ML20237J948

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Partially Deleted Transcript of Investigative Interview W/ J Flint on 850926 in Newport,Mi
ML20237J948
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/26/1985
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NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
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FOIA-86-245 NUDOCS 8708260378
Download: ML20237J948 (30)
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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA j i'

2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3

)

In' the Mattar of: )  ;

) 1 5 INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW ) j

)

6 of- ) ]

7 4thepheaefr )  ;

____________J The Doposition of M FLINT) taken

~

9

, l l 10 pursuant to Notice before me, Elizabeth Diann Ferguson-Evans, )

l 11 Notary Public in and for the County of Nayne (acting in Monroe 12 County), at Fermi II Nuclear Power Plant, 6400 North Dixie Highway, l-13 Newport, Michigan, 48166, on Thursday, Sep+==h=" 26, 1985, )

18 commencing at about 3:40 p.m.

15 l APPEARANCES:

16 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l 17 Office of Investigations Fisld Office: Region III 18 799 Roosevelt Road Glan Ellyn, Illinois 60137 18 (By: James N. raikiman, Esq.)

20 Appearing on hahalf of United States Nuclear i Angulatory Commission l 21 l 22 23 Information in this record was delettd 24 5

in accordance wit th Act, ex ptions --

e o{ot Intermation

.. 25 FOIA --

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., '. s 4-4 4 8708260378 070819 PDR FOIA PUNTENN86-245 PDR c-0N0b() bk l 4

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1 4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA h l l 7

ll NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l! (

j 3 i f--

d l j In the Matter of: )

1

)

l 5 INVESTIGATIVE IIITERVIEW, )

) )

6 .

_of ) l 7 lgll )

) i e

II'-------------)

l q 9 TheDepositionofhROMEFLIN taken

'O pursuant to Notice before me, Elizabeth Diann Ferguson-Evans, j 1

1 l'

,' Notary Public in and for the County of Wayne (acting in Monroe 4

12 County), at Fermi II Nuclear Power Plant, 6400 North Dixie Highway 4

'3 Newport, Michigan, 48166, on Thursday, September 26,.1985,

" commencing at about 3:40 p.m.

'E , i

. APPEARANCES:

16

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f i 17 ) Office of Investigations j

! b Field Offices Region III i 1e 799 Roosevelt Road I j l Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 l

19 (By
James N. Kalkman, Esq.) {

i j 20 Appearing on behalf of United States Nuclear i {

, Regulatory Commission 1

, 21 2

22 ,

23 i l 1

24 j; (continued) d 25

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i 1

i APPEARANCES: (continued)

! {

JOHN H. FLYNN,' ESQ. j 2 y l Senior Staf f Attorney i l f I 3 p Legal Department i

!; 2000 Second Avenue 4 Detroit, Michigan 48226 f 5  ! Appearing on behalf of Detroit Edison I I

6 PETER MARQUARDT, ESQ. ,

l General Attorney 7 f Nuclear Environmental l 2000 Second Avenue 8I i Detroit, Michigan 48226 9

Appearing on behalf of Detroit Edison to THOMAS RANDAEZO, ESQ.

6400 North Dixie Highway  !

e 11 l' Newport, Michigan 48166 l ,

12 l Appearing on behalf of Detroit Edison  !

13 . . . 1 14

'E [ElizabethDiannFerguson-Evans,CSR-1347

! Certified Shorthand Reporter 16 ;

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- 2~ WITNESS PAGE'i i

l\ 3 JERONE FLINT 4 Examination by Mr. Kalkman 4 5

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1 ll Newport, Michigan r,

2 Thursday, September 26, 198S I!

3 at about 3:40 p.m.

4 l  !

4 5 I MR. KALEMAN: For the record, this is i I

1 6

l the interview of Jerome Flint, who is employed by the 7 'l Detroit Edison Company; the location of this interview is J 8 I' the Fermi II Nuclear Power Station, Newport, Michigan.

9 I Present at this interview are Detroit 10 Edison Counsels, Mr. Marquardt, Mr. Flynn, and Mr. Randazzo; 1

l 11 and NRC Investigator, Mr. Kalkman. I

, 1 12 j The subject matter of this interview

'3 concerns a Reactor Operator error which occurred at the

'd Fermi II Nuclear Power Station on July 2, 1985.

