ML20237J890

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Partially Deleted Affidavit of DA Aniol,Clarifying Statements Made in Transcript of Ofc of Investigations Interview of Author on 850723 in Glen Ellyn Re Events Surrounding Reactor Operator Rod Pull Error on 850701-02
ML20237J890
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/23/1985
From: Aniol D
DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:
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ML20237J518 List:
References
FOIA-86-245 NUDOCS 8708260355
Download: ML20237J890 (11)
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t UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATOR 1' COMMISSION

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In the Matter of: )

) Case No. LB-85-214  !

OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS ) l INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW )

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I AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID A.-ANIOL  !

State of Michigan )

County of Monroe ) ss: j

1. I am a Nuclear Shift Supervisor at the Detroit Edison Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Station in Newport, Michigan. I make  !

1 this affidavit to supplement the transcript of my interview conducted by the Office of Investigations in the aoove-referenced case on July 23, 1985 in Glen Ellyn, Illinois. This affidavit will clarify many statements in the i transcript that do not accurately reflect my recollection of J

the events surrounding the reactor operator rod pull error at I

N r mi 2 on the evening of July 1-2, 1985.

2. One item on the master startup checklist is plant superintendent approval for reactor startup. This step in the  !

star tup procedure need not be taken at any particular point in the procedure. Thes, it may be either the first or - the last item ' checked on the mas ter checklis t. It need not immediately i Information In this record was deleted in accordance wit 1 the Fr

, of Information Act, exem tions M FOIA T -MF u.

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precede or follow any other designated. step. It must only be  !

checke4 prior to the first rod pull.

Thus, the plant superintendent must approve reactor startup but need not specifically approve the first rod pull. The shift supervisor may approve the first rod pull upon a determination that every 1 item on the ma=*ar startup checklist is properly checked. The

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j plant superintendent authorized reac, tor startup prior to my reporting on shift at 7:00 p.m. on July 1, but I authorized the l

first rod pull to initiate that startup at approximately 10:30 p.m. that same evening.

3. was only momentarily present at the 11:20 p.m. full shift turnover meeting on July 1 in the control room conference room. He briefly attended to acknowledge his I

presence on shif t but otherwise promptly assumed his duties at Panel 603 and relieved Lyn Barker.

4. The reactor operator had recognized the rod pull error and had begun to take corrective action before I directed him to reinsert the eleven misaligned rods to their initial position. When I so directed him, he had already reinserted two or three of the misaligned rods. ,

1 S. When I initially assessed the reactor operator's rod pull error I scanned the operator's rod pull sheet to roughly es timate the numoer of misaligned rods. I saw at that time that approximately five to twelve rods had been pulled by the _j l reactor operator out of sequence. However, I did not verify 2-l

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this initial estimate until later in the evening, when, while ]l prepecd og a Deviation Event Repor t (DER), I counted on the rod pull sheet the actual number of rods checked by the reactor l

! operator prior to his recognition of the error. Thus, it was

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not until later in the evening and after my telephone i

conversation with Eugene Preston that I established the actual 1

l. number of misaligned rods. .,
6. I did not actually discuss inadver tent criticality with -

l Edward Duda, the shift operations advisor, or Thomas Dong, the rhift technical advisor, on the evening of the July 1-2.

' However , both Mr. Dcda and Mr. Dong were in the immediate vicinity of Panel 603 when I discussed the rod pull error with nd directed to reinser t the misaligned L

rods. I assumed that, in view of their immediate proximity to Panel 603, both Mr. Duda and Mr. Dong were familiar with the

- incident, and that they heard advise me that the reactor had not gone critical. I further assumed that they would have expressed a different view if they believed that the reactor had gone critical. If they had expressed a different view, I would have discussed it with them prior to d' irecting t

i to proceed with the reactor star tup following his ,

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a r einser tion of the misaligned rods.

7. I directedl to reinsert the misaligned rods s I and to proceed with the reactor star tup. I so directed L

pon my determination, that the reactor had not gone l I

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critical. I ass wned tha t Mr . Du da and Mr . Dong agreed.with this determination, vnd that they believed that the reactor had not gone critical. I further assumed that they would have i 1

suggested a different response to the error if they had i I disapproved of my direction to

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8. My rer.-- .se at page 16 lines 20 and 21 of my tes timony transcript is based on an understand,ing of the question to a read: "Did anyone at that time or any time ever tell you that j the reactor had gone critical?" This_ understanding is consistent with Mr. Lang's question at page 16 lines 16 and
17. I did not specifically discuss the rod pull error with the shift operations advisor or the shif t technical advisor on the

. t l evening of July 1-2. I did not discuss the error with Mr. Duda until July 22. Mr. Duda indicated at that time that he did not believe that the reactor had gone critical inadvertently on the

, evening of July 1-2.

