ML20237J911
| ML20237J911 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1985 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237J518 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-86-245 LB-85-214, NUDOCS 8708260364 | |
| Download: ML20237J911 (27) | |
Text
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OR G NAL.
U. ntu STATES N
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j 1
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\\
l IN DE MATTER OF:
DOCKET NO:
L8 214 0FFICE OF INVESTIGATION INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW 1
l J
\\
(CLOSED MEETING)
LOCADON:
NEWPORT, MICHIGAN PAGES:
126 DATE:
WEDNESDAY,-JULY 31, 1985 in' formation in this record was delet d
of Information in accordance wit {th fe';'[MEr I
ace-FEDEFiREPORTERS, INC.
I OfficktReportm I
444 North CyitolStres
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Washington, D.C.20001 (2d' ) 347-3700
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
)
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
3 i
In the Matter of:
)
4
)
Case No.
LB-85-214 5
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION
)
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW
)
6
)
)
J 7
The Deposition of EDWARD DUDA, taken pursuant to Notice before me, Elizabeth Diann Ferguson, Notary 9
j Public in and for the County of Wayne (acting in Monroe County),
10 lat6400DixieHighway, Newport, Michigan,onWednesday, July 31, 11 j
j1985, commencing at about 10:05 a.m.
12 p I3 APPEARANCES:
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Field Office Region III i
'S 799 Roosevelt' Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 16 !
(By:
James N. Kalkman, Esq.)
i Appearing on behalf of the Nucinar Regulatory Commission 8
'7 l
1
'8 JOHN H. FLYNN, ESQ.
y 2000 Secon9 Avenue 5
'9 h
Detroit, Michigan 48226 i
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20 0
Appearing on behalf of Detroit Edison I
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22 ',
i 23 2'
(continuing)
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APPEARANCES:
(continued) q i
3 2
PETER A. MARQUARDT, ESO.
2000 Seoond Avenue 1
l Detroit, Michigan 48226 3
Appearing on behalf of Detroit Edison j
4 t
1 5
ALSO PRESENT:
6 Terrence Land and 7
Thomas Randazzo 8
9 l
l to f
Il Elizabeth Diann Ferguson, CSR-1347 l
33 i Court Reporter i!
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- pag, 2
Witness 3
Edward Duda 5
Examination by Mr. Kalkman
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3
Newport, Michigan.
3 Wednes' day, July 31, 1985 2
at about 10:05 a.m.
3 MR. KALKMAN For the record, this is 5
the interview of Edward Duda, D-u-d-a,.who-is employed by 6
7 the Detroit Edison Company.
The location of this interview is the Fermi II Nuclear Power Station.
8 Present.at this interview are g
Mr. Duda, Detroit Edison Counsels, Peter Marquardt and 10 John Flynn; NRC Reactor Inspector, Terrence Lang, and 11 NRC Investigator, James Kalkman.
12 l
i I
33 !,
As agreed this interview is being li transcribed by the Court Reporter Elizabeth Ferguson.
34 U
The subject matter of this interview 3s c
f concerns a reactor operator error that occurred on 16 l
July 1, 1985, at the Fermi II Nuclear Power Station.
37 Mr. Duda, will you please stand and 18 39 raise your right hand?
I li 20 11 a
21 l EDWARD
- DUDA, i
i I
after having first been duly sworn to tell the truth, 22 the whole truth and nothing but the truth, testified 23 upon his oath as follows:
24 2s 1
4
--______________.,_______.____._____.]
W EXAMINATION 1
l BY MR. KALKMAN:
2 i
O Sir, did you --
3 MR. MARQUARDT I think you ought to l
correct the record, James, and perhaps ask him whether he 5
is employed by Detroit Edison Company, f
6 A
Yes, that would probably be a good idea.
7 l
8 BY MR. KALEMAN:
g O
Are you amployed by Detroit Edison?
,g A
No, I am not.
I am a contractor.
3, Q
Y u are e ntracted to Edison through who?
12 A
R.T.S.
13 i
j Q And that stands for what?
j l
l l
A Resource Tt::hnical Services; and I am employed by myself,
35 my own company.
33
- [
0 You are a sub-contractor?
37
't A
Right.
jg
'i MR. MARQUARDT We just want to keep 3g the record straight.
20 f
~
~
~
21 i
'r BY MR. KALKMAN:
22 0
What is your function at the Fermi Plant as a contractor, 23 as a contract employee?
24 A
My j b is the shift operations advisor.
