read it and I said,."Thank 6 you, Mr.' Thorpe, for letting me see it." And he t said that
.4 7 that is what is going on.
8 The next thing I know, I get a call 9 from Mr. Lang.
10 0 The report stated that the plant had gone critical? 1 1
11 A As I recall, yes, sir, it did. l 12 .
It was a very low count. Like I 13 0 say, I got a call from Mr. Lang and he said that is --
i:
14 I let's put it in.
15 IQ So you know that the Nuclear Engineers studied this
.I 16 incident and declared that the plant had gone critical i i " for a certain period of time?
I g
18 A Yes.
l 19 I saw him.with a report. What he did i
j 20 with the report, I have no idea.
21 And you are disagreeing with that. report?
Q r
. 22 A I am saying that I was sitting.in the 603 panel, I did not 23 call it critical.
24 The reactor was not critical.
25 Now, you said earlier that at this present tima, you do not Q
44
i believe the reactor went critical?
2 A oh, yes.
3 on July 2nd', I did not stay there 4 long enough to find out. After I had a chance to take s a look at the charts again, and just sitting there by 6 myself and looking at it, there is no dcubt in By mind 7 the the reactor is not critical at that time.
3 Q so you are disagreeing with the Nuclear Engineer --
9 e'. At this time period, yes, sir.
10 That is later on down the line. Yes, 11 sir, I am disagreeing with them.
l 12 0 Your disagreement is based on what?
13 A My disagreement is based on that night, like I told 14 Mr. Lang the first time I talked to him:
i is I had not stayed there long enough to 16 call the reactor criticai. through my training; I did not li 17 stay there long enough to even make a determination on F. 18 that.
physically had
} 19 Then after I had a -
20 a chance, two or three weeks later down the line, I have i8 21 had a chance to take a look at the charts again, where I l* 22 can actually sit down and take a look at them, and that 23 reactor is not critical,. sir. l l 24 o so you are basing this -- your opinion, you are basing l
l 25 your opinion on the review of the charts, several -- a l
45.
I week or two later?
2 A What I am saying now, yes, sir.
3 It was last week that I,got a chance 4 to see them again. I got to see them again to make my own 5 personal opinion on whether this reactor went critical.
6 That night, as I said to Mr.Lang, 7 By training and at that time, I had not stayed there long i
8 enough to make that determination. ,,
"~ !
)
9 MR. MARQUARDT: jyou said to you stayed there, you have said that now three different I 11 times.
12 Just so we can be correct, what do you 13 mean by staying there? Do you mean you physically in a i
14 location, or does it mean the rods being in a pertain
' 15 position?
16 A Okay, sir.
i 17 May I have the SRM charts there? !
I I
- is This one is not a very good one.
- 19 First of all, during this time period, i 1 l 20 if you look at the sequence of events here, I am pulling' 21 rods right here; so you have -- there is no way in the f
, 22 world -- I make the determination that something is wrong.
23 I put the rod right back in. I did not have rod motion 24 stopped long enough for me to make a determination that 25 the reactor was critical. I
_ _- -_ -_ __- _ f D
~
1 2 BY.MR. KALKMAN:
3 Q Okay.
4 I am not questioning that.
5 A Okay. ;
i 6 Q I am questioning what you know now from the review group.
7 and you are still disagreeing with --
. 8 A If I could see the other SRM charts, I could show you what 9 leads me to -- I don't know if we have it, but if I can 10 use the back -- could I have a piece of paper to draw you 11 something or what?
12 Q Okay. l l
13 A This is the correct one, sir. This is the right one. !
14 If you look at this one, where you 1 15 can barely see it right here, okay. If I would add a 16 steady nutron count, this commenced my -- I have stopped
! 17 rod pulling. My nutron count would have continued on 1
18 like this. If you take a look at that graph right there, i
- 19 your are going to see that it is going to steady out. You 20 can see it. There is no doubt in my mind that that is going l
i j 21 to steady out.
22 I look at my graph, I see something 23 wrong, I put the rods back in. Now, analytically, the 24 reactor engineer has more of the tools in his hand to be ;
25 able to determine reactor criticality than I do.
47
. ]
i i With my instrumentation that I have 2 right there, that reactor is not critical.
3 0 Okay.
4 I am not arguing the point of what 5 you perceived then.
l 6 Are you a nuclear engineer?
t 7 A No, sir.
