ML20237J911

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Partially Deleted Transcript of Ofc of Investigation Investigative Interview (Closed Meeting) W/E Duda on 850731 in Newport,Mi
ML20237J911
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/31/1985
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI)
To:
Shared Package
ML20237J518 List:
References
FOIA-86-245 LB-85-214, NUDOCS 8708260364
Download: ML20237J911 (27)
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Text

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OR G NAL .  !

U.N ntu STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j 1

\  ?

l IN DE MATTER OF: DOCKET NO:

L8 214 ,

0FFICE OF INVESTIGATION .

l INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW 1 J

.. \

(CLOSED MEETING) .

LOCADON: NEWPORT, MICHIGAN PAGES: 126 DATE: WEDNESDAY,-JULY 31, 1985 in' formation in this d ofrecord Information was delet in accordance wit {th I fe';'[MEr ,

ace-FEDEFiREPORTERS, INC. I OfficktReportm I 444 North CyitolStres )'

Washington, D.C.20001 (2d'2) 347-3700 F; j

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NATICNWEE COVERACE l

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, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

)

2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1

3

______________ i 4 l In the Matter of:

)

. ) Case No. LB-85-214 5 OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION )

INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW )

6

) )

J 7

The Deposition of EDWARD DUDA, taken pursuant to Notice before me, Elizabeth Diann Ferguson, Notary 9 j Public in and for the County of Wayne (acting in Monroe County), I 10  !

lat6400DixieHighway, Newport, Michigan,onWednesday, July 31, 11 j j1985, commencing at about 10:05 a.m.

12 p .

I3 APPEARANCES:

l UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l i Field Office Region III I

'S '

799 Roosevelt' Road l Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 16 ! (By: James N. Kalkman, Esq.) ,

i

'7 8

! Appearing on behalf of the Nucinar Regulatory Commission

! l 1 y

'8 ' JOHN H. FLYNN, ESQ.

i 5

! 2000 Secon9 Avenue

'9 h Detroit, Michigan 48226 i ll 20 l 0 Appearing on behalf of Detroit Edison I
21 h i ,

22 ' ,

i 23 2'

(continuing)

I i 25 I J l

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q 3 APPEARANCES: (continued)

! i PETER A. MARQUARDT, ESO. ':

2 2000 Seoond Avenue 1 Detroit, Michigan 48226 l 3

4 Appearing on behalf of Detroit Edison t j

1 5

6 ALSO PRESENT:

7 Terrence Land and Thomas Randazzo 8 - . .

9 l

l to f I l 33 l Elizabeth Diann Ferguson, CSR-1347 i Court Reporter 12 i!

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2 pag, Witness 3 Edward Duda

  • Examination by Mr. Kalkman 5 ,

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Newport, Michigan.

3 Wednes' day, July 31, 1985 2

at about 10:05 a.m.

3 MR. KALKMAN For the record, this is 5

6 the interview of Edward Duda, D-u-d-a,.who-is employed by 7 the Detroit Edison Company. The location of this 8 interview is the Fermi II Nuclear Power Station.

g Present.at this interview are 10 Mr. Duda, Detroit Edison Counsels, Peter Marquardt and 11 John Flynn; NRC Reactor Inspector, Terrence Lang, and 12 NRC Investigator, James Kalkman.

l i

I 33 !, As agreed this interview is being 34 li transcribed by the Court Reporter Elizabeth Ferguson.

U 3s The subject matter of this interview c

16 f concerns a reactor operator error that occurred on l 37 July 1, 1985, at the Fermi II Nuclear Power Station.

., 18 Mr. Duda, will you please stand and 39 raise your right hand?

I li - - -

! 20 11 '

a EDWARD DUDA,

! 21 l i i

  • I after having first been duly sworn to tell the truth, 22 23 the whole truth and nothing but the truth, testified 24 upon his oath as follows:

2s 1 4

--______________.,_______.____._____.]

