ML20237K316

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Discusses 850731 Interview of M Parker,Nrc Resident Inspector,Re Util Notification of 850702 Reactor Operator Error at Plant
ML20237K316
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/19/1987
From: Kalkman J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
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NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20237J518 List:
References
FOIA-86-245 NUDOCS 8708270138
Download: ML20237K316 (2)


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      ....8                                 GL EL       LL    IS 137 REPORT OF INTERVIEW Interviewee                                          Location                                     4 Michael Parker                                       Femi 2 Nuclear Power Station On July 31, 1985, at approximately 1:00 p.m., I interviewed Michael Parker, NRC Resident Inspector at Femi 2 relating to events ' surrounding Detroit Edison Company's (DECO) notification of NRC (Parker) of _a reactor operator error which occurred on July 2,1985.          Parker stated that on July 3,1985, sometime after noon, he was asked to attend a meeting with Gregg Overbeck and Gene Preston regarding an operator error. Parker was advised that on the night control room operatic 7s shift of July 1,1985, the reactor operator pulled eleven (11) Group 3 control rods from 00-48 rather than from 00-04 as required by the rod pull sheets, which resulted in the operator error.

Parker was advised that the reactor had not reached a critical state based on the SRM charts, which was the DECO Corporate position at that time; however, there was some question in the Deco reactor engineering group as to whether the reactor was in fact critical. Overbeck indicated that he thought there was too much error in the reactor engineering analysis and believed that his operations personnel were correct in their assessment of non-criticality. Overbeck related that DECO would continue to analyze the ottt of sequence rod pull error relative to criticality and that Parker would be notified or advised of the final results of the review. j Parker perceived the significant issue to be the out of sequence rod pull, basing that emphasis on the briefing by Overbeck and Preston. He was given a copy of a DER which documented the rod pull error and identified several , corrective actions. The DER also stated that the reactor did not go critical.  ! Subsequently, on July 3,1985, Parker notified NRC Region III Nick Chrissotimos 1 of the rod pull error and of the fact that DECO stated the reactor had not gone critical. Parker did recall meeting Hari Arora in the Femi 2 lunch room on July 5, 1985. Arora indicated that Reactor Engineering and Operations were meeting that af ternoon to discuss the operator error incident. Arora did not state < that a final decision on criticality had been reached. Parker assumed the l l meeting was to again discuss the analysis of the event. He did not perceive ' a need to attend that meeting since he assumed DECO would notify him if the ' Corporate position on criticality had changed. Parker advised that on July 8-10, 1985, either he or NRC Inspector Craig Jones ! were present at the DECO morning staff meetings where Lenart, Overbeck, or I- Preston were present; however, the operator error or criticality were not i discussed with them, i J

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[' Parker did recall working with Mr. Agusti, Deco Director of Nuclear. Operations on the SAFETEAM review. Parker mentioned.the out of sequence rod pull error and was surprised to find that Agusti apparently had not been advised of that incident.

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                                                      /ames N. Kalkman, Investigator Office of Investigations                  '!

Field Office, Region III

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