ML20237K353

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Discusses 850911 Interview of DG Eisenhut Re Allegation That Util Made Matl False Statement Re Event at Plant.Related Info Encl
ML20237K353
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Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/11/1985
From: Sinclair J
NRC
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NRC
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FOIA-86-245 NUDOCS 8708270153
Download: ML20237K353 (5)
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( REPORT OF INTERVIEW DARRELL G. EISENHUT l September 11, 1985 On September 11,1985,'Mr. Darrell G. EISENHUT, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), was interviewed concerning a recent alle-gation that Detroit Edison Company (Deco) officials may have made a material false statement regarding an event at their Fenni-2 Nuclear facility. Mr.

EISENHUT began the interview by stating that he became aware of an event concerning an inadvertent criticality at the Fermi facility during low power testing on July 15, 1985. As background, Mr. EISENHUT stated that he per-sonally signed the full power license for Fermi in the absence of the Director, NRR. As he recalls, the license was signed on July 12, 1985, and physically j presented to a licensee representative on the following Monday, July 15, 1985.' {

Mr. EISENHUT explained that NRR, had been given the authorization to issue the >

license by the Commission. He also stated that NRC Region III had advised NRR that the applicant did not actually need the license until July 15, 1985.

Mr. EISENHUT also stated that he has within the last several days asked Tom NOVAK, Assistant Director for Licensing, NRR, if he recalled the exact or I approximate time that the license was actually signed. NOVAK offered to  !

contact Joe YOUNGBLOOD, Chief Licensing Branch #1, NRR, and Dave .YNCH,.

j Project Manager for Fermi-2, NRR, to determine if they recalled any of the specifics regarding the issuance of the license.

I I Mr. EISENHUT'S recollection is that the license was not sent out until the morning of July 15, 1985. Mr. EISENHUT added that he was not aware of any information received from Region III prior to July 15 (mentioning an incident of inadvertent criticality at Fermi). He added that this could be checked through contact with Region III personel. In response to a question regarding NRR procedures for verifying last minute issues, Mr. EISENHUT advised that it is his practice to contact senior licensee executives just prior to actually signing a license. In this particular instance, he believes )

that he attempted to contact Wayne JENS, Vice President Nuclear, DECO, and the President and Chief Executive Officer (CE0) of the company. EISENHUT could not recall specifically a conversation with JENS or other top licensee management personnel, and believes that they were each unavailable. However, he is con-vinced that he followed his usual procedure and called the utility prior to signing the license.

Mr. EISENHUT explained that the Commission had a meeting on July 10, 1985, in order to determine whether the licensee was ready to be authorized a full 4 power license. According to EISENHUT there were three senior licensee people j who provided the status of the Fermi project to the Commission. Two of the  !

individuals that were in attendance were JENS and McCarthy. Mr. EISENHUT ,

added that the third individual was either the President or the CEO, however, I he was unable to recall his name.

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According to Mr. EISENHUT, Commissioners' BERNTHAL and ZECH queried the staff I about the adequacy of reactor operator experience at Fermi (see Commission transcript, pages 35-45). In response, the staff provided specific informa-tion pertaining to operator experience and qualifications. EISENHUT also stated that the Region III Deputy Regional Administrator, Mr. Bert DAVIS, advised the Commission that Region III was aware of only one identified l operator error involving power operations subsequent to fuel load. j EISENHUT advised that extensive communications between NRR, Region III, and the licensee were going on during the time frame of July 1 to July 12. Mr.

EISENHUT reiterated that he believes that the license was picked up by the licensee on the morning of July 15, 1985. l l

Accord 9.g to Mr. EISENHUT, NOVAK had been informed about the criticality problem on the 15th. He believes NOVAK was told by the Director, NRR, Harold DENTON.