W EXAMINATION 1

l BY MR. KALKMAN:

2 i

O Sir, did you --

3 MR. MARQUARDT I think you ought to l correct the record, James, and perhaps ask him whether he 5

is employed by Detroit Edison Company, f 6

A Yes, that would probably be a good idea.

7 l

8 g BY MR. KALEMAN:

,g O Are you amployed by Detroit Edison?

3, A No, I am not. I am a contractor.

Q Y u are e ntracted to Edison through who?

12 A R.T.S.

13 i

! ,, j Q And that stands for what? j l l l

A Resource Tt::hnical Services; and I am employed by myself ,

35 33 my own company.

[ 37 0 You are a sub-contractor?

't jg A Right.

'i*

3g MR. MARQUARDT We just want to keep the record straight.

20

~ ~ ~

f 21

'r i BY MR. KALKMAN:

22 0 What is your function at the Fermi Plant as a contractor, 23 as a contract employee?

24 A My j b is the shift operations advisor.

25 5

1 O And what are your responsibilities?  ;

,- A Well, as I know it, my responsibilities are, that to the 3 best of my ability and experience, that I help the 4 operations group maintain safe and proper operations and 5 are accurate.

6 Q What is your experience in nuclear operations?

7 A Well, I have a Bachelor's and Science Degree in Nuclear e Engineering; senior reactor operator's license Unit I; t

9 and I was subsequently licensed here as senice reactor  ;

i Ic operator, licensed here. j I have done reactor engineering work 11

)

12 at the Nine Mile, and I was assistant shift supervisor j 13 l there. ,

14 Is the Nine Mile Point a boiling reactor unit? l Q

l 15 iA Yes.

1 i

1E i O Is it similar to the Fermi Plant as far as generation of a

l6 17 boiling water reactor? J h I 4

18 A Yes.

19 0 Is it a GE reactor?

II i 5 20 l A Yes. )

!!=

i

[ 21 MR. LANG: Unit four? a 4 J 22 A No.

l 23 MR. LANG: What is Nine Mile? I l

24 A Two.  ;

n 5

~ ~ ~

l M  ! l 3

l 6 l t

i

__ _- --__ A

i l

. i

]

1 BY MR. KALKMAN: 1 1

2 0 .You were present on the shift on the evening of July 1, j i i 3 1985, when the reactor operator erred in the sequence pull, J l

l 4 the rod pull sequence, correct?

5 A Yes.

6 Could you describe for us what you recall of that incident, 1

Q 1

7 when you became aware of the incident, and any functions I l

8 you performed in resulting from that rod pull error? i I,

9 A Well, on the first that I knew of it, the reactor operator I 10 at the 603 panel was saying to someone who I don't know, )

11 who he was talking to, that it was out-of-sequence. l I

12 I was standing next to the STA and --  !

I 1

13 Q Is that Mr. Dong? I l l l

14 gA Ye s , Mr . Dong .

15 We decided that the rod-worth-minimizer 16 should have caught our problem. l l

i 17 Following up on that, we decided to I

18 find out why the rod-wortheminimizer did not catch our

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19 problem.

3 j 20 0 Okay.

  • l 21 A Mr. Dong, I eventually found out, minutes afterwards, had t

22 talked to the reactor engineer on the shift and found out 23 that the rod-worth-minimizer is not programmed to catch 24 our reduced notch-worth pulls; and we discussed that for 25 some short period of tbme.

7

1 That was pretty much the extent of our 2 l involvement in the situation. l 3

O So you were standing near the 603 panel when the event i .

l occurred?

5 A Probably about eight feet away.

6 Q And you heard -- who did you overhear --

A The operator at the 603 panel, e

u /

Q He was telling someone that you are not sure who it was?

8 A Right.

'O 1 Q That he was out-of-sequ.ence? ,

l

l A That is correct. l l

12 O Did you observe the shift supervisor?

'3 A At Which time?