'S , Mr. Flint, would you please stand and i 16 raise your right hand.

.i 17 . . - i l

l l

18 l , JEROME FLINT, g

19 after having first been duly sworn to tell the truth,

!I '

lj 20 :i the whole truth and nothing but the truth, testified 1

. 21 upon his oath as follows:

l1 ]li 22 I' - - -

- d l 23 EXAMINATION 24 BY MR. KALKMAN:

i 25 Mr. Flint, are you presently employed as an assistant Q

l ,

l 4

l 1 shif t supervisor?

2 lA Yes, shift 3.

3 Q And you are a licensed Reactor Operator?

r 4 A Xes, senior operator-licensed.

L 5 0 And when did you receive your SRO?  !

6 A December, 'that would be Decaster a year ago,1984.

I 7 !-0 19847

'l 8 jA Yes.

9 Q And you have experience at any other Nuclear facility?

I 10 Well, Natal Nuclear facility, non-consercial.

lA 11 .I Q How long have you been -- what is the extent of your 92 experience?

93 A I joined the Navy in 1970, so I started in about '72, I was

'd workin9 in the Nuclear Plant.

'S ,

I stopped abou't a year and a half ago to 16 g go to school. ,

i 17 il Q Are you a degreed engineer?

ll 1 1B A No, I am not.

}

3 l

I

19 j Q Mr. Flint, you were on the evening shift of July 1st, 1985
,

li i.

! 20 ;- is that correct?

l

[ 21 A Yes, that is the date,.the night shift, midnight until

'i 1

<t 8:00 in the morning.

22 l

23 O And you were on the shif t where the operator error occurred, j 24 which resulted in the criticality. ,

1 25 ! Could you describe what you recall from '

a ,

5 I 1 ,

l

.I

l

. i l

that particular shif t of the rod pull error? j

. l 2 lA okay.

First off, I cannot say I was en the j 3

l I shift with the criticality. Our determination up there was ]

4 I

3 i no, we had no problem with criticality.

0 Well, the issue of criticality?

6 i

y A Right, the rod pull. .

s We had our turnover meeting, 3[

l' g

was the Reactor Operator that we were going to leave on the to ,

603, which is engaged in pulling rods.

l ii j I talked with jafterhehadreviewed .

12 what the on-going operator had, had a good feeling in my li 33 mind that he knew what his job function was, where we were 34 headed to. l l

Af ter the turnover meeting, I went in

' 15 ,

16 the office to start on the paperwork that evening with 3 17

' time cards, bi-weekly hourly reports, and shortly af ter I

ll

. is l that, I heard we had a rod pull incident.

19 lO Well, let's back up a little bit.

Yes.  !

f 20 ll A , a a

ptarted his rod pull or took over from ll i

21 hQ n

When; 22 the prior shif t you ware present when he began his rod pull?

il .

s 23 A I am not exactly sure where I talked to - I think it .

)

24 ! was outside the conference room, which is next to the shift l l l 25 supervisor's office. ,

t I

/ /

l 4

ll

!! I as pretty sure it was after the 1

a 2

turnover meeting and before he went out to relieve, I had

!! a fow words in passing with him.

3 ll I asked him where he was att how did he ,

, h,  !

feel about it, and did it look like there were any problems i 5

continuing; where -- were we close to the point of 6

l 7 0o criticality as far as the pull sheets, compared to what we

! had before; and the answers.I got back were of a positive i e

nature that there was a good feeling that Le had a handle.

,o i on it, he was not walking into a bind.

Did you know that, lhad not performed a criticality 33 Q 1 4

12 l before7 1

33 1

A I was aware that this was his first time actually pulling i f

j i4 rods in the plant, yes, I

Did that mean anything to you as far as --

15 [Q 33 lA well, that was a part of the reason why I talked to him,

'l

37 I

okay? This was one of my first start ups too, so_' I wanted I l to make sure we had everything in order .and we were not

, is l'l i approaching it just like we do another revolution like 19 o{

, I starting a pump or something.

20

[

21 ;Q What do you recall there? How did you become aware of the 3

22 rod pull error?