When responding to a question concerning verifications or confirmations from licensees regarding their meeting license requirements. EISENHUT stated that there were at least two things to go on. First, there was an NRC requirement which would have required Region III to confirm for NRR licensing that the licensee was ready for the issuance of the license. EISENHUT stated that this was accomplished through the mean's of having a letter, believed to be

( characterized as a 94300, sent to NRR. In addition, the utility certifies to both the Region and NRR that the plant meets the application and that the technical specifications reflect the actual plant, and is therefore ready for a license. This is also accomplished by means of a letter. The letter essentially certifies that the plant is built according to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) commitments. Prior to the 15th of July, and specifi-cally the period from July 1 through July 15, EISENHUT was not aware of any unusual occurr(nces that would have affected the license and was not aware of  ;

any communications that would have indicated a licensing problem.

Mr. EISENHUT then stated that he probably was going to be asked what his actions would have been had he known that the Fermi facility had experienced i an unexpected reactor criticality and reactor operator error. Mr. EISENHUT l stated that had he known about the event he would not have signed the Fermi license on July 12, without further inquiries and/or explanations concerning the circumstances. When asked if. he knew whether the plant operating logs are part of a specific license commitment, he stated that he could not recall.

In responding. to questions pertaining to NRC, specifically NRR communications with the licensee, Mr. EISENHUT explained that there were many telephone calls between NRR and the applicant. These calls are used to resolve remaining issues, for the purpose of adding clarification, and for discussing schedules.

Even though there are frequent telephonic contacts, they are for the most part informal to the extent that there are no telephone logs or official documen-tation of these calls. EISENHUT did state that the project managers in some cases keep a log regarding discussions which are considered substantive.

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Mr. EISENHUT added that even though' his office maintains a log of phone messages which are received when he is absent from the office there is no ,

record of all calls received when he is available to answer the telephone. l EISENHUT explained that he would have expected the licensee to inform NRC of the error in reactor operations and an unexpected criticality. This would have been expected to be required in much the same manner as the requirements state in 10CFR 50.72 (Immediate notification requirements for operating nuclear power reactors). Although this particular event is probably not required to be reported under the current described regulatory requirement, i this would have identified as a reportable condition before 10CFR 50.72 was 1 changed.

EISENHUT provided additional information regarding the July 10 Commission meeting for the authorization of the Fermi full power license. He stated that ,

although three senior executives from the utility were present for the staff I presentation, he believes that no one elected to correct the record. EISENHUT continued by stating that not only did the utility executives not speak to correct the staff of an obvious error, the utility also gave a subsequent presentation to the Commissioners in which the information was again not provided. Mr. EISENHUT responded to a question as to whether he would have ,

expected the utility executives to provide infonnation concerning the criti-cality event during the Commission meeting for license by stating that he 1

( believes DECO officials should have informed NRC of the event.

Mr. EISENHUT contacted Mr. YOUNGBLOOD and asked him if he recalled some specific information regarding the issuance of the Fermi full power license.

In response to a question concerning when it was actually signed, YOUNGBLOOD ,

recalled that it was sometime between 4:15 and 5:00pm on Friday July 12, 1985. l YOUNGBLOOD added that he also recalled that NRR called the Region to talk to I them about Fermis' readiness for & full power license. YOUNGBLOOD also added that he recalled EISENHUT making several phone calls sometime after 4:30pm to DECO executives. YOUNGBLOOD believes that the calls were made to JENS, McCARTHY, and the CEO. YOUNGBLOOD then stated that it was his recollection that all of these calls met with negative results because none of the indivi-duals were available. YOUNGBLOOD then stated that he physically handed the signed license to K. EARL, a licensing representative from DECO, at approxi-mately 3:30pm on July 15, 1985. YOUNGBLOOD then added that it was immediately after this that he was approached in the hallway of the Phillips Building by NOVAK who asked if he had issued the license. YOUNGBLOOD stated that it was at this time that he became aware of the issue of unexpected criticality which issued. YOUNGBLOOD also explained had that therenot surfaced prior had been to the verification a written license being(94300) received from Region III verifying that the Fermi facility was ready for a full power license. No additional information could be provided concerning the criticality issue.