'# i Q Enter the Control Room area of the 603 panel? j  ;

'6 A I did not myself observe him come into the area, if that i

'6 1 l is what you mean.

l 3 " 1

. Q Yes.

t l

'8 h

3 A I saw him once he was in there, yes, I guess is the i

'9 <

!) answer to that question. I i 1  !

j 20 MR. LANG: Did you ever observe the f

p 21 ,

e, shift supervisor roll back the charts, the SRM charts? ,

22 fA Nc, I did not. '

23 t I cannot say that he did or did not.

24 '

MR. LANG: So you are saying that the 25 first time you were aware of it was af ter they pulled the

/

1

- j 1

1 rods and inserted in or as they were --  ;

2 A No, I cannot really say when it was.

3 I believe it was sometime -- I know d it was sometime after they found he was out-of-sequence 5 because he was saying that he was in the evolution. It i 6 was like -- l 7 MR. LANG: Did he say that directly 8 to you?

9 A No. As I just stated, it was --

10 -MR. LANG: Did the shift-supervisor 11 get you involved in,the situation, or did you just choose 12 to work on the rod-worth-minimizer? l I

s' 13 l A Well, usually when this is a situation like this and there

'd i! is a problem, we try to work on' what you are able to 0

15  ; at the moment.

16 When it happened, the shift supervisor 17 was not right at the panel, so he did not try to get me l

18 involved with anything, g

s

19 . . .

i 20 BY MR. KALKMAN:

l l 21 What is the difference between your function in the i t lQ 22 control Room and, say, the STA?

23 A Well, I guess it is just what the name implies. The STA 24 is there for technical advise; and the operations advisor, i

25 the shift operations advisor is there for operations advice.

9

. 1 j

The actual function is pretty similar. ]

3

)

2 They are both advisory roles. J l

I MR. LANG - As far as you can tell us 3

on the shif t at night, were .you ever aware of the SRM l charts being increasing? l 5 i i

6 A No.

MR. LANG: Were you aware of the out-7 g

of-sequence -- what does that mean to you, essentially?

g A To me, it means that the rods are not being pulled in accordance with the pull sheets.

to MR. LANG: Were you aware of the number of rods that he had pulled out-of-sequence? l 12 13 A No.

MR. LANG: How do you function with 9

the shift organization?  ;

5 ..

I am having a tough time. j 16 1 l

n Do you take your orders directly from f f

I* the shif t supervisor or --

. 18 I*

39 My orders, could you --

[l A Your directions or any l MR. LANG:

20 n

21 l requests for assistance?
  • A well, if the shift supervisor directly reauests my 22 23 attention, I definitely get involved with the situation.

Other than that, it is pretty much 24 25 lef t up to,the individual advisor to get involved as ha 10

3 feels necessary, MR. LANG ' Were you requested to get 2

3 involved?

4 A No. '

5 s BY MR. KALKMAN:  ;

7 Q Do you keep a log of your activities?

A Unofficially, yes. )

8 9 0 Do you have an unofficial log for the event of July 17 )

A Yes. l 10 u MR. LANG: Did you mention the out-of- '

l 12 sequence in the 1997 13 ! A No, I did not.

I 14 i

MR. LANG: Do you have a reason why you 15 did not?

16 A Well, it did not seem important for me from other events I

s 17 of the night.

I' MR. LANG: So you were, I take it,

., is

- 19 investigating what you perceived to be the failure of the t

20 rod-worth-minimizer?

l .

21 A Yes, t

  • MR. LANG: Did you log it in the log?

22 23 A No.

24 25 11

1 BY MR. KALKMAN:

2 0 What did you log that evening?

3 A The only thing I remember logging is the reactor when 4 we finally pulled in the correct sequence and the reactor 5 operator declared the reactor critical.

6 It was on the f airly long period of 7 time.

. e I did log in my log that period.