23 A Well, the time frames on this are not really -- well, I 24 know it was sometime shortly after the turnover because I 25 was still doing my paperwork, i -

t  ;

i l

/

i i p I am not sure how I knew something was l'

2 ; going on, but I left the office and Dave Aniol the shift ) i 3 supervisor, was already out there; and I 3emember talking i I d to i more or less at the doorway of the shift 5 supervisor's office where he went in the control room.  !

i 8 I think he was going for a cup of coffeas' 7

y and I asked him what was going on. We had a small convar-8 sation, but the words, I cannot remember.

i 9 He described what had happened, whct 10 l

corrective action had been taken; and as far as re-inserting l l

11 l the rods.

12 Q This was ii / '

13 "A Yes.

14 ; I believe I asked him questions concern-

l

' 15 ing did the reactor go critical; and the answer I got was

[

i 16 a pretty positive no.

I' 6 17 No problem, so I accepted that, and

- 18 I am not real positive. I am pretty sure I talked to

! l

19 i Dave Aniol af ter that, to see that he had a handle on what 2

j 20 j was going on, and was aware of it.

21 F i

. ji I did not stop and talk to Steve Burk j

' l 22 who was the control room operator; and then what I did, I I 23 started going back, looking for text spec violations and 24 deportability; and an independent Check on what they had I 25 going on out there; and subsequently, I reported to Dave Aniol I l

1 l

a t s

that I found nothing in .the test specs and I found nothing.

2 in the 10CFR on the deportability, and that I could not 3

think of anything that was reportable under, and we held a discussion and I know for a fact that he said that he was 6

j going to call Gene Preston, operations engineer. l 6

It seemed kind of strange that this.

! particular incident would not be covered under anything a

that would be automatically reportable, written down i l

8 already.

'0 0 Did you discuss this particular incident with anyone.else on that shift? j 12 A

I am sure I did.

3 i As far as the evaluations, concerning 14 deportability or text psecs of what exactly had happened, I know I felt la my own mind that we had -- I actually a ,

16 l found out what the error was, okay; and this was the first

{ l time I had discovered that they were under a reduced'nothe

'8 worth program myself, because I had not inspected the rod l pull sheets real close, page by page.

{

2 i / I had looked at them and verified that

' 21

, they were, in fact, the right ones and what was leaded on 22 the rod owrht minimizer.

23 l David was my concern, giving him the 24 input I had.

25 '

l O Did you talk to the Reactor Engineer on that shif t?  !

9 i ,

1 i

A I don't know whether I did or not. 1 2 Q Now, sometime during that particular shif t, did you become 3 I aware of the f act that the Reactor Bagineer had logged that f the reactor was critical?

5 A No, it was not until weeks later that I found that out.

6 Q Mr. Aniol did not advise you of that?

7 A No, not that he would be expected to. I was providing him e with input.

9 Q So you are aware of the fact that Mr. Aniol had called l I

10 I Mr. Preston? l

" l A Yes.

12 Q Af ter the telephone conversation, did you take any pirt in ]

13 the telephone conversations? l

'd A I think I remember seeing him on the phone. I was not

'S i actually on it.

i is O So there was no speaker box in the office where several j 3 17 people could talk?

,! 1 18 A No.

g

,. l

19 lQ In the conversation?  !

1I 20 l

lj A No, he was in the office and I was outside the office,

l. ' Il 21 either before a: after he said, "I'm going to call Preston,"

li 11

! t 22 or "I called Preston."

23 Q Did you discuss the conversation with Mr, Aniol after --

24 A More or Jess. What I got out of it af terwards, was to 25 generate the DER, have it documented, and whan, I am not l l l 10,

lf .

1 sure if it was the next morning _when be came -- the next Il

~

2 time when Gene came in,-that it would get onto --

3 So Preston's direction was to prepara a DER?

Q ,

d IA

~

well, I know for sure it was'to have -- I don't know i

5 whether he said generate it, but that he'would look at the 6 DER and present it to Osrow ( phonetically), and I'am 7

pretty sure it was like the ASXt day's if not the neXt time a he was in.

9 i

.Q Now, is it your impression that the DER would have been 10 prepared regardless of --

11 A I think it was already half written by the time the-12

  • conversation took place, yes.

13

'Q Did you have any input into the DER? i 14 i! A No, I did not. j i I 15 I may have see'n it that night, but to say, j I

16 okay, that is what I know too, but I cannot tell you'for sure.