9. My response at page 17 lines 17 and 18 of my tes timony transcript incorrectly indicates that I discussed inadver tent criticality with Mr. Dong on the evening of July 1-2. I did not discuss the rod pull error with Mr. Dong until a later date, at which time he indicated that he did not believe that the reactor had gone critichl inadver tently on tfie evening of July 1-2. On that evening, therefore, it was my understanding )

that only the shift technical advisor in training, John:Dewes, believed that the reactor may have gone critical j inadvertently.

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10. Following my initial assessment of the reactor operator error and my direction to to reinsert the misaligned rods, I returned to my' of fice to consult the NRC l regulations governing the deportability of non-emergency events. I determined that no notification of the error was required withi- 4,ther a one-hour or a four-hour time frame. )

However, I knew that I must prepare ,a DER prior to the next shift.

11. When I initially assessed the rod pull error, I did not count on the reactor operator's rod pull sheet the actual r 9 number of rods checked bf ~~ prior to his recognition of

) j the error. It was not until af ter my telephone conversation j with Mr. Preston that I reviewed this sheet to determine the actual number of misaligned rods. While speaking to Mr.

Pres ton on the phone, I relied on a rough estimate, offered by

, Mr. Dewes as he was passing by me, to inform Mr. Preston that 1

l approximately six rods had been pulled out of sequence.

12. The significance of the reactor operator error is reflected in my preparation of a DER for review by and

. 1 discussion with Mr. Preston on the morning of July 2. Thus, 1 there was no need to record in my log either the error or my telephone conversation with Mr. Preston, who routinely reviewed my logs yet who already knew of the error. I had already anticipated a discussion of the error with Mr. Preston on the morning of July 2. Thus, I did not believe on the evening of l

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l July 1-2 that an. entry in my log to record either the reactor >

operator error or my telephone conversation with Mr. Preston a I

was necessary.. It would have been a superfluous entry.

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13. The transcript of my testimony at page 24 line 24 [

incorrectly reflects my response to Mr. Kalkman's question. I.

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had previously informed Mr. Preston that I believed that the f reactor had not gone critical. This. corrected response is consistent with Mr. Kalkman's reply to that response at line 25.  !

14. The GE test engineer, Kip Powel, expressed.no view on ]

inadvertent criticality when I briefly spoke to him on the evening of July 1-2. He merely made mention of the error to me j at that time.  ;

15. I regarded the reactor operator rod pull error as a significant event requiring documentation in the form of a DER. However, in the hours following the error and the action to correct it, I was occupied with the reactor startup and-our efforts to bring the power plant up to 150 pounds of pressure.

These efforts occupied other shift personnel as well. We I viewed the error as significant, yet we had other matters to '

address throughout the evening and did not, consequently, discuss the error at great length. Our lack of discussion, I l believe, is no indication of the seriousness with which we viewed the error. j l

16. Since the time of the reactor operator error on the evening of July 1-2, I have received additional training on rod

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pull procedure. The training and the dates on which I completed it are set forth in Appendix A to this affidavit, l which I hereby adopt and incorporate as part of this affidavit.

17. I have reviewed my interview transcript for textual ]

errors. These errors are set forth in Appendix B to this l j

affidavit, whi" I hereby adopt and incorporate as part of this f 1

affidavit. ., j

18. I am prepared to clarify further any of my statements should the need arise.

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l U d.d> M David A. Aniol I f

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Sworn to before me on October 23, 1985 )

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l f24A bu dc.

Notary Public

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MARCIA BUCK Netary Public. Washtenaw County, Mi i My Commission Dpires Dec.28,1587 MW [h d

M . ')G.

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l APPENDIX A l

Additional Training Date of )

Completion A. Review of Procedures  ;

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1. . Reactor Engineering Procedure 51.000.08

" Control Rod Sequence and Movement Contr ol" Rev. 4 8/ 19/ 85 ,

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2. Operations Procedure 23.608,*" Rod Worth Minimizer" 10/15/85
3. Operations Procedure 24.608 " Rod Worth Minimizer Functional Test" 10/15/85
4. Operations Procedure 24.609." Rod Sequence Control System Functional Test" 10/15/85
5. Operations Administrative Procedure 21.000.01 " Shift Operations l and Control Room" 10/15/85
a. Added to the duties of the NSS the 1 responsibility for ensuring that
  • J the evaluations of events are properly conducted and documented in the log book  !