25 5
1 O
And what are your responsibilities?
A Well, as I know it, my responsibilities are, that to the 3
best of my ability and experience, that I help the operations group maintain safe and proper operations and 4
5 are accurate.
6 Q
What is your experience in nuclear operations?
7 A
Well, I have a Bachelor's and Science Degree in Nuclear e
Engineering; senior reactor operator's license Unit I; t
9 and I was subsequently licensed here as senice reactor i
Ic operator, licensed here.
j 11 I have done reactor engineering work
)
12 at the Nine Mile, and I was assistant shift supervisor j
13 l there.
14 Q
Is the Nine Mile Point a boiling reactor unit?
l l
15 iA Yes.
1 i
1E i O Is it similar to the Fermi Plant as far as generation of a
J l6 17 boiling water reactor?
h I
4 18 A
Yes.
19 0
Is it a GE reactor?
II i
5 20 l A
Yes.
)
=
i
[
21 MR. LANG:
Unit four?
a 4
J 22 A
No.
l 23 MR. LANG:
What is Nine Mile?
I l
24 A
Two.
n 5
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_- --__ A
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1 BY MR. KALKMAN:
1 1
2 0
.You were present on the shift on the evening of July 1, j
i i
3 1985, when the reactor operator erred in the sequence pull, J
l l
4 the rod pull sequence, correct?
1 5
A Yes.
6 Q
Could you describe for us what you recall of that incident, 1
7 when you became aware of the incident, and any functions I
l 8
you performed in resulting from that rod pull error?
i I
9 A
Well, on the first that I knew of it, the reactor operator I
10 at the 603 panel was saying to someone who I don't know,
)
11 who he was talking to, that it was out-of-sequence.
l I
12 I was standing next to the STA and --
I 1
l Q Is that Mr. Dong?
I 13 l
l 14 gA Ye s, Mr. Dong.
15 We decided that the rod-worth-minimizer 16 should have caught our problem.
l l
i 17 Following up on that, we decided to I
{
18 find out why the rod-wortheminimizer did not catch our a
19 problem.
3j 20 0
Okay.
l 21 A
Mr. Dong, I eventually found out, minutes afterwards, had t*
22 talked to the reactor engineer on the shift and found out 23 that the rod-worth-minimizer is not programmed to catch 24 our reduced notch-worth pulls; and we discussed that for 25 some short period of tbme.
7
1 That was pretty much the extent of our 2
involvement in the situation.
3 O
So you were standing near the 603 panel when the event i
occurred?
5 A
Probably about eight feet away.
6 Q
And you heard -- who did you overhear --
A The operator at the 603 panel, u
/
e Q
He was telling someone that you are not sure who it was?
8 A
Right.
'O Q
That he was out-of-sequ.ence?
l A
That is correct.
l l
12 O
Did you observe the shift supervisor?
'3 A
At Which time?
i Q
Enter the Control Room area of the 603 panel?
j
'6 A
I did not myself observe him come into the area, if that i
'6 1
l is what you mean.
l 1
3 Q
Yes.
l
.t h
'8 A
I saw him once he was in there, yes, I guess is the 3
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answer to that question.
I i
1 j
20 MR. LANG:
Did you ever observe the f
p 21 e,
shift supervisor roll back the charts, the SRM charts?
fA Nc, I did not.
22 t
23 I cannot say that he did or did not.
24 MR. LANG:
So you are saying that the 25 first time you were aware of it was af ter they pulled the
/
1 j
1 1
rods and inserted in or as they were --
2 A
No, I cannot really say when it was.
3 I believe it was sometime -- I know it was sometime after they found he was out-of-sequence d
5 because he was saying that he was in the evolution.
It i
6 was like --
7 MR. LANG:
Did he say that directly 8
to you?
9 A
No.
As I just stated, it was --
10
-MR. LANG:
Did the shift-supervisor get you involved in,the situation, or did you just choose 11 12 to work on the rod-worth-minimizer?
s' 13 l A
Well, usually when this is a situation like this and there
'd i!
is a problem, we try to work on' what you are able to 0
15 at the moment.
16 When it happened, the shift supervisor l
was not right at the panel, so he did not try to get me 17 18 g
involved with anything, s
19 i
l 20 BY MR. KALKMAN:
l What is the difference between your function in the 21 lQ i
t 22 control Room and, say, the STA?
23 A
Well, I guess it is just what the name implies.