3 17 Q Did anyone in the control room on that particular shift 18 express an opinion that the reactor may have been critical

18 or was critical?

i I

  • 1 j 20 A I would have to answer no to that. I don't know that they I

. \

21 i did, but -- l 22 O You don't recall anyone --

23 A Once I was aware of what it was, I made one' circuit through 24 the control room to find out, and then I was back in the 25 office in text spect and then 10 CFR; so what conversation l

l 11 j l-

i i

1 1 took place, I 's really not sure.

2 , g I don't rama=her, in speaking with who, ,

(

3 other than but I was lef t with a definite positive  !

N Y 4 feeling that we had no problem with criticality. '

s It was a very tough int to call, so i'

6 I reetwaber that I asked a couple of questions about it, 7 and I Came away with it that there was no problem there. l 1

\

t 6 0 What particular questions did you ask?  !

9 A Well, increasing count, period, okay; I guess the biggest to concarn would be what period meter and what ha saw on that; j 11  ; but I don't know exactly what I said.

12 0, Did you keep any type of a log?

O I 13 .A At that time, I did not. I do now.

14 :O Do you know why this incident was not logged in the shif t c

15 i supervisor's log?

16 A No.

a 17 I really don't.

18 I have my own guess, and that is that n '
19 when a shif t aupervisor gets busy out of the control room, 1

ll 20

( sometimes he has a whole block of things that need logging; i

. h j 21 and that would be the only reason that I could tell you why 22 he did not get it logged.

23 Q Do you know why it was not logged in the ramtM1 room 24 supervisor's -- I found out af ter the fact that Steve Burk, 25 the control room operator, was not aware of the incident at 12 l _ -_ __-___ _ ___ _ -

- I p all.

hQ Well, since Mr. Burk is keeping the Reactor Operator's log, I

3 Y, isn't it someone's responsibility to notify him of the l b.

ll incident? l 4

5 A It certainly is. I l

I E Q And who should have notifled Mr. Burk of this incident?

the

~

A The first notification should have came from s
  • E  :

Second from myself or Dave; and the third from myself or J l

9  ! Dave.

1C Q And the reason that no notification was made was --

\

J

" A To the NRC --

'I Q No, to Mr. Burk, so that he could log this event, was that --

1

'3 was there a reason for it?

12 A I believe that everybody out there, including myself,

E assumed that Steve knew what was going on too; and Steve I

'E was concerned with running the physical plant, skay, so I

i 1- ' he did not become closely involved.

h, I

we all'made that assumption. This is

15 d e i

'9 h hindsight once again.

i

2o 0 Well, if you had been the shif t supervisor, would you have
2'  ! logged that?

! Il 22 'A Well, I certainly hope I would have. I guess I should jump 23 up now and say it did not go completely unlogged or disregarded.

22 ,

I rasnamher seeing sometime or another i

25 that night the pull sheets with long lines drawn through the l

l ul 6,76,  ;

1 i

rods that were pulled, initialed out in the column, and ]

I I 2  ! explaining a statement down at the bottom, that .l ]

1 3 had filled out. )

4 Q Do you think there was a conscious effort not to 109 this? l 5 A No, I do not.

6 Q By anyone in the Control room? j i

7

!A No, sir, 3Bost definitely Dot.

8 0 So it was just a matter of circumstance that it was not ,

9 logged?

10 A Yes, j i

11 Q How do the responsibilities of an assistant shif t supervisor  ;

12 differ from that of a shif t supervisor?

13 A well, I am the assistant, I as there to help him out.

14 our organization today is a little bit

{

15 different than it was the night of the incident.

i

-l 16 1 I will refer to it as it was on the

I i 17 night of the incident: l I l 18 The responsibility that Dave, Dave Aniol h

l 1

19 , had, is towards the plant. His desk sits next to the l I. I i

! 20 '! window in the shift supervisor's office; he has direct

. P

21 j. communication with the control room operator, visually as E

22 !! well as with the phones.  !

23 The assistant, although he is included 24 in this also, in addition, he takes care of the administrative 25 items that I referred to earlier, bi-weekly worked hours, I i 1

6,96 .

l' 1 documentation of facts, working less than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> a week, 2 h eight-hour - brsaks, time cards, concerning yourself with 3

the training requirements of employees, and providing all-d of this information for the shift supervisor so that he is 1

5 free to take care of the plant.