4 8 0 What is your educational background, sir?
9 A 10 11 12 O And' you are a licensed reactor operator? ,
l l
13 ,: A Yes, sir, i
l' l
14 i; Q From what I understand, this was the first time you had I
15 i actually gone critical on an operating. reactor?
I 16 A That is totally wrong.
i 17 I pulled Criticals up at E
. 18 I.
19
. I i
- 21 Q Ihow large is the Control Room in relationship 22 to the room we are in now? .
23 A Approximately twice the size.
24 0 okay.
25 The Control Room is surrounded by panels, r
j
i 1
equipment gauges? ,
2 y,,,
3 _
3 O switches?
4 A Yes.
l 5 0 And numerous electronic devices, correct?
6 A y,g, 7
Q Within that Control Room area, there are how many people 8 on the shift?
9 A Normally we have two people in the Control Room at all times.
10 Normally there is an SOA, or the STA, they are in and out !
11 of the room. They might be getting information that they 12 need; but they are readily available.
13 The assistant and the shift supervisor t
i 14 are readily available and normally one is out in the l
15 shif t supervisor 's office.
~
The reactor engineer is right 16 l outside the horseshoe along with the GE personnel.
- c
) 17 There is a multitude of people there.
I 18 0 The only people that are required to be in there are ll 19 yourself and. another reactor operator?
lj 73 A At what mode of condition are you talking about? 'Are you j j
lj 21 talking about mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 & 57 Because there are !
! 22 l different require: rents for the differer.t modes. 1 23 Q Okay.
24 l When you were pelling these rods on i 25 the evening of July 1, who was required to be in the l
l . 49 l
- j
\
Control Room?
2 A well, you have requirements of a Control Room Operator f 3
and a 603 operator.
4 O And you were the 603 operator? !
5 K Yes, sir.
6 Q And the Control Room Operator was who?
)
7 A Mr. Steve Burt.
g Q Mr. Burt keeps a log?
4 e A Yes, to Q What goes in the log? 1 33 A Pump start-ups, shut-down, systems start-up, shut-down, j 12 anything that -- knything really that he thinks is 4
33
! Laportant gets in there. I cannot answer for what he -- ,
34 Q Are there certain requirements of events that are 15 required to be noted in the log?
16 A Yes, sir.
e i 17 When we start-up, when you bring I
38 your reactor critical, you have certain -- throughout the
, t
, ig procedure, you have certain rod positions, rod numbers, r
! 2o Period, reactor temperature; and I could give -- well, you
-a l
have most of it right there. That is required to be put 21 t
8 l r 22 in there, and what happens, , like a fire or something like i
23 that, that would go in there.
24 When you first fill out your log, you 25 include the actual pressure of the temperature, the flows.
50 l
, .. )
1 Q Is an operator error normally-recorded in the log?'
2- A I don't know,-sir. I don't'know, sir, . because I never
~
3 had to put . it in there. I don't know if it is required a to put it in there, I just' don't know.
5 Q Okay.
6' The only function with the Detroit 7 Edison is the.603 panel operator, or can you from time- !
s to-time be given shifts --
l 9 A Yes, sir. I have carried out both responsibilities.
10 0 Well, let's put yourself in Mr. Burt's shoes on the 11 evening of July 1.
12 Would you have recorded the operator 13 error of -- )
a 14 A No, sir, because I have it. It is all recorded right here.
15 Q Well, you would have not recorded it in the log?
16 A No, sir, because it is all recorded right here. That is l
5 17 a document that we keep there until -- at all times. l
'l '
It is clearly visible to all parties
. 18 l'
in the room if they want to take a look at it. The DER
- 19 I had been written on it, which is another tracking document.
j 20 21 No, I don't think I would have. At t
8 22 that time, I don't think I would have. I don't know. It j
23 is a hard question to answer. ]
24 0 okay. ,
25 A But the way I look at it, with this being very, very visible, 51
I t and the DER, being very, very visible, no.
2 Q who else keeps a log of occurences for each shift?
3 A Well, the one that I directly know of _is the shif t i
' supervisor and the Control Room operator, and I guess --
5 well, I guess the engineer does too, but you would have {
i 6 to aske them. !
7 Q Is Mr. Aniol -- did be ask you not to discuss this operator j
8 error with any of the Control Room personnel?