The STA 24 is there for technical advise; and the operations advisor, i
25 the shift operations advisor is there for operations advice.
9
1 j
The actual function is pretty similar.
]
3
)
They are both advisory roles.
J 2
MR. LANG - As far as you can tell us 3
on the shif t at night, were.you ever aware of the SRM l
charts being increasing?
5 i
i A
No.
6 MR. LANG:
Were you aware of the out-7 of-sequence -- what does that mean to you, essentially?
g A
To me, it means that the rods are not being pulled in g
accordance with the pull sheets.
to MR. LANG:
Were you aware of the number of rods that he had pulled out-of-sequence?
l 12 A
No.
13 MR. LANG:
How do you function with 9
the shift organization?
5 I am having a tough time.
j 16 1
l Do you take your orders directly from f
n f
I the shif t supervisor or --
18
.I*
[l A My orders, could you --
39 l
MR. LANG:
Your directions or any 20 n
l requests for assistance?
21 A
well, if the shift supervisor directly reauests my 22 attention, I definitely get involved with the situation.
23 Other than that, it is pretty much 24 lef t up to,the individual advisor to get involved as ha 25 10
feels necessary, 3
MR. LANG ' Were you requested to get 2
involved?
3 4
A No.
5 s
BY MR. KALKMAN:
7 Q
Do you keep a log of your activities?
)
8 A
Unofficially, yes.
9 0
Do you have an unofficial log for the event of July 17
)
10 A
Yes.
MR. LANG:
Did you mention the out-of-u 12 sequence in the 1997 A
No, I did not.
13 I
MR. LANG:
Do you have a reason why you i
14 15 did not?
16 A
Well, it did not seem important for me from other events of the night.
s 17 I
MR. LANG:
So you were, I take it, is investigating what you perceived to be the failure of the 19 t
rod-worth-minimizer?
l 20 21 A
- Yes, t*
MR. LANG:
Did you log it in the log?
22 23 A
No.
24 25 11
1 BY MR. KALKMAN:
2 0
What did you log that evening?
3 A
The only thing I remember logging is the reactor when 4
we finally pulled in the correct sequence and the reactor 5
operator declared the reactor critical.
6 It was on the f airly long period of 7
time.
e I did log in my log that period.
9 There were other things that I logged, but I don't. recall i
10 them offhand.
1 11 0
Did you get involved in a water level fluctuation problem 12 that evening?
1 13 [A Yes.
I
!j Q Was this in your log?
14 15 A
No.
16 Q
What was the situation with the water level?
si 17 A
Basically as I remember it, the instrument was swinging I
18 up and down and I believe at one time we got -- it may l
19 l
even have been a low-level trip from that instrument.
l'l 0 i
What was the cause of --
j 20 21 A
No cause.
I 22 It was no cause.
No cause was found 23 that I know of.
24 MR. LANG:
Discussions involving the 25 rod-worth-minimizer, when you started investigating what 12
1 l
e i
you perceived to be the failur'e, did you make any 1
(
2-recommendations as to the operability of the rod-worth-
]
(
3 minimizer to the shift supervisor?
A No, because before I ever saw the shif t supervisor, we had the word inom the reactor engineer on the shift that 5
the rod-worth-minimizer was not programmed to do this..
6 7
MR. LANG:
In your experience at Nine Mile, would the rod-worth-minimiser had blocked on 8
I 9
that same circumstance?
10 A
y,,,
il MR, LANG:
.If at'Nine Mile a reactor 12 engineer told you it would not block, would you have declared the rod-worth-minimizer inoperable?
j l
A Well, that is a very hypothetical point, and one that is 15 I sort of academic since our rod-worth-minimizer was l
16 required to be operable except the first --
MR. LANG:
At Nine Mile?
l t
l 18 i
3 ygg,ggy,,
19 It makes it sort of a --
,I
'i 20 MR.'LANG:
I guess the point I am 21 l
trying to get at is when the reactor engineer told you 22 that the rod-worth-minimizer would not block --
23 A
The STA.
24 MR. LANG:
The STA in training or --
25 A
No, the STA.
13
MR. LANG:
Tom Dong?
i l
2 A
Tom Dong.
MR. LANG:
Okay.
3 1
Tom Dong, did you assume he was correct 4
l 5
automatically?
Did you question his statement?
1
.1
~
6 A
Well, we did discuss it.
Whether I actually asked him, "Are 7
1 8
you sure?"