6 At that time, it was not normal to 7 i spend a najority of the time in the control room; but rather, l 8

than to make tours through.

9 Does that answer your question?

'O O Yes. ,

, what would you do if you did not agree 12 l with the shif t supervisor, with his assessment of an error

, I

'3 or something of that nature?

0 3 I i Id

[A Well, I would let him know about the disagreement.

15 0 Is there some procedure that -- of a way to document your

'6 descenting opinion --

8 " A i Well, the only time that I would consider documentation is l! '8 i

g if the disagreement were to be something involving technical

'8 )

specifications, or deportability or the way to operate a )

i i j 20 "

piece of equipment; then it would be documented per the f

i

21 333.s direction. I i

(

22 l But as far as the disagreement goes, 23 that is a matter of my providing feed back to him, okay, 24 to let him know exactly how I feel and what I feel it should 25 be. i l

I l

15

l l

. i i

i In the case of this incident, there 2 was no disagreement, j 1

3 Q So you did not state how you became aware of the rod pull 4 error.

5 Did someone advise you of the error or 6 was it a matter of you stumbling onto this error?

7 A Well, I guess I would have to be closer to stumbling and 8 looking out and seeing what was going on in the coutrol' 9 room. .l 4

10 Most likely, I noticed that there were l 11 more poeple than usual standing up by the 603, okay, and .

12 well, that is not normal, so it is time to look into it.

13 lO Are you in the same office with the shift supervisor?

14 ;A Yes, I am.

Yi .

15 ll Q Now, it is my understanding that the STA in training advised h

16 ' David Aniol, came back to his office and advised him of the l:

le 17 error. I lI l'- 18 Do you know if you were in -- ]

19 A Well, if Dave was in the office when he got advised, then, li ll j, 20 f I was in there with him at the time, d

i

21 o However, you don't recall someone coming into the office s

22 i and --

23 A No, because it would have been on a, " Hey, Daver we got a 24 problem. Come on out." and we have had some physical things 25 in the plant like, "Now," and get the guy to run out there, 16 e.

I 4

1

.1 so I was not real concerned if he was asked to go out to the I

control room to look into something.

3 0 So getting back to your initial avaranans of this problem,

, you took certain actions 'and you talked to -- what l ]

E specifically did you do when you first became aware of this?

6 A Okay.

t When I knew what we had, the rod pull, B  !

put them back, my first thought was 'What did we violate?

9 What do we have to do as a result of this?"

'O Once I was sure of the physical plant. l l0 Well, before that, how did you know that there was a rod i

12

! mispulled? .

h i'

'3

,A Well --

6 O Did you walk cut to the --

lA As I mentioned, I more or less met at the back 16 ,

of the control room and he may haveben goin for a cup of I

I
17 coffee.

[ is I am pretty sure, and I am not positive, I.

is but I am pretty sure that is when I got the first inclination  !

! 20 that there had been a problem.

3 il

! 21 {O So this was -- certainly he did not go get a cup of coffee i* i 22 until he inserted the rods?

23 A Correct.

24 g Now, the situation was under control, and this was quite 25 sometime after the incident occurred?

, j

1 J

l '

I well, as for the time frame, a frame of time, I am really A  ;

I i

p Id l not certain.

i I

3 I would guess somewhere five to 10 minutes,

] ,

but I am not certain.

i O And other than talking to ldidyoutalktoany j

~

r l 6

STA or the SOA or the Reactor Engineer and get their

' i analysis or opinions or whatever?

8 A Specifically, I hcVe to answer no.

I 9

{ I know I went out in the control room;

'O I know I dug into it a little further to find out what had y

gone on, but wno I talked to or what was mentioned, I really ,

t

.. 1.

' ' 1 don't recall. ,

'2

~

Where I have my memory from is in speaking l 1 .,

tol I know at the time I was fully aware of what f h '

'6 had been done and what corrective action had been taken, and il ll .

that my boss, Dave Aniol.was aware of it; and my thought j "

went to, "Okay, what did we violate?" And we started looking-I.

'8

,1 into other assistings to the boss.

1 IO l

, Were you involved with a meeting, a shift turnover, you know,1 20 .

when your shift ended, did you have a meeting with Mr. Aniol

21

'; and Mr. Preston relating to this incident?

t 22 A I don't believe there was any meeting held that night 23 aftarwards, no.