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6. Operations Procedure 23.623 " Reactor Manual Control, CRD, and Rod Sequence

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Control System" 10/15/85 .!

e. Added requirement for reactor operator '

to sign and note' that the rod pull cover sheet has been read and understood

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b. Revised rod pull sheets .

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c. Allows use of laminated rod pull sheets H if alarm typer is working -
d. Revised method of performing coupling l verification check for rods fully
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e. Added new attachment for signoff of l satisfactory coupling check as opposed to signing directly on the rod pull sheets q I

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f. Added three-second wait period after the

" Rod Settle" light goe . out prior to i

, selecting-the next rod for movement

g. Requires verification of alarm typer ,

, operability after each page of the rod' I pull sequence is completed

h. Added section for " Recovery Procedure 'i for RSCS Group Reset" should a rod become ci , sitioned in the Group Notch Logic Mode
i. Requires single rod notch movement above control rod Group 2
8. " Rod Wor th Minimizer Reduced Notch Wor th Procedure Interface" Lesson Plan 8/19/85'
9. GE SIL No. 316 (Nov. 1979) " Reduced Notch Worth Procedure" 8/19/85 B. Miscellaneous Additional Training j

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1. Reviewed seven-minute video tape on "Mispositionin'g of Control Rods" in connection with July 2 incident 8/3/85 ,
2. Attended company presentation to the  :

NRC on "Ptemature Criticality Event of ';

July 2" in Glen Ellyn, Illinois 7/23/85.

3. Attended presentation of " Premature I Criticality Event of July 2" given to all licensed operators by Plant {

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Superintendent R. Lenart 7/25/85 l t

4. Produced videotape of July 2 incident emphasizing the ' points raised in the l DER evaluation and the corrective actions recommended by the CARB.

8/12/85 l

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APPENDIX'B Page Line Reads Should Read 3 2 "ma in ta in " " maintains" 3 5 "make" "makes" 3 6 "sure the" "sure that" 3 19 "Well, shift" "Well, the shift" 5 11 "why he" "why we" 5 24 "mmaster" " master" 5 25 " drive-weld" ,

" dry-weld" 5 25 " procedure proced' ore" " procedure" 7 16 " star t of f " "s tar t up" 7 18 "after after" "after" 8 2 " drive-weld" " d r y.-w e ld" 8 4 " grading" "g r a ti ng "

8 4 *was below" "was not below" 8 4 " mechanisms were" " mechanisms and were" 8 9 "we" "I" 9 9 "an" "and" 11 17 "do the the" "got the" 11 18 "end-up r eset" "inop/ reset" ,

12 17 "I would" "i t would" i 13 13 " Reactor engineer" "The reactor engineer" l 13 15 " Reactor engineer "The reactor engineer" l 14 18- "you know, we" "you know, he"  !

14 22 "11 rods"- "The 11 rods" 15 25 " entering" " inserting" 18 12 "he really" "he realized he" 18 13 "made a- " "made a mistake and" 18 13 " increase" " decrease" 18 22 " draft" " graph" l 20 2 "a basic" "a basic rundown" 20 3 "what happened" "of what happened" 20 4 "were in critical" "were critical" l 21 16 "STA" "STA in training" l 24 17 "were at" "are at"  !

24 24 "i t had" "it had not" 26 7 " thoroughly, would" " thoroughly, and would "

26 11 "and pulled" "and he pulled" 26 23 "we made" "we had" 27 11 "would only have" "would only have been" 27 14 "that's" "that" 27 14 -

"you have the" "you have to have the" l 28 6 "a simulator" "the simulator" l 28 6 "and four" "and four rods" j 29 2 "make" " making" l 29 2 "that's" "that was" i 29 14 "out an" "out and" '

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l Page Line Reads Should Read 29 , 23 "11:30, which" "11:30,_in which" 29 25 "s ta f f 's" "s ta tus "

31 3 " minimizer came" " minimizer, block came" 31 14 "came in there" "was aware" 32 11 "He just" "He may have just" 34 12 "had calculated periods" "the calculated period"

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34 19 "three from" "three' days f r om" 3 34 20 "gone the" "were gone for the"

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