9 There were other things that I logged, but I don't. recall i

10 them offhand. 1 11 0 Did you get involved in a water level fluctuation problem 12 that evening?

1 13 [A Yes.

I 14

!j Q Was this in your log?

15 A No.

16 Q What was the situation with the water level?

s i 17 A Basically as I remember it, the instrument was swinging I

'. 18 up and down and I believe at one time we got -- it may l even have been a low-level trip from that instrument.

19 l

i j 20 l'l 0 What was the cause of --

21 A No cause.

I' 22 It was no cause. No cause was found 23 that I know of.

24 MR. LANG: Discussions involving the 25 rod-worth-minimizer, when you started investigating what 12

1 l

e i

1 you perceived to be the failur'e, did you make any

(

2- recommendations as to the operability of the rod-worth- ]

(

3 minimizer to the shift supervisor?

A No, because before I ever saw the shif t supervisor, we 5 had the word inom the reactor engineer on the shift that 6 the rod-worth-minimizer was not programmed to do this..

7 In your experience at MR. LANG:

8 Nine Mile, would the rod-worth-minimiser had blocked on 9 I that same circumstance?

10 y,,,

A il MR, LANG: .If at'Nine Mile a reactor 12 engineer told you it would not block, would you have

' declared the rod-worth-minimizer inoperable? j l

A Well, that is a very hypothetical point, and one that is <

15 I sort of academic since our rod-worth-minimizer was l 16 required to be operable except the first --

' MR. LANG: At Nine Mile? l t* l 18 ygg,ggy,,

i 3

19 It makes it sort of a --

,I '

'i 20 MR.'LANG: I guess the point I am 21 trying to get at is when the reactor engineer told you l

22 that the rod-worth-minimizer would not block --

23 A The STA.

24 The STA in training or --

MR. LANG:

25 A No, the STA.

13

MR. LANG: Tom Dong?

i l

2 A Tom Dong.

3 MR. LANG: Okay.

1 4 Tom Dong, did you assume he was correct  !

l 5 automatically? Did you question his statement?  !

1

.1

~

6 A Well, we did discuss it.

7 Whether I actually asked him, "Are 1

8 you sure?" I don't remember that. l 1

l 9 I did not feel at the time that it l

'l' 10 would be a big, you know, event; so I don't remember my 11 axact words to him, or exactly what we discussed.

l 12 ,! It was not a quick, "It won't block o

13 i you, okay, we will see you," it was -- what-exactly we 14 said, we said -- it was something. What exactly we said,

!i I am not sure, j 15 q 16 MR. LANG: Other than the conversation i 17 you had with the STA, did you have any other conversations l 1

'. 18 with the shift supervisor or the RO or anyone?

19 A During the event?

i j 20 MR. LANG: During the whole shift.

! 21 A During the whole shift, yes. .

I

  • MR. LANG: Can you paraphrase or -- f 22 i

23 A one conversation I do remember was that the ho at the 603 f I

24 panel, when we went critical in sequence, I remember  !

I 25 someone saying something to him about it being a slow j 14 l

l i

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1 period, and I felt it was kind of slow myself.  ;

l .

2 He asked me whether it was all right  !

3 and I said to him, do you feel comfortable with it?"

~ /

4 And he said yes. And I said, then, it is a good period.

1 5 That is pretty much the extent of it. );

I 6 MR. LANG: You must have been talking I f ' f 7 to puring the second Plant criticality? I L  ; l 8 A Yes. )

9 MR. LANG: Did you do any discussions j to of this order in the first one?

1 11 A No.

12 MR. LANG: When were you actually 13 i aware of the criticality, the first one?

14 A Are we assuming that we were critical?

15 MR. LANG: Well, what do you assume?

16 Were you or were you not?

i 17 A well, can I have a definition on it?