l DATE PREPARED FROM NOTES TAKEN DURING s INTERVIEW 0F 9/11/85 l INTERVIEW 0F: [Mf@'4296 /SE//////-

PREPARED BY: Urn /C M c W 1

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1 8 "' COMMENTS ON

(- OPERATOR ERROR - WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL PODS OUT OF SEOUENCE (OCCURRENCE'ON 7/2/85 AT 0015)

, Reconstruction of Actions The following reconstruction is based on numerous conversations with Reactor Engineers and Nuclear Production manageraent. It includes information obtained from the proce.ss computer events log; this log records every rod movement.

The operator reported for duty and'was assign,ed the task of pulling rods to attain criticality. At the time he started, the previous shift hed pulled Group 1 and most of Group 2 rods. 'Thus, he took:over at  ;

approximately sequence step 40; he was aware that previous criticalities were attained at approximately sequence step 145.

Sequence steps 1 thru 45 (Groups 1 and 2) call for pulling the rod from 1 0 to 48. Sequence step 46, the first step in Group 3, calls for pulling the rod from 0 to 4. The operator failed to note this change and pulled the rod'to~48. (This was the first time this operator had thds assignment.) He continued down the page pulling eleven rods to 48 rather than 4. On the eleventh rod, he started to get frequent period alarms and observed significant increases in power level. The operator noted this behavior, recognized it as unusual, and called the STA, John f f Dewes, over to discuss it. The rod position mistake was discovered and '

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the operator immediately inserted the eleven Group 3 rods to position 4 Some discussion with Shift Supervisor followed, a DER was prepared, I and then the pull to criticality continued.

Cormentary The operator's mistake is an " honest" one. This was his first use of H pull sheets; his methods were consistent with Simulator training. His observation of the period warning and recognition of abnormal responses were good.

The problem could have been corrected much sooner had someone been following the operator's actions. There were several persons in the control room capable of recognizing the mistake. (The.on-duty Reactor Engineer, however, was not in the control room; he was attending his other assignment as Test Engineer for HPCI system.) The problem could  ;

also have been corrected had the RWM been programmed to include the Group 3 and Group 4 sequence steps.

The best resolution to prevent recurrence seems to be to require double sign-off on Group 3 and Group 4 sequence steps until-the RWM is modified. (Preliminary investigations indicate that by using some sophisticated programming groups 3 and 4 sequences can be incorporated.) Another suggestion is to have the operator record on the pull sheet the position displayed for comparison with the pull sheet printed value. Also, the columns for fully-withdrawn indicators should be marked N/A for all steps except those-going to' notch 48.

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  1. ' w(J1 as not Ebould be noted monitoring that Group 3 the and operating staff was Group 4 sequence not aware that the RUM step's.)

( It also seems a revision in Simulator training is called for to incorporate,the latest rod pull sheets.,

The Ouestion of Criticality The~best indicator of criticality is detector reading vs. " time. .Our

' SRM's are on. log scales; if the reactor is slightly above critical, all ,

detectors should show a straight-line increase., However, being at such l a low power level, a constant value from source background will be  !

added on which distorts the curves.

Channel A, which should have been the best indicator since it was the highest reading, was not inking during much of the pull of the eleventh rod. One can conclude, however, that the reactor power increased a ,

factor of 30 as the rod was withdrawn from notch 22 until it was inserted.

I have done a study on Channels B and C to determine the increase in l these channels above backaround during this same period. They both )

show the same factor of-30. 1 In addition, neither Channel B or C shows any tendency to be leveling  !

off - i.e. the increase is approximately linear on the log scale.

Consequently, the data indicate.the reactor Eas critical and on a 100-120 sec. period. (The calculation of eigenvalue on the SIMULATE

( model predicts criticality with a period approximately one-third of this.)

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July 5, 1985

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