24 Q Well, when was the DER given to Mr. Preston?

25 A I cannot state positively.

18'

/ y

. 'l -

1 1 l It would have been routed the next l!

2 i working day, everyday except sometimes Sunday; the on-call 3

I i

staff, Gene Preston or Fred Ableson (phonetically) will 4 come up and attend a turnover knd get the physical plant ,

5 status for themselves and ask questions.

6 That is when it would have been turned 7 directly oVer. I Cannot say positively that happened the 8 next morning.

l 9

Q So you don't recall Mr. Preston came into the control room ]

10 and had a meeting with Mr. Aniol?

" A I really am not certain. 1 l

12 Q So you would recall if you were in a meeting with Mr. Preston i

13 and Mr. Aniol relating to this incident?

I;

Not necessarily.

A 10 I have been involved in DER's since  ;

1 s

is then, and many of the same type turnovers.

17 We haVe a lot of things going On! so he h,

18 certainly could have been there, but I cannot recall that ,

18 l; he was.

j 20 0 So you did not become aware of the Reactor Engineering Log j 21 or that there was a differing opinion of the criticality i

22 until sometime af ter that?

23 A As a matter of fact, I think it was in one of the company's 24 presentations on what had happened that they gave to the 25 supervisors when I first became aware of that. I don't know 19 i

i if it was part of the presentation or something that 2

somebody said.

3

,Q Did you ever make entries into a shift supervisor's log?

4 ,A once again, now, we are running it differently. We did.

In the past, the shift supervisor's 5

l 6

, log would remain on his desk in the shift supervisor's l

7

' office, mostly, and, yes, I have made entries in it before, What would prompt you to make an entry rather than the  ;

s 0 i g shif t supervisor, in his absence?

io A Well, for example, I would be in the office and I would get a phone call, security is dec&aring an event, microwave 33 l

32 zone down. I would go ahead and los the time and write it j f f 33 in there; and if the shif t supervisor log' was not up to i

If he had other  !

14 date, I would put it on a slip of paper.

f 15 P

j; log entries to put in, I would put it right en his log i n

16  !! where it would be seen.

,[

37 0 Is that a conunon practice?

I

. is A I can only say it was for our shif t, for me.

i And you worked on the same shif t with Mr. Aniol normally?  ;

ig Q l 20 Yes.

l tl A Are you saying that if you had several logs, many entries

,'; 23 Q

o
  • and you were busy, you would' just jot them down en a piece 22 ll i 23 of paper and leave them and at a later time complete the 24 log?

25 A Well, that is my practice now, if I have a lot going on.

20 i _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

,- Actually, we have recorders provided, 2

i

! . and I know -- we can record the time of the event as it-1' 3

happens out in the control rooms there are times in the i

4 evening when you have something going on that you don't s

want to walk away from, so you jot a time down, you would a

6 rather stay right there on top of the' problem to make 7 l sure that it is being taken care of. ,

s O Well, what is Mr. Aniol's -- how does he log entries?

9 Does he --

to A Well, his handwriting is better'than sine, but as far as --

n Q I mean does he do it as the events occur, or at the end 12 of the shift or what is his normal practice? 4 i

-l 13 lA Well, my guess would be that he logs it as it goes. I  !

I 14 9 really don't recall, ]

l l

is Q Well, you work with him everyday.  !

l j

16 A Right, what I am thinking <of is that the majority of the I 17 time, when I went to make an entry like the one I told

,I

. 18 l you about on the phone call, it was like, "Well, he logged i  !

19 one 10 minutes ago, so I guess I can put mine in."

! 20 .Q So you would have talked to Barry Myers about this incident, li

! 21 the Reactor Engineer that was on shif t when this occurred?

s

  • I I don't believe I have talked to him specifically about it, 22 A 23 no.

24 Q After you became aware of the reactor -- of the criticality, 25 at least the DECO's position, that there was criticality, 21:

i t__

g 3

have you talked to people on the shif t, to the SOA or STA 2 about that incident? {

1 I

3 A Well, I guess I first became' aware of it, it would have ]

l l 4 been three weeks af ter the incident. I loft for two weeks s vacation afterwards; and shortly after that, ws had the j 1

j 6 company presentation, having set it four days later that 7 the reactor is Criticall Since thm , I aR pretty sure that 8

I talked to the STA that was on that. night, Tom Dong; we 9 have had extensive conversations.