I l 18 KR. LANG: Well, use your own I

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19 definition.

l i l[ 20 A Well, if we are arguing whether K effectively equals one or l 21 not, possibly; but if we are arguing whether or not the r

22 Plant had time to declare the reactor critical per the r 23 definition that was in the procedure, nog he did not.

24 MR. LANG: So the first time that you ,

25 saw the actual SRM charts -- and I am not even sure whether 6i16 '

. I l

I i that was -- did you assume you were critical or not, 1 I based on your own judgment, whatever method of criticality i

J you want to use?

d Well, we were not. ,

A i 5 MR. LANG: You were not critical?

6 g go, 7 MR. LANG: When was the first time 8 you saw the charts?

9 A On the next shift the next night, my next midnight shift.  !

10 I would come in on the second.

11 MR. LANG: Ware there any discussions .

1 12  ! during the event of the shift or shortly thereafter where h

13 maybe three or four of you were involved with the shift  !

supervisor?

[

15 A I don't remember if there were any.

16 . . .

2

' 17 BY MR. KALKMAN i I.

j 18 Q Did Mr. Aniol ask you if you had logged the out-of-sequence

  • I
19 pull event?

i l j 20 g yo, 21 MR. LANG: Did he discuss it with you?

i 22 The out-of-sequence pull event?

A 23 MR. LANG: Yes.

24 A Like I said, if he did, I don't remember.

25 MR. LANG: Did he come to you and say 16

A

'this is what occurred? i I

I A Not that I remember.

3 . . .

l BY MR. KALKMAN:

5 0 Was there any analysis performed after the rods were l

i 6 re-inserted on any review on your part of the reactor i 7 before the okay was given to re-pull the rods in sequence?

8 A Well, about the first part, analysis, what type of ,

9 analysis?

10 Q From the type of rods.

11 A Well, you don't mean --

12 Q The out-of-sequence rods were re-inserted, the time" 13 between that period and when the approval was given to ,

i*

re-pull the rods in sequence, did you have any involvement 15 in any analysis if whether the Plant was -- if there was 16 any damage to the fuel or any Corp or anything?

17 3

A I do not remember my exact discussions during that period i

g 18 of time, but I would imagine that I was talking to someone s

19 about the event, s

20 l I know I was talking with the STA,

21 Tom Dong. I cannot imagine talking about something else t

22 at the time; so I guess I would have to say there probably 23 was some sort of talk about it.

2d O I am not asking about any discussion, I an asking you if 25 you did anything, if you reviewed any procedure or did 17

l' l .

i i

i 1 anything to make a determination if it was okay to re-2 start the Plant.

3 Do you have any functional repsonsibiliy 4 to check anything?

l 5 A Did I do any analysis to determine whether it was --

6 Q Whether the out-of-sequence pull had caused any damage 7

or --  !

8 A It is my experience that this kind of event would not have 9 caused the damage.

1 10 I don't know at the time whether I 1

11 had analysed it that extent or not.

12 MR. LANG: Was your opinion even i

13 requested prior to the --  ;

[

I $

14 iA No. I i l 15 MR. LANG: Pr.ior to..the start-up again? l 16 A No. j

l U MR. LANG: When you went home that l

18 next morning, the end of the shift --

g

19 A Can I continue on that last statement?

I j 20 l MR. LANG: Okay.

21 A It was not requested; however, had I felt it was warranted, t

22 I would have given it.

23 MR. LANG: Was it given that night?

24 A No.

2s - - -

18

' BY MR. KALKMAN:

2 Q You are probably the most experienced person on that 3 shif t, as f ar as operating a reactor, correct?

A Possibly, yes.

8 Q And during that whole period, that shif t that you were 6 not involved in an advisory capacity, I mean, were you 7 there as an advisor, but you were not asked to do any --

i 8 for any advice by the operationa people? )

l I

8 A That is not true.

'O I have already stated I was asked by q

when the reactor did eventually go critical

. 1

,2 1 in sequence.

13 You are saying the whole shif t?

O Okay.