I don't remember that.
l 1
l I did not feel at the time that it l
9 10 would be a big, you know, event; so I don't remember my 11 axact words to him, or exactly what we discussed.
l It was not a quick, "It won't block 12 o
you, okay, we will see you," it was -- what-exactly we 13 i 14 said, we said -- it was something.
What exactly we said,
!i I am not sure, j
q 15 16 MR. LANG:
Other than the conversation you had with the STA, did you have any other conversations l
i 17 1
18 with the shift supervisor or the RO or anyone?
19 A
During the event?
ij 20 MR. LANG:
During the whole shift.
21 A
During the whole shift, yes.
I MR. LANG:
Can you paraphrase or --
f 22 i
23 A
one conversation I do remember was that the ho at the 603 f
I 24 panel, when we went critical in sequence, I remember I
25 someone saying something to him about it being a slow j
14 l
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1 period, and I felt it was kind of slow myself.
l 2
He asked me whether it was all right 3
and I said to him, do you feel comfortable with it?"
/
~
4 And he said yes.
And I said, then, it is a good period.
1 5
That is pretty much the extent of it.
)
I 6
MR. LANG:
You must have been talking I
f f
7 to puring the second Plant criticality?
I l
L
)
8 A
Yes.
9 MR. LANG:
Did you do any discussions j
to of this order in the first one?
1 11 A
No.
12 MR. LANG:
When were you actually 13 i
aware of the criticality, the first one?
14 A
Are we assuming that we were critical?
15 MR. LANG:
Well, what do you assume?
16 Were you or were you not?
i 17 A
well, can I have a definition on it?
I l
{
I 18 KR. LANG:
Well, use your own 19 definition.
l il [
20 A
Well, if we are arguing whether K effectively equals one or l
21 not, possibly; but if we are arguing whether or not the r
22 Plant had time to declare the reactor critical per the 23 definition that was in the procedure, nog he did not.
r 24 MR. LANG:
So the first time that you 25 saw the actual SRM charts -- and I am not even sure whether 6i16
I l
I that was -- did you assume you were critical or not, 1
i I
based on your own judgment, whatever method of criticality i
you want to use?
J A
Well, we were not.
d i
5 MR. LANG:
You were not critical?
6 g
go, 7
MR. LANG:
When was the first time 8
you saw the charts?
9 A
On the next shift the next night, my next midnight shift.
10 I would come in on the second.
11 MR. LANG:
Ware there any discussions 1
during the event of the shift or shortly thereafter where 12 h
maybe three or four of you were involved with the shift 13
[
supervisor?
15 A
I don't remember if there were any.
16 2
17 BY MR. KALKMAN i
I.
j Q
Did Mr. Aniol ask you if you had logged the out-of-sequence 18 19 pull event?
i l
j 20 g
yo, 21 MR. LANG:
Did he discuss it with you?
i 22 A
The out-of-sequence pull event?
23 MR. LANG:
Yes.
24 A
Like I said, if he did, I don't remember.
25 MR. LANG:
Did he come to you and say 16
A
'this is what occurred?
I I
A Not that I remember.
3 l
BY MR. KALKMAN:
5 0
Was there any analysis performed after the rods were i
6 re-inserted on any review on your part of the reactor i
7 before the okay was given to re-pull the rods in sequence?
8 A
Well, about the first part, analysis, what type of 9
analysis?
10 Q
From the type of rods.
11 A
Well, you don't mean --
12 Q
The out-of-sequence rods were re-inserted, the time" 13 between that period and when the approval was given to i*
re-pull the rods in sequence, did you have any involvement 15 in any analysis if whether the Plant was -- if there was 16 any damage to the fuel or any Corp or anything?
3 17 A
I do not remember my exact discussions during that period i
18 g
of time, but I would imagine that I was talking to someone s
19 about the event, s
l 20 I know I was talking with the STA, 21 Tom Dong.
I cannot imagine talking about something else t
22 at the time; so I guess I would have to say there probably 23 was some sort of talk about it.
2d O
I am not asking about any discussion, I an asking you if 25 you did anything, if you reviewed any procedure or did 17
l' l
i i
i 1
anything to make a determination if it was okay to re-2 start the Plant.
3 Do you have any functional repsonsibiliy 4
to check anything?
l 5
A Did I do any analysis to determine whether it was --
6 Q
Whether the out-of-sequence pull had caused any damage 7
or --
8 A
It is my experience that this kind of event would not have 9
caused the damage.
1 10 I don't know at the time whether I 1
11 had analysed it that extent or not.