10 Barry Myers, I don't believe I had 11 any direct -- any relation to the incident. Most of the )

12 people, yes, because I kind of wondered what was going on 3 1

13 ,

when I got back.

14 II Q And what did Mr. Dong, what is his impression or his opinion?

li 15

)! A Of what?

16 IQ Of the criticality.

s 17 A Well, I really can't say.

I

'. 18 0 Did Mr. Dong say, "Well, I. suspected all along it was 1 l 19 critical," or something of that nature?

7 20 A No, he never said anything along that line. I do ramamher j l i

! 21 him being worried about legal implications.

i*

22 I guess that subject I talked about the 23 aost that bothered me the most was while -- I have the t 24 impression that they were doing a " Cover up investilpation,"

25 so I was kind of taken aback by that "They are doing a what?"

22 I l

J

I 3

So naturally, I ctarted asking qu3ctio s 2

and I wanted to find out what was going on.

l 3 o Have you talked to John Dewes, the STA in training about 4 the incident?

5 A I as sure I have, but specific conversations, --

6 o Well, I am trying to find out if you have talked to anyone ,

7 that was on that shift that has expressed an opinion relating a to criticality, not particularly on that shift, but any I

9 time up until the last time you saw them.

io A Well, I would have to answer that -- I have not talked to 11 anyone since the incident that came back and said anything  !

12 like that, like. "Well, I, had concern, but it was not is addressed." ,

14 0 So you had the presence of mind when you talked to

y a 15 on that shif t when the incident occurred, to ask him if there f

is was a criticality?

I 17 A What I remember saying, what I believe I said was, "Did the  !

l 18 reactor go critical?" And the answer was a positive not

{a

19 and I know we $Xchanged words on indications but we talked i

20 about period nostly, as I sentioned before.

l

! 21 We did talk about increase count, but i

22 we talked about period mostly.

23 0 So pu based his answer on what?

24 A Well, I could not tell'you what the definite basis was.

25 What I got was a positive impression, that is what I remember

)

l J

' I

, a positive Lepression that, no, the reactor did not go j t critical. No problem ~1n that respect. -

q 3 0 Well, why did you ask the questics to beyin with? Was there ]

\

4 something that you -- I mesn, a rod pull always --  !

l I

6 A Well, I guess I associated --

l 6 Q Create the question of criticality?

A Well, I guess it is a measure of where you stand in 7

l e

relation to the stability of the reactor, super critical, )

9 sub critical, just critical! and it is more or less a guide to as to how far along you are in the start up, and if we 1

n pull rods out of sequence, well, how far out of sequence. j 1

12 did we go? I imagine that is where the question would 13 L come from.

t-i4 ll Q So you knew what steps your shift was in in the procedure? l p <

Not positively, 15 gA a

is IO Well, you believe you were --

i 17 A We were a long ways --

I 1e Q Did you know when the shift took over that they were at the end of theit group 2 rods?

19 l 20 A I knew they were approaching the end of the group 2 rods,

. 21 and we had group 3 and group 4 to go through for the 50 i il 22 Percent density.

23 0 Which would have been the point where the steps of criticality 24 would have been achieved, right?

25 A Well, I had not looked into it then, and I imagine it would 24 u  ;

' have gone'somewhere in group 3.

2 0 Did any one person perform an analysis to determine whether there was a criticality? Did anyone look at the SRM charts, that sort of thing?  !

5 A Well, in talking to the people out in the control room, I 6 know the charts were looked att but I don't know that this, .i 1

7 i '

for example, took them off of the recorder, laid thest all I

8 out or tried to do an analysis or a count rate. 1 i

  • There is no recorder for that period, i i.

'U that would have been a much, much batter indication of the i

state of the reactor at that moment. I I

O Now, what was looked at? What was on view?

1

'3 g A well; I am not positive what was all looked at; I was not I

out there at the time that it initially happened or I was ) 1 h there for a short period of time, and then I was back into 16 f the books.

l

'7 ll So I am not positive what was all looked 18 j

at and what questions were raised; or what determinations  !

l

[ l were made other than the fact the reactor had not gone

! li

20 a q critical.