'S That is just not true.

jA 16 Q Relating to the out of sequence pull, you were not asked f

' '7 to give any advice?

'8 No, not that I remember.

j A

19 MR. LANG
During the course of a

! 20 typical shift, first of all, do you rotate with that shift?

21 g yo, E

22 MR. LANG: You are on a different shift?

23 A That is correct.

24 MR. LANG: IN the course of your shif t, 25 then, a typical shift, how much involvement do you get or 19 ,

/9 o b

i 1 request for assistance usually frors the shift supervisor, 2 typically?

3 A Typically, the shif t supervisor will discuss a few 4 test specs related questions; I am not sure that everytime l 5 ve get involved we have been asked to get involved.

6 That is obviously not chc case.  ;

7 Mr. Lang, you have been on shift a yourself. Would you ask an advisor for help when you get 9 into a problem? That is pretty much when they do request 10 our assistance when they have a problem or they have a 11 test spec-related question or technical question that they bellave our experience can help them with.

12 .

I; 13 That, is not cut and dry when they 14 have to ask us, if that is what you are asking.

I 15 , MR. LANG: In your own opinion, do l

16 you feel like you have been fully utilized in your

=

l 17 experience, fully utilized to the best advantage?

t

- 18 A Well, that is sort of a leading question.

19 MR. LANG
Well, I am an examiner.

T l 20 A Well, in my opinion, we have been told that any time  ;

1

~

21 we don't agree with the shif t supervisor and we disagree l

22 etrongly enough or feel strongly enough about the issue, 23 we have been told by two individuals, Leo Lesser and i 24 Eugene Preston, that they are available any time for us l 25 to call them.

i 20 l

u i

3 There has not yet been a situation 2 where that has come to pass.

3 MR. LANG: Were you on shift -- I 4 un trying to get an idea of what you actually do on shift.

5 Do you follow the shift engineer?

6 A The shift engineer?

7 MR. LANG: The shift supervisor.

i 8 A Oh, okay.

9 MR. LANG: Do ycu follow him around to and watch his judgment call?

11 A No.

12 MR. LANG: So it is strictly up to him I

13 I as to -- as f ar as when he feels he needs your assistanen? ,

14 A That is pretty much true.

15 I wonid like to point out that it is 16 not only the shift supervisor that we give assistance to. l i 17 KR. LANG: Well, one other question: l l'

. 18 At the end of the shift, who do you ]

I

19 know was actually aware of the out-of-sequence rod pull 1

1 70 and how many rods -- I mean, who in your mind do you think l

21 actually knew there were 11 rods in this position?

  • Zn my opinion?

22 A 23 MR. LANG: Well, let's talk actually 24 first.

25 A That I actually knew?

i

- 21

.. 1 MR. LANG: Yes. ]

J 2

A That is a hard question to answer since I did not know i 3 how many rods had been pulled out-of-sequence until the q

! following shift.

5 MR. LANG: Okay.

6 A It would be an opinion. It would not be an actual j statement.

8 MR. LANG: Well, in your opinion, l

then.

'U In my opinion, I Lalieva the shift -- at least the A

reactor operator pulled the rods, I believe knows most 2

i i

likely the SRO on shift, Dave Aniols the shift supervisor, 1 3 ' others would be guesses on my part, even in an opinion.

MR. LANG: All right.  !

'5 . . . 1 BY MR. KALKMAN

" How many people knew of these out-of-sequence pulls?  !

l Q 8

j A Actually, an opinion or --

I " Q No. .

]i 20 A My opinion?

l 21 O No, who do you know.

f 22 A Who do I know knew about it?

23 g y,,,

t \

24 A The operator at the 603 panel, the STA in 25 training, John Dewes; the shif t supervisor, Dave Aniol: the

/

. l 3

STA, Tom Dong; and myself.