12 MR. LANG:
Was your opinion even i
[
requested prior to the --
13 I
14 iA No.
I i
l 15 MR. LANG:
Pr.ior to..the start-up again?
l 16 A
No.
j l
U l
MR. LANG:
When you went home that 18 next morning, the end of the shift --
g 19 A
Can I continue on that last statement?
Ij 20 l
MR. LANG:
Okay.
21 A
It was not requested; however, had I felt it was warranted, t
22 I would have given it.
23 MR. LANG:
Was it given that night?
24 A
No.
2s 18
BY MR. KALKMAN:
2 You are probably the most experienced person on that Q
3 shif t, as f ar as operating a reactor, correct?
A Possibly, yes.
8 And during that whole period, that shif t that you were Q
6 not involved in an advisory capacity, I mean, were you 7
there as an advisor, but you were not asked to do any --
i
)
8 for any advice by the operationa people?
I 8
A That is not true.
'O I have already stated I was asked by q
when the reactor did eventually go critical 1
,2 1
in sequence.
13 You are saying the whole shif t?
O Okay.
'S jA That is just not true.
16 Relating to the out of sequence pull, you were not asked f
Q
'7 to give any advice?
'8 A
No, not that I remember.
j 19 MR. LANG:
During the course of a typical shift, first of all, do you rotate with that shift?
20 21 g
yo, E
22 MR. LANG:
You are on a different shift?
23 A
That is correct.
24 MR. LANG:
IN the course of your shif t, 25 then, a typical shift, how much involvement do you get or 19
/9 o b
i request for assistance usually frors the shift supervisor, 1
2 typically?
3 A
Typically, the shif t supervisor will discuss a few test specs related questions; I am not sure that everytime l
4 ve get involved we have been asked to get involved.
5 6
That is obviously not chc case.
7 Mr. Lang, you have been on shift a
yourself.
Would you ask an advisor for help when you get 9
into a problem?
That is pretty much when they do request 10 our assistance when they have a problem or they have a test spec-related question or technical question that 11 12.
they bellave our experience can help them with.
I; 13 That, is not cut and dry when they 14 have to ask us, if that is what you are asking.
I 15 MR. LANG:
In your own opinion, do l
16 you feel like you have been fully utilized in your
=
17 experience, fully utilized to the best advantage?
l t.
18 A
Well, that is sort of a leading question.
19 MR. LANG:
Well, I am an examiner.
T l
20 A
Well, in my opinion, we have been told that any time 1
21 we don't agree with the shif t supervisor and we disagree
~
l 22 etrongly enough or feel strongly enough about the issue, 23 we have been told by two individuals, Leo Lesser and i
24 Eugene Preston, that they are available any time for us 25 to call them.
i 20 l
u i
There has not yet been a situation 3
2 where that has come to pass.
3 MR. LANG:
Were you on shift -- I un trying to get an idea of what you actually do on shift.
4 Do you follow the shift engineer?
5 6
A The shift engineer?
7 MR. LANG:
The shift supervisor.
i 8
A Oh, okay.
9 MR. LANG:
Do ycu follow him around to and watch his judgment call?
11 A
No.
12 MR. LANG:
So it is strictly up to him I
13 I
as to -- as f ar as when he feels he needs your assistanen?
14 A
That is pretty much true.
15 I wonid like to point out that it is 16 not only the shift supervisor that we give assistance to.
l i
17 KR. LANG:
Well, one other question:
l l
18 At the end of the shift, who do you
]
.I 19 know was actually aware of the out-of-sequence rod pull 1
70 and how many rods -- I mean, who in your mind do you think l
21 actually knew there were 11 rods in this position?
22 A
Zn my opinion?
23 MR. LANG:
Well, let's talk actually 24 first.
25 A
That I actually knew?
21
1 MR. LANG:
Yes.
]
J 2
That is a hard question to answer since I did not know i
A 3
how many rods had been pulled out-of-sequence until the q
following shift.
5 MR. LANG:
Okay.
6 It would be an opinion.
It would not be an actual A
j statement.
8 MR. LANG:
Well, in your opinion, l
then.
'U A
In my opinion, I Lalieva the shift -- at least the reactor operator pulled the rods, I believe knows most 2
likely the SRO on shift, Dave Aniols the shift supervisor, i
i 1
3 '
others would be guesses on my part, even in an opinion.
MR. LANG: All right.
'5 1
BY MR. KALKMAN l
Q How many people knew of these out-of-sequence pulls?