, 21 ll 0 Was some analyeis performed by panoone, and you don't know Hi '

who that was? ,

23 A I guess not, no. ' '

24

0 Were you working a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shif t at that time?

25 A Well, I am not sure if I was on the 12-hour day or not. ,

J y s

, g56 I

-, l-

. , . < 4 4 ,

,g u

' Q Well, Mr. Aniol was on 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> on and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> off, and 2 I was wondering if you were on also.

3 A Well, I really don't remember for the day, it is possible

' that he was working 12 and I was nots and if there was 8 another shift supervisor being substituted for that.

Well, what do the operations people use the STA and the SOA 8

Q for? .

8 A Well, the shif t operations advisor at this plant is licensed 8 and'is here because he has experience at an operating plant. <

i

'U He remembers things; he knows things that we may not have f

" seen yet and provides that input to the operating shift.

12 The shift technical advisor is a degreed

<3

' t

.i engineer in the control room. He has knowledge of systems j

and how they work, controllers, a higher level of knowledge

' I on prints, especially on electronics; he provides that is input for the shift.

l:

" Now, when an incident occurred, such as a rod pull error, Q

'8 are these people asked to provide any input relative to

'l 19 any decision made on your part, . on the operation. people's l ,

j 2 part?

21 A y,,,

! 22 Q Do you know if the shif t, when this incident occurred, 23 whether the SOA or the STA provided any information?  ;

24 A No, I don't know if they did or not.

O So you did not seek any information from any of these 26

_m___.___ ___

I advisory people?

2 A I did not, no.

I 3 Q Do you know if Mr. Aniol did?

4 A No, I am not certain if he did or not.

5 Q Do you recall the rod worth minimizar block occurring on 6 that particular shift?

! 7 A No, I don't.

B Q Would you normally be advised of something of that nature 9 occurring?

10 A That information would normally scs i.e it to the shift 1

-l 11 l

supervisor; it would not have to go through me, j

! l 12 l! Q Mr. Flint, have I or any other NRC representative threatened { i li 13 [ you in any manner or offered you any rewards in return for 14 pour statement?

!i l 15 lA No, you haven't.

16 Q Have you given this statamant freely and voluntarily?

s 17 A I havs.

^

I

. 18 I do have a concerns il l; 19 Some of the statements that I have li lj 20 said, expressing what other people did or how they l

F i j 21 investigated it, it me.y not be correct, simply because it j' 22 l was such a long time ago, and I am trying to give my best 23 impression; so most of the things are not definite and i

24 : positive.

I 25 0 I understand.

27 L .-

4-I 1

Is there anything further other than .

2 what you have just mentioned that you care to add for the 3

record? I d

A I cannot think of anything.  !

l 5

O Thank you. l 6 '

(Deposition concluded at 4:25 p.m.)

7 - - -

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13 ;' ,

14 i

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i 17  !

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23 24 25 '

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28 i I

kr

a. i

'1 3 STATE OF MICHIGAN)

) ss. 1 2 COUNTY OF WAYNE ~ )

3 I, Elizabeth Diann Ferguson-Evans, do hereby .

4 certify that the witness whose attached deposition was taken before 5 me, in the above-entitled matter, was by me first duly cautioned 6 and sworn to testify to the truth, the whole truth and nothing but 7 the truth, in the cause aforesaid; that the testimony contained a in said deposition was by se reduced to writing in the presence 9 of said witness by means of stenography and af terwards transcribed to upon a typewriter. The said deposition is a true and correct I

11 transcript of the whole fo the testimony given by the said witness 12 aforesaid. I

! I 13 .,

I do further certify that I am not connected i

14 [i by blood or marriage with any of the parties or their agents, . and t

15 that I am not an employee of either of them, nor interested, is directly or indirectly, in the matter of controversy, either as a

3 17 counsel, attorney, agent or otherwise.

3

[ is IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my h

19 hand and affixed my notarial seal at Detroit, Michigan, County of i8 20 Wayne, State of Michigan, this 3 ay o n\4 , 1985 3

21

- 22 b v Ee4An b l %%

23 uu Elizabeth Diann Fergueen-Evans, CSR-1347 Notary Public, Wayne 90aaty, Michigan.

24 .,

My Commission expires May 14, 1985 26 29

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