Q Did the reactor engineer, Barry Myers,did he know? J 2

3 A That would be an opinion. 1 i

4 I believe he did know about the out-At that time, I did not know whether or l 5 of-sequence.

6 not he knew about it.

7 O So you did not have any discussion with Mr. Myers?

l 8 A I did not personally, no.

MR. LANG: Did you overhear the 9

to discussion at all between the shif t supervisor and anyone 11 else in regards to whether or whether or not the thing 12 actually went critical?

13 A No.

14 I

15 BY MR. KAIJRAN :

16 Q Did you ever experience a rod pull incident, an out-of-i 17 sequence pull at the Nine Mile Point?

'l I 18 A Myself?

19 Q Yes.
) 20 A No. j

's  !

21 Q Did they have an incident such as this occur at the Nine l!*

l j

22 Mile Point?

23 A Not that I am aware of.

24 Q Okay.

MR. LANG: As far as DECO goes, does 25 j

23 l

J DECO have a specific procedure or anything as far as how 2

to interface with a shift?

A WEll, it is -- in the shif t conduct -- the conduct of the 3

4 shift operations or --

1 MR. LANG: Is there anything more i 3 j 6

specific than that that just really says what your l I

J 7

responsibilities for the legal --

. g A There may be.

MR. LANG: As far as you know, there )

g 30 is no procedure that says that the shift should check with the SOA when certain types of events occur?

33 12 A Not that I know of.

I could be incorrect on that, though.

13 il ll l 34 l! MR. LANG: Okay. l 15 16 BY MR. KALKMAN:

l 37 0 would you say that this sequence pull event was a I- I ig significant event during the -- as far the particular i

19 shift goes?

. )

j 3 A well, you are going to have to clarify that statement.

3 I mean, was it physically a significant i 21 r

event? was it politically a significant event? j 22 1

What are we talking about? l 23 0 No, just how do you perceive that event? How did you at 24 the time or if you take into consideration everything tha*.

25 24 i l

. l

____ ___________-__-_ D

j occurred on that particular shift, forget about what has 3 l 2

happened since that shift, but in your own mind, that ]

I )

3 particular shift, was this sequence pull, this out-of 4

sequence pull a significant event? i I

A Not really. j 5 1 It was handled the way it should have 6

7 been handled.

g It was one of the things that did not g lead me to further investigation was the lack of panic.

10 It did not seem to be significant at all, as far at that 11 went.

12 Q Would you say the rod-worth-minimizer problem was 13 significant?

34 A Was it at the time or now?

15 Q No, on that particular shift.

16 A Well, I personally would have liked it to have been

} n programmed differently.

1 3g MR. LANG: If the rod-worth-minimizer i

39 had been programmed the way you assumed it to be, and I I l l

s 20 acted as it did, would you have' declared it inoperative? l<

21 A Well, that is another hypothetical question, but probably.

s i

r MR. LANG: Also, on the evening that 22 23 they had the spurious block, were you aware of that?

]

A No.

24 )

i 25 MR. LANG: Were you aware of any 25 l

I spurious blocks?

2 A No.

3 MR. LANG: Not even that night, perhaps 4 a night or two before?

I 5 A well, you know --

~

6 MR. LANG: As far as you know.

7 A Not that I know.

8 MR. LANG All right.

I 9 10 BY MR. KALKMAN:

11 Q Mr. Duda, have I or any other NRC representatives l

12 threatened you in any manner or offered you any reward in 13 ,

return for this statement?

I 14 ll g go, 15 O Have you give this statement freely and voluntarily?

16 A Yes.

)

i " O Is there anything further that you care to add for the l

18 record?

i 19 A Just that I believe that all of the individuals involved 20 working for Detroit Edison did their job safely and 21 although there was an error, the error was corrected in a  ;

22 timely manner, and control of the reactor was never lost.

23 Thank you.

24 MR. KALKMAN: Thank you. l 25 (Despostion concluded at 10:40 a.m.)

26 ,

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