9 A No, sir, he did not. He did not. l 10 There was no mention of that whatsoever; l' that was never even brought up, never even thought about 12 being brought up. ,
)
13 It was the next day that people from 1 l(
l 14 training, hey, they wanted to know what happened and 15 stuff like that. It was not even a thought about not !
l 16 saying anything to anybody.
?
3 17 You know, I want people to learn from 1
- 18 my mistake.
I i 19 Q However, you were reludtant to discuss this with the ia 20 other people in the Control Room? r 21 A No, I was not.
t
. 22 0 During that shif t, did you discuss it? I 23 A Yes, sir.
2' I made an error, I have no qualms, 25 They knew I made an error. I am not neared.
52 4
' I discussed this with my wife end I other people. I have nothing to hide. It is right there 2 in black and white.
' I just hope noboey else -- I hope
! people learned that you can sake a mistake. I would not E even think about hiding something like this.
7 0 Was that Mr. Aniol's position also? I
. E A Yes, sir.
9 He did not even say anything about it.
10 It was never even brought up. It was not even -- it was 15 never even mentioned or anything like that.
12 Q Did you have any input to the DER?
12 A First, like I say, when I saw the -- I have not actually 14 seen the DER, except when they asked me about some input 15 that went into it, and I said, 'Well, look at the pull IE sheet here, and you can see where this rod right here was i 17 1051, where I realized I made a mistake and I did not k
- IE quite get through to finish out my data, and I realized 4
- 'D the error, and I think that would be the 10 or the 11 rods."
t j 73 It was all there in black and white.
j 21 Q Okay.
- 72 A They asked me some questions later about whether the 23 reactor was critical, and like I said bafore, my thought 24 to 'Mr. Lang, I was not there long enough to make a 25 determination. ,
53 L___-_________.______ _
F ..
1 I made sure that when I went back and i I
2 did these rods right, the people who could see exactly 3 what I did, I put my initials there so that there was no 4 doubt in anybody's mind that that is where I went back 5 through it, to make sure -- to verify the proper position.
6 I went through the one line through to -- so that the 1
7 people Could read what I did and there would be no doubt j
l 8 in anybody's mind.
9 I had made a mistake, sir.
10 Q Is there anyone in that Control Room on your shif t that 11 observed -- that is required to observe your performance 12 to make sure you 'are following the right procedure?
13 A Well, there is a -- when there is activity going on in 14 the Control Room, like I said, th'ere is a multitude of 15 people in there, and the books, I mean, the procedures, 16 the pulling rod, the rod pull sheet, they are out, 17 anything like that.
5
)
1
- 18 Now, if you mean is there anyone 1
- 19 directly sitting right next to me to make sure that either r '
l- 20 I or somebody else is doing it right, no, there is not i
j 21 one somebody assigned next to me. No, sir. There is not t
22 somebody assigned to watch what I do.
23 0 Okay.
24 This was the firvt time you brought 25 the plant to a critical state, the Ferni II Plant, correct?
54
' A Yes, sir, this is the first time I had brought the actual 2
plant to criticality.
3 Q When you took over the shift from Mr. Barkar, had you seen d
the shift supervisor?
5 A Yes, sir, I did.
6 Q That evening?
7 A Yes, because he had already made out our assignment. sheet, 8 we have an assignment sheet that tells us what duties and 9 responsibilities that we are going to have; whether we 10 are going to have the Control Room 603 patrol, or the 11 tagging center.
12 He had already made out the shift 13 because he had been there already, like I say before. ,
14
, one of the shift supervisors was.on vacation and he was 15 either coming in early or for four hours earlier, I am 16 not exactly sure how long he had been there.
0 More likely four hours, because he l
18 g stayed there for our regular shift, and he had already 19 made the shift out. I went in there and I looked at it 20 l and said I am assigned to 603; so I went up to 603 and l 21 I commenced observing what was going on in 603. :
5 l 22
~
0 have I or any other NRC representative here 23 threatened you in any manner or offered you any rewards 24 in return for your statement?
25 A No, sir.
I
-l .
J 0 Havo you givsn this statemsnt froaly and voluntarily?
3 A Yes, sir.
2 1
0 Is there anything further you care to add for the record? j 3
, A Not at this timb sir.
MR. KALKMAN: Thank you very much. j
.5 i (Deposition concluded at 3:25 p.m.) i 6
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