8.
A Actually, an opinion or --
j I
Q No.
l
]
20 i
A My opinion?
- f 21 O
No, who do you know.
22 A
Who do I know knew about it?
23 g
y,,,
t
\\
24 A
The operator at the 603 panel, the STA in 25 training, John Dewes; the shif t supervisor, Dave Aniol: the
/
l STA, Tom Dong; and myself.
3 Q
Did the reactor engineer, Barry Myers,did he know?
J 2
3 A
That would be an opinion.
1 i
I believe he did know about the out-4 5
of-sequence.
At that time, I did not know whether or l
not he knew about it.
6 7
O So you did not have any discussion with Mr. Myers?
l 8
A I did not personally, no.
MR. LANG:
Did you overhear the 9
discussion at all between the shif t supervisor and anyone to else in regards to whether or whether or not the thing 11 12 actually went critical?
13 A
No.
I 14 15 BY MR. KAIJRAN :
16 Q
Did you ever experience a rod pull incident, an out-of-sequence pull at the Nine Mile Point?
i 17
'l I
18 A
Myself?
19 Q
Yes.
- )
20 A
No.
j
's 21 Q
Did they have an incident such as this occur at the Nine l!
l
- Mile Point?
j 22 23 A
Not that I am aware of.
24 Q
Okay.
MR. LANG:
As far as DECO goes, does 25 j
23 l
J DECO have a specific procedure or anything as far as how to interface with a shift?
2 A
WEll, it is -- in the shif t conduct -- the conduct of the 3
shift operations or --
4 1
MR. LANG:
Is there anything more i
3 j
specific than that that just really says what your l
6 J
responsibilities for the legal --
7 A
There may be.
g MR. LANG:
As far as you know, there
)
g is no procedure that says that the shift should check with 30 the SOA when certain types of events occur?
33 A
Not that I know of.
12 13 il I could be incorrect on that, though.
ll l
l!
MR. LANG:
Okay.
l 34 15 BY MR. KALKMAN:
16 l
0 would you say that this sequence pull event was a 37 I
significant event during the -- as far the particular ig i
shift goes?
19
)
.j A
well, you are going to have to clarify that statement.
3 3
I mean, was it physically a significant 21 r
event? was it politically a significant event?
j 22 1
What are we talking about?
23 0
No, just how do you perceive that event?
How did you at 24 the time or if you take into consideration everything tha*.
25 24 i
____ ___________-__-_ D
j occurred on that particular shift, forget about what has 3
happened since that shift, but in your own mind, that
]
2 I
)
particular shift, was this sequence pull, this out-of 3
sequence pull a significant event?
i 4
I A
Not really.
j 5
1 It was handled the way it should have 6
been handled.
7 It was one of the things that did not g
lead me to further investigation was the lack of panic.
g It did not seem to be significant at all, as far at that 10 went.
11 12 Q
Would you say the rod-worth-minimizer problem was significant?
13 A
Was it at the time or now?
34 15 Q
No, on that particular shift.
16 A
Well, I personally would have liked it to have been
}
programmed differently.
n 1
MR. LANG:
If the rod-worth-minimizer 3g i*
39 had been programmed the way you assumed it to be, and I
l l
acted as it did, would you have' declared it inoperative?
l 20 s
A Well, that is another hypothetical question, but probably.
21 s
i r
MR. LANG:
Also, on the evening that 22
]
they had the spurious block, were you aware of that?
23 A
No.
24 i
MR. LANG:
Were you aware of any 25 25
I spurious blocks?
2 A
No.
3 MR. LANG:
Not even that night, perhaps 4
a night or two before?
I 5
A well, you know --
6 MR. LANG:
As far as you know.
~
7 A
Not that I know.
8 MR. LANG All right.
I 9
10 BY MR. KALKMAN:
l Q
Mr. Duda, have I or any other NRC representatives 11 threatened you in any manner or offered you any reward in 12 13 return for this statement?
I ll g go, 14 15 O
Have you give this statement freely and voluntarily?
16 A
Yes.
)
O Is there anything further that you care to add for the i
l 18 record?
i 19 A
Just that I believe that all of the individuals involved 20 working for Detroit Edison did their job safely and 21 although there was an error, the error was corrected in a 22 timely manner, and control of the reactor was never lost.
23 Thank you.
24 MR. KALKMAN:
Thank you.
l 25 (Despostion concluded at 10:40 a.m.)
26
!